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Welcome to the Azure Security podcast, where we discuss topics relating to security, privacy,

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reliability and compliance on the Microsoft Cloud Platform.

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Hey everybody, welcome to episode 95.

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This week is myself, Michael, with Mark and Sarah.

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And this week our guest is Sherrod de Grippeau, whose hitch talks to us about threat intelligence.

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But before we get to our guests, let's take a little lap around the news.

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Mark, why don't you kick things off?

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Thanks, Mike.

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So for me, I actually spoke recently at Tampa B-Sides and I was quite amazed at how big

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the event was.

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It was like 1,900 people or something like that.

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And it was a great event, lots of good speakers, you know, except for me.

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I mean, I spoke there too, but I did speak on the SOC.

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I couldn't believe they approved it, but it was the No BS SOC.

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And I was like, okay, yeah, I'll make the talk about that.

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It landed pretty well and I shared the slides for it.

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And so we got the link there in the show notes.

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The interesting thing that I picked up actually is sort of the newsworthy element.

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There's a great CISO panel.

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There was, I think, eight CISOs involved too, co-hosting and six on the panel itself.

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And it was a great two-hour discussion.

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And like over 45 minutes, if I recall correctly, we're focused on a really interesting topic

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that I wasn't fully expecting was how important it is for security to do really kind of awareness,

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partnership, integration, education of all of the various different parts of the business.

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So, you know, business leaders, business unit leaders, on down and directors, managers,

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as well as of course, IT partners.

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And it really sort of the amount of time that they spent on it, these very seasoned CISOs,

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was sort of a very interesting signal to me and it sort of helped me understand that,

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you know, at the end of the day, security doesn't do stuff, right?

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We don't manage these systems.

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We don't keep them up.

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You know, we don't, you know, sort of make the decisions in many cases.

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It's often the business and the IT folks.

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And at the end of the day, we're really a support function, enablement function for

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the rest of the org.

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And you know, basically, as CISO said, the best bang for the buck is working with getting

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all these other folks, you know, aware and on board and understanding what's going on.

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So you still have to have a sock, you still have to respond to stuff, you have to track

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the attackers and all those kind of things.

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But the reality is, is that the people that take action and keep the incidents from happening

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or, you know, make the attackers work a lot harder to make the incident happen, you know,

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really are the partners in the business and IT piece.

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So that was a really interesting insight for me.

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And so I think they recorded it.

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I'm not quite sure what the plans are, but we'll definitely post a link when and if that

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does happen.

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Okay, so I only have one thing this time round.

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For those of you who might be interested in using this, the Azure Virtual Network Manager

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security admin rule config is now GA in 45 regions.

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I actually don't remember how many regions we have now.

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The fact that the new says 45 suggests we have more now.

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Mark, Michael, do you know how many regions we have?

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No idea.

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But I think it's great that they added a new role to Virtual Network Managers.

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I think that's great.

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Yeah.

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And so basically, it lets you enforce security policies across subscriptions and regions,

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but globally.

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And they're evaluated before NSGs, if we think old school firewalls and the way that we process

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different rules in an order, which means it's going to be, it will be enforced uniformly

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across wherever you apply it to.

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So pretty cool, and you should go and check it out if you are using network configuration

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in Azure, which I'm pretty sure most folks will be.

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Yeah, I have a small number of items.

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The first one is in GA is Azure Virtual Network Encryption is now available in all regions,

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which is probably bigger than 45.

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But this allows you to enable encryption of traffic between virtual machines and virtual

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machine scale sets on the same virtual network.

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And that's both regionally and globally, paired virtual networks.

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Great to see more of these defenses coming into play.

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Another one, which is in my backyard, is enabling Key Vault for SQL Server on Linux.

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First of all, a lot of people don't even know it's available on Linux, but there you go.

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But now we have support for using transparent data encryption.

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We can store the key encryption keys in Key Vault from the Linux VM, which is really nice.

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All the Linux instance running SQL Server 2022, that's using cumulative update 12 and

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beyond.

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And it's great to see that now we can have centralized management of keys across our

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SQL Server customers who are running on Linux.

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Also in GA and also from my backyard, Azure Database for PostgreSQL Flexible Server now

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supports PrivateLink.

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I know a lot of customers are really interested in using PostgreSQL on Azure with PrivateLink.

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Another one also from my backyard is in public preview is long term retention for database

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for MySQL Flexible Servers.

