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Welcome to the Azure Security Podcast,

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where we discuss topics relating to security, privacy,

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reliability, and compliance on the Microsoft Cloud Platform.

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Hey, everybody. Welcome to Episode 49.

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This week is just myself, Michael and Gladys.

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Sarah and Mark are taking some time off for spring break.

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We also have a guest this week.

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We have Jason Zahn,

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who's here to talk to us about risk IQ.

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But before we get to Jason,

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let's take a little lap around the news.

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Gladys, why don't you kick things off?

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Well, I want to talk a little bit about risk detections

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before I mention my news related to this topic.

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As you may be aware,

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Azure AD Identity Protection identifies

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suspicious actions related to user accounts.

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Risk can be detected at the user or signing level and can happen

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at real time or offline.

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For example, leak credentials may be found in the dark web,

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and compare against the Azure AD user current credentials.

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If they are found too much,

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the account is marked risky,

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which then triggers a set of remediation activity.

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Well, Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps,

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formally MCAS, has added two new detections in

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the identity protection area.

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This shows the cross collaboration

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that we have between services.

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The first detection is called

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mass access to sensitive files,

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which profiles your environment and triggers alerts when

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users access multiple files from Microsoft SharePoint,

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Microsoft OneDrive.

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For example, an alert is triggered only if the number

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of access file is uncommon for the user and files,

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which may contain sensitive information.

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This may be helpful,

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especially when having ransomware attacks or

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an attacker trying to ex-filtrate data out of the environment.

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The other detection is on

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usual additions of credential to

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auth app which detects suspicious service principal activity.

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Again, this is trying to detect whether an attacker or

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a malicious attempt has been

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done to change a service principal and run

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behind an application without being noticed.

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The next set of news that I want to talk about is sensitive labels.

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For those that are not familiar with these,

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sensitive labels is a way to tag information and allow

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a customer to require different configuration,

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depending on the tag provided to a file.

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For example, the customer may decide that the file must be encrypted,

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and only internal employees can access it,

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or maybe they may select a way for

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external users to access it,

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but it must be stored in a particular location.

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Well, before sensitive labels was incorporated within Office 365

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for Microsoft 365,

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it was a separate service called Azure Information Protection.

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Because Microsoft has deprecated

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Azure Information Protection and no new customers can get it,

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there's new guidance about how to,

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and why would you want to use

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the sensitive labels that are part of

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the Microsoft Information Protection Strategy

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over the Azure Information Protection.

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Also, there are new settings for auto-labeling policies,

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and if you're not familiar with auto-labeling,

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basically, this is a functionality that can auto-mark

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a file depending on content found,

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a social profanity,

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whether it finds the word resume or health-related information,

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or others in a file.

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So a few things took my interest the last couple of weeks.

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The first is that Azure Private Links are now

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supported as your API management.

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Now, some of you may say,

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well, hang on, didn't API management already have that?

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Well, the answer is, kind of yes.

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It was only the developer and the premium tiers.

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Well, now it's available in developer basic standard and premium.

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This is fantastic because it allows you to essentially have

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API management just listening on a private network.

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The next one is,

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Azure Monitor Agent now supports Private Links,

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and that is now generally available.

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So we talked about this a few weeks ago on the podcast,

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but that feature is now generally available.

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So now you can have front-ends to Azure Monitor,

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running on a private network so that way that data isn't exposed.

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I mean, in theory, that data shouldn't be exposed anyway,

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because it could be aggregate,

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but some people like to make sure that data is kept on a private network.

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The third one isn't really news at all.

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It's really just a consequence of

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some events that happened over the last few weeks.

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I've been working with a customer over the last few weeks on Secure Score.

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In other words, how to take the current environment

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and their current Secure Score, look at the recommendations,

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come up with a plan for essentially

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remediating some of those recommendations so that Secure Score can go up.

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Now, I've said this a few times,

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but I'll say it again,

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I'm not a fan of just raising Secure Score just for the sake of raising Secure Score.

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I think you've really got to focus on

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the actual things you're really mitigating and are they worth it?

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A lot of them are worth it, don't get me wrong,

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but some security mitigations carry a much heavier weight

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than other ones, so are you mitigating the right things?

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Now, with that said,

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one thing we found is that overnight,

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there are Secure Score dropped.

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Now, don't get me wrong,

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it's expected as you're making changes and you're moving new resources in,

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and perhaps you don't have as your policies in place to deny certain settings and so on.

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The Secure Score is going to go up and down.

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That's just perfectly natural.

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I mean, the trend over time should be upward,

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but don't get too caught up in the day-to-day pendulum swings.

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Well, one day it dropped a lot,

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and the reason was because some items that were in preview,

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some checks are in preview,

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became generally available and we hadn't mitigated those.

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So, the Secure Score took a hit.

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So, the next question was,

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well, how do we know when these things that are in preview,

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these checks that are in preview,

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when are they going to be available?

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Because that way we can work out which things we need to work on as soon as possible.

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So, I emailed Eurydiauginus and Eury sent me a link back

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of basically the calendar for upcoming recommendations and when they will go GA.

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So, I will provide a link for that in the show notes.

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I think that's a critically important resource.

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It's not just what things are changing,

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it's also what things are coming up.

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So, make sure you take a look at that.

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All right. So, now that we've got the news out of the way,

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let's turn our attention to our guest.

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This week we have Jason Zan,

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who's here to talk to us about Risk IQ.

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Jason, hey, thank you so much for joining us this week.

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We'd like to take a moment and introduce yourself to our listeners.

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Thank you very much, Michael.

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Thank you for giving me the opportunity here today.

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So, my name is Jason Zan.

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I came into the Microsoft family via Risk IQ,

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which was an acquisition that was made by Microsoft probably,

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I want to say it was August of 2021.

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So, it's been about six months now that we've been on board.

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We've had a partnership with Microsoft on a number of

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different levels over the past several years.

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And this just seems to be like a natural step

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that's kind of moving forward here.

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Risk IQ, for those of you that may not know,

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we've developed a technology probably about 10 years ago

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to be able to understand and organize the internet at scale.

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And the real value that we bring to the table

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is the capability of being able to understand

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what an organization looks like from the outside looking in.

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And subsequent to that,

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we also have a very powerful threat hunting

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and threat intelligence platform

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that actually looks at an adversaries organization

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and basically the infrastructure that they're using

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to be able to leverage to do unwanted things

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across the internet.

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What is the vision that Risk IQ had

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to help with all the security out there in the internet?

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Yeah, that's a very fun question.

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It's actually got a very deep history

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within Risk IQ's ethos.

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Way back in the early days when the company was starting,

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we kind of took a step back and we said,

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what's really a mission statement that we can use

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to be able to kind of project a vision,

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something that we can always kind of strive after?

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And we came down to a very simple statement

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saying make the internet a safer place.

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And we realized that that was a very lofty

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and very a very multi-dimensional problem

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set to be able to solve for.

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And as we started analyzing it, we said,

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well, what is the biggest problem

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that's actually keeping the internet

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from being a safer place?

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The way that we looked at it was

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there just wasn't enough good guys in the game, right?

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And so if you, like when we looked at our capabilities

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as we started to come to market,

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as we started working with customers,

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the real question was how do we take the complexities

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and nuances of the internet and all of its forms

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as it's been manifested over time

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and actually make it more accessible

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so that more people can get in the fight essentially.

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And so if you look at the traditional models

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that have been available over time,

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you can either, number one, take very junior level analysts

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and have them do extremely senior level internet

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correlations by training them in terms of how

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the plumbing of the internet works,

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with the artifacts of the internet work,

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how they work in relationship to each other, et cetera.

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That's a lot of what we baked into our technology

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was the capability of taking those complexities

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and boiling it down and placing it into products,

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placing it into other capabilities

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and other security investments that organizations

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have already made.

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And the second piece of that is very senior level operators

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that are in threat intelligence

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or in network defender type of scenarios,

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giving them the capability of doing very consistent work.

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A lot of the challenges that needing to take,

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needing to look at the internet requires,

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usually multiple different sources of data,

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multiple different capabilities,

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and then some system or capability

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to be able to bring all of this together.

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And what we aimed for was to be able to create

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a basically centralized repository

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and a single pane of glass to be able to operate

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at these internet scale problems.

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Security as a whole has always been really interesting to me

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because unlike any engineering discipline,

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it's not really a problem that you solve,

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it's a game that you play.

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And if you think about traditional engineering disciplines,

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even in the physical world,

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if you're gonna build a bridge,

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it's like you have a train,

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you have maybe a river that you wanna be able to cross,

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you take some measurements,

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you get some concrete, some sticks,

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and you put it together and you make a bridge.

