Elysia: Welcome to the Oxford
Undergraduate Law Podcast,
where we discuss the law and its
implications on our relationships,
our markets, and our futures.
I'm Elysia Boon, one
of the podcast editors.
We platform academics, practitioners,
and experts from different
backgrounds on this podcast.
This series was made possible by the
generous support of Crown Office Chambers,
one of the leading London sets of chambers
specializing in civil and commercial work.
The definition of disability is primarily
governed by the Equality Act 2010.
One is considered to have a disability
if they have a physical or mental
impairment that has a substantial and
long-term negative effect on one's
ability to do normal daily activities.
The law as it relates to disability
affects a range of social interactions,
from discrimination to a duty to
make reasonable adjustments, and
conversations surrounding it primarily
focus on ethical considerations
and the legal decisions themselves.
However, an often forgotten aspect
of disability law is the terminology,
legislation, and the judiciary
specifically used to describe and
label disability, which has profound
impact on how people understand
and treat people with disabilities.
Today we are extremely honored to speak
to Dr. Heloise Robinson, Singer Fellow
in Law at the University of Oxford.
Dr. Robinson is interested in the
philosophical foundations that inform the
law, with a special focus on legal and
ethical issues surrounding a selection
against disability, including in relation
to eugenics and to gender equality.
Her work has been published in leading
law and bioethics journals, such as
the Modern Law Review Legal Studies,
Journal of Medical Ethics and the
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics.
Hello, Dr. Robinson.
It's great to have you here today.
Just to introduce us to the realm
of disability law, what are the
laws that govern disability, such
as the Equality Act 2010 and the
European Convention of Human Rights?
Heloise: Great.
Thank you for having me.
I'm happy to be here.
The question as to what is disability
law or what we're looking at when
we're looking at disability law
is a very interesting question.
I think actually it's very broad.
There's not a very straightforward
answer to that question.
So when people think about what might
be disability law or how disability
is relevant in the law, people may
well think about certain explicit
mentions to disability, and certainly
you mentioned the Equality Act.
So the Equality Act has a definition
of disability and people will often
refer to that, although of course
that definition is relevant in the
particular context of that statute.
If we are thinking about how
disability is relevant in the law,
or more broadly what disability law
can be, it can go far beyond that.
You might want to look at how
disability is treated within or
approached in certain areas like
contract law, tort law, criminal law.
And so it's an interesting
question to think about how
the law approaches disability.
I would say it's a much wider topic
than what many people might think.
Elysia: So this podcast episode isn't
necessarily going to be all about
substantive law because it is mainly
based on your paper "Naming and Describing
Disability in the Law", which draws
from lots of different parts of the law.
It's not just law, but also language in
the philosophical or jurisprudential way.
So, if you like to tell us a little
bit like an overview of what your
paper is about and why it's important.
Heloise: Yes.
Thank you.
So this paper, I authored it with
Professor Jonathan Herring, we
wrote it together and that's right.
So in this article, we look at the
way that a disability is named and
described in the context of medicine
as well as in the legal context.
It's important to say that the article
is, is not really actually about,
substantive law or legal effect,
but about the words themselves.
So the terminology, the language
itself that's used and of course
legal effect is important or
questions in the medical context
about medical treatment are important.
But what we focused on are the words
which also deserve separate attention.
So the words that are used to name,
to label, to describe -- it can
affect someone's sense of identity,
the way they perceive themselves.
It can affect the way that other
people perceive an individual.
And one of the reasons we examine,
in particular, the context of
medicine and law is that in those
contexts, there's authority.
So there's an authoritative
source behind the words.
So, so many people in their
everyday lives refer to disability.
People have different preferences
as to which words are used.
Different individuals prefer different
terms, but in medicine, you have a
source of authority as to official
terminology, and in the law as well,
some of the language used might seem
to reflect the view of the state.
