WEBVTT - Generated by AI 00:00:00.430 --> 00:00:03.310 Something is changing in our country, and most 00:00:03.310 --> 00:00:12.169 people feel it before they can explain it. Hello, 00:00:12.349 --> 00:00:14.169 you're listening to the Steady State Sentinel 00:00:14.169 --> 00:00:17.489 from the Steady State. I'm Jim Lawler, a former 00:00:17.489 --> 00:00:20.730 senior CIA operations officer. I've worked some 00:00:20.730 --> 00:00:22.809 of the most sensitive counterproliferation and 00:00:22.809 --> 00:00:26.140 espionage cases in the agency's history. And 00:00:26.140 --> 00:00:28.359 today, I'm pleased to say that I'm joined by 00:00:28.359 --> 00:00:31.359 my friend and former CIA colleague, Mark Fowler. 00:00:31.579 --> 00:00:35.320 Mark is a decorated CIA case officer and one 00:00:35.320 --> 00:00:38.359 of the most experienced Iranian operations officers 00:00:38.359 --> 00:00:41.420 of his generation. He's a Middle Eastern expert. 00:00:41.520 --> 00:00:44.119 He's a veteran of the U .S. war on terror. He's 00:00:44.119 --> 00:00:47.020 an Iran specialist. And he's a Farsi speaker. 00:00:47.219 --> 00:00:50.579 And Farsi is not an easy language. Mark, you 00:00:50.579 --> 00:00:54.020 spent 22 years at CIA, and you rose to be the 00:00:54.020 --> 00:00:57.380 number two position on Iran operations. So for 00:00:57.380 --> 00:00:59.700 our listeners who may not fully appreciate what 00:00:59.700 --> 00:01:02.640 that means, what does an Iran operations officer 00:01:02.640 --> 00:01:06.219 actually do, and what makes Iran such a uniquely 00:01:06.219 --> 00:01:10.700 demanding target? Well, thanks, Jim. Pleasure 00:01:10.700 --> 00:01:14.439 to be here. Happy to participate in steady state 00:01:14.439 --> 00:01:20.379 issues. Yeah, in terms of... I was an Iran specialist, 00:01:20.579 --> 00:01:23.260 as we call it. I don't use the term expert because 00:01:23.260 --> 00:01:25.840 that's probably a little bit of hubris. But at 00:01:25.840 --> 00:01:28.280 the same time, how are you ever a true expert 00:01:28.280 --> 00:01:30.719 on something as complicated and nuanced as Iran? 00:01:31.000 --> 00:01:35.280 But I was a specialist in terms of. Iran operations 00:01:35.280 --> 00:01:39.219 officers. I was specifically an Iran operations 00:01:39.219 --> 00:01:42.420 officer. And what that means is where you're 00:01:42.420 --> 00:01:44.420 a case officer like everybody else, like you 00:01:44.420 --> 00:01:46.959 were, like most officers are within the agency. 00:01:47.060 --> 00:01:50.340 But I had a specific specialty in my back pocket, 00:01:50.400 --> 00:01:53.540 if you will, that I could focus on under certain 00:01:53.540 --> 00:01:55.439 circumstances, depending on what I was working 00:01:55.439 --> 00:01:58.159 on at the time. For example, my first tour was 00:01:58.159 --> 00:02:01.359 actually specifically on Iran only. I spent a 00:02:01.359 --> 00:02:05.359 number of years basically flying around the world, 00:02:05.439 --> 00:02:08.360 chasing Iranians, if you will. And at different 00:02:08.360 --> 00:02:10.340 times in my career, I did regular case officer 00:02:10.340 --> 00:02:14.870 work. against normal targets as you did. But 00:02:14.870 --> 00:02:18.129 I always seem to come back to the Iranian specialists. 00:02:18.370 --> 00:02:21.090 It's like people who are Chinese experts or Russian 00:02:21.090 --> 00:02:24.889 experts or Korean or whatever, North Korean, 00:02:25.050 --> 00:02:27.189 if they have the language, usually they bring 00:02:27.189 --> 00:02:30.469 you back to it because it's a little bit unusual. 00:02:30.889 --> 00:02:33.590 It's hard to get the language, as you said. So 00:02:33.590 --> 00:02:37.490 most Iranian ops officers. have Farsi. Not all 00:02:37.490 --> 00:02:40.729 of them, actually. It's not 100 % required, but 00:02:40.729 --> 00:02:43.189 it's a good idea. Obviously, if there's someone 00:02:43.189 --> 00:02:45.389 who doesn't speak any English at all, you need 00:02:45.389 --> 00:02:46.830 to be able to speak Farsi, and you need to be 00:02:46.830 --> 00:02:49.050 able to speak Farsi well. So that's what an Iran 00:02:49.050 --> 00:02:51.610 operations officer is, a regular operations officer 00:02:51.610 --> 00:02:55.490 at CIA with a specialty in their back pocket, 00:02:55.509 --> 00:02:59.500 if you will. OK. And what made Iran such a such 00:02:59.500 --> 00:03:02.099 a uniquely demanding target, such a difficult 00:03:02.099 --> 00:03:04.139 target or maybe it's not a difficult target? 00:03:04.300 --> 00:03:06.180 Give me your opinion and tell me what you think 00:03:06.180 --> 00:03:08.759 on that. Well, I mean, it's a hard target, as 00:03:08.759 --> 00:03:10.919 we call them. You know, it's up there with the 00:03:10.919 --> 00:03:13.919 harder targets. But the reason a lot of the reason 00:03:13.919 --> 00:03:16.800 for that is not simply they're so hard to recruit. 00:03:16.919 --> 00:03:20.000 It's not that they're easy, but. Well, we don't 00:03:20.000 --> 00:03:22.259 have a presence inside Iran, obviously, since 00:03:22.259 --> 00:03:25.439 79, when the embassy closed down after they took 00:03:25.439 --> 00:03:29.319 the hostages. So basically, a lot of the hardest 00:03:29.319 --> 00:03:31.599 part of working on Iran is actually getting to 00:03:31.599 --> 00:03:35.159 them, getting to an individual. It's not, it's 00:03:35.159 --> 00:03:37.800 normally not going to be like your, you know, 00:03:37.800 --> 00:03:40.180 your six month, year, two years developmental 00:03:40.180 --> 00:03:44.360 process. in terms of how we might normally do 00:03:44.360 --> 00:03:47.460 something, like a lot of what you did, simply 00:03:47.460 --> 00:03:50.120 because you don't have time on target. So a lot 00:03:50.120 --> 00:03:53.340 of these were walk -ins. A lot of these were, 00:03:53.520 --> 00:03:56.300 I want to call them cold pitches, which is kind 00:03:56.300 --> 00:03:57.819 of like when you walk up to someone and say, 00:03:57.939 --> 00:04:00.520 you know, I know about you, we want you to work 00:04:00.520 --> 00:04:02.120 with us, et cetera, et cetera. That actually 00:04:02.120 --> 00:04:04.610 didn't work very well most of the time. But it 00:04:04.610 --> 00:04:06.689 made it hard. The hardest part was getting to 00:04:06.689 --> 00:04:09.750 them, actually recruiting them. Not easy, but 00:04:09.750 --> 00:04:12.669 certainly probably easier than some because so 00:04:12.669 --> 00:04:16.410 many Iranians have antipathy towards their government. 00:04:16.730 --> 00:04:18.509 They love their country. They love their culture. 00:04:18.750 --> 00:04:23.089 But they do not like the regime. A lot of them. 00:04:23.129 --> 00:04:25.649 Obviously, some do. They're invested and they're 00:04:25.649 --> 00:04:28.009 highly and they're also scared. They're scared 00:04:28.009 --> 00:04:30.009 of the regime. So getting them to actually even 00:04:30.009 --> 00:04:32.879 consider talking to you could be hard. You're 00:04:32.879 --> 00:04:36.079 right. I sometimes chafe at the description of 00:04:36.079 --> 00:04:39.240 some particular nationality as being a hard target. 00:04:39.339 --> 00:04:41.639 I think most targets are human beings that will 00:04:41.639 --> 00:04:45.360 respond to human problems. What's hard is what 00:04:45.360 --> 00:04:48.660 you just described, hard access. you know, getting 00:04:48.660 --> 00:04:50.699 the access to them. Once you've got the access 00:04:50.699 --> 00:04:53.100 to them, especially if you can get some sustained 00:04:53.100 --> 00:04:55.480 access, I think they're just like anybody else. 00:04:55.720 --> 00:04:58.680 So I'm glad that you clarified that for us. And 00:04:58.680 --> 00:05:00.839 I noted earlier that you're a Farsi speaker. 00:05:01.100 --> 00:05:04.040 How much did your language ability shape your 00:05:04.040 --> 00:05:08.360 ability to understand the Iranian mindset, not 00:05:08.360 --> 00:05:11.160 just communication, but read the culture and 00:05:11.160 --> 00:05:15.399 the regime? Tell us about that. Yeah, it's very 00:05:15.399 --> 00:05:17.980 important. You can't learn a language, truly 00:05:17.980 --> 00:05:21.339 learn a language without understanding the culture 00:05:21.339 --> 00:05:23.500 and the history. It's sort of part and parcel 00:05:23.500 --> 00:05:26.379 of the same process. Normally, when we take a 00:05:26.379 --> 00:05:28.819 language, I didn't come in with Farsi. It's not 00:05:28.819 --> 00:05:31.040 there's not that many people who look like me, 00:05:31.079 --> 00:05:34.259 frankly, who speak Farsi. So I got it when I 00:05:34.259 --> 00:05:37.279 got into the agency. That's a whole nother story 00:05:37.279 --> 00:05:41.000 how I got there. Serendipitous. But when you 00:05:41.000 --> 00:05:44.399 sit for, you know. months and months and months 00:05:44.399 --> 00:05:46.740 up to a year. Sometimes it's two years for programs. 00:05:46.899 --> 00:05:49.279 It's more of a year -long program. When you sit 00:05:49.279 --> 00:05:52.300 that long with native speaking, obviously Iranian 00:05:52.300 --> 00:05:56.160 language instructors, you talk about so many 00:05:56.160 --> 00:05:57.620 different things, just learning the language. 00:05:57.699 --> 00:05:59.160 So you have to know the history. You have to 00:05:59.160 --> 00:06:01.259 know the mentality. You have to know the culture. 