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And if you can imagine,

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there's a steep learning curve at the beginning

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in terms of a steep work curve at the beginning

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in terms of being able to actually design

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an architect a bridge, and then it kind of drops off, right?

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You have to maintain the bridge,

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maybe you have to like fix some potholes

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or put some different signs on it over the course of time.

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But if you think about that in the world of cybersecurity,

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it's, there's actually an adversary

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on the other side of the equation.

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So for every motion that you make,

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there's almost like a counter motion

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that is made to be able to circumvent.

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And those are one of the things

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that really kind of got me excited

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very much my early days of working in cyber.

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But when you start working at that at an internet scale,

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it poses a whole different set of challenges

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because the internet's constantly in flux,

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it's constantly moving.

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So the ability to be able to kind of take those premises

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and be able to make them more accessible to more people

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more often has been a large charter of us.

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And it's been a lot of fun like kind of going down this path.

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So one of the things that I keep putting emphasis

263
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when presenting my news is the value

264
00:12:37,880 --> 00:12:40,480
that cross service collaboration provide

265
00:12:40,480 --> 00:12:43,280
to help automate activity required

266
00:12:43,280 --> 00:12:46,960
to protect, detect, respond and recover.

267
00:12:46,960 --> 00:12:49,880
So what are the integrations your team is doing

268
00:12:49,880 --> 00:12:53,080
as you get more incorporated into the stack?

269
00:12:53,080 --> 00:12:55,080
Yeah, so that's a very good question.

270
00:12:55,080 --> 00:12:58,080
I mean, I think cybersecurity has largely been challenged

271
00:12:58,080 --> 00:13:00,160
with this since its inception.

272
00:13:00,160 --> 00:13:02,080
If you look at entire industries,

273
00:13:02,080 --> 00:13:04,320
like for example, the SOAR industry

274
00:13:04,320 --> 00:13:06,880
that popped up within cybersecurity,

275
00:13:06,880 --> 00:13:10,880
it was actually like designed to be able to arbitrage

276
00:13:10,880 --> 00:13:13,880
a deficiency that existed within security products

277
00:13:13,880 --> 00:13:16,080
and being able to have them work together.

278
00:13:16,080 --> 00:13:18,360
And if you think about this,

279
00:13:18,360 --> 00:13:22,120
if you think about this problem set inside the firewall,

280
00:13:22,120 --> 00:13:25,280
you have endpoints or maybe network devices,

281
00:13:25,280 --> 00:13:29,720
you have different systems and operating systems

282
00:13:29,720 --> 00:13:33,160
and capabilities and so forth that are built up

283
00:13:33,160 --> 00:13:35,000
and it's often very difficult

284
00:13:35,000 --> 00:13:37,200
to be able to reconcile all of that.

285
00:13:37,200 --> 00:13:40,680
If you take that conversation and move it out to the internet,

286
00:13:40,680 --> 00:13:42,160
one of the advantages of the internet

287
00:13:42,160 --> 00:13:43,760
is the same internet for everybody.

288
00:13:43,760 --> 00:13:46,480
Good guys, bad guys, partners, employees,

289
00:13:46,480 --> 00:13:51,480
they're all kind of operating around the same first principles

290
00:13:51,480 --> 00:13:55,880
of how connectivity and exposure on the internet works.

291
00:13:55,880 --> 00:13:59,280
And so as we started to look at it from a macro perspective,

292
00:13:59,280 --> 00:14:02,280
there's really kind of three general sources of data

293
00:14:02,280 --> 00:14:03,120
that you're working with.

294
00:14:03,120 --> 00:14:06,280
You have internal data, so you can think of like Syslog,

295
00:14:06,280 --> 00:14:09,160
Barlog, different logs that are coming off

296
00:14:09,160 --> 00:14:11,280
of various systems that you have internally.

297
00:14:11,280 --> 00:14:13,040
And then on the other side of the equation,

298
00:14:13,040 --> 00:14:16,160
you have this deep, dark, spooky web,

299
00:14:16,160 --> 00:14:18,040
whatever we're calling it this week.

300
00:14:18,040 --> 00:14:20,920
And then kind of in the middle of all of that is the internet.

301
00:14:20,920 --> 00:14:23,520
And that is what we primarily focused on

302
00:14:23,520 --> 00:14:25,720
is not only the ability to be able to collect

303
00:14:25,720 --> 00:14:28,480
and organize internet-scale data,

304
00:14:28,480 --> 00:14:31,480
but actually be able to unlock it

305
00:14:31,480 --> 00:14:33,600
inside of an organization.

306
00:14:33,600 --> 00:14:37,240
So if you can imagine that the internet

307
00:14:37,240 --> 00:14:40,360
for many organizations has become an extension of their network.

308
00:14:40,360 --> 00:14:42,000
It's an extension of the data center,

309
00:14:42,000 --> 00:14:47,000
how employees work, how customers interact, et cetera.

310
00:14:47,160 --> 00:14:50,400
And the decision calculus that is actually required

311
00:14:50,400 --> 00:14:55,240
to be able to effectively manage an internal network

312
00:14:55,240 --> 00:14:58,520
is largely predicated on being able to infuse

313
00:14:58,520 --> 00:15:01,280
or basically harness the knowledge of the internet

314
00:15:01,280 --> 00:15:03,120
at any particular point in time

315
00:15:03,120 --> 00:15:05,600
in order to make a lot of these decisions.

316
00:15:05,600 --> 00:15:07,920
So the integration paths that we worked on

317
00:15:07,920 --> 00:15:11,040
were largely based around being able to create

318
00:15:11,040 --> 00:15:15,040
one plus one equals three type of scenarios.

319
00:15:15,040 --> 00:15:16,960
So for us, it was very, very important

320
00:15:16,960 --> 00:15:22,040
not just to integrate into or just throw data back and forth

321
00:15:22,040 --> 00:15:24,960
with a particular partner and put each other's logos

322
00:15:24,960 --> 00:15:26,360
on each other's websites,

323
00:15:26,360 --> 00:15:29,080
but actually peeling that onion back and saying,

324
00:15:29,080 --> 00:15:32,520
what's the problem that we're actually trying to solve?

325
00:15:32,520 --> 00:15:35,720
I think one of our most critical integrations

326
00:15:35,720 --> 00:15:39,720
that we started, I guess it was a couple of years ago now,

327
00:15:39,720 --> 00:15:42,640
but continue to reinforce is like, for example,

328
00:15:42,640 --> 00:15:45,160
our integration to Defender or even Sentinel.

329
00:15:45,160 --> 00:15:47,720
If you look at Sentinel, for example,

330
00:15:47,720 --> 00:15:52,720
you could have an incident that comes into your sock.

331
00:15:53,360 --> 00:15:56,040
And then if any incident, any part of that incident

332
00:15:56,040 --> 00:15:58,080
has an intersection point or a nexus

333
00:15:58,080 --> 00:16:00,880
that actually exists on the internet,

334
00:16:00,880 --> 00:16:03,000
the playbooks in the background actually go out

335
00:16:03,000 --> 00:16:07,080
and not only decorate that incident with internet data

336
00:16:07,080 --> 00:16:09,560
and the historical aspects and so forth,

337
00:16:09,560 --> 00:16:13,400
but also brings in what we call observables,

338
00:16:13,400 --> 00:16:16,160
which means what's happening with this domain name,

339
00:16:16,160 --> 00:16:19,280
this IP address, this certificate, et cetera,

340
00:16:19,280 --> 00:16:22,080
that's actually placed inside of that incident.

341
00:16:22,080 --> 00:16:25,360
And if in fact it's currently being observed to,

342
00:16:25,360 --> 00:16:27,960
for example, being relaying malware,

343
00:16:27,960 --> 00:16:31,640
in the background, the playbook will actually promote

344
00:16:31,640 --> 00:16:35,640
from maybe a medium flagged incident

345
00:16:35,640 --> 00:16:38,360
into being maybe a high level incident.

346
00:16:38,360 --> 00:16:41,480
And then when you think of the actual sock analyst,

347
00:16:41,480 --> 00:16:44,080
whoever actually opens that incident,

348
00:16:44,080 --> 00:16:45,680
there's usually one of two things

349
00:16:45,680 --> 00:16:47,400
that they traditionally end up doing.

