WEBVTT - AI Generated 00:00:00.200 --> 00:00:03.299 Something is changing in our country, and most 00:00:03.299 --> 00:00:11.539 people feel it before they can explain it. My 00:00:11.539 --> 00:00:13.900 guest today is Shane Harris, a national security 00:00:13.900 --> 00:00:16.500 journalist at The Atlantic and a former Washington 00:00:16.500 --> 00:00:19.059 Post national security reporter. Shane's known 00:00:19.059 --> 00:00:20.980 for deeply reported stories on intelligence, 00:00:21.019 --> 00:00:24.000 surveillance, and cyber conflict. And at The 00:00:24.000 --> 00:00:25.820 Post, he was a part of the team that won the 00:00:25.820 --> 00:00:28.899 2022 Pulitzer Prize for Public Service. He's 00:00:28.899 --> 00:00:30.539 also the author of two books on surveillance 00:00:30.539 --> 00:00:33.240 and cyber conflict, The Watchers and At War. 00:00:33.700 --> 00:00:35.820 And he's known for deeply reported stories that 00:00:35.820 --> 00:00:37.840 connect intelligence tradecraft to real world 00:00:37.840 --> 00:00:39.859 consequences. In fact, he's one of those guys 00:00:39.859 --> 00:00:42.460 that somehow has sources inside the report stuff 00:00:42.460 --> 00:00:44.299 that even those of us in the national security 00:00:44.299 --> 00:00:47.320 space are like, wow, how do you know that? So 00:00:47.320 --> 00:00:49.340 Shane, welcome to the show. Good to see you, 00:00:49.359 --> 00:00:51.539 John. Thanks for having me. My pleasure. It's 00:00:51.539 --> 00:00:54.320 great to see you too. I want to talk about your 00:00:54.320 --> 00:00:56.700 career and changes you've witnessed in U .S. 00:00:56.700 --> 00:00:58.820 national security and also some recent events. 00:00:59.420 --> 00:01:01.399 But I think Americans are rightly focused on 00:01:01.399 --> 00:01:03.880 domestic economic issues now. But I think it's 00:01:03.880 --> 00:01:06.819 nonetheless important to show what happens abroad 00:01:06.819 --> 00:01:09.159 and in our national security that will eventually 00:01:09.159 --> 00:01:11.579 impact us at home. So I want to get to some of 00:01:11.579 --> 00:01:13.519 that stuff, if you don't mind. Sure. That's great. 00:01:13.659 --> 00:01:15.379 Well, first of all, I know you spent several 00:01:15.379 --> 00:01:17.140 years at The Washington Post. Your reporting 00:01:17.140 --> 00:01:19.859 was excellent. And like I said, often surprising 00:01:19.859 --> 00:01:21.959 to a former intelligence officer about just how 00:01:21.959 --> 00:01:24.659 much you uncovered. So what is your take on what's 00:01:24.659 --> 00:01:28.000 happening at the Post now and maybe the state 00:01:28.000 --> 00:01:30.280 of media and journalism related to foreign affairs 00:01:30.280 --> 00:01:33.519 in general? Yeah, well, my my my big take on 00:01:33.519 --> 00:01:35.239 what's happening at the post is it's terribly 00:01:35.239 --> 00:01:38.180 sad. You know, I spent seven years there and 00:01:38.180 --> 00:01:41.400 worked with a lot of people who aren't there 00:01:41.400 --> 00:01:43.340 anymore, either because they left, you know, 00:01:43.359 --> 00:01:46.439 a year or so ago, like I did, or they got they 00:01:46.439 --> 00:01:49.280 lost their jobs or in the recent round of layoffs. 00:01:50.060 --> 00:01:54.439 You know, I said this publicly. I think that. 00:01:54.760 --> 00:01:56.659 The sad truth about what's going on at The Post 00:01:56.659 --> 00:01:58.540 is the people who've been in charge don't know 00:01:58.540 --> 00:02:00.840 how to run a newspaper. They just don't really 00:02:00.840 --> 00:02:05.459 seem to understand, you know, the business model 00:02:05.459 --> 00:02:09.120 of journalism in the year 2026, which I'm not 00:02:09.120 --> 00:02:11.099 saying that there's some, you know, obvious way 00:02:11.099 --> 00:02:15.759 to do this. But, you know. It seems to me that 00:02:15.759 --> 00:02:18.280 they alienated a lot of their subscribers with 00:02:18.280 --> 00:02:20.439 things like canceling a presidential endorsement 00:02:20.439 --> 00:02:22.500 11 days before the endorsement, which, look, 00:02:22.580 --> 00:02:23.960 I'm in the category of people who don't think 00:02:23.960 --> 00:02:25.719 newspapers should be doing presidential endorsements 00:02:25.719 --> 00:02:28.080 either. But if you do it 11, if you cancel it 00:02:28.080 --> 00:02:30.639 11 days before an election, you're going to annoy 00:02:30.639 --> 00:02:32.599 some people. And they lost hundreds of thousands 00:02:32.599 --> 00:02:34.659 of subscribers because of that. There just never 00:02:34.659 --> 00:02:38.199 was really a plan for how to make money, given 00:02:38.199 --> 00:02:39.939 all the great reporting that people were doing 00:02:39.939 --> 00:02:42.770 at The Post. The Wall Street Journal figured 00:02:42.770 --> 00:02:44.430 out how to do that. The New York Times figured 00:02:44.430 --> 00:02:46.530 out how to do that. My current employer has figured 00:02:46.530 --> 00:02:49.009 out how to do that. And I don't think that the 00:02:49.009 --> 00:02:54.849 answer is unknowable. I just think that the people 00:02:54.849 --> 00:02:58.509 who are at the top really did not make good decisions. 00:02:58.530 --> 00:03:02.490 And ultimately, Jeff Bezos is very distracted 00:03:02.490 --> 00:03:05.909 and is more interested in building rockets and 00:03:05.909 --> 00:03:08.469 competing with Elon Musk than running a newspaper. 00:03:09.760 --> 00:03:11.479 Well, does he even need to make money? I mean, 00:03:11.500 --> 00:03:13.319 the guy's got so much money, he could run the 00:03:13.319 --> 00:03:15.060 Washington Post out of his back pocket and not 00:03:15.060 --> 00:03:17.659 even realize where the money is going. So in 00:03:17.659 --> 00:03:20.539 a certain sense, if I was super rich and I was 00:03:20.539 --> 00:03:21.900 running something, I would just like say, hey, 00:03:21.939 --> 00:03:23.460 make this the best in the world. If it costs 00:03:23.460 --> 00:03:25.039 me some money, fine. If it makes money, great. 00:03:25.180 --> 00:03:27.300 But like, I don't get it. And that's exactly 00:03:27.300 --> 00:03:30.000 what people thought. I mean, when we were when 00:03:30.000 --> 00:03:31.659 I was at the Post, that's what people thought 00:03:31.659 --> 00:03:36.400 that he was intending. You know. There was a 00:03:36.400 --> 00:03:38.199 period where we were profitable, particularly, 00:03:38.280 --> 00:03:40.080 you know, during the first Trump administration 00:03:40.080 --> 00:03:41.960 where we had tons of readers and subscribers. 