And so to some extent, you can't always,
if you disagree with the language use,
you can't necessarily avoid it because
you might need to name a particular
condition in the medical context, or
you might need to use the words in a
statute, specifically in legal argument.
So you can't necessarily
avoid those particular words.
What's also important in those contexts
is when you do have authority you have
- there's also an exercise of power.
So being able to name someone or
something is an exercise of power.
And so if the words used are not the best
ones, or if it can lead to stereotyping
or to stigma, this is especially
important to consider if there's
power and authority behind the words.
Elysia: So in your paper naming and
describing disability in law, you identify
several different ways in which different
kinds of disabilities have been labeled.
So the four examples you have identified
are the use of the word disease
versus condition, the use of the word
abnormality, the changing labeling of
ASD or autism spectrum disorder and the
labeling of intellectual disabilities.
Would you like to explain firstly, how
the use of the labels disease versus
condition are used in legal settings?
Heloise: Yeah, so we, so more, more
broadly speaking, I think we can make a
distinction between the word condition
and the word disease in the sense that
condition is often thought to be a more
neutral term, whereas disease implies
there could be a problem or there needs
to be medical treatment, for example,
or something that needs to be rectified.
And this is something that, that's
a recurring issue in many types of
discussions that, that take place
surrounding disability because
sometimes what you have is you have
a condition itself, which is not
negative, but there may well be
associated negative health effects.
So one example which we wouldn't think
of as disability would be pregnancy.
So we wouldn't think
pregnancy is a disease.
We don't think it's negative, but you
can have associated negative effects.
You can have gestational diabetes.
So we can say gestational diabetes is bad.
We don't want that.
But it doesn't mean the
pregnancy itself is bad.
You can separate it out.
So another example that could
be given is Down syndrome.
So people with Down Syndrome
are more likely to have certain
negative health effects, but you
can say that some of those health
problems are negative in themselves
without saying that Down Syndrome
itself is a condition is negative.
Elysia: it does seem as though the
word condition has a more neutral
kind of presentation as opposed
to the more negative word disease.
Um, but specifically would you like to
elaborate on some of the potentially
misleading references to health with
regards to these words of disease and
condition in a legal context, such as
in McFarlane v Tayside Health Board--
Heloise: Mm-hmm.
Elysia: And Parkinson v St. James and
Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust?
Heloise: Sure.
So you have some cases
involving a failed sterilization
procedure, where subsequently
there was the birth of a child.
And so in McFarlane, for example,
there was a reference to the
child being born healthy.
In fact, there were many
references throughout the case
to there being a healthy child,
which seemed to be important.
In Parkinson, it was a disabled child who
was born, so I suppose there's an issue
there in understanding what we mean by the
term healthy, because as I was explaining
before with the term condition, so you
could have a disability or you could
have a condition which is not negative in
itself and where you actually are healthy.
So you could have Down syndrome and
be healthy, and in fact, many people
can be proud of their disabilities.
Or there's a lot of discussion
about this in the philosophical
literature about what it means
and how you can define disability.
And so many people can identify
with their condition and be proud
of it and you can have a disability
and nevertheless be healthy.
So this is an example where the
terminology used might not be
ideal and can be misleading.
Of course there, there are a number
of reasons why that might be the case.
Generally, when you're looking at case
law, the judges may have their own
preferred terminology, but it may well
be that certain terms are used by the
parties in the course of argument.
But when you are identifying this language
surrounding disability, if it is in a
case, you have, as I said earlier, a
source of language used, which can be
perceived as being more authoritative,
and that can have stronger effects
or effects of a different nature than
the kind of language that's used in,
for example, a more everyday context.
Elysia: So the second example
you identify in your paper is
the use of the word abnormality.
So what would you say
about that specifically?
Heloise: Sure.
So abnormality is a tricky term because
it could be interpreted as implying a
value judgment or a normative judgment
that there's something wrong, there's
something not normal, but equally it
might not be used with that intention.
It might just be referring to,
statistical deviation, for example.
