WEBVTT - Generated by AI 00:00:11.119 --> 00:00:14.220 Welcome to the Steady State Sentinel. I'm Lauren 00:00:14.220 --> 00:00:16.879 Anderson. Today we're doing something different. 00:00:17.120 --> 00:00:20.719 We're partnering with Mission Implausible, a 00:00:20.719 --> 00:00:23.519 podcast that asks a question that many of us 00:00:23.519 --> 00:00:26.940 can't answer. When is a conspiracy theory an 00:00:26.940 --> 00:00:30.940 actual conspiracy? Hosted by former CIA officers 00:00:30.940 --> 00:00:34.340 John Cipher and Jerry O'Shea, who spent their 00:00:34.340 --> 00:00:37.119 careers creating conspiracies in the service 00:00:37.119 --> 00:00:39.859 of U .S. intelligence goals, They're uniquely 00:00:39.859 --> 00:00:42.659 equipped to separate manipulation from reality. 00:00:43.460 --> 00:00:45.520 John is also one of my co -hosts here on the 00:00:45.520 --> 00:00:49.039 Steady States Sentinel. In this episode, Hunting 00:00:49.039 --> 00:00:52.500 Weapons of Mass Destruction, John sits down with 00:00:52.500 --> 00:00:55.479 Andy Weber, former Assistant Secretary of Defense 00:00:55.479 --> 00:00:58.460 for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense 00:00:58.460 --> 00:01:01.780 Programs, and one of the foremost experts on 00:01:01.780 --> 00:01:05.980 countering WMD threats. One of the more startling 00:01:05.980 --> 00:01:10.379 arguments in this episode. is this. Biological 00:01:10.379 --> 00:01:13.980 weapons may ultimately prove more dangerous than 00:01:13.980 --> 00:01:18.379 nuclear ones, particularly now that AI enablement 00:01:18.379 --> 00:01:21.799 is a real possibility. And Weber makes clear 00:01:21.799 --> 00:01:24.400 exactly how much the U .S. knows about Iran's 00:01:24.400 --> 00:01:28.659 nuclear capability. So please join us and enjoy 00:01:28.659 --> 00:01:38.159 this episode. I'm John Seifert. And I'm Jerry 00:01:38.159 --> 00:01:40.840 O'Shea. Between us, we have over 60 years of 00:01:40.840 --> 00:01:43.260 experience as clandestine officers in the CIA. 00:01:43.500 --> 00:01:46.120 Part of our job was creating conspiracies, like 00:01:46.120 --> 00:01:48.659 being undercover, to deceive our adversaries. 00:01:48.819 --> 00:01:51.439 Now, we're going to use that experience to investigate 00:01:51.439 --> 00:01:53.560 the conspiracy theories everyone's talking about, 00:01:53.680 --> 00:01:55.459 as well as some you may not have heard. Could 00:01:55.459 --> 00:01:58.140 these be true, or are we being manipulated? Find 00:01:58.140 --> 00:02:03.379 out now on Mission Implausible. So we at Mission 00:02:03.379 --> 00:02:04.959 Implausible are doing something a little bit 00:02:04.959 --> 00:02:07.569 different today. Our episode is a joint production 00:02:07.569 --> 00:02:10.949 with the Steady State Sentinel podcast. The Steady 00:02:10.949 --> 00:02:13.810 State's a nonpartisan nonprofit made up of former 00:02:13.810 --> 00:02:16.750 U .S. national security officials created to 00:02:16.750 --> 00:02:18.870 defend constitutional democracy, the rule of 00:02:18.870 --> 00:02:21.909 law, and national security from threats at home 00:02:21.909 --> 00:02:24.509 and abroad. And our guest today is perfect for 00:02:24.509 --> 00:02:26.469 both the Steady State and Mission Plausible. 00:02:26.729 --> 00:02:29.289 Today, we're joined by Andy Weber, one of the 00:02:29.289 --> 00:02:31.289 most experienced American officials in the world 00:02:31.289 --> 00:02:33.689 of nuclear, chemical, and biological threat reduction. 00:02:34.439 --> 00:02:37.439 Andy spent decades in the U .S. national security, 00:02:37.719 --> 00:02:39.919 including as an assistant secretary of defense. 00:02:40.840 --> 00:02:43.319 He's been sought after in recent weeks as discussion 00:02:43.319 --> 00:02:46.659 swirls around Iran's enriched uranium and whether 00:02:46.659 --> 00:02:49.240 or not we can do anything about it. So before 00:02:49.240 --> 00:02:51.080 the senior titles, Andy was a young American 00:02:51.080 --> 00:02:54.620 diplomat in post -Soviet Kazakhstan at a moment 00:02:54.620 --> 00:02:56.180 when the world was only beginning to understand 00:02:56.180 --> 00:02:58.000 what the collapse of the Soviet Union had left 00:02:58.000 --> 00:03:01.879 behind. Nuclear weapons, weapons usable, uranium, 00:03:02.240 --> 00:03:05.330 biological weapons facilities. and lots of scientists 00:03:05.330 --> 00:03:07.030 who had worked inside one of the most secretive 00:03:07.030 --> 00:03:10.090 military industrial systems ever built. So we'll 00:03:10.090 --> 00:03:13.050 chat about his role in a covert 1994 mission 00:03:13.050 --> 00:03:15.569 to remove over 1 ,000 pounds of highly enriched 00:03:15.569 --> 00:03:18.409 uranium, as well as anthrax and other biological 00:03:18.409 --> 00:03:21.250 agents from Kazakhstan, which was later described 00:03:21.250 --> 00:03:23.169 in David Hoffman's Pulitzer Prize -winning book, 00:03:23.270 --> 00:03:27.250 The Dead Hand. So, Andy, welcome. Thank you. 00:03:27.819 --> 00:03:29.960 So let's start with that story a little bit. 00:03:30.039 --> 00:03:31.340 And then obviously we're going to talk about 00:03:31.340 --> 00:03:33.539 Iran and we're going to talk about these bigger 00:03:33.539 --> 00:03:35.960 issues. But take us back to Kazakhstan in the 00:03:35.960 --> 00:03:38.620 early 90s. What did the collapse of the Soviet 00:03:38.620 --> 00:03:41.460 Union look like from the ground? And what was 00:03:41.460 --> 00:03:43.159 it like? What was the security like at these 00:03:43.159 --> 00:03:47.180 former nuclear and bioweapon sites? It was incredible. 00:03:47.419 --> 00:03:50.479 I mean, it was an amazing time to be there. I 00:03:50.479 --> 00:03:54.020 volunteered to go, spent a year in Russian language 00:03:54.020 --> 00:03:58.789 training. arrived in the summer of 1993. It was 00:03:58.789 --> 00:04:02.449 still a relatively new country. The strategic 00:04:02.449 --> 00:04:07.750 facilities were protected, but frankly, their 00:04:07.750 --> 00:04:09.710 biggest protection had been during the Soviet 00:04:09.710 --> 00:04:12.770 period, the fact that they were closed cities, 00:04:12.870 --> 00:04:15.370 that nobody could go to them. They were completely 00:04:15.370 --> 00:04:18.769 closed off to visitors. And then that system 00:04:18.769 --> 00:04:23.290 all fell apart. They were accessible and they 00:04:23.290 --> 00:04:27.550 just weren't designed with modern security the 00:04:27.550 --> 00:04:30.810 way we think about it. Yeah, we talk a lot about 00:04:30.810 --> 00:04:33.209 conspiracies and conspiracy theories on this 00:04:33.209 --> 00:04:37.290 program. But this was an absolute lack of conspiracy, 00:04:37.569 --> 00:04:41.029 right? I mean, this was just a factory, Operation 00:04:41.029 --> 00:04:44.750 Sapphire, you could look it up, with incredible 00:04:44.750 --> 00:04:47.949 amounts of... material that you can make a bomb 00:04:47.949 --> 00:04:49.850 out of, right? I mean, it was just sitting there. 00:04:49.930 --> 00:04:52.750 If you could maybe take us through just how vulnerable 00:04:52.750 --> 00:04:56.009 this was or how vulnerable we all were to this. 00:04:57.089 --> 00:05:00.209 Well, it was a huge process of discovery because 00:05:00.209 --> 00:05:05.829 we didn't know it was there. I learned about 00:05:05.829 --> 00:05:11.350 it initially through sort of my driver, mechanic, 00:05:11.910 --> 00:05:16.350 you know, fixer. His name was Slava. And he asked 00:05:16.350 --> 00:05:19.589 me shortly after I arrived if I'd be interested 00:05:19.589 --> 00:05:25.689 in buying some uranium. History could have gone 00:05:25.689 --> 00:05:27.550 a different way if you'd done your own bomb. 00:05:28.269 --> 00:05:31.709 I could have just laughed it off. But it was 00:05:31.709 --> 00:05:34.350 such a crazy time in history that you had to 00:05:34.350 --> 00:05:38.769 pull the string on all these threads. And this 00:05:38.769 --> 00:05:41.470 led to an introduction to a factory director 00:05:41.470 --> 00:05:45.339 named Vitaly Mete. And then several months of 00:05:45.339 --> 00:05:48.160 building trust with him, including on a moose 00:05:48.160 --> 00:05:51.519 hunting trip and sharing a bottle of wild turkey 00:05:51.519 --> 00:05:57.139 whiskey together in one sitting. And then eventually, 00:05:57.319 --> 00:06:05.839 through a retired KGB border guard colonel named 00:06:05.839 --> 00:06:10.920 Korbater, he did provide me with detailed information 00:06:13.790 --> 00:06:16.629 how much material they had. It was 600 kilograms. 00:06:17.050 --> 00:06:20.069 On the enrichment level, it was enriched to 90 00:06:20.069 --> 00:06:24.910 % uranium -235, which is weapons usable. And 00:06:24.910 --> 00:06:26.970 so I reported all that back to Washington. There 00:06:26.970 --> 00:06:31.470 was a lot of skepticism that, you know, I think 00:06:31.470 --> 00:06:33.310 they thought I was being scammed. There were 00:06:33.310 --> 00:06:36.829 some many crazy stories about suitcase nukes 00:06:36.829 --> 00:06:40.149 being sold at the time, et cetera. So it wasn't 00:06:40.149 --> 00:06:44.129 actually until we got permission from the president 00:06:44.129 --> 00:06:48.189 of Kazakhstan at the time, Nur -Sultan Nazarbayev, 00:06:48.310 --> 00:06:52.470 for me and a technical expert from Oak Ridge 00:06:52.470 --> 00:06:57.589 to visit the facility secretly and see for ourselves 00:06:57.589 --> 00:07:01.430 the inventory. But Andy, there was a lock on 00:07:01.430 --> 00:07:05.689 the door, wasn't there? Well, after that visit, 00:07:05.850 --> 00:07:10.629 our inspection visit in March of 1994, we reported 00:07:10.629 --> 00:07:14.149 back that It was protected by a good padlock. 