00:03:42.300 --> 00:03:43.879 I mean, that is the important difference between 00:03:43.879 --> 00:03:45.699 someone who just reads the paper and who actually 00:03:45.699 --> 00:03:51.479 pays for it. And not that, you know, you know, 00:03:51.479 --> 00:03:53.180 just because you have a billionaire owner, they 00:03:53.180 --> 00:03:56.199 should run a newspaper like a charity. But profit 00:03:56.199 --> 00:03:58.900 was never going to be the thing for him. I mean, 00:03:58.900 --> 00:04:01.159 it was I mean, even in the days when newspapers 00:04:01.159 --> 00:04:03.740 made, you know, hefty, hefty profits, you know, 00:04:03.740 --> 00:04:06.960 decades ago. The Post was never going to generate 00:04:06.960 --> 00:04:08.580 the kind of money that would matter to somebody 00:04:08.580 --> 00:04:12.340 as rich as him. So my question is, and I don't 00:04:12.340 --> 00:04:13.639 know that we know the answer to this, at what 00:04:13.639 --> 00:04:17.660 point did Bezos go from being a kind of benevolent 00:04:17.660 --> 00:04:20.459 owner who, as he said, wanted this to be his 00:04:20.459 --> 00:04:22.480 legacy and the thing that he looked back on when 00:04:22.480 --> 00:04:24.939 he was in his 90s as what he was most proud of? 00:04:25.480 --> 00:04:27.379 to somebody who said, no, I actually need this 00:04:27.379 --> 00:04:29.180 thing to be more efficient and turn a profit. 00:04:29.600 --> 00:04:35.220 I think you can read in his very outward political 00:04:35.220 --> 00:04:38.740 overtures to the current administration, you 00:04:38.740 --> 00:04:40.720 know, including Amazon buying, you know, the 00:04:40.720 --> 00:04:44.560 Melania documentary for $40 million, which would 00:04:44.560 --> 00:04:47.959 have gone a long way to helping a post get out 00:04:47.959 --> 00:04:52.579 of the red. You know, I do think that there's 00:04:52.579 --> 00:04:55.620 something to this kind of... rightward tilt of 00:04:55.620 --> 00:05:01.160 the editorial page and a kind of gutting of the 00:05:01.160 --> 00:05:03.079 newsroom that's more interested in turning it 00:05:03.079 --> 00:05:05.459 into. Something that can be self -sustaining, 00:05:05.519 --> 00:05:07.300 which is great. But there's again, the problem 00:05:07.300 --> 00:05:09.379 is there's no plan here. Like, I mean, at the 00:05:09.379 --> 00:05:11.420 end of the day, they said we want to focus on 00:05:11.420 --> 00:05:14.259 politics and national security journalism, which 00:05:14.259 --> 00:05:15.860 that's great. Those are two things that I've 00:05:15.860 --> 00:05:18.139 spent my career writing about. But then how are 00:05:18.139 --> 00:05:20.279 you any different than like Politico? Why are 00:05:20.279 --> 00:05:22.000 you The Washington Post when you don't have a 00:05:22.000 --> 00:05:24.220 sports section, a local section? You don't have 00:05:24.220 --> 00:05:28.420 a foreign desk anymore. Color me skeptical that 00:05:28.420 --> 00:05:31.079 you can record on U .S. national security without 00:05:31.079 --> 00:05:34.779 having a foreign staff. It doesn't work that 00:05:34.779 --> 00:05:36.920 way. Oh, it's sad. That's one thing for sure. 00:05:37.019 --> 00:05:38.699 So now you're at The Atlantic and you've written 00:05:38.699 --> 00:05:41.759 a number of excellent articles. And one recent 00:05:41.759 --> 00:05:43.500 one that I found really fascinating had to do 00:05:43.500 --> 00:05:45.439 with your potential brush with an Iranian spy 00:05:45.439 --> 00:05:48.959 in an article called They Killed My Source. Can 00:05:48.959 --> 00:05:50.600 you give the listeners a bit of background on 00:05:50.600 --> 00:05:52.899 the story and like what ethical lines did you 00:05:52.899 --> 00:05:54.639 have to think about while you're pursuing that 00:05:54.639 --> 00:05:57.279 story? Yeah, this was one of the wilder stories 00:05:57.279 --> 00:05:59.480 in my career, which has had some pretty wild 00:05:59.480 --> 00:06:01.819 ones. So this actually goes all the way back 00:06:01.819 --> 00:06:04.360 to 2016, and I waited a long time to write about 00:06:04.360 --> 00:06:06.519 this for various reasons that we can talk about 00:06:06.519 --> 00:06:11.579 if you want. But back in 2016, a source of mine 00:06:11.579 --> 00:06:14.360 in the cybersecurity world alerted me to the 00:06:14.360 --> 00:06:17.160 fact that there had been a message posted on 00:06:17.160 --> 00:06:19.160 essentially like a bulletin board on the dark 00:06:19.160 --> 00:06:21.939 web that was known to be frequented by hacker 00:06:21.939 --> 00:06:25.339 groups. And this person posting this message 00:06:25.339 --> 00:06:28.920 claimed to be part of an Iranian hacker collective, 00:06:29.240 --> 00:06:31.639 which was well known at the time, and that they 00:06:31.639 --> 00:06:34.199 had information about the downing of a U .S. 00:06:34.240 --> 00:06:37.079 stealth drone over Iran, which had taken place 00:06:37.079 --> 00:06:41.199 earlier. And in my experience, you know, I get 00:06:41.199 --> 00:06:44.740 emails from and texts from people fairly frequently 00:06:44.740 --> 00:06:46.839 that claim to know something about, you know. 00:06:48.680 --> 00:06:51.019 mysterious beings buried in the desert or the 00:06:51.019 --> 00:06:53.079 fillings in my teeth are talking to me, right? 00:06:53.180 --> 00:06:54.620 And then there's people who claim to know something 00:06:54.620 --> 00:06:57.740 that sounds a little bit more potentially real, 00:06:57.879 --> 00:06:59.540 but most of the time they turn out to really 00:06:59.540 --> 00:07:02.639 not know much anything at all. And it's those 00:07:02.639 --> 00:07:05.839 kind of inquiries that, you know, it's worth 00:07:05.839 --> 00:07:07.879 just firing it off an email just to see if the 00:07:07.879 --> 00:07:09.600 person is completely full of it or not. Like, 00:07:09.600 --> 00:07:11.240 what does it cost you? It costs you 30 seconds. 00:07:11.639 --> 00:07:13.839 So I wrote to this person and said, hey, I heard 00:07:13.839 --> 00:07:15.259 you have this information. You claim to have 00:07:15.259 --> 00:07:18.079 information. Long story short, he gets back in 00:07:18.079 --> 00:07:19.899 touch with me a few days later and starts going 00:07:19.899 --> 00:07:22.420 through this whole protocol to, like, verify 00:07:22.420 --> 00:07:26.259 my identity. Based on things that he must have 00:07:26.259 --> 00:07:29.519 researched online about my biography to kind 00:07:29.519 --> 00:07:32.480 of verify that I am who I am. And as I'm talking 00:07:32.480 --> 00:07:34.220 to him, I'm like, this guy sure seems to be, 00:07:34.220 --> 00:07:36.600 you know, kind of professionalized about this. 00:07:36.680 --> 00:07:41.360 This is interesting. And what he told me was 00:07:41.360 --> 00:07:45.600 that he was an Iranian intelligence officer. 