350
00:16:47,400 --> 00:16:50,760
Number one, that they wanna know as much information

351
00:16:50,760 --> 00:16:53,480
as they can get about that particular incident,

352
00:16:53,480 --> 00:16:56,040
which that is what the purpose of the playbook is,

353
00:16:56,040 --> 00:16:59,400
is to be able to keep the analyst from having to alt tab

354
00:16:59,400 --> 00:17:02,360
to another system or maybe even multiple systems

355
00:17:02,360 --> 00:17:04,720
or be able to cross reference it with multiple systems

356
00:17:04,720 --> 00:17:08,120
where all of that information is really at their fingertips

357
00:17:08,120 --> 00:17:10,320
and really in their field of view

358
00:17:10,320 --> 00:17:13,920
when they're making a decision about triaging an incident

359
00:17:13,920 --> 00:17:18,280
or suppressing it or maybe creating an internal ticket.

360
00:17:18,280 --> 00:17:21,360
The second thing that normally comes off

361
00:17:21,360 --> 00:17:24,800
of a well-decorated incident is you might,

362
00:17:24,800 --> 00:17:27,720
instead of having a sock analyst that's trying to triage it,

363
00:17:27,720 --> 00:17:29,040
you may have a threat hunter

364
00:17:29,040 --> 00:17:31,240
that wants to go investigate it further.

365
00:17:31,240 --> 00:17:33,560
Maybe they wanna understand, am I a targeted chance

366
00:17:33,560 --> 00:17:34,920
or a targeted choice?

367
00:17:34,920 --> 00:17:37,520
Is this something that's rather prolific across the internet

368
00:17:37,520 --> 00:17:39,520
or is this a singular incident?

369
00:17:39,520 --> 00:17:43,320
And so the capability of being able to systematically

370
00:17:43,320 --> 00:17:44,960
go directly from that alert,

371
00:17:44,960 --> 00:17:49,000
directly into the depths of the internet research

372
00:17:49,000 --> 00:17:52,880
and kind of what the internet has to say about that information

373
00:17:52,880 --> 00:17:57,880
or that particular incident becomes a very fluid transition

374
00:17:58,560 --> 00:18:00,760
for whoever's working.

375
00:18:00,760 --> 00:18:04,240
Hey Jason, you said whether someone has a target of choice.

376
00:18:04,240 --> 00:18:05,360
Could you explain what you,

377
00:18:05,360 --> 00:18:07,200
and you had some other stuff in there?

378
00:18:07,200 --> 00:18:09,160
Target of chance or targeted choice?

379
00:18:09,160 --> 00:18:11,240
Yeah, can you just explain that a little bit?

380
00:18:11,240 --> 00:18:12,440
That sort of piqued my interest.

381
00:18:12,440 --> 00:18:15,760
Yeah, so one thing that we've found,

382
00:18:15,760 --> 00:18:20,000
and you see this replicated with a whole kind of classes

383
00:18:20,000 --> 00:18:24,080
of incidents that we've seen across the internet.

384
00:18:24,080 --> 00:18:29,080
So a target of chance is I'm gonna create a piece of malware

385
00:18:29,120 --> 00:18:31,840
or I'm going to look for a particular vulnerability

386
00:18:31,840 --> 00:18:34,640
and I'm just gonna mass exploit it across the internet.

387
00:18:34,640 --> 00:18:38,840
I don't care like who you are in terms of industry vertical.

388
00:18:38,840 --> 00:18:41,440
I don't care in terms of who you are

389
00:18:41,440 --> 00:18:43,040
in terms of sophistication.

390
00:18:43,040 --> 00:18:45,280
If you have this particular exposure

391
00:18:45,280 --> 00:18:47,320
and if I do have access to it,

392
00:18:47,320 --> 00:18:51,920
I will subsequently go ahead and compromise

393
00:18:51,920 --> 00:18:53,960
or at least interrogate that particular target

394
00:18:53,960 --> 00:18:56,920
for the purposes of being able to understand

395
00:18:56,920 --> 00:18:59,000
if I have a second or third order event

396
00:18:59,000 --> 00:19:00,880
that I can place on top of it.

397
00:19:00,880 --> 00:19:04,360
A target of choice is the bad guy's not gonna go away.

398
00:19:04,360 --> 00:19:05,880
They're gonna go another way.

399
00:19:05,880 --> 00:19:09,000
For whatever reason, you either have PII

400
00:19:09,000 --> 00:19:10,720
that has a specific interest to them

401
00:19:10,720 --> 00:19:14,240
or you have a political leaning as an organization

402
00:19:14,240 --> 00:19:18,840
that is of specific distaste for a set of bad actors.

403
00:19:18,840 --> 00:19:23,840
And you can look at even the bad actor cases of e-crime.

404
00:19:23,840 --> 00:19:26,080
You could look at in a nation state lens.

405
00:19:26,080 --> 00:19:28,480
You could look at in a hacktivism lens.

406
00:19:28,480 --> 00:19:31,000
You could look at people that are just like basically

407
00:19:31,000 --> 00:19:33,120
just out to cause problems.

408
00:19:33,120 --> 00:19:37,920
And we just take one of those, for example, like e-crime.

409
00:19:37,920 --> 00:19:41,680
It kind of goes back to that old Willie Sutton explanation

410
00:19:41,680 --> 00:19:43,920
when he got arrested and people were asking,

411
00:19:43,920 --> 00:19:46,800
like, why are you always trying to break into banks?

412
00:19:46,800 --> 00:19:48,720
And he's like, because that's where the money is.

413
00:19:48,720 --> 00:19:50,360
So when you look at that paradigm

414
00:19:50,360 --> 00:19:53,480
of target a chance versus target a choice,

415
00:19:53,480 --> 00:19:55,680
I think it's pretty safe to say that

416
00:19:55,680 --> 00:19:57,880
a bullet can kill you regardless.

417
00:19:57,880 --> 00:19:59,400
But you as an organization,

418
00:19:59,400 --> 00:20:01,760
understanding if that bullet's being fired from a sniper

419
00:20:01,760 --> 00:20:06,000
or if it's just a random projectile

420
00:20:06,000 --> 00:20:07,800
that's thrown out from a drive-by,

421
00:20:07,800 --> 00:20:11,760
those are two very different response characteristics

422
00:20:11,760 --> 00:20:14,200
that you probably would end up employing internally.

423
00:20:14,200 --> 00:20:18,080
So about a month ago, I was watching a webcast

424
00:20:18,080 --> 00:20:23,080
that the Sentinel team, Regina Kapoor and Brandon Dixon

425
00:20:23,320 --> 00:20:26,240
from your team were presenting as part

426
00:20:26,240 --> 00:20:29,480
of the Microsoft security community.

427
00:20:29,480 --> 00:20:32,160
They were explaining how to ingest

428
00:20:32,160 --> 00:20:33,800
the threat intelligence data

429
00:20:33,800 --> 00:20:37,240
or all this information that you're talking about, right?

430
00:20:38,200 --> 00:20:41,160
This has become really important because

431
00:20:41,160 --> 00:20:45,520
there have been several executive office mandates

432
00:20:45,520 --> 00:20:48,560
and guidance being put out there

433
00:20:48,560 --> 00:20:52,320
and a lot is talking about threat information.

434
00:20:52,320 --> 00:20:55,880
Can you talk a little bit about how do you come up

435
00:20:55,880 --> 00:20:58,240
with this threat information sharing?

436
00:20:58,240 --> 00:21:02,320
And I think you have a Section 52 team

437
00:21:02,320 --> 00:21:04,560
that is actually mistaking,

438
00:21:04,560 --> 00:21:08,600
that is helping sometimes with the information

439
00:21:08,600 --> 00:21:11,200
that you're putting, plus you have your own analysts

440
00:21:11,200 --> 00:21:15,240
or researchers that are putting this information.

441
00:21:15,240 --> 00:21:16,720
Yes, absolutely.

442
00:21:16,720 --> 00:21:21,480
So for Risk IQ, and this has pretty much been,

443
00:21:21,480 --> 00:21:23,520
since the beginning of us as an organization,

444
00:21:23,520 --> 00:21:26,960
we've largely been based around visibility

445
00:21:26,960 --> 00:21:31,600
in terms of being able to not necessarily focus

446
00:21:31,600 --> 00:21:35,520
as much on who's doing something, as much as where is it.

447
00:21:35,520 --> 00:21:37,960
So if you think about this in the context of,

448
00:21:37,960 --> 00:21:41,280
I was just going through a whole series of vulnerabilities,

449
00:21:41,280 --> 00:21:45,200
one in particular, with regards to OpenSSL yesterday.

