WEBVTT - Generated with AI 00:00:00.200 --> 00:00:03.279 Something is changing in our country, and most 00:00:03.279 --> 00:00:12.660 people feel it before they can explain it. Welcome 00:00:12.660 --> 00:00:15.800 to the Steady State Sentinel. I'm Lauren Anderson. 00:00:16.219 --> 00:00:19.899 I served nearly three decades in the FBI, focused 00:00:19.899 --> 00:00:22.739 on national security in both operational and 00:00:22.739 --> 00:00:25.179 executive leadership roles at home and overseas. 00:00:26.079 --> 00:00:28.699 I now work in geopolitics and governance with 00:00:28.699 --> 00:00:32.399 a focus on institutional integrity. So as we 00:00:32.399 --> 00:00:35.000 get into tonight's episode, if you haven't had 00:00:35.000 --> 00:00:37.600 the opportunity to listen to our recent episode 00:00:37.600 --> 00:00:42.000 on why an apolitical FBI is vital to national 00:00:42.000 --> 00:00:45.439 security, I'd encourage you to do so. It provides 00:00:45.439 --> 00:00:48.439 important context for tonight's conversation. 00:00:49.119 --> 00:00:52.200 And my guest is Phil Gursky, and I am delighted 00:00:52.200 --> 00:00:54.740 Phil is here. He is our first international guest. 00:00:55.719 --> 00:00:59.619 Phil is a former senior strategic analyst with 00:00:59.619 --> 00:01:02.060 the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. He 00:01:02.060 --> 00:01:04.700 is the president of Borealis Threat and Risk 00:01:04.700 --> 00:01:08.439 Consulting and host of the podcast Spies Like 00:01:08.439 --> 00:01:11.159 Us, where I was honored to be a guest late last 00:01:11.159 --> 00:01:14.859 year to talk about the FBI. Phil is the author 00:01:14.859 --> 00:01:17.620 of multiple books on terrorism and intelligence, 00:01:18.019 --> 00:01:21.180 including a forthcoming book marking the 25th 00:01:21.180 --> 00:01:24.459 anniversary of 9 -11. Bill and his colleagues 00:01:24.459 --> 00:01:26.819 hosted me in Ottawa last fall at the Pillar Society, 00:01:26.879 --> 00:01:29.000 and we've had quite a few candid conversations 00:01:29.000 --> 00:01:33.319 since then. We both know that alliances between 00:01:33.319 --> 00:01:35.599 the U .S. and other countries aren't abstract. 00:01:36.200 --> 00:01:38.799 They're built over years, and they can be strengthened 00:01:38.799 --> 00:01:42.400 or weakened by who's in the room and who's no 00:01:42.400 --> 00:01:45.480 longer in the room. Today, we're going to ask 00:01:45.480 --> 00:01:48.599 a hard question during this conversation. When 00:01:48.599 --> 00:01:51.480 America's closest allies look at the United States 00:01:51.480 --> 00:01:54.540 right now, at our institutions, our intelligence 00:01:54.540 --> 00:01:56.780 and law enforcement communities, and our leadership, 00:01:57.040 --> 00:02:00.040 what do they see and what are they assessing? 00:02:00.579 --> 00:02:03.459 So, Phil, I'm delighted that you are with us 00:02:03.459 --> 00:02:06.140 today. And before we get into our present discussion, 00:02:06.359 --> 00:02:08.240 I always love to start and say to everybody, 00:02:08.539 --> 00:02:11.099 what drew you into your work in the first place? 00:02:11.180 --> 00:02:14.050 Why did you want to do this? Well, first and 00:02:14.050 --> 00:02:16.530 foremost, Lauren, thank you so much for inviting 00:02:16.530 --> 00:02:19.810 me on to your podcast. You were a wonderful guest 00:02:19.810 --> 00:02:22.009 here in Ottawa last October. We've got nothing 00:02:22.009 --> 00:02:25.090 but rave reviews for your candor in talking about 00:02:25.090 --> 00:02:27.449 what's happening in your country right now in 00:02:27.449 --> 00:02:29.310 the security, intelligence and law enforcement 00:02:29.310 --> 00:02:31.530 community. We've become friends. We've stayed 00:02:31.530 --> 00:02:35.409 in touch, which is great. You know, life takes 00:02:35.409 --> 00:02:40.740 amazing turns sometimes. I began my career actually 00:02:40.740 --> 00:02:42.780 not with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 00:02:42.939 --> 00:02:45.479 but with Communication Security Establishment, 00:02:45.479 --> 00:02:48.219 or CSE, which is the Canadian Signals Intelligence 00:02:48.219 --> 00:02:51.139 Organization, the equivalent of NSA in your country. 00:02:51.960 --> 00:02:55.439 And a long time ago, decades and decades ago, 00:02:55.580 --> 00:02:58.639 I was at university in my hometown of London, 00:02:58.759 --> 00:03:01.860 Ontario. It was during the early 1980s recession, 00:03:02.020 --> 00:03:04.099 which I'm sure you remember was not a great time 00:03:04.099 --> 00:03:07.439 in the West. Interest rates were through the 00:03:07.439 --> 00:03:09.340 roof. I think my brother once signed a mortgage 00:03:09.340 --> 00:03:13.139 for 22 % on his house. I was an arts graduate 00:03:13.139 --> 00:03:17.520 from Western University and jobs were not plentiful 00:03:17.520 --> 00:03:20.300 at the time. And as somebody who graduated with 00:03:20.300 --> 00:03:23.919 a master's in Spanish, it didn't look good. And 00:03:23.919 --> 00:03:27.280 I was despairing for what to do. I had a part 00:03:27.280 --> 00:03:29.659 -time job at the local YMCA, which kind of put 00:03:29.659 --> 00:03:32.629 me through university. But I decided that, you 00:03:32.629 --> 00:03:34.330 know, staring at wrinkled old men naked in the 00:03:34.330 --> 00:03:36.629 shower for the next 25 years was not going to 00:03:36.629 --> 00:03:39.629 be an excellent career choice. And so I decided 00:03:39.629 --> 00:03:42.590 to look for further work. And lo and behold, 00:03:42.789 --> 00:03:45.210 in the student placement office up on campus, 00:03:45.389 --> 00:03:50.169 there was a very plain, no logo, sort of piece 00:03:50.169 --> 00:03:52.330 of cardboard that says Department of National 00:03:52.330 --> 00:03:54.710 Defense wants you. It's almost kind of like Uncle 00:03:54.710 --> 00:03:56.990 Sam wants you, right? But without the fancy graphics. 00:03:57.900 --> 00:04:00.020 And one of the categories they were hiring for 00:04:00.020 --> 00:04:02.979 was linguist. Well, I was a linguist. I studied 00:04:02.979 --> 00:04:06.740 five languages at Western. I was taking linguistics 00:04:06.740 --> 00:04:09.879 courses. So I thought, wow. And the summer before, 00:04:09.979 --> 00:04:13.319 I worked as a student translator in Ottawa from 00:04:13.319 --> 00:04:14.680 Spanish to English. I thought this is a great 00:04:14.680 --> 00:04:17.779 opportunity. And so I won't bore the details, 00:04:17.920 --> 00:04:20.819 but I applied. And after, of course, a long process 00:04:20.819 --> 00:04:23.180 of being vetted, security clearance, et cetera, 00:04:23.240 --> 00:04:26.279 et cetera. I showed up in Ottawa, what I thought 00:04:26.279 --> 00:04:29.220 was national defense, and I get this indoctrination 00:04:29.220 --> 00:04:32.279 briefing by this big bear of a man who was a 00:04:32.279 --> 00:04:35.360 former RCMP officer, scared the living daylights 00:04:35.360 --> 00:04:38.120 out of me. And he basically said, we're not D 00:04:38.120 --> 00:04:40.579 &D, son. We're signals intelligence, to which 00:04:40.579 --> 00:04:44.680 my response was, excuse me? First of all, what 00:04:44.680 --> 00:04:46.620 is signals intelligence? Because, of course, 00:04:46.660 --> 00:04:50.019 this is pre -internet days, Lauren. CSE did not 00:04:50.019 --> 00:04:54.139 exist on paper. sorry, did not exist in the public 00:04:54.139 --> 00:04:58.459 mind in 1983. And so I entered the world of intelligence 00:04:58.459 --> 00:05:02.220 purely through dumb luck. And I spent 17 and 00:05:02.220 --> 00:05:05.779 a half years with CSE as a multilingual foreign 00:05:05.779 --> 00:05:08.980 intelligence analyst, working in about 10 different 00:05:08.980 --> 00:05:13.300 languages. And then I got an opportunity to move 00:05:13.300 --> 00:05:16.579 to the security service. Again, serendipitously, 00:05:16.639 --> 00:05:20.259 as an Iranian specialist back in 2001. And then 00:05:20.259 --> 00:05:22.910 nine months later, 9 -11 happened. And because 00:05:22.910 --> 00:05:24.769 I also had Arabic and I had a good background 00:05:24.769 --> 00:05:27.310 in Middle Eastern history and culture, I quickly 00:05:27.310 --> 00:05:29.269 morphed into a jihadi specialist, which is what 00:05:29.269 --> 00:05:31.410 I spent my career doing at the security service. 00:05:31.629 --> 00:05:33.930 So, you know, you can't plan these things sometimes. 00:05:34.329 --> 00:05:36.889 I think it's a little easier now in both of our 00:05:36.889 --> 00:05:38.790 countries in the sense that our agencies are 00:05:38.790 --> 00:05:41.230 a little more out there in terms of their recruiting 00:05:41.230 --> 00:05:43.350 campaigns. There's websites, there's places to 00:05:43.350 --> 00:05:46.410 go. But way back then, and I'm sure you had a 00:05:46.410 --> 00:05:48.009 similar experience when you joined the Bureau, 00:05:48.129 --> 00:05:50.910 but... And they weren't obvious. It wasn't quite 00:05:50.910 --> 00:05:53.490 as secretive as the old British method of tapping 00:05:53.490 --> 00:05:55.810 you on the shoulder at Cambridge or Oxford and 00:05:55.810 --> 00:05:59.329 saying, we might have a job for you. But I ended 00:05:59.329 --> 00:06:02.589 up in Ottawa and spent 32 and a half years with 00:06:02.589 --> 00:06:05.189 a career that, in all honesty, and I say this 00:06:05.189 --> 00:06:08.069 to this day, I had the luckiest job on the planet. 