00:06:01.420 --> 00:06:05.139 And it's very important, especially with a target 00:06:05.139 --> 00:06:07.620 or a country like Iran, because of their long 00:06:07.620 --> 00:06:10.689 history, thousands of years of history. magnificent 00:06:10.689 --> 00:06:13.350 history in some cases, some really tremendous 00:06:13.350 --> 00:06:15.269 things they've done over the years. It's been 00:06:15.269 --> 00:06:19.529 a while since they've had a regime like that. 00:06:19.709 --> 00:06:22.129 You know, they go back to Cyrus, to Great Darius, 00:06:22.230 --> 00:06:23.970 et cetera. But it's been a while since they've 00:06:23.970 --> 00:06:26.110 had a government that they could be proud of. 00:06:26.149 --> 00:06:28.250 But you have to understand their culture and 00:06:28.250 --> 00:06:30.110 their history because it's always going to come 00:06:30.110 --> 00:06:32.029 up. And even recent history, the whole issue 00:06:32.029 --> 00:06:36.750 of Mossadegh in 53, the overthrow of the elected 00:06:36.750 --> 00:06:41.240 government or prime minister. I don't remember 00:06:41.240 --> 00:06:44.399 almost any case where I was working with somebody, 00:06:44.459 --> 00:06:46.480 an Iranian, who didn't at least mention that. 00:06:46.600 --> 00:06:48.639 So why did you do that? It was always a question. 00:06:48.720 --> 00:06:51.899 Of course, I would say long before my time, but 00:06:51.899 --> 00:06:55.139 needless to say, it always came up. You had to 00:06:55.139 --> 00:06:57.420 understand what it was about. You don't want 00:06:57.420 --> 00:06:59.160 to get lost in that because we're not talking 00:06:59.160 --> 00:07:02.120 about what happened. 50 years ago or a couple 00:07:02.120 --> 00:07:03.579 of hundred years ago. We're talking about what's 00:07:03.579 --> 00:07:05.779 happening now. But you certainly need to understand, 00:07:06.019 --> 00:07:08.959 and it also helps them feel confidence in you, 00:07:09.019 --> 00:07:12.420 that you are a person they can talk to and who 00:07:12.420 --> 00:07:14.060 understands where they're coming from. That's 00:07:14.060 --> 00:07:16.939 very important. It's part of the empathy of being 00:07:16.939 --> 00:07:20.459 a good case officer, frankly. I think part of 00:07:20.459 --> 00:07:23.660 our mistake in tackling the Iranian problem has 00:07:23.660 --> 00:07:26.899 sometimes been underestimating them. We forget 00:07:26.899 --> 00:07:29.879 the fact that Iranians... at least Persians, 00:07:29.879 --> 00:07:32.720 invented whole fields of mathematics when... 00:07:33.040 --> 00:07:35.339 Some of our ancestors were still painting their 00:07:35.339 --> 00:07:38.560 faces blue. Exactly. These people are incredibly 00:07:38.560 --> 00:07:41.139 bright. You look around at a lot of the expatriate 00:07:41.139 --> 00:07:44.060 Iranians in the United States, and they're frequently 00:07:44.060 --> 00:07:47.680 doctors, they're physicians, they're financiers. 00:07:47.680 --> 00:07:50.540 They're incredibly bright people. And I think 00:07:50.540 --> 00:07:53.639 we make a mistake sometimes when we say, well, 00:07:53.680 --> 00:07:56.279 these people are backwards or something like 00:07:56.279 --> 00:07:58.920 that. They're not at all. Not at all. No. They're 00:07:58.920 --> 00:08:01.379 very, very bright. They're very bright. They're 00:08:01.379 --> 00:08:05.170 very accomplished. very, very, very proud. That's 00:08:05.170 --> 00:08:09.189 a big word, madrur, pride. Exactly. So their 00:08:09.189 --> 00:08:11.730 country, the current regime, the Islamic Republic, 00:08:11.910 --> 00:08:15.350 it's survived now for over 45 years, and sure, 00:08:15.470 --> 00:08:18.029 it's had its internal dissent, economic pressure, 00:08:18.250 --> 00:08:21.290 repeated confrontations with the West. But from 00:08:21.290 --> 00:08:23.550 your vantage point, what has kept this regime 00:08:23.550 --> 00:08:26.589 in power when so many folks have predicted its 00:08:26.589 --> 00:08:32.919 collapse? Yeah, that's a good question. First 00:08:32.919 --> 00:08:36.860 of all, they did things inside Iran with their 00:08:36.860 --> 00:08:40.039 own country. It wasn't all bad, let me put it 00:08:40.039 --> 00:08:43.220 that way. They did things like they improved 00:08:43.220 --> 00:08:45.320 transportation, they improved health, they improved 00:08:45.320 --> 00:08:51.419 education. Fluency in reading, et cetera, is 00:08:51.419 --> 00:08:54.200 very high, even among women. It's not like the 00:08:54.200 --> 00:08:56.139 Taliban or something like that. Even if they 00:08:56.139 --> 00:08:57.940 cover their hair, that doesn't mean they're not 00:08:57.940 --> 00:09:00.980 educated. You meet many Iranian women who are 00:09:00.980 --> 00:09:05.139 doctors or PhDs or certainly college educated. 00:09:05.419 --> 00:09:07.879 So they did a lot of good things over the years. 00:09:08.440 --> 00:09:12.740 But what they did was they gave them certain 00:09:12.740 --> 00:09:14.259 things they could do, and they gave them internet, 00:09:14.559 --> 00:09:16.259 et cetera, et cetera, to the world. So they gave 00:09:16.259 --> 00:09:21.470 them access. But they used... social moors as 00:09:21.470 --> 00:09:23.730 a sort of a safety valve. So that allowed them 00:09:23.730 --> 00:09:28.169 to sort of like let off pressure or increase 00:09:28.169 --> 00:09:30.230 pressure depending on what was going on inside 00:09:30.230 --> 00:09:33.750 Iran. And in terms of surviving from external 00:09:33.750 --> 00:09:39.149 threats, it's simply because they've... One of 00:09:39.149 --> 00:09:40.629 the things that was very important was the Iran 00:09:40.629 --> 00:09:43.110 -Iraq War, obviously. That's when the IRGC, the 00:09:43.110 --> 00:09:45.370 Revolutionary Guards, came into being, and that 00:09:45.370 --> 00:09:47.570 really formed the core. And we're still seeing 00:09:47.570 --> 00:09:50.250 people at the highest levels of the IRGC, the 00:09:50.250 --> 00:09:52.850 Revolutionary Guards, who fought in the Iraq 00:09:52.850 --> 00:09:56.409 War. In fact, that's many of the leaders there 00:09:56.409 --> 00:09:59.850 right now. Most of the leadership that was there 00:09:59.850 --> 00:10:02.409 before the revolution or as the revolution happened, 00:10:02.669 --> 00:10:04.929 most of them are gone. Not all of them, but a 00:10:04.929 --> 00:10:09.049 lot of them. And so they're smart about how they 00:10:09.049 --> 00:10:12.330 approach this. They're a big country. They're 00:10:12.330 --> 00:10:16.090 powerful in their own way. They are strong internally. 00:10:16.809 --> 00:10:19.049 And they're very smart about how they do this. 00:10:19.090 --> 00:10:20.769 One of the ways they've actually been able to 00:10:20.769 --> 00:10:24.389 survive is through their proxy network and also 00:10:24.389 --> 00:10:27.759 self -sufficiency. They don't want to count on 00:10:27.759 --> 00:10:30.000 anybody because they've come to believe they 00:10:30.000 --> 00:10:32.159 can't count on anybody. And you could make that 00:10:32.159 --> 00:10:35.559 argument. And so they make their own weapons. 00:10:35.639 --> 00:10:40.480 They have their own industrial weapons industry. 00:10:42.940 --> 00:10:45.860 And also the proxies have helped them sort of 00:10:45.860 --> 00:10:51.419 like push out the threat to others to keep others 00:10:51.419 --> 00:10:53.700 at bay. Hezbollah, of course, is focused on. 00:10:54.739 --> 00:10:57.200 Israel. The Houthis, they're pretty new. They're 00:10:57.200 --> 00:10:59.879 pretty new. Iraq, they came in and it helped. 00:11:00.179 --> 00:11:02.960 It just provides them with a defensive circle, 00:11:03.100 --> 00:11:05.399 if you will, almost like a picket line, and it 00:11:05.399 --> 00:11:07.519 pushes it farther out. So it makes it harder 00:11:07.519 --> 00:11:13.340 for people to, for other countries to sort of 00:11:13.340 --> 00:11:15.299 threaten them, if you will. We're seeing a little 00:11:15.299 --> 00:11:18.019 different situation right now. But, you know, 00:11:18.019 --> 00:11:20.600 for many, many years, they were very adept at 00:11:20.600 --> 00:11:23.960 managing internal internal opposition and internal 00:11:23.960 --> 00:11:26.779 protests. We've seen that recently in the last 00:11:26.779 --> 00:11:29.860 several decades, almost a regular series of major 00:11:29.860 --> 00:11:32.679 protests. The most recent one, of course, was 00:11:32.679 --> 00:11:35.500 just before the war started, essentially. And 00:11:35.500 --> 00:11:38.220 they'll let them go on at a certain point until 00:11:38.220 --> 00:11:40.059 they get out of hand, but they're willing to 00:11:40.059 --> 00:11:41.919 kill their own people to do that. And that's 00:11:41.919 --> 00:11:44.279 really the key in terms of putting down protests 00:11:44.279 --> 00:11:48.259 within the country. And what they usually do 00:11:48.259 --> 00:11:51.070 is they'll The Internet's there, of course, and 00:11:51.070 --> 00:11:53.590 they'll use the Internet initially to gather 00:11:53.590 --> 00:11:55.950 information on the leadership, if you will, the 00:11:55.950 --> 00:12:00.190 social apps and everything. And they'll figure 00:12:00.190 --> 00:12:01.970 out who the leaders are because they're using 00:12:01.970 --> 00:12:03.990 these to gather, et cetera, et cetera, because 00:12:03.990 --> 00:12:06.090 they can monitor everything on the Internet. 