WEBVTT - AI Generated 00:00:00.430 --> 00:00:03.310 Something is changing in our country, and most 00:00:03.310 --> 00:00:12.009 people feel it before they can explain it. Welcome 00:00:12.009 --> 00:00:15.230 back to the Steady State Sentinel. I'm Brie Fram, 00:00:15.410 --> 00:00:18.309 a retired Space Force colonel and astronautical 00:00:18.309 --> 00:00:21.070 engineer forced out by the Trump administration. 00:00:21.170 --> 00:00:24.929 Like so many of the people that we have, it's 00:00:24.929 --> 00:00:27.329 a challenge to figure out... What is it that 00:00:27.329 --> 00:00:31.170 we do to hold on to our oath? What got us into 00:00:31.170 --> 00:00:34.229 national security? And what do we do with the 00:00:34.229 --> 00:00:36.549 knowledge that we've gained? So that's why I'm 00:00:36.549 --> 00:00:39.009 really excited today to be talking with Julia 00:00:39.009 --> 00:00:42.829 Curley. Julia is a public service fellow at Lawfare 00:00:42.829 --> 00:00:46.270 and a former CIA analyst with 25 years of experience 00:00:46.270 --> 00:00:49.420 in national security. She served as a National 00:00:49.420 --> 00:00:52.240 Security Council director in the Biden and second 00:00:52.240 --> 00:00:54.880 Trump White Houses and as a presidential daily 00:00:54.880 --> 00:00:58.039 brief briefer to the vice president. She completed 00:00:58.039 --> 00:01:00.460 multiple tours in the Middle East and South Asia 00:01:00.460 --> 00:01:03.719 and served in CIA's China Mission Center. She 00:01:03.719 --> 00:01:05.659 holds master's degrees from the National War 00:01:05.659 --> 00:01:09.480 College and American University. Julia, thanks 00:01:09.480 --> 00:01:11.939 for joining us on The Sentinel. Wonderful. Thanks, 00:01:12.099 --> 00:01:14.640 Bree. You make me sound really old. That's quite 00:01:14.640 --> 00:01:17.640 the list of things. But no, I'm thrilled to be 00:01:17.640 --> 00:01:20.560 here and talk with you. And, you know, full disclosure, 00:01:20.900 --> 00:01:24.079 I not only do not represent the views of the 00:01:24.079 --> 00:01:26.140 United States government, but Bree and I are 00:01:26.140 --> 00:01:31.120 friends. Yeah, how dare we get into this without 00:01:31.120 --> 00:01:34.739 saying that I actually know you. As many people 00:01:34.739 --> 00:01:37.420 who have been tossed out do, but also who have 00:01:37.420 --> 00:01:40.439 been in this fight for so long and are now speaking 00:01:40.439 --> 00:01:43.859 out. Tends to be those circles close up quite 00:01:43.859 --> 00:01:47.680 a bit. But what I really wanted to get into to 00:01:47.680 --> 00:01:51.239 start off this with you was kind of your motivation 00:01:51.239 --> 00:01:55.700 for... Why this kind of career? Why dive into 00:01:55.700 --> 00:01:58.719 something that is behind the shadows that I know 00:01:58.719 --> 00:02:02.680 you now are just letting a little peek into? 00:02:03.200 --> 00:02:09.719 Even with that, disclaimers abound. But you jumped 00:02:09.719 --> 00:02:11.520 into something where people are not going to 00:02:11.520 --> 00:02:13.460 know about the vast majority of what you did 00:02:13.460 --> 00:02:16.259 throughout your career. Why did you join the 00:02:16.259 --> 00:02:19.979 CIA and get into something that is so challenging 00:02:19.979 --> 00:02:23.090 for so many people to understand? You know, I 00:02:23.090 --> 00:02:25.229 don't even know really where it came from. So 00:02:25.229 --> 00:02:27.189 I grew up in Hawaii. I was a barefoot kid on 00:02:27.189 --> 00:02:31.030 the beach for most of my feral childhood. And 00:02:31.030 --> 00:02:34.610 from nowhere, I got this wanderlust, this desire 00:02:34.610 --> 00:02:37.310 to see the world. And it probably was The Hunt 00:02:37.310 --> 00:02:40.229 for Red October. Who am I kidding? The movie 00:02:40.229 --> 00:02:45.069 where the analyst is the hero, I will note. And 00:02:45.069 --> 00:02:48.479 so... I got it in my head when I was weirdly 00:02:48.479 --> 00:02:51.639 young that a career at the CIA would be for me. 00:02:51.840 --> 00:02:54.539 And I was very fortunate to get to live out that 00:02:54.539 --> 00:02:59.259 dream. I did multiple tours in war zones and, 00:02:59.340 --> 00:03:01.979 you know, there were ups and downs along the 00:03:01.979 --> 00:03:05.379 way, but it was a wonderful career. I deeply 00:03:05.379 --> 00:03:09.840 miss still being a part of CIA. I loved its mission. 00:03:09.900 --> 00:03:14.180 I love its people. I love it still. And, you 00:03:14.180 --> 00:03:16.900 know, here we are podcasting instead of working 00:03:16.900 --> 00:03:18.639 in the national security infrastructure. But 00:03:18.639 --> 00:03:22.000 nonetheless, public service carries on. And so 00:03:22.000 --> 00:03:23.659 I'm happy to be able to be here with you today. 00:03:24.520 --> 00:03:27.639 I think that's one of the big things that people 00:03:27.639 --> 00:03:30.340 need to understand about these ongoing purges 00:03:30.340 --> 00:03:34.180 all around and making life for federal workers 00:03:34.180 --> 00:03:37.919 so hellish is the brain drain that we're losing 00:03:37.919 --> 00:03:40.729 and that. Both you and I likely would have been 00:03:40.729 --> 00:03:43.229 doing this kind of career for another 10 plus 00:03:43.229 --> 00:03:46.949 years in an alternate universe where the value 00:03:46.949 --> 00:03:51.310 of intelligence wasn't demeaned, where the consideration 00:03:51.310 --> 00:03:55.169 of outside opinions actually mattered. We would 00:03:55.169 --> 00:03:58.229 still likely be in positions supporting our national 00:03:58.229 --> 00:04:00.900 security and the government. But that kind of 00:04:00.900 --> 00:04:03.560 flows into what I want to talk about with you 00:04:03.560 --> 00:04:06.780 is the bulk of our conversation is the value 00:04:06.780 --> 00:04:11.560 of intelligence and why the production of intelligence, 00:04:11.659 --> 00:04:13.840 that analyst piece that you saw and said, oh 00:04:13.840 --> 00:04:18.279 my God, that's actually important. Why that matters 00:04:18.279 --> 00:04:22.079 and why doing it in a rigorous fact -based way 00:04:22.079 --> 00:04:27.110 matters. Let's start by telling me about how 00:04:27.110 --> 00:04:30.709 is intelligence used at the highest levels of 00:04:30.709 --> 00:04:35.930 government and how should it be used? There are 00:04:35.930 --> 00:04:39.069 various definitions of intelligence, but I think 00:04:39.069 --> 00:04:41.370 the simplest way to describe it is it's information 00:04:41.370 --> 00:04:47.639 made useful. Information made... So that one 00:04:47.639 --> 00:04:51.240 could not misunderstand the message. Information 00:04:51.240 --> 00:04:53.459 put in the right context to help a policymaker 00:04:53.459 --> 00:04:56.879 make the right decisions. And so the information 00:04:56.879 --> 00:05:00.980 that flows out of smoky bars overseas or is intercepted 00:05:00.980 --> 00:05:04.800 out of the airwaves by NSA, all of that is raw 00:05:04.800 --> 00:05:08.660 reporting. And while we could call it intelligence, 00:05:08.759 --> 00:05:11.319 it doesn't really provide the policymaker what 00:05:11.319 --> 00:05:14.500 they need. And to jump to the end, not having 00:05:14.500 --> 00:05:17.779 intelligence, not just being a pun here, results 00:05:17.779 --> 00:05:21.000 in terrible decisions. As we've seen several 00:05:21.000 --> 00:05:25.139 times in our adult lives where either intelligence 00:05:25.139 --> 00:05:29.100 was cherry picked or alternative views were shut 00:05:29.100 --> 00:05:31.860 out, it leads to terrible decisions on behalf 00:05:31.860 --> 00:05:34.759 of the United States and all of us have suffered 00:05:34.759 --> 00:05:39.319 from it. it's the Iraq WMD fiasco or all the 00:05:39.319 --> 00:05:43.279 way to the present with the Iran war. So I'd 00:05:43.279 --> 00:05:45.660 be happy to get into more details on how a report 00:05:45.660 --> 00:05:47.779 makes its way through the ecosystem, how a bill 00:05:47.779 --> 00:05:50.079 becomes a law, if that would help. Yeah, what 00:05:50.079 --> 00:05:53.019 I think I want to dive into a little bit more 00:05:53.019 --> 00:05:56.779 is a word you mentioned there. context. When 00:05:56.779 --> 00:06:01.959 you get that raw report from the field on something 00:06:01.959 --> 00:06:05.420 that has happened or something has been identified, 00:06:05.800 --> 00:06:11.379 by the time it makes it to a president, to a 00:06:11.379 --> 00:06:14.300 senior official in the government, there's a 00:06:14.300 --> 00:06:17.879 lot of context that normally is added to that. 00:06:18.160 --> 00:06:23.459 How does that occur and how Do people inject 00:06:23.459 --> 00:06:27.220 themselves into that to decide what context is 00:06:27.220 --> 00:06:30.420 relevant to our senior leaders? Well, putting 00:06:30.420 --> 00:06:32.420 it in context probably takes place at every single 00:06:32.420 --> 00:06:34.439 level of the intelligence cycle, which is the 00:06:34.439 --> 00:06:37.040 phrase we use for it. So a meeting happens in 00:06:37.040 --> 00:06:40.839 a bar. The case officer can tell you if they 00:06:40.839 --> 00:06:43.620 have existing relationships. They put the meeting 00:06:43.620 --> 00:06:45.600 and the person in context so that the individual 00:06:45.600 --> 00:06:47.720 report comes back. Somebody back in Washington 00:06:47.720 --> 00:06:50.879 is reading these reports. They're looking at 00:06:50.879 --> 00:06:52.839 all of the information that individual source 00:06:52.839 --> 00:06:55.300 has said over time, putting that in context. 