00:06:08.189 --> 00:06:09.910 I had a job that I couldn't wait to get to every 00:06:09.910 --> 00:06:11.430 morning because it was so exciting and it was 00:06:11.430 --> 00:06:14.720 so important. It truly is. And you're right about 00:06:14.720 --> 00:06:17.560 how agencies were at that time. I mean, NSA in 00:06:17.560 --> 00:06:19.660 the United States was always known as no such 00:06:19.660 --> 00:06:24.620 agency for a long period of time, because for 00:06:24.620 --> 00:06:27.000 a long period of time, you had to operate that 00:06:27.000 --> 00:06:28.540 way. And, you know, I think we could probably 00:06:28.540 --> 00:06:31.579 both argue the merits of having that kind of 00:06:31.579 --> 00:06:35.060 discretion as it was then. And now sometimes 00:06:35.060 --> 00:06:37.800 you can't even stay on top of things because. 00:06:38.490 --> 00:06:41.470 There's so much information out there. And I 00:06:41.470 --> 00:06:43.110 think it's tough to manage because I think we'd 00:06:43.110 --> 00:06:45.649 both argue too that there are certain kinds of 00:06:45.649 --> 00:06:48.230 information and intelligence that need to stay 00:06:48.230 --> 00:06:51.850 hidden, need to stay quiet. I think, you know, 00:06:51.850 --> 00:06:54.389 I hold to the maxim that you don't discuss sources, 00:06:54.410 --> 00:06:57.189 you don't discuss methods. Those are sacrosanct. 00:06:57.740 --> 00:06:59.920 I even worked as a crypto analyst for a year, 00:06:59.959 --> 00:07:02.319 and I will never talk about what systems we were 00:07:02.319 --> 00:07:04.279 working on and what systems we successfully were 00:07:04.279 --> 00:07:07.199 able to read, because that betrays a very, very 00:07:07.199 --> 00:07:09.019 sensitive series of operations. Similar with 00:07:09.019 --> 00:07:11.139 your career with the Bureau, you never disclose 00:07:11.139 --> 00:07:13.579 your sources, right? Unless they end up testifying 00:07:13.579 --> 00:07:16.519 for the prosecution in a criminal trial, that's 00:07:16.519 --> 00:07:19.339 a different matter. But if it's not sources and 00:07:19.339 --> 00:07:21.839 it's not methods, I think there's a lot of benefit 00:07:21.839 --> 00:07:24.259 to talking about our careers and what our agencies 00:07:24.259 --> 00:07:27.699 did. First of all, it can help attract... really 00:07:27.699 --> 00:07:29.360 good Canadians and Americans that want to do 00:07:29.360 --> 00:07:31.959 similar jobs. And secondly, you talked about 00:07:31.959 --> 00:07:34.480 the information flow. There's so much crap out 00:07:34.480 --> 00:07:37.180 there, a disinformation about what we do and 00:07:37.180 --> 00:07:39.939 why we do it, that former such as ourselves, 00:07:40.139 --> 00:07:44.579 if we convey stories about what we did, it can 00:07:44.579 --> 00:07:46.459 help dispel a lot of the disinformation and misinformation. 00:07:46.680 --> 00:07:48.279 I'm not saying it's going to solve it because 00:07:48.279 --> 00:07:50.959 that's a huge problem. But I do think that our 00:07:50.959 --> 00:07:54.480 citizenry has a right to know some of it. I mean, 00:07:54.500 --> 00:07:56.720 we are. civil servants. We are paid from the 00:07:56.720 --> 00:07:59.480 public purse. We're doing the best job we can 00:07:59.480 --> 00:08:01.660 to help keep our nations and our allies safe. 00:08:01.879 --> 00:08:05.420 And so I think coming, playing with some information, 00:08:05.600 --> 00:08:09.000 again, not compromising sources or methods, is 00:08:09.000 --> 00:08:10.819 in the end of the day, I think is a positive 00:08:10.819 --> 00:08:12.860 outcome for, and as a positive change we've seen 00:08:12.860 --> 00:08:15.600 over the past couple of years. I completely agree 00:08:15.600 --> 00:08:18.459 with you. And it is a careful balance. And that's 00:08:18.459 --> 00:08:21.180 actually a perfect segue because a lot of people 00:08:21.180 --> 00:08:24.800 think that out in the Canadian public, the American 00:08:24.800 --> 00:08:27.300 public that we operate within our agencies. And 00:08:27.300 --> 00:08:30.160 I think they don't really appreciate and haven't 00:08:30.160 --> 00:08:32.860 had the opportunity to learn about the importance 00:08:32.860 --> 00:08:36.240 of those liaison relationships. And you spent 00:08:36.240 --> 00:08:40.399 decades inside CSIS. deeply integrated into what 00:08:40.399 --> 00:08:42.980 we know as the Five Eyes Partnership, and particularly 00:08:42.980 --> 00:08:46.480 with the U .S. So for our listeners who may not 00:08:46.480 --> 00:08:48.960 be familiar with that concept or the absolute 00:08:48.960 --> 00:08:52.480 criticality of our relationships, can you briefly 00:08:52.480 --> 00:08:55.519 explain what Five Eyes is and why it matters? 00:08:56.059 --> 00:08:59.039 Sure. You know, coming out of the Second World 00:08:59.039 --> 00:09:01.919 War, not surprisingly, there was a very strong 00:09:01.919 --> 00:09:04.360 Western alliance that fought the Axis powers. 00:09:04.440 --> 00:09:06.480 So Japan, Italy, and Germany, and we were victorious 00:09:06.480 --> 00:09:09.409 by... you know, May of 45 against Germany and 00:09:09.409 --> 00:09:13.470 August of 45 against Japan. And of course, those 00:09:13.470 --> 00:09:15.129 alliances were very strong. I mean, you look 00:09:15.129 --> 00:09:17.289 at D -Day, for example, it's not a coincidence 00:09:17.289 --> 00:09:19.549 that the three armies that landed on the beaches 00:09:19.549 --> 00:09:23.289 in Normandy were Canadian, American, and British. 00:09:23.970 --> 00:09:26.570 The plans had gone through, you know, years of 00:09:26.570 --> 00:09:29.830 preparation in England. And, you know, you've 00:09:29.830 --> 00:09:31.769 probably seen all the movies I've seen too, you 00:09:31.769 --> 00:09:33.269 know, the landing at the beaches, the number 00:09:33.269 --> 00:09:35.889 of soldiers that we lost. But in the end of the 00:09:35.889 --> 00:09:37.409 day, that was the turning point of World War 00:09:37.409 --> 00:09:40.690 II. And those alliances were strengthened that 00:09:40.690 --> 00:09:43.649 day. And so as a consequence, the alliances went 00:09:43.649 --> 00:09:45.950 forward. And it should be also mentioned too, 00:09:46.009 --> 00:09:48.029 Laura, that even during the war, before the creation 00:09:48.029 --> 00:09:51.470 of the Five Eyes itself, Britain, Canada, United 00:09:51.470 --> 00:09:53.529 States shared some very sensitive intelligence 00:09:53.529 --> 00:09:56.870 on our adversaries, primarily the Germans and 00:09:56.870 --> 00:10:00.429 the Japanese. In fact, there was a sort of incipient 00:10:00.429 --> 00:10:03.110 signals intelligence unit in Canada called the 00:10:03.110 --> 00:10:05.460 Examinations Unit. that was working on German 00:10:05.460 --> 00:10:07.559 and Japanese cipher. And of course, everyone 00:10:07.559 --> 00:10:09.440 knows about Bletchley Park, of course, the famous 00:10:09.440 --> 00:10:11.639 Enigma breaking by the Polish mathematicians 00:10:11.639 --> 00:10:13.860 working with Alan Turing. But both our countries, 00:10:13.879 --> 00:10:15.980 too, had a major role to play in that. So that's 00:10:15.980 --> 00:10:19.480 the war. So the immediate, I think, logical alliance 00:10:19.480 --> 00:10:21.539 was between your country and the United Kingdom. 