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We can now store your backups for up to 10 years.

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I believe the limit was literally about a month prior to this update.

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So this is really awesome to see mainly for compliance and regulatory requirements.

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All right, so that's the news out of the way.

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Now let's turn our attention to our guest, as I mentioned at the beginning.

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Our guest this week is Sherrod de Grippeux, who's here to talk to us about threat intelligence.

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So Sherrod, first of all, thank you so much for coming on the podcast.

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We'd like to take a moment and introduce yourself to our listeners.

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Yeah, hi.

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My name is Sherrod de Grippeux.

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I am the Director of Threat Intelligence Strategy at Microsoft.

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I've spent the past 20 years focusing on information security and past 18 of those years working

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at information security and threat intelligence vendors.

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So I've been doing this a long time.

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And essentially, the whole point is to watch what threat actors do and report back on that

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and use it in ways that help protect people.

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I'd like to start with the basics, if that's okay.

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So tell me, and by the way, I'm a huge fan.

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I love your Ignite sessions and all that kind of stuff and your podcast as well.

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Tell us, how do you view threat intelligence?

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What is it useful for?

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Why should people care?

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And honestly, how are people using it incorrectly as a term or as a data source?

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That question is one that it's a firestorm in the industry.

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When I think about threat intelligence, threat intelligence to me is the difference between

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knowing that no one has broken into your house and me telling you who has tried to break

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into your house, what they look like, the car they drive, the kind of clothes they wear,

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their height, weight, date of birth.

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And I can tell you the other houses they've broken into down the street.

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Either way, your home still has not been broken into, but now you're armed with information

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that can help you protect yourself more than you were before.

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And that's sort of how I see threat intelligence is.

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It gives you the understanding of what you need to know to make better security choices.

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Gotcha.

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So it's more than just a file hashes and IP addresses.

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Sorry, don't mean to trigger you, but I do mean to trigger you.

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IOCs are not threat intelligence.

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So right, if you're not in this world, something that we talk about quite a bit is data.

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And an example that you use is a bunch of file hashes.

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So if you have a feed of file hashes, is that threat intelligence?

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I would say absolutely not.

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It is not threat intelligence.

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It is data.

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And it has maybe an additional metadata point, which is these are file hashes that are malicious

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and they're malicious in a certain way.

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Data has to be processed and analyzed before it can become part of threat intelligence.

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And I argue that even that isn't enough.

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In order for it to actually be credible threat intelligence, it needs to be processed by

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someone who has threat analysis, training, education, and experience.

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Gotcha.

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So it's really effectively, it's the context to help you make a decision.

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It's a context to help you make a decision, and I think one of those big decisions that

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we would talk about would be resource allocation is a really important example.

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So if people aren't familiar who are listening, we typically break threat actors up into two

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main groups.

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And that typically is APT or nation-sponsored threat actors, which are your traditional

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espionage groups that are a lot of times government employees for the most part.

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And they work with the military intelligence or they work in some kind of security services

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for their country.

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And they are tasked with espionage responsibilities and they do that espionage over cyber channels,

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so over the internet.

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And then we typically see on the other side of that financially motivated or crime.

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There's also like third, fourth, fifth categories of like hacktivism and disruptor and private

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sector offensive actors and things.

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But for the most part, we break them into those two categories.

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And if you're an organization that traditionally is not targeted, for example, by nation-backed

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threat actors, let's say you're a retail enterprise, most governments are generally not attacking

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retail enterprise.

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It doesn't have a lot of espionage value.

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So that would mean I would advise you to focus your resources around fraud, financial and

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crimeware.

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So that's where you would want to put your time.

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It doesn't mean that you'll never get attacked by a nation-sponsored actor, but it does mean

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that you'll essentially get a bigger return on your investment if you give a little bit

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more focus to those crimeware actors.

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So one thing I hear all the time are these sort of, I'm not going to sugarcoat this,

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but all these sort of funky names.

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When we come to describe what's going on in the world, is there like a meaning to those

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names?

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I mean, or does someone just come up with a random idea and say, hey, well, let's call

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these things something funky or what's the story behind all that?

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That's a great topic, which is one that people talk about quite a bit in the industry.

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It's a bit of a spicy, spicy topic.

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So essentially we want to differentiate these groups when we do something called attribution.

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Attribution is essentially saying this particular activity is, you know, there's a responsible

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party and that responsible party is this group.

