WEBVTT - generated with AI 00:00:00.200 --> 00:00:03.299 Something is changing in our country, and most 00:00:03.299 --> 00:00:11.019 people feel it before they can explain it. Good 00:00:11.019 --> 00:00:13.380 evening, I'm Peter Mina, a civil rights and federal 00:00:13.380 --> 00:00:15.380 employment law attorney, as well as a former 00:00:15.380 --> 00:00:17.539 Department of Homeland Security official who 00:00:17.539 --> 00:00:19.519 worked to integrate civil rights and civil liberties 00:00:19.519 --> 00:00:22.019 protections in the department's national security 00:00:22.019 --> 00:00:24.320 programs, and you are listening to the Steady 00:00:24.320 --> 00:00:26.960 State Sentinel from the Steady State. We are 00:00:26.960 --> 00:00:29.660 facing an existential threat. Growing autocracy 00:00:29.660 --> 00:00:32.240 in the United States. The steady state sentinel 00:00:32.240 --> 00:00:34.200 is a place where we and our distinguished guests 00:00:34.200 --> 00:00:37.039 use our national security expertise to discuss 00:00:37.039 --> 00:00:39.579 and analyze the decisions and acts of this administration 00:00:39.579 --> 00:00:42.600 that feed that autocratic slide and threaten 00:00:42.600 --> 00:00:44.259 to supplant the pillars of our constitutional 00:00:44.259 --> 00:00:47.280 democracy. Today, we're talking with Alex Joel, 00:00:47.420 --> 00:00:49.799 the senior project director and resident adjunct 00:00:49.799 --> 00:00:51.780 professor at the American University Washington 00:00:51.780 --> 00:00:55.000 College of Law. Professor Joel leads the Privacy 00:00:55.000 --> 00:00:57.320 Across Borders Research Initiative, which is 00:00:57.320 --> 00:00:59.520 part of the law school's Tech, Law, and Security 00:00:59.520 --> 00:01:02.439 program. He is conducting research, developing 00:01:02.439 --> 00:01:05.200 programming, and teaching courses focused on 00:01:05.200 --> 00:01:07.879 the intersection between the law, national security, 00:01:08.260 --> 00:01:11.579 technology, and privacy. Prior to coming to American, 00:01:11.819 --> 00:01:13.980 Professor Joel spent nearly two decades in the 00:01:13.980 --> 00:01:17.019 intelligence community. In 2002, he joined the 00:01:17.019 --> 00:01:18.959 Central Intelligence Agency's Office of General 00:01:18.959 --> 00:01:22.409 Counsel. Subsequently, in 2005, he moved to the 00:01:22.409 --> 00:01:24.209 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 00:01:24.409 --> 00:01:26.689 or ODNI, where he served as a civil liberties 00:01:26.689 --> 00:01:29.829 protection officer for 14 years, reporting directly 00:01:29.829 --> 00:01:32.489 to five different directors of national intelligence. 00:01:32.790 --> 00:01:35.909 And starting in 2015, he simultaneously served 00:01:35.909 --> 00:01:38.930 as the ODNI's chief transparency officer. And 00:01:38.930 --> 00:01:41.469 with that, welcome to the show, Alec. Thank you, 00:01:41.469 --> 00:01:44.620 Peter. Thank you for having me. Thanks so much 00:01:44.620 --> 00:01:47.040 for coming. So why don't we start off by having 00:01:47.040 --> 00:01:49.420 you talk to our audience a little bit about what 00:01:49.420 --> 00:01:51.400 your current work is at American University, 00:01:51.519 --> 00:01:54.280 and in particular, what the Privacy Across Borders 00:01:54.280 --> 00:01:57.280 initiative is. Yes, thanks. I've been teaching 00:01:57.280 --> 00:01:59.879 at American universities at the law school for 00:01:59.879 --> 00:02:03.299 the last five years or so. I teach national security, 00:02:03.459 --> 00:02:05.939 surveillance, and secrecy, as well as issues 00:02:05.939 --> 00:02:08.120 relating to technology and privacy around the 00:02:08.120 --> 00:02:10.889 world. And with the Privacy Cross Borders Research 00:02:10.889 --> 00:02:13.729 Initiative, we're looking at data flows and technology 00:02:13.729 --> 00:02:17.530 as it's required for our society and our economies 00:02:17.530 --> 00:02:21.330 around the world, focusing on cross -border data 00:02:21.330 --> 00:02:25.310 flows and issues of trust relating to how governments 00:02:25.310 --> 00:02:28.509 access personal data held by companies for national 00:02:28.509 --> 00:02:31.409 security or law enforcement purposes, as well 00:02:31.409 --> 00:02:34.870 as how AI is governed and used in ways that implicate 00:02:34.870 --> 00:02:37.289 national security and privacy at the same time. 00:02:38.319 --> 00:02:41.080 Well, those issues couldn't be more salient than 00:02:41.080 --> 00:02:44.139 right now. And so I want to kind of start a little 00:02:44.139 --> 00:02:47.240 bit at your beginnings. What led you to the, 00:02:47.240 --> 00:02:48.879 you know, ultimately very distinguished career 00:02:48.879 --> 00:02:51.259 you had in intelligence and national security? 00:02:51.699 --> 00:02:53.900 And then, you know, within that, what led you 00:02:53.900 --> 00:02:57.740 to a particular focus on privacy, tech, and then 00:02:57.740 --> 00:02:59.840 certainly civil liberties, particularly at your 00:02:59.840 --> 00:03:04.000 role at ODI? Okay, well, we're going to go back 00:03:04.000 --> 00:03:06.400 in time a little bit since you asked for my beginnings. 00:03:06.979 --> 00:03:10.319 So I graduated from law school and I served four 00:03:10.319 --> 00:03:14.479 years as an Army JAG. And after I got out of 00:03:14.479 --> 00:03:17.139 the Army, I joined a law firm and I did technology 00:03:17.139 --> 00:03:19.780 outsourcing work, sort of technology transactional 00:03:19.780 --> 00:03:23.300 work. And then I joined Marriott International 00:03:23.300 --> 00:03:27.360 in -house and I was their privacy. and e -commerce 00:03:27.360 --> 00:03:29.879 and new business ventures lawyer for seven years. 00:03:30.099 --> 00:03:32.020 And I was super happy in that job. That was a 00:03:32.020 --> 00:03:33.939 great place to work. And then 9 -11 happened. 00:03:34.120 --> 00:03:36.900 So that changed everything for me. So with 9 00:03:36.900 --> 00:03:39.740 -11, I decided I needed to reenter public service. 