00:10:21.679 --> 00:10:24.080 So there was an agreement that came out shortly 00:10:24.080 --> 00:10:27.049 after the war. We joined that alliance, I believe, 00:10:27.110 --> 00:10:28.230 if my memory serves me correct, in the early 00:10:28.230 --> 00:10:31.490 50s, I think 1952, officially. And then eventually, 00:10:31.629 --> 00:10:34.509 two other countries, Australia and New Zealand, 00:10:34.529 --> 00:10:36.370 were brought in, and it's now called the Five 00:10:36.370 --> 00:10:40.909 Eyes. It's a logical pairing. First of all, A, 00:10:41.049 --> 00:10:43.149 we're all English -speaking, although in Canada, 00:10:43.169 --> 00:10:45.649 of course, but English and French. But we have 00:10:45.649 --> 00:10:47.990 similar culture. We have a similar history. We 00:10:47.990 --> 00:10:50.330 have a similar worldview. We fought on the same 00:10:50.330 --> 00:10:55.159 side in two world wars. And there's a... There's 00:10:55.159 --> 00:10:57.120 a sense of community, I think, amongst those 00:10:57.120 --> 00:11:01.500 partners that is very strong. And that led to, 00:11:01.580 --> 00:11:04.820 I think, a level of trust that we could share 00:11:04.820 --> 00:11:07.200 very sensitive intelligence amongst those five 00:11:07.200 --> 00:11:10.620 partners. And for your listeners, we do share 00:11:10.620 --> 00:11:13.779 very sensitive intelligence, both signals intelligence, 00:11:14.220 --> 00:11:17.100 human imagery, you name it, amongst the five 00:11:17.100 --> 00:11:18.779 partners. Now, there will always be intelligence 00:11:18.779 --> 00:11:21.039 that's too sensitive to share. You guys call 00:11:21.039 --> 00:11:22.899 it no foreign. We call it Canadian eyes only. 00:11:23.399 --> 00:11:25.039 There's other terms, I'm sure, in the other three 00:11:25.039 --> 00:11:27.679 partners. But in my time in Sigginton Human, 00:11:27.879 --> 00:11:34.480 I was always very impressed with the sheer volume 00:11:34.480 --> 00:11:38.840 of information that was shared. And that sharing 00:11:38.840 --> 00:11:43.039 enabled us to work on investigations, to produce 00:11:43.039 --> 00:11:46.059 intelligence that, in the end of the day, protected 00:11:46.059 --> 00:11:48.860 our interests and, in some cases, protected public 00:11:48.860 --> 00:11:52.200 safety. I call it the gold standard of sharing, 00:11:52.460 --> 00:11:54.000 Lauren. And you know from your time at the Bureau, 00:11:54.019 --> 00:11:57.519 there are other partners besides the Five Eyes. 00:11:57.759 --> 00:12:00.200 We work a lot with Western European partners, 00:12:00.519 --> 00:12:03.720 even partners in Africa and Asia as well, depending 00:12:03.720 --> 00:12:06.259 on the circumstances. But those relationships 00:12:06.259 --> 00:12:09.299 will never be as close, I don't think, as the 00:12:09.299 --> 00:12:11.539 Five Eyes partnership has. And again, it speaks 00:12:11.539 --> 00:12:14.799 to... It speaks to a shared vision of what we 00:12:14.799 --> 00:12:16.740 want the world to be. We want the world to be 00:12:16.740 --> 00:12:18.559 free. We want it to be democratic. We want it 00:12:18.559 --> 00:12:21.399 to be liberal in outlook. And these intelligence 00:12:21.399 --> 00:12:24.200 agencies, they work very hard to provide decision 00:12:24.200 --> 00:12:26.000 makers and policymakers with the information 00:12:26.000 --> 00:12:28.679 required to help protect that kind of world. 00:12:29.080 --> 00:12:34.000 And it's worked very well. It has. Until recently, 00:12:34.039 --> 00:12:36.980 maybe. Until recently. Yeah, no, no, no. I agree 00:12:36.980 --> 00:12:40.210 with you. In fact, I would argue that... all 00:12:40.210 --> 00:12:42.350 of our countries and the world writ large is 00:12:42.350 --> 00:12:45.950 much safer because of these relationships that 00:12:45.950 --> 00:12:50.190 we've had for so many decades now. And I think 00:12:50.190 --> 00:12:52.429 that's something that until you're inside, you 00:12:52.429 --> 00:12:54.070 don't appreciate. And that's something that I 00:12:54.070 --> 00:12:56.629 kind of love to stand outside and holler out 00:12:56.629 --> 00:12:59.629 to the world is we are so much better when we're 00:12:59.629 --> 00:13:03.809 together. And it's funny, Lauren, maybe it's 00:13:03.809 --> 00:13:05.870 not so big in your country, but it's obviously 00:13:05.870 --> 00:13:07.330 an issue here. I know it's an issue in academia 00:13:07.330 --> 00:13:09.690 in the United States. This whole, you know, anti 00:13:09.690 --> 00:13:12.190 -colonialism and talking about colonial powers 00:13:12.190 --> 00:13:14.970 and people trying to cling to the past kind of 00:13:14.970 --> 00:13:16.690 thing and laying all the ills of the world on 00:13:16.690 --> 00:13:19.970 colonialism. Yeah, a lot of bad things happen 00:13:19.970 --> 00:13:22.090 under colonialism. But, you know, we're not the 00:13:22.090 --> 00:13:24.570 source of all evil in the world. And the Five 00:13:24.570 --> 00:13:28.850 Eyes is not an effort to, you know, recreate 00:13:28.850 --> 00:13:32.850 colonial powers in parts of the world. It's an 00:13:32.850 --> 00:13:35.549 effort to share information that can keep us 00:13:35.549 --> 00:13:39.379 collectively safer. And I have no, I broke no 00:13:39.379 --> 00:13:41.700 tolerance for people who say, well, you know, 00:13:41.720 --> 00:13:43.379 you shouldn't be sharing with these countries 00:13:43.379 --> 00:13:44.740 because of what they've done historically. I'm 00:13:44.740 --> 00:13:46.340 saying, I'm sharing with them because of what 00:13:46.340 --> 00:13:49.159 they're doing now. And the fact that we, you 00:13:49.159 --> 00:13:51.240 know, we rely on you, you rely on us, we rely 00:13:51.240 --> 00:13:53.820 on the Brits, et cetera, et cetera. This is a 00:13:53.820 --> 00:13:55.879 really good development. This is a good club 00:13:55.879 --> 00:13:58.840 to be in. Being on the outside would, I think, 00:13:58.860 --> 00:14:02.059 make us collectively weaker. And so I would hope 00:14:02.059 --> 00:14:05.200 that the leadership within the Five Eyes, at 00:14:05.200 --> 00:14:07.600 least, put it this way, I know that within the 00:14:07.600 --> 00:14:09.360 intelligence and law enforcement community, relations 00:14:09.360 --> 00:14:12.679 are still very, very strong. My concern is at 00:14:12.679 --> 00:14:14.779 the political level. And I'm sure we're going 00:14:14.779 --> 00:14:17.559 to get into that. But I think that operationally, 00:14:17.559 --> 00:14:20.279 it's pretty strong. Yeah, I agree. And we are 00:14:20.279 --> 00:14:22.159 going to get into that. And I just have one more 00:14:22.159 --> 00:14:25.000 bit of a kind of a layup question for everybody 00:14:25.000 --> 00:14:27.500 to understand. And that is, we do have these 00:14:27.500 --> 00:14:29.940 great relationships. But one place where Canada 00:14:29.940 --> 00:14:33.389 is different. is Canada does not have an external 00:14:33.389 --> 00:14:37.889 intelligence service modeled on MI6 and certainly 00:14:37.889 --> 00:14:41.669 the CIA. So I wonder when you look at that as 00:14:41.669 --> 00:14:43.529 we move into talking about the relationship, 00:14:43.750 --> 00:14:48.470 how has that framed if it has your relationship 00:14:48.470 --> 00:14:50.830 with the United States in the intelligence world? 00:14:51.110 --> 00:14:53.789 It's a great question. So to bring your listeners 00:14:53.789 --> 00:14:56.950 a bit of sort of background as to why we don't. 00:14:57.230 --> 00:14:59.330 So the security service, the Canadian Security 00:14:59.330 --> 00:15:02.490 Intelligence Service, or CSIS, was created in 00:15:02.490 --> 00:15:05.429 1984. It used to be part of the RCMP, the Royal 00:15:05.429 --> 00:15:06.950 Canadian Mounted Police. It was called the security 00:15:06.950 --> 00:15:09.529 service, kind of like MI5, within the law enforcement 00:15:09.529 --> 00:15:11.970 organization. For reasons I won't get into because 00:15:11.970 --> 00:15:14.730 it's very complicated, it was decided to carve 00:15:14.730 --> 00:15:17.730 that function out of the RCMP and make it a civilian 00:15:17.730 --> 00:15:19.629 agency as opposed to a law enforcement organization. 00:15:20.369 --> 00:15:22.870 And so CSIS saw the light of day in June of 1984. 00:15:23.350 --> 00:15:26.610 I started at CSC in July of 83. So I was there 00:15:26.610 --> 00:15:29.070 at the birth of CSIS and worked very closely 00:15:29.070 --> 00:15:31.750 with them right from day one. The powers that 00:15:31.750 --> 00:15:35.690 be at the time decided that they wanted to basically 00:15:35.690 --> 00:15:40.149 replicate the security service and give it a 00:15:40.149 --> 00:15:44.120 foreign intelligence mandate. but very limited 00:15:44.120 --> 00:15:48.019 in scope. So it's actually a misconception. CSIS 00:15:48.019 --> 00:15:50.080 is also a foreign intelligence organization. 00:15:50.419 --> 00:15:55.220 Great point. But the minions at the time, when 00:15:55.220 --> 00:15:57.580 they drafted legislation, put this really bizarre 00:15:57.580 --> 00:16:00.720 clause in the CSIS Act. It's called Section 16. 00:16:01.440 --> 00:16:03.720 CSIS has the authority to collect foreign intelligence, 00:16:03.919 --> 00:16:07.649 but wait for it, only within Canada. which kind 00:16:07.649 --> 00:16:09.570 of sounds like an oxymoron if you think about 00:16:09.570 --> 00:16:10.730 it. How can it be foreign if you're collecting 00:16:10.730 --> 00:16:12.549 it within Canada? Well, there are ways, and I 00:16:12.549 --> 00:16:15.129 won't get into the details, but it's important 00:16:15.129 --> 00:16:16.970 to realize that from a security intelligence 00:16:16.970 --> 00:16:19.690 perspective, CSIS has no barriers. It can go 00:16:19.690 --> 00:16:21.129 anywhere in the universe to collect security 00:16:21.129 --> 00:16:23.169 intelligence. We're not constrained to Canada. 