450
00:21:45,200 --> 00:21:50,080
And it appears to be a pretty significant issue

451
00:21:50,080 --> 00:21:51,920
that will require a handful of patch,

452
00:21:51,920 --> 00:21:53,600
or quite a bit of patching,

453
00:21:53,600 --> 00:21:57,120
but the question is not necessarily whether or not

454
00:21:57,120 --> 00:22:00,920
that OpenSSL issue is bad.

455
00:22:00,920 --> 00:22:05,080
I think everybody can look at the information

456
00:22:05,080 --> 00:22:06,600
about the exploit itself and say

457
00:22:06,600 --> 00:22:09,640
that it's probably not good at a minimum.

458
00:22:09,640 --> 00:22:11,000
But the real question is,

459
00:22:11,000 --> 00:22:12,960
where is that within my environment?

460
00:22:12,960 --> 00:22:15,160
Where is that across my attack surface?

461
00:22:15,160 --> 00:22:17,800
In terms of what I'm responsible for on the internet

462
00:22:17,800 --> 00:22:19,960
as an organization,

463
00:22:19,960 --> 00:22:21,840
do I have any of these libraries

464
00:22:21,840 --> 00:22:23,720
that are natively incorporated?

465
00:22:23,720 --> 00:22:26,480
Then you can take the kind of second tertiary conversations

466
00:22:26,480 --> 00:22:27,880
with that of saying like,

467
00:22:27,880 --> 00:22:32,040
I may have 10 or 100 or 1,000 critical vendors.

468
00:22:32,040 --> 00:22:35,080
And I've leveraged different parts

469
00:22:35,080 --> 00:22:37,480
of the digital footprint or the attack surfaces

470
00:22:37,480 --> 00:22:39,400
of these different vendors.

471
00:22:39,400 --> 00:22:43,520
So which one of those actually have this SSL vulnerability

472
00:22:43,520 --> 00:22:44,760
put inside of it?

473
00:22:44,760 --> 00:22:46,520
So that visibility component,

474
00:22:46,520 --> 00:22:49,680
and probably the easiest way to think about it,

475
00:22:49,680 --> 00:22:51,160
in the world of threat intelligence,

476
00:22:51,160 --> 00:22:53,720
there's really kind of two flavors

477
00:22:53,720 --> 00:22:56,040
of threat intelligence that are out there.

478
00:22:56,040 --> 00:22:58,600
And I generally put them into the Doppler radar

479
00:22:58,600 --> 00:23:00,600
versus the meteorologist.

480
00:23:00,600 --> 00:23:03,440
And a meteorologist says,

481
00:23:03,440 --> 00:23:05,080
you should bring an umbrella tomorrow.

482
00:23:05,080 --> 00:23:06,800
It's gonna be bad,

483
00:23:06,800 --> 00:23:10,360
or it might rain in the afternoon.

484
00:23:10,360 --> 00:23:12,720
Where a Doppler radar actually says,

485
00:23:12,720 --> 00:23:15,960
over the course of the next 24 hours,

486
00:23:15,960 --> 00:23:17,520
this is what the precipitation will be.

487
00:23:17,520 --> 00:23:20,840
This is the confidence that's associated with it.

488
00:23:20,840 --> 00:23:23,920
This is the empirical data that actually presents that.

489
00:23:23,920 --> 00:23:27,240
And that's a lot of what risk IQ has,

490
00:23:27,240 --> 00:23:28,320
what our focus is,

491
00:23:28,320 --> 00:23:31,440
is really the quality of internet data

492
00:23:31,440 --> 00:23:34,880
and being able to surface that at the point in time

493
00:23:34,880 --> 00:23:36,760
that it's actually needed in order to be able

494
00:23:36,760 --> 00:23:39,960
to make a decision.

495
00:23:39,960 --> 00:23:43,440
So when you think about like,

496
00:23:43,440 --> 00:23:46,000
how that data actually comes into play,

497
00:23:46,000 --> 00:23:48,320
it really has to do with the core underpinnings

498
00:23:48,320 --> 00:23:49,440
of our system.

499
00:23:49,440 --> 00:23:53,120
Because we control all of our collections infrastructure.

500
00:23:53,120 --> 00:23:55,680
We control the entire analysis layer.

501
00:23:55,680 --> 00:23:58,920
This isn't leveraged based on partnerships and so forth.

502
00:23:58,920 --> 00:24:02,320
This is just raw telemetry of what the internet looks like.

503
00:24:02,320 --> 00:24:06,840
And through a series of products as well as APIs,

504
00:24:06,840 --> 00:24:08,240
the way we go to market, et cetera,

505
00:24:08,240 --> 00:24:11,800
those are exposed then to customers.

506
00:24:11,800 --> 00:24:15,960
And so when you think about the integrations that are,

507
00:24:15,960 --> 00:24:19,200
I'm sorry, the way that that visibility ends up working,

508
00:24:19,200 --> 00:24:23,440
it provides a very unique vantage point to risk IQ

509
00:24:23,440 --> 00:24:25,200
as well as our customers.

510
00:24:25,200 --> 00:24:28,160
And if you look across our customer base,

511
00:24:28,160 --> 00:24:31,120
we have a number like in the tens,

512
00:24:31,120 --> 00:24:35,080
like the high tens of global cybersecurity organizations.

513
00:24:35,080 --> 00:24:36,440
And you'll notice like,

514
00:24:36,440 --> 00:24:39,080
they will write research papers and say,

515
00:24:39,080 --> 00:24:40,280
here's a bad guy,

516
00:24:40,280 --> 00:24:41,680
here's why he's picking on you,

517
00:24:41,680 --> 00:24:43,040
here's an example,

518
00:24:43,040 --> 00:24:45,200
here's every place else on the internet

519
00:24:45,200 --> 00:24:47,880
that this exact thing is happening, that's normally us.

520
00:24:47,880 --> 00:24:50,440
And then normally they close out with

521
00:24:50,440 --> 00:24:51,720
buying more of their products

522
00:24:51,720 --> 00:24:53,800
or configuring it differently for the purposes

523
00:24:53,800 --> 00:24:58,800
of being able to maybe respond to a particular threat

524
00:24:58,840 --> 00:25:00,680
or an unwanted event.

525
00:25:00,680 --> 00:25:03,520
Well, that visibility,

526
00:25:03,520 --> 00:25:07,160
that capability of being able to take a singular thread

527
00:25:07,160 --> 00:25:08,000
on a sweater,

528
00:25:08,000 --> 00:25:11,040
and if you will pull an unravel it and be able to see it,

529
00:25:11,040 --> 00:25:14,920
is something that is not very common,

530
00:25:14,920 --> 00:25:17,800
if at all within the cybersecurity

531
00:25:17,800 --> 00:25:18,800
industry.

532
00:25:18,800 --> 00:25:22,320
So when we have within risk IQ,

533
00:25:22,320 --> 00:25:23,360
prior to the acquisition,

534
00:25:23,360 --> 00:25:25,920
it's just been bolstered quite a bit more

535
00:25:25,920 --> 00:25:28,600
with the acquisition by Microsoft.

536
00:25:28,600 --> 00:25:32,280
We have a tier one threat intelligence team

537
00:25:32,280 --> 00:25:36,160
that is constantly looking for bad actors,

538
00:25:36,160 --> 00:25:38,280
bad infrastructure, bad associations,

539
00:25:38,280 --> 00:25:40,240
et cetera, across the internet.

540
00:25:40,240 --> 00:25:44,280
And normally the original piece,

541
00:25:44,280 --> 00:25:47,280
the original thread that's pulled, if you will,

542
00:25:47,280 --> 00:25:49,640
is actually directly related to

543
00:25:49,640 --> 00:25:52,640
a specific observed event that occurred.

544
00:25:52,640 --> 00:25:56,000
And then once you find that piece of infrastructure,

545
00:25:56,000 --> 00:25:58,760
the capability of being able to expand the aperture

546
00:25:58,760 --> 00:26:02,000
and say, okay, this isn't just one of one,

547
00:26:02,000 --> 00:26:04,440
this is one of a hundred different things

548
00:26:04,440 --> 00:26:07,480
that are happening exactly like this across the internet,

549
00:26:07,480 --> 00:26:09,720
so that when you're making a decision of alerting,

550
00:26:09,720 --> 00:26:11,800
when you're making a decision about blocking,

551
00:26:11,800 --> 00:26:13,800
you're actually doing it with the confidence

552
00:26:13,800 --> 00:26:16,720
of what the internet as a whole looks like,

553
00:26:16,720 --> 00:26:18,880
not just what a singular event is.

554
00:26:18,880 --> 00:26:19,880
Does that make sense?