00:03:39.900 --> 00:03:42.099 And I was asking around, trying to figure out 00:03:42.099 --> 00:03:45.159 how I could best contribute. And I was very interested 00:03:45.159 --> 00:03:48.199 already at the time in terms of the intersection 00:03:48.199 --> 00:03:50.979 of privacy and technology. And now what could 00:03:50.979 --> 00:03:53.340 we do with national security? I was also concerned 00:03:53.340 --> 00:03:56.580 about civil liberties. and about making sure 00:03:56.580 --> 00:03:58.960 that our Muslim American friends weren't being 00:03:58.960 --> 00:04:03.639 stigmatized and those kinds of issues. And a 00:04:03.639 --> 00:04:05.580 friend of mine who had been at the FBI for a 00:04:05.580 --> 00:04:08.099 few years strongly recommended that I apply to 00:04:08.099 --> 00:04:12.759 the CIA. So I did in October 2002, 2001. And 00:04:12.759 --> 00:04:18.220 I started at the CIA in 2002. And I spent three 00:04:18.220 --> 00:04:20.980 years there. And a lot of the issues that I was 00:04:20.980 --> 00:04:25.399 dealing with at the agency. How do we apply the 00:04:25.399 --> 00:04:28.379 rules and constraints that grew out of the church 00:04:28.379 --> 00:04:30.660 committee hearings in the 1970s that are embodied 00:04:30.660 --> 00:04:33.959 in an executive order, Executive Order 12333? 00:04:34.180 --> 00:04:36.980 How do we apply those rules as well as deal with 00:04:36.980 --> 00:04:39.660 conflicting laws around the world that might 00:04:39.660 --> 00:04:43.879 impact the ability to obtain information to prevent 00:04:43.879 --> 00:04:46.439 another terrorist attack? And when they stood 00:04:46.439 --> 00:04:48.740 up the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 00:04:48.819 --> 00:04:52.519 as your audience may know, that was in the Intelligence 00:04:52.519 --> 00:04:54.600 Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 00:04:54.839 --> 00:04:58.639 they stood it up. Director Negroponte was the 00:04:58.639 --> 00:05:01.839 first DNI. He was sworn in in April 2005. And 00:05:01.839 --> 00:05:04.899 I was detailed over from the CIA to the DNI, 00:05:04.899 --> 00:05:07.319 sort of in that first wave of lawyers to help 00:05:07.319 --> 00:05:11.269 stand it up. And I was there in June of 2005. 00:05:11.649 --> 00:05:14.610 And I was named the Civil Liberties Protection 00:05:14.610 --> 00:05:17.430 Officer pretty immediately as the interim to 00:05:17.430 --> 00:05:19.910 fulfill that role while we were looking for a 00:05:19.910 --> 00:05:23.569 permanent person. And Director Negroponte decided 00:05:23.569 --> 00:05:27.209 to make me the full -time Civil Liberties Protection 00:05:27.209 --> 00:05:30.750 Officer by the end of 2005. And so that's sort 00:05:30.750 --> 00:05:33.220 of the... the the story there and i was i did 00:05:33.220 --> 00:05:36.040 it for 14 years i i had you know occasion to 00:05:36.040 --> 00:05:37.860 think about doing something different in the 00:05:37.860 --> 00:05:39.579 intelligence community but i didn't have an interest 00:05:39.579 --> 00:05:42.399 in that i i've always been both intellectually 00:05:42.399 --> 00:05:45.839 fascinated and sort of emotionally motivated 00:05:45.839 --> 00:05:49.560 and committed to this idea that we can do both 00:05:49.560 --> 00:05:52.019 we must be able to do both we must be able to 00:05:52.019 --> 00:05:54.920 protect the nation's security and at the same 00:05:54.920 --> 00:05:57.300 time protect people's privacy and civil liberties 00:05:57.300 --> 00:05:59.899 and i still believe that to be true that Yes, 00:05:59.920 --> 00:06:02.339 there are tensions between the two goals, obviously, 00:06:02.420 --> 00:06:08.540 but there are ways to enable our agencies to 00:06:08.540 --> 00:06:11.839 carry out their national security mission and 00:06:11.839 --> 00:06:14.620 at the same time constrain them from going too 00:06:14.620 --> 00:06:16.740 far to make sure that they don't become themselves 00:06:16.740 --> 00:06:21.100 a threat to our freedoms and our democracy. Well, 00:06:21.120 --> 00:06:23.480 I actually want to ask you a little bit more 00:06:23.480 --> 00:06:25.680 about that because I think that's at the core 00:06:25.680 --> 00:06:28.720 of... you know, trying to make sense of what's 00:06:28.720 --> 00:06:31.360 happening right now. How do you I mean, use the 00:06:31.360 --> 00:06:33.459 word tension. And I've certainly heard that from 00:06:33.459 --> 00:06:36.980 others over the years. You know, do you see it 00:06:36.980 --> 00:06:40.079 as sort of this push and pull? Or do you think 00:06:40.079 --> 00:06:41.899 as I think I, you know, sort of pick up from 00:06:41.899 --> 00:06:45.000 your answer, that these, you know, really important 00:06:45.000 --> 00:06:48.519 foundational concepts can actually coexist? I 00:06:48.519 --> 00:06:50.420 think they have to coexist. I mean, there's, 00:06:50.420 --> 00:06:55.120 there's clearly potential trade offs. Obviously, 00:06:55.259 --> 00:06:58.439 if I read if I get an order to read somebody's 00:06:58.439 --> 00:07:02.139 emails, that person has lost privacy to to the 00:07:02.139 --> 00:07:05.759 government. But that's where you have the internal 00:07:05.759 --> 00:07:10.100 and external checks and balances. So the way 00:07:10.100 --> 00:07:12.279 I think about it, and I've done a lot of work 00:07:12.279 --> 00:07:16.399 with other countries as well and spoken to different 00:07:16.399 --> 00:07:18.220 oversight entities from around the world and 00:07:18.220 --> 00:07:21.149 how they think about. This balance that has to 00:07:21.149 --> 00:07:23.589 be achieved between national security and protecting 00:07:23.589 --> 00:07:27.230 people's privacy. The way I think of it is that 00:07:27.230 --> 00:07:30.129 a legal framework in a democracy has to do two 00:07:30.129 --> 00:07:33.589 things simultaneously and equally well. The legal 00:07:33.589 --> 00:07:35.850 framework has to authorize the intelligence agencies 00:07:35.850 --> 00:07:38.629 to do things to protect national security. What 00:07:38.629 --> 00:07:40.949 kinds of things? It typically is intrusive things. 