1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:11,620 Welcome to the Oxford Undergraduate Law Podcast, where we discuss the law and its implications 2 00:00:11,620 --> 00:00:16,980 on our relationships, our markets and our futures. I'm Jake Pronger, one of your podcast 3 00:00:16,980 --> 00:00:21,660 editors. We platform academics, practitioners and experts from different backgrounds on 4 00:00:21,660 --> 00:00:26,940 this podcast. This series was made possible by the generous support of Crown Office Chambers, 5 00:00:26,940 --> 00:00:31,520 one of the leading London sets of Chambers specialising in civil and commercial work. 6 00:00:31,520 --> 00:00:36,840 With the inauguration of Donald J. Trump on the 20th of January 2025, the elections which 7 00:00:36,840 --> 00:00:40,160 have been on many people's minds have been the elections which took place in the United 8 00:00:40,160 --> 00:00:45,480 States of America. However, just south of the border, Mexico is shaping up to face some 9 00:00:45,480 --> 00:00:50,800 of the most important elections in its history, which have the potential to shape the face 10 00:00:50,800 --> 00:00:57,120 of the North and South American continent and indeed the world for the foreseeable future. 11 00:00:57,120 --> 00:01:02,560 Over the course of 2025 and 2027, Mexico will look to hold elections to replace some 7,000 12 00:01:02,560 --> 00:01:08,600 judges and the soonest of these elections will take place in June of this year. Judicial 13 00:01:08,600 --> 00:01:12,960 reform in Mexico has long been a contentious issue with widespread calls to address corruption, 14 00:01:12,960 --> 00:01:17,560 inefficiency and lack of accountability within the judiciary. The latest reform initiative 15 00:01:17,560 --> 00:01:21,880 known as Plan C has sparked significant debate due to its sweeping proposals including electing 16 00:01:21,880 --> 00:01:26,840 judges by popular vote and creating a disciplinary court to oversee judicial conduct. On the 17 00:01:26,840 --> 00:01:33,380 15th of September, Mexico's Senate approved the reform by 86 to 41 and the constitution 18 00:01:33,380 --> 00:01:39,760 was therefore amended. Plan C follows two earlier reform attempts, imaginatively called 19 00:01:39,760 --> 00:01:45,000 Plan A and Plan B. Plan A was introduced by President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador and 20 00:01:45,000 --> 00:01:49,800 his Morena party, aiming to make constitutional changes including reducing the number of electoral 21 00:01:49,800 --> 00:01:55,160 councillors and centralising electoral oversight under the National Electoral Institute, the 22 00:01:55,160 --> 00:02:00,160 INE. This proposal was rejected due to concerns of electoral interference and the risk of 23 00:02:00,160 --> 00:02:06,640 undermining the democratic process. Subsequently, Plan B was introduced in November of 2022, 24 00:02:06,640 --> 00:02:12,040 focusing on secondary laws to reduce the administrative powers of the INE and to introduce elections 25 00:02:12,040 --> 00:02:19,120 for its officials. However, in June of 2023, Mexico's Supreme Court declared Plan B unconstitutional 26 00:02:19,120 --> 00:02:25,400 in a 9 to 11 supermajority. It did so on the grounds that these reforms were rushed through 27 00:02:25,400 --> 00:02:30,440 Congress without proper debate and according to Justice Alberto Pérez Dayán, this violated 28 00:02:30,440 --> 00:02:37,680 the right to freedom of expression, transparency and access to public information and accountability. 29 00:02:37,680 --> 00:02:42,360 Supporters of Plan C, including Morena and some civil society groups, argued that the reforms 30 00:02:42,360 --> 00:02:47,640 would democratise the judiciary and address corruption and nepotism concerns. Conversely, 31 00:02:47,640 --> 00:02:52,340 organisations such as the INE, Human Rights Watch and Legal Scholars have warned that these 32 00:02:52,340 --> 00:02:56,520 reforms threaten judicial independence and risk concentrating power in the executive 33 00:02:56,520 --> 00:03:00,520 branch alone. Critics also highlight that the reforms could undermine the judiciary's 34 00:03:00,520 --> 00:03:05,420 role as a check on the government's power, potentially eroding democratic safeguards. 35 00:03:05,420 --> 00:03:09,360 The controversy surrounding Plan C underscores the tension between calls for judicial reform 36 00:03:09,360 --> 00:03:14,960 and the imperative to preserve the rule of law and constitutional balance in Mexico. 37 00:03:14,960 --> 00:03:19,280 Today I am delighted to be joined by my guest, Luz Orozco y Villa. She is a legal scholar 38 00:03:19,280 --> 00:03:24,160 and author of the article entitled, 'The Dangerous Path of Mexico's Judicial Reform: What is 39 00:03:24,160 --> 00:03:29,560 at stake for judicial independence in the Americas?' Luz is a DPhil (PhD) in law candidate 40 00:03:29,560 --> 00:03:34,340 at the Faculty of Law. Her research lies at the intersection of constitutional law and 41 00:03:34,340 --> 00:03:39,440 emerging technologies. Supervised by Professor Rowbottom, her doctoral thesis focuses on the 42 00:03:39,440 --> 00:03:45,060 constitutionalisation of the digital environment, specifically the case of online service providers 43 00:03:45,060 --> 00:03:48,520 regarding content moderation. 44 00:03:48,520 --> 00:03:53,240 Prior to joining Oxford, Luz worked as a career clerk for the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice 45 00:03:53,240 --> 00:03:58,520 and as a research adviser at the gender equality programme of the Federal Judicial Council. 46 00:03:58,520 --> 00:04:02,840 She has taught international human rights law, philosophy of human rights, family law 47 00:04:02,840 --> 00:04:07,760 and gender justice to undergraduate law students at different universities. She completed an 48 00:04:07,760 --> 00:04:13,560 LLM from Columbia Law School as a Fulbright Scholar and an LLB from el Instituto Tecnológico 49 00:04:13,560 --> 00:04:18,240 Autónimo de México. Luz is currently the co-convener of the Future of Technology and 50 00:04:18,240 --> 00:04:20,960 Society Discussion Group. 