00:12:06.129 --> 00:12:08.330 It has to go through central points. And then 00:12:08.330 --> 00:12:09.830 they'll shut off the Internet and then they'll 00:12:09.830 --> 00:12:12.110 go after the leadership. So they're able to sort 00:12:12.110 --> 00:12:16.830 of identify and crush. the leaders that do appear 00:12:16.830 --> 00:12:18.789 from among the people, if you will. It's not 00:12:18.789 --> 00:12:21.730 external. It's internal. And frankly, they're 00:12:21.730 --> 00:12:25.269 just really good at survival. And their focus 00:12:25.269 --> 00:12:27.889 has always been the regime itself. And they've 00:12:27.889 --> 00:12:30.169 done certain things for the population. Like 00:12:30.169 --> 00:12:32.889 I mentioned before, the standard of living was 00:12:32.889 --> 00:12:36.029 rising and rising. But at the same time, They 00:12:36.029 --> 00:12:39.289 were also, things came home to roost, if you 00:12:39.289 --> 00:12:42.710 will. The high inflation, the environmental issues 00:12:42.710 --> 00:12:46.850 they're suffering, and of course, their hostility 00:12:46.850 --> 00:12:49.830 towards Israel and others in the region has brought 00:12:49.830 --> 00:12:55.389 down war on them, if you will. So one of the 00:12:55.389 --> 00:12:57.129 reasons they've been able to manage internally 00:12:57.129 --> 00:12:59.149 very well, which is really the biggest threat, 00:12:59.269 --> 00:13:01.629 that's what scares them the most. Other than... 00:13:01.769 --> 00:13:04.429 A full -scale invasion by the U .S., I guess, 00:13:04.529 --> 00:13:06.669 boots on the ground, but we're not talking a 00:13:06.669 --> 00:13:08.909 couple of dozen soldiers. We're talking hundreds 00:13:08.909 --> 00:13:10.929 of thousands. That's what it would take. That 00:13:10.929 --> 00:13:12.750 scares them. But the other thing that scares 00:13:12.750 --> 00:13:15.370 them is the streets in Tehran, because that's 00:13:15.370 --> 00:13:17.269 where they came from. So that's where they focus 00:13:17.269 --> 00:13:19.610 most of their effort, and that's how they managed 00:13:19.610 --> 00:13:23.330 to survive for so long. If you were to just take 00:13:23.330 --> 00:13:26.320 a wild guess, what... Do you think what percentage 00:13:26.320 --> 00:13:29.299 of the Iranian population supports the current 00:13:29.299 --> 00:13:34.279 regime or at least is silent about it? What percentage 00:13:34.279 --> 00:13:36.759 would actually strongly supports the current 00:13:36.759 --> 00:13:39.159 regime? Just do you take a guess or do you know? 00:13:39.559 --> 00:13:42.379 I mean, I don't really know, but I would say 00:13:42.379 --> 00:13:45.659 it's probably in the range of 20 ish or, you 00:13:45.659 --> 00:13:47.980 know, something like that. I mean, it's real 00:13:47.980 --> 00:13:50.039 hard to tell. I mean, to get obviously polling 00:13:50.039 --> 00:13:54.600 data, but it's. But that's still a lot of people. 00:13:54.740 --> 00:13:57.460 I mean, you know, it's like 20 million -ish or 00:13:57.460 --> 00:13:59.840 something like that, a little less. And that's 00:13:59.840 --> 00:14:02.659 a lot of people. And some of them are really 00:14:02.659 --> 00:14:05.879 completely invested and embedded within the regime. 00:14:06.019 --> 00:14:08.679 Others are simply going along to get along. They're 00:14:08.679 --> 00:14:10.759 sort of they have relatives or they're doing 00:14:10.759 --> 00:14:13.200 OK and it's all right. And it doesn't really 00:14:13.200 --> 00:14:16.460 affect their or didn't in the past. Things are 00:14:16.460 --> 00:14:19.340 different now, obviously. So they they sort of 00:14:19.340 --> 00:14:21.320 just. They don't get involved in politics. It's 00:14:21.320 --> 00:14:23.000 kind of like things were in Iraq for years. I 00:14:23.000 --> 00:14:26.019 talked to Iraqis, and they were not happy with 00:14:26.019 --> 00:14:27.500 it. But they said, as long as we stay out of 00:14:27.500 --> 00:14:30.799 politics, life is not that bad for a lot of Iraqis. 00:14:30.799 --> 00:14:33.139 It got worse, obviously. Things changed. But 00:14:33.139 --> 00:14:36.960 similar in Iran, life has been in the past. It's 00:14:36.960 --> 00:14:40.399 changed. But it was getting really bad in the 00:14:40.399 --> 00:14:43.159 lead up to the war. The environmental issues 00:14:43.159 --> 00:14:45.299 were really, they were running out of water, 00:14:45.360 --> 00:14:51.879 literally. And obviously, power, et cetera, hydroelectric 00:14:51.879 --> 00:14:54.299 power. There were a lot of things that were really 00:14:54.299 --> 00:14:58.120 coming to a head when this war came along. And 00:14:58.120 --> 00:15:01.059 sadly, the 20 percent you describe as either 00:15:01.059 --> 00:15:03.679 regime supporters or at least tacit supporters, 00:15:03.879 --> 00:15:05.600 they're the ones who have the weapons and the 00:15:05.600 --> 00:15:09.100 guns. Exactly. Exactly. I used to laugh that 00:15:09.100 --> 00:15:12.519 it's not a joke, but especially people like the 00:15:12.519 --> 00:15:14.820 Basij who are the sort of the street thugs that 00:15:14.820 --> 00:15:17.740 they use. They're almost like a reserve. A lot 00:15:17.740 --> 00:15:19.820 of these people are in some are, you know, completely 00:15:19.820 --> 00:15:21.720 because they come from the villages. A lot of 00:15:21.720 --> 00:15:24.220 these people, they're less educated and et cetera, 00:15:24.299 --> 00:15:27.710 not illiterate, but less educated. a joke that 00:15:27.710 --> 00:15:29.590 a lot of them were in this because they got dental 00:15:29.590 --> 00:15:33.309 and they got benefits, literally special stores 00:15:33.309 --> 00:15:35.909 they could shop at. You know, they got consideration 00:15:35.909 --> 00:15:38.789 for jobs and other things. And and, you know, 00:15:38.809 --> 00:15:41.330 how it is a lot of people in the communist regimes 00:15:41.330 --> 00:15:44.230 as they were. They didn't really they were communists 00:15:44.230 --> 00:15:46.509 only or BAF party members, because that's the 00:15:46.509 --> 00:15:48.149 only way they could get a decent job. They didn't 00:15:48.149 --> 00:15:50.070 believe in it. They didn't truly support it. 00:15:50.110 --> 00:15:52.870 But they knew the only way that they could sort 00:15:52.870 --> 00:15:56.039 of. take advantage of what was out there, and 00:15:56.039 --> 00:15:57.840 there were things out there, was to be a member, 00:15:57.960 --> 00:16:02.379 at least outwardly. Yeah. Now, I know we have 00:16:02.379 --> 00:16:04.740 fond memories of you serving as the chief of 00:16:04.740 --> 00:16:07.179 station in that region. We worked together on 00:16:07.179 --> 00:16:10.159 some things, very successful things, and your 00:16:10.159 --> 00:16:14.039 support was key. But without getting into anything 00:16:14.039 --> 00:16:17.250 you... reluctant to discuss. How did allied intelligence 00:16:17.250 --> 00:16:20.929 services view Iran differently than we did? And 00:16:20.929 --> 00:16:23.769 where did those differences matter? Is there 00:16:23.769 --> 00:16:29.850 anything, any comment on that? Yeah. Yeah, there 00:16:29.850 --> 00:16:34.149 were, obviously in the region, the Iranians are 00:16:34.149 --> 00:16:37.009 a boogeyman, but there's an issue that a lot 00:16:37.009 --> 00:16:38.490 of this was, first of all, they were terrified 00:16:38.490 --> 00:16:41.610 of the Iranians. Let's be very, very clear about 00:16:41.610 --> 00:16:44.629 that in the sense of what the threat actually 00:16:44.629 --> 00:16:47.889 was. Early on after the revolution, the Iranians, 00:16:47.950 --> 00:16:49.769 and they announced it, they were going to export 00:16:49.769 --> 00:16:51.970 the revolution. And obviously the revolution 00:16:51.970 --> 00:16:54.210 is the Shia revolution, not a Sunni revolution. 00:16:54.769 --> 00:16:58.509 Shias are about 15 % of the Muslim world, more 00:16:58.509 --> 00:17:00.629 or less there. They're a persecuted minority. 00:17:00.750 --> 00:17:05.009 They have been for a couple thousand years since 00:17:05.009 --> 00:17:08.730 Islam came along and the split a couple of hundred 00:17:08.730 --> 00:17:12.670 years later. And so most of these, the countries 00:17:12.670 --> 00:17:14.690 in that region, most of them are Sunni, first 00:17:14.690 --> 00:17:17.950 of all, almost all of them are. Iraq is an example. 