00:07:41.410 --> 00:07:45.329 And it also are intrusive measures that are taken 00:07:45.329 --> 00:07:47.470 in secret, because if it's fully transparent, 00:07:47.689 --> 00:07:50.259 then the. targets the bad guys will know what 00:07:50.259 --> 00:07:51.939 you're doing and we'll try to avoid it right 00:07:51.939 --> 00:07:54.720 so um the way i put it is that a fully in effect 00:07:54.720 --> 00:07:57.240 a fully transparent intelligence service would 00:07:57.240 --> 00:08:00.639 be fully ineffective um so you're doing secret 00:08:00.639 --> 00:08:02.839 intrusive things and at the same time that legal 00:08:02.839 --> 00:08:04.899 framework has to constrain the agencies from 00:08:04.899 --> 00:08:07.360 going too far it has to do both and so it's really 00:08:07.360 --> 00:08:10.160 it's really finding that way to do both and and 00:08:10.160 --> 00:08:11.920 the other thing i would say is i remember early 00:08:11.920 --> 00:08:14.300 on in my tenure we there were a lot of arguments 00:08:14.300 --> 00:08:17.040 about the balance metaphor like is this Is this 00:08:17.040 --> 00:08:19.019 the balance? Which one outweighs the other? And 00:08:19.019 --> 00:08:21.800 I was always a proponent of saying that the balance, 00:08:21.939 --> 00:08:24.819 the goal is to keep the scale balanced, right? 00:08:24.899 --> 00:08:28.139 You want to do things on the national security 00:08:28.139 --> 00:08:30.300 side of the scale, but you have to counterbalance 00:08:30.300 --> 00:08:32.720 it with things on the civil liberties protection 00:08:32.720 --> 00:08:35.500 side of the scale, including, you know, cutting 00:08:35.500 --> 00:08:37.460 back on some national security measures that 00:08:37.460 --> 00:08:42.480 aren't really necessary. So that's been my... 00:08:42.860 --> 00:08:45.559 The metaphor that I've always felt comfortable 00:08:45.559 --> 00:08:47.899 with, but now with so many changes in the way 00:08:47.899 --> 00:08:49.779 technology moves so quickly and world events 00:08:49.779 --> 00:08:53.120 change and policies change and people change, 00:08:53.980 --> 00:08:57.940 I've really come to feel like it's always going 00:08:57.940 --> 00:09:01.600 to be dynamic. It's not static. You never achieve 00:09:01.600 --> 00:09:04.639 a balance and say, we're done. As the world changes, 00:09:04.799 --> 00:09:06.879 as things change, you have to adjust, and it's 00:09:06.879 --> 00:09:09.539 always going to be shifting in a constant dynamic 00:09:09.539 --> 00:09:12.710 motion, and that's okay. So there will be periods 00:09:12.710 --> 00:09:14.710 where things seem to be out of balance, but as 00:09:14.710 --> 00:09:17.450 long as the system is trying to correct it, it's 00:09:17.450 --> 00:09:20.029 always correcting and trying to find that balance. 00:09:20.389 --> 00:09:24.549 That's the key. Makes complete sense. And actually, 00:09:24.710 --> 00:09:27.490 as we continue this conversation, I want to talk 00:09:27.490 --> 00:09:30.169 a little more with you about the civil liberties 00:09:30.169 --> 00:09:32.929 component of that. We'll talk a lot about privacy. 00:09:33.639 --> 00:09:36.620 But again, given the moment that we're in, there 00:09:36.620 --> 00:09:39.919 have been lots of discussion and questions and 00:09:39.919 --> 00:09:42.879 ultimately litigation over the intersection of 00:09:42.879 --> 00:09:45.899 national security and civil liberties. But for 00:09:45.899 --> 00:09:49.960 folks that don't really understand sort of the 00:09:49.960 --> 00:09:53.259 legal framework around these issues, one of the 00:09:53.259 --> 00:09:56.539 obviously foundational statutes in this area 00:09:56.539 --> 00:09:58.950 is the Privacy Act. And so I was wondering if 00:09:58.950 --> 00:10:01.269 you could kind of give our listeners just a basic 00:10:01.269 --> 00:10:03.690 description of, you know, what is the Privacy 00:10:03.690 --> 00:10:06.049 Act and what is it designed, what and who is 00:10:06.049 --> 00:10:08.590 it designed to protect? Yeah, the Privacy Act 00:10:08.590 --> 00:10:10.669 is an amazing statute. I think a lot of people 00:10:10.669 --> 00:10:13.570 feel like it's outdated and needs to be amended. 00:10:13.769 --> 00:10:16.789 And I certainly would agree that it could use 00:10:16.789 --> 00:10:19.389 a refresher, a refresher. But it was enacted 00:10:19.389 --> 00:10:22.389 in 1974. So sort of we were in the middle of 00:10:22.389 --> 00:10:25.509 press disclosures about, you know, Watergate 00:10:25.509 --> 00:10:28.250 and about, you know. Press reporting was already 00:10:28.250 --> 00:10:30.169 coming out about some of the intelligence abuses 00:10:30.169 --> 00:10:34.629 in the early 70s and the 60s. And so in response 00:10:34.629 --> 00:10:37.350 to that, Congress and then on top of that, there 00:10:37.350 --> 00:10:42.009 was a landmark report by the Department of Health, 00:10:42.049 --> 00:10:44.809 Education and Welfare of all departments that 00:10:44.809 --> 00:10:47.610 was very concerned about the centralization of 00:10:47.610 --> 00:10:50.610 data of Americans in these large, big mainframe 00:10:50.610 --> 00:10:54.009 computers that governments were operating to 00:10:54.009 --> 00:10:57.070 process people's information. And so out of that 00:10:57.070 --> 00:10:59.690 report, that was sort of raising the alarm about 00:10:59.690 --> 00:11:03.850 the power of these 1970s era mainframe computers. 00:11:04.389 --> 00:11:08.470 And the notion that you have all of this centralized 00:11:08.470 --> 00:11:12.289 data that is being accessed and processed by 00:11:12.289 --> 00:11:16.009 government technocratic experts who may be separated 00:11:16.009 --> 00:11:19.309 from the people that the data pertains to and 00:11:19.309 --> 00:11:22.350 aren't focused on the rights of those individuals, 00:11:22.470 --> 00:11:28.250 but are focused on the... whatever the modality 00:11:28.250 --> 00:11:30.909 was at that time to process computer information, 00:11:31.350 --> 00:11:36.509 the report came out and recommended a series 00:11:36.509 --> 00:11:38.730 of what we, of course, as you well know, Peter, 00:11:38.730 --> 00:11:40.750 called the fair information practice principles. 00:11:40.870 --> 00:11:43.649 This idea that people should know what the government 00:11:43.649 --> 00:11:46.330 has on them and should be able to access that 00:11:46.330 --> 00:11:50.029 information and correct it if necessary or ask 00:11:50.029 --> 00:11:53.009 that it be removed if it wasn't collected in 00:11:53.009 --> 00:11:55.789 an appropriate way. And the idea that the information 00:11:55.789 --> 00:11:59.570 should be used in general for the purpose that 00:11:59.570 --> 00:12:01.909 the agency had when it collected the information. 