51 00:04:20,960 --> 00:04:23,680 Thanks so much for having me, Jake. I'm delighted to be here. 52 00:04:23,680 --> 00:04:27,960 Thank you. Well, I think we should get straight into the questions. So, most of our audience 53 00:04:27,960 --> 00:04:32,080 are not familiar with the Mexican judicial system, nor would they have any links to Mexico 54 00:04:32,080 --> 00:04:37,920 at all. But I think it's important to highlight Mexico's role as a key player in the Americas. 55 00:04:37,920 --> 00:04:41,560 And therefore, if we could provide a brief overview of judicial reforms in Mexico, including 56 00:04:41,560 --> 00:04:44,880 the background on Plan C and why these reforms are considered so controversial. 57 00:04:44,880 --> 00:04:52,000 Yes, of course, Jake. Thanks so much for the question. I think it would be important to 58 00:04:52,000 --> 00:05:01,640 highlight three components of the very massive judicial overhaul that was passed by Congress. 59 00:05:01,640 --> 00:05:08,080 I would address the removal of all sitting judges at all levels, the replacement with 60 00:05:08,080 --> 00:05:14,040 newly popularly elected judges and the creation of the disciplinary court. And I think each 61 00:05:14,040 --> 00:05:18,400 one of these components is truly controversial. 62 00:05:18,400 --> 00:05:23,600 The first one is this idea of removing all sitting judges from the justices of the Supreme 63 00:05:23,600 --> 00:05:28,760 Court to all local judges as well as at the federal level. We're talking about more 64 00:05:28,760 --> 00:05:36,760 than 6,000 people being immediately removed from office during the next three years. And 65 00:05:36,760 --> 00:05:42,080 this is highly controversial because according to international human rights law standards, 66 00:05:42,080 --> 00:05:48,800 you can only remove judges under permitted grounds such as age, retirement, misconduct, 67 00:05:48,800 --> 00:05:54,440 serious incompetence. And the rationality that is behind this is pretty simple. Judges 68 00:05:54,440 --> 00:06:03,640 have a guarantee of tenure. You need some breathing space in order to do the job. In 69 00:06:03,640 --> 00:06:10,520 order to be able to decide cases freely, you need to not fear the possibility of losing 70 00:06:10,520 --> 00:06:18,480 your job. You're not having the fear of losing your job, right? So this is in itself unprecedented, 71 00:06:18,480 --> 00:06:24,240 I think, in the global scale. There's not another case in history where all the judiciary 72 00:06:24,240 --> 00:06:34,880 of a country is removed. And then the second component is a replacement with newly elected 73 00:06:34,880 --> 00:06:41,920 judges by the people, right? Like this idea of electing through popular vote all the judiciary. 74 00:06:41,920 --> 00:06:48,140 And well, according to international human rights law, there's not an established specific 75 00:06:48,140 --> 00:06:57,320 procedure to designate judges. International human rights standards do establish that these 76 00:06:57,320 --> 00:07:02,800 elections should be based in personal merit and qualifications, not your political endorsements, 77 00:07:02,800 --> 00:07:11,760 right? So it's very important to guarantee that judges have, as I've said, the qualifications 78 00:07:11,760 --> 00:07:18,520 in order to do their job. And it really doesn't matter how popular you are, but that you're 79 00:07:18,520 --> 00:07:25,280 in a position to take a technical decision when you are deciding over a case. And the 80 00:07:25,280 --> 00:07:32,160 third element that I would say is important of this reform, and it's also very problematic 81 00:07:32,160 --> 00:07:37,760 under constitutional law, is the creation of this disciplinary court that will be in 82 00:07:37,760 --> 00:07:46,320 charge of overseeing and disciplining judges. And these members of the court will also be 83 00:07:46,320 --> 00:07:53,880 elected by popular vote. And I think the design in itself is problematic because the reform 84 00:07:53,880 --> 00:07:59,840 grants the executive and the legislative branches a lot of power to preselect the candidates 85 00:07:59,840 --> 00:08:06,040 that were eventually run for the elections in order to contend for one place at the court. 86 00:08:06,040 --> 00:08:11,680 And according again to international human rights law, any disciplinary system should 87 00:08:11,680 --> 00:08:19,000 be isolated from political interference. And not only that, the reform also provides for 88 00:08:19,000 --> 00:08:25,160 disciplinary grounds for sanctioning judges that are too vague and too open-ended. So 89 00:08:25,160 --> 00:08:35,920 this grants a broad discretion for this disciplinary court that I would say does not provide the 90 00:08:35,920 --> 00:08:42,760 possibility for a judge to check on political power or protect minorities as it's their 91 00:08:42,760 --> 00:08:43,760 job to do so. 92 00:08:43,760 --> 00:08:50,080 I think there's certainly something to be said that if, for example, at a nation's 93 00:08:50,080 --> 00:08:55,340 entire level, if you're electing around 7,000 judges, there's a possibility for the people 94 00:08:55,340 --> 00:08:59,440 in those elections, if you have over 80 candidates on your ballot, the likelihood of you knowing 95 00:08:59,440 --> 00:09:03,200 the extent to which each candidate is going to be able to contribute in a positive way 96 00:09:03,200 --> 00:09:07,920 to your future is very decreased. You're not making an informed decision in the same way 97 00:09:07,920 --> 00:09:11,880 that you are when you're electing the president of the country. So what would you make of 98 00:09:11,880 --> 00:09:17,560 the commentators who say that Morena was elected and they have been re-elected under Claudia 99 00:09:17,560 --> 00:09:22,120 Sheinbaum with a huge majority in Congress and that they were elected on the grounds 100 00:09:22,120 --> 00:09:26,560 of introducing reform into the judicial system for the country as a whole. And therefore 101 00:09:26,560 --> 00:09:29,720 these reforms are needed to bring about that reform. 