00:06:55.920 --> 00:06:58.839 Kicking it over to the analyst who made an entire 00:06:58.839 --> 00:07:01.300 profession about putting things in context. Where 00:07:01.300 --> 00:07:03.620 does this one report fit in with the pattern 00:07:03.620 --> 00:07:06.310 of behavior we are seeing? from the country, 00:07:06.529 --> 00:07:10.149 from past instances, what we know to be the trajectory 00:07:10.149 --> 00:07:13.550 of events. And at each one of these layers, there's 00:07:13.550 --> 00:07:17.850 an entire profession devoted to having the expertise 00:07:17.850 --> 00:07:21.389 to do the best possible work on behalf ultimately 00:07:21.389 --> 00:07:23.970 of a customer of one at the top who will make 00:07:23.970 --> 00:07:27.149 the final decisions. Once the analysts have worked 00:07:27.149 --> 00:07:30.050 through these hard problems, put things in context, 00:07:30.129 --> 00:07:32.449 say, ah, this report doesn't work, this one does, 00:07:32.649 --> 00:07:36.250 then it gets transmitted onward in the form of 00:07:36.250 --> 00:07:39.170 finished analysis to policymakers, whether that 00:07:39.170 --> 00:07:41.069 is at the National Security Council, the Secretary 00:07:41.069 --> 00:07:43.389 of State, Defense, or ultimately the premier 00:07:43.389 --> 00:07:45.610 product that the intelligence community produces 00:07:45.610 --> 00:07:49.430 is the PDB, the President's Daily Brief. Despite 00:07:49.430 --> 00:07:52.550 its name, not only the president receives the 00:07:52.550 --> 00:07:54.829 president's daily brief, and unfortunately under 00:07:54.829 --> 00:07:56.550 this president, the president doesn't normally 00:07:56.550 --> 00:07:59.209 read the president's daily brief, but it does 00:07:59.209 --> 00:08:02.509 serve as a valuable context leveling across the 00:08:02.509 --> 00:08:04.889 U .S. government so that everybody has the same 00:08:04.889 --> 00:08:07.670 set of facts and the same basic analysis to help 00:08:07.670 --> 00:08:10.949 them make good decisions. You were a presidential 00:08:10.949 --> 00:08:15.490 daily brief briefer, and I want to talk eventually 00:08:15.490 --> 00:08:18.449 about some of the gates it reaches. before that, 00:08:18.550 --> 00:08:21.810 but when it finally got to you and you were the 00:08:21.810 --> 00:08:26.250 one providing that update, did you still feel 00:08:26.250 --> 00:08:29.750 it was your job to add additional context or 00:08:29.750 --> 00:08:33.570 what did you have to be aware of to be able to 00:08:33.570 --> 00:08:38.720 provide this brief as the lead briefer? Right. 00:08:38.820 --> 00:08:42.840 So to use the office space line, we talk to the 00:08:42.840 --> 00:08:46.860 customer. We're that final step to deliver the 00:08:46.860 --> 00:08:48.860 piece of information. And as much as analysts 00:08:48.860 --> 00:08:51.000 like me would love to believe that you just sort 00:08:51.000 --> 00:08:53.159 of throw the paper over the wall and there's 00:08:53.159 --> 00:08:55.639 a policymaker waiting to catch it and they will 00:08:55.639 --> 00:08:58.059 just do whatever you tell them to do, that doesn't 00:08:58.059 --> 00:09:01.139 happen. A human, in the case of the top officials 00:09:01.139 --> 00:09:03.620 of our government, receives a morning briefing. 00:09:04.399 --> 00:09:07.960 where they have a live person, often with at 00:09:07.960 --> 00:09:10.320 least 10 to 20 years of experience in the intelligence 00:09:10.320 --> 00:09:12.940 community, often with deep regional or functional 00:09:12.940 --> 00:09:15.360 knowledge themselves, that can walk them through 00:09:15.360 --> 00:09:17.639 these reports and make their, because their time 00:09:17.639 --> 00:09:20.559 is among the most valuable assets that they have. 00:09:20.700 --> 00:09:22.580 And so they have a person who's already read 00:09:22.580 --> 00:09:24.860 everything, who can help capture the most important 00:09:24.860 --> 00:09:27.720 parts and speed them through that so they don't 00:09:27.720 --> 00:09:30.480 miss anything. What I'll say about like the individual 00:09:30.480 --> 00:09:35.210 briefer. This is a job like no other. This is 00:09:35.210 --> 00:09:38.409 a job where you're rolling in at midnight, where 00:09:38.409 --> 00:09:41.149 your loved ones will probably see the indentation 00:09:41.149 --> 00:09:43.350 in the pillow, but not the person themselves. 00:09:44.320 --> 00:09:46.240 where you're spending all night, like in an all 00:09:46.240 --> 00:09:49.120 -night cram session for an exam every morning, 00:09:49.179 --> 00:09:50.620 and you don't know what subjects are going to 00:09:50.620 --> 00:09:53.120 be tested, but here you are. You've got to commit 00:09:53.120 --> 00:09:56.659 to memory. And you learn both the information 00:09:56.659 --> 00:10:01.019 consumption styles of customers to fold, because 00:10:01.019 --> 00:10:03.379 it's their needs that have to come first, because 00:10:03.379 --> 00:10:06.679 they're the principal. And so you mold the way 00:10:06.679 --> 00:10:09.299 it's delivered to their needs. Famously, George 00:10:09.299 --> 00:10:12.220 W. Bush preferred an oral briefing, and so these 00:10:12.220 --> 00:10:16.240 were presentations, and people... would put together 00:10:16.240 --> 00:10:19.279 a presentation bringing outside experts. Also 00:10:19.279 --> 00:10:22.019 famously, Barack Obama was a reader. He, for 00:10:22.019 --> 00:10:24.279 some reason, didn't want a CIA analyst staring 00:10:24.279 --> 00:10:28.799 at him while he was reading the PDB. As a policy 00:10:28.799 --> 00:10:31.740 customer at one point, I also felt it was a little 00:10:31.740 --> 00:10:34.179 weird to have somebody staring at me. But what 00:10:34.179 --> 00:10:36.759 I did is I, like in a hybrid approach, which 00:10:36.759 --> 00:10:39.889 many... policy customers will do. I will read 00:10:39.889 --> 00:10:42.629 the piece first and then ask them questions and 00:10:42.629 --> 00:10:44.350 engage in that kind of dialogue. And it's in 00:10:44.350 --> 00:10:47.490 that context that you can task out your questions, 00:10:47.649 --> 00:10:50.470 which get scurried back to Langley or wherever 00:10:50.470 --> 00:10:53.250 else where legions of analysts are waiting and 00:10:53.250 --> 00:10:54.830 you give them the tasking and they're going to 00:10:54.830 --> 00:10:57.990 work while you go to bed and you try to get a 00:10:57.990 --> 00:10:59.090 few hours of sleep before you've got to wake 00:10:59.090 --> 00:11:00.610 up at midnight. And hopefully there's a paper 00:11:00.610 --> 00:11:02.809 waiting for you in the morning that will answer 00:11:02.809 --> 00:11:05.879 the policymakers' questions. So it's a... It's 00:11:05.879 --> 00:11:08.860 a great customer service oriented business, but 00:11:08.860 --> 00:11:11.399 high stakes. And I was very lucky to get to travel 00:11:11.399 --> 00:11:14.480 around the world with the vice president. When 00:11:14.480 --> 00:11:16.440 you're presenting that information, there is 00:11:16.440 --> 00:11:20.580 often a confidence level associated with it. 00:11:20.820 --> 00:11:24.600 How do you convey that in particular when it's. 00:11:25.000 --> 00:11:28.840 low. What is the challenge that these briefers 00:11:28.840 --> 00:11:31.460 or the generators of intelligence along the way 00:11:31.460 --> 00:11:34.940 face in providing the sort of confidence that 00:11:34.940 --> 00:11:39.649 allows good decision making? Yeah, the use of 00:11:39.649 --> 00:11:42.330 this estimative language and confidence levels 00:11:42.330 --> 00:11:45.250 is often misunderstood. And I don't blame them. 00:11:45.350 --> 00:11:48.429 It's a little bit obscure. Sometimes it's an 00:11:48.429 --> 00:11:51.350 effort to put quantities or numbers behind the 00:11:51.350 --> 00:11:54.610 language that we use. So, you know, you'll have 00:11:54.610 --> 00:11:58.250 live debates over whether 25 % likely is unlikely. 