00:12:02.090 --> 00:12:04.470 So if it goes, if I interact with an agency and 00:12:04.470 --> 00:12:06.129 it says fill out this form because we need it 00:12:06.129 --> 00:12:08.730 to process for Social Security benefits, well, 00:12:08.769 --> 00:12:10.590 then my expectation is that that's exactly what 00:12:10.590 --> 00:12:14.350 the agency will do. So those concepts were embodied 00:12:14.350 --> 00:12:16.990 in a messy way, like it's in a very technical 00:12:16.990 --> 00:12:21.990 way in the Privacy Act of 1974. And the Privacy 00:12:21.990 --> 00:12:25.860 Act applies. government -wide. There are exemptions 00:12:25.860 --> 00:12:28.980 from certain of the provisions to deal with classified 00:12:28.980 --> 00:12:31.220 information and with national security and law 00:12:31.220 --> 00:12:33.879 enforcement. So that's clear. Like, you can't 00:12:33.879 --> 00:12:36.059 have a terrorist submit a request to the CIA 00:12:36.059 --> 00:12:39.139 and say, give me access to my file, right? So 00:12:39.139 --> 00:12:41.700 the CIA is going to say, we can neither confirm 00:12:41.700 --> 00:12:44.899 nor deny that we have anything on you. Properly 00:12:44.899 --> 00:12:47.399 so. So there are exceptions to the Privacy Act, 00:12:47.500 --> 00:12:51.080 but I think, and it's a complicated statute, 00:12:51.200 --> 00:12:54.960 but I would say at its core, it does A few things. 00:12:55.059 --> 00:12:59.519 One is it requires agencies to publish the systems 00:12:59.519 --> 00:13:02.919 of records, the databases that they have about 00:13:02.919 --> 00:13:06.580 Americans. And so that comes out in what is called 00:13:06.580 --> 00:13:10.039 a system of records notice. And it requires them 00:13:10.039 --> 00:13:12.879 to receive and process requests for access to 00:13:12.879 --> 00:13:17.480 agency records from the individuals who are covered 00:13:17.480 --> 00:13:21.279 by those records. So if I go to the Social Security 00:13:21.279 --> 00:13:23.620 Administration, I want to see my... the information 00:13:23.620 --> 00:13:26.559 they have on me i'm entitled to do that under 00:13:26.559 --> 00:13:28.980 the privacy act and they are obligated to respond 00:13:28.980 --> 00:13:32.059 so once you have these records on americans you 00:13:32.059 --> 00:13:34.059 have to publish a notice and you have to have 00:13:34.059 --> 00:13:36.419 a process by which they can access the information 00:13:36.419 --> 00:13:39.320 and the other main thing it does is that it requires 00:13:39.320 --> 00:13:43.419 in a in this same public notice that they explain 00:13:43.419 --> 00:13:46.460 what they're using the information for and who 00:13:46.460 --> 00:13:49.379 has access to it so you know as you know peter 00:13:49.919 --> 00:13:52.500 Those are called routine uses, like what is the 00:13:52.500 --> 00:13:55.679 routine use for this data? And that's important 00:13:55.679 --> 00:13:58.980 because in those routine uses, there will be 00:13:58.980 --> 00:14:01.879 either, you know, they will explain to what extent 00:14:01.879 --> 00:14:04.700 they are disclosing the data. They are sharing 00:14:04.700 --> 00:14:08.500 the data with other agencies. And it also limits 00:14:08.500 --> 00:14:11.480 the ability of agency employees to access the 00:14:11.480 --> 00:14:14.440 data. That same agency, those employees must 00:14:14.440 --> 00:14:18.200 have. a need to know to access the data so it's 00:14:18.200 --> 00:14:20.399 not like once the agency has the data it's freely 00:14:20.399 --> 00:14:22.899 available to everybody it's still tightly controlled 00:14:22.899 --> 00:14:28.320 and regulated and documented and audited but 00:14:28.320 --> 00:14:29.919 i think the privacy act continues to serve an 00:14:29.919 --> 00:14:32.460 important purpose it's comprehensive you know 00:14:32.460 --> 00:14:35.179 we we often criticize including myself the united 00:14:35.179 --> 00:14:37.440 states for not having a comprehensive privacy 00:14:37.440 --> 00:14:43.159 law and uh we all should should should modify 00:14:43.159 --> 00:14:45.039 that we don't have a comprehensive privacy law 00:14:45.039 --> 00:14:47.299 that applies to the private sector to the commercial 00:14:47.299 --> 00:14:50.220 sector we do have a comprehensive privacy law 00:14:50.220 --> 00:14:51.799 that applies to the federal government and we 00:14:51.799 --> 00:14:53.580 were way ahead of the rest of the world in that 00:14:53.580 --> 00:14:58.500 going back to 1974 so it's interesting because 00:14:58.500 --> 00:15:01.840 i think there's a lot of um parallels between 00:15:01.840 --> 00:15:06.279 1974 and the health education and welfare you 00:15:06.279 --> 00:15:08.279 know commission or committee that was established 00:15:08.279 --> 00:15:11.480 that looked at you know sort of this aggregation 00:15:11.769 --> 00:15:14.929 of data and here we are more than 50 years later 00:15:14.929 --> 00:15:17.889 and we're again talking about you know the issues 00:15:17.889 --> 00:15:21.009 surrounding aggregation of data you know dating 00:15:21.009 --> 00:15:22.629 back to the beginning of this administration 00:15:22.629 --> 00:15:26.070 with doge and you know collecting social security 00:15:26.070 --> 00:15:29.090 data and sharing it with other agencies and then 00:15:29.090 --> 00:15:31.649 questions about whether that data was also going 00:15:31.649 --> 00:15:34.750 to private entities whether that be basex or 00:15:34.750 --> 00:15:38.049 companies like palantir um and so i guess you 00:15:38.049 --> 00:15:39.830 know you alluded to it a little bit in your previous 00:15:39.830 --> 00:15:42.679 response but You know, for the, you know, again, 00:15:42.759 --> 00:15:44.740 the person that might not be as familiar with 00:15:44.740 --> 00:15:47.360 these issues, what's the problem with agency 00:15:47.360 --> 00:15:51.600 sharing information? Why in a world, you know, 00:15:51.600 --> 00:15:55.399 for example, post, you know, 9 -11, where, you 00:15:55.399 --> 00:15:58.440 know, some of the criticism was, you know, siloing 00:15:58.440 --> 00:16:01.740 of information between agencies and how that 00:16:01.740 --> 00:16:04.139 created vulnerabilities. You know, why should 00:16:04.139 --> 00:16:07.080 we be so concerned with that now? Yeah, I'm glad 00:16:07.080 --> 00:16:11.019 you brought up the 9 -11. example, just as a 00:16:11.019 --> 00:16:14.620 matter of history there in terms of what we did 00:16:14.620 --> 00:16:17.799 in that post -9 -11 period. So you're right that 00:16:17.799 --> 00:16:20.659 a huge issue was the need to share information. 