00:17:18.170 --> 00:17:20.309 You know, they were run by Sunnis, but they were 00:17:20.309 --> 00:17:26.369 two -thirds -ish Shia. But they were terrified 00:17:26.369 --> 00:17:28.130 of these guys and what they could do. They knew 00:17:28.130 --> 00:17:30.650 they had capabilities, real capabilities. And 00:17:30.650 --> 00:17:32.990 a lot of them, frankly, I love a lot of the other 00:17:32.990 --> 00:17:34.750 people that I worked with, but they just didn't 00:17:34.750 --> 00:17:36.450 have the capabilities, at least not the same 00:17:36.450 --> 00:17:39.039 way. They couldn't do stuff. the way the Iranians 00:17:39.039 --> 00:17:42.180 could do stuff on their own. So they, and they 00:17:42.180 --> 00:17:45.240 approached sort of the Iran issue as much as 00:17:45.240 --> 00:17:48.559 anything through the lens of Sunni Shia, the 00:17:48.559 --> 00:17:52.319 Sunni Shia history, which is, it was difficult 00:17:52.319 --> 00:17:54.160 to break through that because of course, you 00:17:54.160 --> 00:17:56.400 know, they were Sunni and those guys are Shia 00:17:56.400 --> 00:17:59.359 and there's a lot of history there. And so you 00:17:59.359 --> 00:18:00.900 kind of had to punch through that to actually 00:18:00.900 --> 00:18:04.000 talk to them because frankly. I mean, obviously, 00:18:04.099 --> 00:18:06.180 I'm a Christian, you're a Christian, and we're 00:18:06.180 --> 00:18:07.980 dealing with Shia, they're Muslims, and it's 00:18:07.980 --> 00:18:10.319 like, ah, you know. No, we never talked about 00:18:10.319 --> 00:18:12.859 religion, or at least barely. That was not the 00:18:12.859 --> 00:18:15.339 issue. So they had a hard time kind of punching 00:18:15.339 --> 00:18:18.579 through the religious piece to get to the actual 00:18:18.579 --> 00:18:20.319 pieces that mattered, which were nationalism, 00:18:20.680 --> 00:18:22.980 I love my country, I love my culture, I hate 00:18:22.980 --> 00:18:25.960 this regime, they killed my brother, or, you 00:18:25.960 --> 00:18:28.500 know, my kids, I want them to have a future, 00:18:28.759 --> 00:18:32.720 et cetera, et cetera. terrified, and trying to 00:18:32.720 --> 00:18:36.559 get them to look around the lens of the Sunni 00:18:36.559 --> 00:18:40.400 -Shia conflict, because they didn't know what 00:18:40.400 --> 00:18:41.859 to do. They just didn't know how to get past 00:18:41.859 --> 00:18:43.940 that half the time, so it kind of stymied them, 00:18:44.019 --> 00:18:47.619 to be frank. Okay. The Islamic Revolutionary 00:18:47.619 --> 00:18:50.559 Guard Corps and the intelligence apparatus that's 00:18:50.559 --> 00:18:53.400 around Khamenei, Khamenei Jr., they're often 00:18:53.400 --> 00:18:56.599 described as a state within a state. How did 00:18:56.599 --> 00:18:59.779 that internal power structure complicate both 00:18:59.779 --> 00:19:02.420 collection, basically recruiting and analysis. 00:19:03.619 --> 00:19:10.240 Yeah. It was both a challenge and frankly, a 00:19:10.240 --> 00:19:14.640 bit of a vulnerability for them. Obviously, there's 00:19:14.640 --> 00:19:19.019 massive internal security organizations. There 00:19:19.019 --> 00:19:22.019 was the MOIS, the Ministry of Intelligence and 00:19:22.019 --> 00:19:24.819 Security. They call it MI, Ministry of Intelligence. 00:19:25.180 --> 00:19:27.259 They always used to say, what's this MOIS stuff? 00:19:27.319 --> 00:19:31.539 We're MI. But, yeah, I know. It's just like that's 00:19:31.539 --> 00:19:33.160 how we are. We think about it that way. They 00:19:33.160 --> 00:19:36.079 have another way of looking at it. When they 00:19:36.079 --> 00:19:38.660 first, they didn't dissolve them. They were the 00:19:38.660 --> 00:19:40.500 former SAVAK guys, and they went through a couple 00:19:40.500 --> 00:19:43.759 of iterations until they sort of landed on that. 00:19:45.200 --> 00:19:47.359 And the IRGC grew up, and initially they were 00:19:47.359 --> 00:19:49.759 simply the guardians of the revolution, and they've 00:19:49.759 --> 00:19:51.400 developed tremendously, and they have their own 00:19:51.400 --> 00:19:54.839 intelligence organizations. Where it really becomes 00:19:54.839 --> 00:19:58.240 tricky, to say the least, and very difficult, 00:19:58.299 --> 00:20:01.589 is all of these organizations. have their own 00:20:01.589 --> 00:20:04.890 counterintelligence, counterespionage apparatuses 00:20:04.890 --> 00:20:07.430 for a variety of reasons. And it's a question 00:20:07.430 --> 00:20:10.210 of the MOIS is involved in internal security 00:20:10.210 --> 00:20:12.910 less and less over the years, simply because 00:20:12.910 --> 00:20:17.329 of the growth of the IRGC and the besiege. But 00:20:17.329 --> 00:20:21.329 there's a tremendous, there's overlap, but also 00:20:21.329 --> 00:20:22.970 compartmentation. They didn't really talk to 00:20:22.970 --> 00:20:25.339 each other. But frankly, Part of the challenge 00:20:25.339 --> 00:20:27.319 was there were just so many people working on 00:20:27.319 --> 00:20:29.240 counterintelligence. And they're not stupid. 00:20:29.319 --> 00:20:31.819 They know who we're interested in. They know 00:20:31.819 --> 00:20:33.880 who the people are, pretty much, that we're looking 00:20:33.880 --> 00:20:37.000 at. And we weren't there. And they would look 00:20:37.000 --> 00:20:39.400 at people who traveled and or had at least the 00:20:39.400 --> 00:20:42.160 potential to be contacted. And it provided them 00:20:42.160 --> 00:20:45.359 with a shortened list of who they should be keeping 00:20:45.359 --> 00:20:48.839 an eye on, if you will. And they did. There were 00:20:48.839 --> 00:20:50.900 ways to get around it, as you know. But it was 00:20:50.900 --> 00:20:56.250 tricky and it was difficult. One thing to keep 00:20:56.250 --> 00:20:59.210 in mind, even at the revolution, the Savak guys, 00:20:59.410 --> 00:21:01.869 the counterintelligence people were trained by 00:21:01.869 --> 00:21:03.750 the Russians, so they were good. They actually 00:21:03.750 --> 00:21:05.410 knew what they were doing. They actually kept 00:21:05.410 --> 00:21:07.670 those guys around, most of them, not all of them, 00:21:07.769 --> 00:21:10.250 but they kept a group of that around, and those 00:21:10.250 --> 00:21:13.359 guys trained. subsequent counterintelligence, 00:21:13.400 --> 00:21:17.019 counterespionage cadres. So they had good grounding 00:21:17.019 --> 00:21:20.240 in their training, and they got better training 00:21:20.240 --> 00:21:23.099 over the years. And they're very good. It's like 00:21:23.099 --> 00:21:26.539 the whole issue of the spy den books. They basically 00:21:26.539 --> 00:21:29.140 weave together all these cables that we tried 00:21:29.140 --> 00:21:32.500 to shred, like carpet. like making carpets, et 00:21:32.500 --> 00:21:34.440 cetera. And so they're very patient. They're 00:21:34.440 --> 00:21:37.940 very detail -oriented when they want to be. But 00:21:37.940 --> 00:21:42.579 okay, at the same time, vulnerabilities, different 00:21:42.579 --> 00:21:46.160 groups, very, very much sometimes at odds with 00:21:46.160 --> 00:21:50.369 each other. A lot of the MOIS, MI guys. felt 00:21:50.369 --> 00:21:52.630 like they were sort of being pushed aside and 00:21:52.630 --> 00:21:55.529 or ultimately they were going to be dissolved, 00:21:55.690 --> 00:21:57.930 if you will, you know, taken out, not physically 00:21:57.930 --> 00:22:00.650 necessarily, but as an organization. So there 00:22:00.650 --> 00:22:03.549 was a lot of rivalry there. And I mean, strong 00:22:03.549 --> 00:22:06.450 rivalry. When things got really bad as they are 00:22:06.450 --> 00:22:08.740 probably right now, they kind of. came together 00:22:08.740 --> 00:22:10.759 and worked together. But otherwise, half the 00:22:10.759 --> 00:22:12.900 time they were fighting against each other as 00:22:12.900 --> 00:22:14.779 much as anything. So that provided opportunities. 00:22:15.099 --> 00:22:17.140 So does that make sense? It's kind of both sides. 00:22:17.259 --> 00:22:19.960 No, that's fascinating. It's something, you know, 00:22:19.960 --> 00:22:24.160 that we're always looking at is the SVR cooperating 00:22:24.160 --> 00:22:27.930 with the GRU or loggerheads jealous. I mean, 00:22:27.950 --> 00:22:32.069 yeah, exactly. So in 2004, you were the Director 00:22:32.069 --> 00:22:35.410 of Operations Senior Representative to the WMD 00:22:35.410 --> 00:22:38.950 Commission following the Iraq WMD failure. And 00:22:38.950 --> 00:22:40.529 I know that had to be a sobering assignment. 00:22:40.829 --> 00:22:43.910 What did that experience, though, teach you about 00:22:43.910 --> 00:22:48.529 the dangers, really dangers, of mirror imaging 00:22:48.529 --> 00:22:50.970 and analytical assumptions? And how should those 00:22:50.970 --> 00:22:54.950 lessons apply to how we assess, say, Iran's nuclear 00:22:54.950 --> 00:22:58.230 intentions today? Yeah, that's a good question. 00:22:58.329 --> 00:23:03.130 That's a hard one. Yeah, the whole WMD thing 00:23:03.130 --> 00:23:06.390 was interesting. I actually just wrote an article 00:23:06.390 --> 00:23:09.509 on that in my sub stack, and it referenced that. 00:23:09.569 --> 00:23:11.329 It wasn't on that whole issue, but it was about 00:23:11.329 --> 00:23:14.150 the misuse of intelligence, if you will, following 00:23:14.150 --> 00:23:17.490 the president's speech last week on domestic, 00:23:17.809 --> 00:23:21.029 when he released the documents, et cetera. It's 00:23:21.029 --> 00:23:23.639 around that. That's a whole other issue. Yes, 00:23:23.639 --> 00:23:27.240 it was a massive failure on our part, if you 00:23:27.240 --> 00:23:29.680 will. I was still in the field. I'll just say 00:23:29.680 --> 00:23:31.779 that right up front. I wasn't involved in the 00:23:31.779 --> 00:23:35.559 actual, you know, the lead up to the war. I came 00:23:35.559 --> 00:23:38.640 in the summer of 2003 and took over as number 00:23:38.640 --> 00:23:42.500 two on CIA for Iraq. And then I watched the whole 00:23:42.500 --> 00:23:44.839 thing collapse later on due to a whole nother 00:23:44.839 --> 00:23:47.640 set of things. But yes, we mirror image them 00:23:47.640 --> 00:23:50.539 to an extent that was just astounding, frankly. 