00:07:14.430 --> 00:07:18.009 The sort of padlock that you see in like an antique 00:07:18.009 --> 00:07:21.149 shop, you know, Civil War era, imagine. I feel 00:07:21.149 --> 00:07:24.209 safe. I remember, well, in the book, The Dead 00:07:24.209 --> 00:07:26.089 Hand, which I talked about, David Hoffman talks 00:07:26.089 --> 00:07:27.829 about this. I remember there's one story that 00:07:27.829 --> 00:07:29.709 I want to ask you about. I recall from the book 00:07:29.709 --> 00:07:32.230 it said when finally, you know, Washington eventually 00:07:32.230 --> 00:07:35.589 figured this out and then created a whole effort 00:07:35.589 --> 00:07:38.089 to come and get this stuff, right? And this massive 00:07:38.089 --> 00:07:41.399 C -5 aircraft was sent. secretly to come take 00:07:41.399 --> 00:07:43.800 away the material. And you were in the control 00:07:43.800 --> 00:07:45.740 tower. And since nobody spoke English, right, 00:07:45.819 --> 00:07:49.300 you had to like guide the planes in. It was a 00:07:49.300 --> 00:07:52.699 frightening test of my Russian language skills. 00:07:52.720 --> 00:07:55.660 They were telling me in Russian what to tell 00:07:55.660 --> 00:08:00.480 the cockpit of this incoming C -5. But it landed 00:08:00.480 --> 00:08:03.759 safely. I was very relieved to see it land. And 00:08:03.759 --> 00:08:06.699 then we drove out to the cockpit and welcomed 00:08:06.699 --> 00:08:10.879 them to Uzhgorod, Kazakhstan. So what was the 00:08:10.879 --> 00:08:13.300 most shocking thing to you when you first encountered 00:08:13.300 --> 00:08:15.100 this whole infrastructure? I also remember there 00:08:15.100 --> 00:08:17.379 was a story about you guys on these rickety trucks 00:08:17.379 --> 00:08:21.060 on sleet. It was sleet and ice and all kinds 00:08:21.060 --> 00:08:25.000 of things. So it took almost six weeks to package 00:08:25.000 --> 00:08:27.980 the material for transport. It was a huge operation. 00:08:28.439 --> 00:08:32.279 Over 30 people came from the United States to 00:08:32.279 --> 00:08:35.559 do that packaging work. And then we had it all 00:08:35.559 --> 00:08:40.649 loaded up into trucks. these soviet uh gas trucks 00:08:40.649 --> 00:08:44.889 and um we decided for tactical surprise to make 00:08:44.889 --> 00:08:48.070 the movement from the factory to the airfield 00:08:48.070 --> 00:08:51.750 uh in the middle of the night and we picked a 00:08:51.750 --> 00:08:54.429 night we were sort of racing against winter to 00:08:54.429 --> 00:08:57.309 get the stuff out you know before it was too 00:08:57.309 --> 00:09:01.049 late for the c5 galaxy aircraft to even land 00:09:01.049 --> 00:09:04.549 in that part of the world and uh the movement 00:09:04.549 --> 00:09:08.139 was uh 3 o 'clock in the morning, I was in the 00:09:08.139 --> 00:09:12.620 lead Volga sedan. We had some armed escorts, 00:09:12.620 --> 00:09:17.259 and these trucks were sliding on this black ice. 00:09:17.460 --> 00:09:22.259 It was a very cold night, and I was worried one 00:09:22.259 --> 00:09:24.379 of them was going to slide off a bridge, and 00:09:24.379 --> 00:09:26.899 I'd have to report to Washington that it was 00:09:26.899 --> 00:09:29.759 floating down the Ertish River. But luckily, 00:09:29.940 --> 00:09:32.700 they know how to drive in those parts in bad 00:09:32.700 --> 00:09:34.779 weather, and we made it out to the airfield, 00:09:34.820 --> 00:09:39.720 and then... At first light, the first of two 00:09:39.720 --> 00:09:45.059 C -5 aircraft came to pick up the team and the 00:09:45.059 --> 00:09:48.620 highly enriched uranium, where it was then flown 00:09:48.620 --> 00:09:52.139 back without any landing, aerial refuelings en 00:09:52.139 --> 00:09:54.480 route all the way to Dover, Delaware, and then 00:09:54.480 --> 00:09:57.220 over and to Oak Ridge, Tennessee. I guess it 00:09:57.220 --> 00:10:00.580 was the longest C -5 flight ever, right? Yeah, 00:10:00.580 --> 00:10:03.120 if you look at a globe, it's literally halfway 00:10:03.120 --> 00:10:05.820 around. So Andy, you've said a couple of things 00:10:05.820 --> 00:10:07.820 here and you have to help me out because I'm 00:10:07.820 --> 00:10:11.120 a history major. So you've talked about the stuff, 00:10:11.320 --> 00:10:15.159 right? And HEU up to 90%. So if you can maybe 00:10:15.159 --> 00:10:16.840 help me out and maybe a couple of people in the 00:10:16.840 --> 00:10:20.519 audience who aren't quite sure. So the stakes 00:10:20.519 --> 00:10:23.820 here, the stuff is the stuff that you could make 00:10:23.820 --> 00:10:27.440 X amount of nuclear bombs or radiological. What 00:10:27.440 --> 00:10:31.320 were we dealing with here? Yeah, at the unclassified 00:10:31.320 --> 00:10:35.340 level, about two dozen nuclear weapons. That's 00:10:35.340 --> 00:10:39.600 nice. Much of it was in readily weaponizable 00:10:39.600 --> 00:10:43.779 form. So it was 90 % enriched, which is weapons 00:10:43.779 --> 00:10:46.899 grade. But a lot of it was just in the form of 00:10:46.899 --> 00:10:52.000 pure uranium metal. So to fashion it into a gun 00:10:52.000 --> 00:10:54.320 -type nuclear device would have been relatively 00:10:54.320 --> 00:10:58.440 simple. So that you beat North Korea or Iran 00:10:58.440 --> 00:11:01.179 or al -Qaeda and stuff, right? I mean, think 00:11:01.179 --> 00:11:03.600 about it. You know, Iran went through all this 00:11:03.600 --> 00:11:07.720 trouble to develop a nuclear program, build these 00:11:07.720 --> 00:11:11.279 big enrichment facilities underground, you know, 00:11:11.299 --> 00:11:15.240 30 years of work, huge billions of dollars of 00:11:15.240 --> 00:11:17.600 investments. Had they acquired this material 00:11:17.600 --> 00:11:23.090 from Kazakhstan in 1993 or 4? They would have 00:11:23.090 --> 00:11:25.230 short -circuited that whole process and they 00:11:25.230 --> 00:11:28.850 would have had enough material for about, you 00:11:28.850 --> 00:11:31.389 know, two dozen nuclear weapons. So you're enemy 00:11:31.389 --> 00:11:33.450 number one for the Iranian regime. That's good 00:11:33.450 --> 00:11:36.950 to know. They were definitely seeking this material. 00:11:36.950 --> 00:11:38.549 Yeah, they were trying to get it. What can you 00:11:38.549 --> 00:11:40.669 say about that? Weren't they trying to, you know, 00:11:40.690 --> 00:11:43.269 deal with scientists and buy their way into the 00:11:43.269 --> 00:11:47.009 program? The Iranians were... scouring the former 00:11:47.009 --> 00:11:49.350 Soviet Union, Russia, and the neighboring states 00:11:49.350 --> 00:11:54.129 for expertise, for materials, for weapons. And 00:11:54.129 --> 00:11:58.409 a lot of it was for sale. They would invite experts 00:11:58.409 --> 00:12:02.730 to teach at universities in Tehran. And indeed, 00:12:02.809 --> 00:12:06.909 the factory that had the HEU, when we visited, 00:12:07.070 --> 00:12:11.570 they had a stack of crates, wooden crates, addressed 00:12:11.570 --> 00:12:17.350 to... an address in Tehran. And it was, we were 00:12:17.350 --> 00:12:20.970 told by the factory director that it was Iranians 00:12:20.970 --> 00:12:24.289 who were seeking to buy beryllium metal, which 00:12:24.289 --> 00:12:27.909 was also produced at this plant. But had they 00:12:27.909 --> 00:12:30.789 known about the highly enriched uranium there, 00:12:30.850 --> 00:12:32.649 I'm sure that would have been their next purchase. 00:12:32.730 --> 00:12:39.289 But that deal was stopped. Boy, it's rare, except 00:12:39.289 --> 00:12:43.539 in Hollywood, that like a lone you know, U S 00:12:43.539 --> 00:12:47.019 official saves the world kind of sort of, but 00:12:47.019 --> 00:12:49.179 it's, you know, it's, it's good. You must feel 00:12:49.179 --> 00:12:51.139 really good sort of being on part of the team 00:12:51.139 --> 00:12:52.980 and leading the team that actually did. Well, 00:12:52.980 --> 00:12:55.759 I mean, like anything in government, it's always 00:12:55.759 --> 00:12:58.960 a team sport. Right. But you mentioned Hollywood. 00:12:59.600 --> 00:13:03.399 I do have a life rights agreement that was just 00:13:03.399 --> 00:13:06.759 extended today. As a matter of fact. All right. 00:13:06.759 --> 00:13:08.320 We'll get you. Cause we have a company that's 00:13:08.320 --> 00:13:09.539 trying to make movies. We'll see what we can 00:13:09.539 --> 00:13:12.100 do. That's great. Any help would be fantastic 00:13:12.100 --> 00:13:15.159 because it's been hot and cold for about 10 years 00:13:15.159 --> 00:13:17.440 now. Except, you know, in the movie, you're not 00:13:17.440 --> 00:13:19.200 going to be able to shoot a moose, right? I'm 00:13:19.200 --> 00:13:22.379 just, people won't go for that. No, that's right. 