00:16:21.580 --> 00:16:25.519 And the concern was that the 9 -11 Commission's 00:16:25.519 --> 00:16:28.340 concern and what the report said was that the 00:16:28.340 --> 00:16:31.460 federal government had failed to connect the 00:16:31.460 --> 00:16:34.419 dots. So this idea that there are pieces of information 00:16:34.419 --> 00:16:37.450 in different databases that if combined would 00:16:37.450 --> 00:16:40.230 show the picture. Like, you know, you would see 00:16:40.230 --> 00:16:42.669 what the terrorist plot is if you were able to 00:16:42.669 --> 00:16:45.110 connect all the disparate pieces of data in different 00:16:45.110 --> 00:16:47.769 databases. It's very powerful, and it's still 00:16:47.769 --> 00:16:51.570 a concern. Like, you want to be able to make 00:16:51.570 --> 00:16:54.690 sure that the relevant information is accessible 00:16:54.690 --> 00:16:56.769 by the people who are charged with the mission 00:16:56.769 --> 00:16:59.750 of protecting national security. So DHS was always 00:16:59.750 --> 00:17:01.850 a big part of that because of the information 00:17:01.850 --> 00:17:04.950 that DHS had, and DHS was created after 9 -11. 00:17:06.160 --> 00:17:11.559 But at the same time, the concern in the United 00:17:11.559 --> 00:17:14.099 States has always been with the creation of a 00:17:14.099 --> 00:17:17.920 huge centralized database of Americans. And part 00:17:17.920 --> 00:17:20.160 of the concern is that that would give people 00:17:20.160 --> 00:17:22.940 with access to the database enormous power, like 00:17:22.940 --> 00:17:27.019 the potential for abuse and misuse would have 00:17:27.019 --> 00:17:31.359 a huge impact on how people carried out their 00:17:31.359 --> 00:17:34.099 daily activities. That's coming at it from one 00:17:34.099 --> 00:17:39.059 end is like, do we want a huge database where 00:17:39.059 --> 00:17:43.920 everybody's records are all centralized and accessible 00:17:43.920 --> 00:17:46.400 to some cadre of analysts? And this is exactly 00:17:46.400 --> 00:17:49.700 the concern that HEW, that that report was raising, 00:17:49.759 --> 00:17:51.859 came up with the fair information practice principles 00:17:51.859 --> 00:17:54.420 to deal with it. So coming at it from a different 00:17:54.420 --> 00:17:57.240 direction, it's this idea that if you interact 00:17:57.240 --> 00:18:00.079 with a government agency and they tell you to 00:18:00.079 --> 00:18:02.710 fill out a form for a particular purpose. Your 00:18:02.710 --> 00:18:04.589 expectation is that your information will be 00:18:04.589 --> 00:18:07.710 used for that purpose. If you had known something 00:18:07.710 --> 00:18:09.710 different, you may not have applied. You may 00:18:09.710 --> 00:18:11.930 not have provided your information. So it's this 00:18:11.930 --> 00:18:17.309 idea that people expect certain things when dealing 00:18:17.309 --> 00:18:19.349 with an agency to be able to go to that agency 00:18:19.349 --> 00:18:22.190 for benefits. They don't expect that agency to 00:18:22.190 --> 00:18:25.150 then make their information public, to provide 00:18:25.150 --> 00:18:28.150 it to all kinds of agencies that may have different 00:18:28.150 --> 00:18:32.220 equities and a different approach. And that's 00:18:32.220 --> 00:18:37.319 where this idea of the requirement that if you 00:18:37.319 --> 00:18:39.500 share it with another agency, it be for a compatible 00:18:39.500 --> 00:18:42.539 purpose, that the purpose be compatible with 00:18:42.539 --> 00:18:46.579 the purpose that you told the individual about 00:18:46.579 --> 00:18:49.119 when you were originally collecting that information. 00:18:49.160 --> 00:18:52.059 And I think that's a key protection. Now, it's 00:18:52.059 --> 00:18:54.720 true that people talk about the Privacy Act as 00:18:54.720 --> 00:18:58.980 being old fashioned. And what it did was it operates 00:18:58.980 --> 00:19:01.359 in silos. Each department or agency is in its 00:19:01.359 --> 00:19:04.380 own silo. Right. And naturally, that's going 00:19:04.380 --> 00:19:07.240 to create information sharing issues. And is 00:19:07.240 --> 00:19:09.619 that really the way technology works? And aren't 00:19:09.619 --> 00:19:11.819 there other better ways of protecting privacy 00:19:11.819 --> 00:19:14.359 than sort of having an agency keep their information 00:19:14.359 --> 00:19:17.849 in the silo? and then go through a laborious 00:19:17.849 --> 00:19:19.990 process under the Privacy Act to share information 00:19:19.990 --> 00:19:23.869 with other agencies. And there probably are more 00:19:23.869 --> 00:19:26.109 modern ways of thinking about how to do that 00:19:26.109 --> 00:19:28.089 more effectively, but you would still need to 00:19:28.089 --> 00:19:30.890 protect people's privacy and respect some of 00:19:30.890 --> 00:19:33.230 the original expectations. I'll just say one 00:19:33.230 --> 00:19:35.769 last thing is that so post 9 -11, we were really 00:19:35.769 --> 00:19:38.109 focused on connecting dots. We were really focused 00:19:38.109 --> 00:19:42.369 on making sure the agencies operated. more cohesively 00:19:42.369 --> 00:19:44.849 not only inside the intelligence community but 00:19:44.849 --> 00:19:47.509 also with other departments and agencies in the 00:19:47.509 --> 00:19:49.750 federal government with state and local law enforcement 00:19:49.750 --> 00:19:51.910 with foreign partners with the private sector 00:19:51.910 --> 00:19:55.289 the idea was we we wanted to connect dots but 00:19:55.289 --> 00:19:58.190 we went through enormous trouble to make sure 00:19:58.190 --> 00:20:00.250 we complied with the privacy act to make sure 00:20:00.250 --> 00:20:03.890 that the agency's routine uses supported the 00:20:03.890 --> 00:20:06.230 sharing or if they needed a new routine use if 00:20:06.230 --> 00:20:08.859 they needed to explain how they were now going 00:20:08.859 --> 00:20:10.799 to be sharing terrorism -related information 00:20:10.799 --> 00:20:14.380 with the intelligence community, that they went 00:20:14.380 --> 00:20:16.240 through an analysis to make sure that that was 00:20:16.240 --> 00:20:19.160 lawful under the Privacy Act. So there was no 00:20:19.160 --> 00:20:22.579 effort by the president or by any department 00:20:22.579 --> 00:20:24.579 or agency that I'm aware of to simply ignore, 00:20:24.799 --> 00:20:27.680 override, or supersede those protections. It 00:20:27.680 --> 00:20:29.980 was really a matter of how do we work within 00:20:29.980 --> 00:20:31.839 the Privacy Act and with other laws. There's 00:20:31.839 --> 00:20:34.599 a lot of other rules and restrictions that are 00:20:34.599 --> 00:20:36.640 intended to protect privacy. How do we act within 00:20:36.640 --> 00:20:39.619 those constraints? to share information better 00:20:39.619 --> 00:20:42.740 so that we can prevent another terrorist attack. 