00:07:46.350 --> 00:07:48.970 that he was part of essentially their cyber warfare 00:07:48.970 --> 00:07:54.689 unit, that it was his staff that had hacked the 00:07:54.689 --> 00:07:57.970 stealth drone and forced it to crash, and that 00:07:57.970 --> 00:08:02.610 he had information about the regime's cyber activities 00:08:02.610 --> 00:08:06.129 that he wanted to leak to a reporter. And I'm 00:08:06.129 --> 00:08:08.089 kind of collapsing, you know, several days of 00:08:08.089 --> 00:08:12.240 conversation here, but... He said he was a regime 00:08:12.240 --> 00:08:14.480 insider, that his father was a senior intelligence 00:08:14.480 --> 00:08:18.540 person in the intelligence ministry. And he clearly 00:08:18.540 --> 00:08:22.300 had grudges against people in the bureaucracy 00:08:22.300 --> 00:08:25.019 and had like revenge that he wanted to exact 00:08:25.019 --> 00:08:27.019 on people for reasons that were not entirely 00:08:27.019 --> 00:08:30.339 clear to me at the time by leaking on them. So 00:08:30.339 --> 00:08:32.980 he was sort of interested in kind of burning 00:08:32.980 --> 00:08:35.419 the house down. And in the course of this, he 00:08:35.419 --> 00:08:38.039 then told me that in addition to being an Iranian 00:08:38.039 --> 00:08:40.320 intelligence officer, he had also been an agent 00:08:40.320 --> 00:08:42.840 for the CIA. So he had spied for the Americans. 00:08:43.360 --> 00:08:48.440 And that the relationship had ended not on great 00:08:48.440 --> 00:08:51.500 terms. I didn't know what that meant at the time. 00:08:51.919 --> 00:08:56.419 And that his hope was that in the course of leaking 00:08:56.419 --> 00:08:58.940 information to me that would then show up in 00:08:58.940 --> 00:09:04.190 news articles, the CIA would notice this. And 00:09:04.190 --> 00:09:06.190 at some point he was going to see if I would 00:09:06.190 --> 00:09:08.610 be willing to call the agency on his behalf. 00:09:08.610 --> 00:09:10.690 Get back in touch with them. Get back in touch 00:09:10.690 --> 00:09:12.750 with them and say, hey, you remember your boy 00:09:12.750 --> 00:09:15.570 who you broke up with a while ago? He's got new 00:09:15.570 --> 00:09:17.769 stuff for you. He's got new stuff. Look, you're 00:09:17.769 --> 00:09:21.129 reading about it in the press. And for all kinds 00:09:21.129 --> 00:09:25.450 of reasons, that sounded absolutely nuts. But 00:09:25.450 --> 00:09:28.669 the first part of, you know, I want to leak things 00:09:28.669 --> 00:09:30.570 to you that you can then go try to verify and 00:09:30.570 --> 00:09:33.990 report on. That's what I do. That's exactly what 00:09:33.990 --> 00:09:36.730 my job is. So we talked for about two months, 00:09:36.769 --> 00:09:39.090 and my intention was to gather information and 00:09:39.090 --> 00:09:42.549 eventually try and vet him, which I did, by the 00:09:42.549 --> 00:09:46.750 way, and determined that he had been an asset 00:09:46.750 --> 00:09:49.269 for the agency, a pretty productive one and a 00:09:49.269 --> 00:09:52.250 good one, but a very hard -to -handle one who 00:09:52.250 --> 00:09:55.269 liked to do things his own way. And I think that 00:09:55.269 --> 00:09:58.409 the risk -reward... relationship here for the 00:09:58.409 --> 00:10:00.250 agency which is a normal calculus when you're 00:10:00.250 --> 00:10:02.090 inside yeah it just so they cut him off you got 00:10:02.090 --> 00:10:04.230 to keep these people safe like if you have them 00:10:04.230 --> 00:10:05.269 and eventually they're going to get themselves 00:10:05.269 --> 00:10:07.600 caught It's almost better, you know, sometimes 00:10:07.600 --> 00:10:09.259 to get rid of that intelligence because it's 00:10:09.259 --> 00:10:11.019 going to fall apart at some point. Well, and 00:10:11.019 --> 00:10:13.179 to your point, I mean, and I learned all this 00:10:13.179 --> 00:10:18.259 later, but he had gotten himself caught after 00:10:18.259 --> 00:10:21.419 he had separated with the agency. He had been 00:10:21.419 --> 00:10:25.700 arrested. He had been suspected of leaking information 00:10:25.700 --> 00:10:28.019 to dissident groups in Iran. He had spent time 00:10:28.019 --> 00:10:31.639 in prison. I didn't know any of this. And I learned 00:10:31.639 --> 00:10:35.279 about this after he was killed while. He was 00:10:35.279 --> 00:10:38.120 in touch with me. So on a day that we were supposed 00:10:38.120 --> 00:10:41.419 to have one of our regular online meetings and 00:10:41.419 --> 00:10:43.600 we met with these kind of encrypted communications 00:10:43.600 --> 00:10:48.840 helping us, he didn't show up. And then I heard 00:10:48.840 --> 00:10:50.519 for a couple of days later from a mutual contact 00:10:50.519 --> 00:10:53.679 that he had been killed at his apartment. And 00:10:53.679 --> 00:10:56.820 the story is kind of going back and piecing all 00:10:56.820 --> 00:10:59.659 of this together and figuring out, you know. 00:11:00.679 --> 00:11:02.799 Why he was talking to me in the first place, 00:11:02.919 --> 00:11:04.620 what was really the nature of his relationship 00:11:04.620 --> 00:11:08.500 with the agency. And one of the things I explore 00:11:08.500 --> 00:11:12.200 in the story is how the relationship that a reporter 00:11:12.200 --> 00:11:16.259 forms with a source becomes this extremely intimate 00:11:16.259 --> 00:11:19.320 relationship that is very similar to what your 00:11:19.320 --> 00:11:21.419 world was when you're developing sources as an 00:11:21.419 --> 00:11:24.299 intelligence officer. And one of the things I 00:11:24.299 --> 00:11:25.940 kind of grapple with in this story was a lot 00:11:25.940 --> 00:11:30.299 of the. uh uh initial um um fear and guilt i 00:11:30.299 --> 00:11:33.350 had that had i done something to not keep him 00:11:33.350 --> 00:11:36.350 safe enough that he had got caught. And people 00:11:36.350 --> 00:11:38.649 can kind of read the story and, you know, learn 00:11:38.649 --> 00:11:41.210 more about that. But from an ethical standpoint, 00:11:41.570 --> 00:11:44.029 it was it was a very challenging relationship 00:11:44.029 --> 00:11:47.090 because on the one hand, he was a source. On 00:11:47.090 --> 00:11:51.929 the other hand, he wanted to use me to get back 00:11:51.929 --> 00:11:54.429 in touch with his old handlers, which would have 00:11:54.429 --> 00:11:56.669 been we never had to cross that bridge. But I 00:11:56.669 --> 00:11:58.230 don't think I would have been able to do that. 00:11:58.679 --> 00:12:00.940 Well, it's an incredible story. And I would suggest 00:12:00.940 --> 00:12:03.000 that people read it. But it shows those kind 00:12:03.000 --> 00:12:05.120 of things we dealt with in our work when I worked 00:12:05.120 --> 00:12:07.960 in CIA of like balancing security and safety 00:12:07.960 --> 00:12:10.879 and the information and somebody's ego and the 00:12:10.879 --> 00:12:13.059 trust. And so I think it's a great, great story. 