00:16:23.470 --> 00:16:25.210 It's only with respect to foreign intelligence 00:16:25.210 --> 00:16:27.289 that we can't collect outside of Canada. And 00:16:27.289 --> 00:16:28.850 of course, the signals intelligence organization 00:16:28.850 --> 00:16:31.429 is by definition a foreign intelligence organization, 00:16:31.649 --> 00:16:34.690 albeit signals not human. And so, you know, it 00:16:34.690 --> 00:16:37.299 does collect foreign intelligence. I don't think 00:16:37.299 --> 00:16:39.919 it complicated matters. I mean, my dealings with 00:16:39.919 --> 00:16:42.399 the CIA only stem from my time at CSIS. So I 00:16:42.399 --> 00:16:44.600 was very familiar with NSA for 17 and a half 00:16:44.600 --> 00:16:47.039 years. And then when I joined the security service, 00:16:47.100 --> 00:16:49.580 of course, that was 9 -11. And, you know, again, 00:16:49.639 --> 00:16:52.519 the sharing of information was the floodgates 00:16:52.519 --> 00:16:54.580 had opened. We were all sharing in real time 00:16:54.580 --> 00:16:57.299 because we had to. You can't let 3 ,000 people 00:16:57.299 --> 00:17:00.299 die and your closest friend and neighbor and 00:17:00.299 --> 00:17:02.019 not help them figure out who's who in the zoo 00:17:02.019 --> 00:17:05.779 and try to go after these people, right? I don't 00:17:05.779 --> 00:17:09.720 think the lack of a dedicated foreign human service 00:17:09.720 --> 00:17:13.119 has jeopardized our relationship with the Five 00:17:13.119 --> 00:17:14.619 Eyes. And you're right, we are the only one. 00:17:14.839 --> 00:17:17.460 Even the Kiwis have one. Their service is a hybrid. 00:17:18.420 --> 00:17:20.460 There's ASIO and there's ASIS in Australia. There's 00:17:20.460 --> 00:17:22.640 MI5, MI6. And of course, there's the Bureau and 00:17:22.640 --> 00:17:25.759 the agency. There's still a debate now, Lauren, 00:17:25.819 --> 00:17:28.799 on whether we should create one. But you don't 00:17:28.799 --> 00:17:32.670 create these things overnight. You see academics 00:17:32.670 --> 00:17:35.329 and policy wonks talking about this periodically. 00:17:35.690 --> 00:17:38.029 I think you should just remove the within Canada 00:17:38.029 --> 00:17:40.109 clause from CSIS and make it a hybrid service. 00:17:40.369 --> 00:17:42.269 We're already good at recruiting human resources. 00:17:42.349 --> 00:17:44.750 That's what we do for a living. So you've got 00:17:44.750 --> 00:17:46.450 half the organization works foreign intelligence 00:17:46.450 --> 00:17:48.730 and half works security intelligence. It's not 00:17:48.730 --> 00:17:51.250 complicated. It makes sense. And another part 00:17:51.250 --> 00:17:55.069 of the relationship I think people may not recognize 00:17:55.069 --> 00:17:57.950 as we start talking about what's going on today 00:17:57.950 --> 00:18:01.220 is that also overseas. You know, the FBI has 00:18:01.220 --> 00:18:03.299 positions called legal attaches, including in 00:18:03.299 --> 00:18:06.420 Canada and in over 50 countries around the world. 00:18:06.640 --> 00:18:10.000 And similarly, your folks are deployed as well. 00:18:10.099 --> 00:18:12.059 So we're not only working together in the United 00:18:12.059 --> 00:18:14.720 States and Canada, but those relationships become 00:18:14.720 --> 00:18:17.400 important because it's another trusted partner 00:18:17.400 --> 00:18:19.920 in third countries around the world. And I think 00:18:19.920 --> 00:18:22.480 that's also been a very successful partnership. 00:18:23.420 --> 00:18:26.579 I recall one story when I arrived at CSIS in 00:18:26.579 --> 00:18:29.680 2001. This was prior to 9 -11. I attended a presentation 00:18:29.680 --> 00:18:33.799 by a dear friend of mine who worked for the RCMP 00:18:33.799 --> 00:18:35.380 and then for the Security Service and then for 00:18:35.380 --> 00:18:39.539 CSIS. He was in Nairobi in 98 when the attack 00:18:39.539 --> 00:18:41.700 took place. That was the al -Qaeda attack against 00:18:41.700 --> 00:18:45.500 your embassies in Dar es Salaam and in Nairobi. 00:18:45.859 --> 00:18:49.339 And he was actually meeting with his CIA counterpart 00:18:49.339 --> 00:18:51.259 at the time when the bombs went off. And he tells 00:18:51.259 --> 00:18:54.220 this story. They were blown across the room from 00:18:54.220 --> 00:18:57.019 the shockwave. And then basically his job was 00:18:57.019 --> 00:18:58.940 to do anything possible to help your embassy 00:18:58.940 --> 00:19:02.599 and the staff and other Americans in Kenya get 00:19:02.599 --> 00:19:04.480 to the bottom of what happened, provide any assistance 00:19:04.480 --> 00:19:09.119 possible, medical, whatever it took to try to 00:19:09.119 --> 00:19:11.980 get over this. So yeah, those trusted relationships, 00:19:12.359 --> 00:19:15.140 as you said, work right across the world. And 00:19:15.140 --> 00:19:16.779 they work because of the Five Eyes Alliance. 00:19:16.940 --> 00:19:19.059 And they work because we know each other. We 00:19:19.059 --> 00:19:20.839 don't always agree on things. There was a lot 00:19:20.839 --> 00:19:24.150 of... disagreement. Canada did not go into Iraq 00:19:24.150 --> 00:19:27.750 in 2003 under President Bush. We were the one 00:19:27.750 --> 00:19:29.769 that did not agree to go in. The Brits went in. 00:19:29.809 --> 00:19:31.990 The Australians went in. But, I mean, overall, 00:19:32.230 --> 00:19:36.210 we share the same goals. We share basically the 00:19:36.210 --> 00:19:37.930 same training. I mean, we cross -train all the 00:19:37.930 --> 00:19:39.910 time, right, in each other's organizations. We 00:19:39.910 --> 00:19:43.269 have secondees in each other's organizations. 00:19:43.509 --> 00:19:44.950 We even have people who get married in other 00:19:44.950 --> 00:19:46.690 organizations. I know of at least two examples 00:19:46.690 --> 00:19:49.369 of Americans and Canadians in SIGINT that ended 00:19:49.369 --> 00:19:51.839 up marrying each other. There you go. And we 00:19:51.839 --> 00:19:54.339 share values. Absolutely. We share values as 00:19:54.339 --> 00:19:58.339 humans and we share values as democracies. And 00:19:58.339 --> 00:20:01.400 I think that's really important. And I, you know, 00:20:01.400 --> 00:20:04.039 to pivot a little bit about today, and you and 00:20:04.039 --> 00:20:06.299 I have talked about this on multiple occasions 00:20:06.299 --> 00:20:08.660 over the year plus we've known each other, is 00:20:08.660 --> 00:20:11.039 would you look at what's happening right now 00:20:11.039 --> 00:20:15.119 in the United States broadly? And then, of course, 00:20:15.160 --> 00:20:17.400 with the agency that you've had most of the work 00:20:17.400 --> 00:20:19.759 with over your career, what do you see? What 00:20:19.759 --> 00:20:21.319 does this mean for you? What do you think it 00:20:21.319 --> 00:20:24.160 means for the relationship between the United 00:20:24.160 --> 00:20:26.440 States and Canada in the intelligence and law 00:20:26.440 --> 00:20:29.680 enforcement sector? OK, it's a great question. 00:20:29.759 --> 00:20:32.579 So as I said earlier, I've been assured by my 00:20:32.579 --> 00:20:34.619 contacts who are still within the security intelligence 00:20:34.619 --> 00:20:37.900 community that at the operational level, it's 00:20:37.900 --> 00:20:40.200 it's the status quo. Everything is working fine. 00:20:40.400 --> 00:20:42.400 Right. Because we know each other. We you know, 00:20:42.400 --> 00:20:46.480 we share briefs. We've had cases about a year 00:20:46.480 --> 00:20:49.019 and a half ago, there was a Pakistani student 00:20:49.019 --> 00:20:50.839 on a visa here in Canada who tried to cross the 00:20:50.839 --> 00:20:52.859 border into New York State. He wanted to go to 00:20:52.859 --> 00:20:55.059 New York and carry on attacking its Jewish targets 00:20:55.059 --> 00:20:56.599 in their attribution for what Israel was doing 00:20:56.599 --> 00:20:59.599 in Gaza Strip. And the FBI and CSIS and the RCMP 00:20:59.599 --> 00:21:02.240 shared intelligence information all the time, 00:21:02.259 --> 00:21:03.660 and the guy was arrested at the border. So he 00:21:03.660 --> 00:21:05.799 never got anywhere near New York City. That shows 00:21:05.799 --> 00:21:07.480 that at the operational level, things are working 00:21:07.480 --> 00:21:12.180 well. But the problem is, and it's not just in 00:21:12.180 --> 00:21:15.400 your country, What worries me is what we call 00:21:15.400 --> 00:21:18.880 the politicization of intelligence. You know, 00:21:19.079 --> 00:21:22.839 as well as I do, that we're messengers. We're 00:21:22.839 --> 00:21:26.740 advisory bodies. We collect information. We process 00:21:26.740 --> 00:21:29.619 it. We assess it for veracity. We assess it for 00:21:29.619 --> 00:21:33.559 reliability. We analyze it. We bring in other 00:21:33.559 --> 00:21:36.500 types of information. We put it through the blender. 