102 00:09:29,720 --> 00:09:36,160 Yeah, I think you raise a relevant point. One of the arguments that the Morena Party uses 103 00:09:36,160 --> 00:09:42,240 in order to legitimize this judicial overhaul is that they actually have a popular mandate 104 00:09:42,240 --> 00:09:48,320 after their sweeping victory in June elections. I would push back on that argument because 105 00:09:48,320 --> 00:09:56,040 I don't think that actually these reforms were passed in a very deliberative process 106 00:09:56,040 --> 00:10:05,000 that respects actually that democratic substance. I think actually the way that Morena secured 107 00:10:05,000 --> 00:10:13,960 the vote in order to pass this bill was deeply problematic. It was more about political extortion 108 00:10:13,960 --> 00:10:19,720 rather than having a broad consensus among the different parties in both chambers of 109 00:10:19,720 --> 00:10:30,680 Congress. So I don't see a linear, I don't see the connection between a sweeping victory 110 00:10:30,680 --> 00:10:40,320 which of course happened and Claudia Sheinbaum was elected by I think 35 million votes. Still 111 00:10:40,320 --> 00:10:48,680 I don't think the Mexican people had enough time to actually get engaged and discuss thoroughly 112 00:10:48,680 --> 00:10:56,880 this reform that was presented in February. We're talking only about a few months and 113 00:10:56,880 --> 00:11:03,520 I think all the relevant stakeholders in terms of civil society actually caution against 114 00:11:03,520 --> 00:11:09,000 the passing of this reform which I think it's important to take into account. Like every 115 00:11:09,000 --> 00:11:16,320 single NGO that works in justice, universities, students, there were massive civil protests 116 00:11:16,320 --> 00:11:21,560 in Mexico asking maybe not necessarily against the reform but asking for more time in order 117 00:11:21,560 --> 00:11:28,040 to be able to actually discuss it and reach a broader consensus. I would tend to agree 118 00:11:28,040 --> 00:11:33,680 with the statements that you make, in particular to other scholars, Mr. Parra and Mr. Heckel 119 00:11:33,680 --> 00:11:37,440 in one of the recent articles that they wrote. They mentioned that the way in which the reform 120 00:11:37,440 --> 00:11:43,240 was passed in Congress, because of the protests it was held in another room and at one point 121 00:11:43,240 --> 00:11:49,360 one of the senators who said he wasn't previously going to vote for the reform, he was no longer 122 00:11:49,360 --> 00:11:52,880 ill and turned up to vote in favour of the reform. Many people argue that there must 123 00:11:52,880 --> 00:11:58,560 have been some back works, behind-the-scenes political meandering for him to be forced 124 00:11:58,560 --> 00:12:03,800 to vote in a way allegedly the senator had corruption investigations and he was going 125 00:12:03,800 --> 00:12:08,920 to face charges which he no longer is facing. So I wonder to what extent do you think the 126 00:12:08,920 --> 00:12:15,920 reform in and of itself was passed in a democratic manner in which the people elected the Morena 127 00:12:15,920 --> 00:12:22,640 party to do so? Yes, I agree with you. I think it was like a whole Mexican telenovela happening 128 00:12:22,640 --> 00:12:28,120 in Congress. There was not only the change of venue that you mentioned, like at the end 129 00:12:28,120 --> 00:12:33,800 I think at the Chamber of Deputies it was passed in a gym, literally. But yeah, you 130 00:12:33,800 --> 00:12:42,040 mentioned that there were three votes that were highly contentious people from the opposition, 131 00:12:42,040 --> 00:12:49,080 legislators from the opposition that eventually voted with Morena party and it seems to be 132 00:12:49,080 --> 00:12:55,680 the case that it was in exchange of the dropping of some charges so it was definitely political 133 00:12:55,680 --> 00:13:05,360 extortion behind it. One could argue that this is politics but I would say that since 134 00:13:05,360 --> 00:13:16,480 it was amidst huge massive civil protests we should be much more committed to broader 135 00:13:16,480 --> 00:13:28,160 consensus, more public involvement if we really want to reform that constitution in a legitimate 136 00:13:28,160 --> 00:13:37,920 way. Yes, yeah. So I think I read recently that 74 of AMLO's proposed laws were struck 137 00:13:37,920 --> 00:13:45,280 down by the Supreme Court under Norma Piña's presidency. He obviously saw that as an affront 138 00:13:45,280 --> 00:13:50,640 to his role as the president and therefore instituted the change of Plan A which failed 139 00:13:50,640 --> 00:13:55,040 and then Plan B and then followed by Plan C which finally passed. Do you think it's 140 00:13:55,040 --> 00:14:00,600 legitimate for a president who, again, they would argue that the mandate is from the people, 141 00:14:00,600 --> 00:14:07,160 if their laws are in some way affronted to the constitution, should that process be hindered 142 00:14:07,160 --> 00:14:12,760 by an independent judiciary which is unelected and therefore unaccountable to the people? 143 00:14:12,760 --> 00:14:22,880 Yes, I think if we look back and take into account the real motives behind the reform, 144 00:14:22,880 --> 00:14:28,760 I don't think right at the centre is access to justice. I think this comes out of political 145 00:14:28,760 --> 00:14:38,440 revenge, right? As you mentioned, the Supreme Court struck down several of former President 146 00:14:38,440 --> 00:14:44,560 Andrés Manuel López Obrador initiatives. For instance, we can think about Plan B in 147 00:14:44,560 --> 00:14:49,000 terms of the electoral authorities, but we can also think about the militarization, this 148 00:14:49,000 --> 00:14:56,240 idea of putting the Guardia Nacional, the institution that is in charge of public safety, 149 00:14:56,240 --> 00:15:00,840 under the Secretary of Defense, which was super controversial and that was struck down 150 00:15:00,840 --> 00:15:09,000 by the Supreme Court as well. So it seemed that the Supreme Court began, it was like 151 00:15:09,000 --> 00:15:17,640 a public