00:13:22.480 --> 00:13:24.860 That's not it. Talk a little bit about just, 00:13:24.940 --> 00:13:26.559 you know, we'll get off of this story in a minute 00:13:26.559 --> 00:13:28.100 and talk about other things, but talk a little 00:13:28.100 --> 00:13:31.840 bit about Banya diplomacy. Sounds like personal 00:13:31.840 --> 00:13:34.500 relationships, your Russian language, the fact 00:13:34.500 --> 00:13:35.840 that you would be able to drink with these guys, 00:13:35.879 --> 00:13:37.899 probably did more to help to close down those 00:13:37.899 --> 00:13:40.399 evil Soviet programs and all the treaties in 00:13:40.399 --> 00:13:42.639 the world. How important were personal trust 00:13:42.639 --> 00:13:47.620 and language skills? I mean, it was just an incredible 00:13:47.620 --> 00:13:50.240 time. You know, almost, you know, at least every 00:13:50.240 --> 00:13:53.779 week, sometimes several times a week, I would 00:13:53.779 --> 00:13:55.840 meet people who had never in their lives met 00:13:55.840 --> 00:14:00.049 an American. it had been a pretty isolated part 00:14:00.049 --> 00:14:03.850 of the Soviet Union. And, you know, they always 00:14:03.850 --> 00:14:06.070 looked up to us. We were their enemies, but they 00:14:06.070 --> 00:14:09.590 admired us. And then they had the chance to meet 00:14:09.590 --> 00:14:12.049 somebody. I'm not exactly out of central casting, 00:14:12.309 --> 00:14:16.690 but the fact that I spoke Russian really helped 00:14:16.690 --> 00:14:20.009 a lot in terms of building trust and then, you 00:14:20.009 --> 00:14:22.610 know, doing what they did, what they enjoyed, 00:14:22.730 --> 00:14:27.889 whether it was... going hunting or fishing or 00:14:27.889 --> 00:14:30.950 drinking or, you know, taking off your clothes 00:14:30.950 --> 00:14:33.870 and beating each other with birch branches in 00:14:33.870 --> 00:14:37.710 a Russian banya, you know, sauna. It was really 00:14:37.710 --> 00:14:40.950 the personal trust and those relationships that 00:14:40.950 --> 00:14:44.190 I developed in doing this work over a period 00:14:44.190 --> 00:14:47.429 of 20 years. We did a lot of work with Russian 00:14:47.429 --> 00:14:51.309 scientists also. Yeah. So, Professor, I need 00:14:51.309 --> 00:14:57.029 a little help with HEU and percentages. So I've 00:14:57.029 --> 00:14:59.009 actually got sort of a little cheat sheet. So 00:14:59.009 --> 00:15:03.809 to take uranium to go from 0 % to 20 % is like 00:15:03.809 --> 00:15:08.850 90 % of the work. But 20 % only gets you on the 00:15:08.850 --> 00:15:12.409 threshold of making a weapon, right? And then 00:15:12.409 --> 00:15:14.830 when you get it up to 60%, which takes a lot 00:15:14.830 --> 00:15:18.779 less work. Right. Then then you're on sort of 00:15:18.779 --> 00:15:22.679 a dangerous threshold. And 90 percent is like 00:15:22.679 --> 00:15:24.600 weapons grade. Right. You can build a bomb from 00:15:24.600 --> 00:15:27.740 it. And Hiroshima, little boy, was 80 percent. 00:15:28.120 --> 00:15:31.019 So so, you know, for the for talking about Iran 00:15:31.019 --> 00:15:35.139 later and for this here, you know, what more 00:15:35.139 --> 00:15:38.480 can you sort of let us know about like. HEU, 00:15:38.600 --> 00:15:41.440 highly enriched uranium percentages. How important 00:15:41.440 --> 00:15:43.820 is that? And what do people need to know? Certainly 00:15:43.820 --> 00:15:46.360 to talk about what's going on in Iran, what they 00:15:46.360 --> 00:15:48.899 have or may not have, or, you know, the Russians 00:15:48.899 --> 00:15:51.379 and this story and other things. What do people 00:15:51.379 --> 00:15:53.940 need to keep in their heads? Well, I mean, the 00:15:53.940 --> 00:15:57.840 most worrisome, so Kazakhstan had 600 kilograms 00:15:57.840 --> 00:16:01.700 of 90 % enriched. So, you know, think about ivory 00:16:01.700 --> 00:16:05.779 grade weapons usable material. Iran has about 00:16:05.779 --> 00:16:13.299 450 kilograms, 970 pounds of 60 % enriched HEU. 00:16:14.320 --> 00:16:20.000 If they had a, you know, a remaining enrichment 00:16:20.000 --> 00:16:24.840 capacity, they could enrich that to 90 % in a 00:16:24.840 --> 00:16:27.480 matter of weeks. And then they would have to 00:16:27.480 --> 00:16:32.340 convert it to metal to make it bomb usable. They're 00:16:32.340 --> 00:16:35.100 pretty close. And they have, you know, about 00:16:35.100 --> 00:16:39.220 10 to 12 nuclear weapons worth of material. It's 00:16:39.220 --> 00:16:42.519 currently in the form of uranium hexafluoride 00:16:42.519 --> 00:16:48.139 gas. But they have about 11 tons of uranium that's 00:16:48.139 --> 00:16:51.820 enriched to a lesser degree, right? To 60 % or 00:16:51.820 --> 00:16:56.120 50%. And another key figure that everybody sort 00:16:56.120 --> 00:17:00.250 of glosses over. is that when in 2015, when the 00:17:00.250 --> 00:17:04.430 Obama administration signed the JCPOA agreement 00:17:04.430 --> 00:17:08.069 with Iran, they had zero highly enriched uranium. 00:17:08.829 --> 00:17:15.109 They had uranium only enriched to 3 .67%. And 00:17:15.109 --> 00:17:18.910 then before that agreement even entered into 00:17:18.910 --> 00:17:23.329 force, they allowed 97 % of that low enriched 00:17:23.329 --> 00:17:26.150 uranium to be transported out of the country. 00:17:26.880 --> 00:17:30.759 with help from Kazakhstan to Russia. So it was 00:17:30.759 --> 00:17:34.480 only in 2018 after Trump pulled out of the agreement 00:17:34.480 --> 00:17:37.420 because he was going to negotiate a better agreement 00:17:37.420 --> 00:17:41.059 that they built up this inventory of highly enriched 00:17:41.059 --> 00:17:44.160 uranium, which is extremely dangerous and it's 00:17:44.160 --> 00:17:48.140 still there. Well, we're going to go into Iran 00:17:48.140 --> 00:17:50.000 in a second. I want to ask one more because the 00:17:50.000 --> 00:17:53.200 part I guess we forget too was the Soviet Union's 00:17:53.200 --> 00:17:56.980 biological weapons program too, right? How much 00:17:56.980 --> 00:17:59.880 of that did Soviet officials hide? And tell us 00:17:59.880 --> 00:18:02.240 a little bit about the Sverdlovsk incident and 00:18:02.240 --> 00:18:03.819 some of the stuff that you guys did to get rid 00:18:03.819 --> 00:18:05.819 of some of the weaponized anthrax and other things. 00:18:06.339 --> 00:18:13.259 So the Soviet bioweapons program, we pretty much 00:18:13.259 --> 00:18:15.859 missed it from an intelligence perspective during 00:18:15.859 --> 00:18:19.089 the Cold War. The scope of that program. And 00:18:19.089 --> 00:18:22.250 I was able to visit many, not all, but many of 00:18:22.250 --> 00:18:25.029 the facilities that were part of that and met 00:18:25.029 --> 00:18:28.230 and worked with hundreds of scientists and engineers 00:18:28.230 --> 00:18:31.170 who were part of that program. It was enormous. 00:18:31.230 --> 00:18:34.490 At one point, it probably employed about 50 ,000 00:18:34.490 --> 00:18:39.390 people, included over 50 facilities and the largest 00:18:39.390 --> 00:18:42.869 facility of all. So go back. You asked about 00:18:42.869 --> 00:18:45.650 Sverdlovsk, which is now the city of Ekaterinburg. 00:18:45.910 --> 00:18:50.849 In 1979. There was a military biological weapons 00:18:50.849 --> 00:18:56.750 facility that accidentally released anthrax into 00:18:56.750 --> 00:19:00.230 the environment and killed over 100 people who 00:19:00.230 --> 00:19:02.250 were out early in the morning waiting at bus 00:19:02.250 --> 00:19:05.109 stops, you know, innocent civilians. That was 00:19:05.109 --> 00:19:10.329 covered up by the KGB. But after that, they decided 00:19:10.329 --> 00:19:13.630 maybe it's not such a great idea to build anthrax 00:19:13.630 --> 00:19:17.750 facilities in major cities. So they built this 00:19:17.750 --> 00:19:21.369 new place in the 1980s at a place called, it 00:19:21.369 --> 00:19:25.410 was then a secret city in Kazakhstan called Stepnogorsk. 00:19:25.490 --> 00:19:28.829 And this was the world's largest anthrax factory. 00:19:29.049 --> 00:19:32.970 It was capable of producing and loading onto 00:19:32.970 --> 00:19:38.589 weapons 300 metric tons of anthrax and other 00:19:38.589 --> 00:19:42.349 bacterial agents during about an eight -month 00:19:42.349 --> 00:19:47.250 mobilization period. I was able to visit that 00:19:47.250 --> 00:19:52.069 facility also in the early 90s, mid -90s. In 00:19:52.069 --> 00:19:56.150 June of 1995, we made a secret visit with some 00:19:56.150 --> 00:20:00.269 American experts. And eventually, we negotiated 00:20:00.269 --> 00:20:03.450 with the government of Kazakhstan to completely 00:20:03.450 --> 00:20:06.089 destroy that facility. And if you were to go 00:20:06.089 --> 00:20:10.490 there today, you would just find a field of grass 00:20:10.490 --> 00:20:12.589 growing. You must have had lots of vaccinations 00:20:12.589 --> 00:20:15.029 at the time. My father -in -law worked at Fort 00:20:15.029 --> 00:20:17.410 Detrick with some of those things, and Ken Allaback 00:20:17.410 --> 00:20:19.869 and those kind of people. Yeah, so I got to know 00:20:19.869 --> 00:20:24.349 Ken pretty well. I was part of the special vaccination 00:20:24.349 --> 00:20:28.970 program, so I had vaccines for things that are 00:20:28.970 --> 00:20:32.490 generally not available, like for tularemia and 00:20:32.490 --> 00:20:37.240 plague. and other very, very rare diseases that 00:20:37.240 --> 00:20:39.220 were used. So you may be the one person left 00:20:39.220 --> 00:20:43.059 after the biological war that's coming. I've 00:20:43.059 --> 00:20:46.539 got pretty good immunity. And then I add about 00:20:46.539 --> 00:20:49.740 eight different COVID vaccines since then. I'm 00:20:49.740 --> 00:20:53.740 a big fan of the mRNA vaccine. Andy, so if this 00:20:53.740 --> 00:20:56.160 is what's going on then in the Soviet Union, 00:20:56.859 --> 00:20:59.640 What was going on in the West as far as offensive 00:20:59.640 --> 00:21:03.359 capabilities? Was that totally forbidden? Did 00:21:03.359 --> 00:21:07.000 we have our own capabilities? Just to put that 00:21:07.000 --> 00:21:09.839 into perspective. Yeah, it's a very good question 00:21:09.839 --> 00:21:12.740 because most people don't study this history. 