555
00:26:19,880 --> 00:26:21,760
It does, actually.

556
00:26:21,760 --> 00:26:24,960
This is something that I've been talking recently,

557
00:26:24,960 --> 00:26:27,400
especially about data quality,

558
00:26:27,400 --> 00:26:31,320
because there's many vendors and many talks out there

559
00:26:31,320 --> 00:26:35,040
of how to increase the amount of thread intelligence

560
00:26:35,040 --> 00:26:36,120
that is shared.

561
00:26:36,120 --> 00:26:40,680
And sometimes I am concerned about the noise

562
00:26:40,680 --> 00:26:43,600
that it will be introduced if the people

563
00:26:43,600 --> 00:26:47,640
do not have the expertise to share quality data

564
00:26:47,640 --> 00:26:49,520
to the rest of the community,

565
00:26:49,520 --> 00:26:52,880
and how that data can be used

566
00:26:52,880 --> 00:26:56,400
across the security solutions.

567
00:26:56,400 --> 00:26:58,640
Yeah, that's actually a very good point, Glydez,

568
00:26:58,640 --> 00:27:03,640
because imagine that you received a piece of intelligence,

569
00:27:04,840 --> 00:27:06,720
whether it could be sensitive source reporting,

570
00:27:06,720 --> 00:27:08,880
whether it could be from another system

571
00:27:08,880 --> 00:27:11,440
that you have inside of your environment,

572
00:27:11,440 --> 00:27:14,480
or if a peer of yours in the industry comes to you

573
00:27:14,480 --> 00:27:16,760
and says, here's a bad IP.

574
00:27:16,760 --> 00:27:19,200
Well, what does that mean?

575
00:27:19,200 --> 00:27:22,400
Is it always bad and it's just continuing to be bad?

576
00:27:22,400 --> 00:27:26,120
Is it bad, is it normally good and it's just bad right now?

577
00:27:26,120 --> 00:27:27,680
Is it from Russia?

578
00:27:27,680 --> 00:27:30,120
And right now, anything from Russia is bad.

579
00:27:30,120 --> 00:27:33,240
And then once you make that determination for today,

580
00:27:33,240 --> 00:27:36,080
what happens in an hour from now, or a day or a week?

581
00:27:36,080 --> 00:27:39,480
What does the entropy of that actually end up looking like?

582
00:27:39,480 --> 00:27:43,600
And so, you know, because, as I was mentioning earlier,

583
00:27:43,600 --> 00:27:46,640
because we own our own collections infrastructure,

584
00:27:46,640 --> 00:27:48,520
and this is a systems, assistance,

585
00:27:48,520 --> 00:27:51,200
petabytes of petabytes type of problem set

586
00:27:51,200 --> 00:27:53,720
that we're dealing with here,

587
00:27:53,720 --> 00:27:57,160
but because we own that entire collections infrastructure,

588
00:27:57,160 --> 00:27:59,120
we have the capability of being able to provide

589
00:27:59,120 --> 00:28:03,680
the providence of what that IP addresses in this example,

590
00:28:03,680 --> 00:28:06,320
the reputation of what that IP address is,

591
00:28:06,320 --> 00:28:09,600
that reputation over time, the history of it,

592
00:28:09,600 --> 00:28:11,800
like what else was it related to?

593
00:28:11,800 --> 00:28:14,280
And what that does is it surfaces

594
00:28:14,280 --> 00:28:17,160
all of that content in context.

595
00:28:17,160 --> 00:28:20,120
And when that context is actually directly related

596
00:28:20,120 --> 00:28:23,120
to a particular issue that you are attempting

597
00:28:23,120 --> 00:28:26,560
to triage right now, that becomes invaluable.

598
00:28:26,560 --> 00:28:27,960
If you think about it generally,

599
00:28:27,960 --> 00:28:30,680
just look at the amount of news and research

600
00:28:30,680 --> 00:28:33,400
and source reporting that is happening

601
00:28:33,400 --> 00:28:37,600
on literally a daily basis now across cybersecurity.

602
00:28:37,600 --> 00:28:39,240
And a lot of them are interesting,

603
00:28:39,240 --> 00:28:42,800
a lot of them, a lot of the information that comes off

604
00:28:42,800 --> 00:28:45,880
is actually, you know, quite battle tested

605
00:28:45,880 --> 00:28:47,760
and relevant and so forth.

606
00:28:47,760 --> 00:28:50,840
But the real question that you have is, so what?

607
00:28:50,840 --> 00:28:52,200
What does this mean to me?

608
00:28:52,200 --> 00:28:54,520
You know, that's good that these bad guys

609
00:28:54,520 --> 00:28:57,640
are using this infrastructure to attack these kinds of targets.

610
00:28:57,640 --> 00:28:59,400
I generally aligned to that target,

611
00:28:59,400 --> 00:29:01,760
but am I specifically aligned?

612
00:29:01,760 --> 00:29:06,760
And the ability to be able to tease that out in real time,

613
00:29:06,920 --> 00:29:11,080
the ability to be able to dynamically understand

614
00:29:11,080 --> 00:29:15,560
as your priorities change, as your security programs change,

615
00:29:15,560 --> 00:29:18,240
as threat adversaries change, you know,

616
00:29:18,240 --> 00:29:20,360
how that constantly relates to you.

617
00:29:20,360 --> 00:29:22,480
When I was doing a little bit of research on risk IQ,

618
00:29:22,480 --> 00:29:25,080
I noticed that there's actually a risk IQ connector

619
00:29:25,080 --> 00:29:27,920
for the power platform and for logic apps.

620
00:29:27,920 --> 00:29:29,040
Yes.

621
00:29:29,040 --> 00:29:31,400
Can you explain kind of where would somebody use,

622
00:29:31,400 --> 00:29:32,560
you know, that connector?

623
00:29:32,560 --> 00:29:36,240
Well, generally, the primary benefit

624
00:29:36,240 --> 00:29:39,640
of having these connectors is to being able to,

625
00:29:39,640 --> 00:29:43,240
to be able to ingest the specific components

626
00:29:43,240 --> 00:29:45,560
related to the internet that has to do

627
00:29:45,560 --> 00:29:47,800
with your particular business application.

628
00:29:47,800 --> 00:29:52,520
So prior to the acquisition, we were primarily,

629
00:29:52,520 --> 00:29:54,760
and we still are very, very heavily focused

630
00:29:54,760 --> 00:29:56,480
on the threat intelligence world

631
00:29:56,480 --> 00:30:01,160
and how to be able to provide internet scale data sets

632
00:30:01,160 --> 00:30:04,280
to provide a decision advantage.

633
00:30:04,280 --> 00:30:07,000
But if you think about it, the extensibility

634
00:30:07,000 --> 00:30:10,120
that goes beyond threat intelligence

635
00:30:10,120 --> 00:30:14,040
for internet scale data is almost infinite.

636
00:30:14,040 --> 00:30:18,520
If you imagine like yourself as a CIO versus a CISO,

637
00:30:18,520 --> 00:30:22,000
you may have a simple question of what technologies

638
00:30:22,000 --> 00:30:23,720
that you're leveraging.

639
00:30:23,720 --> 00:30:26,360
You may have like very firm understanding

640
00:30:26,360 --> 00:30:29,360
of the assets that you have within your organization,

641
00:30:29,360 --> 00:30:33,320
whether it's, you know, desktops or workstations

642
00:30:33,320 --> 00:30:38,080
or servers or licenses, bandwidth, rack space, et cetera.

643
00:30:38,080 --> 00:30:40,680
But what do you have in terms of a digital asset management

644
00:30:40,680 --> 00:30:41,480
system?

645
00:30:41,480 --> 00:30:43,560
Because if you think about the fundamental components

646
00:30:43,560 --> 00:30:47,120
of digital assets, they're different than what

647
00:30:47,120 --> 00:30:49,560
exists inside the firewall.

648
00:30:49,560 --> 00:30:52,720
In a very simple example, you could have one singular IP

649
00:30:52,720 --> 00:30:56,160
address that maybe has 100 websites behind it,

650
00:30:56,160 --> 00:31:00,280
or you could have 100 IP addresses that all go back

651
00:31:00,280 --> 00:31:01,840
to a singular website.

652
00:31:01,840 --> 00:31:04,200
And then once you go to a singular website,

653
00:31:04,200 --> 00:31:10,200
well, what CDNs are actually being used to transmit traffic

654
00:31:10,200 --> 00:31:14,160
basically across the internet to your organization?