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We typically think of threat actors in groups.

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If you're not familiar with this world, you might think of like a lone hacker in a attic

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who's doing her hacking and she's going after a company to steal their information.

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That's a bit storybook.

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We actually more see groups that are organized into a professional operation and whether

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those groups are employed by a nation or employed by sort of a crime organization, they typically

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fall into group categories.

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In order to track those groups, we give them names.

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And Microsoft about a year ago released a new naming convention, which is made up of

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two pieces.

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It's a modifier and then an indicator that tells you the country of origin.

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So as an example, Sandstorm will always be an actor that is based out of or sponsored

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by Iran.

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Do you have some other examples?

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Just other names?

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Yeah, there's so many.

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So we track over 300 different actor groups and once we know enough about them to give

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them a name, they graduate.

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They start off as a storm group, a storm in a number, and then they eventually get graduated

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into a full name.

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So Octo Tempest is a crime war group that's quite a big topic in the news right now.

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Silk Typhoon or Volt Typhoon, those are both actors that are based out of China.

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The tsunami groups, those are what we call private sector offensive actors.

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So those are typically part of some kind of private entity that works on behalf of a government.

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Lizards are based out of Russia and sleets are typically based out of North Korea.

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So each country sort of has its own assigned weather pattern and then we add a modifier

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in front of it, like a color or a texture or a type so that we can kind of keep them

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all separated.

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And there are people within Microsoft threat intelligence that are responsible for focusing

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on that particular group.

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So we have individuals in Microsoft who they focus 100%, for example, on, let's see, Cadet

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Blizzard, which is a Russian-based threat actor.

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And that's really who they track and they watch the threats that that threat actor sends

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in their attempts to do espionage operations against Microsoft customers.

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Okay.

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I'm going to ask just for anybody out there who's listening who might not know, what is

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an APT, Sherrod?

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So we level set on that.

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There's no level setting.

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That's also very controversial.

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Oh, there's so many fights over the definition of APT.

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So APT stands for Advanced Persistent Threat, which Sarah of course knows.

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And that typically has become over time synonymous, correct or not, synonymous with nation-sponsored

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threats.

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I try to leverage the terminology of nation-sponsored, meaning that a particular country's government

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is in support of the activity of that group.

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An APT could be a crime group.

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It depends.

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It's a bit subjective.

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But I would say that certain crime groups of the past probably were worth considering

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at that APT level.

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Like FIN7, for example, which I don't have the Microsoft name off the top of my head

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for FIN7.

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But FIN7, I would say would definitely qualify as an APT group.

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They were advanced.

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They were persistent.

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And it's really a lot of times the persistence that tends to be the qualifier.

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A lot of those threat actors are not super advanced, but they might be nation-sponsored

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and they might be persistent.

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So they get that APT designation.

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FIN7 is Sangria Tempest at Microsoft.

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So APT is sort of like the big baddies.

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They're organized.

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They're operational.

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They're typically sponsored by a country's government who's comfortable with the work

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they're doing.

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And they're typically going after things for espionage purposes.

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Now, is some of the confusion around that APT term is that it was originally sort of

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a, hey, we can talk about this in public about a nation-state without naming that nation-state,

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like going back 20 some years and then it's sort of evolved since then?

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Or I'm just kind of curious, how did we get to this level of confusion?

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I don't want to be responsible for how we got here.

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No, I think you're right.

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Well, I think what's happened is, yeah, so APT-1 was released, you're right, about 20

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years ago or something.

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And over time, I think what has really caused the merging and squishiness and sort of gray

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areas in a lot of places is this.

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Every organization, whether they're private enterprise, public sector, such as a government

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entity, if they're a think tank, they could be an NGO, they could be a nonprofit.

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All of these analysts that are responsible for doing this tracking have a different point

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of view.

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So every organization sees a different slice of data, kind of like if you've ever heard

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that parable of people touching an elephant and they're all describing something different

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and ultimately, it's because they only have this narrow limited visibility.

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The trunk, the tail, the leg, et cetera, they think it's a tree or a brush or whatever.

255
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Right, exactly.

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They're unable to see the whole picture because of their restricted visibility.

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And I think that that's true about all of the analyst groups that do this work.

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And that has kind of led to a separation in the way that we do naming, in the way that

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we consider things APT, in the way that we consider things nation-sponsored versus private

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sector.