00:21:13.619 --> 00:21:17.720 We had a significant program, very successful. 00:21:18.759 --> 00:21:22.960 Our Joint Chiefs of Staff really thought it was 00:21:22.960 --> 00:21:25.440 on a par with nuclear weapons in terms of the 00:21:25.440 --> 00:21:30.289 strategic. effects that it could have. We almost 00:21:30.289 --> 00:21:33.390 scared ourselves with some major tests in the 00:21:33.390 --> 00:21:38.569 late 1960s. And President Nixon, with help from 00:21:38.569 --> 00:21:43.490 Henry Kissinger and a wonderful scientist who 00:21:43.490 --> 00:21:45.890 I became friends with named Matt Messelson, who's 00:21:45.890 --> 00:21:51.569 still teaching at Harvard in his 90s, they decided 00:21:51.569 --> 00:21:56.549 to get rid of America's offensive biological 00:21:56.549 --> 00:21:59.829 weapons program. It was outlawed by Nixon in 00:21:59.829 --> 00:22:04.170 1969. And then they negotiated the Biological 00:22:04.170 --> 00:22:08.710 Weapons Convention in 1972 that went into force 00:22:08.710 --> 00:22:15.150 in 1975, which completely prohibits the development 00:22:15.150 --> 00:22:18.049 and stockpiling of biological weapons. So that 00:22:18.049 --> 00:22:24.099 entire type of weapon is banned globally. After 00:22:24.099 --> 00:22:27.099 the ink was drying, or as the ink was drying 00:22:27.099 --> 00:22:31.079 on that agreement, is when the Soviet Union expanded 00:22:31.079 --> 00:22:34.559 its biological weapons program. And that horrible 00:22:34.559 --> 00:22:38.900 facility at Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, that anthrax 00:22:38.900 --> 00:22:44.200 factory, was built in the 1980s. And did the 00:22:44.200 --> 00:22:47.460 two questions, you know, on design intelligence, 00:22:47.640 --> 00:22:53.000 if you can answer, did we know? that they had 00:22:53.000 --> 00:22:56.940 these programs to this extent? And did they know 00:22:56.940 --> 00:23:00.240 that we didn't have these programs? Because their 00:23:00.240 --> 00:23:04.180 propaganda was NATO is offensive. NATO is an 00:23:04.180 --> 00:23:08.059 offensive alliance. We're going to be attacked. 00:23:08.460 --> 00:23:11.500 Did they know that we were disarmed and that 00:23:11.500 --> 00:23:13.119 they were building? And did we know that they 00:23:13.119 --> 00:23:16.619 were? Yes. They knew for sure that we had stopped 00:23:16.619 --> 00:23:19.670 our biological weapons program. They may have 00:23:19.670 --> 00:23:22.130 believed internally some of their own propaganda, 00:23:22.230 --> 00:23:27.569 but the people who had the highest security clearances, 00:23:27.609 --> 00:23:30.049 they knew for sure that we were no longer engaged. 00:23:30.109 --> 00:23:32.950 And they visited our facilities. And we started 00:23:32.950 --> 00:23:35.430 a process called the trilateral process where 00:23:35.430 --> 00:23:39.109 they visited our facilities. Ken Alibek, Kandachan 00:23:39.109 --> 00:23:41.990 Alibekov at the time, was part of that inspection 00:23:41.990 --> 00:23:45.509 team, as was someone I became very good friends 00:23:45.509 --> 00:23:48.970 with after, Lev Sandakchiev, who... who ran the 00:23:48.970 --> 00:23:53.670 vector facility in Siberia, they were absolutely 00:23:53.670 --> 00:23:59.029 convinced that we didn't have a program. And 00:23:59.029 --> 00:24:01.930 they were, you know, lied to. A lot of the scientists 00:24:01.930 --> 00:24:04.269 were lied to by their government and told that 00:24:04.269 --> 00:24:06.890 we're only doing this because the U .S. does 00:24:06.890 --> 00:24:09.490 have a program. But the leadership level knew 00:24:09.490 --> 00:24:12.930 that we didn't. Even Gorbachev, who at the time 00:24:12.930 --> 00:24:15.769 was seen as someone who was against the hardcore 00:24:15.769 --> 00:24:19.250 KGB and military. supported this program? Well, 00:24:19.430 --> 00:24:24.410 Gorbachev signed a decree expanding the biological 00:24:24.410 --> 00:24:27.650 weapons program in the mid -1980s. So this led 00:24:27.650 --> 00:24:30.190 to the Nunn -Lugar Agreement, and it's often 00:24:30.190 --> 00:24:32.029 described as one of the great post -Cold War 00:24:32.029 --> 00:24:35.509 successes. Why hasn't that become a model that 00:24:35.509 --> 00:24:38.789 we've used more in the future and more in the 00:24:38.789 --> 00:24:41.869 past than we have? Well, it's a great model, 00:24:41.930 --> 00:24:44.490 and I had the privilege of being involved in 00:24:44.490 --> 00:24:49.319 the Nunn -Lugar Program. started in 1991 as the 00:24:49.319 --> 00:24:53.440 Soviet Union had just collapsed for decades. 00:24:53.819 --> 00:24:57.619 It still continues to this day. We do great work 00:24:57.619 --> 00:25:01.099 all over the world now. It is the model. And 00:25:01.099 --> 00:25:05.220 I think an example of how that model was used 00:25:05.220 --> 00:25:09.599 successfully was when Syria, when the Assad regime 00:25:09.599 --> 00:25:15.519 used chemical weapons on a large scale. and killed 00:25:15.519 --> 00:25:18.900 over a thousand men, women, and children in August 00:25:18.900 --> 00:25:25.259 of 2013. By threatening the use of military force, 00:25:25.539 --> 00:25:28.599 we were able to get Syria to join the Chemical 00:25:28.599 --> 00:25:31.940 Weapons Convention. We negotiated an agreement 00:25:31.940 --> 00:25:38.200 to remove from Syria and destroy 1 ,300 tons 00:25:38.200 --> 00:25:41.240 of chemical weapons. And that's described in 00:25:41.240 --> 00:25:44.579 a great book by Pulitzer Prize -winning author 00:25:44.579 --> 00:25:48.539 Joby Warrick. The book was called Red Line. And 00:25:48.539 --> 00:25:51.960 the people in government at the time who made 00:25:51.960 --> 00:25:57.200 that happen, people like Ash Carter, Liz Sherwood 00:25:57.200 --> 00:26:00.599 Randall, Laura Holgate, had all been involved 00:26:00.599 --> 00:26:03.119 in some way or another in the early non -Lugar 00:26:03.119 --> 00:26:07.470 years. Just because I can't help myself, the 00:26:07.470 --> 00:26:10.569 rhetoric coming out of Russia today and Putin 00:26:10.569 --> 00:26:13.690 is that the great humiliation, the Soviet Union 00:26:13.690 --> 00:26:17.089 collapsed, and then we humiliated them. But what 00:26:17.089 --> 00:26:19.210 you're sort of saying is we actually helped. 00:26:19.289 --> 00:26:22.470 We went in and we spent enormous amounts of money 00:26:22.470 --> 00:26:24.730 to clean up the mess that the Soviet Union had 00:26:24.730 --> 00:26:27.910 created to kill us. We employed their nuclear 00:26:27.910 --> 00:26:31.190 scientists to keep them busy, to keep North Korea 00:26:31.190 --> 00:26:35.180 from poaching them. And they know that NATO is 00:26:35.180 --> 00:26:38.740 not a, you know, an alliance that's looking to 00:26:38.740 --> 00:26:42.259 capitalize on this. And yet their propaganda 00:26:42.259 --> 00:26:44.980 is that, you know, they're coming back because 00:26:44.980 --> 00:26:47.779 of the humiliation. And, you know, for folks 00:26:47.779 --> 00:26:50.759 out there who buy that, including in, you know. 00:26:51.099 --> 00:26:53.619 one of our political parties, you know, who buy 00:26:53.619 --> 00:26:56.240 into Russia, this Russian propaganda on, on NATO 00:26:56.240 --> 00:26:58.660 and the West. I just don't know. I don't know 00:26:58.660 --> 00:27:00.740 what to say, but you, you were, you were there 00:27:00.740 --> 00:27:02.839 for it. And this is really good for that in the 00:27:02.839 --> 00:27:05.740 sort of, you know, the broader horizon sort of 00:27:05.740 --> 00:27:09.380 perspective. It's, it's the big lie, right? I 00:27:09.380 --> 00:27:13.960 mean, this program helped Russia tremendously. 00:27:14.619 --> 00:27:18.119 And we spent hundreds of millions of dollars 00:27:18.119 --> 00:27:22.769 in Russia. including, you know, improving the 00:27:22.769 --> 00:27:26.190 security at their nuclear facilities, even at 00:27:26.190 --> 00:27:30.609 their biological research centers, upgrading 00:27:30.609 --> 00:27:34.289 laboratories, engaging in peaceful research, 00:27:34.490 --> 00:27:38.849 employing scientists. This was a program that 00:27:38.849 --> 00:27:41.369 was, yes, it was in our national security interest, 00:27:41.670 --> 00:27:45.130 but it also made the world safer. And it was 00:27:45.130 --> 00:27:49.849 really Putin himself who... took the lead in 00:27:49.849 --> 00:27:52.970 shutting down this program. He claimed that it 00:27:52.970 --> 00:27:55.170 was just being used to spy on their sensitive 00:27:55.170 --> 00:27:58.269 facilities, which was not true. I mean, it did 00:27:58.269 --> 00:28:01.289 give us transparency at their sensitive facilities 00:28:01.289 --> 00:28:03.970 because that's where the work was done. These 00:28:03.970 --> 00:28:07.150 were their formerly very secret weapons of mass 00:28:07.150 --> 00:28:09.650 destruction facilities. And they weren't all, 00:28:09.690 --> 00:28:12.009 you know, near Moscow or Petersburg. They were 00:28:12.009 --> 00:28:16.930 way out in the, you know. farthest regions of 00:28:16.930 --> 00:28:20.789 Russia across all 11 time zones. So, you know, 00:28:20.789 --> 00:28:23.130 our teams did spend a lot of time working in 00:28:23.130 --> 00:28:29.710 those remote facilities. And then Putin really 00:28:29.710 --> 00:28:32.609 shut it down. My last visit to Russia was with 00:28:32.609 --> 00:28:38.430 Senator Lugar in August of 2012. And that's pretty 00:28:38.430 --> 00:28:40.910 much when Putin had made the decision that he 00:28:40.910 --> 00:28:46.920 was going to end the program. early 2014, and 00:28:46.920 --> 00:28:50.140 that was it for our cooperation with Russia. 