00:23:50.960 --> 00:23:53.470 I'll tell you a quick story. on the Iraq side 00:23:53.470 --> 00:23:59.250 is I was talking to one of the most senior WMD 00:23:59.250 --> 00:24:03.589 leaders from Iraq. He wasn't on the cards. He 00:24:03.589 --> 00:24:06.490 wasn't on the deck of cards, but he was a guy 00:24:06.490 --> 00:24:08.470 we all wanted to, and we were talking to him. 00:24:08.609 --> 00:24:10.890 And frankly, he told us there is no WMD and we 00:24:10.890 --> 00:24:12.230 didn't believe him, but it turned out he was 00:24:12.230 --> 00:24:14.769 true. It was true because obviously there wasn't. 00:24:15.250 --> 00:24:16.910 But we put, I don't know if you remember the 00:24:16.910 --> 00:24:19.660 guy with the aluminum tubes. I can't remember 00:24:19.660 --> 00:24:22.200 his name. I want to say Joe, but whatever. But 00:24:22.200 --> 00:24:27.539 he was 100%, 1 ,000 % convinced that these aluminum 00:24:27.539 --> 00:24:31.740 tubes that the Iraqis were buying could be used, 00:24:31.779 --> 00:24:34.480 therefore were being used for centrifuges. And 00:24:34.480 --> 00:24:37.079 that's centrifuges. And you know all about that. 00:24:37.180 --> 00:24:40.319 I know you do. And we put this guy, and this 00:24:40.319 --> 00:24:42.720 is after the war, we're inside, et cetera, obviously, 00:24:42.900 --> 00:24:45.339 and looking desperately, increasingly desperately 00:24:45.339 --> 00:24:49.140 for the WMDs here somewhere still. He came out 00:24:49.140 --> 00:24:51.519 and talked. I put him in front of this gentleman, 00:24:51.859 --> 00:24:55.279 if you will, very senior, actually very educated, 00:24:55.440 --> 00:24:58.279 highly educated man, spoke perfect English. I 00:24:58.279 --> 00:24:59.900 put him in front of him and I let them talk. 00:25:00.259 --> 00:25:03.240 I just let him, I just. I didn't even sit there 00:25:03.240 --> 00:25:05.079 and listen the whole time because it was very 00:25:05.079 --> 00:25:08.819 technical. And our guy made the entire case for 00:25:08.819 --> 00:25:11.940 the tubes, et cetera, and all the reasons and 00:25:11.940 --> 00:25:14.779 all the analytical stuff and all his reasoning 00:25:14.779 --> 00:25:19.099 why this was this. And I remember the doctor 00:25:19.099 --> 00:25:21.819 saying, well, you know what? He says, I understand 00:25:21.819 --> 00:25:24.019 how you might have come to that conclusion, but 00:25:24.019 --> 00:25:26.759 you're wrong. That's not the case. You came to 00:25:26.759 --> 00:25:30.200 a faulty conclusion. It was that simple. So we 00:25:30.200 --> 00:25:34.049 did. completely mirror image what we thought. 00:25:34.150 --> 00:25:36.450 They had it. They used it. They would never get 00:25:36.450 --> 00:25:38.269 rid of it. Therefore, they must still have it, 00:25:38.329 --> 00:25:40.190 et cetera, et cetera. And the other thing he 00:25:40.190 --> 00:25:43.250 explained, and this may, I'm jumping a little 00:25:43.250 --> 00:25:46.150 bit. He said one of the reasons, and they did 00:25:46.150 --> 00:25:48.410 get rid of it. And as we know, they actually 00:25:48.410 --> 00:25:50.450 got rid of their WMD, including their nuclear 00:25:50.450 --> 00:25:53.869 program. They buried a couple of centrifuges 00:25:53.869 --> 00:25:56.049 or whatever it was, something that's pretty much 00:25:56.049 --> 00:26:00.089 all they had left, if I remember correctly. I 00:26:00.089 --> 00:26:02.230 said, why did you get rid of it? He said, well, 00:26:02.289 --> 00:26:05.250 Saddam, obviously, the regime, realized that 00:26:05.250 --> 00:26:08.150 the use of WMD, especially nuclear, but almost 00:26:08.150 --> 00:26:12.849 any WMD, was a regime -ending incident. In other 00:26:12.849 --> 00:26:16.690 words, if we do that, us, and probably the Israelis 00:26:16.690 --> 00:26:19.869 as well, understandably, it would end the regime. 00:26:20.509 --> 00:26:24.210 And that kind of, I think, flows into the next 00:26:24.210 --> 00:26:27.589 issue of lessons learned in how looking at the 00:26:27.589 --> 00:26:31.880 Iranians. taunting us for several decades now 00:26:31.880 --> 00:26:35.339 with, you know, we have a right, technically 00:26:35.339 --> 00:26:39.119 they do, right, under the non -proliferation 00:26:39.119 --> 00:26:41.460 treaty. Technically, they have a right to enrich, 00:26:41.559 --> 00:26:44.200 if I'm not mistaken. And you know more about 00:26:44.200 --> 00:26:48.039 that than I do. But that doesn't mean they should 00:26:48.039 --> 00:26:50.500 or how they're doing it, and certainly not to 00:26:50.500 --> 00:26:55.279 the levels they were at recently. They were taunting 00:26:55.279 --> 00:26:57.960 us with this for years and they were playing 00:26:57.960 --> 00:27:01.880 a dangerous game, but they were, we need to be 00:27:01.880 --> 00:27:03.599 careful how we look at this. What are they actually 00:27:03.599 --> 00:27:05.599 looking for? Do they actually think they need 00:27:05.599 --> 00:27:07.420 a nuclear weapon? We keep saying, oh, now they 00:27:07.420 --> 00:27:10.000 do. Well, I'm not so sure because as people are 00:27:10.000 --> 00:27:12.000 saying, they have a weapon of mass destruction 00:27:12.000 --> 00:27:14.599 now, which is the Strait of Hormuz. They don't 00:27:14.599 --> 00:27:18.140 really need a nuclear weapon per se. We'll see. 00:27:18.900 --> 00:27:25.150 We need to keep an eye on that as well. And that's 00:27:25.150 --> 00:27:27.509 where intelligence comes in, as we know. Sometimes 00:27:27.509 --> 00:27:30.170 you really need to dig really deep to get to 00:27:30.170 --> 00:27:32.569 the plans and the intentions just because they're 00:27:32.569 --> 00:27:37.049 enriching to a much higher level than they need. 00:27:37.130 --> 00:27:39.430 Some of that's just taunting or I can do this. 00:27:39.509 --> 00:27:41.250 And it's almost like touching a hot stove, you 00:27:41.250 --> 00:27:43.349 know, dare me, dare me, dare me. And that's what 00:27:43.349 --> 00:27:45.250 they're doing. And they're paying a price now 00:27:45.250 --> 00:27:50.750 for that to a degree. But we have to be careful. 00:27:51.279 --> 00:27:55.799 not to over -analyze what they're doing as well, 00:27:55.900 --> 00:27:59.039 not to attribute, okay, this is what it would 00:27:59.039 --> 00:28:00.740 mean to this. If we're enriching this, there's 00:28:00.740 --> 00:28:04.039 no reason otherwise. So obviously they must be 00:28:04.039 --> 00:28:06.420 going for a nuclear weapon. Not necessarily. 00:28:07.519 --> 00:28:09.859 It's a lot more nuanced here. It's like, we have 00:28:09.859 --> 00:28:11.579 the right, therefore we could do it. And of course, 00:28:11.579 --> 00:28:15.160 the whole history of President Trump abrogating 00:28:15.160 --> 00:28:19.079 the JCPOA, which was, as far as I understand 00:28:19.079 --> 00:28:21.980 it, We had them pretty much under control, at 00:28:21.980 --> 00:28:24.180 least in terms of the very intrusive inspections, 00:28:24.500 --> 00:28:30.000 etc. They were doing what they were supposed 00:28:30.000 --> 00:28:33.279 to be doing, at least at that time. So does that 00:28:33.279 --> 00:28:36.019 make sense? We need to be careful not to attribute 00:28:36.019 --> 00:28:38.500 this, this and this. I used to call it must be 00:28:38.500 --> 00:28:41.799 intelligence. And it's like we know this and 00:28:41.799 --> 00:28:43.720 we know this and we see this and we see this. 00:28:43.779 --> 00:28:45.920 Therefore, it must be that. And we have to be 00:28:45.920 --> 00:28:48.460 very careful. We did that in Iraq. We have to 00:28:48.460 --> 00:28:51.740 be very careful. um not to over i want to say 00:28:51.740 --> 00:28:54.359 overreact but we need to be careful how we attribute 00:28:54.359 --> 00:28:58.359 that um with iran because it's not easy as we 00:28:58.359 --> 00:29:00.839 see right now we're people say we're stuck we 00:29:00.839 --> 00:29:03.680 are kind of stuck it's a stalemate to a degree 00:29:03.680 --> 00:29:07.119 but uh yeah does that make sense no it makes 00:29:07.119 --> 00:29:09.619 that makes incredible sense one of my other good 00:29:09.619 --> 00:29:12.980 cia friends once laughingly said, you know, we 00:29:12.980 --> 00:29:15.759 probably have more analysts studying the Iranian 00:29:15.759 --> 00:29:18.359 nuclear program than there are people in the 00:29:18.359 --> 00:29:21.859 Iranian nuclear program. Right. Well, you know, 00:29:21.859 --> 00:29:26.119 as you know, it's like, it's really hard to get 00:29:26.119 --> 00:29:28.240 inside and to figure out what's going on. There's 00:29:28.240 --> 00:29:32.000 ways to do it and it can be done. But then again, 00:29:32.240 --> 00:29:34.079 you've got, you know, you've got what they're 00:29:34.079 --> 00:29:36.759 doing and then you've got, what are their actual 00:29:36.759 --> 00:29:40.559 intentions? And that's where, you know, that's 00:29:40.559 --> 00:29:43.259 where we, That's where we shine in my historically. 00:29:43.619 --> 00:29:46.339 You try at least to get to the point where, OK, 00:29:46.420 --> 00:29:47.880 they're doing all this stuff and they actually 00:29:47.880 --> 00:29:50.119 have, you know, a bunch of enriched uranium, 00:29:50.259 --> 00:29:54.480 which is virtually weapons grade. Do they have 00:29:54.480 --> 00:29:57.599 a weapon, an actual device? Do they have a way 00:29:57.599 --> 00:30:00.099 of delivering this other than putting in the 00:30:00.099 --> 00:30:02.960 back of a boat or on a donkey and literally, 00:30:03.059 --> 00:30:05.119 you know, walking it into the city or something 00:30:05.119 --> 00:30:07.039 like that? You know, missile. That's a whole 00:30:07.039 --> 00:30:09.039 different issue. you know, getting it to the 00:30:09.039 --> 00:30:10.700 size where they could put it on a missile, as 00:30:10.700 --> 00:30:13.319 you well know. So, I mean, this is these are 00:30:13.319 --> 00:30:16.920 very complicated, very involved processes. And 00:30:16.920 --> 00:30:18.940 just because they're doing that doesn't necessarily. 