00:20:43.640 --> 00:20:47.539 So with that as a backdrop, and again, comparing 00:20:47.539 --> 00:20:51.099 it to the present moment, it seems almost as 00:20:51.099 --> 00:20:55.519 though the aggregation of data is almost being 00:20:55.519 --> 00:20:59.539 used as a threat to American citizens. It's almost 00:20:59.539 --> 00:21:05.380 like a cudgel to say, hey, be careful. You shouldn't 00:21:05.380 --> 00:21:09.950 make... statements that are contrary to the mission 00:21:09.950 --> 00:21:13.490 of an agency like dhs for example or you know 00:21:13.490 --> 00:21:15.890 we're gonna you know track that activity you 00:21:15.890 --> 00:21:18.789 know there's been talk of you know a database 00:21:18.789 --> 00:21:21.450 of first amendment protesters you know people 00:21:21.450 --> 00:21:25.130 protesting against ice for example um and so 00:21:25.130 --> 00:21:27.910 i'm kind of wondering if i could get your you 00:21:27.910 --> 00:21:31.190 know reaction to you know that use of information 00:21:31.190 --> 00:21:34.569 collection and then you know sort of on the opposite 00:21:34.569 --> 00:21:36.569 end of the spectrum you know one of the things 00:21:36.569 --> 00:21:41.470 that i think is always uh you know attention 00:21:41.470 --> 00:21:44.490 or requiring a balancing and you've alluded to 00:21:44.490 --> 00:21:47.049 it in this conversation is that balance between 00:21:47.049 --> 00:21:50.470 national security and transparency and so you 00:21:50.470 --> 00:21:53.519 know Given that kind of maelstrom of a moment 00:21:53.519 --> 00:21:56.220 that we're in, how do you kind of unpack those 00:21:56.220 --> 00:21:59.119 issues in a way that makes sense to someone, 00:21:59.240 --> 00:22:01.740 you know, unlike us, that doesn't live this every 00:22:01.740 --> 00:22:06.220 day? Right. And you sent me links to a couple 00:22:06.220 --> 00:22:08.839 of the articles that you're alluding to. And 00:22:08.839 --> 00:22:10.920 I'm not I haven't studied those specific issues, 00:22:11.140 --> 00:22:14.019 but I will say that generally speaking, what 00:22:14.019 --> 00:22:17.400 those articles are talking about is whether. 00:22:18.509 --> 00:22:20.650 So there's two sets of issues. Let me just sort 00:22:20.650 --> 00:22:23.089 of unpack it a little bit. So one is one is the 00:22:23.089 --> 00:22:26.009 right of people to peacefully protest. Right. 00:22:26.069 --> 00:22:31.289 And so, as you well know, the First Amendment 00:22:31.289 --> 00:22:34.190 is one of the most fiercely protected rights 00:22:34.190 --> 00:22:37.630 in our democracy in terms of the right of speech, 00:22:37.910 --> 00:22:41.089 petition for grievances, freedom of assembly, 00:22:41.369 --> 00:22:43.869 freedom of religion, freedom of the press. So 00:22:43.869 --> 00:22:46.930 those are extremely important fundamental rights. 00:22:47.930 --> 00:22:51.089 In the 1970s, during the Church Committee hearings, 00:22:51.210 --> 00:22:53.750 as you know, with Senator Frank Church, one of 00:22:53.750 --> 00:22:56.329 the main concerns that came out of that was that 00:22:56.329 --> 00:22:58.630 given all the turmoil in the 60s and 70s, we 00:22:58.630 --> 00:23:01.049 had, you know, the Vietnam War protests going 00:23:01.049 --> 00:23:04.170 on. We had there were domestic terrorist incidents 00:23:04.170 --> 00:23:06.690 back in the 1970s with the weather underground 00:23:06.690 --> 00:23:09.890 and things like that. There were it was a time 00:23:09.890 --> 00:23:12.690 of enormous turmoil and civil rights movement 00:23:12.690 --> 00:23:16.359 and marchers getting attacked, you know. by protesters, 00:23:16.700 --> 00:23:20.380 counter -protesters. And so it was a time of 00:23:20.380 --> 00:23:22.619 great turmoil. And even in that time of turmoil, 00:23:22.940 --> 00:23:27.599 coming out of that was a reinforced concern for 00:23:27.599 --> 00:23:30.680 protecting the First Amendment rights of Americans. 00:23:31.019 --> 00:23:33.980 And one of the big issues that came out of those 00:23:33.980 --> 00:23:37.500 hearings was that intelligence agencies seem 00:23:37.500 --> 00:23:41.039 to have been turning their focus inward toward 00:23:41.039 --> 00:23:45.500 those protesters in ways that would chill and 00:23:45.500 --> 00:23:49.160 restrict their abilities to exercise their First 00:23:49.160 --> 00:23:51.420 Amendment rights. And so the court spoke up about 00:23:51.420 --> 00:23:53.920 that. There's a famous case called the Keith 00:23:53.920 --> 00:23:58.400 case that is exactly about those concerns. Coming 00:23:58.400 --> 00:24:01.819 out of the church committee hearings, President 00:24:01.819 --> 00:24:04.200 Ford issued an executive order, which was then 00:24:04.200 --> 00:24:07.759 reissued, superseded by one that President Carter 00:24:07.759 --> 00:24:10.240 issued. And then President Reagan superseded 00:24:10.240 --> 00:24:12.640 Carter's with what we now know as Executive Order 00:24:12.640 --> 00:24:15.650 12333. And then we also mentioned the Privacy 00:24:15.650 --> 00:24:19.430 Act previously. Those were designed in part to 00:24:19.430 --> 00:24:23.869 constrain the government from essentially conducting 00:24:23.869 --> 00:24:27.230 domestic surveillance on its own people in a 00:24:27.230 --> 00:24:29.869 way that would constrain their freedoms and their 00:24:29.869 --> 00:24:32.269 rights. And as you know, the Privacy Act has 00:24:32.269 --> 00:24:34.650 a provision that says that you cannot maintain 00:24:34.650 --> 00:24:38.369 a record of an American based solely on their 00:24:38.369 --> 00:24:42.150 exercise of First Amendment rights. And so the 00:24:42.150 --> 00:24:46.240 idea that. that the government would be looking 00:24:46.240 --> 00:24:50.079 at everybody who goes to a protest is, I think, 00:24:50.079 --> 00:24:53.099 a huge issue given that history