00:28:50.380 --> 00:28:52.440 Well, I think we've learned a lot about how to 00:28:52.440 --> 00:28:54.319 create fake narratives that get people worked 00:28:54.319 --> 00:28:57.640 up from Putin's use of that. In fact, I often 00:28:57.640 --> 00:29:00.380 say that, you know, NATO threatens Russia like 00:29:00.380 --> 00:29:03.259 a lock threatens a thief, right? I mean, you 00:29:03.259 --> 00:29:06.460 know, they know that it's a de facto alliance. 00:29:06.640 --> 00:29:08.779 Well, you know, one example, you guys are into 00:29:08.779 --> 00:29:11.799 conspiracy theories, so this big Russian lie 00:29:11.799 --> 00:29:16.680 about the Ukraine biolabs. That's right. Tulsi 00:29:16.680 --> 00:29:19.440 Gabbard is pushing, right? Yeah. Yeah. It's a 00:29:19.440 --> 00:29:26.279 complete fabrication. We actually started a program 00:29:26.279 --> 00:29:28.740 working with Ukraine to strengthen their public 00:29:28.740 --> 00:29:31.859 health laboratories, to make them safer, more 00:29:31.859 --> 00:29:37.539 modern. And it was all so they would have a better 00:29:37.539 --> 00:29:40.619 ability to detect and respond to infectious disease 00:29:40.619 --> 00:29:43.930 outbreaks in their country. you know, to isolate 00:29:43.930 --> 00:29:47.049 them from spreading around the world and becoming 00:29:47.049 --> 00:29:51.069 a pandemic. And I was directly involved in those 00:29:51.069 --> 00:29:54.509 programs. The Ukraine effort started after 9 00:29:54.509 --> 00:29:58.329 -11. The agreement was signed when Senator Lugar 00:29:58.329 --> 00:30:01.970 and Senator Obama visited Kiev. I was part of 00:30:01.970 --> 00:30:06.009 that trip in August of 2005. And the Russian 00:30:06.009 --> 00:30:08.069 disinformation, you know, just like with the 00:30:08.069 --> 00:30:12.910 HIV -AIDS story. which we know to be a well -documented 00:30:12.910 --> 00:30:16.769 fabrication by the KGB, they started using the 00:30:16.769 --> 00:30:22.529 same playbook, using a female journalist in Bulgaria 00:30:22.529 --> 00:30:28.150 to plant these ridiculous stories. And the same 00:30:28.150 --> 00:30:30.690 with the National Center for Disease Control 00:30:30.690 --> 00:30:35.650 that we built in Tbilisi, Georgia. And those 00:30:35.650 --> 00:30:42.549 sort of unofficial... press plants and disinformation 00:30:42.549 --> 00:30:47.269 campaign, then it just elevated to the point 00:30:47.269 --> 00:30:50.009 where Putin himself was talking about it. He 00:30:50.009 --> 00:30:55.730 had a three -star general, Igor Kirillov, who 00:30:55.730 --> 00:30:59.150 was actually one of the leaders of their illegal 00:30:59.150 --> 00:31:02.230 chemical and biological weapons programs, which... 00:31:02.569 --> 00:31:06.970 continue to this day in violation of the BWC 00:31:06.970 --> 00:31:13.269 treaty. He actually was guilty and found guilty 00:31:13.269 --> 00:31:19.150 in a Ukrainian secret court case of using chemical 00:31:19.150 --> 00:31:22.329 weapons in Syria, or I'm sorry, using chemical 00:31:22.329 --> 00:31:26.990 weapons inside Ukraine, which continues to this 00:31:26.990 --> 00:31:31.569 day. And he was leaving his apartment one morning 00:31:32.460 --> 00:31:34.720 And there was a scooter next to the doorway. 00:31:34.960 --> 00:31:37.980 And General Igor Kirillov is no longer with us. 00:31:38.099 --> 00:31:41.079 But it's perverse that the general who was in 00:31:41.079 --> 00:31:43.440 charge of their illegal programs, who's using 00:31:43.440 --> 00:31:47.990 chemical weapons in Ukraine. Is the same person 00:31:47.990 --> 00:31:51.130 going on TV and spouting these lies about the 00:31:51.130 --> 00:31:53.230 Ukraine biolabs? They do it all around the world. 00:31:53.309 --> 00:31:55.710 I remember being in Indonesia, the Russians had 00:31:55.710 --> 00:31:57.609 spread disinformation about some of these programs 00:31:57.609 --> 00:32:00.910 we did with the Navy. So it's a lie they play 00:32:00.910 --> 00:32:03.569 over and over again. So let me move a little 00:32:03.569 --> 00:32:06.069 bit into some of the Iran stuff, because it matters 00:32:06.069 --> 00:32:08.150 to us today, now, because there's a lot of talk 00:32:08.150 --> 00:32:11.180 about it. Oh, did we obliterate the program? 00:32:11.319 --> 00:32:13.599 Or if we didn't, can we just send some special 00:32:13.599 --> 00:32:15.400 forces guys in there? You've written an excellent 00:32:15.400 --> 00:32:17.539 op -ed in the New York Times. Let me just start 00:32:17.539 --> 00:32:20.000 with the first one. What would you want to know 00:32:20.000 --> 00:32:22.720 before you believed any claim that Iran's nuclear 00:32:22.720 --> 00:32:25.259 capability had been obliterated or destroyed? 00:32:25.779 --> 00:32:29.819 Well, we know more about the Iranian nuclear 00:32:29.819 --> 00:32:32.519 programs than just about any other intelligence 00:32:32.519 --> 00:32:35.380 target. I mean, when I served as assistant secretary 00:32:35.380 --> 00:32:39.430 of defense. I was a consumer of the most exquisite 00:32:39.430 --> 00:32:43.910 intelligence from our own sources, from Israeli 00:32:43.910 --> 00:32:46.690 sources. I mean, we had that program totally 00:32:46.690 --> 00:32:49.569 penetrated. So there's very little we don't know 00:32:49.569 --> 00:32:55.089 about it. Plus we had IAEA inspectors there and 00:32:55.089 --> 00:32:59.990 remote. you know, video cameras and monitoring 00:32:59.990 --> 00:33:04.769 for many, many, many years. So we know everything 00:33:04.769 --> 00:33:08.150 there is to know about the Iranian nuclear program. 00:33:09.410 --> 00:33:13.769 The bombing in June, Operation Midnight Hammer, 00:33:13.950 --> 00:33:16.190 and when I was at the Pentagon, we started that 00:33:16.190 --> 00:33:19.789 program to develop a special munition just for 00:33:19.789 --> 00:33:24.200 those facilities in Iran. That bombing was very 00:33:24.200 --> 00:33:26.779 successful. It took out their enrichment capacity 00:33:26.779 --> 00:33:32.400 at two places called Fordow and Natanz. What 00:33:32.400 --> 00:33:39.259 it didn't do was much of anything to their stockpile 00:33:39.259 --> 00:33:42.539 of highly enriched uranium, and especially the 00:33:42.539 --> 00:33:45.440 60 % enriched uranium, where they have about 00:33:45.440 --> 00:33:50.960 440 kilograms of it. enough for up to a dozen 00:33:50.960 --> 00:33:54.619 bombs. That's what I worry about. We think we 00:33:54.619 --> 00:33:57.500 know where most of it is. It's in tunnels in 00:33:57.500 --> 00:34:00.779 Isfahan. We had bombed the entrances to those 00:34:00.779 --> 00:34:03.240 tunnels, and then the Iranians poured more dirt 00:34:03.240 --> 00:34:06.440 and put up more barriers. But we think it's deep 00:34:06.440 --> 00:34:10.679 inside those tunnels. Eventually, I would love 00:34:10.679 --> 00:34:13.880 to see an international effort. First of all, 00:34:13.880 --> 00:34:17.139 in a negotiated agreement for Iran to allow that 00:34:17.139 --> 00:34:21.760 material to be excavated, packaged for transport 00:34:21.760 --> 00:34:25.179 and moved to a third country. Until we do that, 00:34:25.280 --> 00:34:31.239 they still have a, you know, a good possibility 00:34:31.239 --> 00:34:36.489 of developing nuclear weapons. bomb away the 00:34:36.489 --> 00:34:39.909 knowledge, though, right? I mean, this is technology 00:34:39.909 --> 00:34:43.730 from the 1940s, how to make at least a basic 00:34:43.730 --> 00:34:48.210 bomb. And yeah, I don't know, you know, we've 00:34:48.210 --> 00:34:51.210 come to, question for you, we've come to accept 00:34:51.210 --> 00:34:53.610 that North Korea has a bomb, right? And they're 00:34:53.610 --> 00:34:56.110 arguably, not even arguably, they're more of 00:34:56.110 --> 00:35:02.070 a threat to the U .S. than Iran is. So it seems 00:35:02.070 --> 00:35:04.579 like we're at a crossroads. Do we Do we negotiate 00:35:04.579 --> 00:35:07.260 and accept the legitimacy, you know, holding 00:35:07.260 --> 00:35:09.340 our nose of the Iranian regime and try to work 00:35:09.340 --> 00:35:13.980 a deal? Or do we try to overthrow the Iranians? 00:35:14.119 --> 00:35:16.440 And if that's the case, then it makes no sense 00:35:16.440 --> 00:35:19.340 for them to give up their nuclear weapons, right? 00:35:19.420 --> 00:35:21.199 I mean, that's their, at least in their minds, 00:35:21.320 --> 00:35:27.219 that's their fail safe. So what do we do? You 00:35:27.219 --> 00:35:28.659 know, not that you're the president or anything, 00:35:28.760 --> 00:35:32.079 unfortunately, but I'd vote for you. I mean, 00:35:32.119 --> 00:35:37.260 do we do you cut a deal like JCPOA part two and 00:35:37.260 --> 00:35:39.320 just simply recognize that we're going to have 00:35:39.320 --> 00:35:41.860 to live with this to a certain extent? I think 00:35:41.860 --> 00:35:43.980 in the short term, that's our only option is 00:35:43.980 --> 00:35:47.320 to cut a deal. It's our only option. Let's hope 00:35:47.320 --> 00:35:52.380 that that hideous regime, you know, is replaced 00:35:52.380 --> 00:35:55.619 in the future. that the Iranian people get a 00:35:55.619 --> 00:35:58.239 better government that they so long have deserved. 