00:11:58.529 --> 00:12:02.090 Is it possible? And there's like lots of analyst 00:12:02.090 --> 00:12:05.799 on analyst violence over what means what. So 00:12:05.799 --> 00:12:07.580 it's very difficult, which is why having a live 00:12:07.580 --> 00:12:10.759 human is really good. But one of the key points 00:12:10.759 --> 00:12:15.240 that's worth making is the United States collects 00:12:15.240 --> 00:12:18.299 a tremendous amount of information. I can't get 00:12:18.299 --> 00:12:21.379 into the details of what it is, but we had this 00:12:21.379 --> 00:12:23.700 joke that you could basically construct any narrative 00:12:23.700 --> 00:12:25.700 you wanted based on what we'd already collected. 00:12:25.860 --> 00:12:28.480 And so if your theory is that aliens stole the 00:12:28.480 --> 00:12:30.820 election, almost certainly there's going to be 00:12:30.820 --> 00:12:33.259 a report of an alien visitation and attempted 00:12:33.259 --> 00:12:36.259 manipulation of voting machines. So if you were 00:12:36.259 --> 00:12:39.620 having to present that to a customer saying, 00:12:39.759 --> 00:12:41.399 well, we have intelligence saying the aliens 00:12:41.399 --> 00:12:43.840 visited, you probably also offer a low confidence 00:12:43.840 --> 00:12:46.580 estimate. And whether that's because of the subject 00:12:46.580 --> 00:12:50.259 or the obvious issues with that statement or 00:12:50.259 --> 00:12:53.279 the sourcing just is a little bit weak. It's 00:12:53.279 --> 00:12:56.259 like second or third hand. So it's another attempt 00:12:56.259 --> 00:12:58.600 to make sure the policymaker doesn't misunderstand 00:12:58.600 --> 00:13:02.909 what we're trying to convey to them. I certainly 00:13:02.909 --> 00:13:05.490 had some of that experience with a little bit 00:13:05.490 --> 00:13:08.149 of our signals intelligence pipeline and just 00:13:08.149 --> 00:13:11.929 seeing how massive it is. And that's one type 00:13:11.929 --> 00:13:16.110 of intelligence from one area. So there is a 00:13:16.110 --> 00:13:20.370 massive amount collected every day, every second, 00:13:20.429 --> 00:13:24.870 and there is a natural funneling of this. We 00:13:24.870 --> 00:13:27.250 talked a little bit about the context and about 00:13:27.250 --> 00:13:29.470 some of these organizations where... more and 00:13:29.470 --> 00:13:32.429 more is put in and fused together along the way. 00:13:32.590 --> 00:13:35.350 But you had a lot of experience near the top 00:13:35.350 --> 00:13:38.850 of that funnel. So while those analysts in the 00:13:38.850 --> 00:13:41.350 field may be adding some context or maybe taking 00:13:41.350 --> 00:13:43.669 two or three different sources and pulling it 00:13:43.669 --> 00:13:46.830 together, by the time it gets to the Director 00:13:46.830 --> 00:13:49.029 of National Intelligence or the National Security 00:13:49.029 --> 00:13:52.429 Council, it's already passed through a lot of 00:13:52.429 --> 00:13:55.169 gates where some is filtered out, some moves 00:13:55.169 --> 00:13:58.299 on, and you're getting... towards the top of 00:13:58.299 --> 00:14:00.759 what ends up in that briefing that you provided. 00:14:01.120 --> 00:14:04.259 But I want to dig into those two organizations. 00:14:04.360 --> 00:14:09.600 And you've recently written about both. So let's 00:14:09.600 --> 00:14:14.940 start with the DNI. We recently just had John 00:14:14.940 --> 00:14:17.200 Clayton confirmed, or excuse me, Jay Clayton 00:14:17.200 --> 00:14:20.379 confirmed as the new Director of National Intelligence. 00:14:20.460 --> 00:14:24.019 But in the meantime, for a little while, we had 00:14:24.019 --> 00:14:28.960 Bill Pulte. And you wrote of him as the apotheosis 00:14:28.960 --> 00:14:33.700 of incompetence and malevolence. What is the 00:14:33.700 --> 00:14:37.519 danger of having someone that can be described 00:14:37.519 --> 00:14:42.840 that way, even in an interim role at the DNI? 00:14:44.169 --> 00:14:47.250 Right. So just we should do a brief history lesson 00:14:47.250 --> 00:14:50.669 on where the DNI came from. So for most of the 00:14:50.669 --> 00:14:52.149 U .S. intelligence community's history, there 00:14:52.149 --> 00:14:54.690 was not a DNI, which meant that you have all 00:14:54.690 --> 00:14:56.710 these agencies, but no one technically above 00:14:56.710 --> 00:15:00.870 them. So you had the director of the CIA given 00:15:00.870 --> 00:15:02.570 these community management responsibilities. 00:15:02.789 --> 00:15:05.649 But generally, the director of the CIA was focused 00:15:05.649 --> 00:15:07.570 on the CIA and neglecting the other parts of 00:15:07.570 --> 00:15:09.509 the community. So there wasn't this like synthesis 00:15:09.509 --> 00:15:13.830 across. the agencies, not bureaucratically, you 00:15:13.830 --> 00:15:15.570 know, in a natural configuration. And so they, 00:15:15.649 --> 00:15:20.870 after 9 -11, after the Iraq WMD fiasco, there 00:15:20.870 --> 00:15:24.470 was a, the Congress decided to move ahead with 00:15:24.470 --> 00:15:26.610 one idea that had floated around for some time, 00:15:26.649 --> 00:15:27.990 which was the director of national intelligence, 00:15:28.169 --> 00:15:31.970 who would be above the rest of the intelligence 00:15:31.970 --> 00:15:35.450 community's 15 independent. independent agencies 00:15:35.450 --> 00:15:38.070 and ensure that they're cooperating, ensure that 00:15:38.070 --> 00:15:41.429 the alternative perspectives are being missed, 00:15:41.529 --> 00:15:43.409 that we're not missing connecting the dots as 00:15:43.409 --> 00:15:46.750 in 9 -11, but also to serve as the president's 00:15:46.750 --> 00:15:51.210 senior intelligence advisor. which was baked 00:15:51.210 --> 00:15:54.190 in from the beginning but is a problem when the 00:15:54.190 --> 00:15:56.690 director of the CIA also thinks of themselves 00:15:56.690 --> 00:15:58.769 as the president's senior intelligence advisor 00:15:58.769 --> 00:16:01.090 or the director of the NSA thinks of themselves 00:16:01.090 --> 00:16:04.350 as the president's preeminent expert on SIGINT. 00:16:04.490 --> 00:16:07.090 And so there was a little bit of a problem from 00:16:07.090 --> 00:16:09.870 the beginning where you had an individual who 00:16:09.870 --> 00:16:12.350 didn't have much of an organization underneath 00:16:12.350 --> 00:16:14.789 him and the people that supposedly worked for 00:16:14.789 --> 00:16:17.889 him were all answerable in their careers to someone 00:16:17.889 --> 00:16:20.799 else. So it was an issue from the beginning and 00:16:20.799 --> 00:16:22.860 for the most of its history, the DNI has just 00:16:22.860 --> 00:16:25.940 been thought of as basically ineffective. And, 00:16:26.019 --> 00:16:27.360 you know, at the beginning of the administration, 00:16:27.639 --> 00:16:30.139 it's actually mentioned in the Haberman Swan 00:16:30.139 --> 00:16:34.360 book, the selection of Tulsi Gabbard was surrounded 00:16:34.360 --> 00:16:36.960 by the idea, well, you know, she's got some ideas, 00:16:37.080 --> 00:16:40.019 but. How much harm can she do? It's the DNI after 00:16:40.019 --> 00:16:42.139 all. Like that was like literally what the president 00:16:42.139 --> 00:16:44.220 said about her appointment. And I would have 00:16:44.220 --> 00:16:46.659 said I agreed for most of the last couple of 00:16:46.659 --> 00:16:49.860 decades. And there have been various reform proposals 00:16:49.860 --> 00:16:52.279 to put more meat on the bones of the DNI. But 00:16:52.279 --> 00:16:57.110 it basically wasn't thought of as a threat. Unfortunately, 00:16:57.230 --> 00:16:59.549 under this administration, it has been weaponized. 