So , it's a term I think is important
to pay attention to and to take those
factors into account and think about
the context in which the word is used.
If someone is being labeled
as abnormal, that could be
considered to be stigmatizing.
And so it's a term that can, I
think that just merits some thought
and attention when it's used.
Elysia: So in a legal setting,
one of the ways in which the term
abnormality or related terms is
used is in the Abortion Act 1967.
So would you like to talk
a little bit about that?
Heloise: Sure.
So yes, in that statute you have
a specific disability ground.
So, there's provision to allow
for abortion on the grounds of
disability, and there has been some
criticism of the specific language
used in that ground, as well.
So again, leaving aside the legal
effect or issues about abortion more
generally, there, there's also been
attention to the specific language.
So in that particular ground in the
statute, abortion can be lawful, if
there is a substantial risk that if the
child were born, it would suffer from
such physical or mental abnormalities
as to be seriously handicapped.
And so there you have an example
of the word abnormalities used.
There could be criticism
of the word risk or suffer.
Maybe people don't necessarily
suffer from a disability.
And also handicapped is now
considered to be outdated.
So this was raised, for example, in
a recent case in the Court of Appeal
where a person from Mencap, a charity
for people with learning disabilities
referred to some of this problematic
language in the statute as being
a problem with the language itself.
Elysia: You identified the shift in
labeling ASD from autism to autism
spectrum, and rightly point out
the benefits of doing so, such as
acknowledging that each individual on the
spectrum is unique in their presentation
of ASD and how it affects them.
However, the courts have not been
as quick to pick up on this as
you identify in Khan v Meadows.
Why do you think this is the case?
Heloise: Yes.
So in Khan v Meadows, there was
a reference to an individual
as suffering from autism.
So here you have that reference
again to the word suffer which is
unfortunate to be used in this context.
Why the courts use this language
is a difficult question.
It, it may be that it would be helpful
for there to be greater awareness
about the terminology that can be used.
it's important to remember,
of course, that it could
come from a particular judge.
It may also be that parties are
maybe themselves using certain
expressions in the course of argument.
There are a number of examples where you
can look to the way that disability is
referred to or described in judgements
where it would be better if different
formulations were used and no doubt
a greater awareness in general and
society and perhaps in the legal context
could lead to progress in this area.
Elysia: I think the last situation
that you identify is the labeling
of intellectual disabilities, where
some of the most egregious comments
have been made by the judiciary,
including comparing someone with an
intellectual disability to a cabbage.
Uh, there is a widespread use of
terms generally considered offensive,
such as mongoloid or vegetable-
Heloise: Mm-hmm.
Elysia: -Uh, within the judiciary.
So why do you think this might still
be the case, even though most people
would tend to think that these terms
would not be acceptable anymore.
Heloise: Yes.
So it's certainly true in the context
of referring to intellectual disability.
There are some very unfortunate
examples, maybe some of the most
unfortunate examples of language used.
So the reference you, you
made, there to reference to a
cabbage, was from some time ago.
So that was a case from 1981.
We certainly can hope there's been some
evolution in the language that's been
used, but one example of terminology
we still see now, in both the medical
context and still in case law, is
reference to a vegetative state,
or a persistent vegetative state.
And that's used quite commonly
perhaps without much question.
Although when, when you think about it,
it's actually quite insulting, isn't it?
Because it seems quite dehumanizing,
in fact, to use that, that terminology.
Perhaps people think it's not insulting
to the individual, the themselves, if
they are not hearing the terminology.
I think we have seen some progress
and some evolution in the terminology
that's used, but there's definitely room
for more progress and awareness still.
Elysia: Now that we've gone through all
these examples of the way that these
different terms are used in a legal
setting, do you think that firstly
labels do actually have a real impact
on the way that courts treat disability
and therefore people treat disability?
And secondly, do you think that this
is really like the be all and end
all about disability and language?