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It is squishy.

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And I'll tell you this though.

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What I love about it is that threat intelligence is data analyzed and put through not only

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rigor but subjective designations and subjective commentary based on an individual's experience.

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That subjectivity is very, very important because it brings a sense of opinion, background,

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and direction that you can't just get from data alone.

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Yeah, because ultimately, these are humans on the other end and these are just the digital

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trails that they've left that were able to infer things about their motivations, which

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are just as fluid as any other humans and doing a job.

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I love that because the thing that...

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We talk about this quite a bit.

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You're exactly right.

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Most of these groups are operationalized and they're either doing...

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They're generally doing a job for their employer, whether their employer is an organized criminal

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group or their employer is a government of some type.

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Most of these threat actor groups are given directions.

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They're given operational projects.

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They're given tasks.

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And really, if you think about it, what's so crazy is that people in threat intelligence

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and information security, all our job is to make the other person's job not work.

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They're just doing their job and we are just trying to make them really bad at their job.

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And that's just the back and forth of it.

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Our success is their failure.

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I actually just posted on LinkedIn about that today.

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It's quite amazing that there are people, especially in the criminal world, I think

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that's something that a lot of people don't understand or aren't familiar with.

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In Eastern European and Russian criminal, as well as Nigeria, Middle Eastern, the crime

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war groups generally don't see what they do as illegal or immoral or unethical.

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They don't really see themselves as criminals.

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Their family doesn't see them as criminals.

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They see themselves as, well, I'm a software developer or what, I'm a computer engineer,

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but I run internet.

293
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I follow the directions that I'm given and I make these things happen.

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It's not a big deal.

295
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It's just computer stuff.

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And so you kind of have to understand their job is really to hit the targets that they've

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been told to hit that day.

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And our job is to prevent them from hitting the targets they've been told to hit that

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day.

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We have to make them fail.

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We're trying to make people fail at their jobs.

302
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So that's actually a very interesting segue.

303
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So if we get to the absolute practicalities of it, I mean, it's fair to say that these

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threat actors are obviously going after cloud resources, right?

305
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That's why we're the AZZI Security Podcast.

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Yes.

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So what sort of things can you share with our listeners about what things you're seeing

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and perhaps more importantly, what can they do?

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So I think one of the things that I always talk about with groups and CISOs and engineers

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and everybody when I think about this is, so if I had a choice to raid your personal

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checking account or your employer's checking account, your employer's bank account, which

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one do you think would be more attractive?

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I would assume it's your employer.

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For all of us, I'm sure it is.

315
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But when you think about it from that perspective, you have to understand that threat actors

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find corporate enterprise identities to be extremely valuable because what they can do

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is they can log in as you.

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They can get into your identity.

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They can become you.

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Once they become you, they can operate as you, meaning they can send email as you.

321
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They can read email that you've sent.

322
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They can start forwarding your email to other services.

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They can do things like set up rules where certain email goes certain places.

324
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They can reply to threads as you.

325
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They can get into your files.

326
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They can start looking through your data.

327
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So cloud threat in my world is extremely tied to identity threat.

328
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Thinking about threat actors having the ability to become you, that's a super important thing

329
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that you want to think about.

330
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I also think that if you want to do something about it, I think one of the number one things

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that you can do is think about your logging situation and your logging strategies.

332
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Those tend to be the places that it's like ripping the mask off the Scooby-Doo villain.

333
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It's sort of like, okay, now I can see what's really going on.

334
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I think that that's a really important thing to do as well as making sure that your identities

335
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are... your identities and the identities of those that you're responsible for protecting

336
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are strong and are using multi-factor authentication and are set up in a way that is as secure

337
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as it possibly can be in a best practice.

338
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So if we have all this intel, are we doing something to our products based on this knowledge?

339
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Do we take that threat intel and I'm not going to say productize it, but at least put some

340
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elements of the data into our products?

341
00:21:38,560 --> 00:21:39,560
Absolutely.

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So we do productize the threat intelligence itself.

343
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You can access that through something like Copilot for Security.

344
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You can go and ask it specifically, like, tell me about Octo Tempest and it will.

345
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But the majority of those 78 trillion signals and we take that information, we're watching

346
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what threat actors are doing.

347
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We're watching their attempts to break into your house, for example.

348
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We're watching their attempts to distribute malware or brute force passwords or break

349
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into web panels.