enemy of the executive. It was precisely the only institution that put some obstacles 152 00:15:17,640 --> 00:15:25,160 to his political project and that's the reason behind what we're looking at now as the judicial 153 00:15:25,160 --> 00:15:30,760 reform. Yeah. When you mention like 'enemy of the people' or 'enemy of the public', it, 154 00:15:30,760 --> 00:15:36,480 as someone who's studying in the English jurisdiction and English law, it brings one to think about 155 00:15:36,480 --> 00:15:40,920 the Miller cases, which were obviously those famous cases where the government or I suppose 156 00:15:40,920 --> 00:15:46,480 the executive tried to pass laws without the approval of the legislative body. And in that 157 00:15:46,480 --> 00:15:50,120 case, the Supreme Court did not allow the government to do so and they had to require 158 00:15:50,120 --> 00:15:56,880 consent from parliament to leave the European Union for the reasons of Brexit. In the high, 159 00:15:56,880 --> 00:16:01,840 in the Divisional Court's decision, some of the tabloids in the UK printed the faces of the 160 00:16:01,840 --> 00:16:06,760 pictures of the judges and called them 'enemy of the people'. So I think this brings us to 161 00:16:06,760 --> 00:16:12,400 a point that you had in your article that it's very easy for when a populist figure 162 00:16:12,400 --> 00:16:19,600 thinks that there's an improper check on their power, they turn to, I suppose, demagoguery 163 00:16:19,600 --> 00:16:24,320 to suit their own ends. So it really is what the question that I'm asking is behind these 164 00:16:24,320 --> 00:16:30,040 reforms. Is it less of reforming the Mexican judicial system and more so of a power grab 165 00:16:30,040 --> 00:16:33,040 in favour of the executive? 166 00:16:33,040 --> 00:16:43,600 I would agree with that reading. I think since maybe 2022, we can even trace it back a bit 167 00:16:43,600 --> 00:16:54,280 in Andrés Manuel's career. He was, he's been always very critical and skeptical about judges 168 00:16:54,280 --> 00:17:00,760 but his derogatory rhetoric became really strong in 2022. And after the Supreme Court 169 00:17:00,760 --> 00:17:11,560 actually struck down some of his initiatives, he had like this open, hostile and intimidating 170 00:17:11,560 --> 00:17:17,600 discourse against judges in his mañaneras, as you know, these like morning sessions that 171 00:17:17,600 --> 00:17:25,200 he would address the people and basically complain about the judiciary. So he began 172 00:17:25,200 --> 00:17:33,400 building on this idea of Supreme Court and particularly President Chief Justice Piña 173 00:17:33,400 --> 00:17:36,080 as a public enemy, right? 174 00:17:36,080 --> 00:17:43,720 Yes, yeah. And so some scholars have argued that at its very best, if we take, I suppose, 175 00:17:43,720 --> 00:17:48,480 an optimistic view of the situation, Mexico's judiciary or I suppose judicial system is 176 00:17:48,480 --> 00:17:54,400 in dire need of some reform. I think according to the judiciary's own data, they received 177 00:17:54,400 --> 00:17:59,120 391 complaints of corruption and nepotism within the ranks, but none led to the dismissal 178 00:17:59,120 --> 00:18:04,480 of any judges. And so there's an idea or conception of the judiciary in Mexico being full of nepo-babies, 179 00:18:04,480 --> 00:18:08,640 I suppose you could call them, or people who have some tangential link to the judiciary. 180 00:18:08,640 --> 00:18:11,760 And in that sense, you're not getting the, it's not a meritocratic system where you're 181 00:18:11,760 --> 00:18:15,960 getting the best judges to produce the best judicial outcomes. You're just keeping it 182 00:18:15,960 --> 00:18:21,880 within a close-knit circle. So at its very best, the reform is seeking to change that 183 00:18:21,880 --> 00:18:29,120 in a misguided way. But obviously at its very worst, it can be seen as authoritarianism 184 00:18:29,120 --> 00:18:33,080 in action. I wonder what you make of those claims. Which one do you think is more likely 185 00:18:33,080 --> 00:18:34,080 to be the case? 186 00:18:34,080 --> 00:18:39,640 Well, I believe that both nepotism and corruption are definitely one of the problems that we 187 00:18:39,640 --> 00:18:46,880 are facing in the judiciary. And this is not new. I think a thorough reform of the administration 188 00:18:46,880 --> 00:18:56,280 of justice in Mexico is long overdue. I think the big problem is that this judicial reform 189 00:18:56,280 --> 00:19:03,520 is not solving any of those issues. And I would actually identify other problems as 190 00:19:03,520 --> 00:19:12,520 even more urgent than corruption and nepotism. If we look at the structural obstacles to 191 00:19:12,520 --> 00:19:18,680 the access of justice in Mexico, I think those are much more relevant to address. Of course, 192 00:19:18,680 --> 00:19:24,000 oversight of nepotism is an element, but it's only one among many. 193 00:19:24,000 --> 00:19:31,600 Yeah. I think that's certainly true. Another aspect of these reforms is the move to increase 194 00:19:31,600 --> 00:19:36,400 the amount of time someone on trial can be kept in pretrial detention before they've 195 00:19:36,400 --> 00:19:41,160 actually received their conviction. And many people seem to overlook the human rights implications 196 00:19:41,160 --> 00:19:46,560 of doing so. In Mexico, prosecutors are responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes. 197 00:19:46,560 --> 00:19:53,120 And in 2022, they opened 2.2 million investigations, but only 238,000 made it before a judge, which 198 00:19:53,120 --> 00:19:57,120 is about 10%. So clearly there is a disparity between the amount of people who are being 199 00:19:57,120 --> 00:20:01,680 held in pretrial captivity and the amount of those people who are genuinely, possibly 200 00:20:01,680 --> 00:20:08,080 guilty of a crime. So I wonder what you make of if the headlines of electing judges is 201 00:20:08,080 --> 00:20:14,840 hiding some arguably more impactful human rights violations beneath the surface. 