00:12:13.159 --> 00:12:15.980 So I suggest people read it. So let me move on 00:12:15.980 --> 00:12:17.559 a little bit to something more general about 00:12:17.559 --> 00:12:20.759 intelligence and national security. So obviously, 00:12:20.899 --> 00:12:22.980 with this new Trump administration, there's been 00:12:22.980 --> 00:12:26.860 a lot of changes. But let's go back to what you've 00:12:26.860 --> 00:12:28.320 been doing this for the last 10, 15 years. What 00:12:28.320 --> 00:12:31.519 changes have you witnessed over the past 10 to 00:12:31.519 --> 00:12:34.120 15 years, essentially during the Trump era? Because 00:12:34.120 --> 00:12:35.879 it seems like the Trump era is a stress test 00:12:35.879 --> 00:12:39.139 on our institutions. Yeah. How are they changing? 00:12:39.480 --> 00:12:41.960 And how does it affect who stays, who leaves, 00:12:42.080 --> 00:12:44.440 who rises? Give us a sense of what's changed 00:12:44.440 --> 00:12:47.019 and what you've learned. You know, I used to 00:12:47.019 --> 00:12:51.460 say in the first Trump term. Looking back on 00:12:51.460 --> 00:12:54.500 those four years that I spent that time not writing 00:12:54.500 --> 00:12:56.860 about the intelligence community, but about a 00:12:56.860 --> 00:12:58.919 president at war with the intelligence community. 00:12:59.100 --> 00:13:04.620 And it's so often felt like the main story within 00:13:04.620 --> 00:13:10.639 these agencies was how they were trying to resist 00:13:10.639 --> 00:13:13.679 political influence by the president, how they 00:13:13.679 --> 00:13:17.000 were trying to, to some significant degree, defend 00:13:17.000 --> 00:13:20.029 themselves against. His constant accusations 00:13:20.029 --> 00:13:23.990 that it was, you know, run by a deep state of 00:13:23.990 --> 00:13:27.330 people who were not loyal to him, who were manufacturing 00:13:27.330 --> 00:13:31.129 information to try and take him down. And that 00:13:31.129 --> 00:13:33.690 was just kind of, you know, a dominant theme 00:13:33.690 --> 00:13:39.549 of the coverage. And that was extraordinary because, 00:13:39.629 --> 00:13:43.529 I mean, you know, I came of age writing about 00:13:43.529 --> 00:13:46.929 the intelligence community after 9 -11. And one 00:13:46.929 --> 00:13:49.450 of the and I mean, I before I was like a 25 year 00:13:49.450 --> 00:13:50.870 old reporter and everything I knew about the 00:13:50.870 --> 00:13:53.529 CIA had seen in movies, which, you know, is totally 00:13:53.529 --> 00:13:57.450 accurate. But one of the things that was really 00:13:57.450 --> 00:14:01.149 impressed upon me very early on by people who 00:14:01.149 --> 00:14:04.230 were veteran intelligence officers. was the way 00:14:04.230 --> 00:14:06.570 in which the community strives to function in 00:14:06.570 --> 00:14:09.149 a political manner. It doesn't mean it always 00:14:09.149 --> 00:14:12.110 succeeds, right? But that the default position 00:14:12.110 --> 00:14:14.470 should be that we are an organization that is 00:14:14.470 --> 00:14:17.809 here to serve the president and the decision 00:14:17.809 --> 00:14:19.889 makers, whoever they are, whatever the party, 00:14:20.029 --> 00:14:22.210 and that we do this in as objective a way as 00:14:22.210 --> 00:14:24.149 possible, which resonated with me because that's 00:14:24.149 --> 00:14:28.009 kind of how we work as journalists. And that 00:14:28.009 --> 00:14:31.750 Trump wasn't seeing this. And wasn't understanding 00:14:31.750 --> 00:14:35.649 it or didn't believe it. Just colored the entire 00:14:35.649 --> 00:14:38.809 relationship, I think. You know, and then layering 00:14:38.809 --> 00:14:41.490 on top of that, you know, that, you know, there 00:14:41.490 --> 00:14:43.809 were early on concerns that his campaign had 00:14:43.809 --> 00:14:45.730 been in touch with Russians. And like, I mean, 00:14:45.750 --> 00:14:47.330 people forget this, right? I mean, you don't. 00:14:47.350 --> 00:14:52.529 But that the first year of his term in office, 00:14:52.730 --> 00:14:55.419 I mean, he was. actively under investigation 00:14:55.419 --> 00:14:57.980 by a special counsel to determine whether his 00:14:57.980 --> 00:15:00.539 campaign was coordinating with the Russians during 00:15:00.539 --> 00:15:03.799 the election. And, you know, which he loves to 00:15:03.799 --> 00:15:08.299 call the Russia hoax. Those were real targets 00:15:08.299 --> 00:15:10.820 for us as journalists. And that made us targets 00:15:10.820 --> 00:15:12.500 for a lot of his critics who thought that we 00:15:12.500 --> 00:15:15.960 were inventing this stuff. So, you know, then 00:15:15.960 --> 00:15:19.500 you get kind of to Biden. And things seem to 00:15:19.500 --> 00:15:23.039 kind of revert back to the norm then. And, you 00:15:23.039 --> 00:15:27.480 know, there were many success stories, I think, 00:15:27.500 --> 00:15:29.639 for the intelligence community in the Biden years, 00:15:29.679 --> 00:15:32.360 particularly, you know, their very accurate call 00:15:32.360 --> 00:15:36.600 about Putin's intentions to invade Russia, which 00:15:36.600 --> 00:15:38.759 was now practically four years ago to the day. 00:15:39.080 --> 00:15:42.539 And it just felt like the intelligence agencies 00:15:42.539 --> 00:15:45.879 were sort of getting back to. the kind of normal 00:15:45.879 --> 00:15:47.980 position that they were always in when I covered 00:15:47.980 --> 00:15:51.379 them, which kind of made it a more normal story. 00:15:52.039 --> 00:15:55.399 And now we've sort of flipped back the way things 00:15:55.399 --> 00:15:58.120 were in Trump 1. But what's really changed and 00:15:58.120 --> 00:16:03.220 I think is really alarming to me, I mean, just 00:16:03.220 --> 00:16:07.899 as a citizen, is that in the first term, you 00:16:07.899 --> 00:16:10.899 had people in positions of authority and people 00:16:10.899 --> 00:16:12.759 leading all of these various national security 00:16:12.759 --> 00:16:15.639 agencies. That I think generally, I mean, with 00:16:15.639 --> 00:16:17.519 some exceptions, but we're generally trying to, 00:16:17.539 --> 00:16:19.840 quote, do the right thing. Right. And understood 00:16:19.840 --> 00:16:21.940 that the system was under tremendous strain. 00:16:22.000 --> 00:16:24.820 And in many instances, we're trying to kind of 00:16:24.820 --> 00:16:28.279 hold the line or resist the temptation, the president's 00:16:28.279 --> 00:16:30.740 impulses to really politicize these agencies. 