00:30:19.920 --> 00:30:21.640 Not that we should allow that. I'm not saying 00:30:21.640 --> 00:30:24.619 we should. We cannot let this one. The only time 00:30:24.619 --> 00:30:26.779 I'm probably going to ever agree with President 00:30:26.779 --> 00:30:28.819 Trump on this, we can't allow them to have a 00:30:28.819 --> 00:30:31.140 nuclear weapon. But it's not that simple. And 00:30:31.140 --> 00:30:34.460 we that doesn't justify, in my view, what what's 00:30:34.460 --> 00:30:36.559 recently happened. But we have to be careful 00:30:36.559 --> 00:30:39.900 not to attribute what we would do to them. So, 00:30:39.900 --> 00:30:43.210 yeah. Okay, so this is going to be a really impossible 00:30:43.210 --> 00:30:46.490 question to answer. Oh, thanks. Yeah, I know. 00:30:46.569 --> 00:30:50.049 I know. I'm your buddy, Mark. I love you too 00:30:50.049 --> 00:30:52.349 much, Jim. Yeah, I know. You've been writing 00:30:52.349 --> 00:30:55.470 in your Substack column about the current U .S.-Iranian 00:30:55.470 --> 00:30:58.109 conflict, and it changes every day. If we had 00:30:58.109 --> 00:31:00.849 recorded this a couple of weeks ago, you'd have 00:31:00.849 --> 00:31:04.269 said one thing, and now I'm sure you're going 00:31:04.269 --> 00:31:06.410 to say another. Give us kind of a thumbnail. 00:31:06.529 --> 00:31:09.869 Where do you think we are? And you've made the 00:31:09.869 --> 00:31:13.000 point about... negotiating with Iranians is like 00:31:13.000 --> 00:31:15.680 negotiating with somebody in the bazaar. Can 00:31:15.680 --> 00:31:18.519 you give us some of your thoughts on this? Yeah, 00:31:18.539 --> 00:31:22.539 thanks a lot for that question. There are graveyards 00:31:22.539 --> 00:31:24.559 full of analysts trying to predict what Iran 00:31:24.559 --> 00:31:28.740 is going to do. Yeah, we're not in a good place. 00:31:30.359 --> 00:31:33.539 Obviously, as the administration says, you know, 00:31:33.539 --> 00:31:35.480 we've taken out this, we've taken out that. The 00:31:35.480 --> 00:31:37.299 Navy doesn't matter. It never did. You know, 00:31:37.339 --> 00:31:39.599 they got some small boats left, but even without 00:31:39.599 --> 00:31:42.990 those. You know, you could get a fishing dow 00:31:42.990 --> 00:31:45.450 to do some of these things as well. But they've 00:31:45.450 --> 00:31:48.710 still got, obviously, they've still got some 00:31:48.710 --> 00:31:50.509 missiles. I don't know how many, but there are 00:31:50.509 --> 00:31:52.730 certainly some missiles left. And the drones 00:31:52.730 --> 00:31:55.210 are probably the thing that they could just make 00:31:55.210 --> 00:31:57.210 those in a shack someplace at this point. And 00:31:57.210 --> 00:31:59.549 they have thousands of those, as far as I know. 00:31:59.910 --> 00:32:03.150 We're kind of stuck in a dead end, but it can't 00:32:03.150 --> 00:32:06.609 stay there. First of all, it appears the administration 00:32:06.609 --> 00:32:10.099 is primarily focused on... reopening the Strait 00:32:10.099 --> 00:32:12.460 of Hormuz, which is understandable. The fact 00:32:12.460 --> 00:32:14.180 that it was never closed in the first place, 00:32:14.299 --> 00:32:17.900 a whole different issue. That's probably a whole 00:32:17.900 --> 00:32:20.259 other podcast to talk about that. But the fact 00:32:20.259 --> 00:32:23.700 is, it will open at some point, somehow. The 00:32:23.700 --> 00:32:25.759 Iranians need it open as well. There's only so 00:32:25.759 --> 00:32:29.440 long they can't go indefinitely. I'm not sure 00:32:29.440 --> 00:32:32.140 we can stand the pain longer than they can. That's 00:32:32.140 --> 00:32:36.769 another issue. I think I wrote an article, a 00:32:36.769 --> 00:32:39.130 sub stack on this, and it was saying, basically, 00:32:39.250 --> 00:32:42.710 I think we do need to make sure we either blunt 00:32:42.710 --> 00:32:45.950 and or diminish or take out completely their 00:32:45.950 --> 00:32:48.829 ability along the coast to control the Strait 00:32:48.829 --> 00:32:51.150 of Hormuz. We need to do that. As long as they've 00:32:51.150 --> 00:32:55.450 got that capability of lobbing a drone or a missile 00:32:55.450 --> 00:32:58.250 or whatever, cruise missile at a passing oil 00:32:58.250 --> 00:33:01.140 tanker, they're going to control the state. the 00:33:01.140 --> 00:33:04.039 straight because, you know, insurance costs and 00:33:04.039 --> 00:33:06.660 everything else. So we're in a difficult position. 00:33:07.579 --> 00:33:12.799 And I think right now we're sort of in an escalatory 00:33:12.799 --> 00:33:16.720 loop, if you will. And when the MOU came out, 00:33:16.799 --> 00:33:18.819 which was a disaster, frankly, I've got to be 00:33:18.819 --> 00:33:21.940 honest with you. I don't know how the Iranians 00:33:21.940 --> 00:33:25.799 were actually, as far as I can see, more or less 00:33:25.799 --> 00:33:29.420 interpreting the MOU as it was written. They 00:33:29.420 --> 00:33:32.539 had. a right to control the straight to some 00:33:32.539 --> 00:33:34.400 degree, because that's how it was written. I 00:33:34.400 --> 00:33:38.180 don't know how they came away with an MOU so 00:33:38.180 --> 00:33:44.180 overly advantaged to Iran. It was truly ridiculous. 00:33:44.420 --> 00:33:48.079 And the one thing I said is, this MOU guarantees 00:33:48.079 --> 00:33:50.900 we'll be back. Well, we're back already. It wasn't 00:33:50.900 --> 00:33:52.480 clear that it was going to be quite this quickly. 00:33:52.519 --> 00:33:54.859 So you're saying, in a sense, the Iranians were 00:33:54.859 --> 00:33:57.500 very content with the MOU the United States had 00:33:57.500 --> 00:34:00.359 helped draft. Well, yeah, they got it said it 00:34:00.359 --> 00:34:02.279 gave them almost everything. It said sovereignty. 00:34:02.460 --> 00:34:06.380 It mentioned Hezbollah in Lebanon or Lebanon. 00:34:06.460 --> 00:34:10.190 It mentioned, you know. No more interference 00:34:10.190 --> 00:34:12.969 in sovereign affairs. It mentioned after 60 days, 00:34:13.170 --> 00:34:16.429 Oman and us get to sort of work out the administration 00:34:16.429 --> 00:34:18.769 of the—now, it didn't say we're going to charge 00:34:18.769 --> 00:34:23.250 tolls, but this gave them—they must have been 00:34:23.250 --> 00:34:27.610 flabbergasted when we accepted it and the president 00:34:27.610 --> 00:34:28.889 signed it. I don't know. He must not have read 00:34:28.889 --> 00:34:31.329 it. That's all I can say. I guess he doesn't 00:34:31.329 --> 00:34:32.889 read very much, but he should have read this 00:34:32.889 --> 00:34:36.650 one because it's so clear that it essentially 00:34:36.650 --> 00:34:39.840 gave them permission. to in some manner have 00:34:39.840 --> 00:34:43.219 administered the Strait of Hormuz. Now, that's 00:34:43.219 --> 00:34:46.000 where they interpreted more for tolls, et cetera, 00:34:46.079 --> 00:34:48.880 et cetera. But we gave them permission. I don't 00:34:48.880 --> 00:34:52.699 understand how our negotiators, such as they 00:34:52.699 --> 00:34:57.260 are. allowed that to be the document that we 00:34:57.260 --> 00:35:00.219 accepted. Maybe this is the secret of the art 00:35:00.219 --> 00:35:02.059 of the deal. You just give your opponent what 00:35:02.059 --> 00:35:04.820 he wants. I guess. I mean, and then you don't 00:35:04.820 --> 00:35:07.239 pay him later on. Maybe that's the way things 00:35:07.239 --> 00:35:09.699 work. You fool them into it. So, I mean, we're 00:35:09.699 --> 00:35:11.800 in a tough spot right now. And people say it, 00:35:11.840 --> 00:35:13.920 and I've said it many times, and I've been writing 00:35:13.920 --> 00:35:16.159 on this for several months now in my sub stack, 00:35:16.280 --> 00:35:19.139 but I called it Groundhog Day, and then I did 00:35:19.139 --> 00:35:21.579 Groundhog Day 2. You know, we're back to where 00:35:21.579 --> 00:35:23.710 we are because... the way they went to this in 00:35:23.710 --> 00:35:25.989 the first place. And we're in a tough spot. And 00:35:25.989 --> 00:35:28.269 I'm not sure how it's going to go. I don't think 00:35:28.269 --> 00:35:33.690 we can escalate indefinitely, obviously. And 00:35:33.690 --> 00:35:36.989 if we start to hit civilian targets the way discussions 00:35:36.989 --> 00:35:39.630 have been sort of out there, that's a really 00:35:39.630 --> 00:35:43.730 tricky path to go down. I got to be honest with 00:35:43.730 --> 00:35:47.110 you. I hate almost hesitate to use this term, 00:35:47.150 --> 00:35:49.429 but when you say if you hit, you know, if you 00:35:49.429 --> 00:35:51.789 hit a ship or hit something, we're going to take 00:35:51.789 --> 00:35:54.429 out this, you know, that is civilian, a bridge, 00:35:54.449 --> 00:35:56.230 a power plant, et cetera, et cetera. They're 00:35:56.230 --> 00:35:58.809 saying it's dual use. There's a little bit of 00:35:58.809 --> 00:36:01.610 a hint, a whiff of collective punishment going 00:36:01.610 --> 00:36:04.969 on there. And I hate to say that, but they need 00:36:04.969 --> 00:36:06.849 to be very careful where they go with this kind 00:36:06.849 --> 00:36:09.889 of thing. So I think we're going to have to get 00:36:09.889 --> 00:36:13.630 back to the table. The administration is going 00:36:13.630 --> 00:36:17.510 to have to accept them, frankly, really hard. 00:36:17.610 --> 00:36:19.789 They're going to have to drink the poison like 00:36:19.789 --> 00:36:22.570 Khomeini did after the Iran -Iraq war. They're 00:36:22.570 --> 00:36:24.530 going to have to take a deal they really don't 00:36:24.530 --> 00:36:27.610 want to take, I guess, because I don't know if 00:36:27.610 --> 00:36:30.250 he's capable of doing that because he could pretend 00:36:30.250 --> 00:36:32.329 it was a good deal, but it's not going to be 00:36:32.329 --> 00:36:34.230 a good deal. And we're going to have to come 00:36:34.230 --> 00:36:38.190 back in the future in terms of the actual issues, 00:36:38.230 --> 00:36:40.829 because it doesn't really talk about the nuclear 00:36:40.829 --> 00:36:44.179 program. Or it kind of makes references, I think, 00:36:44.199 --> 00:36:46.599 to the nuclear program and maybe even some inspections 00:36:46.599 --> 00:36:49.059 if I'm I don't have it here in front of me. But 00:36:49.059 --> 00:36:50.760 there's a lot of ways that can be interpreted. 