00:16:59.610 --> 00:17:02.350 And whether we're talking about Tulsi Gabbard's 00:17:02.350 --> 00:17:05.829 repeated use of selective declassification, which 00:17:05.829 --> 00:17:09.690 is a power that she has, or in order to reveal 00:17:09.690 --> 00:17:12.470 information that would specifically hurt the 00:17:12.470 --> 00:17:15.190 president's political enemies or provide some 00:17:15.190 --> 00:17:18.609 narrative that he wants to hear, or it's her 00:17:18.609 --> 00:17:20.490 getting involved in law enforcement matters, 00:17:20.569 --> 00:17:23.809 like down in Georgia, which is not a responsibility 00:17:23.809 --> 00:17:28.960 of the DNI. Separately, at the same time, the 00:17:28.960 --> 00:17:31.960 DNI has accumulated some bureaucracies, which, 00:17:32.039 --> 00:17:36.920 again, were not malicious, but were thought of 00:17:36.920 --> 00:17:40.279 as somewhat redundant. You have the NCTC, which 00:17:40.279 --> 00:17:42.960 is the National Counterterrorism Center, designed 00:17:42.960 --> 00:17:46.170 to get FBI and CIA to talk to each other. FBI 00:17:46.170 --> 00:17:49.049 and CIA already were working together and had 00:17:49.049 --> 00:17:52.630 the information and the assets to prosecute counterterrorism. 00:17:52.710 --> 00:17:54.529 So again, it was this, what is this institution 00:17:54.529 --> 00:17:57.369 trying to be above them? There's also a National 00:17:57.369 --> 00:17:59.630 Counterintelligence Center, which suffers from 00:17:59.630 --> 00:18:01.990 the same problem, where both CIA, FBI, and other 00:18:01.990 --> 00:18:03.769 agencies are responsible for the same mission, 00:18:03.869 --> 00:18:07.420 and they're the door kickers. So you've had an 00:18:07.420 --> 00:18:10.579 organization that's been adrift, looking for 00:18:10.579 --> 00:18:13.059 a cause since 9 -11, perhaps getting too big, 00:18:13.099 --> 00:18:15.759 and a director who has all of these authorities 00:18:15.759 --> 00:18:18.119 that they can use maliciously. It was like a 00:18:18.119 --> 00:18:20.539 loaded gun waiting on the table. And here we 00:18:20.539 --> 00:18:22.980 are with Tulsi Gabbard. And then now we had Bill 00:18:22.980 --> 00:18:26.460 Pulte following in her wake. And we're going 00:18:26.460 --> 00:18:30.980 to have Clayton, who was confirmed by the Senate. 00:18:31.119 --> 00:18:33.859 But in each of these cases, We're not seeing 00:18:33.859 --> 00:18:36.240 any evidence that the DNI is going to stand up 00:18:36.240 --> 00:18:37.700 for the intelligence community, the workforce, 00:18:37.960 --> 00:18:40.619 and serve the broader interests of the United 00:18:40.619 --> 00:18:42.960 States rather than just the person of Donald 00:18:42.960 --> 00:18:46.660 Trump, the president. What should the role of 00:18:46.660 --> 00:18:49.900 the DNI be, in your opinion? How does it either 00:18:49.900 --> 00:18:54.119 serve as a gatekeeper, as a policy, as an organized 00:18:54.119 --> 00:18:56.920 train and equip function for the intelligence 00:18:56.920 --> 00:19:01.170 community? Where should it be? Or have we moved 00:19:01.170 --> 00:19:04.869 beyond that kind of need for this coordinating 00:19:04.869 --> 00:19:08.150 function at that level? Well, I think that there's 00:19:08.150 --> 00:19:12.029 probably a need for a coordinator role, which 00:19:12.029 --> 00:19:15.289 was the one thing that CIA really couldn't do 00:19:15.289 --> 00:19:18.569 on its own and what led to a lot of resentment 00:19:18.569 --> 00:19:22.690 of CIA for advancing its primacy in the intelligence 00:19:22.690 --> 00:19:26.380 community. But much of else of what the DNI does 00:19:26.380 --> 00:19:29.960 probably could be done by someone else. If you 00:19:29.960 --> 00:19:32.759 look at important functions like the president's 00:19:32.759 --> 00:19:35.960 daily briefing, CIA could probably run that and 00:19:35.960 --> 00:19:38.619 with proper oversight would incorporate other 00:19:38.619 --> 00:19:41.119 agencies' information. CIA is, according to public 00:19:41.119 --> 00:19:43.720 reporting, already producing about 80 to 90 percent 00:19:43.720 --> 00:19:45.680 of what goes in the book. They could probably 00:19:45.680 --> 00:19:48.680 take that responsibility on. Most of the briefers 00:19:48.680 --> 00:19:52.460 are from CIA. It could probably work. The NIC, 00:19:52.480 --> 00:19:55.180 which is the National Intelligence Council. Also, 00:19:55.380 --> 00:19:59.160 they produce NIEs. They produce the now famous 00:19:59.160 --> 00:20:02.559 2020 election assessments. Also could be taken 00:20:02.559 --> 00:20:05.339 in by CIA. People could could rotate in from 00:20:05.339 --> 00:20:07.619 other agencies on on joint duty assignments. 00:20:07.819 --> 00:20:10.940 So you have that interagency flavor, but you 00:20:10.940 --> 00:20:13.299 don't necessarily need it to be in a different 00:20:13.299 --> 00:20:16.740 agency. But there are other things that the DNI 00:20:16.740 --> 00:20:20.299 does that probably make sense to be the responsibility 00:20:20.299 --> 00:20:24.680 of someone, not someone with authorities and 00:20:24.680 --> 00:20:29.420 perhaps idle hands leading them to taking actions 00:20:29.420 --> 00:20:33.059 like what Tulsi Gabbard and Pulte have done. 00:20:33.200 --> 00:20:37.740 But I think that there is a need for a considered... 00:20:38.710 --> 00:20:40.529 look at this problem. It's one of the things 00:20:40.529 --> 00:20:42.250 I'm working on now that I'm out of government 00:20:42.250 --> 00:20:44.190 is trying to think about how to right -size the 00:20:44.190 --> 00:20:46.609 DNI in the future. But one thing I would just 00:20:46.609 --> 00:20:50.509 want to say is that Pulte and Tulsi have also 00:20:50.509 --> 00:20:53.710 been doing this, but the mass layoffs, the mass 00:20:53.710 --> 00:20:59.130 firings of DNI officers, seemingly with no explanation 00:20:59.130 --> 00:21:04.430 of why or who, other than they're the deep state 00:21:04.430 --> 00:21:07.529 enemy within, or other than the DNI should be 00:21:07.529 --> 00:21:11.789 smaller. I thought that as being the custodian 00:21:11.789 --> 00:21:13.329 of the government, you'd want to put some time 00:21:13.329 --> 00:21:17.009 and thought into a zero -based review of its 00:21:17.009 --> 00:21:20.029 functions, who is needed and who is not. I don't 00:21:20.029 --> 00:21:21.190 know how to remind people, but we're in the middle 00:21:21.190 --> 00:21:24.910 of a war with Iran. And there were, according 00:21:24.910 --> 00:21:27.589 to press, potentially cyber attacks on the United 00:21:27.589 --> 00:21:31.069 States, in the United States, that affected the 00:21:31.069 --> 00:21:34.049 water treatment in several American states. And 00:21:34.049 --> 00:21:36.789 one of the agencies, one of the entities that 00:21:36.789 --> 00:21:40.779 looks at that, of foreign terrorist activity 00:21:40.779 --> 00:21:44.099 in the U .S. is the NCTC, which is under the 00:21:44.099 --> 00:21:46.920 gun and potentially being purged. So other than 00:21:46.920 --> 00:21:51.200 providing a supply of people to be ritualistically, 00:21:51.299 --> 00:21:54.839 performatively fired to create content on the 00:21:54.839 --> 00:21:57.880 internet, I don't know what the goal is. And 00:21:57.880 --> 00:22:01.569 so... I'm all in favor of reducing the DNI. Reasonable 00:22:01.569 --> 00:22:04.069 people can disagree. I hope more thought is put 00:22:04.069 --> 00:22:06.230 into this. But what this administration has done 00:22:06.230 --> 00:22:08.609 with the DNI is to weaponize it and to turn it 00:22:08.609 --> 00:22:12.150 into some sort of tool to be used for performance 00:22:12.150 --> 00:22:15.289 in the media at the expense of really hardworking 00:22:15.289 --> 00:22:19.400 people. I do want to get into that a little bit 00:22:19.400 --> 00:22:23.220 further. And the cost of ever offering a dissenting 00:22:23.220 --> 00:22:26.660 view, which has become very clear, is you're 00:22:26.660 --> 00:22:31.039 gone in this administration. But before we talk 00:22:31.039 --> 00:22:33.859 about kind of that in a broader picture, put 00:22:33.859 --> 00:22:36.140 your other hat on. You worked on the National 00:22:36.140 --> 00:22:39.480 Security Council. And that, if we extend