00:16:31.559 --> 00:16:34.240 There is no one like that in positions of authority 00:16:34.240 --> 00:16:36.860 today. In fact, it is the opposite. I think for 00:16:36.860 --> 00:16:39.799 almost exclusively, with some notable exceptions, 00:16:40.059 --> 00:16:43.460 you have people. Running these agencies who very 00:16:43.460 --> 00:16:48.580 much believe in the mission of politicizing the 00:16:48.580 --> 00:16:50.759 agencies, turning them into instruments of politics 00:16:50.759 --> 00:16:52.740 and policy. Now, they will not see it that way, 00:16:52.799 --> 00:16:56.559 but that is what they're doing. I mean, you do 00:16:56.559 --> 00:16:59.919 not have an independent FBI and Justice Department 00:16:59.919 --> 00:17:02.879 right now. The director of national intelligence 00:17:02.879 --> 00:17:05.990 appears to be spending most of her time. Trying 00:17:05.990 --> 00:17:08.309 to prove conspiracy theories to undermine Americans' 00:17:08.529 --> 00:17:10.829 confidence in the election, I presume so that 00:17:10.829 --> 00:17:15.730 when Republicans lose the House in nine months, 00:17:16.230 --> 00:17:18.210 the president's supporters will say the election 00:17:18.210 --> 00:17:23.619 is stolen. Like we have gone so far past the 00:17:23.619 --> 00:17:26.500 zone of even what a politicized intelligence 00:17:26.500 --> 00:17:29.480 community I thought would look like. Let me ask 00:17:29.480 --> 00:17:33.119 you a little bit. How is that impacting the workforce? 00:17:33.220 --> 00:17:34.839 So when I worked at CIA, yes, they bring in a 00:17:34.839 --> 00:17:37.319 new director. And in this case, they bring in 00:17:37.319 --> 00:17:40.319 incompetent partisan directors, Tulsi Gabbard, 00:17:40.400 --> 00:17:43.960 Ratcliffe, Ash Patel or whatever. But in general, 00:17:43.980 --> 00:17:46.599 the workforce, everybody else there came from 00:17:46.599 --> 00:17:48.900 the bottom up, was trained, sees themselves as 00:17:48.900 --> 00:17:52.059 professionals. How is it impacting? I mean, I'm 00:17:52.059 --> 00:17:54.259 careful not to actually reach into old friends 00:17:54.259 --> 00:17:55.960 and ask questions because I'd be putting them 00:17:55.960 --> 00:17:58.460 at risk. But that's sort of your job. Do you 00:17:58.460 --> 00:18:03.200 see that this is having an impact on the workforces? 00:18:03.700 --> 00:18:05.900 What do you see is happening? Because there's 00:18:05.900 --> 00:18:07.940 a lot of news lately that, you know, Ratcliffe 00:18:07.940 --> 00:18:11.019 is saying, pulling all these old analytical reports 00:18:11.019 --> 00:18:13.640 because they're woke and Tulsi Gabbard is trying 00:18:13.640 --> 00:18:16.480 to say that the community was involved in. in 00:18:16.480 --> 00:18:18.059 Russia hoax and all these kind of things. How 00:18:18.059 --> 00:18:19.559 is that impacting the workforce? What are you 00:18:19.559 --> 00:18:23.480 seeing as a reporter? I see morale being plummeting. 00:18:23.859 --> 00:18:26.079 People who've been in the agencies long enough 00:18:26.079 --> 00:18:28.019 to know that this is not how it normally works, 00:18:28.059 --> 00:18:30.119 questioning whether they should leave. A lot 00:18:30.119 --> 00:18:33.960 of people leaving. People being fired, obviously, 00:18:34.059 --> 00:18:37.740 who won't go along with the program, as it were. 00:18:38.960 --> 00:18:42.039 You know, people know this is messed up. Like 00:18:42.039 --> 00:18:44.140 they know this isn't normal and whether they're 00:18:44.140 --> 00:18:46.440 Republicans, Democrats, and they, for the most 00:18:46.440 --> 00:18:49.299 part, they leave the politics at the door when 00:18:49.299 --> 00:18:53.960 they go to work every day. And I think, you know, 00:18:54.000 --> 00:18:59.119 I don't, one thing I wonder is, you know, about 00:18:59.119 --> 00:19:02.079 young people who were in positions where they're 00:19:02.079 --> 00:19:05.400 just coming in right now. And this is. This is 00:19:05.400 --> 00:19:07.579 the environment in which they're learning about 00:19:07.579 --> 00:19:10.200 how the intelligence community works. And are 00:19:10.200 --> 00:19:12.359 they going to presume this is always how it's 00:19:12.359 --> 00:19:14.880 been? Like this is the I mean, you know, it's 00:19:14.880 --> 00:19:17.140 a very as you know, it's a closed system. Right. 00:19:17.259 --> 00:19:19.980 I mean, and you are really inculcated in the 00:19:19.980 --> 00:19:22.180 traditions and the values by people above you. 00:19:22.259 --> 00:19:24.740 Now, I have to imagine to some degree those people 00:19:24.740 --> 00:19:26.640 are saying to young people like this is not how 00:19:26.640 --> 00:19:29.599 it's always worked. But, you know, there are 00:19:29.599 --> 00:19:33.049 reports about loyalty tests. Or, you know, people 00:19:33.049 --> 00:19:35.109 coming into positions now in the national security 00:19:35.109 --> 00:19:37.930 agencies, are we, are they now screening only 00:19:37.930 --> 00:19:42.130 for, you know, MAGA people? This could have a 00:19:42.130 --> 00:19:44.109 long -term kind of effect, you know, and, you 00:19:44.109 --> 00:19:47.589 know, and another, you know, way to measure this 00:19:47.589 --> 00:19:50.130 is in talking to, you know, American allies, 00:19:50.450 --> 00:19:54.089 particularly in the Five Eyes community. You 00:19:54.089 --> 00:19:56.509 know, I talked to, you know, one member of that 00:19:56.509 --> 00:20:03.599 group who said to me, you know, When Biden was 00:20:03.599 --> 00:20:07.640 elected in 2020, we thought, OK, Trump was the 00:20:07.640 --> 00:20:11.160 aberration in American politics. Biden, now we're 00:20:11.160 --> 00:20:13.660 back to the norm. When Trump was reelected in 00:20:13.660 --> 00:20:16.279 2024, this person said, now we realize Biden 00:20:16.279 --> 00:20:19.160 was the aberration, that the norm in your politics 00:20:19.160 --> 00:20:23.490 is that you are polarized. And, you know. Whether 00:20:23.490 --> 00:20:25.990 it's the Canadians, the Brits, the Aussies, whoever 00:20:25.990 --> 00:20:29.170 cooperates with us, I think at the working level, 00:20:29.269 --> 00:20:31.710 those relationships are still pretty sound, from 00:20:31.710 --> 00:20:36.809 what I can tell, and reasonable. But I think 00:20:36.809 --> 00:20:42.890 there is just now this presumption for our allies 00:20:42.890 --> 00:20:46.609 that our politics could vacillate between extreme 00:20:46.609 --> 00:20:48.970 hyper -partisanship and something that looks 00:20:48.970 --> 00:20:51.940 more normal. And by the way, if it does... And 00:20:51.940 --> 00:20:56.960 if a Democrat is elected in two years, is that 00:20:56.960 --> 00:20:59.440 a guarantee that that person won't politicize? 