202 00:20:14,840 --> 00:20:20,680 I think that's definitely the case. I think, yeah, the 'la prevención preventiva', which is what 203 00:20:20,680 --> 00:20:30,680 you're describing precisely, is contrary to international human rights law. It has already 204 00:20:30,680 --> 00:20:37,200 been decided by the Inter-American Court of Justice. Mexico is actually violating its 205 00:20:37,200 --> 00:20:45,760 international obligations by keeping this figure in the constitution. And yeah, we have 206 00:20:45,760 --> 00:20:56,320 high impunity rates and huge delays, overloaded prosecutors, underfunded police. We have structural 207 00:20:56,320 --> 00:21:03,080 obstacles and clearly electing judges is not going to solve any of them. 208 00:21:03,080 --> 00:21:07,520 Yes. Yeah. I think to borrow a phrase from Lord Leggatt in a recent Supreme Court case 209 00:21:07,520 --> 00:21:12,080 in the UK, he said that "you can only care about that, but you know about." So this brings 210 00:21:12,080 --> 00:21:16,640 us back to the practical issues of electing around 7,000 judges, 1,300 in Mexico City 211 00:21:16,640 --> 00:21:25,480 alone. How are, I suppose, the general public meant to inform themselves about which judge 212 00:21:25,480 --> 00:21:31,800 they have the possibility of electing? And therefore, how can we say that there's any 213 00:21:31,800 --> 00:21:37,120 benefit being accrued to the Mexican people by electing these officials? It seems that 214 00:21:37,120 --> 00:21:43,800 the party in power, which is Morena right now, would have a more than average chance 215 00:21:43,800 --> 00:21:47,920 of being able to push the candidates which they prefer or which are more likely to align 216 00:21:47,920 --> 00:21:53,040 with their views. And therefore, those people are more likely to be voted in by the general 217 00:21:53,040 --> 00:21:59,320 public because they would have more, I suppose, more screen time with them, more chance of 218 00:21:59,320 --> 00:22:01,120 being known by them. 219 00:22:01,120 --> 00:22:09,480 Yes, definitely. There are two puzzling elements of that, of that election first. Actually, 220 00:22:09,480 --> 00:22:14,000 there will be a preselection done by the executive, the legislative and the judiciary, and that 221 00:22:14,000 --> 00:22:21,400 will be the first filter. So it's not a direct popular vote. And in that preselection, you 222 00:22:21,400 --> 00:22:27,760 can imagine the influence that the party in power can have. And there is a second element 223 00:22:27,760 --> 00:22:33,400 I would add, and it's the possibility for the normal citizen to actually engage with 224 00:22:33,400 --> 00:22:40,120 the campaigns, right? Candidates are supposed not to receive any public or private funding 225 00:22:40,120 --> 00:22:48,400 for their campaign. So I wonder how are they going to actually communicate with the citizens 226 00:22:48,400 --> 00:22:55,040 and the electorate in that way. So yes, it seems that there is a really bad design in 227 00:22:55,040 --> 00:23:00,960 terms of this electoral system for judges. 228 00:23:00,960 --> 00:23:08,120 Yes. And I noticed that the proposers of the reform have mentioned that there'll be free 229 00:23:08,120 --> 00:23:13,400 time or airtime allocated to all the candidates. Obviously, I'm not sure about the feasibility 230 00:23:13,400 --> 00:23:17,640 of that for so many candidates. Obviously, the election will be spread out between 2025 231 00:23:17,640 --> 00:23:23,640 and 2027. But again, I think it brings us back to this problem of if the airtime is 232 00:23:23,640 --> 00:23:28,960 being administered by the party in power, the people who are likely to receive the primetime 233 00:23:28,960 --> 00:23:34,400 slots are those which are likely to align with their views. Do you think there's a possibility 234 00:23:34,400 --> 00:23:40,080 of international organisations such as the UN or the Inter-American Court to somehow 235 00:23:40,080 --> 00:23:46,040 be involved in this process and make it more democratic in the sense that it will ensure 236 00:23:46,040 --> 00:23:51,480 that the body which is administering the process by which judges are elected is held to account 237 00:23:51,480 --> 00:23:57,560 to do it in a way which is fair and impartial? 238 00:23:57,560 --> 00:24:06,400 I'm kind of pessimistic about this. I think the UN rapporteur on the independence of judges 239 00:24:06,400 --> 00:24:14,200 has already warned Mexico, caution against this reform. There's already a communication 240 00:24:14,200 --> 00:24:22,960 in that sense. It's the same for the Inter-American Commission. Recently, we held some hearings 241 00:24:22,960 --> 00:24:31,600 regarding the judicial reform. Although there was, of course, not yet a decision on it, 242 00:24:31,600 --> 00:24:38,640 some of the comisionados clearly stated their doubts and their concerns regarding this judicial 243 00:24:38,640 --> 00:24:47,400 reform and the Mexican state is still carrying the reform and implemented it on those terms. 244 00:24:47,400 --> 00:24:55,160 For the future, if thinking about the influence that international organisations can have, 245 00:24:55,160 --> 00:25:02,960 I'm a little bit sceptical. For me, it's so antithetical, the idea of electing judges 246 00:25:02,960 --> 00:25:10,600 with a constitutional democracy, that even if in the process there are some kind of channels 247 00:25:10,600 --> 00:25:19,240 for civil society to participate. I think in terms of the design, simply judges should 248 00:25:19,240 --> 00:25:28,080 not respond to the electorate. In order to be able to do their job, they need to be independent 249 00:25:28,080 --> 00:25:38,840 from political interference. Even if civil society can participate, for instance, in 250 00:25:38,840 --> 00:25:50,240 the designating processes, I'm quite pessimistic that this will change and that the best judges, 251 00:25:50,240 --> 00:25:54,600 the more prepared ones, the more technical, will actually be elected. I think the ones 252 00:25:54,600 --> 00:26:01,800 that will be elected, as you said, are the ones that are more close to Morena. 