Heloise: Well, it is a very difficult
issue to deal with problematic
terminology because what can be negative
is not necessarily a meaning inherent
or necessary within the word itself.
It can also be the connotations
that attached to a word.
So I mentioned vegetative before that in
a way, maybe that's inherently negative
if there's reference to vegetable,
it seems dehumanizing, but there are
other words where there's nothing
obviously negative in the word itself.
It's more that they're, or not necessarily
more negative than other words, but it's
the connotations that surround the word.
So it's perceived as an
offensive term, for example.
And that's difficult to deal with
because in the short term, you could
say, right, okay, there are some words
we should avoid, and that's true.
Some words are offensive and we should
just avoid them, and so there could
be greater awareness to avoid them.
But if there continues to be general
prejudice and stigma regarding disabled
people in society, then if we use another
word, which might seem more neutral
now, eventually, negative connotations
can attach to that word as well if
there is general prejudice in society.
So I mentioned earlier the term
condition, which is quite neutral,
but if there is a lot of prejudice
surrounding disabled people, and the
term condition is used, maybe one
day that term will also be associated
with more negative connotations.
So, really, in order to, to
deal with a problem, you need
to have a wider approach.
You need to be looking at ideally changing
attitudes more broadly in society, and so
dealing at a higher level, at a broader
level with combating stigmatization.
So the more we're able to reduce
stigma, prejudice in society, then
the less that's going to come up and
attach itself to particular words.
And again, so that's why also it can be
particularly important to look at words
used in a context where there is more
authority and power, so in the context
of medicine, in law, words that people
are really gonna look to as a first
source or as an authoritative source.
And that can then be used elsewhere.
To really combat the use of
problematic terminology, we can't
just look at words one by one.
You have to also take a broader approach.
Elysia: Thank you so much Dr. Robinson,
for your insightful commentary regarding
the current use of labels within
disability law and outside of it as well.
Before we move on to the next segment
regarding possible reforms of terminology
used with regards to disability, we would
like to express our gratitude for the
generous support of Crown Office Chambers.
Crown Office Chambers is a leading
set consisting of over a hundred
commercial and common law, barristers,
arbitrators, and mediators.
They have just released a short
film introducing their pupils, the
film, as well as other information
about pupillages, can be found on
their website at www.crown office
chambers.com/careers/pupilage.
Thank you Crown Office Chambers.
Elysia: Now we return to the next
segment of our episode today discussing
possible reforms of terminology
used with regards to disability.
To resolve or mitigate the issues
surrounding labeling of disability
within a legal context, your paper,
"Naming and Describing Disability in
the Law" explores two ways in which
descriptions of disability can be handled.
Firstly, the neutral approach, and
secondly, the targeted approach.
Would you like to elaborate on
the first approach of presenting
information in a value neutral way?
Heloise: Yes.
So there's a lot of discussion
in the philosophical literature
about how to define disability or
the right model of disability or
conception or theory of disability.
It's one of the themes, the issues
that's getting the most attention in the
philosophical literature on disability.
And it's a very difficult question.
It might seem quite obvious, it's,
it's a bit like defining health and
health notoriously -we all think we
know what it means, but it's very
notoriously difficult to actually define.
One way to look at it is we might need
to agree, you know, on how we understand
disability and whether we can also
understand disability in the absence
of any particular value judgments
or whether that's possible or not.
But another approach might be to
say we can look at more specific
narrow or targeted issues.
And especially perhaps in a legal
context, we might say there might be
some instances where we don't necessarily
need to agree in an abstract way on
how we define disability, but we might
think, okay, here we're concerned with
pain or we're concerned with mobility
issues and so on, or in a medical context
too, we might think we're concerned
with these particular targeted issues.
And so then we can leave aside
broader complications about how you
define disability or whether there is
something good or bad in being disabled.
If it's something that's a positive
identity or something that is
associated with medical treatment
and so on, we can leave aside some of
those complications if you're looking
at specific, more targeted issues.
Elysia: Okay.