00:35:58.599 --> 00:36:01.840 But in the meantime, you have to deal with the 00:36:01.840 --> 00:36:04.980 government that's there. And unfortunately, we 00:36:04.980 --> 00:36:10.360 probably have emboldened the hardliners, strengthened 00:36:10.360 --> 00:36:15.079 the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. And that's 00:36:15.079 --> 00:36:17.699 why we're having such a devil of a time trying 00:36:17.699 --> 00:36:20.780 to negotiate anything with them. And they've, 00:36:20.780 --> 00:36:25.170 you know, by not losing the war. And having been 00:36:25.170 --> 00:36:28.789 able to close the Strait of Hormuz, they had 00:36:28.789 --> 00:36:31.510 the world economy in a bit of a stranglehold. 00:36:32.079 --> 00:36:34.159 It's a little bit better than having a nuclear 00:36:34.159 --> 00:36:36.539 bomb. So I mentioned this New York Times op -ed 00:36:36.539 --> 00:36:38.800 that you wrote about the difficulty of getting 00:36:38.800 --> 00:36:41.579 out Iran's nuclear program. Tell us a little 00:36:41.579 --> 00:36:43.699 bit about that. What would it take to remove 00:36:43.699 --> 00:36:46.300 or secure nuclear material? We did it in Kazakhstan. 00:36:46.719 --> 00:36:48.900 We've done it with chemical weapons in Syria. 00:36:48.960 --> 00:36:51.280 Tell us, what would that take? Can we send in 00:36:51.280 --> 00:36:54.340 a SEAL Team 6 and they could just go in there 00:36:54.340 --> 00:36:57.329 and grab it? And let's just define it, because 00:36:57.329 --> 00:37:01.690 there's 11 tons of uranium, right? And then, 00:37:01.710 --> 00:37:04.809 but just, you know, 900 pounds of the highly 00:37:04.809 --> 00:37:08.730 enriched stuff. Yeah, so I'm most concerned about 00:37:08.730 --> 00:37:12.989 the 60%, but we need to pay attention to the 00:37:12.989 --> 00:37:18.769 20 % and even, you know, the 3 .67%. The 3 .67%, 00:37:18.769 --> 00:37:21.639 they have an argument that... They can use that 00:37:21.639 --> 00:37:25.460 for nuclear energy, for their power reactors. 00:37:25.739 --> 00:37:28.739 So there's some legitimacy to having low enriched 00:37:28.739 --> 00:37:31.920 uranium at that level, but a limited amount. 00:37:34.219 --> 00:37:36.900 What I like to say, first of all, when I served 00:37:36.900 --> 00:37:39.019 as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, 00:37:39.159 --> 00:37:41.500 Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, I 00:37:41.500 --> 00:37:46.619 did a lot of work with the elite special forces 00:37:46.619 --> 00:37:50.769 that are trained in this area. They're the best 00:37:50.769 --> 00:37:53.730 in the world. The Israelis also have very good 00:37:53.730 --> 00:37:57.690 special forces. But you can't get around the 00:37:57.690 --> 00:38:02.110 fact that this is not a go in and grab Maduro 00:38:02.110 --> 00:38:06.769 and come right out with him. Because we'd bomb 00:38:06.769 --> 00:38:10.130 these tunnels, the time on target required would 00:38:10.130 --> 00:38:16.929 probably be days, probably even weeks. You'd 00:38:16.929 --> 00:38:19.989 have to do a major excavation. to recover these 00:38:19.989 --> 00:38:24.210 canisters that have the 60 % enriched. They're 00:38:24.210 --> 00:38:26.210 deep in these tunnels. We don't know what condition 00:38:26.210 --> 00:38:29.730 they're in. Are some of them damaged by the bombing 00:38:29.730 --> 00:38:32.829 and maybe have released toxic gas and chemicals? 00:38:33.130 --> 00:38:35.909 So there are a lot of unknowns about the current 00:38:35.909 --> 00:38:40.150 condition. So if you have to have a special team 00:38:40.150 --> 00:38:43.289 working on the ground in the middle of Iran, 00:38:44.250 --> 00:38:47.050 for, you know, a week or more, then you have 00:38:47.050 --> 00:38:50.110 to have a perimeter protecting that. And so you've 00:38:50.110 --> 00:38:53.130 got heavy equipment. You need heavy equipment, 00:38:53.309 --> 00:38:55.289 right? You need heavy equipment. You need an 00:38:55.289 --> 00:38:59.809 airfield. And you'd have to have thousands of 00:38:59.809 --> 00:39:03.210 boots on the ground, U .S. soldiers protecting 00:39:03.210 --> 00:39:06.860 that force. for as long as they're working there, 00:39:07.059 --> 00:39:10.099 against Iranian, you know, missile, short -range 00:39:10.099 --> 00:39:14.079 missile and drone attacks and ground assaults. 00:39:14.320 --> 00:39:19.699 So I just don't think it's realistic. I think 00:39:19.699 --> 00:39:24.260 it's so risky. We would probably take a large 00:39:24.260 --> 00:39:27.599 number of casualties. Yes, we could do it, but 00:39:27.599 --> 00:39:31.800 it would be so much better to do it as a negotiated 00:39:31.800 --> 00:39:37.340 solution. with an international team under IAEA, 00:39:37.460 --> 00:39:39.739 International Atomic Energy Agency, supervision 00:39:39.739 --> 00:39:44.500 to, you know, to monitor and verify the quantities 00:39:44.500 --> 00:39:52.039 and locations. I just don't see even Trump taking 00:39:52.039 --> 00:39:55.460 that big a risk of rolling the dice with our 00:39:55.460 --> 00:40:01.369 soldiers' lives. And to get really scary, as 00:40:01.369 --> 00:40:04.309 if this isn't scary enough, right? So there was 00:40:04.309 --> 00:40:05.730 this article, you've probably seen it in the 00:40:05.730 --> 00:40:08.989 New York Times a little while ago, that Dr. David 00:40:08.989 --> 00:40:12.769 Relman, who is a microbiologist, a biosecurity 00:40:12.769 --> 00:40:18.730 guy, he was working with a chat box, an AI function, 00:40:19.090 --> 00:40:24.500 and he was testing it out. And he asked it about 00:40:24.500 --> 00:40:27.980 a pathogen. And the AI chat box was able to, 00:40:28.019 --> 00:40:31.599 using AI, was able to tell him how to take, it 00:40:31.599 --> 00:40:33.480 doesn't identify that, but it's how to take a 00:40:33.480 --> 00:40:35.800 potentially dangerous pathogen or dangerous pathogen, 00:40:35.840 --> 00:40:40.780 how to modify it, how to modify it so it can't 00:40:40.780 --> 00:40:44.579 be treated, how to spread it in an urban area 00:40:44.579 --> 00:40:47.239 to cause mass casualties. And then it, just for 00:40:47.239 --> 00:40:49.619 luck. It told him, like, how you can get away 00:40:49.619 --> 00:40:53.199 with it and probably not get caught. And so this 00:40:53.199 --> 00:40:56.280 chat box is like, and he said, it was telling 00:40:56.280 --> 00:40:57.860 me all sorts of things that I hadn't thought 00:40:57.860 --> 00:41:01.760 of. And he's a biosecurity expert, right? And 00:41:01.760 --> 00:41:05.679 so now you've got Anthropic telling the Pentagon 00:41:05.679 --> 00:41:08.659 it doesn't want to give Anthropic to the Pentagon 00:41:08.659 --> 00:41:11.380 with, I guess, with those sort of capabilities. 00:41:12.280 --> 00:41:13.840 What are these sort of capabilities that you 00:41:13.840 --> 00:41:16.599 could have or, God forbid, John could have, right? 00:41:16.719 --> 00:41:21.360 I mean, so I was just wondering if we could get 00:41:21.360 --> 00:41:23.300 your, you know, you're a big thinker on this 00:41:23.300 --> 00:41:26.199 kind of thing. What are your thoughts on technology 00:41:26.199 --> 00:41:29.760 and AI and, you know, not so much nuclear, but 00:41:29.760 --> 00:41:34.320 back to chem bio issues? Yeah, so I spent, you 00:41:34.320 --> 00:41:36.699 know, over 30 years of my career working against 00:41:36.699 --> 00:41:40.179 biological weapons, and they probably scare me 00:41:40.179 --> 00:41:44.619 the most. David Relman is a dear friend and colleague 00:41:44.619 --> 00:41:47.119 at Stanford University. He was involved in the 00:41:47.119 --> 00:41:49.219 Havana syndrome stuff too, working with those 00:41:49.219 --> 00:41:52.059 people. Yes, he was. He's a very level -headed 00:41:52.059 --> 00:41:56.099 guy. He's not an alarmist. Kevin Esvelt is the 00:41:56.099 --> 00:41:58.699 other scientist who was quoted in that article. 00:41:59.139 --> 00:42:02.699 So bioweapons threats have always been a major 00:42:02.699 --> 00:42:08.599 concern of mine. But now you add AI enablement. 00:42:10.599 --> 00:42:14.960 These large language models which make information, 00:42:15.260 --> 00:42:20.340 how -to information, available to a larger section 00:42:20.340 --> 00:42:24.440 of the public, of the world, and of bad actors, 00:42:24.579 --> 00:42:30.360 potential bad actors. And it also enables those 00:42:30.360 --> 00:42:33.360 few countries that still develop biological weapons, 00:42:33.460 --> 00:42:36.880 and we're talking about just less than a handful, 00:42:37.019 --> 00:42:41.940 Russia. The PRC, North Korea, and Iran are really 00:42:41.940 --> 00:42:46.800 the four that our government knows are pursuing 00:42:46.800 --> 00:42:52.639 prohibited biological and chemical weapons today 00:42:52.639 --> 00:42:58.099 in violation of the treaties. It gives them the 00:42:58.099 --> 00:43:01.260 capability to make more precise biological weapons, 00:43:01.340 --> 00:43:05.360 to tailor the effects. And so I worry a lot about... 