350
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We're watching threat actors do those things and we're seeing and understanding those attempts

351
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and we're taking that information and we're putting it back into the product to protect

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people better and better and better across the full portfolio of products, whether it's

353
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cloud or endpoint or email or web browsing or browser or search.

354
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Those are constantly being updated, literally all day.

355
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That's the majority of what threat detection engineers at Microsoft do is they take the

356
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threat intelligence we have and they turn that into a detection capability.

357
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Now I know that we have all these different threat actors with different names, but I

358
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wondered if you could tell us about, I don't want to use the word cool because cool doesn't

359
00:22:52,400 --> 00:22:59,200
seem the right word to say to describe them, but some of the interesting groups that we've

360
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been tracking and what they've been up to because I always find this stuff fascinating.

361
00:23:05,480 --> 00:23:06,480
Absolutely.

362
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I think I also find it fascinating and I think that's pretty common in the threat intelligence

363
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world in the industry.

364
00:23:15,360 --> 00:23:21,220
People say, oh my gosh, did you see this TTP, which is a way to say, did you see what they're

365
00:23:21,220 --> 00:23:22,940
doing, their tactics?

366
00:23:22,940 --> 00:23:25,280
Did you see this interesting thing that threat actor is doing?

367
00:23:25,280 --> 00:23:29,600
I think right now the industry is really focused on OctoTempest.

368
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OctoTempest is also known as Scattered Spider or UNC 3944 and they actually leverage a significant

369
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amount of social engineering.

370
00:23:37,920 --> 00:23:43,320
So they'll call a help desk, they'll pretend to be an employee and they will attempt to

371
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get the help desk to reset the password of that employee and then the threat actor will

372
00:23:49,800 --> 00:23:55,900
log in as that employee and start trying to elevate privileges or leverage exploits.

373
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They use this combination of social engineering immediately to some kind of technical capability

374
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once they're able to log in and then they typically, very quickly, and I mean within

375
00:24:08,640 --> 00:24:14,040
a couple of hours, like extremely quickly, they understand the entire network landscape

376
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of that target organization and then they do ransomware, meaning they encrypt all of

377
00:24:20,400 --> 00:24:24,420
the data that they have access to and they start making ransom demands.

378
00:24:24,420 --> 00:24:27,800
This is a very high profile threat actor.

379
00:24:27,800 --> 00:24:31,000
We've talked about them on the Microsoft Threat Intelligence podcast.

380
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We've written blogs about them.

381
00:24:32,680 --> 00:24:36,160
OctoTempest is a significant actor on the crime or landscape right now.

382
00:24:36,160 --> 00:24:41,160
Are there any other choice groups you can tell us about?

383
00:24:41,160 --> 00:24:42,480
Oh, there's so many.

384
00:24:42,480 --> 00:24:44,560
So Peach Sandstorm is another one.

385
00:24:44,560 --> 00:24:52,200
So Peach Sandstorm is typically associated with activity that is considered intelligence

386
00:24:52,200 --> 00:24:53,200
gathering.

387
00:24:53,200 --> 00:24:55,480
They also are based out of Iran.

388
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So we see that group doing things like using SAML attacks to exfiltrate data.

389
00:25:02,400 --> 00:25:07,640
We see them doing persistence, which means that they will stay within an environment

390
00:25:07,640 --> 00:25:12,540
and they'll try to get back into an environment if they do get evicted from it.

391
00:25:12,540 --> 00:25:19,960
We have a lot of information on Peach Sandstorm doing things like spearfishing and using Red

392
00:25:19,960 --> 00:25:21,800
Team tools that are open source.

393
00:25:21,800 --> 00:25:28,800
So if you ever see some of those arguments online about should open source offensive

394
00:25:28,800 --> 00:25:32,840
tools be allowed because they are used by threat actors, in this case, Peach Sandstorm

395
00:25:32,840 --> 00:25:34,880
is one of those actors.

396
00:25:34,880 --> 00:25:39,740
Also, they go after remote management tools.

397
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So any of those remote management and remote access tools that are legitimate, they try

398
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to leverage those and get into them so that they can control a machine remotely.

399
00:25:50,840 --> 00:25:57,280
And finally, they're known to typically go after the energy sector and the defense sector.

400
00:25:57,280 --> 00:26:00,360
So they have a specific targeting vertical that they like to hit.