00:20:59.960 --> 00:21:03.000 the FBI and the CIA and the DNI, the way this 00:21:03.000 --> 00:21:04.819 administration has? I mean, will they look at 00:21:04.819 --> 00:21:06.460 this and say, well, Trump got away with it. Maybe 00:21:06.460 --> 00:21:08.900 I can do it, too. I mean, it's not we shouldn't 00:21:08.900 --> 00:21:11.700 just presume that because somebody is a Democrat, 00:21:11.880 --> 00:21:14.920 that they're just disposed to be, you know, apolitical 00:21:14.920 --> 00:21:17.559 institutionalists when it comes to this stuff. 00:21:17.740 --> 00:21:20.519 And I think our allies see that as well. And 00:21:20.519 --> 00:21:23.299 that makes them very nervous. Well, as a reporter, 00:21:23.400 --> 00:21:26.740 though, does it make it hard or easier to report? 00:21:26.839 --> 00:21:30.839 Are there more people? Maybe let me spread that 00:21:30.839 --> 00:21:32.839 out to the national security community. Are more 00:21:32.839 --> 00:21:35.880 people willing to talk to reporters to leak those 00:21:35.880 --> 00:21:40.440 type of things or less? It makes it easier for 00:21:40.440 --> 00:21:42.480 people, I think, who are disgruntled and afraid. 00:21:42.720 --> 00:21:47.559 Like those people kind of come forward, which, 00:21:48.299 --> 00:21:51.940 you know, look, I mean, as a reporter. Disgruntled 00:21:51.940 --> 00:21:54.319 government employees are often like really good 00:21:54.319 --> 00:21:57.599 sources of information. Right. So in that sense, 00:21:57.740 --> 00:22:01.160 I think. It is helpful insofar as people might 00:22:01.160 --> 00:22:03.460 feel more compelled to go to a reporter and say 00:22:03.460 --> 00:22:04.980 somebody has to do something about this or I 00:22:04.980 --> 00:22:08.519 have to tell someone about this. On the flip 00:22:08.519 --> 00:22:12.380 side, what's making it harder is that, you know, 00:22:12.380 --> 00:22:15.380 in a properly functioning intelligence community, 00:22:15.819 --> 00:22:19.039 it's not that the leadership are friendly with 00:22:19.039 --> 00:22:23.319 the press, but. You know, they realize that the 00:22:23.319 --> 00:22:25.680 press has a role to play as well in informing 00:22:25.680 --> 00:22:28.200 the public on foreign policy and the operations 00:22:28.200 --> 00:22:31.859 of government. And the best DNIs or CIA directors, 00:22:32.019 --> 00:22:34.779 in my experience, are the ones who have been 00:22:34.779 --> 00:22:38.140 willing talk to reporters, to bring them in, 00:22:38.220 --> 00:22:41.200 to brief them, to put analysts in front of them, 00:22:41.319 --> 00:22:43.519 you know, often off the record or on background. 00:22:44.640 --> 00:22:47.759 But those folks who really did see the press 00:22:47.759 --> 00:22:50.759 as, you know, an organization, institution that 00:22:50.759 --> 00:22:53.079 they needed to have a relationship with, both 00:22:53.079 --> 00:22:54.980 to get their views across, but also because they 00:22:54.980 --> 00:22:56.500 understood that we play an important part in 00:22:56.500 --> 00:22:59.059 performing the public. In the current environment, 00:23:00.059 --> 00:23:02.859 You have leaders who view us as the enemy. I 00:23:02.859 --> 00:23:05.599 mean, who delight in, you know, slamming us on 00:23:05.599 --> 00:23:09.839 Twitter all day. And so speaking for myself, 00:23:10.000 --> 00:23:13.299 that dialogue that used to occur between the 00:23:13.299 --> 00:23:16.339 press and the institution in the terms through 00:23:16.339 --> 00:23:18.759 the leadership of those organizations, it's not 00:23:18.759 --> 00:23:21.759 there. Does it make it harder when people come 00:23:21.759 --> 00:23:23.839 to talk to you from inside, like quote unquote 00:23:23.839 --> 00:23:26.140 whistleblowers or what have you, because you 00:23:26.140 --> 00:23:29.819 have to then vet. How do you develop trust with 00:23:29.819 --> 00:23:34.279 them? How do you know that they are not? I don't 00:23:34.279 --> 00:23:36.380 know, because like in our world, when I was trying 00:23:36.380 --> 00:23:38.980 to run sources, we were looking for people who 00:23:38.980 --> 00:23:41.440 had a clear motivation that we understood, that 00:23:41.440 --> 00:23:42.859 we understood where they were coming from, but 00:23:42.859 --> 00:23:45.380 also we wanted them to be sources for a long 00:23:45.380 --> 00:23:47.160 time. Like I didn't want just someone to come 00:23:47.160 --> 00:23:49.220 out, dump something and then go away, right? 00:23:49.319 --> 00:23:52.099 We wanted, how does that impact, like what has 00:23:52.099 --> 00:23:54.559 changed for you since you started this work? 00:23:55.119 --> 00:23:56.779 on national security and you're getting inside 00:23:56.779 --> 00:23:58.940 information compared to now. Is it different? 00:23:59.960 --> 00:24:03.180 On a fundamental level, I think it is still the 00:24:03.180 --> 00:24:07.200 same in that you have to develop trust and you 00:24:07.200 --> 00:24:11.880 have to, you know, I often say that like the 00:24:11.880 --> 00:24:14.160 motive for the source is not the most important 00:24:14.160 --> 00:24:16.579 thing. It's the information that the source has. 00:24:16.799 --> 00:24:19.240 And on one level, that's true. Like if somebody 00:24:19.240 --> 00:24:22.240 comes to you with a claim that seems like something 00:24:22.240 --> 00:24:24.299 you might be able to report, you have to go out 00:24:24.299 --> 00:24:27.420 and find, independent sources to back that up. 00:24:28.119 --> 00:24:30.539 But then in a longer term relationship, right, 00:24:30.579 --> 00:24:33.079 as you say, the motive is important and you want 00:24:33.079 --> 00:24:35.099 to know like, well, why is this person taking 00:24:35.099 --> 00:24:37.180 a risk and talking to me? Is it because they're 00:24:37.180 --> 00:24:39.680 a good government type and they think that things 00:24:39.680 --> 00:24:41.279 should be done a certain way and they're not? 00:24:41.920 --> 00:24:45.880 Do they just have a huge ego? Do they like spilling 00:24:45.880 --> 00:24:49.079 their guts to a reporter? And I think the most 00:24:49.079 --> 00:24:50.599 important thing that I've found that you can 00:24:50.599 --> 00:24:53.119 do with a source is you just have to really actively 00:24:53.119 --> 00:24:56.539 listen to that person. That the act of listening 00:24:56.539 --> 00:25:00.759 is extremely powerful. People want to be heard. 00:25:00.920 --> 00:25:04.089 And if someone has made the decision to... you 00:25:04.089 --> 00:25:06.470 know, violate their security agreement and take 00:25:06.470 --> 00:25:08.670 the risk of talking to a reporter. What they 00:25:08.670 --> 00:25:10.490 really want is that reporter to take them seriously 00:25:10.490 --> 00:25:14.549 and to listen to them. So, you know, I mean, 00:25:14.569 --> 00:25:17.069 I do a lot of talking and writing in my work, 00:25:17.089 --> 00:25:18.690 but when I'm reporting, for the most part, I'm 00:25:18.690 --> 00:25:21.289 just listening to people. And has it become harder 00:25:21.289 --> 00:25:25.250 now? I mean, I think what's actually making it 00:25:25.250 --> 00:25:29.089 harder now is probably that sources are even 00:25:29.089 --> 00:25:32.730 more afraid. of, you know, what will happen to 00:25:32.730 --> 00:25:34.670 them if they're found to be talking to a reporter. 