00:43:06.300 --> 00:43:11.920 a covert attack by state actors. You know, think 00:43:11.920 --> 00:43:16.880 of Salisbury. It was two GRU officers with 10 00:43:16.880 --> 00:43:20.219 ,000 lethal doses of Novichok, you know, fourth 00:43:20.219 --> 00:43:22.840 -generation chemical weapons agent that was recovered 00:43:22.840 --> 00:43:25.719 in that perfume bottle. Now, their goal was to 00:43:25.719 --> 00:43:28.880 kill one guy. That was the point of that operation. 00:43:29.659 --> 00:43:32.940 But that same capability, if we're in a... a 00:43:32.940 --> 00:43:35.280 moment of tension. And, you know, Russia is committing 00:43:35.280 --> 00:43:39.519 sabotage in Western Europe, whether it's China 00:43:39.519 --> 00:43:42.159 trying to prevent the flow of forces towards 00:43:42.159 --> 00:43:47.719 a Taiwan scenario, hitting U .S. bases in Japan 00:43:47.719 --> 00:43:52.800 or Guam, Hawaii, with a covert attack of biological 00:43:52.800 --> 00:43:55.920 weapons, and then tailored ones that might not 00:43:55.920 --> 00:43:58.659 even be lethal and might be hard to attribute. 00:44:00.719 --> 00:44:05.320 That's a real concern of mine is so you have 00:44:05.320 --> 00:44:09.380 the more traditional, you know, bioterrorists 00:44:09.380 --> 00:44:13.699 or lone actors are enabled by these new technologies. 00:44:13.900 --> 00:44:18.320 But then the state programs that could use them 00:44:18.320 --> 00:44:24.760 covertly in a, you know, a gray operation, a 00:44:24.760 --> 00:44:28.190 hybrid. warfare scenario, you know, before a 00:44:28.190 --> 00:44:33.090 total conflict to neutralize our bases, airports, 00:44:33.570 --> 00:44:36.690 seaports, you know, our ability to move forces. 00:44:37.789 --> 00:44:41.309 It's very frightening. But the good news is we 00:44:41.309 --> 00:44:44.809 can use these same tools for biodefense and to 00:44:44.809 --> 00:44:48.530 develop this system of biodefense from early 00:44:48.530 --> 00:44:51.190 warning, you know, wastewater surveillance, air 00:44:51.190 --> 00:44:54.510 sampling, rapid characterization attribution. 00:44:55.239 --> 00:44:57.860 There's a huge initiative the Pentagon just launched. 00:44:57.940 --> 00:45:01.739 It's not very well known. It's called the Indo 00:45:01.739 --> 00:45:07.559 -Pacific Biodeterrence Sprint. And this year, 00:45:07.639 --> 00:45:12.500 by the end of this calendar year, we are going 00:45:12.500 --> 00:45:16.940 to have systems in place at 25 sites in the Indo 00:45:16.940 --> 00:45:20.860 -Pacific region that will be able to detect bioattacks. 00:45:21.000 --> 00:45:24.519 And that's what we need are those kinds of visible, 00:45:25.239 --> 00:45:28.199 major investments that leverage our technical 00:45:28.199 --> 00:45:32.059 capabilities. And I'm convinced that if we invest 00:45:32.059 --> 00:45:35.719 significantly and exercise those capacities, 00:45:36.039 --> 00:45:39.039 that we can take bioweapons off the table. But 00:45:39.039 --> 00:45:41.900 in the meantime, you know, as COVID showed, we're 00:45:41.900 --> 00:45:45.239 woefully underprepared. So you mentioned that 00:45:45.239 --> 00:45:49.059 there's got to be, if we look at Iran now, the 00:45:49.059 --> 00:45:51.039 most likely thing was going to be some sort of 00:45:51.039 --> 00:45:52.719 deal. Now, of course, the Trump administration 00:45:52.719 --> 00:45:55.320 said the JCPOA was the worst. agreement and the 00:45:55.320 --> 00:45:57.340 history of agreements and stuff. And what they're 00:45:57.340 --> 00:45:59.400 going to get is probably that or something worse. 00:45:59.920 --> 00:46:02.980 However, for our listeners, when they look at 00:46:02.980 --> 00:46:06.179 whatever kind of deal comes down the road, what 00:46:06.179 --> 00:46:10.480 would a serious verification regime look like? 00:46:10.519 --> 00:46:13.639 What should we look for to be at least, if we're 00:46:13.639 --> 00:46:16.440 serious about an agreement, what would we expect 00:46:16.440 --> 00:46:19.980 to see? Well, you'd have to have intrusive IAEA 00:46:19.980 --> 00:46:23.960 inspections, and they're very good at this. Rafael 00:46:23.960 --> 00:46:28.159 Grossi, the director general of the IAEA, is 00:46:28.159 --> 00:46:35.179 a very experienced, capable diplomat. Any deal 00:46:35.179 --> 00:46:39.519 that leaves the highly enriched uranium in -country 00:46:39.519 --> 00:46:43.380 is a failed deal in my book. I mean, we need 00:46:43.380 --> 00:46:45.980 to get that material out. It doesn't have to 00:46:45.980 --> 00:46:48.619 come to the United States. I believe we could. 00:46:49.789 --> 00:46:54.070 negotiate the removal to Kazakhstan, to the IAEA 00:46:54.070 --> 00:46:57.550 low -enriched fuel bank in Kazakhstan, where 00:46:57.550 --> 00:46:59.929 it could be blended down for the power sector 00:46:59.929 --> 00:47:06.409 under IAEA safeguards. Russia and President Putin 00:47:06.409 --> 00:47:10.130 and President Takayev from Kazakhstan have been 00:47:10.130 --> 00:47:14.329 speaking recently. And I understand from what 00:47:14.329 --> 00:47:19.309 I've been reading in the press is that The Iranians 00:47:19.309 --> 00:47:21.710 are talking about allowing at least some of the 00:47:21.710 --> 00:47:24.789 material to be moved out of the country. So I 00:47:24.789 --> 00:47:27.570 think that's something we need to press for is 00:47:27.570 --> 00:47:30.630 to have that material removed. And then you have 00:47:30.630 --> 00:47:33.469 to deal with whatever enrichment capacity remains, 00:47:33.829 --> 00:47:38.170 the facilities like Pickaxe Mountain, you know, 00:47:38.170 --> 00:47:40.349 that we haven't really been into to make sure 00:47:40.349 --> 00:47:44.389 that those aren't operational and remain non 00:47:44.389 --> 00:47:47.010 -operational if they're not operational today. 00:47:48.460 --> 00:47:51.039 And then have, you know, continuous inspections. 00:47:51.340 --> 00:47:56.719 That's what we had before 2018 when Trump walked 00:47:56.719 --> 00:47:58.360 away from the deal and said he was going to get 00:47:58.360 --> 00:48:01.360 a better one. And here we are eight years later. 00:48:01.440 --> 00:48:05.300 We don't have a better one. We certainly did 00:48:05.300 --> 00:48:08.760 demolish those enrichment facilities at Natanz 00:48:08.760 --> 00:48:12.880 and Fordow. But the material is still there. 00:48:13.039 --> 00:48:16.599 And, you know, they still have probably centrifuges. 00:48:17.599 --> 00:48:19.639 which are more advanced than the ones that they 00:48:19.639 --> 00:48:22.340 were making 10 years ago. They have the IR -6 00:48:22.340 --> 00:48:25.539 model, which is their sixth generation centrifuge. 00:48:25.659 --> 00:48:28.219 So there's a lot of work that would have to be 00:48:28.219 --> 00:48:31.739 done over months and years to have that inspection 00:48:31.739 --> 00:48:35.159 regime to ensure that Iran never pursues a nuclear 00:48:35.159 --> 00:48:38.400 weapon. Andy, you've missed, I think, maybe the 00:48:38.400 --> 00:48:40.659 biggest point, and I'll just point it out, is 00:48:40.659 --> 00:48:44.579 that what you need is a better CIA. You need 00:48:44.579 --> 00:48:46.739 better espionage because it all comes down to 00:48:46.739 --> 00:48:50.079 both. Russia, Putin, and the Iranians, it seems 00:48:50.079 --> 00:48:53.400 to me, plans and intentions, right? What is it 00:48:53.400 --> 00:48:55.260 that they want to do? There's what they can do. 00:48:55.380 --> 00:48:58.380 And so I'll put in a plug for the espionage side 00:48:58.380 --> 00:49:01.119 of the house, especially the human side of the 00:49:01.119 --> 00:49:03.400 house that John and I were involved in at CIA. 00:49:03.880 --> 00:49:09.809 You also need a robust way to... you know, to 00:49:09.809 --> 00:49:11.550 get into their heads and understand what they, 00:49:11.570 --> 00:49:14.090 what they want to achieve. So just a quick point. 00:49:14.110 --> 00:49:18.130 I was a beneficiary. I was a beneficiary, a consumer 00:49:18.130 --> 00:49:22.110 of what I described as the most exquisite intelligence 00:49:22.110 --> 00:49:24.710 on Iran's nuclear program that, you know, I had 00:49:24.710 --> 00:49:28.550 the privilege of seeing when I was in, in serving 00:49:28.550 --> 00:49:31.010 as assistant secretary of defense. I mean, our 00:49:31.010 --> 00:49:35.289 collection capabilities across the board and 00:49:35.289 --> 00:49:38.030 then combined with the Israeli collection capabilities. 