655
00:31:14,160 --> 00:31:17,840
You could look at it in terms of CMSs or maybe third party

656
00:31:17,840 --> 00:31:22,960
components or widgets or different functionality that's

657
00:31:22,960 --> 00:31:27,040
pulled in from across the internet at runtime.

658
00:31:27,040 --> 00:31:31,360
And if you look at the charter of like CIOs, I mean,

659
00:31:31,360 --> 00:31:37,200
effectively, they get paid to do one very simple but very far

660
00:31:37,200 --> 00:31:37,880
reaching thing.

661
00:31:37,880 --> 00:31:40,240
And that's to take the blinking lights in the data center

662
00:31:40,240 --> 00:31:42,040
and tie it to earnings per share.

663
00:31:42,040 --> 00:31:44,600
And the reality is that those blinking lights in the data

664
00:31:44,600 --> 00:31:47,040
center are now becoming elements of the web

665
00:31:47,040 --> 00:31:50,040
or partially on the web or partially in the cloud

666
00:31:50,040 --> 00:31:52,800
and partially on the web or partially in your data center

667
00:31:52,800 --> 00:31:53,680
as well.

668
00:31:53,680 --> 00:31:59,280
So the way that that problem needs to be solved has changed.

669
00:31:59,280 --> 00:32:02,040
And so as a result of changing that,

670
00:32:02,040 --> 00:32:05,640
the capability of being able to take this level of data

671
00:32:05,640 --> 00:32:10,760
and being able to infuse it into other IT operations

672
00:32:10,760 --> 00:32:14,160
provides a very, very interesting future, I think,

673
00:32:14,160 --> 00:32:16,560
for Microsoft and RISC-IQ.

674
00:32:16,560 --> 00:32:19,840
Yeah, I think you basically just said that it sounds like I

675
00:32:19,840 --> 00:32:23,440
could consume one of these APIs, call out to RISC-IQ,

676
00:32:23,440 --> 00:32:25,600
and I could use the response that you give me.

677
00:32:25,600 --> 00:32:27,200
Let's just take a real simple example.

678
00:32:27,200 --> 00:32:29,360
Let's say someone connects to my logic app from some IP

679
00:32:29,360 --> 00:32:30,280
address.

680
00:32:30,280 --> 00:32:33,280
I could call the RISC-IQ stuff and give me all the information

681
00:32:33,280 --> 00:32:35,600
that I need to know about that IP address.

682
00:32:35,600 --> 00:32:37,640
So I could take the information about that IP address

683
00:32:37,640 --> 00:32:39,440
and then start to make decisions about whether I'm

684
00:32:39,440 --> 00:32:41,320
going to accept that connection, for example.

685
00:32:41,320 --> 00:32:42,480
Correct.

686
00:32:42,480 --> 00:32:47,000
And I think in your example there of making a decision,

687
00:32:47,000 --> 00:32:49,200
the capability of being able to do that

688
00:32:49,200 --> 00:32:51,880
on a case by case or a singular, like,

689
00:32:51,880 --> 00:32:55,920
does this work type of instance, but as well as being

690
00:32:55,920 --> 00:32:57,200
able to automate it.

691
00:32:57,200 --> 00:33:00,800
Because having the power of the internet basically

692
00:33:00,800 --> 00:33:04,120
harnessed into a singular collective data

693
00:33:04,120 --> 00:33:08,880
set with all the associated relationships packed onto it,

694
00:33:08,880 --> 00:33:12,800
there may be ways that that decision ends up

695
00:33:12,800 --> 00:33:18,000
maturing over time as you end up adding more or different types

696
00:33:18,000 --> 00:33:21,080
of data into the pipelines to be able to make that decision.

697
00:33:21,080 --> 00:33:23,160
So again, when I was looking at stuff about RISC-IQ,

698
00:33:23,160 --> 00:33:27,600
I noticed that RISC-IQ occupies a niche within the environment

699
00:33:27,600 --> 00:33:30,240
called Enterprise Attack Surface Management.

700
00:33:30,240 --> 00:33:32,400
It's interesting that I see the term Attack Surface in there,

701
00:33:32,400 --> 00:33:36,280
because I've used the term Attack Surface for a long time

702
00:33:36,280 --> 00:33:40,720
as has the industry to understand how exposed, for example,

703
00:33:40,720 --> 00:33:42,280
an operating system is.

704
00:33:42,280 --> 00:33:44,240
Like, if I have an operating system and it's got,

705
00:33:44,240 --> 00:33:46,760
I don't know, let's make up a number, 20 open ports,

706
00:33:46,760 --> 00:33:49,440
and seven of those ports are open to the internet,

707
00:33:49,440 --> 00:33:52,040
and although seven one is unauthenticated,

708
00:33:52,040 --> 00:33:55,680
then that particular port has a very high Attack Surface,

709
00:33:55,680 --> 00:33:58,640
because it's basically accessible to anybody on the internet.

710
00:33:58,640 --> 00:34:01,080
And one thing that we focus on a lot back in the early days

711
00:34:01,080 --> 00:34:05,840
of Windows, especially with the delta between Windows XP

712
00:34:05,840 --> 00:34:08,840
Service Pack 2 and Windows Vista was reducing the operating

713
00:34:08,840 --> 00:34:10,240
system to Attack Surface.

714
00:34:10,240 --> 00:34:13,160
In fact, a Microsoft Attack Surface analysis and Attack

715
00:34:13,160 --> 00:34:15,600
Surface reduction is a critical part

716
00:34:15,600 --> 00:34:16,760
of designing any system.

717
00:34:16,760 --> 00:34:19,120
It's a major part of the Microsoft Security Development

718
00:34:19,120 --> 00:34:19,880
Lifecycle.

719
00:34:19,880 --> 00:34:21,480
So it's really kind of interesting when

720
00:34:21,480 --> 00:34:24,480
I saw this term, Enterprise Attack Surface Management.

721
00:34:24,480 --> 00:34:26,040
Could you just give us the elevator

722
00:34:26,040 --> 00:34:29,440
pitch of what Enterprise Attack Surface Management actually

723
00:34:29,440 --> 00:34:30,240
is?

724
00:34:30,240 --> 00:34:35,160
The way to think about this is that the same elements

725
00:34:35,160 --> 00:34:38,120
that you described with regards to the attack

726
00:34:38,120 --> 00:34:41,640
surface of a particular desktop that had maybe ports

727
00:34:41,640 --> 00:34:43,920
and services that were open to the internet,

728
00:34:43,920 --> 00:34:47,120
that is now at a completely different level

729
00:34:47,120 --> 00:34:49,280
when you start talking about Enterprise Attack Surface

730
00:34:49,280 --> 00:34:53,120
Management from an industrial strength,

731
00:34:53,120 --> 00:34:55,760
kind of global organizational vantage point.

732
00:34:55,760 --> 00:34:58,960
And there's two primary differences that are nuanced,

733
00:34:58,960 --> 00:35:02,040
even though the underlying premise is still the same.

734
00:35:02,040 --> 00:35:04,120
First of all, the underlying premise being

735
00:35:04,120 --> 00:35:05,880
you can't protect what you don't know.

736
00:35:05,880 --> 00:35:07,400
So if you don't know something exists,

737
00:35:07,400 --> 00:35:09,360
if you don't know that a business unit went out

738
00:35:09,360 --> 00:35:13,280
and registered a website on a service provider

739
00:35:13,280 --> 00:35:16,560
and maybe put it up on a different cloud hosted provider

740
00:35:16,560 --> 00:35:21,320
and is offering some kind of services to customers,

741
00:35:21,320 --> 00:35:23,160
if something goes sideways with that,

742
00:35:23,160 --> 00:35:26,960
if something gets hacked within relationship to that,

743
00:35:26,960 --> 00:35:28,920
how do you even know where to start to respond?

744
00:35:31,480 --> 00:35:36,680
The way that this is manifested on the corporate side

745
00:35:36,680 --> 00:35:40,160
and basically on the enterprise or organizational sides,

746
00:35:40,160 --> 00:35:41,640
whether you're looking in governments

747
00:35:41,640 --> 00:35:46,400
or whether you're looking in a specific commercial entity

748
00:35:46,400 --> 00:35:48,640
is that everybody came on the internet

749
00:35:48,640 --> 00:35:50,240
a little bit differently.

750
00:35:50,240 --> 00:35:55,480
Some people started off day one with a web server

751
00:35:55,480 --> 00:35:57,680
and a firewall and got going from there.

752
00:35:57,680 --> 00:36:00,720
Some people immediately went to a co-location facility.

753
00:36:00,720 --> 00:36:04,360
Some people started to outsource it to third parties

754
00:36:04,360 --> 00:36:07,040
to be able to manage all aspects of it.