and given the 00:24:53.099 --> 00:24:55.720 intent of those rules. The other thing I'll say, 00:24:55.900 --> 00:24:58.160 you know, obviously, if there is violence, if 00:24:58.160 --> 00:25:01.680 there is unlawful conduct, if there's criminality, 00:25:01.799 --> 00:25:05.420 be it in a protest or anything else, then yes, 00:25:05.460 --> 00:25:07.599 that would be a legitimate reason for looking 00:25:07.599 --> 00:25:11.140 at somebody. Now, that's sort of on the First 00:25:11.140 --> 00:25:13.579 Amendment side. There's the aggregation of data 00:25:13.579 --> 00:25:16.259 side, which doesn't necessarily have to do with 00:25:16.259 --> 00:25:18.319 the First Amendment. It could, you know, in the 00:25:18.319 --> 00:25:20.880 situation you posit, if they're looking up all 00:25:20.880 --> 00:25:23.420 the protesters in a large centralized database 00:25:23.420 --> 00:25:26.339 to try to find something on them that they can 00:25:26.339 --> 00:25:31.059 use to get people in trouble that they don't 00:25:31.059 --> 00:25:34.400 want to be out there protesting, you know, so 00:25:34.400 --> 00:25:36.480 they're going to find information in federal 00:25:36.480 --> 00:25:40.299 databases to use. against them, and again, I 00:25:40.299 --> 00:25:42.039 haven't been following that specific issue, so 00:25:42.039 --> 00:25:44.400 I don't know, then of course that's a concern 00:25:44.400 --> 00:25:46.839 as well. And that would be an inappropriate use 00:25:46.839 --> 00:25:52.900 of access to those databases. So in other words, 00:25:52.900 --> 00:25:55.480 what is commonly thought of as phishing expeditions. 00:25:55.500 --> 00:25:58.599 Again, if you have a specific articulable reason 00:25:58.599 --> 00:26:01.440 under the law for looking at somebody, for example, 00:26:01.579 --> 00:26:03.880 commissioned of a violent act or planning a criminal 00:26:03.880 --> 00:26:07.059 act, then that would be a valid reason to look 00:26:07.059 --> 00:26:11.970 it up. So I think, you know, as I hear you, you 00:26:11.970 --> 00:26:13.690 know, one of the things that I, you know, that 00:26:13.690 --> 00:26:17.130 comes to mind immediately is, you know, public 00:26:17.130 --> 00:26:20.430 efficacy in our, you know, national security 00:26:20.430 --> 00:26:24.210 and intelligence activities. And if the belief 00:26:24.210 --> 00:26:27.670 is that, oh, you know, the government might use, 00:26:27.710 --> 00:26:30.849 you know, the information that it collects, you 00:26:30.849 --> 00:26:33.269 know, in a way that seems inconsistent with. 00:26:33.720 --> 00:26:35.220 You know, whether it's the First Amendment or 00:26:35.220 --> 00:26:37.920 the Privacy Act or other civil liberties and 00:26:37.920 --> 00:26:41.279 privacy protections, you know, maybe that diminishes 00:26:41.279 --> 00:26:44.259 the overall confidence in the national security 00:26:44.259 --> 00:26:47.859 enterprise. And so I'm also wondering, you know, 00:26:47.880 --> 00:26:50.539 as sort of an offshoot of that, you know, how 00:26:50.539 --> 00:26:53.460 do you see the impact or, you know, I guess the 00:26:53.460 --> 00:26:55.880 presence or lack thereof of transparency sort 00:26:55.880 --> 00:26:58.359 of in that, you know, question of public efficacy? 00:26:58.740 --> 00:27:00.900 I mean, particularly when you think about members 00:27:00.900 --> 00:27:03.759 of the intelligence community. like NSA that 00:27:03.759 --> 00:27:06.519 used to be called no such agency. So, you know, 00:27:06.519 --> 00:27:09.359 how do you how do you see that? Yeah. So one 00:27:09.359 --> 00:27:11.960 of the as you pointed out when you were going 00:27:11.960 --> 00:27:14.579 over my bio, one of my titles when I was in the 00:27:14.579 --> 00:27:16.799 government was chief transparency officer for 00:27:16.799 --> 00:27:19.819 the director of national intelligence. So transparency 00:27:19.819 --> 00:27:22.559 was a big push of ours following the Snowden 00:27:22.559 --> 00:27:26.279 disclosures. I had always wanted more transparency 00:27:26.279 --> 00:27:29.240 because I felt. It was very difficult to get 00:27:29.240 --> 00:27:31.380 public trust to get one to get one of your issues 00:27:31.380 --> 00:27:33.359 if you couldn't explain to the public what it 00:27:33.359 --> 00:27:35.059 was that we were doing and how you were doing 00:27:35.059 --> 00:27:38.420 it. So I had always felt that that that frustration 00:27:38.420 --> 00:27:41.140 and not being able to explain how our rules work 00:27:41.140 --> 00:27:43.880 and not only make them public, but sometimes, 00:27:43.940 --> 00:27:46.059 you know, several sets of rules at the time were 00:27:46.059 --> 00:27:50.180 public, not not nearly as many as are now. But 00:27:50.180 --> 00:27:53.940 not only making the document public, but explaining 00:27:53.940 --> 00:27:57.190 it. Right. So making sure you've met. with people 00:27:57.190 --> 00:27:59.549 and went over it and made sure they understood 00:27:59.549 --> 00:28:01.869 it, or you put information out there that explained 00:28:01.869 --> 00:28:05.150 it more clearly. So following the Snowden disclosures, 00:28:05.150 --> 00:28:08.670 even though I had been quite proud of our framework 00:28:08.670 --> 00:28:10.789 for protecting privacy and civil liberties, it 00:28:10.789 --> 00:28:14.490 was always secret. A large part of it was classified 00:28:14.490 --> 00:28:16.450 and not available to the public. And then after 00:28:16.450 --> 00:28:18.529 the Snowden disclosures, we realized, well, we 00:28:18.529 --> 00:28:21.750 really need to make a stronger push. So coming 00:28:21.750 --> 00:28:23.269 out of that, the intelligence community committed 00:28:23.269 --> 00:28:26.640 to what is still in effect and it's still posted 00:28:26.640 --> 00:28:28.819 on the dni website the principles of intelligence 00:28:28.819 --> 00:28:31.519 transparency uh for the intelligence community 00:28:31.519 --> 00:28:34.299 and these were organizing principles to make 00:28:34.299 --> 00:28:36.940 sure that the agencies were able to lean into 00:28:36.940 --> 00:28:39.240 providing more information to the public about 00:28:39.240 --> 00:28:42.299 how what their authorities were how they interpreted 00:28:42.299 --> 00:28:44.359 them how they used them what their compliance 00:28:44.359 --> 00:28:46.140 with those authorities looked like what were 