253 00:26:01,800 --> 00:26:10,040 That would be very unfortunate indeed. I wonder, in your opening statement and in your article 254 00:26:10,040 --> 00:26:15,640 you mentioned that the significant role Mexico plays in influencing the politics and I suppose 255 00:26:15,640 --> 00:26:22,360 setting the judicial precedent, judicial standard for the rest of South and North America. 256 00:26:22,360 --> 00:26:28,200 What can be learned from any attempt in North or South America to elect judges, number one? 257 00:26:28,200 --> 00:26:33,440 And number two, has there been any success in this regard? 258 00:26:33,440 --> 00:26:43,320 Yes. When we were discussing, scholars were discussing, because this happened honestly 259 00:26:43,320 --> 00:26:51,440 so fast that we didn't have a broad discussion about these issues. Of course, Bolivia and 260 00:26:51,440 --> 00:27:03,920 the US cases were highlighted, but I don't think that either Bolivia or the US have meaningful 261 00:27:03,920 --> 00:27:12,280 experiences or significant experiences in terms of this idea. I think actually that 262 00:27:12,280 --> 00:27:17,280 there is a false analogy and Francisco has an extraordinary article regarding how we 263 00:27:17,280 --> 00:27:26,520 shouldn't look at the US as an argument for the judicial reform because the case of the 264 00:27:26,520 --> 00:27:34,000 US is very exceptional and it also circumscribes to local judges whereas the Mexican judicial 265 00:27:34,000 --> 00:27:42,880 reform is actually overhauling both the federal and the local state and is removing all of 266 00:27:42,880 --> 00:27:48,880 them, not only local judges. And the case of Bolivia is also deeply problematic. I wouldn't 267 00:27:48,880 --> 00:27:56,680 look at Bolivia as a successful story about the democratization of the judiciary. It hasn't 268 00:27:56,680 --> 00:28:04,440 worked. The electorate was not engaged with the whole process and now you have a political 269 00:28:04,440 --> 00:28:10,800 capture of apex courts. And it was also only in the case of Bolivia only related to 270 00:28:10,800 --> 00:28:16,320 the apex courts, not the whole judiciary. So the cases are different. We shouldn't draw 271 00:28:16,320 --> 00:28:21,240 quick analogies and even if we draw these analogies, they are not successful cases, 272 00:28:21,240 --> 00:28:27,800 I would say. On the point about apex courts, I think it's also important to note that the 273 00:28:27,800 --> 00:28:32,800 election of the Supreme Court was changing the Supreme Court's constitution from 11 274 00:28:32,800 --> 00:28:37,000 to 9 justices in line with the US, but they will all be up for election. So that makes 275 00:28:37,000 --> 00:28:42,200 it very likely in the US there's talk of the US Supreme Court being packed by Donald Trump's 276 00:28:42,200 --> 00:28:49,000 nominees. But the same will be true to a much larger degree in the Mexican case where the 277 00:28:49,000 --> 00:28:51,880 likelihood, as we said, of judges being elected because they have backing from the Morena 278 00:28:51,880 --> 00:28:58,360 party, the likelihood of the Supreme Court being made up of Morena candidates or Morena 279 00:28:58,360 --> 00:29:03,680 affiliated judges is a lot higher. Because there's less judges now, the likelihood of 280 00:29:03,680 --> 00:29:09,440 being in the majority is increased. And so I wonder if Mexico's Supreme Court has the 281 00:29:09,440 --> 00:29:14,040 power to determine laws to be unconstitutional. And that was one of the last checks on the 282 00:29:14,040 --> 00:29:19,320 executive power. Where did we get the rest of these checks on the powers of the executive 283 00:29:19,320 --> 00:29:25,200 branch or the presidential decisions? If you dismantle the branches that are supposed 284 00:29:25,200 --> 00:29:37,280 to check on power, then you have nothing. It sounds like an exaggeration, but if you 285 00:29:37,280 --> 00:29:45,320 capture the court, there is nothing left. That's true. I suppose in the UK we have a 286 00:29:45,320 --> 00:29:51,560 conception of the ability of our legislative body and I suppose conjoined with the executive 287 00:29:51,560 --> 00:29:56,200 here in the House of Commons, the executive has a very powerful position because they 288 00:29:56,200 --> 00:30:00,200 command the majority of the House of Commons. And so we have the doctrine of parliamentary 289 00:30:00,200 --> 00:30:03,240 sovereignty which all first-year lawyers would be familiar with from their constitutional 290 00:30:03,240 --> 00:30:09,520 law seminars. But essentially if you had to boil it down, it would be that whatever parliament 291 00:30:09,520 --> 00:30:15,320 decides or enacts is law, is passed by virtue of their parliamentary sovereignty. So some 292 00:30:15,320 --> 00:30:23,680 people would suggest that because Mexico's Congress, they voted however you want to cut 293 00:30:23,680 --> 00:30:29,520 it, in the end the vote was passed for the reform. Could the argument be made that Mexico 294 00:30:29,520 --> 00:30:34,520 is a beneficiary of the same principle of parliamentary sovereignty or is there a difference 295 00:30:34,520 --> 00:30:41,240 between the two contexts of the UK and Mexico? That's a hard question. I would not dare to, 296 00:30:41,240 --> 00:30:54,960 because I'm not an expert in parliamentarism and sovereignty of parliament according to 297 00:30:54,960 --> 00:31:09,800 the British system. But I would say that right now, since basically Morena has a strong majority, 298 00:31:09,800 --> 00:31:17,280 it's not a qualified majority, but it's a strong majority, and we have a presidential 299 00:31:17,280 --> 00:31:27,480 tradition that maybe on paper is not that strong, but in terms of culture, the presidential 300 00:31:27,480 --> 00:31:36,960 figure still is super powerful, then you have full House, right? So not anymore checks and 301 00:31:36,960 --> 00:31:45,440 balances. So I wonder if you can move on to some questions about some alternatives of 302 00:31:45,440 --> 00:31:52,440 what we might have preferred. Alternatives? Yeah. So what alternative reforms would you 303 00:31:52,440 --> 00:31:57,120 suggest to address the legitimate concerns about the judiciary without compromising its independence? 