00:21:36.740 --> 00:21:38.539 We figure out what does all this stuff mean. 00:21:39.259 --> 00:21:40.960 And then we send it up the line to senior people 00:21:40.960 --> 00:21:43.019 so that they can be in the know as to what's 00:21:43.019 --> 00:21:46.180 happening on X, Y, or Z. We can't tell them what 00:21:46.180 --> 00:21:49.460 to do with it. We can't tell them to use it, 00:21:49.500 --> 00:21:52.079 not use it, line your birdcage with it. That's 00:21:52.079 --> 00:21:54.259 not our job. We're the messengers. We're not 00:21:54.259 --> 00:21:58.059 the implementers of the intelligence. What I 00:21:58.059 --> 00:22:00.099 have noticed, and again, it's not just in your 00:22:00.099 --> 00:22:03.059 country, is that there are times where people 00:22:03.059 --> 00:22:06.359 in very high positions don't like the message. 00:22:06.920 --> 00:22:10.059 and then attempt to shoot the messenger. I'll 00:22:10.059 --> 00:22:12.640 give you a couple of examples, one from my country 00:22:12.640 --> 00:22:14.759 and one from yours, you'll be familiar with, 00:22:14.880 --> 00:22:17.319 but we had an inquiry a couple of years ago into 00:22:17.319 --> 00:22:18.960 Chinese interference in our federal elections. 00:22:19.619 --> 00:22:22.759 And my former organization, CSIS, has been warning 00:22:22.759 --> 00:22:25.720 for 40 years about this, four zero years about 00:22:25.720 --> 00:22:30.000 this. And somebody, we don't know who, leaked 00:22:30.000 --> 00:22:33.000 a very sensitive intelligence summary to the 00:22:33.000 --> 00:22:34.640 Globe and Mail, which is a main newspaper in 00:22:34.640 --> 00:22:37.279 Toronto. Saying CSIS thinks this is happening. 00:22:37.839 --> 00:22:40.039 And it caused a big scandal. Why was this leaked? 00:22:40.220 --> 00:22:41.599 What, you know, what are they saying? And the 00:22:41.599 --> 00:22:44.240 first thing that came out from the prime minister's 00:22:44.240 --> 00:22:47.059 office was, we don't want our security intelligence 00:22:47.059 --> 00:22:49.819 service to be spreading anti -Asian racism in 00:22:49.819 --> 00:22:53.259 Canada. And we thought, this has nothing to do 00:22:53.259 --> 00:22:55.099 with anti -Asian racism. We're talking about 00:22:55.099 --> 00:22:57.839 a foreign power that can do influence our elections 00:22:57.839 --> 00:22:59.819 in much the same way the Russians sought to influence 00:22:59.819 --> 00:23:03.990 elections in your country in 2016 and 2020. Then 00:23:03.990 --> 00:23:06.329 we had a big inquiry into this, and it turned 00:23:06.329 --> 00:23:08.690 out that several intelligence reports that had 00:23:08.690 --> 00:23:11.049 been sent up the line were sent back for rewording 00:23:11.049 --> 00:23:14.150 because the message was uncomfortable. Because 00:23:14.150 --> 00:23:16.329 they didn't want to hear what China was up to. 00:23:16.450 --> 00:23:18.170 And yet we've been saying this, again, since 00:23:18.170 --> 00:23:21.829 the 80s, that they've been up to this. Similar 00:23:21.829 --> 00:23:23.750 in your country, you've got agencies like the 00:23:23.750 --> 00:23:26.609 National Security Agency, the DIA, talking about, 00:23:26.670 --> 00:23:29.410 for example, bomb assessments after the bombing 00:23:29.410 --> 00:23:32.809 of many nuclear sites last year. The White House 00:23:32.809 --> 00:23:34.789 said complete obliteration. They said, excuse 00:23:34.789 --> 00:23:37.769 me, sir, we looked at the imagery and we've got 00:23:37.769 --> 00:23:40.410 intelligence on the ground. And we don't think 00:23:40.410 --> 00:23:43.170 that that the obliteration is as complete as 00:23:43.170 --> 00:23:44.970 you said. And what was the immediate reaction? 00:23:45.250 --> 00:23:48.230 Well, what do you know? Right. In other words, 00:23:48.269 --> 00:23:50.109 the White House is politically inconvenient. 00:23:50.490 --> 00:23:53.250 That's right. The White House had a firm position 00:23:53.250 --> 00:23:55.990 that the airstrikes had destroyed the Iranian 00:23:55.990 --> 00:23:58.430 nuclear program. And have your intelligence services 00:23:58.430 --> 00:24:00.230 say, well, that's not what the evidence shows, 00:24:00.269 --> 00:24:03.480 sir. was frankly inconvenient. And then given 00:24:03.480 --> 00:24:06.339 them, I'll leave it this way, their mercurial 00:24:06.339 --> 00:24:09.900 personality of your president, he rejected the 00:24:09.900 --> 00:24:12.619 message completely. And that's really scary. 00:24:12.859 --> 00:24:15.940 Like I said, intelligence agencies are there 00:24:15.940 --> 00:24:21.079 to provide really good information that can help 00:24:21.079 --> 00:24:24.599 us figure out who's who in the zoo and what we 00:24:24.599 --> 00:24:27.460 should do about it. We're not decision makers. 00:24:27.960 --> 00:24:31.450 Right. And the other. I'm sorry, go ahead. What 00:24:31.450 --> 00:24:37.869 we don't do is craft our product to suit a particular 00:24:37.869 --> 00:24:41.230 individual or a particular political party. We 00:24:41.230 --> 00:24:44.250 are neutral intelligence gatherers, law enforcement 00:24:44.250 --> 00:24:47.029 gatherers. We provide the best product possible. 00:24:47.130 --> 00:24:50.410 As I wrote an op -ed piece, I said, you know, 00:24:50.410 --> 00:24:52.789 if I write a report, this is not Phil Gursky's 00:24:52.789 --> 00:24:55.369 report. This report goes through umpteen levels 00:24:55.369 --> 00:24:57.789 of verification. In fact, when I used to write 00:24:57.789 --> 00:25:00.509 things on counterterrorism, It went right back 00:25:00.509 --> 00:25:04.190 to the investigators themselves. If I was misrepresenting 00:25:04.190 --> 00:25:06.630 what they thought or what their sources were 00:25:06.630 --> 00:25:09.930 telling them, I wanted to find out. And so it 00:25:09.930 --> 00:25:12.089 went through many levels of checking before. 00:25:12.250 --> 00:25:13.390 And when it went out of the building, it went 00:25:13.390 --> 00:25:15.210 out of the building with a thesis crest on it, 00:25:15.250 --> 00:25:17.490 not Phil Gursky's photo on it. It was the best 00:25:17.490 --> 00:25:20.609 product available, similar with the FBI. If the 00:25:20.609 --> 00:25:22.990 FBI stamps on that, that's the FBI's position 00:25:22.990 --> 00:25:26.670 on X, Y, or Z. You're not writing it to please 00:25:26.670 --> 00:25:28.150 somebody. You're writing to inform somebody. 00:25:28.720 --> 00:25:30.779 You're right. And the other thing that you mentioned 00:25:30.779 --> 00:25:33.059 that I really want to go back on, because I think 00:25:33.059 --> 00:25:34.880 it's really important for people who are trying 00:25:34.880 --> 00:25:37.440 to understand more about how we operate, is that 00:25:37.440 --> 00:25:40.859 partnership between you as the analyst and the 00:25:40.859 --> 00:25:43.740 expertise from your role and me sitting on the 00:25:43.740 --> 00:25:46.059 operational side. And I think that that's sometimes 00:25:46.059 --> 00:25:50.119 not clearly understood about how much more effective 00:25:50.119 --> 00:25:52.980 we are when both those pieces are together. And 00:25:52.980 --> 00:25:55.779 I think when we look at Some of the hollowing 00:25:55.779 --> 00:25:58.559 out that's going on in the FBI right now, how 00:25:58.559 --> 00:26:01.599 troublesome that is, because we also know that 00:26:01.599 --> 00:26:04.619 in the work that we lived in, that it takes a 00:26:04.619 --> 00:26:07.000 long time to get good at what you're doing. It 00:26:07.000 --> 00:26:09.839 takes like at least five years to really get 00:26:09.839 --> 00:26:11.640 your legs under you when you're talking about 00:26:11.640 --> 00:26:14.420 the intelligence world and encounter terrorism. 00:26:14.420 --> 00:26:16.799 So I wonder if you could comment on that a little 00:26:16.799 --> 00:26:18.539 bit, expand upon that, because I think that's 00:26:18.539 --> 00:26:20.509 a really important point. Yeah, I'm glad you 00:26:20.509 --> 00:26:22.869 raised that. So as you mentioned, I mean, I was 00:26:22.869 --> 00:26:24.450 a foreign intelligence analyst. Then I became 00:26:24.450 --> 00:26:26.430 a counterterrorism analyst when I joined the 00:26:26.430 --> 00:26:28.450 security service. So I was not an intelligence 00:26:28.450 --> 00:26:31.430 officer. I didn't go recruit human sources. I 00:26:31.430 --> 00:26:34.390 didn't run investigations. But one thing that 00:26:34.390 --> 00:26:36.109 I was, you know, one of the things I was grateful 00:26:36.109 --> 00:26:38.470 for were the people with whom I worked at CSIS. 00:26:38.769 --> 00:26:41.809 They saw my background. They saw my specialization. 00:26:42.009 --> 00:26:44.049 My knowledge had been built up over more than 00:26:44.049 --> 00:26:46.690 two decades. And they said, you know your stuff. 00:26:47.279 --> 00:26:49.599 And so I was one of the very few analysts that 00:26:49.599 --> 00:26:53.079 was regularly invited to source debriefs. So 00:26:53.079 --> 00:26:54.960 they would say, okay, I'm going to debrief my 00:26:54.960 --> 00:26:57.559 source and, you know, this place on this time. 00:26:57.759 --> 00:27:00.539 I want you there because I know you can ask questions 00:27:00.539 --> 00:27:02.819 that I can't. So I'm not sure how it works in 00:27:02.819 --> 00:27:04.960 the Bureau, Lauren, but in the security service, 00:27:05.180 --> 00:27:07.779 most of the investigators are what we call generalists, 00:27:07.819 --> 00:27:10.319 which means you're hired, you're taught how to 00:27:10.319 --> 00:27:12.920 run a source, recruit a source, do an operation. 