Something is changing in our country, and most
people feel it before they can explain it. Good
afternoon, I'm Peter Mina, founder of the Mina
Firm, a civil rights and federal employment law
firm in Washington, D .C., as well as a former
deputy officer for civil rights and civil liberties
at the Department of Homeland Security, where
I work to integrate civil rights and civil liberties
protections in the department's national security
programs. and you are listening to the steady
state sentinel from the steady state we are facing
an existential threat growing autocracy in the
united states the steady state sentinel is a
place where we and our distinguished guests use
our national security expertise to discuss and
analyze the decisions and acts of this administration
that feed that autocratic slide and threaten
to supplant the pillars of our constitutional
democracy today we're talking with jim petrilla
jim retired from the central intelligence agency
in late 2018. where he practiced in the Office
of General Counsel for 25 years. During his last
several years at the CIA, he was responsible
for management and oversight of attorneys within
CIA's Operations Directorate. He provided legal
advice on a wide variety of cutting -edge legal
issues across a broad range of matters to include
counterterrorism and technical collection operations.
He had considerable experience in working with
senior lawyers in the intelligence community,
together with frequent engagement with congressional
oversight committees on a variety of controversial
issues. He served as deputy legal advisor at
the National Security Council from 2013 to 2015.
Throughout his career, Jim provided regular briefings
and training modules to CIA officers on topics
such as Executive Order 1233, counterterrorism
and related authorities, and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. He has been an adjunct professor
of law at George Washington University School
of Law since 2019. Jim holds a JD from the University
of Virginia and a master's degree from Stanford
University in Russian history. He has a bachelor's
from Knox College in Galesburg, Illinois, with
a major in Russian studies. And today, as we
alluded to in his background, we're going to
talk about the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act. and in particular Section 702, which some
of you may have seen in the news, what that is,
what it means, not only for congressional action,
but also what it means for the collection of
information on Americans like you and I. Good
afternoon, Jim. Welcome to the podcast. Well,
thank you for having me too, Peter. Delighted
to talk about the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, one of my favorite topics. I think you're
one of the few people that can say that, Jim.
So maybe before we get started talking about
the meat of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act or FISA, tell us a little bit about your
current work and what you're working on right
now. So as you mentioned, I retired, I can't
believe it's been nearly eight years. And I've
been doing some writing for the steady state.
since I think the mission of the steady state
is so critical. Jennifer Gregg, who is our extraordinary
editor, was kind enough to publish a series that
I wrote on the... removal enterprise that the
government has established from the apprehension
of undocumented people to their detention and
to their rendition. So there's a five -part series
on that broken up. And I encourage everyone to
check that out on Substack. It is a really important
and powerful read. Well, thank you. And I've
written a couple of other things. One on, I have
an article out on the Havana syndrome and issues,
I think serious issues with the way that CIA
has handled that issue across administrations,
by the way. And I think that it... may have fallen
into a little bit of a dark hole, even though
the current DNI has promised that she would get
to the by God bottom of it. And the problem is
that the bottom of the Havana syndrome is the
Russians. And so, you know, Tulsi has a real
dilemma about how you address that one. And then
also given some of the craziness going on with
this. investigation of the massive non -existing
conspiracy of, I don't know how many elections
now, 2016, 2020, if the Democrats have success
in 2026, it'll be the 2026, and on and on it
goes. And so it's like all aboard the retribution
train. Department of Justice has just turned
itself on its head to turn itself into a retribution
unit is really pretty shame. I've been trying
to comment on those things. Yeah. So going back
to the beginning, Jim, what led you to a career
in national security and ultimately to join the
CIA? Well, you know, I've always been interested
in it as. An area, right. And part of that is
family, family background. Both of my father's
parents were Lithuanian immigrants. And I knew
that we had family back there. I had no idea.
And, you know, when you're a kid, you kind of
fantasize about, gee, what, you know, what, what
are they doing? You know, living behind the Iron
Curtain in the Soviet Union. So I think that
may have been a triggering, triggering thing.
Part, you know, my father was very good about
opening up. things to us. And then so having
the chance to go to Knox, where I had a major
in Russian studies. And, you know, that was just
eye opening. And then I don't know, kind of all
fell from there. I was in a PhD program in Russian
history for four years and was about Two -thirds
of the way through my dissertation when I realized
it was fundamentally flawed. And I was writing
on right -wing opposition to the Tsar, you know,
around the turn of the century, focusing on the
failure of Russia and the rest of the Japanese
war and the 1905 revolution, but that's gone.