this 00:22:39.480 --> 00:22:42.099 coordination function for national security beyond 00:22:42.099 --> 00:22:45.680 just The intelligence community was designed 00:22:45.680 --> 00:22:49.740 to do that coordination among all aspects of 00:22:49.740 --> 00:22:52.940 government to make sure that the president was 00:22:52.940 --> 00:22:56.579 capable of making well -informed decisions, that 00:22:56.579 --> 00:22:59.559 we get all the perspectives possible. And now, 00:22:59.680 --> 00:23:01.220 of course, it doesn't seem like any perspective 00:23:01.220 --> 00:23:05.460 is needed on anything. But I want to... quote 00:23:05.460 --> 00:23:08.140 a phrase that you wrote in an article that said, 00:23:08.359 --> 00:23:11.140 the breakdown of the NSC's coordination function 00:23:11.140 --> 00:23:14.559 may be precisely what the president and his advisors 00:23:14.559 --> 00:23:17.720 want, but has produced serious miscalculations 00:23:17.720 --> 00:23:20.339 from ill -conceived tariffs to the catastrophic 00:23:20.339 --> 00:23:23.359 planning failures in the run -up to the war with 00:23:23.359 --> 00:23:26.980 Iran. Probably most listeners of this podcast 00:23:26.980 --> 00:23:30.720 would say, yeah, of course, that is exactly what 00:23:30.720 --> 00:23:36.180 it has done. Tell me how a healthy NSC does that 00:23:36.180 --> 00:23:40.480 coordination function and helps prevent catastrophic 00:23:40.480 --> 00:23:45.549 decision making. So much like the DNI, there 00:23:45.549 --> 00:23:47.990 are many opinions on what the best form of an 00:23:47.990 --> 00:23:51.250 NSC is. And the Biden administration in which 00:23:51.250 --> 00:23:53.730 I served came under criticism for being overly 00:23:53.730 --> 00:23:56.269 centralized, bureaucratic, too many meetings, 00:23:56.509 --> 00:23:58.690 too much White House control and not enough deference 00:23:58.690 --> 00:24:01.170 to departments and agencies. The Obama administration 00:24:01.170 --> 00:24:05.269 had suffered from the same critique. But we have 00:24:05.269 --> 00:24:09.170 now experienced the alternative, which is effectively 00:24:09.170 --> 00:24:12.700 a NSC that has been neutered and not. functional 00:24:12.700 --> 00:24:16.880 at all. I think that just to give you more mechanics 00:24:16.880 --> 00:24:20.140 on how the NSC works, I'll just do a very brief 00:24:20.140 --> 00:24:24.259 overview. So at the very top of the NSC would 00:24:24.259 --> 00:24:28.079 be the actual National Security Council, chaired 00:24:28.079 --> 00:24:31.609 by the president in the Situation Room. And below 00:24:31.609 --> 00:24:33.750 them could be a principals committee without 00:24:33.750 --> 00:24:35.609 the president, sometimes including the vice president, 00:24:35.789 --> 00:24:38.109 which would be the heads of departments and agencies, 00:24:38.230 --> 00:24:41.630 the secretary of state, defense, CIA, the director 00:24:41.630 --> 00:24:43.809 of the national intelligence. And they would 00:24:43.809 --> 00:24:46.049 be the sort of the key, like really the highest 00:24:46.049 --> 00:24:49.289 non -presidential decision making body. Below 00:24:49.289 --> 00:24:51.269 them, a deputies committee, which is where the 00:24:51.269 --> 00:24:53.609 real work, you know, of developing options to 00:24:53.609 --> 00:24:56.910 tee up for the decision maker heads of departments. 00:24:57.049 --> 00:24:59.630 These are the deputies. So the deputy director 00:24:59.630 --> 00:25:02.829 of the CIA, the deputy secretary of state and 00:25:02.829 --> 00:25:04.750 so on and so on. And then below them, you have 00:25:04.750 --> 00:25:07.410 assistant secretary level work, which is which 00:25:07.410 --> 00:25:10.869 is where the real expertise resides. Above that 00:25:10.869 --> 00:25:13.529 level, these are individuals who their days are 00:25:13.529 --> 00:25:15.650 scheduled in 15 minute increments. They don't 00:25:15.650 --> 00:25:19.809 have time to read a 10 page report on the state 00:25:19.809 --> 00:25:21.829 of the war in Iran. They have people for that 00:25:21.829 --> 00:25:24.450 and they get briefed and they don't need to do 00:25:24.450 --> 00:25:26.490 that because they have whole staffs of experts 00:25:26.490 --> 00:25:28.670 who have devoted their lives to becoming the 00:25:28.670 --> 00:25:32.250 best Iran maritime expert that could provide 00:25:32.250 --> 00:25:36.289 you expert advice on what to do about our inability 00:25:36.289 --> 00:25:40.880 to transit the Strait of Hormuz. So if you effectively 00:25:40.880 --> 00:25:46.740 decapitate the NSC, which is what happened in 00:25:46.740 --> 00:25:50.099 the third day of the administration, send 160 00:25:50.099 --> 00:25:53.059 career staffers home with no replacements in 00:25:53.059 --> 00:25:56.220 place, you rip the wiring out of the system. 00:25:56.680 --> 00:26:00.599 It immediately prevents a normal cadence of assistant 00:26:00.599 --> 00:26:03.119 secretary level meetings from happening. You 00:26:03.119 --> 00:26:06.019 get these deputies and above meetings, which 00:26:06.019 --> 00:26:10.769 if you saw the signal gate. fiasco where they'd 00:26:10.769 --> 00:26:13.710 been using Signal to run high -level policy meetings. 00:26:13.829 --> 00:26:17.369 And if you just see what was there, you'll find 00:26:17.369 --> 00:26:21.089 how amateurish it was and how these individuals 00:26:21.089 --> 00:26:24.349 didn't really understand the options at hand 00:26:24.349 --> 00:26:27.910 or the background of the case. So we have a system 00:26:27.910 --> 00:26:30.849 designed to prevent that. But this administration 00:26:30.849 --> 00:26:35.630 effectively cut off its own hands, plucked out 00:26:35.630 --> 00:26:39.720 its own eyes. The point I was trying to make 00:26:39.720 --> 00:26:41.819 that you were paraphrasing is the president can 00:26:41.819 --> 00:26:46.000 want things. The president can have urges. But 00:26:46.000 --> 00:26:48.299 that doesn't mean they will be done or done well. 00:26:48.619 --> 00:26:51.539 And what this administration has done is it's 00:26:51.539 --> 00:26:54.599 acting as if it is not in charge of the world's 00:26:54.599 --> 00:26:58.180 largest corporation. It's not acting as if it's 00:26:58.180 --> 00:27:00.640 responsible for the results and the performance 00:27:00.640 --> 00:27:03.720 of the most complex organization on the planet, 00:27:03.779 --> 00:27:06.119 the US government. It's acting as if it's just 00:27:06.119 --> 00:27:08.920 a vertical. as if the words coming out of the 00:27:08.920 --> 00:27:11.819 president don't need expert advice. They don't 00:27:11.819 --> 00:27:13.740 need a national security council. They don't 00:27:13.740 --> 00:27:16.140 need a coordinated intelligence community because 00:27:16.140 --> 00:27:18.599 he doesn't need any additional information. But 00:27:18.599 --> 00:27:22.039 that can't possibly be true that he is the world 00:27:22.039 --> 00:27:25.740 expert on the implementation of oil sanctions 00:27:25.740 --> 00:27:28.700 on Iran. He hasn't spent a career studying that. 00:27:28.859 --> 00:27:31.319 And so I think the predictable result of all 00:27:31.319 --> 00:27:34.670 of that is both bad decisions. But then when 00:27:34.670 --> 00:27:37.150 those decisions are made, they can't even implement 00:27:37.150 --> 00:27:38.930 those decisions effectively. And that's why I 00:27:38.930 --> 00:27:41.710 brought up the case of the war in Iran, where 00:27:41.710 --> 00:27:44.869 despite decades of public war games that talked 00:27:44.869 --> 00:27:47.549 about how the Iranians would close the Strait 00:27:47.549 --> 00:27:50.009 of Hormuz, that decapitating the Iranian leadership 00:27:50.009 --> 00:27:53.869 would not lead to the collapse, or how the Iranians 00:27:53.869 --> 00:27:55.490 would hit back, including potentially in the 00:27:55.490 --> 00:27:57.750 United States, somehow none of those considerations 00:27:57.750 --> 00:28:00.630 made it up to the top, which any functional... 