So just zooming in a little
bit on the neutral approach.
So what exactly would that look like?
So for example, you mentioned that
NHS guidance on prenatal testing aims
to provide more balanced information
and has attempted to move towards
a more balanced language using
chance versus risk of a baby being
born with a particular condition.
Heloise: Yeah, so one context where
it is very relevant to think about
how information is provided and
whether the approach to disability
is neutral or implies certain value
judgments is in the context of prenatal
testing and information provided
to parents about the chance that
their child will be born disabled.
In that context, a recurring criticism
is that the information provided can
be overly negative about disability.
So the parents will be told, there's
a chance your child will have this
particular condition, this particular
disability, and it's thought to be
important to provide this information,
often to promote reproductive autonomy
and to give the pregnant woman an the
choice to have or not have an abortion:
an abortion on the grounds of disability.
So it's often thought that it's
important to provide accurate
information in terms of the chance or
the risk or the diagnosis, and also
information about the condition itself.
But one of the difficulties is how
can you provide this information
in a way which is neutral or is it
possible to, to really provide this
information in a way that is neutral?
And so a recurring criticism is that
the information can be overly negative.
It can maybe, there can be a
discussion of certain negative sides
associated with raising a child
with a particular disability, but
no mention of some positive sides.
So there has been recently some efforts
to try to provide with, it's often
called more balanced information,
more neutral, more balanced.
So there has been, for example, a
change in, instead of referring to a
risk that the child will be born with
a particular condition, guidance might
say there's a chance that the child
be born with a particular condition,
which seems to be a more neutral term.
So that is seen by many
people as an improvement.
Of course, it's not entirely neutral
because the fact that you're being
informed that there's a chance that
your child will have this particular
condition, it's of course implying
that you need to think about it and
that there would be a good reason
not to give birth to this child.
So it's not entirely neutral given
that it takes place in the context of
testing where routine prenatal testing
implies there's a reason for testing and
there's a reason to think about whether
or not you want to have the child.
But the specific word chance in this
context is considered, for example, to
be less negative than the word risk.
Elysia: So in your previous answer,
you do touch upon some of the possible
issues or objections with the approach,
but would you mind fleshing it out, what
exactly the possible issues or objections
with the neutral approach might be?
Heloise: Sure.
So for example, there's a guidance that
describes Down syndrome where both what
might be considered to be positive and
negative characteristics are listed.
So there you have an example of what
might seem to be a more balanced approach.
So the guidance, for example, says that
children with this condition will have
a learning disability and will be more
likely to have certain health problems.
But then it also mentions that
they can have a good quality
of life and attend school.
So this can be an example where it seems
that more balanced information can be
provided where the information provided
is not only negative, but it is difficult
if you're trying to provide information
in a neutral way, it is really difficult
because how do you know how many positive
or negative aspects would you mention?
We don't normally do this for
most people, for most babies, we
don't list positive and negative
features about someone's life.
To provide more balanced information
might seem to be making a move towards
a less negative approach to disability
in the context of prenatal testing.
But at the same time, it's not entirely
neutral, especially since one way
to interpret it is that if you hear
information like that, it will sound
like the child will have certain negative
traits that other children won't have.
And then the positive traits
are ones which most children
would have anyway really.
So it sort of implies that that overall
there is still something negative.
A better approach might be to, if
you're listing negative traits,
to also list positive traits that
are specific to the condition.
So mentioning that the child will
probably attend school is not specific
to Down Syndrome and most children attend
school, but perhaps something which
is especially positive and associated
with Down Syndrome and not with most
children could also be provided.
So that's, I I think it's, this is
really tricky because it's an example
where your information is provided.
If the objective is for the information to
be accurate and balanced and neutral, it's
important to think about these issues.
But equally, of course it will
never entirely be neutral.
There's no entirely neutral way of
presenting this information and, really,
given the wider context in which it's
provided, you could say that overall
there, the message being sent is still
that there's a good reason to consider
avoiding the birth of the child.