And I realized that my dissertation was fundamentally
flawed because... The fellow that I thought had
provided an intellectual basis for right wing
opposition, in fact, was regarded by everybody
as a whack job. So, you know, no one I mean,
he self -published his stuff and no one read
it. And so I thought, you know, I need to get
a job. So I went to law school. I feel like that
is an answer for many of us. I need a job, so
I might as well go to law school. And then private
practice was fine for a couple of years to pay
off debts. But then I had the chance to go work
at NSA. And I had no idea what they did, right?
Sure. No such agency. Yeah. In God we trust,
everyone else we monitor. Right. I'm sorry, Jen.
Oh, I was going to say I traded in a very long
commute and a wonderful environment, work environment
for a shorter commute and also under John Rizzo,
who is a longtime kind of acting general counsel
and I think the one person responsible for putting
CIS Office of General Counsel together. I wound
up with a shorter commute. equally, if not greater,
interesting work and an equally good working
environment. Awesome. Yeah, I was just going
to say, I think that it's really common for people
that are first generation to find their way to
public service. I mean, myself included. And
so I think that there's probably a good conversation
to be had about why that is. And I feel like
many of us, like you and I, have been in the
national security space. And so why don't we
start with just the real basics about FISA? What
is it? What was it? How did it begin? So it is,
you know, it is a really good place to begin
right at the beginning. The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act passed in 1978, and it was passed
as a result of pretty much revelations during
the Church and Pipe Committee hearings. Prior
to that, of all things, there was a domestic
terrorist attack in Ann Arbor where some chuckleheads
blew up a CIA building that led to their arrest.
It led to, and this is in the late 60s, early
70s, so it was after Title III had been passed,
right? You know, where in order to do criminal
warrants, to do electronic collection for criminal
cases, you needed a warrant under Title III of
the Omnibus Crime and State Streets Act of 1968.
So it turned out in this case, which wound up
under the name of the Keith case, as it's known,
the formal name is U .S.-United States. of America
versus United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, which I think should win
an award for one of the more... I wouldn't think
so. I don't know that I've ever heard of a case
where it's the United States against any court.
Yeah. And it's named after Judge Keith, who,
by the way, was the first African -American district
court judge in the Eastern District of Michigan.
Wow. And incredibly talented and capable judge.
who was a graduate of Howard Law School. And
Judge Keith passed away a few years ago. He lived
well into his 90s and was on the bench for much
of that. Anyway, so what happened in that case
was the defendants, as entitled under Title III,
filed a claim saying, you know, we need the government
to give us whatever information they have. On
us, right? And it turns out that the government
wound up, they lost the Keith case, right? Keith
said, yeah, you got to give it to them. The government
said, no, it's too sensitive. And so the government
lost. And what the court said in that case was
law enforcement is law enforcement. Title III
is Title III. And if you are doing something
in the national security area. That's fine, but
this is a domestic criminal investigation. So
if you got it, Title III says you got to turn
it over. And that led the government to drop
the case because, as came out in the Church and
Pike Committee, it turned out that there was
a lot of domestic surveillance going on. So how
do you deal with that? The key case was 1972.
Feist was passed in 1978. And it's not because
people were, you know, just like, yeah, yeah,
yeah, we'll get to it. It's just these issues
are really hard. And the difficulty is how do
you go about providing sufficient authority for
the government to collect national security information?
doing technical collection when you know that
incidental collection is going to take place
and when you know that that collection is critical
to the national security. So FISA was the result
of all of this. And I think that the original
history is important to understand the current
controversy over 702, Section 702. And so the
key to understanding FISA as originally passed
is to look at the definitions. And so 50 U .S
.C. Section 1801F, 1, 2, 3, and 4, four definitions.
And it lays out what Congress had in mind consistent
with the Fourth Amendment based on 1878 technology.
In advance from 1878, but compared to today,
it ain't that much different than 1878. FISA
distinguished between radio communications and
wire communications. Now, radio to FISA meant
satellite communications, right? So again, it's
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Wire
meant, you know, domestic communications pretty
much. And the reason is because international
communications were sent via satellite. Got it.
So there is a distinction between as, you know,
one of the original FBI guys that dealt with
this. I'm stealing his line, so I want to give
credit. And lest anybody think I never said anything
good about the FBI. You got birds, you got ducks.
And birds are treated differently than ducks.