00:28:01.750 --> 00:28:06.190 NSC structure would have done. So what we're 00:28:06.190 --> 00:28:10.069 seeing here is, I think, by design, but the catastrophic 00:28:10.069 --> 00:28:14.890 results were predictable. The buy design has 00:28:14.890 --> 00:28:17.750 been clear in my own experience when we were 00:28:17.750 --> 00:28:21.269 talking about the Golden Dome missile shield 00:28:21.269 --> 00:28:24.289 and how that was going to be implemented. When 00:28:24.289 --> 00:28:27.390 initial ideas out of the administration showed 00:28:27.390 --> 00:28:31.329 up, my comment as an engineer on these things 00:28:31.329 --> 00:28:33.849 was, this is the least technologically feasible, 00:28:33.970 --> 00:28:36.410 highest cost way of accomplishing this mission. 00:28:36.589 --> 00:28:39.650 And when I tried to raise that point to get it 00:28:39.650 --> 00:28:42.640 to the political appointees, One of my bosses 00:28:42.640 --> 00:28:44.740 basically just said, we can't tell them that 00:28:44.740 --> 00:28:46.599 because the only thing they're willing to hear 00:28:46.599 --> 00:28:51.640 is yes. And my understanding is that was what 00:28:51.640 --> 00:28:55.119 was happening everywhere. at the political appointee 00:28:55.119 --> 00:28:59.099 level. Dissent was not a consideration. And in 00:28:59.099 --> 00:29:03.460 a healthy National Security Council or at any 00:29:03.460 --> 00:29:06.180 lower level, I'm guessing you saw dissent that 00:29:06.180 --> 00:29:08.880 was valuable. And perhaps without getting into 00:29:08.880 --> 00:29:12.799 specifics, can you talk about how dissent and 00:29:12.799 --> 00:29:15.400 different perspectives come together in making 00:29:15.400 --> 00:29:21.809 better outcomes? Right. The intelligence community 00:29:21.809 --> 00:29:23.910 does not exist to tell the president what he 00:29:23.910 --> 00:29:26.950 wants to hear. It exists to describe the world 00:29:26.950 --> 00:29:29.430 as it is and what is likely to happen next. So 00:29:29.430 --> 00:29:32.509 if by dissent we mean presenting a version of 00:29:32.509 --> 00:29:35.250 events that he doesn't like, the intelligence 00:29:35.250 --> 00:29:38.809 community does that every day. We had a joke 00:29:38.809 --> 00:29:41.890 among analysts that the only consistent analytic 00:29:41.890 --> 00:29:44.630 bias of a CIA officer is your policy is going 00:29:44.630 --> 00:29:46.170 to fail and there's nothing you can do about 00:29:46.170 --> 00:29:50.430 it. So that is just in the bloodstream of a... 00:29:50.700 --> 00:29:53.079 of an organization that, that, you know, chisels 00:29:53.079 --> 00:29:55.119 on the wall, the idea that the truth will set 00:29:55.119 --> 00:29:56.859 you free and that, you know, truth to power. 00:29:57.279 --> 00:30:01.180 But what has happened is when dissent has arrived. 00:30:01.220 --> 00:30:03.539 So I'll use the case of the Trendel Aragua assessment, 00:30:03.799 --> 00:30:07.200 which was this Venezuelan street gang, prison 00:30:07.200 --> 00:30:10.740 gang that the administration wanted to designate 00:30:10.740 --> 00:30:13.440 as a terrorist organization. And I was the acting 00:30:13.440 --> 00:30:15.160 senior director on day one of the administration. 00:30:15.640 --> 00:30:18.519 And when Stephen Miller wanted an assessment 00:30:18.519 --> 00:30:21.549 that said, the very thing that would be the predicate 00:30:21.549 --> 00:30:24.750 for invoking the terrorism authorities or the 00:30:24.750 --> 00:30:27.730 Alien Enemies Act, which would open up another 00:30:27.730 --> 00:30:31.549 basket of authorities for deportations. I tasked 00:30:31.549 --> 00:30:33.450 it to the National Intelligence Council, who 00:30:33.450 --> 00:30:36.690 dutifully did the assessment. And when the word 00:30:36.690 --> 00:30:38.710 came back that, no, in fact, the street gang 00:30:38.710 --> 00:30:41.369 wasn't directed to invade the United States, 00:30:41.509 --> 00:30:44.069 it's a street gang, the head of the NIC was fired, 00:30:44.190 --> 00:30:47.680 along with his deputy. They both had stood up 00:30:47.680 --> 00:30:50.539 for the values of our organization of speaking 00:30:50.539 --> 00:30:53.779 truth to power, and they were fired for it. And 00:30:53.779 --> 00:30:56.180 this has happened again and again. And so whether 00:30:56.180 --> 00:30:58.039 it was that case or it was the firing of the 00:30:58.039 --> 00:31:01.299 director of the Defense Intelligence Agency for 00:31:01.299 --> 00:31:05.220 rightly claiming in public or rightly testifying 00:31:05.220 --> 00:31:08.400 that the Iranian nuclear program had not been 00:31:08.400 --> 00:31:11.380 dissolved or had not been destroyed in the first 00:31:11.380 --> 00:31:13.640 wave of attacks, which subsequently, of course, 00:31:13.660 --> 00:31:16.150 the administration had to admit as it. went to 00:31:16.150 --> 00:31:18.250 war a second time for the same purpose, to eliminate 00:31:18.250 --> 00:31:21.170 the Iranian nuclear program. It has taught analysts 00:31:21.170 --> 00:31:24.089 across the community that any form of dissent, 00:31:24.089 --> 00:31:26.970 even dissent a decade ago, if you wrote one of 00:31:26.970 --> 00:31:29.349 the Russia assessments, can be held against you. 00:31:29.869 --> 00:31:32.529 And so we've seen with this administration a 00:31:32.529 --> 00:31:35.049 type of politicization, which I think hasn't 00:31:35.049 --> 00:31:37.309 been seen in the U .S. since the McCarthy administration. 00:31:38.029 --> 00:31:41.250 And it is driving out a generation of officers. 00:31:42.109 --> 00:31:44.450 who want to serve their country, but do not want 00:31:44.450 --> 00:31:46.450 to be part of the president's political agenda. 00:31:47.009 --> 00:31:50.349 And this again manifested itself in the election 00:31:50.349 --> 00:31:51.970 speech the president gave the other day, which 00:31:51.970 --> 00:31:56.130 we can also talk about. There is so much there 00:31:56.130 --> 00:31:59.069 that we could dive into in another episode about 00:31:59.069 --> 00:32:02.650 the brain drain that we're seeing, the generational 00:32:02.650 --> 00:32:06.569 work to rebuild trust and capability that is 00:32:06.569 --> 00:32:11.099 inevitably. going to have to follow this administration. 00:32:12.440 --> 00:32:15.339 But because we don't have terribly much time, 00:32:15.400 --> 00:32:20.619 I want to get into just one more topic on the 00:32:20.619 --> 00:32:23.950 rules -based order. that this country used to 00:32:23.950 --> 00:32:27.990 operate in. Does something like that still exist 00:32:27.990 --> 00:32:32.089 within our relationships to organizations like 00:32:32.089 --> 00:32:35.730 NATO or the value of the alliances that we have 00:32:35.730 --> 00:32:39.910 as we kind of careen from one presidential whim 00:32:39.910 --> 00:32:44.930 or grievance to another? How do our friends and 00:32:44.930 --> 00:32:49.009 allies or our friends who... who may no longer 00:32:49.009 --> 00:32:52.769 be or may no longer want to be our friends, see 00:32:52.769 --> 00:32:56.390 this kind of behavior, these wild swings of policy? 00:32:57.150 --> 00:33:01.390 And do we still have an opportunity to lead in 00:33:01.390 --> 00:33:05.650 this environment? I'll first begin with the idea 00:33:05.650 --> 00:33:07.849 that the international rules -based order, by 00:33:07.849 --> 00:33:10.329 which we mean the institutions, the alliances 00:33:10.329 --> 00:33:13.009 that we built after we won World War II, were 00:33:13.009 --> 00:33:14.910 designed with America's national interest in 00:33:14.910 --> 00:33:18.349 mind of cementing our primacy around the world. 00:33:18.450 --> 00:33:22.029 And they worked for decades. And ensured American 00:33:22.029 --> 00:33:24.990 commerce had access to countries around the world. 00:33:25.150 --> 00:33:27.589 And we were, you know, the dollar was the reserve 00:33:27.589 --> 00:33:30.049 currency of the world. So we could effectively 00:33:30.049 --> 00:33:32.329 borrow unlimited money. All of that has been 00:33:32.329 --> 00:33:37.329 based on U .S. primacy alliances, you know, military 00:33:37.329 --> 00:33:41.890 power that and offering security to our allies 00:33:41.890 --> 00:33:44.589 and partners by falling in under that umbrella. 00:33:45.309 --> 00:33:49.269 This administration has gotten it into its head 00:33:49.269 --> 00:33:53.150 that. All of that doesn't matter, that allies 00:33:53.150 --> 00:33:55.589 and partners are freeloaders and they have effectively 00:33:55.589 --> 00:33:58.349 shredded several of our key alliances. Now, they 00:33:58.349 --> 00:34:01.029 might be lingering on. NATO still exists. Article 00:34:01.029 --> 00:34:03.470 5 of NATO still exists. But does anyone believe 00:34:03.470 --> 00:34:07.829 that if Estonia were invaded, that Donald Trump 00:34:07.829 --> 00:34:10.590 would be interested in committing American forces? 