Elysia: So moving on to the
second approach, which is the
targeted approach which seeks to
address specific ethical concerns.
So you did talk about this in the
beginning of this segment where
you talked about how people want to
address specific concerns, so such as
reduced mobility and things like that.
So would you mind elaborating
on what that would look like as
compared to the neutral approach?
Heloise: Yes.
Well, one thing that can be done is
to distinguish between cases where
you can have a condition that can be
cured and a condition that is lifelong.
So if you have a condition with a
number of health problems that can
be treated or that can be cured,
maybe a targeted approach can be
taken where you refer to specific
problems and how to deal with them.
But if you have a lifelong condition,
it might be especially important to
refer if there are negative aspects
to refer to positive aspects as
well, and to bear in mind that with
a lifelong condition, it may affect
more a person's sense of identity.
And so if negative information is given
about a lifelong condition, it might be
interpreted as not just being negative
with respect to something that could
be separated out, and health problems
as something separate, but that can
attach to the person themselves.
So I think there it can be important
to bear in mind the nature of the
condition you're dealing with.
Elysia: So what are some possible issues
or objections with the targeted approach?
Heloise: Well, I think in some
contexts we can look at very specific
issues and we don't necessarily need
to ask, is this disability or not?
We can refer to something more specific.
I think more broadly though, it can
be helpful for a number of reasons to
ask whether we're generally dealing
with disability and how we understand
disability more broadly in society.
So although there can be different
specific issues, they can be tied
together in certain important ways.
And so it's important to see, I suppose
the, the broader picture as well.
So sometimes referring to
specific issues is helpful.
But at the same time, bearing in
mind the links between specific
issues or what a broader approach
can achieve will also have benefits.
Elysia: In your paper, you've identified
a recent case in which the courts have
attempted a balanced description, which
is Crowter v Secretary of State for Health
and Social Care, which you've also written
an article about titled "Discrimination
in Abortion Law and Message the Law
is Sending: R (Crowter) v Secretary
of State for Health and Social Care."
Would you mind telling us
what happened in this case?
Heloise: Yes.
So one of the reasons why the case
was really interesting is that it was
in a sense about what you could call
the expressivist argument, which has
been discussed extensively in the
literature on philosophy on bioethics.
The expressivist argument is essentially
that prenatal testing and abortion on
the grounds of disability expresses a
negative message about disabled people.
It sends a message that they're less
welcome in society, for example,
or that society might think,
or some people might think that
their lives are less worthwhile.
So that's been discussed extensively
in the philosophical literature.
There's debate about it.
Not everyone agrees with the argument.
What's particularly interesting
is that this essentially was
the argument that came to court.
There wasn't any reference in the
case to the philosophical literature.
I guess that's not, not surprising.
But also what I should say is, one
difficulty with the expressivist
argument is we might ask who
is expressing the message.
So if it's the parents or the pregnant
woman herself, we might think, well.
If an individual pregnant woman decides
to have an abortion on the grounds
of disability, she isn't necessarily
trying to express a wider message
about disabled people in general.
She might be making a decision based
on her own personal circumstances.
She might be taking many different factors
into account, so she's not trying to
necessarily say, other people should
do the same thing as me or making a
general statement about disability, it
might seem like a personal decision.
So that's one problem with
the expressivist argument.
But if the message is coming from the
law itself, so that was the issue in
Crowter, then it's different because
if we think it's the law or it's the
state that's sending the message that
there's an especially good reason to
avoid the birth of disabled children,
then it could be more concerning.
One thing I should say as well, and
this did not come out clearly from
the case if you read the case, but
this is not in fact a sort of pro-life
or pro-life or pro-choice issue.
So you can take issue with a negative
message in the law without necessarily
thinking that access to abortion
should be, needs to be restricted.
So right now the law singles
out disability as a very
specific ground for abortion.
There are other reasons a woman
might want to have an abortion that
are, that are not listed in the law.