401
00:26:00,360 --> 00:26:06,080
I'm sure that we could talk probably about most of these groups all day.

402
00:26:06,080 --> 00:26:11,400
But in the interest of time, I won't ask you to keep listing them even though we should

403
00:26:11,400 --> 00:26:13,720
totally talk about them offline sometimes.

404
00:26:13,720 --> 00:26:17,000
For anyone listening, if you're interested in these threat actor profiles, just follow

405
00:26:17,000 --> 00:26:22,560
the Microsoft Threat Intelligence blog and you'll get all of the updates and profiles

406
00:26:22,560 --> 00:26:23,920
as we publish them.

407
00:26:23,920 --> 00:26:24,920
They're pretty fascinating.

408
00:26:24,920 --> 00:26:26,960
So where does AI fit in all of this?

409
00:26:26,960 --> 00:26:29,280
I mean, AI seems to fit in absolutely everything these days.

410
00:26:29,280 --> 00:26:30,840
So I mean, are the attackers using AI?

411
00:26:30,840 --> 00:26:32,080
Are they leveraging AI?

412
00:26:32,080 --> 00:26:33,080
What's going on there?

413
00:26:33,080 --> 00:26:35,480
Yeah, that's something we're watching closely.

414
00:26:35,480 --> 00:26:40,800
And honestly, what are threat actors doing with AI for probably the past 12 or 18 months

415
00:26:40,800 --> 00:26:44,000
has been the number one question that I've gotten.

416
00:26:44,000 --> 00:26:50,040
And I'll tell you, we did a really nice report in February about threat actors and how they're

417
00:26:50,040 --> 00:26:51,760
leveraging AI.

418
00:26:51,760 --> 00:26:57,680
And we specifically focused on the four primary nation-sponsored groups, which is Russia,

419
00:26:57,680 --> 00:27:00,000
North Korea, China, and Iran.

420
00:27:00,000 --> 00:27:06,700
And we found that all four of those countries had groups leveraging AI.

421
00:27:06,700 --> 00:27:08,280
They're using it for reconnaissance.

422
00:27:08,280 --> 00:27:13,800
They're using it to help them build scripting tools or scripting to build tools.

423
00:27:13,800 --> 00:27:16,840
They're using it to refine their development capabilities.

424
00:27:16,840 --> 00:27:23,520
So they're using it for pretty technical assistance type co-pilot work.

425
00:27:23,520 --> 00:27:25,660
They're doing vulnerability research.

426
00:27:25,660 --> 00:27:30,680
They're using it to better understand how they can socially engineer their targets.

427
00:27:30,680 --> 00:27:36,360
They're also using it to evade detection mechanisms, meaning they're trying to figure out how they

428
00:27:36,360 --> 00:27:40,520
can make their attacks not noticed by detection and protection products.

429
00:27:40,520 --> 00:27:43,960
And of course, the good guys are using it for good as well.

430
00:27:43,960 --> 00:27:48,640
Like, we have products like co-pilot for security, which we talked about a couple of weeks ago.

431
00:27:48,640 --> 00:27:49,640
Right.

432
00:27:49,640 --> 00:27:56,520
And what's noteworthy to me is that the defenders, those who create detection products and security

433
00:27:56,520 --> 00:28:00,760
products, we've been using AI and machine learning and data science.

434
00:28:00,760 --> 00:28:02,760
We've been using that for years and years and years.

435
00:28:02,760 --> 00:28:07,280
We're actually very, very good at using it for detection and protection.

436
00:28:07,280 --> 00:28:13,840
So while the threat actors are experimenting with this now, it's likely that they will

437
00:28:13,840 --> 00:28:16,920
go deeper and deeper and get better at it and better at it.

438
00:28:16,920 --> 00:28:22,000
But we're pretty well ahead of the game in terms of using AI for detection.

439
00:28:22,000 --> 00:28:24,340
So I think we're very well positioned there.

440
00:28:24,340 --> 00:28:27,520
We being Microsoft or we the defenders?

441
00:28:27,520 --> 00:28:29,800
Well we being Microsoft.

442
00:28:29,800 --> 00:28:33,720
So I have a much deeper view into Microsoft than I do anywhere else.

443
00:28:33,720 --> 00:28:38,080
And I absolutely see that Microsoft has been using AI for protection capabilities for years

444
00:28:38,080 --> 00:28:39,120
and years.