00:27:14.240 --> 00:27:16.180 You might work China for two years and then work 00:27:16.180 --> 00:27:18.759 Russia and then work organized crime for two 00:27:18.759 --> 00:27:21.640 years. That's true. That can shift around. I 00:27:21.640 --> 00:27:23.660 will say that in the Bureau on the counterintelligence 00:27:23.660 --> 00:27:26.759 side, people often tend to stay there and counterterrorism. 00:27:26.819 --> 00:27:29.279 But your point is so well taken because back 00:27:29.279 --> 00:27:34.059 decades ago, I was really fortunate to be part 00:27:34.059 --> 00:27:38.160 of a team involved with debriefing a terrorist 00:27:38.160 --> 00:27:41.500 who agreed to cooperate. But I couldn't have 00:27:41.500 --> 00:27:44.069 done it without. The analyst, her name was Theresa 00:27:44.069 --> 00:27:47.589 Felix. I will forever be indebted to her. But 00:27:47.589 --> 00:27:51.069 to have her in the room along with this terrorist 00:27:51.069 --> 00:27:53.809 we were debriefing and another agent and a translator 00:27:53.809 --> 00:27:57.009 was so important because she, like you, was able 00:27:57.009 --> 00:27:59.890 to sit back and say, you know what, Lauren, I 00:27:59.890 --> 00:28:02.490 heard him say this and I think this means this. 00:28:02.569 --> 00:28:05.289 And I think tomorrow when you go back, you need 00:28:05.289 --> 00:28:07.150 to probe a little bit further in this area so 00:28:07.150 --> 00:28:09.390 we can build upon that. And that relationship 00:28:09.390 --> 00:28:12.289 to me. Anybody who doesn't see the value in it 00:28:12.289 --> 00:28:14.809 is missing the point and is not going to be as 00:28:14.809 --> 00:28:17.230 effective as he or she could be. It's so true. 00:28:17.470 --> 00:28:19.289 I mean, I was even brought in to train human 00:28:19.289 --> 00:28:21.190 sources. So if we wanted to run somebody into 00:28:21.190 --> 00:28:23.509 what we call thought of terrorism cell, I was 00:28:23.509 --> 00:28:25.690 brought in to say, OK, this is how you talk. 00:28:25.829 --> 00:28:27.470 This is what you look like. This is what you 00:28:27.470 --> 00:28:29.450 say. This is what you believe. This is the ideology 00:28:29.450 --> 00:28:32.130 you want. Because, again, the investigators in 00:28:32.130 --> 00:28:34.890 some cases were quite junior, didn't have that 00:28:34.890 --> 00:28:37.069 knowledge. I was brought in to do debriefings 00:28:37.069 --> 00:28:39.440 of terrorists in prison. You know, who claim, 00:28:39.480 --> 00:28:41.819 oh, I've de -radicalized. I've changed my ways. 00:28:41.839 --> 00:28:43.700 Can you let me out of prison now? Well, no, we 00:28:43.700 --> 00:28:45.079 can't because you haven't changed your ways. 00:28:45.220 --> 00:28:47.140 I was even brought in to interview the moms, 00:28:47.299 --> 00:28:50.240 the moms of dead terrorists, which I must say, 00:28:50.259 --> 00:28:52.339 in all of my career, you sit across the room 00:28:52.339 --> 00:28:54.319 from my mother and you see in the background, 00:28:54.480 --> 00:28:57.359 she's got photos of her kid in elementary school 00:28:57.359 --> 00:29:00.160 and secondary school. And now her kid is dead 00:29:00.160 --> 00:29:02.420 as a terrorist and he's killed people somewhere 00:29:02.420 --> 00:29:05.160 abroad. And now she's the mom of the dead terrorist. 00:29:05.660 --> 00:29:08.019 And you're talking to her, trying to understand, 00:29:08.460 --> 00:29:12.400 you know, what happened to your son? When did 00:29:12.400 --> 00:29:15.640 this start? When were the changes occurring? 00:29:15.960 --> 00:29:18.099 How did they occur? What did you notice? What 00:29:18.099 --> 00:29:19.960 did you not notice? Who did he hang out with? 00:29:20.640 --> 00:29:22.599 You know, one of the hardest things I've ever 00:29:22.599 --> 00:29:25.359 had to do. And these poor women are trying to 00:29:25.359 --> 00:29:28.480 keep it together, right? Because not only have 00:29:28.480 --> 00:29:31.119 they lost their sons, but they know their sons 00:29:31.119 --> 00:29:33.900 have, you know, taken part in heinous acts of 00:29:33.900 --> 00:29:35.839 terrorism that have killed innocent people. But 00:29:35.839 --> 00:29:38.160 I was very fortunate in that sense. And I couldn't 00:29:38.160 --> 00:29:40.480 agree with you more. It's a team effort. We would 00:29:40.480 --> 00:29:42.299 also bring in, as in your case, we bring in the 00:29:42.299 --> 00:29:44.400 linguists, the people that we would hire and 00:29:44.400 --> 00:29:46.200 they would, you know, they would go through intercepted 00:29:46.200 --> 00:29:48.079 communications under, we would have to get a 00:29:48.079 --> 00:29:50.440 federal court warrant to intercept communications, 00:29:50.680 --> 00:29:52.599 obviously in a different language. And then the 00:29:52.599 --> 00:29:55.640 linguists, they got to know the targets as well 00:29:55.640 --> 00:29:57.759 as anybody else did. And you want them there 00:29:57.759 --> 00:30:00.460 because they can detect those subtleties that 00:30:00.460 --> 00:30:02.400 other people can't because they kind of, it's 00:30:02.400 --> 00:30:04.240 almost like you're listening to your family members 00:30:04.240 --> 00:30:06.799 after a period of time. It's absolutely true. 00:30:06.960 --> 00:30:09.980 And you can't function if you don't have that 00:30:09.980 --> 00:30:12.099 entire team together and understanding a threat. 00:30:12.440 --> 00:30:15.440 So considering all that and considering a little 00:30:15.440 --> 00:30:17.779 bit of what we've talked about, what worries 00:30:17.779 --> 00:30:21.180 you the most right now about the path that the 00:30:21.180 --> 00:30:24.319 FBI is on, that the CIA is on? What does this 00:30:24.319 --> 00:30:27.920 portend for the relationship with Canada and 00:30:27.920 --> 00:30:30.619 with other allies? And what worries you about 00:30:30.619 --> 00:30:34.250 it? A couple of things. So strictly internally, 00:30:34.549 --> 00:30:37.289 I read more and more reports in the New York 00:30:37.289 --> 00:30:40.690 Times, the Washington Post, that the FBI has 00:30:40.690 --> 00:30:43.869 fired, dismissed, whatever, sidelined X number 00:30:43.869 --> 00:30:45.950 of people because of whatever. The most recent 00:30:45.950 --> 00:30:48.029 one is a whole bunch of people that I believe 00:30:48.029 --> 00:30:50.289 is a Washington Post article, I believe, that 00:30:50.289 --> 00:30:54.690 I shared with you. The director fired a bunch 00:30:54.690 --> 00:30:57.980 of people. who were working on Iran. So the possibility 00:30:57.980 --> 00:31:00.099 that Iran might have agents in your country that 00:31:00.099 --> 00:31:01.940 will retaliate because of the bombing going on 00:31:01.940 --> 00:31:04.059 right now in that country, they're all fired 00:31:04.059 --> 00:31:05.700 because they worked on the Mar -a -Lago investigation 00:31:05.700 --> 00:31:07.859 a couple of years ago where the president was 00:31:07.859 --> 00:31:09.900 alleged to have had classified documents that 00:31:09.900 --> 00:31:12.180 he shouldn't have had in his house. And that's 00:31:12.180 --> 00:31:15.539 pure vindictiveness. There's no just cause for 00:31:15.539 --> 00:31:18.099 doing that. So I worry about the bleeding of 00:31:18.099 --> 00:31:21.019 expertise. Because one thing that I know, when 00:31:21.019 --> 00:31:24.250 I worked in counterterrorism, We would meet regularly. 00:31:24.470 --> 00:31:28.509 In fact, I spearheaded a brand new group amongst 00:31:28.509 --> 00:31:31.049 the Five Eyes to look at radicalization patterns. 00:31:31.369 --> 00:31:33.930 What did we learn from our investigations? What 00:31:33.930 --> 00:31:35.910 were the behavioral indicators? And we would 00:31:35.910 --> 00:31:37.910 have experts. We'd get together two, three days. 00:31:38.029 --> 00:31:40.509 So once in Ottawa, once in Washington, once in 00:31:40.509 --> 00:31:42.390 Canberra. And we'd sit around a couple of days 00:31:42.390 --> 00:31:45.210 and we'd go through what we knew. And having 00:31:45.210 --> 00:31:48.309 those experts in the room with you, good God, 00:31:48.390 --> 00:31:50.579 I learned so much. Well, I had my own sort of 00:31:50.579 --> 00:31:52.700 narrow view on what the Canadian landscape was 00:31:52.700 --> 00:31:55.359 like. Now I have the British landscape and the 00:31:55.359 --> 00:31:57.380 Australian landscape and the American landscape. 