So the first definition, F1, says if you are
targeting a known person in the United States.
then you need a warrant, right? That's F -1.
It can be wire, it can be satellite. F -2 says
if you are doing a wire collection against a
person in the United States, where a warrant
would be required, you need to get a warrant
from the FISA court. So, you know, we're going
to say, we're going to give FISA a voice of its
own. FISA says if you fall into one of these
definitions, you need to get a warrant. So FISA
says if you're targeting a known person in the
United States, you need a warrant. Number two
is if you're doing wire against a person in the
United States, you need a warrant. Let me ask
a question about that before you move on. You
use the phrase a person in the United States.
However, you know, we're talking about the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act. When you say a
person in the United States, do you mean a foreign
national? Do you mean a U .S. citizen? Both?
What does that term mean for purposes of this
discussion? Well, I'll tell you what. Rather
than answer that directly, and if I don't get
to this, you know, come back and tell me that
I... So you're looking at two separate things
here. One is domestic collection where the target
is in the United States. So WIRE specifically
does not distinguish between U .S. persons and
non -U .S. persons. And the reason for that is
because of NSA and the FBI targeting embassies,
which you would expect, right? I mean, you know,
I mean, if we're not, I mean, shame on us. Okay,
so what the FISA drafters wanted to ensure was
that the government didn't say, oh, well, this
focused on U .S. persons. If you are a diplomat,
you are not a U .S. person. So F2, critical language,
a person, known person, person in the United
States. Now, okay, so then F3 says, F3 focuses
on radio communications, right? Okay. And so
let me, I actually made a note of this so that
I would make sure that I got it right. So FISA
says for radio, which is to say satellite communication,
if the sender and all recipients. are in the
United States, you need a FISA warrant. Why is
that? Well, this is for satellite communications.
You know, a wire is a wire, right? And this is,
I mean, this is like old time stuff where you
would actually, you know, like do it, right?
How many people, you know, put something on there
and you, you know, it's like in the old time
movies. But radio, satellite communication was
different. And so because you could put a satellite
dish down, right? In order to do a wire communication,
you needed the cooperation of the wire service.
So you had to go like to the local bell service.
If you were wiretapping somebody in the United
States, you give them a warrant and then they
would put the tap on. But if you're collecting
off of a satellite, all you need to do is sit
in the footprint and you can put your own dish
down next to. you know, like the satellite provider,
and you can collect the same thing they collect.
Now, why would they do that? So the first one,
F2, the wire, was intended to ensure that if
the government was going to go after diplomatic
facilities in the United States, then they would
have to go to the FISA court and get a warrant.
they wanted to protect was the ability of NSA
to collect foreign communications, even if there
was one end in the U .S., and to allow that program,
which was very well known, it's called the ILC
program, International Lease Circuits, based
on the lease circuit of the satellites, they
wanted to allow that to continue. And so long
as the target was a non -U .S. person located
overseas, then the collection could occur in
the United States as well as outside the United
States. Is that clear? It is. So that was great.
But what happened? Well, the bird became a duck,
right? Cat A. Transatlantic table number A. The
previous seven were copper, and they were unreliable
and slow. A satellite, on the other hand, was
a massive improvement over copper, both in terms
of the amount of data as well as reliability.
But fiber optic, man, that was a game changer,
right? And so TAD -8, which was introduced in
the late 80s, meant that the bird, in fact, became
a duck. Now, what did that mean in terms of NSA's
collection? Well, you're no longer in a satellite.
A satellite dish doesn't do you any good if the
international gateway switch on the other side
says, hey, you know what? It is great. We can
send this over there real quick. Right. Okay.
Now, what that means is in order to collect the
wire, you know, leave aside what it does in terms
of the law. And I'll mention kind of a real world
impact on that in a second. But what that means
is in order to collect that information, you
need the cooperation of the telecommunications
company that controls the International Gateway
Facility. That was the big secret. That was the
big sensitivity. And that's what 702 addresses.
Now, what was a big triggering event here? So,
you know, there wasn't an immediate switchover
from satellite to fiber optic, but, you know,
it reached a tipping point where most all communications
traveled via wire. So they were ducks, not birds,
which was a more restrictive part of the statute.