755
00:36:07,040 --> 00:36:08,440
And over the course of time,

756
00:36:08,440 --> 00:36:10,520
organizations have started to adopt

757
00:36:10,520 --> 00:36:13,240
and move from the inside to the outside

758
00:36:13,240 --> 00:36:16,640
or moving within their data center to cloud providers.

759
00:36:16,640 --> 00:36:20,320
Some have elected to go from co-location facilities

760
00:36:20,320 --> 00:36:23,240
into the cloud or maybe back into a data center.

761
00:36:23,240 --> 00:36:28,160
And the primary difference that starts to surface here

762
00:36:28,160 --> 00:36:30,240
is that if you look at the whole reason

763
00:36:30,240 --> 00:36:32,320
that you have a website to begin with,

764
00:36:32,320 --> 00:36:35,800
it's actually not for the host organization.

765
00:36:35,800 --> 00:36:38,040
It's to be able to service your customers.

766
00:36:38,040 --> 00:36:41,320
So the question becomes on one side,

767
00:36:41,320 --> 00:36:43,160
how do I protect myself?

768
00:36:43,160 --> 00:36:44,400
Because that's important.

769
00:36:44,400 --> 00:36:49,280
I don't want somebody to take PII or PCI type data

770
00:36:49,280 --> 00:36:50,680
out of my environment.

771
00:36:50,680 --> 00:36:53,600
But how of your security stack

772
00:36:53,600 --> 00:36:57,320
and the whole reason that you have a website to begin with

773
00:36:57,320 --> 00:36:58,920
is for your customers,

774
00:36:58,920 --> 00:37:01,200
how do I know my customers aren't getting hacked?

775
00:37:01,200 --> 00:37:04,160
If you look at some rather large incidents

776
00:37:04,160 --> 00:37:06,320
that have happened over the past several years,

777
00:37:06,320 --> 00:37:09,960
it's actually not an instance of the host company being attacked.

778
00:37:09,960 --> 00:37:12,480
It's the host company's website

779
00:37:12,480 --> 00:37:16,160
providing a mechanism for their customers to be attacked.

780
00:37:16,160 --> 00:37:20,160
So a simple example of this is you may have some widget,

781
00:37:20,160 --> 00:37:22,800
maybe a third party shopping cart application

782
00:37:22,800 --> 00:37:24,560
that you have on your website.

783
00:37:24,560 --> 00:37:26,240
And that shopping cart application

784
00:37:26,240 --> 00:37:28,760
is actually being hosted somewhere else on the internet.

785
00:37:28,760 --> 00:37:31,640
It's not within any of your positive control points.

786
00:37:31,640 --> 00:37:35,920
And an adversary could try to hack your particular organization

787
00:37:35,920 --> 00:37:39,000
and maybe take credit cards out of your organization,

788
00:37:39,000 --> 00:37:42,440
or they could hack that third party.

789
00:37:42,440 --> 00:37:43,840
And they could hack that third party

790
00:37:43,840 --> 00:37:47,320
so that any time that somebody went to your website

791
00:37:47,320 --> 00:37:50,000
and put in their name and their credit card number

792
00:37:50,000 --> 00:37:52,920
and their CVV and expiration date, et cetera,

793
00:37:52,920 --> 00:37:54,880
that when they hit that submit button,

794
00:37:54,880 --> 00:37:57,880
not only does it go internally to your organization to process,

795
00:37:57,880 --> 00:38:01,640
but it also goes to an adversary's website

796
00:38:01,640 --> 00:38:04,400
where they can house and subsequently end up using

797
00:38:04,400 --> 00:38:07,720
that credit card information in this example

798
00:38:07,720 --> 00:38:09,360
in a fraudulent manner.

799
00:38:09,360 --> 00:38:12,800
And if you look at how attack surface management

800
00:38:12,800 --> 00:38:16,800
has grown up over the past 10 years or so,

801
00:38:16,800 --> 00:38:18,440
we didn't really even know what to call it

802
00:38:18,440 --> 00:38:19,960
when we first saw it, right?

803
00:38:19,960 --> 00:38:23,120
It's like we knew we had this capability.

804
00:38:23,120 --> 00:38:26,120
We knew that it was something the customers wanted.

805
00:38:26,120 --> 00:38:30,240
We knew that providing an attack surface to a customer

806
00:38:30,240 --> 00:38:32,720
provided ways to be able to augment

807
00:38:32,720 --> 00:38:37,120
or subsequently enhance anything from their bug bounty programs,

808
00:38:37,120 --> 00:38:39,160
from their vulnerability management programs,

809
00:38:39,160 --> 00:38:42,200
app sec, pen testing, et cetera.

810
00:38:42,200 --> 00:38:45,520
But there also was this element of being able to provide

811
00:38:45,520 --> 00:38:48,760
a confidence that their customers, in fact,

812
00:38:48,760 --> 00:38:52,200
weren't taking advantage by utilizing their web services.

813
00:38:52,200 --> 00:38:57,280
And as that scenario started to grow

814
00:38:57,280 --> 00:39:01,240
over the course of time, it kind of went from a fringe,

815
00:39:01,240 --> 00:39:04,080
like if I have time, yes, we'll do attack surface management

816
00:39:04,080 --> 00:39:09,040
for our digital enterprise, for the digital state

817
00:39:09,040 --> 00:39:12,520
that we've created and being able to have visibility to this

818
00:39:12,520 --> 00:39:15,800
the same way that users do, the same way that adversaries do,

819
00:39:15,800 --> 00:39:19,600
the same way that partners and customers, et cetera,

820
00:39:19,600 --> 00:39:21,920
have with my environment, and then being

821
00:39:21,920 --> 00:39:23,560
able to crystallize that.

822
00:39:23,560 --> 00:39:27,520
And as we noticed probably about four or five years ago,

823
00:39:27,520 --> 00:39:29,880
this started to catch a lot of traction,

824
00:39:29,880 --> 00:39:31,680
for example, with analyst firms.

825
00:39:31,680 --> 00:39:35,880
It started to become more top of mind topics

826
00:39:35,880 --> 00:39:41,080
that we've seen covered in a number of different forums,

827
00:39:41,080 --> 00:39:44,280
like conferences and webinars, et cetera.

828
00:39:44,280 --> 00:39:50,600
And the ability for this to become a foundational component,

829
00:39:50,600 --> 00:39:52,200
the ability for attack surface management

830
00:39:52,200 --> 00:39:53,920
to become a foundational component

831
00:39:53,920 --> 00:39:57,000
of any contemporary enterprise security program

832
00:39:57,000 --> 00:40:02,320
has gone from the early adopters into, I would say,

833
00:40:02,320 --> 00:40:05,720
more of a critical mass of organizations.

834
00:40:05,720 --> 00:40:09,200
And these are not just very large multinational global

835
00:40:09,200 --> 00:40:12,120
organizations, though they were probably more

836
00:40:12,120 --> 00:40:13,800
in the early adopter camp.

837
00:40:13,800 --> 00:40:16,880
But think of organizations that have disproportionately

838
00:40:16,880 --> 00:40:20,680
smaller security teams to disproportionately large digital

839
00:40:20,680 --> 00:40:22,160
presences that they have.

840
00:40:22,160 --> 00:40:25,960
You see this a lot of time in multinational or even

841
00:40:25,960 --> 00:40:28,680
domestically conglomerates, where

842
00:40:28,680 --> 00:40:32,640
they're more of a combination of a bunch of smaller brands

843
00:40:32,640 --> 00:40:37,880
and organizations that roll up under a centralized organization

844
00:40:37,880 --> 00:40:39,680
from an accounting perspective.

845
00:40:39,680 --> 00:40:43,600
So how can somebody see how this looks like?

846
00:40:43,600 --> 00:40:47,280
Do you have demos, some videos?

847
00:40:47,280 --> 00:40:50,480
Yeah, so a very good question.

848
00:40:50,480 --> 00:40:52,040
Gladys, it actually takes us right back

849
00:40:52,040 --> 00:40:54,240
to the beginning of the conversation.

850
00:40:54,240 --> 00:40:58,600
Rizky Q said that we wanted to make the internet a safer place.

851
00:40:58,600 --> 00:41:01,960
And we came to the realization that the biggest challenge

852
00:41:01,960 --> 00:41:03,840
that we had to make in the internet a safer place

853
00:41:03,840 --> 00:41:06,280
was there wasn't enough good guys in the game.