00:31:57.720 --> 00:32:00.279 And it made me a better analyst because now I 00:32:00.279 --> 00:32:03.059 could see things more clearly because they'd 00:32:03.059 --> 00:32:07.019 experienced things that I hadn't seen. What worries 00:32:07.019 --> 00:32:10.359 me is if those experts are all fired for reasons 00:32:10.359 --> 00:32:13.059 that don't make any sense, that kind of exchange 00:32:13.059 --> 00:32:16.299 ends. So that's very worrisome. The other thing, 00:32:16.339 --> 00:32:17.980 of course, is that, you know, about a year ago 00:32:17.980 --> 00:32:20.930 or so. There were rumors, and I forget the individual's 00:32:20.930 --> 00:32:23.109 name, some minor figure in the Trump administration, 00:32:23.430 --> 00:32:26.049 even threatened to kick Canada out of the Five 00:32:26.049 --> 00:32:28.849 Eyes. It was a completely offhanded remark that 00:32:28.849 --> 00:32:30.869 came completely out of left field. It didn't 00:32:30.869 --> 00:32:33.410 make any sense whatsoever. And of course, it 00:32:33.410 --> 00:32:35.390 was denied and hushed up later on kind of thing. 00:32:35.450 --> 00:32:38.890 But, you know, if we're going to have this politicization 00:32:38.890 --> 00:32:42.329 of intelligence and intelligence sharing get 00:32:42.329 --> 00:32:45.549 that much worse. I mean, first of all, I don't 00:32:45.549 --> 00:32:47.369 know how you kick somebody out of the Five Eyes. 00:32:47.410 --> 00:32:48.710 I don't think there's any protocol for doing 00:32:48.710 --> 00:32:51.069 that. But certainly, I mean, you know, the United 00:32:51.069 --> 00:32:54.250 States could choose to turn the tap off. You 00:32:54.250 --> 00:32:56.430 did it against New Zealand in the 80s. And there 00:32:56.430 --> 00:33:00.250 was a controversy over a U .S. warship that was 00:33:00.250 --> 00:33:02.809 docking in Auckland. And the policy was, you 00:33:02.809 --> 00:33:05.410 know, don't ask, don't tell about nuclear weapons 00:33:05.410 --> 00:33:07.910 on board, right? And the Kiwis said, well, you're 00:33:07.910 --> 00:33:09.250 not docking until you tell us. And the Americans 00:33:09.250 --> 00:33:10.470 said, we're not telling you. We're going to cut 00:33:10.470 --> 00:33:12.170 off intelligence. And they did for a period of 00:33:12.170 --> 00:33:15.269 time. If we were to lose that access to American 00:33:15.269 --> 00:33:17.630 intelligence, it would have a tremendous impact 00:33:17.630 --> 00:33:19.549 on our ability to inform our decision makers. 00:33:19.750 --> 00:33:20.990 I mean, we have our own intelligence and we still 00:33:20.990 --> 00:33:22.809 get it from the Brits and the Aussies and the 00:33:22.809 --> 00:33:25.589 New Zealanders. But the bottom line, Lauren, 00:33:25.650 --> 00:33:28.890 is Canada, given our size, is a net importer 00:33:28.890 --> 00:33:31.309 of intelligence. Whereas I think the United States 00:33:31.309 --> 00:33:34.829 is a net exporter of intelligence. So losing 00:33:34.829 --> 00:33:38.309 that access would have a deleterious effect on 00:33:38.309 --> 00:33:40.029 our understanding of the situation around the 00:33:40.029 --> 00:33:42.160 world. And at that point, it can start to affect 00:33:42.160 --> 00:33:44.579 joint operations as well. And, you know, we've 00:33:44.579 --> 00:33:48.380 bragged now for over a century, well, two centuries 00:33:48.380 --> 00:33:50.759 now, that we have the world's longest undefended 00:33:50.759 --> 00:33:54.000 border. You know, until recently, right? People 00:33:54.000 --> 00:33:56.579 cross pretty easily. I'm not going to cross anytime 00:33:56.579 --> 00:33:59.039 soon for reasons I won't get into. I remember 00:33:59.039 --> 00:34:00.880 as a kid with my dad going to see the Tigers 00:34:00.880 --> 00:34:03.160 play in Detroit. And basically, it was a wave 00:34:03.160 --> 00:34:05.099 and a smile at the border. That's all you had. 00:34:05.180 --> 00:34:09.710 No passports, no ID, nothing. So we do share 00:34:09.710 --> 00:34:11.750 information that keeps the border safe for both 00:34:11.750 --> 00:34:13.570 of our countries. And if this is going to be 00:34:13.570 --> 00:34:16.050 jeopardized because of the politicization and 00:34:16.050 --> 00:34:18.190 because of the vindictiveness of certain officials, 00:34:18.550 --> 00:34:21.510 it's going to affect both of us. It'll affect 00:34:21.510 --> 00:34:23.050 us because we won't have the intelligence that 00:34:23.050 --> 00:34:24.949 you share with us. It'll affect the Americans 00:34:24.949 --> 00:34:27.510 because we'll be that much more. I mean, I wouldn't 00:34:27.510 --> 00:34:29.889 say be a tit for tat. Let's just say, you know, 00:34:29.889 --> 00:34:31.889 if we're cut off, there'll be a greater reluctance 00:34:31.889 --> 00:34:34.349 to share what we know with our American counterparts 00:34:34.349 --> 00:34:36.090 because, well, you're not sharing with us. So 00:34:36.090 --> 00:34:38.159 why in heaven? It'd be like tariffs, right? You 00:34:38.159 --> 00:34:39.940 put tariffs on us, we're going to put tariffs 00:34:39.940 --> 00:34:42.940 on you. Right. Well, and the thing is, is everybody 00:34:42.940 --> 00:34:45.840 suffers with that. Everybody is less safe when 00:34:45.840 --> 00:34:48.539 that happens. And I think that's the key point, 00:34:48.599 --> 00:34:51.500 because we both know that political leaders come 00:34:51.500 --> 00:34:54.099 and go, and hopefully they come in with the best 00:34:54.099 --> 00:34:56.800 of intentions about what they want to do. But 00:34:56.800 --> 00:34:58.519 at the end of the day, the jobs that you and 00:34:58.519 --> 00:35:01.219 I had and the people that still do those jobs 00:35:01.219 --> 00:35:04.340 on a day -to -day basis. Do it out of patriotism. 00:35:04.360 --> 00:35:07.280 Do it because they love their country. They want 00:35:07.280 --> 00:35:10.199 to make their country safe. And we both know 00:35:10.199 --> 00:35:12.300 that the people doing the job on the ground are 00:35:12.300 --> 00:35:15.219 not paying attention to the politics. They're 00:35:15.219 --> 00:35:17.900 about getting the mission done. And so, you know, 00:35:17.920 --> 00:35:19.960 as we've often said, and I think I shared with 00:35:19.960 --> 00:35:22.500 you when I was in France, the French didn't agree 00:35:22.500 --> 00:35:25.420 with the choice to invade Iraq either. And I 00:35:25.420 --> 00:35:29.019 was so worried that they would stop sharing information. 00:35:29.980 --> 00:35:32.599 And it was the best feedback because what they 00:35:32.599 --> 00:35:35.079 said to me is, don't worry, that's the politicians. 00:35:35.219 --> 00:35:38.139 We still have a job to do in keeping the people 00:35:38.139 --> 00:35:40.619 in our countries and around the world safer. 00:35:40.739 --> 00:35:43.480 And so we're going to continue to focus on that. 00:35:43.579 --> 00:35:46.880 And I think if we can do that, that's what keeps 00:35:46.880 --> 00:35:50.559 everybody in a better place. And I think hopefully 00:35:50.559 --> 00:35:52.659 hearing from you, too, is really important because 00:35:52.659 --> 00:35:55.099 it allows people to understand the mechanism 00:35:55.099 --> 00:35:58.159 and the importance of those relationships. And 00:35:58.159 --> 00:36:00.559 it's also unnecessary. I mean, the system was 00:36:00.559 --> 00:36:04.840 working fine. You know, again, I've seen incredibly 00:36:04.840 --> 00:36:07.519 sensitive source intelligence that's being shared 00:36:07.519 --> 00:36:12.019 back and forth for over three decades. If it 00:36:12.019 --> 00:36:14.760 ain't broke, don't fix it. You know, again, we're 00:36:14.760 --> 00:36:17.639 going to have our disagreements, but, you know, 00:36:17.639 --> 00:36:20.679 it's such a fluid relationship that we have. 00:36:20.780 --> 00:36:23.639 It's almost seamless. You know, we have, again, 00:36:23.719 --> 00:36:25.679 we have, you know, we have our liaison people 00:36:25.679 --> 00:36:27.440 in each other's agency, but we also have people 00:36:27.440 --> 00:36:31.059 that, you know, work in each other's agencies 00:36:31.059 --> 00:36:34.260 and even work on files that normally they wouldn't 00:36:34.260 --> 00:36:36.320 have access to because there's that trust factor 00:36:36.320 --> 00:36:40.519 that's there. And for this to be happening. Even 00:36:40.519 --> 00:36:43.219 with you and I, Phil, because we came from the 00:36:43.219 --> 00:36:45.059 environment we came in, although we didn't know 00:36:45.059 --> 00:36:47.480 each other personally while we were still working 00:36:47.480 --> 00:36:49.719 for our respective governments, we knew people 00:36:49.719 --> 00:36:53.019 in common. So that trust always is there. We 00:36:53.019 --> 00:36:56.519 inherently said, I'm trusting him. I'm trusting 00:36:56.519 --> 00:37:00.769 her. Because we spent so long recognizing that 00:37:00.769 --> 00:37:03.889 we were better together and we assume that trust 00:37:03.889 --> 00:37:07.130 is there for the good until there's a reason 00:37:07.130 --> 00:37:09.289 not to. And I think that's an important point 00:37:09.289 --> 00:37:12.250 also and a through line that will continue for 00:37:12.250 --> 00:37:15.809 us probably for the rest of our lives. I couldn't 00:37:15.809 --> 