Make the switch from bird to duck. And now, you
know, as we've been talking about, there's this
rapid evolution of technology. And so, you know,
let's move forward a little bit along the timeline
to 9 -11. And you now have the Bush administration
making a judgment call as to whether to amend
FISA or... Go just bypass it. And so tell us
a little bit about that. And then also, you know,
what you think of the potential echoes of that
decision to what's happening in the current administration
as it relates to national security and the collection
of information. And Peter, that's a great way
of framing it. So, you know, the Internet burst,
you know, and so with the Cold War dividend,
the thought was. You know, we don't need this
stuff so much anymore. And so there was a decision
that the intelligence community had to make.
Do you try to amend the statute so the bird and
the duck are treated the same? And the decision
was made not to pursue a change in the statute.
Now, the problem, like the most dramatic way
of describing how it's probably not a smart idea.
the Hanover group that plotted 9 -11, communicated
via the Internet. And so NSA was shut out of
a lot of that communication because it was being,
it was wire, not satellite. And the definition
of wire, so satellite, it didn't matter if there
was a party in the United States. Right. Why?
Or if one party was in the United States, then
the warrant requirement kicked in. Okay. All
right. So you got this problem. And then you
have 9 -11. And then you figure, well, given
all the changes that can be made, right, to all
kinds of things, like you got Department of Justice
and the wall, you know, you got to separate foreign
intelligence, separate FISA from Title III. I
mean, things that bureaucratically were important,
but substantively, to my mind, they really didn't
make all that much sense. So that was the chance
to bring FISA into the modern world. And the
Bush administration chose not to. Instead, they
came up with this just crazy... legal opinion
out of Office of Legal Counsel, a combination
of John Yoo and, oh, what's his name? The guy
that's now the Ninth Circuit judge who is actually
the head of OLC. And that opinion relied on,
of all things, the authorized use of military
force, the AUMF, and it's like a triple bank
shot that makes... You know, as much sense as
some of the crap coming out of OLC these days.
If I can be so, you know, I mean, be so bold
as to say that. And even though FISA has a provision
that says, during war, here's what you do, right?
Right. And there's an actual provision. Kind
of what OLC said was, well, but we are kind of
at war. And so Article 2 and, you know, at its
height. Very, very familiar. And so let's just
pretend that we have amended FISA. Got it. And
that worked until it didn't. And then, you know,
Jim Comey has, I mean, I think he's been, he's
kind of made, you know, a lifetime of speeches
on his hospital visit with John Ashcroft and,
you know, him saying no and, you know, yeah,
yeah, yeah. And so a stellar win was then what
was exposed. And the view was, well, wait a minute.
You know, we're now several years past 9 -11.
You guys are collecting information from off
of a wire in the United States. And FISA says
you need an order and you're not getting orders.
And so what that meant was that the Bush administration
had convinced the common carriers to assist based
upon a presidential letter. And I think Comey's
account and other accounts are that like every
six months, Bush would send another letter saying,
no, no, no, we still could be doing this. And
so one of the reasons for not amending FISA,
I mean, as I mentioned, you know, when we were
beginning the discussion, was the sensitivity
of going to. the common carriers and having their
assistance at the international gateway facility
where they are actually providing that information
to the government. So what happened? Well, people
filed lawsuits, right, on the East Coast, West
Coast, against ATT, against, you know, against
all the common carriers, Western Union. And so
what you wound up in was rather than a process,
an orderly process to amend the statute and bring
it in line with technology, modern technology.
You had this kind of sneaky Pete way of trying
to pull a fast one. Right. And, you know, you
get caught up. People get, you know, people.
Oh, yeah. Yeah. I mean, that's the thing. You
know, all of these people that are, you know,
saying, oh, yeah, yeah, we can do this. We can
do that. You know, we can smoke boats in the
Caribbean and all. You know, eventually it catches
up to you, you know. And so it caught up to what
the Bush administration had tried to do. And
that meant that when the statute was modernized,
FISA being the statute, when FISA was modernized,
you were already wrong -footed. The other thing
is that, you know, it's one thing with satellite
communications back in the 70s, 80s, late 70s,
80s, and early 90s. But with the Internet, the
total explosion of... of communications, I mean,
there's no way, right, that you can just say,
oh, well, we'll treat the bird and the duck the
same, and you don't need a warrant, and we'll
rely on you internally. So the solution that
came out of all of this kind of heartache and
pain was Section 702, which said, okay, there's
a lot of stuff out there. And we know that there's
going to be incidental collection of U .S. persons.