00:34:11.210 --> 00:34:15.070 It has been a tremendous blow to our alliances. 00:34:15.130 --> 00:34:18.050 And, you know, I'll put it in a couple of specifics 00:34:18.050 --> 00:34:21.980 for you. If you are a foreign government deciding 00:34:21.980 --> 00:34:24.719 whether to share valuable intelligence with the 00:34:24.719 --> 00:34:27.159 United States, but you believe that the U .S. 00:34:27.179 --> 00:34:29.460 intelligence community has been politicized or 00:34:29.460 --> 00:34:31.340 that the White House is going to plop your information 00:34:31.340 --> 00:34:33.559 on the White House website because it serves 00:34:33.559 --> 00:34:35.360 a political end, you're not going to give us 00:34:35.360 --> 00:34:38.500 information. If you're a source deciding whether 00:34:38.500 --> 00:34:40.659 to work with the United States and the White 00:34:40.659 --> 00:34:43.260 House might plop your secret information that 00:34:43.260 --> 00:34:45.719 you risk your lives to deliver to the U .S., 00:34:45.719 --> 00:34:49.619 you're not going to get that information. Beyond, 00:34:49.679 --> 00:34:52.019 there's this idea that soft power of the United 00:34:52.019 --> 00:34:56.079 States is some airy -fairy thing, but the power 00:34:56.079 --> 00:34:58.559 of the United States is built on our attractiveness. 00:34:59.159 --> 00:35:01.320 And even in the context of this administration, 00:35:01.559 --> 00:35:03.400 I'll just put it in purely their terms, it was 00:35:03.400 --> 00:35:05.179 a presidential priority at the beginning of the 00:35:05.179 --> 00:35:08.219 administration to ensure access to critical minerals, 00:35:08.420 --> 00:35:12.039 which are the key elements going into advanced 00:35:12.039 --> 00:35:15.659 weapons systems and the U .S. economy. What did 00:35:15.659 --> 00:35:19.320 they do in the opening? part of the administration. 00:35:20.099 --> 00:35:24.039 They doged, they put into a woodchipper USAID, 00:35:24.099 --> 00:35:27.460 which was the primary source of US influence, 00:35:27.599 --> 00:35:30.860 prying open markets in the very countries that 00:35:30.860 --> 00:35:34.860 were the critical minerals providers. And so 00:35:34.860 --> 00:35:37.820 when you hurt an ally or partner, and then you 00:35:37.820 --> 00:35:39.820 turn around and make demands of them, they seem 00:35:39.820 --> 00:35:42.239 to be a little less interested in that. In the 00:35:42.239 --> 00:35:44.639 Iran case, where we launched a war of choice. 00:35:45.260 --> 00:35:48.039 which we couldn't finish in the end. Midway through 00:35:48.039 --> 00:35:50.079 the conflict, we start berating our allies for 00:35:50.079 --> 00:35:51.960 not jumping in to provide us with capabilities 00:35:51.960 --> 00:35:55.260 like minesweepers that we needed. I traveled 00:35:55.260 --> 00:35:58.719 in France earlier this year, and the farmers 00:35:58.719 --> 00:36:00.980 were not planting their spring crop. They couldn't 00:36:00.980 --> 00:36:04.159 afford the gas because they were paying double 00:36:04.159 --> 00:36:06.219 of what they would normally pay. It would not 00:36:06.219 --> 00:36:10.230 be economically profitable. In the local context 00:36:10.230 --> 00:36:12.670 where you have French farmers who can't put in 00:36:12.670 --> 00:36:15.469 their crops, they're watching local news and 00:36:15.469 --> 00:36:17.630 local news is telling them precisely who is at 00:36:17.630 --> 00:36:19.369 fault. They're saying the United States launched 00:36:19.369 --> 00:36:21.869 a war of choice without talking to our countries 00:36:21.869 --> 00:36:23.710 or considering our interests. And this is replicating 00:36:23.710 --> 00:36:26.610 itself all around the world, whether it is basing 00:36:26.610 --> 00:36:29.909 rights in East Asia or the future of the NATO 00:36:29.909 --> 00:36:34.150 alliance. Countries just simply are going their 00:36:34.150 --> 00:36:37.280 own way. When a new administration comes in, 00:36:37.340 --> 00:36:39.059 God willing, and is trying to put these things 00:36:39.059 --> 00:36:42.059 back together, the damage has been done because 00:36:42.059 --> 00:36:44.400 our allies and partners will know that we are 00:36:44.400 --> 00:36:46.679 always going to be four years away from potentially 00:36:46.679 --> 00:36:49.519 doing a hard turn toward isolationism and tearing 00:36:49.519 --> 00:36:51.820 up the agreements that we worked out with them. 00:36:52.119 --> 00:36:53.940 So we're going to have to do some serious thinking 00:36:53.940 --> 00:36:56.860 about what a future American foreign policy looks 00:36:56.860 --> 00:36:58.559 like because it's just not going back to where 00:36:58.559 --> 00:37:00.300 it was because of the damage of this administration. 00:37:01.340 --> 00:37:05.460 Getting away from something that... That goes 00:37:05.460 --> 00:37:09.880 back to the post -World War II era. It was our 00:37:09.880 --> 00:37:13.139 enlightened self -interest to help others because 00:37:13.139 --> 00:37:16.480 they then wanted to help us and we all benefited 00:37:16.480 --> 00:37:19.179 from it. Where we've now transitioned to this 00:37:19.179 --> 00:37:24.099 much more naked power, running a country like 00:37:24.099 --> 00:37:27.159 a crime family that has a demand to say, give 00:37:27.159 --> 00:37:31.809 me something or else. Now, with that falling 00:37:31.809 --> 00:37:35.070 apart and with this reluctance of our allies 00:37:35.070 --> 00:37:38.369 to support us, whether that is from a simple 00:37:38.369 --> 00:37:41.130 intelligence product, that is basing access, 00:37:41.469 --> 00:37:44.750 that is more longer and durable partnership. 00:37:45.389 --> 00:37:49.190 Who wins in all of this? Who is being empowered 00:37:49.190 --> 00:37:54.289 to act around the globe? Well, it is quite remarkable 00:37:54.289 --> 00:37:56.329 at the time that the United States is tearing 00:37:56.329 --> 00:37:58.769 up its own alliances. We're seeing our adversaries. 00:37:59.239 --> 00:38:01.840 working together, you know, closer than ever 00:38:01.840 --> 00:38:05.320 before. You have North Korea sending, you know, 00:38:05.340 --> 00:38:08.199 support to help the Russians fight in Ukraine. 00:38:08.420 --> 00:38:11.360 You've got the Iranians providing Shahid drones, 00:38:11.659 --> 00:38:14.440 which are one of the main weapons that are hurting 00:38:14.440 --> 00:38:18.139 the Ukrainians and now are being used against 00:38:18.139 --> 00:38:19.960 us in the Gulf. I mean, you have the Chinese 00:38:19.960 --> 00:38:22.039 weapons being sold to the Iranians. You have 00:38:22.039 --> 00:38:24.199 all of our main adversaries now working together 00:38:24.199 --> 00:38:27.420 on a closer basis. While meanwhile, we're tearing 00:38:27.420 --> 00:38:29.969 up our own alliances. Now, I don't want to get 00:38:29.969 --> 00:38:31.989 too far ahead of it. I mean, there's obvious 00:38:31.989 --> 00:38:34.170 major differences between this type of transactional 00:38:34.170 --> 00:38:36.909 behavior between them. But we're going the wrong 00:38:36.909 --> 00:38:40.190 direction. And this administration, in its national 00:38:40.190 --> 00:38:43.909 security strategy, has no understanding of who 00:38:43.909 --> 00:38:46.250 actually America's adversaries are. They've taken 00:38:46.250 --> 00:38:49.190 out Russia. They've marginalized China. Everything 00:38:49.190 --> 00:38:51.269 is about some dealmaking that they can do. And 00:38:51.269 --> 00:38:53.590 then they've elevated domestic groups as the 00:38:53.590 --> 00:38:56.690 real enemy within. Doing our enemies work for 00:38:56.690 --> 00:39:00.869 us. So it's been really disheartening to watch. 