00:37:17.949 agree with you more. I still have very close 00:37:17.949 --> 00:37:21.170 friendships with colleagues in Australia, United 00:37:21.170 --> 00:37:24.119 Kingdom. in New Zealand and the United States, 00:37:24.300 --> 00:37:26.300 even in some of the Western European partners 00:37:26.300 --> 00:37:27.960 with which I worked in counterterrorism over 00:37:27.960 --> 00:37:31.219 the years. They weren't just colleagues, they 00:37:31.219 --> 00:37:34.820 became friends. And, you know, those friendships 00:37:34.820 --> 00:37:38.239 are lasting. And it's because it worked well. 00:37:38.559 --> 00:37:42.420 And, you know, trust is earned. And this trust 00:37:42.420 --> 00:37:45.480 has been earned over the better part of almost 00:37:45.480 --> 00:37:47.119 a while. It's not quite a century now since the 00:37:47.119 --> 00:37:49.760 end of the Second World War. You know, for two 00:37:49.760 --> 00:37:51.739 countries, I'll throw the Brits in, for three 00:37:51.739 --> 00:37:53.480 countries that died together on the beaches of 00:37:53.480 --> 00:37:57.420 Normandy, free Europe from tyranny. Similar in 00:37:57.420 --> 00:38:00.159 Afghanistan, you know, when the president, you 00:38:00.159 --> 00:38:03.400 know, talked about nobody else, you know, was 00:38:03.400 --> 00:38:05.880 on the front lines of Afghanistan. I mean, people 00:38:05.880 --> 00:38:08.719 were justifiably angry. I mean, 164 Canadian 00:38:08.719 --> 00:38:12.400 soldiers died in Afghanistan. That's not a small 00:38:12.400 --> 00:38:15.900 number for a country our size. You know, to have 00:38:15.900 --> 00:38:17.780 that ignored and have that sort of poo -pooed 00:38:17.780 --> 00:38:21.900 or dismissed, it really hurts because Americans, 00:38:22.079 --> 00:38:23.659 Canadians, Brits all surrounded, we all fought 00:38:23.659 --> 00:38:27.280 together in those various wars. And to insult 00:38:27.280 --> 00:38:31.400 the memory and the sacrifice that was made, it's, 00:38:31.480 --> 00:38:35.119 but Lauren, it's so unnecessary. You know, I 00:38:35.119 --> 00:38:37.280 mean, there's other ways to score cheap political 00:38:37.280 --> 00:38:40.099 points. And, you know, as well as I did, that's 00:38:40.099 --> 00:38:42.239 what politicians do. They want to score cheap 00:38:42.239 --> 00:38:45.360 points, right? Why in heaven's name would you 00:38:45.360 --> 00:38:48.800 score cheap points when it comes to multilateral 00:38:48.800 --> 00:38:51.079 intelligence and military and law enforcement 00:38:51.079 --> 00:38:54.320 alliances? It doesn't make any sense to me. It's 00:38:54.320 --> 00:38:57.139 almost like an own goal. Like you're just cutting 00:38:57.139 --> 00:38:58.920 off your nose just by your face in this regard. 00:38:59.719 --> 00:39:05.019 I hope this too shall pass. I don't know. The 00:39:05.019 --> 00:39:08.719 alliance is far too important to founder. I hope 00:39:08.719 --> 00:39:12.539 we can get the point where... You know, the trust 00:39:12.539 --> 00:39:14.780 levels are going to be re -established. Like 00:39:14.780 --> 00:39:16.719 I said, at the ground, you know, the cold face 00:39:16.719 --> 00:39:19.159 level, I'm not too worried about that. It's the 00:39:19.159 --> 00:39:20.519 higher levels that I think are going to take. 00:39:20.579 --> 00:39:23.920 And as my prime minister said, you know, if you 00:39:23.920 --> 00:39:25.579 break trust one day, it doesn't reappear the 00:39:25.579 --> 00:39:28.239 next day. It's going to take some time to rebuild 00:39:28.239 --> 00:39:31.360 that. I have confidence, though, in our alliance. 00:39:31.559 --> 00:39:33.760 I have confidence that, you know, as I said, 00:39:33.800 --> 00:39:36.500 you know, as neighbors, as friends, you know, 00:39:36.500 --> 00:39:40.030 we've been very close for, you know. since the 00:39:40.030 --> 00:39:45.110 last time you tried to invade us in 1812. Well, 00:39:45.190 --> 00:39:47.389 I think that's a perfect segue. So we want to 00:39:47.389 --> 00:39:49.889 start wrapping this up. But if you could build 00:39:49.889 --> 00:39:52.090 on that just a little, what, Phil, would you 00:39:52.090 --> 00:39:55.489 like to leave our listeners with? What is one 00:39:55.489 --> 00:39:58.150 thing or a couple things that you would really 00:39:58.150 --> 00:40:00.230 want people to understand about the importance 00:40:00.230 --> 00:40:03.349 of the liaison relationship and the alliances 00:40:03.349 --> 00:40:06.550 between the United States and Canada and with 00:40:06.550 --> 00:40:10.260 others? Okay, I'll put it real simple. The United 00:40:10.260 --> 00:40:13.500 States has no better or closer friend and ally 00:40:13.500 --> 00:40:16.619 than Canada. That's been the case for centuries. 00:40:17.059 --> 00:40:20.500 We have our disagreements. There always is a 00:40:20.500 --> 00:40:23.039 latent anti -Americanism within Canada. It's 00:40:23.039 --> 00:40:25.480 only because I think a lot of us, you know, we 00:40:25.480 --> 00:40:27.980 see you as a major power that we're not. We're 00:40:27.980 --> 00:40:31.360 very much a middle power. But we visited each 00:40:31.360 --> 00:40:33.760 other's countries. We do vacations in each other's 00:40:33.760 --> 00:40:36.420 countries. Canadians flee to Florida and Arizona 00:40:36.420 --> 00:40:39.530 when it's minus. 145 million degrees up here 00:40:39.530 --> 00:40:42.150 in wintertime, like it has this winter. Although 00:40:42.150 --> 00:40:43.929 that too has been affected over the past couple 00:40:43.929 --> 00:40:47.550 months, unfortunately. But why would you want 00:40:47.550 --> 00:40:53.170 to harm such a close, mutually beneficial relationship? 00:40:53.869 --> 00:40:55.809 Whether we're talking trade, whether we're talking 00:40:55.809 --> 00:40:58.469 the military. Let me look at NORAD, right? North 00:40:58.469 --> 00:40:59.750 American Air Defense. I mean, this has been around 00:40:59.750 --> 00:41:02.070 since the Cold War. And it's jointly commanded 00:41:02.070 --> 00:41:04.809 by a Canadian American. Why would, again, if 00:41:04.809 --> 00:41:08.670 it ain't broke, don't fix it. This alliance has 00:41:08.670 --> 00:41:11.989 stood the test of time. We have shown through 00:41:11.989 --> 00:41:13.989 blood and treasure that we're on the same side. 00:41:14.769 --> 00:41:18.730 And moving on, I hope we can get back to that 00:41:18.730 --> 00:41:22.630 sense of trust and mutual respect. I'm hopeful. 00:41:23.170 --> 00:41:26.329 Again, the average American, the average Canadian, 00:41:26.530 --> 00:41:32.190 we get it. And I think that it'll be a rather 00:41:32.190 --> 00:41:34.789 rapid reestablishment of that relationship once 00:41:34.789 --> 00:41:37.760 the current... you know, political shenanigans 00:41:37.760 --> 00:41:41.860 end. So I'm confident in that regard. I just 00:41:41.860 --> 00:41:43.360 wish we weren't going through this rather hard 00:41:43.360 --> 00:41:45.900 patch right now. Yeah, they are tough. They are 00:41:45.900 --> 00:41:50.139 tough. Phil, I am so grateful to you for taking 00:41:50.139 --> 00:41:53.699 the time to come on here with me and talk about 00:41:53.699 --> 00:41:55.699 this. I mean, we have our own great new friendship 00:41:55.699 --> 00:41:59.460 forged over the last 14 months or so, which is 00:41:59.460 --> 00:42:02.880 wonderful. But I value, we value hearing from 00:42:02.880 --> 00:42:07.219 you as our... As our partners, as our friends 00:42:07.219 --> 00:42:09.659 to the north, you've always been there. I hope 00:42:09.659 --> 00:42:12.239 it always stays. And I'm very grateful for you 00:42:12.239 --> 00:42:15.719 sharing your time, your wisdom, your views on 00:42:15.719 --> 00:42:19.400 things, because it matters. And so thank you 00:42:19.400 --> 00:42:22.559 so much for that. Thanks for having me on. Even 00:42:22.559 --> 00:42:24.599 though you won both gold medals and ice hockey 00:42:24.599 --> 00:42:28.579 at the Olympics, we will forgive you. Well, thank 00:42:28.579 --> 00:42:31.820 you for that. And thanks for everyone for tuning 00:42:31.820 --> 00:42:34.519 in for this episode of the Steady State Sentinel. 00:42:35.289 --> 00:42:37.530 This is Lauren Anderson, still standing watch. 00:42:37.730 --> 00:42:43.710 Thank you. Thank you for listening to the SteadyState 00:42:43.710 --> 00:42:47.250 Sentinel podcast. Don't miss out on more insights 00:42:47.250 --> 00:42:50.429 and exposes from America's premier global security 00:42:50.429 --> 00:42:55.050 experts. Also, subscribe to our Substack at substack 00:42:55.050 --> 00:42:59.369 .com slash at SteadyState1 and follow our social 00:42:59.369 --> 00:43:02.010 media and join us right here next week for another 00:43:02.010 --> 00:43:05.650 exciting edition. The Steady State is a nonprofit 00:43:05.650 --> 00:43:08.630 organization working to sustain our democracy 00:43:08.630 --> 00:43:12.110 and national security. 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