And, you know, with the original one, like with
F3, it was known you're going to get U .S. person
information. And, you know, I mean, you know,
what was that used for? Well, things like, you
know, counterproliferation, right? If you were
tracking what German companies were doing, selling
stuff to the Iranians or Russian efforts to circumvent
our sanctions, U .S. companies would have...
potentially have been involved indirectly or
you know there would have been communication
between i don't know you know let's say siemens
you know and motorola and you know so it's incidental
right and you deal with it procedurally well
that's one thing if it's satellites communications
that that that are expensive but if it's the
internet where it's free pretty much You're just
going to get gazillions of things. And so how
do you then handle the incidental collection?
And so what the statute came up with was a series
of procedures targeting limitations. You know,
a very active audit program, a list of topics.
that the FISA court agrees are legitimate foreign
intelligence targets. And that targeting list,
which I think is still secret, but you can imagine
what it is, put forth by the DNI and by the Attorney
General. I have Verizon as my internet provider.
And it is now part of the statute that... There's
this incidental collection that's happening.
Unless I'm particularly interested in this topic
and I do some research and I read the law, is
there any way Americans are notified of the fact
that there are U .S. government agencies that
are collecting information regarding their communications,
even if it is on an incidental basis? No, and
that's one of the controversies that is associated
with 702. And so, you know, you have all this
information and it's the 702 collections put
into specific dedicated databases. And then you
have queries that can be made against those databases.
And the primary controversy has, I mean, there
are some people that say, well, you just shouldn't
do 702 because of all the stuff you're going
to get. No, I mean, that's been part of the statute
for so long. But the controversy has been over
whether a warrant requirement should be required
when you target a U .S. person to determine if
there is additional information in the 702 database.
So let me give you an example. And then if we
have time, I can tell you why there is so much
controversy over the FBI. So do you want an example
first? Let's do the example. I know you've been
very gracious with your time, but I'm also cognizant
of the limited time that we have. So why don't
you go ahead with an example? So an example would
be you're following a Mexican drug cartel. And
this is a great hypothetical because I don't
think there's any way that this would occur under
this administration, right? But from following
the Mexican cartel, you figure out where they're
getting most of their guns. Let's say it's a
gun dealer from somewhere along the border, Texas,
Arizona, California, wherever. You can pick California
because, you know, I mean, if it was Texas, people
would have picked, right? The question then would
be, could you target that gun dealer, the U .S.
gun dealer, in order to determine if, in fact,
there are other foreign nationals that they're
dealing with, right? In other words, you have
all this information in there, and if you just
go, you know, you type in the identifier of the
U .S. person to determine if there's additional
foreign intelligence information. Now, should
you get a warrant for that? That's kind of the
I mean, that's that's like the example of, you
know, should you be able to go? Because can you
get a warrant? Is there probable cause that based
on the information you have that the U .S. gun
dealer is, in fact, knowingly dealing with cartels?
From a foreign intelligence point of view, and
then or. If the answer is no, then you're fine.
If the answer is yes, then the FBI presumably
would take that information and then in order
to engage in a criminal investigation, would
use that as the basis for a warrant. So there's
an efficiency level, right? So I think a couple
of thoughts here in the time that we have left.
I guess the question... that comes to mind is
sort of this uh tension right i mean of course
there's a legitimate law enforcement and national
security purpose for the collection of this type
of information and understandably you won't be
able to give notice and it sort of defeats the
purpose if you're the subject of an investigation
and i have to tell you well jim we're collecting
information you know from verizon with regard
to your social media postings or whatever um
and so i understand that but at the same time
there's no warrant requirement there's no probable
cause or even reasonable suspicion requirement
and certainly that creates uh potential you know
civil liberties uh and maybe even depending on
the circumstances civil rights concerns how how
do you and how should um your listener right
now, kind of resolve those questions or that
tension or that balance, which is always, I think,
an issue in these national security spaces. So
the first thing is, unlike Title III, I mean,
you're right. So Title III, you're subject to
a Title III warrant. You're entitled to everything
they have on you, right? I mean, the government.
But that's not the case with FISA. There are
internal constraints. So that if you just willy
-nilly type in a number, the audit is going to
pick you up. And over time, what has happened
is the need for justification has been written
into the statute, into Section 702. So there
has to be a justification for targeting a U .S.
person against the 702 database. But you're right.
That's, you know, relies on the internal audit
and there is no requirement. You know, in fact,
there really is no mechanism for determining
whether whether it's being anything is being
used against you. And and so, you know, you wind
up with. a real dilemma in that, do you trust
the system? Do you trust the targeting procedures?