445
00:28:39,120 --> 00:28:46,600
So yeah, I'm 100% in agreement with you on the Microsoft use of all the various different

446
00:28:46,600 --> 00:28:49,080
generations of AI technology and machine learning.

447
00:28:49,080 --> 00:28:53,880
Because I've been very impressed with what I've seen our product teams do with that.

448
00:28:53,880 --> 00:28:57,360
There are other, in my opinion, there are other good uses of it in industry as well.

449
00:28:57,360 --> 00:28:59,860
So Microsoft's not the only one that's doing that.

450
00:28:59,860 --> 00:29:04,600
So security is definitely a team sport and we are all defenders.

451
00:29:04,600 --> 00:29:05,920
That's one of my big things.

452
00:29:05,920 --> 00:29:12,120
One of the things that we do, Sherrod, is we always ask our guests as a final closeout.

453
00:29:12,120 --> 00:29:13,680
What are your final thoughts?

454
00:29:13,680 --> 00:29:18,320
Something you'd like to leave our audience with to plant a seed and get them thinking

455
00:29:18,320 --> 00:29:21,760
on what you think is important or interesting for them to think about?

456
00:29:21,760 --> 00:29:24,800
I think something really, really important to think about, especially if you're cloud

457
00:29:24,800 --> 00:29:34,680
focused, is constantly tapping into that little spider sense, tingly feeling concern that

458
00:29:34,680 --> 00:29:38,760
you have when you see something and you think, that's weird.

459
00:29:38,760 --> 00:29:45,640
If you can really listen to that feeling, I think it brings a broader security mindset

460
00:29:45,640 --> 00:29:47,080
to what you do.

461
00:29:47,080 --> 00:29:52,760
If you're constantly checking in with yourself of, when I look at this code, when I look

462
00:29:52,760 --> 00:29:57,120
at this diagram, when I look at this behavior, when that little weird blip came up on the

463
00:29:57,120 --> 00:30:01,120
computer when I clicked that link, what was that?

464
00:30:01,120 --> 00:30:06,120
If you hold onto that feeling for a moment and say, I worry that I need to investigate

465
00:30:06,120 --> 00:30:10,120
this a little more, and you dig a little deeper, maybe you ask a friend.

466
00:30:10,120 --> 00:30:12,120
Maybe you find somebody in your security team.

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00:30:12,120 --> 00:30:16,680
Maybe you use some of the tools that you have in your organization to report security concerns.

468
00:30:16,680 --> 00:30:21,720
I think we've got to all better listen now to our intuition because security is every

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00:30:21,720 --> 00:30:23,040
single person's job.

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00:30:23,040 --> 00:30:28,680
It's every single person's responsibility, whether you're a coder, developer, operations,

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00:30:28,680 --> 00:30:30,480
security, anything.

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00:30:30,480 --> 00:30:33,080
Security is number one and you have to focus on it.

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00:30:33,080 --> 00:30:38,040
I know we could probably spend the next couple of hours going over some example crime groups,

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00:30:38,040 --> 00:30:39,440
but we just don't have time.

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00:30:39,440 --> 00:30:40,440
So look, hey.

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I'll come back and we'll talk.

477
00:30:42,440 --> 00:30:43,440
All right.

478
00:30:43,440 --> 00:30:46,000
Hey, look, Cheryl, thank you so much for joining us this week.

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00:30:46,000 --> 00:30:47,480
I know you're really, really busy.

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00:30:47,480 --> 00:30:51,560
I learned something on every single episode, but this one, there's a lot that I know I

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00:30:51,560 --> 00:30:52,560
didn't know.

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00:30:52,560 --> 00:30:53,560
So this has been really useful.

483
00:30:53,560 --> 00:30:56,000
Again, thank you so much for joining us this week.

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00:30:56,000 --> 00:30:59,440
And to all our listeners out there, we hope you found it of use as well.

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00:30:59,440 --> 00:31:01,480
Stay safe and we'll see you next time.

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00:31:01,480 --> 00:31:04,640
Thanks for listening to the Azure Security Podcast.

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00:31:04,640 --> 00:31:11,480
You can find show notes and other resources at our website, azsecuritypodcast.net.

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00:31:11,480 --> 00:31:16,640
If you have any questions, please find us on Twitter at Azure Setpod.

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00:31:16,640 --> 00:31:21,640
The music is from ccmixtor.com and licensed under the Creative Commons license.