304 00:31:57,120 --> 00:32:06,720 That's also a big question. The way that I thought that I could address it was by highlighting 305 00:32:06,720 --> 00:32:16,720 the shortcomings of the current system, but I think I already mentioned the high impunity rates 306 00:32:16,720 --> 00:32:23,360 that delays overloaded courts, marginalized communities doesn't have any access. But I 307 00:32:23,360 --> 00:32:29,720 would say that going forward, I think instead of electing judges, we have a fair amount 308 00:32:29,720 --> 00:32:34,680 of important measures that we should take into account. And I would say that these measures 309 00:32:34,680 --> 00:32:42,280 should be much more structural and vicious. Instead of focusing on the selection methods 310 00:32:42,280 --> 00:32:48,200 of judges that could lead, as we've said, potentially to political capture, I would 311 00:32:48,200 --> 00:32:57,400 say that we need to fund police, we need to fund prosecutors, we need to fund public defenders. 312 00:32:57,400 --> 00:33:04,160 There is a need for a professionalization of all public servants and also to work at 313 00:33:04,160 --> 00:33:09,480 the local level. I think it's very important to strengthen the local judiciaries. But this 314 00:33:09,480 --> 00:33:18,440 involves money. So that's part of, I would say, the trick of the judicial reform that 315 00:33:18,440 --> 00:33:24,480 even without funding, you're saying that you're doing something, but at the end, you're actually 316 00:33:24,480 --> 00:33:31,520 not changing, as I've said, the structural problems of the administration of justice 317 00:33:31,520 --> 00:33:38,240 in Mexico. Yes. So on a more optimistic note, many people seem to regard that Claudia Sheinbaum 318 00:33:38,240 --> 00:33:44,720 is less radical than her predecessor, AMLO. And obviously, the constitutional reform lays 319 00:33:44,720 --> 00:33:51,440 out the broad framework by which judges will be elected and the changes to the pre-incarceration 320 00:33:51,440 --> 00:33:58,400 regulations, et cetera. But do you think on a more practical note that Claudia Sheinbaum 321 00:33:58,400 --> 00:34:05,040 being more measured in her presidential approach would be laying out the framework of this 322 00:34:05,040 --> 00:34:12,160 reform in a more measured and sensible way, with secondary legislation? That's a very 323 00:34:12,160 --> 00:34:19,680 interesting point. And actually, I think she has been in power for just a few months, but 324 00:34:19,680 --> 00:34:28,240 seem to be originally a much more maybe moderate leader. I think in terms of the results, she 325 00:34:28,240 --> 00:34:36,400 hasn't been a more moderate leader. And I don't see how secondary legislation can make 326 00:34:36,400 --> 00:34:41,520 up for what the constitution says right now, that is that we are going to have elections 327 00:34:41,520 --> 00:34:50,440 next June and that we are going to remove all these sitting judges. So I don't see any 328 00:34:50,440 --> 00:34:59,400 moderation at all. Let's see how this works in the following months. But things are looking 329 00:34:59,400 --> 00:35:12,400 kind of gloomy, to be honest. And I am curious to see how the reform will be implemented. 330 00:35:12,400 --> 00:35:21,160 But I think there will be a counter-reform. And we can also see this maybe happening already 331 00:35:21,160 --> 00:35:27,520 in terms of the feasibility of the judicial reform by the electoral authorities saying 332 00:35:27,520 --> 00:35:33,200 that they actually don't have time. So they actually asked for more time in order to organize 333 00:35:33,200 --> 00:35:40,600 the elections. This was denied by Congress, both the executive and the legislative power. 334 00:35:40,600 --> 00:35:47,520 But let's see if they actually get away with it. Maybe even the implementation of the reform 335 00:35:47,520 --> 00:35:55,960 will prove to be impossible. So reality will hit before. I don't know. 336 00:35:55,960 --> 00:36:01,800 I think that is certainly possible. So I think we have been speaking for about 40 minutes, 337 00:36:01,800 --> 00:36:12,640 so we are going to take a quick break. Before we move on to the next segment of the 338 00:36:12,640 --> 00:36:17,320 podcast, we would like to express our gratitude for the generous support of Crown Office Chambers. 339 00:36:17,320 --> 00:36:22,840 Crown Office Chambers is a leading set consisting of over 100 commercial and common law barristers, 340 00:36:22,840 --> 00:36:28,000 arbitrators and mediators. They have just released a short film introducing their pupilages. 341 00:36:28,000 --> 00:36:32,480 The film, as well as other information about pupilages, can be found on their website at 342 00:36:32,480 --> 00:36:39,680 www.crownofficechambers.com/careers/pupilage. Thank you 343 00:36:39,680 --> 00:36:50,640 once again to Crown Office Chambers. Now back to our discussion. 344 00:36:50,640 --> 00:36:55,320 In your article, you mentioned that these reforms are part of a broader trend towards 345 00:36:55,320 --> 00:37:01,200 'autocratisation’. I wonder if you could expand on what you meant by this and how significant 346 00:37:01,200 --> 00:37:04,360 this is for the Americans and what it signals to other countries in the region. 