Do you trust the minimization procedures? Do
you trust the audits that are going on? Do you
trust that the FBI, NSA, CIA, you know, whoever
else has access to these databases will use that
access in good faith? Well, and I think given
the... sort of the dismantling of the oversight
structure, not just in the national security
space, but all over, it's hard to, you know,
to believe that that is in fact happening, to
place that trust. And so, you know, given sort
of the uncertain future of 702 in Congress, you
know, what do you see as the path forward? Not
necessarily a policy outcome necessarily, but
do you think that, you know, for example, congress
and the white house will come to some sort of
agreement you know whatever the policy is or
are we going to continue to have you know kind
of this you know the administration having you
know free will to essentially collect this information
without necessarily any real guardrails well
702 is such a critical part of the intelligence
collection posture I mean, if you're interested
in following the disputes, you could check George
Croner, C -R -O -N -E -R, versus the Brennan
Center and ACLU. And George knows probably more
about FISA than most anybody that I know. And
the Brennan Center. has been very consistent
in their opposition. Not so much to 702, but
to the warrant requirement. I think that there's
a much broader issue, though, and that 702 is
constrained, right? It takes place under a statutory
framework and the data is segregated and is audited
and all. I think a greater concern is the use
of third -party data. So that you have a tremendous
amount of information that is collected by private
parties. You know, anytime you use one of these,
right, you're sending all kinds of data that's
collected. And we are all the product, right?
We're not the customer, we're the product. And
a lot of that data, you know, is collected by
third -party data brokers and they sell it. They
can sell it to anybody. And and and currently,
I'm not sure that there are any restrictions
on what what the government can or can't do with
data that they buy from third party data brokers.
And it's almost as if, you know, like that, you
know, don't don't forget. Don't forget, you know,
the big elephant in the room, you know, who is
who has just all sorts of data. And are there
limitations on any of that stuff? you know i
mean and yeah i mean the question also too comes
to mind given my background is what opportunity
is there for regress if that information is just
wrong yeah yeah and the privacy act does give
you uh you know does establish methods but if
you don't know it's there in the first place
um you know What are you going to do about it?
Or, you know, you don't know that people have
been following what you're doing until you show
up at the airport and your TSA pre is no longer
operable. Exactly. Exactly. On that note, I think
it is really critical for our listeners and really
everyone out there to get smart about things
like FISA and Section 702, because this impacts
you day to day in almost the conduct to your
point, showing your smartphone in almost everything
we do and every time we have a communication.
And so, you know, Jim, thank you so much for
being so gracious with your time, for being able
to really break this down in a way that our listeners
and everyone out there can understand. And so
can you let folks know where people might be
able to find your work or, you know, more about
you? You know, speaking of that brand internet,
where can we find more about Jim Petrola? Well,
certainly the steady state. And then I'm also
connected with a really, you know, kind of a
new venture that someone I used to work with,
a former ops officer named Ed Bogan, has set
up called the Institute for the Study of States
of Exception. And ISSC really complements the
steady state. very nicely. ISSE is focused more
on states of exception from an academic point
of view, kind of an analytic point of view, and
a legal point of view. And it's how emergency
authorizations can very easily be misused into
the same kind of illiberal structures that, Peter,
you mentioned at the beginning of our talk here.
Great. So lots of interesting reading out there
and content from Jim and others. And so if you
like what you heard on today's show, please subscribe
to the Steady State Sentinel wherever you get
your podcasts and give us a five -star review
on Google. Those subscriptions and five -star
reviews help us get this important content to
the widest audience possible. If you'd like to
hear more from our guests about the implications
of... FISA, Section 702, and maybe more broadly
about the collection of information on Americans,
check out my prior interview with Alex Stoll,
the former Civil Liberties Protection Officer
at ODNI, the Director of National Intelligence.
And as always, the steady state Sentinel is for
you, our listeners, and we want to hear from
you. Please join us for our next episode so that
you can stay engaged and stay informed. Remember,
protecting our democracy is not a spectator sport.
This is Peter Mina for the City -State Sentinel,
still standing watch. Thank you for listening
to the Steady State Sentinel podcast. Don't miss
out on more insights and exposes from America's
premier global security experts. Also, subscribe
to our Substack at substack .com slash at SteadyState1
and follow our social media and join us right
here next week for another exciting edition.
The Steady State is a nonprofit organization
working to sustain our democracy and national
security. Join us and support our mission by
visiting www .thesteadysate .org.