00:39:01.329 --> 00:39:03.489 And I think it's just a natural consequence of 00:39:03.489 --> 00:39:06.230 both the president's desires to not be corrected 00:39:06.230 --> 00:39:08.849 when he's wrong and the lack of coordination 00:39:08.849 --> 00:39:10.610 across the U .S. government that would have elevated 00:39:10.610 --> 00:39:13.849 these concerns as decisions were being made in 00:39:13.849 --> 00:39:15.630 a process in the first administration, in the 00:39:15.630 --> 00:39:17.110 first Trump administration, that was largely 00:39:17.110 --> 00:39:20.590 followed. So it didn't have to be like this. 00:39:20.849 --> 00:39:23.010 It's going to be a long two and a half more years 00:39:23.010 --> 00:39:25.329 to get through it unless the administration fundamentally 00:39:25.329 --> 00:39:27.949 changes how it makes decisions. And you see no 00:39:27.949 --> 00:39:31.210 evidence that they're going to. I think what 00:39:31.210 --> 00:39:35.590 we are starting to see is countries and leaders 00:39:35.590 --> 00:39:38.750 around the world stopping even responding to 00:39:38.750 --> 00:39:41.409 us or to the latest outburst of the president. 00:39:41.590 --> 00:39:44.579 We're saying it'll be different. two days later. 00:39:45.019 --> 00:39:48.219 And to close out, I do want to touch on some 00:39:48.219 --> 00:39:54.199 of this with Iran, that we are constantly in 00:39:54.199 --> 00:39:57.460 this back and forth where we are saying one thing, 00:39:57.539 --> 00:40:00.539 the Iranians are saying another, and there's 00:40:00.539 --> 00:40:04.280 no even chance to get back to the status quo 00:40:04.280 --> 00:40:08.679 ante. Is there any other out that you see that 00:40:08.679 --> 00:40:14.400 is different than a lose, lose, lose? proposition? 00:40:14.400 --> 00:40:18.559 Or have we basically given up the opportunity 00:40:18.559 --> 00:40:21.719 to even get back to what was and create the conditions 00:40:21.719 --> 00:40:25.980 for prosperity in the Middle East? You know, 00:40:26.000 --> 00:40:27.980 after the Iraq war, I really didn't think I would 00:40:27.980 --> 00:40:30.480 see a strategic blunder that the United States 00:40:30.480 --> 00:40:31.900 would commit, especially in the Middle East, 00:40:31.960 --> 00:40:35.139 that would compete with that, you know, terrible 00:40:35.139 --> 00:40:39.219 decision to invade. I don't see a good way out. 00:40:39.239 --> 00:40:42.559 And I just want to describe why. So the Iranians 00:40:42.559 --> 00:40:44.599 have taken blow after blow after blow. They have 00:40:44.599 --> 00:40:47.780 suffered tremendously. They are, you know, the 00:40:47.780 --> 00:40:51.699 country is in ruins. But this is a regime fighting 00:40:51.699 --> 00:40:54.599 for its survival. There are millions of people 00:40:54.599 --> 00:40:57.219 in the Iranian government who are part of the 00:40:57.219 --> 00:41:00.199 regime's security forces whose entire lives are 00:41:00.199 --> 00:41:03.760 caught up in the survival of the regime. An air 00:41:03.760 --> 00:41:07.320 campaign from above is not going to lead to the 00:41:07.320 --> 00:41:09.440 kind of outcomes that the president has stated. 00:41:10.360 --> 00:41:13.460 On the other side, the U .S. war aims have shifted 00:41:13.460 --> 00:41:16.519 several times over the course of the conflict, 00:41:16.659 --> 00:41:18.440 depending on the whims of the president's Twitter 00:41:18.440 --> 00:41:20.960 finger. Whether it is, well, we're just going 00:41:20.960 --> 00:41:23.199 to, you know, we want a better deal on the nuclear 00:41:23.199 --> 00:41:25.500 negotiations. Oh, well, no, actually, we want 00:41:25.500 --> 00:41:28.780 regime change. And then at the Memorandum of 00:41:28.780 --> 00:41:31.340 Understanding, which has now fallen apart, we 00:41:31.340 --> 00:41:34.079 were offering them a better deal than they had 00:41:34.079 --> 00:41:37.719 before the conflict. I don't know what it's called 00:41:37.719 --> 00:41:41.219 when you end up with a worse deal than when you 00:41:41.219 --> 00:41:42.920 started the war. I think it's called losing. 00:41:43.639 --> 00:41:46.380 And the United States is in no position now, 00:41:46.519 --> 00:41:49.099 the greatest Navy on earth is in no position 00:41:49.099 --> 00:41:53.420 to ensure the security of transit through the 00:41:53.420 --> 00:41:56.199 Strait of Hormuz. You have the Defense Department. 00:41:56.670 --> 00:41:59.489 And people have seen this emailing around to 00:41:59.489 --> 00:42:03.809 servicemen via, you know, on their systems asking 00:42:03.809 --> 00:42:06.929 for inputs. Does anyone have any creative ideas 00:42:06.929 --> 00:42:10.570 of how we're going to inflict pain on the Iranians? 00:42:10.650 --> 00:42:12.429 And I read this and I'm like, God, if only there 00:42:12.429 --> 00:42:14.869 was some sort of council that would discuss national 00:42:14.869 --> 00:42:18.730 security and be informed by the latest intelligence 00:42:18.730 --> 00:42:21.369 and experts who might be able to inform a good 00:42:21.369 --> 00:42:22.909 policy. God, I don't know what even what you 00:42:22.909 --> 00:42:25.469 would call such a thing. Instead, it's amateur 00:42:25.469 --> 00:42:29.289 hour. And between that and sending the president's 00:42:29.289 --> 00:42:31.949 son -in -law and real estate developers to deal 00:42:31.949 --> 00:42:35.349 with hardened revolutionaries or trying to negotiate 00:42:35.349 --> 00:42:37.269 with a supreme leader who we killed his dad, 00:42:37.570 --> 00:42:40.309 I just – I don't see the way out. And the Iranians 00:42:40.309 --> 00:42:43.789 are famous for seeing an American president in 00:42:43.789 --> 00:42:45.809 political trouble, which this president has been 00:42:45.809 --> 00:42:47.929 since the moment he launched this war, facing 00:42:47.929 --> 00:42:52.219 midterm elections in November. And I can't imagine 00:42:52.219 --> 00:42:55.059 what incentive they have to give him a political 00:42:55.059 --> 00:42:58.460 gift to wind up this conflict when all they need 00:42:58.460 --> 00:43:01.820 to do is just not come to the table. And so I 00:43:01.820 --> 00:43:03.860 expect them to basically just wait us out and 00:43:03.860 --> 00:43:06.199 watch us as we give them more and more and more 00:43:06.199 --> 00:43:08.199 as the political calculations of the White House 00:43:08.199 --> 00:43:12.000 intensify. I never thought I would live in a 00:43:12.000 --> 00:43:14.239 world where people are sharing on social media 00:43:14.239 --> 00:43:16.739 Iranian propaganda and we're all going, well, 00:43:16.780 --> 00:43:18.599 that's actually really good. Nice use of Legos, 00:43:18.599 --> 00:43:23.559 Iran. It is crazy to think that that's the position 00:43:23.559 --> 00:43:27.599 we're in where we're just hopeful for a less 00:43:27.599 --> 00:43:31.940 bad outcome because there is no good outcome 00:43:31.940 --> 00:43:36.619 that we can foresee. So when this outcome shows 00:43:36.619 --> 00:43:39.340 up, I'd love to talk to you more about it because 00:43:39.340 --> 00:43:43.949 there is so much that... We have to cover on 00:43:43.949 --> 00:43:46.510 the continuing role of the intelligence coordination 00:43:46.510 --> 00:43:49.750 function, putting good people in place, putting 00:43:49.750 --> 00:43:52.929 people who live up to their oaths. So, Julia 00:43:52.929 --> 00:43:56.429 Curley, thank you for joining us on this episode 00:43:56.429 --> 00:43:58.630 of the Steady State Sentinel. For our listeners 00:43:58.630 --> 00:44:00.869 out there, we hope that this episode gave you 00:44:00.869 --> 00:44:04.690 something to think about. Let us know what resonated 00:44:04.690 --> 00:44:08.090 with you or what questions did it raise? You 00:44:08.090 --> 00:44:10.309 can find us on Substack and across all social 00:44:10.309 --> 00:44:13.449 media. Your feedback matters and helps us improve 00:44:13.449 --> 00:44:16.550 this product. But until next time, thank you 00:44:16.550 --> 00:44:19.050 for listening. I'm Brie Fram, still standing 00:44:19.050 --> 00:44:24.550 watch. Thank you for listening to the Steady 00:44:24.550 --> 00:44:28.110 State Sentinel podcast. Don't miss out on more 00:44:28.110 --> 00:44:31.269 insights and exposes from America's premier global 00:44:31.269 --> 00:44:35.039 security experts. Also, subscribe to our Substack 00:44:35.039 --> 00:44:40.179 at substack .com slash at SteadyState1 and follow 00:44:40.179 --> 00:44:42.619 our social media and join us right here next 00:44:42.619 --> 00:44:46.119 week for another exciting edition. The Steady 00:44:46.119 --> 00:44:48.900 State is a nonprofit organization working to 00:44:48.900 --> 00:44:50.960 sustain our democracy and national security. 00:44:51.780 --> 00:44:55.400 Join us and support our mission by visiting www 00:44:55.400 --> 00:44:57.599 .thesteadysate .org.