854
00:41:06,280 --> 00:41:09,920
And then bringing the capability of complex internet

855
00:41:09,920 --> 00:41:13,400
investigations and visibility and so forth down

856
00:41:13,400 --> 00:41:18,120
to a more consumable level that allowed anybody

857
00:41:18,120 --> 00:41:21,560
to interact with that, that led us down the path of actually

858
00:41:21,560 --> 00:41:23,520
creating an entire freemium model.

859
00:41:23,520 --> 00:41:27,840
So today, you can go to community.riskyq.com.

860
00:41:27,840 --> 00:41:29,240
You can set up a free account.

861
00:41:29,240 --> 00:41:31,280
Everything that we've been talking about here today

862
00:41:31,280 --> 00:41:35,080
can be unlocked within that account itself.

863
00:41:35,080 --> 00:41:39,680
We have a little over 110,000, 120,000 different analysts

864
00:41:39,680 --> 00:41:43,560
across about 15,000 organizations today that are using it.

865
00:41:43,560 --> 00:41:49,800
It is, but arguably, one of the most prolific freemium

866
00:41:49,800 --> 00:41:53,840
SaaS-based offerings that exist on the internet.

867
00:41:53,840 --> 00:41:59,440
And it also has a number of additional value

868
00:41:59,440 --> 00:42:01,560
ads that we look at in terms of being

869
00:42:01,560 --> 00:42:09,560
able to provide visibility and capabilities to organizations.

870
00:42:09,560 --> 00:42:11,600
We have Threat Hunter workshops.

871
00:42:11,600 --> 00:42:14,440
For example, we do them about once a month.

872
00:42:14,440 --> 00:42:16,800
We usually get hundreds and hundreds of people

873
00:42:16,800 --> 00:42:21,280
from across the globe on these Threat Hunter workshops.

874
00:42:21,280 --> 00:42:25,080
And what we do is we actually take things that are in the news.

875
00:42:25,080 --> 00:42:27,600
We take technologies that customers

876
00:42:27,600 --> 00:42:29,160
are the market that are using.

877
00:42:29,160 --> 00:42:35,520
We take concepts that are very basic to very complex.

878
00:42:35,520 --> 00:42:39,680
And we actually show how within the product itself,

879
00:42:39,680 --> 00:42:42,960
you can solve for a lot of these problems.

880
00:42:42,960 --> 00:42:45,240
So yeah, if you're looking for a way

881
00:42:45,240 --> 00:42:47,040
to be able to get in the game right now,

882
00:42:47,040 --> 00:42:50,440
you can go set up an account.

883
00:42:50,440 --> 00:42:53,080
And you can reach out to your Microsoft Contact,

884
00:42:53,080 --> 00:42:56,520
and we can give you extended access and more visibility

885
00:42:56,520 --> 00:42:59,520
and take a lot of some of the limitations

886
00:42:59,520 --> 00:43:02,760
that we have within the product and the freemium side

887
00:43:02,760 --> 00:43:05,920
and actually provide a full enterprise version.

888
00:43:05,920 --> 00:43:07,680
And then I would also offer if you

889
00:43:07,680 --> 00:43:10,320
wanted to either sign up and look at some

890
00:43:10,320 --> 00:43:13,640
of our historical Threat Hunting workshops that we've done,

891
00:43:13,640 --> 00:43:18,280
where we've taken very robust infrastructure that

892
00:43:18,280 --> 00:43:23,000
has been set up by bad guys and systematically decompose it,

893
00:43:23,000 --> 00:43:26,600
you can sign up for those, or you can sign up

894
00:43:26,600 --> 00:43:29,920
for new Threat Hunting workshops that we

895
00:43:29,920 --> 00:43:31,480
have coming up in the future.

896
00:43:31,480 --> 00:43:35,680
Yeah, originally when I started learning about RISC-Q,

897
00:43:35,680 --> 00:43:38,520
I signed up for some of those workshops.

898
00:43:38,520 --> 00:43:42,160
I think it's every other Thursday for a couple of hours.

899
00:43:42,160 --> 00:43:44,280
And they were awesome.

900
00:43:44,280 --> 00:43:45,680
It just got me started.

901
00:43:45,680 --> 00:43:47,400
So I really recommend that.

902
00:43:47,400 --> 00:43:49,520
Yeah, it's a lot of fun.

903
00:43:49,520 --> 00:43:53,360
I mean, what has traditionally been types of access

904
00:43:53,360 --> 00:43:55,480
and types of visibility that have been relegated

905
00:43:55,480 --> 00:44:00,400
to a very small niche of cybersecurity professionals

906
00:44:00,400 --> 00:44:03,560
that largely learned how to do it over years and years

907
00:44:03,560 --> 00:44:08,200
of research and being practitioners, et cetera.

908
00:44:08,200 --> 00:44:09,840
Being able to bring that down to be

909
00:44:09,840 --> 00:44:11,560
able to have individuals.

910
00:44:11,560 --> 00:44:13,800
I mean, we've got programs that we've done for high school

911
00:44:13,800 --> 00:44:17,960
kids, where we've taken very simple articles that show up

912
00:44:17,960 --> 00:44:21,840
in mainstream news that have either a singular domain name

913
00:44:21,840 --> 00:44:26,080
or a singular IP address in them and actually expand all of that

914
00:44:26,080 --> 00:44:30,480
and be able to say, this is what this infrastructure looks

915
00:44:30,480 --> 00:44:32,680
like on the internet right now.

916
00:44:32,680 --> 00:44:36,880
And this is the story behind everything

917
00:44:36,880 --> 00:44:38,760
that you just read in that news article.

918
00:44:38,760 --> 00:44:40,240
This has been really great.

919
00:44:40,240 --> 00:44:41,560
I learned a ton.

920
00:44:41,560 --> 00:44:43,400
I mean, I just understood a little bit

921
00:44:43,400 --> 00:44:48,200
of what risk IQ is, but certainly learned one heck of a lot

922
00:44:48,200 --> 00:44:49,040
more.

923
00:44:49,040 --> 00:44:51,920
So Jason, one thing we'd like to ask our guests

924
00:44:51,920 --> 00:44:55,560
is if you had one thought to leave our listeners with,

925
00:44:55,560 --> 00:44:56,680
what would it be?

926
00:44:56,680 --> 00:45:01,320
If I could leave any kind of parting thoughts with anybody,

927
00:45:01,320 --> 00:45:07,280
it would be around not needing to wait until some additional

928
00:45:07,280 --> 00:45:11,440
technology comes along or some future state occurs.

929
00:45:11,440 --> 00:45:14,840
The capabilities are there now, and the entry point

930
00:45:14,840 --> 00:45:18,320
is far easier than it's ever been in the past.

931
00:45:18,320 --> 00:45:21,800
In closing, I'd really like to thank you for the time here

932
00:45:21,800 --> 00:45:22,280
today.

933
00:45:22,280 --> 00:45:24,600
And this is a topic that's very exciting to me,

934
00:45:24,600 --> 00:45:27,000
and I'm very passionate about.

935
00:45:27,000 --> 00:45:28,920
And it's very personal to me.

936
00:45:28,920 --> 00:45:35,320
So anything I could do to help, please feel free to reach out.

937
00:45:35,320 --> 00:45:38,040
I'm sure maybe we can do this again sometime.

938
00:45:38,040 --> 00:45:40,360
So again, thanks so much for joining us this week, Jason.

939
00:45:40,360 --> 00:45:42,880
I know Gladys and I really appreciate you taking the time.

940
00:45:42,880 --> 00:45:45,960
And to our listeners out there, thank you also for listening.

941
00:45:45,960 --> 00:45:48,200
Stay safe, and we'll see you next time.

942
00:45:48,200 --> 00:45:51,040
Thanks for listening to the Azure Security Podcast.

943
00:45:51,040 --> 00:45:54,800
You can find show notes and other resources at our website,

944
00:45:54,800 --> 00:45:57,840
azsecuritypodcast.net.

945
00:45:57,840 --> 00:46:00,160
If you have any questions, please find us

946
00:46:00,160 --> 00:46:01,840
on Twitter at azurecenter.com.

947
00:46:01,840 --> 00:46:03,600
And other resources on the website

948
00:46:03,600 --> 00:46:05,760
is from ccmixter.com.

949
00:46:05,760 --> 00:46:07,200
And licensed under the Creative Commons license.

950
00:46:07,200 --> 00:46:09,920
If you have any questions, please find us on Twitter

951
00:46:09,920 --> 00:46:11,920
at azuresetpod.

952
00:46:11,920 --> 00:46:14,880
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953
00:46:14,880 --> 00:46:34,040
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