00:25:35.049 --> 00:25:37.250 And I want to make clear, too, that like I'm 00:25:37.250 --> 00:25:40.170 not there are some people who are like many people 00:25:40.170 --> 00:25:42.230 who come talk to reporters and, you know, I'm 00:25:42.230 --> 00:25:44.450 no different. are telling you things that are 00:25:44.450 --> 00:25:46.869 not classified. Like they might be talking about 00:25:46.869 --> 00:25:48.589 at a school, they might be in Canada, but it 00:25:48.589 --> 00:25:50.289 doesn't mean that they're handing you a top secret 00:25:50.289 --> 00:25:54.569 document, right? But even that is a risk because 00:25:54.569 --> 00:25:57.150 they're not supposed to be, if they work in a 00:25:57.150 --> 00:25:58.529 job where they're not authorized to talk to a 00:25:58.529 --> 00:26:00.789 reporter. And their people are being much cagier 00:26:00.789 --> 00:26:04.650 and much more careful because they fear the consequences 00:26:04.650 --> 00:26:09.410 of being seen as disloyal. This administration 00:26:09.410 --> 00:26:12.740 also, again, sees journalists as the enemy. They 00:26:12.740 --> 00:26:15.160 might come after you. They might start to use 00:26:15.160 --> 00:26:17.960 those government resources that they took more 00:26:17.960 --> 00:26:20.400 seriously in the past. The FBI and others started 00:26:20.400 --> 00:26:23.160 like, OK, I want to know. Shane clearly has sources. 00:26:23.279 --> 00:26:25.480 I'm going to start tapping Shane's phone. So 00:26:25.480 --> 00:26:27.539 I'm going to start listening. This has been something 00:26:27.539 --> 00:26:30.319 that has been an issue for years, but we've normally 00:26:30.319 --> 00:26:32.619 been protected from it. Are you more worried 00:26:32.619 --> 00:26:35.579 because you've written about fiber and how big 00:26:35.579 --> 00:26:38.400 data is used in these surveillance techniques? 00:26:39.359 --> 00:26:41.140 How does that impact you? Has that changed the 00:26:41.140 --> 00:26:42.460 way you do business now? Because essentially 00:26:42.460 --> 00:26:45.700 the ways that people can contact a reporter are 00:26:45.700 --> 00:26:48.059 essentially things that can be found out using 00:26:48.059 --> 00:26:50.740 law enforcement and intelligence techniques, 00:26:50.839 --> 00:26:52.819 surveillance techniques. A hundred percent. I 00:26:52.819 --> 00:26:57.839 mean, the technology allows for the government 00:26:57.839 --> 00:27:00.640 to get much more precise in trying to figure 00:27:00.640 --> 00:27:04.119 out who might be talking. So, you know, we do 00:27:04.119 --> 00:27:06.339 all the things that, you know, one would expect 00:27:06.339 --> 00:27:10.150 of using good. Information security protocols 00:27:10.150 --> 00:27:11.710 and all that, and I'll just kind of leave it 00:27:11.710 --> 00:27:16.009 at that. But technology helps with that. The 00:27:16.009 --> 00:27:19.289 thing that worries me more now, though, is it's 00:27:19.289 --> 00:27:22.309 less, you know, can the government use its own 00:27:22.309 --> 00:27:25.630 really powerful surveillance apparatus to find 00:27:25.630 --> 00:27:29.450 out who reporters are talking to? It's more that 00:27:29.450 --> 00:27:34.630 the government is not abiding by the traditions 00:27:34.630 --> 00:27:40.670 of the past, which was to make it the norm. It 00:27:40.670 --> 00:27:42.930 was very, well, let me back this up and say, 00:27:43.049 --> 00:27:46.069 I mean, it used to be that the government, if 00:27:46.069 --> 00:27:48.529 they were investigating a leak, would consider 00:27:48.529 --> 00:27:52.890 subpoenaing the phone records of a reporter as 00:27:52.890 --> 00:27:55.750 a kind of measure of last resort. And that's 00:27:55.750 --> 00:27:58.150 just not the case anymore. You know, a few months 00:27:58.150 --> 00:28:01.130 ago, the FBI served a search warrant on the home 00:28:01.130 --> 00:28:03.269 of Hannah Nathanson, you know, one of my former 00:28:03.269 --> 00:28:06.430 colleagues at the Washington Post, and took her 00:28:06.430 --> 00:28:09.579 electronic devices. That is absolutely extraordinary. 00:28:10.160 --> 00:28:14.019 And in my conversations with people who have 00:28:14.019 --> 00:28:16.720 worked in the government and know how these leak 00:28:16.720 --> 00:28:19.720 investigations normally work, that is so far 00:28:19.720 --> 00:28:22.599 beyond anything that a Republican or a Democratic 00:28:22.599 --> 00:28:24.880 administration would have done in the past to 00:28:24.880 --> 00:28:27.480 actually serve a search warrant on a reporter's 00:28:27.480 --> 00:28:31.019 home, which might strike some listeners as strange 00:28:31.019 --> 00:28:32.319 because you think, well, wait a minute, like 00:28:32.319 --> 00:28:34.500 you're getting classified information. Of course, 00:28:34.500 --> 00:28:36.680 they're going to search your house. We haven't 00:28:36.680 --> 00:28:38.460 done it that way because there has long been 00:28:38.460 --> 00:28:40.599 a tradition in the Justice Department and the 00:28:40.599 --> 00:28:43.920 intelligence community that we do not want to 00:28:43.920 --> 00:28:46.720 impede upon a functioning free press and that 00:28:46.720 --> 00:28:48.920 we don't criminalize journalism. We criminalize 00:28:48.920 --> 00:28:51.259 sources giving information to journalists, of 00:28:51.259 --> 00:28:54.400 course, but not the journalists themselves for 00:28:54.400 --> 00:28:57.160 publishing what they received. And so now we're 00:28:57.160 --> 00:28:59.579 in this zone where the government, I think, is 00:28:59.579 --> 00:29:01.420 very clearly, you know, has taken the gloves 00:29:01.420 --> 00:29:05.700 off. And that worries me even more than the technology 00:29:05.700 --> 00:29:08.460 and the capability they have to monitor communications. 00:29:08.859 --> 00:29:11.480 That's what authoritarian governments do abroad, 00:29:11.720 --> 00:29:14.579 too. So, I mean, we're clearly this, among other 00:29:14.579 --> 00:29:16.660 things, are moving in that direction. Let me 00:29:16.660 --> 00:29:18.759 ask you just into some of the issues of your 00:29:18.759 --> 00:29:20.160 covering of late. I know you've written about 00:29:20.160 --> 00:29:24.440 Greenland, Iran, this recent stuff with Venezuela. 