00:28:46.140 --> 00:28:48.779 the compliance incidents and also how the intelligence 00:28:48.779 --> 00:28:51.619 community operates how it does its job and uh 00:28:51.619 --> 00:28:55.009 that became you know a cause for me. That was 00:28:55.009 --> 00:28:57.430 something that I really championed and felt very 00:28:57.430 --> 00:29:01.670 deeply about the importance of that. And we would 00:29:01.670 --> 00:29:04.829 meet with advocates, including organizations 00:29:04.829 --> 00:29:08.329 that were suing us. And I know that DHS was able 00:29:08.329 --> 00:29:10.210 to do that much more. I know that your former 00:29:10.210 --> 00:29:15.730 office had great relationships with... advocacy 00:29:15.730 --> 00:29:19.470 groups. Absolutely. You know, super important 00:29:19.470 --> 00:29:21.690 just to have those relationships. And I think 00:29:21.690 --> 00:29:23.650 if in the absence of that, if you don't have 00:29:23.650 --> 00:29:25.849 transparency, then people are naturally suspicious. 00:29:25.890 --> 00:29:29.250 And it's a way of figuring out, well, you know, 00:29:29.269 --> 00:29:30.869 you've mentioned these stories about databases. 00:29:31.089 --> 00:29:33.009 Well, what are the databases? What are they doing 00:29:33.009 --> 00:29:35.130 with the data? You know, the more transparent 00:29:35.130 --> 00:29:38.950 you are, the better. The way I would put it is 00:29:38.950 --> 00:29:41.309 that if I'm proud, we should feel be proud of 00:29:41.309 --> 00:29:43.549 what we're doing. And unless there's a reason 00:29:43.549 --> 00:29:45.490 to keep it hidden, for example, classified information 00:29:45.490 --> 00:29:48.890 sources and methods, you know, a lot of active 00:29:48.890 --> 00:29:50.890 law enforcement litigation. There are clearly 00:29:50.890 --> 00:29:53.630 reasons, a lot of reasons to keep a lot of information, 00:29:53.769 --> 00:29:56.130 a lot of detailed information secret. But generally 00:29:56.130 --> 00:29:58.390 speaking, what you know, what we what we're doing 00:29:58.390 --> 00:30:01.670 with data, how are we collecting it in general? 00:30:01.809 --> 00:30:04.769 What are the protections? You should be proud 00:30:04.769 --> 00:30:07.849 of what you're doing and there should be no embarrassment 00:30:07.849 --> 00:30:10.230 in explaining it and what you're what you're. 00:30:10.519 --> 00:30:13.480 what you are keeping secret are things that could 00:30:13.480 --> 00:30:16.619 hamper operations, but you're not, you're not 00:30:16.619 --> 00:30:18.359 even tempted to keep something secret because 00:30:18.359 --> 00:30:20.559 you're embarrassed about it. Right. If you are 00:30:20.559 --> 00:30:22.680 embarrassed about something, fix it, like do 00:30:22.680 --> 00:30:26.119 something about it, fix it. So you're not embarrassed 00:30:26.119 --> 00:30:28.940 about it anymore. Right. Or even if you're thinking 00:30:28.940 --> 00:30:32.039 about it in advance, if you can't explain it, 00:30:32.079 --> 00:30:36.380 maybe don't do it. Right. Exactly. Well, you 00:30:36.380 --> 00:30:38.730 know, Alex, you've been so kind and generous 00:30:38.730 --> 00:30:41.230 with your time. You know, I really appreciate 00:30:41.230 --> 00:30:43.490 it. And I hope I know our audience will as well. 00:30:44.250 --> 00:30:46.970 It's been incredibly educational. I feel like 00:30:46.970 --> 00:30:49.250 we could talk about so many more issues in the 00:30:49.250 --> 00:30:51.630 space. And so we'd love to have you back whenever 00:30:51.630 --> 00:30:55.410 time allows. Is there anything that you'd like 00:30:55.410 --> 00:30:57.509 to, you know, tell people, you know, you're working 00:30:57.509 --> 00:30:59.750 on right now? Obviously, you know, we recognize 00:30:59.750 --> 00:31:02.660 the you know privacy across borders initiative 00:31:02.660 --> 00:31:04.819 but um if there's anything else you wanted to 00:31:04.819 --> 00:31:06.859 highlight and then maybe tell folks you know 00:31:06.859 --> 00:31:09.400 where they can find you you know on social media 00:31:09.400 --> 00:31:11.940 or you know elsewhere if they wanted more information 00:31:11.940 --> 00:31:14.859 yeah look for me on linkedin i think that that's 00:31:14.859 --> 00:31:17.519 become the social media platform of choice at 00:31:17.519 --> 00:31:19.680 least for me in terms of professional connections 00:31:19.680 --> 00:31:23.200 um in a couple weeks i'm going to be speaking 00:31:23.200 --> 00:31:25.920 on a couple of panels at the privacy symposium 00:31:25.920 --> 00:31:28.710 in venice so if anyone's going to venice Would 00:31:28.710 --> 00:31:30.549 love to see you there. One of them is on the 00:31:30.549 --> 00:31:34.410 national security and privacy implications of 00:31:34.410 --> 00:31:37.170 commercially available information in the age 00:31:37.170 --> 00:31:39.670 of AI. So we're going to have a really interesting 00:31:39.670 --> 00:31:43.910 panel discussion around this whole concept of 00:31:43.910 --> 00:31:46.829 commercially available information. And if you 00:31:46.829 --> 00:31:51.289 want to email me, my bio on the university website 00:31:51.289 --> 00:31:54.869 has my email address. Excellent. Well, again, 00:31:54.990 --> 00:31:57.089 thank you so much for joining us tonight, Alex. 00:32:14.679 --> 00:32:19.119 Please join us for our next episode so that you 00:32:19.119 --> 00:32:21.940 can stay engaged and stay informed. Remember, 00:32:22.200 --> 00:32:25.099 protecting our democracy isn't a spectator sport. 00:32:25.609 --> 00:32:27.569 This is Peter Mina for the SteadyState Sentinel. 00:32:27.769 --> 00:32:33.029 Still standing watch. Thank you for listening 00:32:33.029 --> 00:32:36.750 to the SteadyState Sentinel podcast. Don't miss 00:32:36.750 --> 00:32:39.829 out on more insights and exposes from America's 00:32:39.829 --> 00:32:43.329 premier global security experts. Also, subscribe 00:32:43.329 --> 00:32:48.410 to our Substack at substack .com slash at SteadyState1 00:32:48.410 --> 00:32:51.529 and follow our social media and join us right 00:32:51.529 --> 00:32:53.250 here next week for another exciting edition. 00:32:54.670 --> 00:32:56.910 The Steady State is a nonprofit organization 00:32:56.910 --> 00:32:59.910 working to sustain our democracy and national 00:32:59.910 --> 00:33:03.690 security. 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