00:36:51.000 --> 00:36:53.519 And, you know, so we're going to have to eat 00:36:53.519 --> 00:36:55.679 some crow that all these words have been used 00:36:55.679 --> 00:36:58.480 out there. But we're going to have to the president's 00:36:58.480 --> 00:37:01.280 going to have to admit he won't admit he's wrong, 00:37:01.360 --> 00:37:03.400 but he's going to have to take a deal that is 00:37:03.400 --> 00:37:05.579 overly advantaged towards the Iranians. And we're 00:37:05.579 --> 00:37:06.960 probably going to have to come back at a later 00:37:06.960 --> 00:37:10.039 date to address. all these issues that we can't 00:37:10.039 --> 00:37:12.659 address now. And whether that's militarily or 00:37:12.659 --> 00:37:15.559 otherwise, you know, I'm not sure that's a satisfactory 00:37:15.559 --> 00:37:18.059 answer. It's not. I think it's about as good 00:37:18.059 --> 00:37:19.880 as we can do. And so I'm going to switch gears 00:37:19.880 --> 00:37:22.840 now. And I want to talk about your debut novel, 00:37:23.139 --> 00:37:25.980 A Prince of Mirrors, which draws heavily on your 00:37:25.980 --> 00:37:28.440 CIA experience and which I'm enjoying reading 00:37:28.440 --> 00:37:31.960 as I say this. Without giving away too much, 00:37:32.079 --> 00:37:34.900 what truth about the intelligence business did 00:37:34.900 --> 00:37:37.579 you most want to convey through fiction that 00:37:37.579 --> 00:37:39.659 you couldn't say in any other form? Give us a 00:37:39.659 --> 00:37:43.980 few words about your book. Yeah, we've talked 00:37:43.980 --> 00:37:47.139 about our fiction writing and it's kind of cathartic. 00:37:47.320 --> 00:37:49.820 And I think you said that and I 100 percent agree. 00:37:50.159 --> 00:37:54.639 It allows us to talk about things that we did, 00:37:54.760 --> 00:37:58.239 saw, heard about, you know, et cetera, in a way 00:37:58.239 --> 00:38:01.139 that, you know, it allows us to portray these 00:38:01.139 --> 00:38:03.119 things and sort of get it off our chest, if you 00:38:03.119 --> 00:38:06.719 will. A lot of what I focused on and, you know, 00:38:06.719 --> 00:38:09.159 the subtitle, it's called A Prince of Mirrors. 00:38:09.780 --> 00:38:12.579 which is, well, it's a historical thing. It was 00:38:12.579 --> 00:38:15.820 a document written by an old Persian prince years 00:38:15.820 --> 00:38:21.019 ago, thousands of years ago. But a CIA odyssey 00:38:21.019 --> 00:38:24.119 of trust and betrayal. It's the dichotomy between, 00:38:24.260 --> 00:38:28.900 for CIA officers or handlers, frankly, DIA too, 00:38:29.000 --> 00:38:31.280 anybody who's a human, a real human officer, 00:38:31.579 --> 00:38:35.239 is the sort of dichotomy between handling assets 00:38:35.239 --> 00:38:38.420 and it's the trust and the suspicion, et cetera. 00:38:38.860 --> 00:38:41.599 You have to develop trust with the people in 00:38:41.599 --> 00:38:44.820 order for them to trust you. And then also for 00:38:44.820 --> 00:38:47.539 us to trust them enough that their information 00:38:47.539 --> 00:38:51.760 is vetted and valuable, can be used. But it's 00:38:51.760 --> 00:38:54.659 very, very, it's difficult. It's a constant dance, 00:38:54.820 --> 00:38:57.079 if you will, going back and forth, you know, 00:38:57.079 --> 00:38:59.219 because I always just, a lot of people think, 00:38:59.380 --> 00:39:01.340 oh, we're, you know, CIA, you're just a bunch 00:39:01.340 --> 00:39:04.079 of liars. You always lie about everything. Actually, 00:39:04.139 --> 00:39:06.719 no, we use lies to get maybe in front of them. 00:39:06.800 --> 00:39:09.900 But I always used to. And it's in the book. And 00:39:09.900 --> 00:39:12.579 one of the things is, you want to get to the 00:39:12.579 --> 00:39:15.639 point where you're dealing only in truths, real 00:39:15.639 --> 00:39:18.199 truths, deep truths. And I'm talking about with 00:39:18.199 --> 00:39:20.820 assets. And I saw this very often. Iranians are 00:39:20.820 --> 00:39:24.039 very suspicious. And they, you know, CIA and 00:39:24.039 --> 00:39:26.739 America looms very large in their minds and their 00:39:26.739 --> 00:39:29.340 history, because Mossadegh and Shah and all the 00:39:29.340 --> 00:39:32.360 rest of it. And the British before us, you know, 00:39:32.360 --> 00:39:34.579 all that. We live very large and they're very 00:39:34.579 --> 00:39:36.480 suspicious because, frankly, they've been they 00:39:36.480 --> 00:39:40.599 have been taken advantage of for many, many years, 00:39:40.739 --> 00:39:43.679 decades and hundreds of years recently. And they 00:39:43.679 --> 00:39:45.920 always used to tell me, I know what you're going 00:39:45.920 --> 00:39:47.760 to do. You're going to use me like a Kleenex 00:39:47.760 --> 00:39:49.880 and throw me away, which is a horrible image. 00:39:50.019 --> 00:39:52.539 But they used to really think that. And so I 00:39:52.539 --> 00:39:55.360 would spend a lot of time dealing with them to. 00:39:56.619 --> 00:39:58.480 prove that they could actually take what I said 00:39:58.480 --> 00:40:00.820 to the bank, if you will. I mean, literally sometimes, 00:40:01.000 --> 00:40:03.400 but also. I wanted to be able to get to the point 00:40:03.400 --> 00:40:05.019 where I was telling them the truth, that they 00:40:05.019 --> 00:40:06.559 would say, I want to do this or I want to go 00:40:06.559 --> 00:40:08.800 to America. I said, no, that's not going to happen. 00:40:08.880 --> 00:40:11.300 I didn't say, oh, sure, I can make that happen. 00:40:11.360 --> 00:40:14.880 I said, maybe you can at some point later on 00:40:14.880 --> 00:40:17.059 down the road. But I was very honest as much 00:40:17.059 --> 00:40:20.039 as I could be. And so that's part of what the 00:40:20.039 --> 00:40:23.219 book is about. It's about how you work with assets. 00:40:23.519 --> 00:40:25.840 They all have different motivations. Some of 00:40:25.840 --> 00:40:27.719 them are more transactional than others. Sometimes 00:40:27.719 --> 00:40:29.599 it's like. I'll give you the money. I'll give 00:40:29.599 --> 00:40:31.579 you the information. You give me the money. Others, 00:40:31.659 --> 00:40:34.559 it's like I have a family, my country. I love 00:40:34.559 --> 00:40:36.420 my country. They're destroying my country. They're 00:40:36.420 --> 00:40:40.079 holding us back, these damn mullahs. And I've 00:40:40.079 --> 00:40:42.440 just been, others, like one of the characters 00:40:42.440 --> 00:40:46.519 is a Quds Force officer who's just so disappointed 00:40:46.519 --> 00:40:49.260 in his country after giving so much during the 00:40:49.260 --> 00:40:52.360 Iran -Iraq war and heavily wounded, et cetera. 00:40:52.539 --> 00:40:54.980 And now he's seen what the regime has become. 00:40:55.179 --> 00:40:58.199 So it focuses on what it's like. like from the 00:40:58.199 --> 00:41:00.619 CIA side in terms of being a case officer and 00:41:00.619 --> 00:41:03.000 a handler and the difficulties and the inherent 00:41:03.000 --> 00:41:06.380 difficulties and how this can tear at you, frankly, 00:41:06.519 --> 00:41:09.039 because you are doing things, you are manipulating 00:41:09.039 --> 00:41:11.500 people, and sometimes you're sending them not 00:41:11.500 --> 00:41:12.920 to their deaths. I don't want to put it that 00:41:12.920 --> 00:41:15.139 way, but sometimes they die. You are sending 00:41:15.139 --> 00:41:19.420 them into very dangerous situations. And at the 00:41:19.420 --> 00:41:22.380 same time, I try to portray from the other side 00:41:22.380 --> 00:41:25.460 based on my pretty pretty extensive experience 00:41:25.460 --> 00:41:28.360 dealing with Iranians and a lot of assets, how 00:41:28.360 --> 00:41:30.619 they think about it and what they do and why 00:41:30.619 --> 00:41:33.599 they do it and what it means to them. Yeah, you 00:41:33.599 --> 00:41:36.079 know, like you, Mark, I never made any promises 00:41:36.079 --> 00:41:39.340 to my assets that I felt I couldn't keep. I always, 00:41:39.460 --> 00:41:42.340 I think, you know, this is the foundation of 00:41:42.340 --> 00:41:45.500 any relationship is trust. And that goes both 00:41:45.500 --> 00:41:47.699 ways. I had to trust them and they had to trust 00:41:47.699 --> 00:41:51.059 me. And I wouldn't make commitments I couldn't 00:41:51.059 --> 00:41:53.519 keep. So you're already working on your second 00:41:53.519 --> 00:41:56.820 novel, a second protocol. Can you give us a small 00:41:56.820 --> 00:41:59.079 taste of which way you're headed with that one? 00:41:59.760 --> 00:42:04.719 Yeah, it's a second in the series. The primary 00:42:04.719 --> 00:42:07.739 character, the protagonist in my first is Victoria 00:42:07.739 --> 00:42:11.239 Vick O 'Bannon, her name. She's a CIA case officer. 