347 00:37:04,360 --> 00:37:10,360 Yes, thank you very much for the question. I refer to these reforms as a playbook on 348 00:37:10,360 --> 00:37:16,360 autocratisation that happens when a legitimately elected leader dismantles the capacity of 349 00:37:16,360 --> 00:37:19,720 other branches to check their power. And I think this is precisely what we are looking 350 00:37:19,720 --> 00:37:30,920 at with the Mexican judicial reform. Basically, removing judges from office and blaming it 351 00:37:30,920 --> 00:37:36,640 on the Supreme Court is clearly an excuse for trying to eliminate all the checks and 352 00:37:36,640 --> 00:37:47,320 balances and to basically, I would say, capture the judiciary. And this is pretty, I would 353 00:37:47,320 --> 00:37:54,360 say concerning and should raise all the alarms in the region. Not only, I would say even 354 00:37:54,360 --> 00:37:59,360 in Latin America, but in the whole world that is this can actually happen. And it happens 355 00:37:59,360 --> 00:38:09,640 in Mexico in less than a I would say seven months. So also there is a time trap here. 356 00:38:09,640 --> 00:38:16,600 As you recall, at the same time, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador proposed 18 constitutional amendments 357 00:38:16,600 --> 00:38:25,400 and it was impossible for academics, political science, people that were involved actually 358 00:38:25,400 --> 00:38:32,240 to even follow up with what he was doing. And of course civil society, I would say, 359 00:38:32,240 --> 00:38:39,720 didn't have the time to actually engage with all the reforms that were put down on the 360 00:38:39,720 --> 00:38:44,160 table. So this is part, I guess, of a larger trend and we need to keep an eye on that. 361 00:38:44,160 --> 00:38:49,440 Yes, yeah, I totally agree with you. I mentioned or I noticed that you had an expertise in 362 00:38:49,440 --> 00:38:57,280 the family law system of Mexico. And I wondered just now how you think that the, as part of 363 00:38:57,280 --> 00:39:01,120 the reforms, as a certain qualifications that a judge must meet, they must be nominated 364 00:39:01,120 --> 00:39:06,560 by certain parties and also have reference letters, but they also have to have a law 365 00:39:06,560 --> 00:39:11,840 degree, but only average of grade of I think it was a seven or an eight, which is not particularly 366 00:39:11,840 --> 00:39:17,160 high. And in the people who have been, you know, gone through the Mexico's education 367 00:39:17,160 --> 00:39:22,880 system in the law suggest that that's too low of a threshold. And what potential impacts 368 00:39:22,880 --> 00:39:27,720 that might have on the day to day running of a family court, for example, for the justice 369 00:39:27,720 --> 00:39:29,880 being done to those people involved. 370 00:39:29,880 --> 00:39:37,600 Yes, totally. I think that the current requirements to run for an election for an electoral, for 371 00:39:37,600 --> 00:39:43,640 a judicial position are even ridiculous, like the five letters of recommendation, eight 372 00:39:43,640 --> 00:39:51,400 out of 10. I guess that the most concerning part of these judicial reform or component 373 00:39:51,400 --> 00:39:56,080 is precisely that is destroying the judicial career. Like Mexico, of course, faces many, 374 00:39:56,080 --> 00:40:01,000 many challenges in terms of access to justice. But one of the, I would say topics that where 375 00:40:01,000 --> 00:40:08,360 we had really made some progress was precisely building a strong judicial career, meritocratic, 376 00:40:08,360 --> 00:40:17,280 I would say judges needed to pass exams. And it was not easy. It took like usually it was 377 00:40:17,280 --> 00:40:23,520 almost like 20 years in order for a judge to become a judge. And that is all gone. Now 378 00:40:23,520 --> 00:40:30,000 you need five letters of recommendation and eight out of 10 points in your degree. 379 00:40:30,000 --> 00:40:36,520 Yeah, I think some student-run societies here have stricter requirements to run for those 380 00:40:36,520 --> 00:40:41,880 political offices. Well, we've been talking for nearly an hour now and I think the discussion 381 00:40:41,880 --> 00:40:46,520 has been very fruitful. Thank you so much for your time. I would have one more question, 382 00:40:46,520 --> 00:40:53,080 if I may. I noticed that you have an interest in the use of AI and commercial systems. But 383 00:40:53,080 --> 00:40:57,720 more broadly speaking, there's some talk in the UK jurisdiction about the possibility 384 00:40:57,720 --> 00:41:03,000 of AI one day becoming so advanced that it's capable of producing judgments with a high 385 00:41:03,000 --> 00:41:10,000 probability of valid conclusions in the sense that, you know, a judge is only as fallible 386 00:41:10,000 --> 00:41:16,960 as the next human being, but obviously much more experienced in that judicial system. But if 387 00:41:16,960 --> 00:41:22,600 an AI could do the same role, then it could be desirable for reasons of efficiency and 388 00:41:22,600 --> 00:41:28,720 cost to introduce AI-assisted decision making. And in parts of Mexico's judiciary, that's 389 00:41:28,720 --> 00:41:33,640 already being done, apparently. So I wonder if you think that AI could have any or could 390 00:41:33,640 --> 00:41:38,080 provide any risks or advantages to these reforms. Could it help mitigate some of the things 391 00:41:38,080 --> 00:41:42,680 that we've discussed as a challenge or do you not see it as being capable of doing so 392 00:41:42,680 --> 00:41:48,360 at this stage at the very least? Yes, thank you very much for the question. I cannot predict 393 00:41:48,360 --> 00:41:54,400 the future, but I think currently, at least in the Mexican landscape, in terms of the 394 00:41:54,400 --> 00:42:01,440 AI ecosystem, we don't have the safeguards in place in order to open up the black boxes 395 00:42:01,440 --> 00:42:17,240 that come along with AI systems working for the public system. And I would say the use 396 00:42:17,240 --> 00:42:25,400 of AI technologies may pose great risks in terms of being opaque. If it would be possible 397 00:42:25,400 --> 00:42:31,840 to work on accountability and transparency measures, I would be more optimistic. But 398 00:42:31,840 --> 00:42:40,280 I would say currently, we still have a long way to go. Yes, I think that's certainly 399 00:42:40,280 --> 00:42:44,920 the least dystopian of the two views to take. Well, thank you so much for your time, Luz. 400 00:42:44,920 --> 00:42:50,680 And that concludes this recording of the podcast. Well, that's all the questions that we have 401 00:42:50,680 --> 00:42:55,600 for today. Thank you so much for taking the time to listen to this episode of the podcast. 402 00:42:55,600 --> 00:43:15,640 Once again, thank you to Crown Office Chambers for making this series possible.