00:49:38.730 --> 00:49:42.369 were extraordinary because we made it a very, 00:49:42.409 --> 00:49:45.530 very high priority. And when you do that and 00:49:45.530 --> 00:49:49.030 you focus over decades, it's incredible what 00:49:49.030 --> 00:49:51.789 you can learn. I'm not sure how well CIA can 00:49:51.789 --> 00:49:54.190 do now that John and I aren't there, but I imagine 00:49:54.190 --> 00:49:57.570 it'll struggle on. Well, also, it's amazing to 00:49:57.570 --> 00:50:00.300 me that when you say it was... largely successful, 00:50:00.500 --> 00:50:02.219 we're getting good at, is we didn't have people 00:50:02.219 --> 00:50:05.000 there. I think in many ways when there's not 00:50:05.000 --> 00:50:08.159 diplomats and experts and academics and spies 00:50:08.159 --> 00:50:11.119 and stuff in country, it makes it much harder 00:50:11.119 --> 00:50:15.079 to get at those secrets. And much easier to fool 00:50:15.079 --> 00:50:18.000 us, too. We've seen that in Iraq and Iran and 00:50:18.000 --> 00:50:20.780 other places. Yeah, but Iran has never been totally 00:50:20.780 --> 00:50:23.519 closed off to the world like the way North Korea 00:50:23.519 --> 00:50:29.900 is. So I think we did a very good job. And we 00:50:29.900 --> 00:50:32.659 need, obviously, to continue. Intentions, political 00:50:32.659 --> 00:50:35.420 intentions of the leadership, that's always the 00:50:35.420 --> 00:50:40.440 hardest to know, right? You can learn about capabilities, 00:50:40.599 --> 00:50:44.059 but what's in that, you know, what is in Putin's 00:50:44.059 --> 00:50:47.820 head this morning? That's not necessarily a secret 00:50:47.820 --> 00:50:51.159 you can steal. Good point. So, listen, you've 00:50:51.159 --> 00:50:53.860 been really kind with your time. So let me just 00:50:53.860 --> 00:50:55.480 get you sort of out of here with one question. 00:50:56.139 --> 00:50:58.900 And also. At the end of that, let us know if 00:50:58.900 --> 00:51:02.199 there's stuff that you're doing publicly or writing 00:51:02.199 --> 00:51:04.980 about that people could find. And the question 00:51:04.980 --> 00:51:06.619 just sort of, you spent your whole career trying 00:51:06.619 --> 00:51:09.280 to reduce the danger of weapons of mass destruction. 00:51:09.760 --> 00:51:12.500 Are we in a more dangerous era now than in the 00:51:12.500 --> 00:51:14.460 early 1990s when you started your work? Well, 00:51:14.519 --> 00:51:16.860 if you look at the arc of, you know, let's say 00:51:16.860 --> 00:51:21.980 40 years since I started my government career. 00:51:22.760 --> 00:51:25.079 And then, you know, now 10 years into retirement, 00:51:25.239 --> 00:51:29.900 I still do consulting for the government. We 00:51:29.900 --> 00:51:32.940 had at that time five rogue states that were 00:51:32.940 --> 00:51:35.699 pursuing weapons of mass destruction. And one 00:51:35.699 --> 00:51:40.320 by one, that number has decreased. So Libya no 00:51:40.320 --> 00:51:43.179 longer has weapons of mass destruction programs. 00:51:44.320 --> 00:51:47.159 Syria no longer has. And we have a chance to 00:51:47.159 --> 00:51:49.800 really put a bookend. on the remnants of the 00:51:49.800 --> 00:51:52.219 chemical weapons program with the new regime 00:51:52.219 --> 00:51:55.179 in Syria. They're cooperating very well with 00:51:55.179 --> 00:51:57.019 the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 00:51:57.019 --> 00:52:01.320 Weapons. So those are two countries. Iraq has 00:52:01.320 --> 00:52:03.659 no weapons of mass destruction. So that's three 00:52:03.659 --> 00:52:08.039 out of five. Iran, I think we're close. And with 00:52:08.039 --> 00:52:12.340 the JCPOA, we were actually there. But we tore 00:52:12.340 --> 00:52:15.139 up that agreement, and now we're in a much worse 00:52:15.139 --> 00:52:18.699 situation with Iran. I'll keep my fingers crossed 00:52:18.699 --> 00:52:22.039 and hope that we can negotiate a solution that, 00:52:22.099 --> 00:52:24.280 you know, once and for all ends their nuclear 00:52:24.280 --> 00:52:27.219 weapons aspirations. And then the big one, the 00:52:27.219 --> 00:52:30.820 big unfinished piece of unfinished business is 00:52:30.820 --> 00:52:34.360 North Korea, which, by the way, in addition to 00:52:34.360 --> 00:52:37.280 their missile and nuclear weapons programs, also 00:52:37.280 --> 00:52:43.119 has a very, very large chemical weapons stockpile 00:52:43.119 --> 00:52:47.000 and biological weapons program. And their biological 00:52:47.000 --> 00:52:50.420 weapons program is applying all these new scientific 00:52:50.420 --> 00:52:53.619 capabilities that we've been discussing. I'm 00:52:53.619 --> 00:52:55.460 going to go have a drink. It's early in the morning. 00:52:57.440 --> 00:52:59.340 Here he's hiding over there in Hawaii. He thinks 00:52:59.340 --> 00:53:02.119 he's going to be safe from all this, but he's 00:53:02.119 --> 00:53:06.269 not. I do want to ask one on a lighter note. 00:53:06.809 --> 00:53:10.590 My favorite intelligence failure when it comes 00:53:10.590 --> 00:53:12.449 to this weapons of mass destruction actually 00:53:12.449 --> 00:53:14.210 comes out of World War II. I wonder if you know 00:53:14.210 --> 00:53:19.800 about Operation Toothpaste. This was... True 00:53:19.800 --> 00:53:23.440 story. Russian, excuse me, the Nazis were looking 00:53:23.440 --> 00:53:25.639 at a nuclear weapon, right? They weren't as far 00:53:25.639 --> 00:53:27.960 along as we thought they were. And they had this 00:53:27.960 --> 00:53:29.960 group, the Alsos group, right, which was trying 00:53:29.960 --> 00:53:33.659 to figure out how close they were and what routes 00:53:33.659 --> 00:53:35.940 they were taking to possibly to a nuclear weapon 00:53:35.940 --> 00:53:39.920 adjacent to our own Manhattan Project. And before 00:53:39.920 --> 00:53:45.690 France fell after D -Day to the Allies. A group 00:53:45.690 --> 00:53:49.010 of a group of German Nazis went into this research 00:53:49.010 --> 00:53:53.130 facility in Paris and took all their thorium. 00:53:53.190 --> 00:53:55.889 And apparently thorium is one potential avenue 00:53:55.889 --> 00:53:58.809 to making a nuclear weapon. And Alsos thought, 00:53:59.010 --> 00:54:02.650 oh, my God, the intelligence was the only explanation 00:54:02.650 --> 00:54:05.170 for this is that they are trying to develop a 00:54:05.170 --> 00:54:09.269 nuclear weapon via the thorium avenue. And as 00:54:09.269 --> 00:54:15.719 it turns out, we and this this. Allied bombing 00:54:15.719 --> 00:54:20.760 runs were prefaced off of this. Huge military 00:54:20.760 --> 00:54:23.980 personnel were put into different places because 00:54:23.980 --> 00:54:27.460 we were concerned about this. And at the end 00:54:27.460 --> 00:54:29.760 of the war, it turned out we got it all wrong, 00:54:29.860 --> 00:54:34.380 that thorium was an ingredient in a popular German 00:54:34.380 --> 00:54:39.010 toothpaste called Thoramed. or Doramed. And it 00:54:39.010 --> 00:54:41.590 actually, it made your teeth shiny because it 00:54:41.590 --> 00:54:43.690 was uranium. And of course it was like, watch 00:54:43.690 --> 00:54:45.309 your teeth, but they didn't know it. And they 00:54:45.309 --> 00:54:47.750 thought it cleaned your gums. And the Nazis thought 00:54:47.750 --> 00:54:50.730 we're going to lose the war. If we get the thorium, 00:54:50.789 --> 00:54:53.550 we can come up with a better toothpaste afterwards. 00:54:54.690 --> 00:54:57.829 And it was, it was, we got it wrong. It was all 00:54:57.829 --> 00:55:01.110 about toothpaste, not a nuclear weapon. The intelligence 00:55:01.110 --> 00:55:04.230 got it completely wrong. We, we may. You know, 00:55:04.269 --> 00:55:07.829 we've made some big mistakes through our history. 00:55:08.449 --> 00:55:10.750 You know, the one that's resurfaced in the news 00:55:10.750 --> 00:55:15.489 recently is the Iraqi fabricator, Curveball, 00:55:15.690 --> 00:55:19.809 who sold us on the mobile BW Labs, which was 00:55:19.809 --> 00:55:23.690 a complete fabrication. So we make mistakes, 00:55:24.050 --> 00:55:26.849 but more often— We can blame that. I blame that 00:55:26.849 --> 00:55:29.250 on the DIA and the analytic component. I do, 00:55:29.309 --> 00:55:32.090 too. We in CIA, we're okay with that. It wasn't 00:55:32.090 --> 00:55:35.699 us. I mean, but, you know, more often we get 00:55:35.699 --> 00:55:38.820 it right. We got Putin's invasion of Ukraine 00:55:38.820 --> 00:55:41.099 100 % right. Well, Andy, it's so good to have 00:55:41.099 --> 00:55:42.539 you on. It's good to see you. I'm glad you're 00:55:42.539 --> 00:55:45.440 doing stuff and keeping busy. We'll have to have 00:55:45.440 --> 00:55:48.480 some drinks one of these days. Yeah, I just closed. 00:55:49.139 --> 00:55:53.900 So currently I'm working for a small think tank 00:55:53.900 --> 00:55:56.920 called the Council on Strategic Risks. And it's 00:55:56.920 --> 00:56:00.409 just... I get to still work on these issues that 00:56:00.409 --> 00:56:03.170 I care so passionately about. But what gives 00:56:03.170 --> 00:56:06.030 me real optimism and hope are the young people 00:56:06.030 --> 00:56:08.590 that we're mentoring. We run fellowship programs. 00:56:08.929 --> 00:56:12.269 And the next generation is so much better than 00:56:12.269 --> 00:56:16.710 we were, John. It really gives me hope for the 00:56:16.710 --> 00:56:25.679 future. Thanks for listening to this joint Steady 00:56:25.679 --> 00:56:29.000 State Mission Implausible episode. We'd love 00:56:29.000 --> 00:56:30.880 to hear from you about what you thought about 00:56:30.880 --> 00:56:33.699 this episode and the broader idea of occasional 00:56:33.699 --> 00:56:36.699 partnerships. And if Iran caught your attention, 00:56:36.920 --> 00:56:39.920 stay tuned. In one of our upcoming episodes, 00:56:40.199 --> 00:56:42.579 I sit down with former Assistant Secretary of 00:56:42.579 --> 00:56:46.320 Defense Mary Beth Long for a deep dive into Iran 00:56:46.320 --> 00:56:48.900 and what the current moment actually means for 00:56:48.900 --> 00:56:52.019 all of us. You won't want to miss it. Thanks 00:56:52.019 --> 00:56:54.280 again for joining us. This is Lauren Anderson 00:56:54.280 --> 00:56:57.400 for the Steady State Sentinel Still Standing 00:56:57.400 --> 00:56:57.780 Watch.