00:42:11.340 --> 00:42:14.420 She and an Iran specialist. And we do have them. 00:42:14.460 --> 00:42:16.599 It's not impossible. It's not easy, but it's 00:42:16.599 --> 00:42:19.989 not impossible. I knew. Some and they were extremely 00:42:19.989 --> 00:42:23.849 accomplished. And we've both known female case 00:42:23.849 --> 00:42:26.469 officers who were just like unbelievable. And 00:42:26.469 --> 00:42:28.590 they could do everything and sometimes a little 00:42:28.590 --> 00:42:30.449 differently. But man, could they do the job? 00:42:31.030 --> 00:42:35.170 Bottom line is the second novel is the first 00:42:35.170 --> 00:42:37.670 novel is mostly with her, mostly with her outside 00:42:37.670 --> 00:42:41.130 working from, you know, remotely into into into 00:42:41.130 --> 00:42:43.929 her assets. And the second one, she's actually 00:42:43.929 --> 00:42:47.869 in Tehran for for most of the. actual book. And 00:42:47.869 --> 00:42:50.329 it's a whole story. And it brings together Iran 00:42:50.329 --> 00:42:53.369 and China. There's a China, major China angle 00:42:53.369 --> 00:42:56.650 there, and a threat to the United States, kind 00:42:56.650 --> 00:42:59.829 of a cyber weapon kind of thing. And so it's, 00:42:59.829 --> 00:43:02.829 without giving too much away, she has to go in 00:43:02.829 --> 00:43:05.230 and work with a variety of people. And there's 00:43:05.230 --> 00:43:07.650 lots of surprises along the way, but she needs 00:43:07.650 --> 00:43:12.860 to stop and or steal. this cyber weapon being 00:43:12.860 --> 00:43:14.800 developed by the Chinese and the Iranians. Well, 00:43:14.880 --> 00:43:16.699 I can't wait to read that one. That one sends 00:43:16.699 --> 00:43:19.559 chills up my back just thinking about it. It's 00:43:19.559 --> 00:43:23.300 pretty good. A CIA officer inside Iran. That's 00:43:23.300 --> 00:43:27.900 amazing. So one last question. You know, Americans, 00:43:27.980 --> 00:43:30.239 we're trying to make sense of Iran right now. 00:43:30.460 --> 00:43:32.719 So if you cut through the noise, the politics 00:43:32.719 --> 00:43:35.280 and the headlines, what's one thing you wish 00:43:35.280 --> 00:43:37.619 that Americans understood that virtually nobody 00:43:37.619 --> 00:43:40.289 gets right? From your perspective of all those 00:43:40.289 --> 00:43:43.250 years, 22 years in the agency working this issue, 00:43:43.489 --> 00:43:46.090 what would be something that if you could tell 00:43:46.090 --> 00:43:52.389 Americans? Most Iranians simply want to live 00:43:52.389 --> 00:43:57.780 their lives. They're not. crazy ideologues or, 00:43:57.840 --> 00:44:00.800 you know, I want to be a martyr or anything like 00:44:00.800 --> 00:44:02.719 that. One of my Substack articles does address 00:44:02.719 --> 00:44:05.480 the whole martyrdom issue and everything, but 00:44:05.480 --> 00:44:07.480 we don't go down that. That's kind of a rabbit 00:44:07.480 --> 00:44:10.719 hole. But most of them, even if they're good 00:44:10.719 --> 00:44:12.619 Muslims, if you will, and they go to mosque, 00:44:12.739 --> 00:44:15.639 et cetera, they simply want to live their lives. 00:44:15.760 --> 00:44:18.860 They're trying to, most of them want Iran to 00:44:18.860 --> 00:44:21.119 be, to live up to its potential, which it's not 00:44:21.119 --> 00:44:23.679 now because this regime has never, has not allowed 00:44:23.679 --> 00:44:27.579 it to. through its ideology. So they simply want 00:44:27.579 --> 00:44:30.820 to, I wouldn't say get along to go along, et 00:44:30.820 --> 00:44:33.199 cetera, but they want to raise their families. 00:44:33.239 --> 00:44:35.199 They want to raise their kids. They love their 00:44:35.199 --> 00:44:38.559 children. They are incredibly proud of their 00:44:38.559 --> 00:44:43.300 country, what it has been, what it sort of was 00:44:43.300 --> 00:44:46.199 heading towards being and what it could be. It's 00:44:46.199 --> 00:44:48.480 being derailed right now for a variety of reasons. 00:44:51.969 --> 00:44:55.630 It's really important to realize how normal they 00:44:55.630 --> 00:44:57.949 are. And they're not a bunch of crazy, you know, 00:44:57.969 --> 00:45:00.570 Shia, I want to die kind of people. It's just, 00:45:00.750 --> 00:45:02.849 there's a few of them, certainly. And a lot of 00:45:02.849 --> 00:45:05.329 them are at the top, unfortunately. But they 00:45:05.329 --> 00:45:07.110 just want to be, I don't want to say like us, 00:45:07.269 --> 00:45:10.530 but they admire, and a lot of Iranians, tremendous 00:45:10.530 --> 00:45:13.150 number of Iranians, admire the United States. 00:45:13.789 --> 00:45:15.469 Even ones that have never been here. I told a 00:45:15.469 --> 00:45:18.170 quick story. This was in one of my Substack articles. 00:45:18.389 --> 00:45:20.269 I was sitting with a rev guard, young rev guard, 00:45:20.349 --> 00:45:23.139 years ago. We were just talking. I was debriefing 00:45:23.139 --> 00:45:24.559 and blah, blah, blah, et cetera, et cetera. This 00:45:24.559 --> 00:45:27.599 is way back when this is the Iran -Contra thing. 00:45:27.699 --> 00:45:29.320 And it came up and he kind of looked at me and 00:45:29.320 --> 00:45:31.639 he said, what's going on? I didn't even know 00:45:31.639 --> 00:45:33.860 because, frankly, it was just I hadn't been read 00:45:33.860 --> 00:45:36.599 in on it. It wasn't evolved, thank God. This 00:45:36.599 --> 00:45:39.809 was under Reagan. And it. He asked me, so what's 00:45:39.809 --> 00:45:41.670 going on? What are you doing? Because it was 00:45:41.670 --> 00:45:43.389 already coming out that we had provided them 00:45:43.389 --> 00:45:46.170 with weapons, et cetera, et cetera, tow missiles, 00:45:46.349 --> 00:45:48.829 if I'm not mistaken. I said, I'm not really sure. 00:45:49.349 --> 00:45:51.949 I can't really. I don't know the details. Maybe 00:45:51.949 --> 00:45:58.130 it's a mistake. We'll just have to see. And so 00:45:58.130 --> 00:46:00.409 he said, but you're America. In other words, 00:46:00.409 --> 00:46:02.010 how could you make a mistake like this? He'd 00:46:02.010 --> 00:46:03.730 never been. He'd never met an American before. 00:46:04.030 --> 00:46:08.039 Never mind into America. They have an oversized 00:46:08.039 --> 00:46:11.460 view. In terms of CIA, our reputation exceeds 00:46:11.460 --> 00:46:14.639 us. In terms of America, they have a shining 00:46:14.639 --> 00:46:17.699 city on the hill, at least they used to, vision 00:46:17.699 --> 00:46:21.139 of who we are. So this is something we need to 00:46:21.139 --> 00:46:23.420 understand is they're normal people, most of 00:46:23.420 --> 00:46:26.519 them. They simply want to sell their, if they're 00:46:26.519 --> 00:46:27.940 a rug seller, sell their rags. They want to do 00:46:27.940 --> 00:46:29.179 business. They want to raise their families. 00:46:29.320 --> 00:46:31.980 They want to have a good life. Mark, this has 00:46:31.980 --> 00:46:35.139 been incredibly fascinating and educational for 00:46:35.139 --> 00:46:38.239 me, and I'm sure for our listeners, and we really 00:46:38.239 --> 00:46:41.219 appreciate you coming on today. Tell us how we 00:46:41.219 --> 00:46:44.980 can find your Substack column. Yeah, it's on 00:46:44.980 --> 00:46:48.880 Substack, and it's under Mark A. Fowler, Mark 00:46:48.880 --> 00:46:54.320 A. Fowler, and at Malfow5 is also the handle, 00:46:54.440 --> 00:46:59.019 at Malfow5. So, yeah. Okay, great. Well, we're 00:46:59.019 --> 00:47:01.219 going to try and put a link to that and also 00:47:01.219 --> 00:47:03.739 to your book, The Prince of Mirrors. Hopefully 00:47:03.739 --> 00:47:07.219 coming out later this summer or early fall. Yeah. 00:47:07.300 --> 00:47:11.579 Okay, great. So very, very much appreciate you 00:47:11.579 --> 00:47:14.159 coming on. And for our listeners, if you like 00:47:14.159 --> 00:47:16.900 today's conversation, please subscribe to the 00:47:16.900 --> 00:47:19.280 Steady State Sentinel. Leave us a five -star 00:47:19.280 --> 00:47:22.460 review and join us again next week. For the Steady 00:47:22.460 --> 00:47:25.460 State Sentinel, I'm Jim Lawler, still standing 00:47:25.460 --> 00:47:31.480 watch. Thank you for listening to the Steady 00:47:31.480 --> 00:47:35.059 State Sentinel podcast. Don't miss out on more 00:47:35.059 --> 00:47:38.239 insights and exposes from America's premier global 00:47:38.239 --> 00:47:41.980 security experts. Also, subscribe to our Substack 00:47:41.980 --> 00:47:47.139 at substack .com slash at SteadyState1 and follow 00:47:47.139 --> 00:47:49.579 our social media and join us right here next 00:47:49.579 --> 00:47:53.059 week for another exciting edition. 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