If you had, for example, a more liberal
approach to the law and abortion, if,
for example, a woman could just have
an abortion for any reason, then you
wouldn't have disability singled out.
So, in practice there could be abortions
on the grounds of disability, and that
may well reflect a personal decision
and the law wouldn't be singling it out.
So it was, it was a very interesting
and somewhat complicated case, but one
of the reasons why it was interesting
is that it was really looking at this
expressivist argument as tied to a message
coming from the law itself and coming
from the state itself, which is more
concerning, but equally, it wasn't in fact
a, a pro-life, pro-choice sort of issue.
Elysia: Yeah, so the case was very
interesting for the kind of arguments
that both parties brought to the table.
But would you'd like to summarize for us
basically what the outcome was of Crowter?
Heloise: Yeah, so the case was dismissed.
So the appellants weren't
successful in their case.
Essentially, the central reason in the
lead judgment was that the law on abortion
is not concerned with disabled people.
It's just concerned with
the unborn, with the fetus.
So it's not sending a negative
message about disabled people
because it's not about disabled
people, it's about the fetus.
So, with respect, I don't think it's
a very convincing interpretation.
Clearly, the ground is about
preventing the birth of disabled
children, about the child.
In fact, the law specifically refers
to the, it uses the words, the child.
I don't think anyone is really
concerned about whether there's
a disabled fetus, whether there's
disability only in the womb.
So really the provision is about
preventing the birth of a disabled child.
So there's much more that can be said
about it, but certainly I think that
central reason is unfortunately not very
convincing as an interpretation of the way
we can understand the law in its message.
Elysia: I see.
So why do you think that the courts are
still reluctant to interpret legislation
as being worded in a discriminatory way?
Heloise: I think that's-
it is a difficult question.
I think perhaps inevitably, because the
case was on abortion that might just color
the approach to this particular case.
You could have another case,
which is about the negative
message sent by the law.
You could imagine maybe a scenario
where you have a negative message
about disability sent in the law, and
it's not in the context of abortion.
It may well be that, given that this was
an abortion case, and given that that's
a sensitive area, that may well have
affected the approach that was taken here.
Elysia: So you mentioned that the
reality is that it might be impossible
to describe disability in a way that's
entirely neutral, especially as many
conditions have a range of presentations,
which make it difficult to fully
encompass the diversity of experience.
So how can legislators and the judiciary
move forward then to provide descriptions
of disability that do people justice?
Heloise: Yes.
That's such an important and such
a difficult question and so we
didn't intend in this article to
provide a full resolution to that.
I think part of the answer will
come from greater awareness.
I think as there's greater awareness
of the importance of language and more
understanding about disability, there can
be progress that can be made in both the
medical context and the legal context.
But, and as I said before what's important
to bear in mind is that the broader
attitudes to disability, if there is
a broader prejudice and stigma within
society, it is very likely that that's
going to affect one way or another the
terminology that's going to be used.
In terms of making progress, part of
the progress can come from saying,
right, we need greater awareness about
certain terms that should not be used.
There's some terms where it's obvious,
there's others where there's debate
and different views, but there's some
terms we shouldn't use, but equally the
connotations attaching to terms can change
over time, and so the more we have a more
inclusive approach in society in general,
and the more that hopefully that will
trickle down to the terminology as well.
Elysia: That's all the questions
that we have for today.
Dr. Robinson, thank you so much for
taking time out of your day to speak
with us and to let everyone know a
little bit more about the descriptions
of disability in a legal context.
Would you like to say a few final words?
Heloise: Uh, that's all great.
I, I just wanna say thank you
very much for having me and
for speaking with me today.
And I'm very happy if there is
any interest in these issues.
Elysia: Thank you very much to Dr.
Robinson once again for coming to the
Oxford University Undergraduate Law
Podcast and to Crown Office Chambers
for making this series possible.
Lastly, thank you to our listeners
for supporting the podcast.