00:29:24.859 --> 00:29:27.099 Talk a little bit about, you know, the kind of 00:29:27.099 --> 00:29:28.720 things that you're looking at now, you're worried 00:29:28.720 --> 00:29:32.380 about now. Are there underreported? areas that 00:29:32.380 --> 00:29:35.259 are worth discussing? Well, what really is on 00:29:35.259 --> 00:29:37.039 my mind, I mean, as we're talking right now, 00:29:37.119 --> 00:29:39.000 obviously, is, you know, is the president going 00:29:39.000 --> 00:29:41.759 to order a military strike on Iran? And by the 00:29:41.759 --> 00:29:44.059 time folks hear this, he may have. And it just, 00:29:44.079 --> 00:29:48.680 you know, it's what's remarkable to me in this 00:29:48.680 --> 00:29:54.859 second term is how President Trump has put so 00:29:54.859 --> 00:29:58.539 much of his attention on foreign affairs. And 00:29:58.539 --> 00:30:01.500 for somebody who, you know, notably ran for office 00:30:01.500 --> 00:30:04.859 talking about unnecessary foreign engagements 00:30:04.859 --> 00:30:11.859 and years long wars that wasted lives and treasure. 00:30:12.480 --> 00:30:15.380 He sure seems interested in using military force 00:30:15.380 --> 00:30:17.240 and the intelligence agencies to get involved 00:30:17.240 --> 00:30:20.460 in the metal and other countries affairs. So 00:30:20.460 --> 00:30:22.599 that's a big, big thing on my mind right now. 00:30:22.680 --> 00:30:24.059 I mean, if you look, Greenland is a really good 00:30:24.059 --> 00:30:26.220 example of another kind of meta story that I'm 00:30:26.220 --> 00:30:30.640 paying attention to this term, which is, you 00:30:30.640 --> 00:30:33.480 know. The dismantling of the post -World War 00:30:33.480 --> 00:30:36.960 II, you know, U .S.-led Western liberal order, 00:30:37.099 --> 00:30:39.839 right? I mean, you know, the institutions that, 00:30:39.920 --> 00:30:42.480 you know, for the better part of the past eight 00:30:42.480 --> 00:30:45.380 decades that Americans were instrumental in building 00:30:45.380 --> 00:30:48.660 have kept, you know, hundreds of millions of 00:30:48.660 --> 00:30:51.759 people in the West generally safe and quite prosperous. 00:30:52.619 --> 00:30:55.240 That's all coming apart and it's being deliberately 00:30:55.240 --> 00:31:00.700 taken apart by us. Our government is doing that. 00:31:01.700 --> 00:31:04.500 And that is having just profound ripple effects 00:31:04.500 --> 00:31:06.680 throughout the world and particularly in Europe 00:31:06.680 --> 00:31:08.759 with our allies. And Greenland was kind of this 00:31:08.759 --> 00:31:12.400 acute example of that where, you know, there 00:31:12.400 --> 00:31:14.960 was a week there where we were all watching and 00:31:14.960 --> 00:31:17.779 talking to sources and people, including in Denmark 00:31:17.779 --> 00:31:20.359 and in Greenland and in NATO, were not sure whether 00:31:20.359 --> 00:31:22.000 the president was just going to unilaterally 00:31:22.000 --> 00:31:24.460 declare that Greenland now belongs to the United 00:31:24.460 --> 00:31:27.549 States. And you had this extraordinary moment 00:31:27.549 --> 00:31:30.089 where the prime minister of Denmark gave an interview 00:31:30.089 --> 00:31:34.569 in which she said, you know, if the United States 00:31:34.569 --> 00:31:38.009 like forcibly tries to take Greenland, like puts 00:31:38.009 --> 00:31:40.490 troops in Greenland, which sounds preposterous 00:31:40.490 --> 00:31:43.650 because it's only like 50 ,000 people, that's 00:31:43.650 --> 00:31:47.140 the end of NATO. If you try and take the territory 00:31:47.140 --> 00:31:49.799 of a NATO member state, I mean, that's the end. 00:31:50.700 --> 00:31:53.079 And this was really something we were all contemplating. 00:31:53.319 --> 00:31:56.440 And then Trump went off and had a meeting with 00:31:56.440 --> 00:31:58.579 Mark Ruda, the secretary general of NATO, and 00:31:58.579 --> 00:31:59.819 came out and was like, oh, no, we've reached 00:31:59.819 --> 00:32:02.299 a deal. It's good. It's all fine. And it's just 00:32:02.299 --> 00:32:04.000 I mean, but that's sort of the world that we're 00:32:04.000 --> 00:32:06.119 living in, where it is this kind of like traumatic 00:32:06.119 --> 00:32:09.880 whipsawing. And it takes a huge effect on our 00:32:09.880 --> 00:32:13.089 allies and it erodes trust. And it may continue 00:32:13.089 --> 00:32:15.230 and it is likely to continue. It'll absolutely 00:32:15.230 --> 00:32:18.569 continue. This is not a bug. This is the feature. 00:32:18.750 --> 00:32:20.430 And I'm just surprised he's spending so much 00:32:20.430 --> 00:32:22.569 time on international affairs while the economy 00:32:22.569 --> 00:32:25.529 is turning south. And that's the thing he was 00:32:25.529 --> 00:32:27.910 elected to fix and he's not fixing it. I agree. 00:32:28.109 --> 00:32:30.930 The one thing I would also say, and I think you 00:32:30.930 --> 00:32:33.210 agree with this, is I don't think previous presidents 00:32:33.210 --> 00:32:37.089 Biden, Obama, Bush, others have really communicated 00:32:37.089 --> 00:32:40.849 to the American people why that post -war... 00:32:41.309 --> 00:32:43.710 way of the world and why these allies and why 00:32:43.710 --> 00:32:45.990 they're so important. How do they help Americans 00:32:45.990 --> 00:32:49.210 themselves? Those of us who worked there, lived 00:32:49.210 --> 00:32:50.910 overseas and worked with allies and saw what 00:32:50.910 --> 00:32:52.670 they did, saw the value to American citizens, 00:32:52.849 --> 00:32:54.910 how they save American lives, how they build 00:32:54.910 --> 00:32:57.930 American economy, totally get it. But most Americans 00:32:57.930 --> 00:33:00.650 don't. So it made it easy, easier for Trump to 00:33:00.650 --> 00:33:03.849 just rip it apart or because there's people who 00:33:03.849 --> 00:33:06.009 just don't get it. And I think one of the jobs 00:33:06.009 --> 00:33:07.490 of presidents is to communicate and previous 00:33:07.490 --> 00:33:09.470 presidents didn't communicate clearly enough. 00:33:10.269 --> 00:33:14.930 I totally agree with you. And it's almost I don't 00:33:14.930 --> 00:33:19.950 want to say it's too late, but boy, has, you 00:33:19.950 --> 00:33:23.789 know, have the Atlanticists in the United States 00:33:23.789 --> 00:33:27.109 politics really lost a lot of time here to try 00:33:27.109 --> 00:33:29.289 and make the case for like, why should we care 00:33:29.289 --> 00:33:32.200 about? you know the security of you know european 00:33:32.200 --> 00:33:34.660 democracies and why does that matter to me and 00:33:34.660 --> 00:33:36.539 and the case i think is pretty clear it's just 00:33:36.539 --> 00:33:38.759 that it's a you know u .s elections are not one 00:33:38.759 --> 00:33:41.089 on foreign policy And there's just been this 00:33:41.089 --> 00:33:43.650 bedrock presumption. They're like, well, no, 00:33:43.730 --> 00:33:45.890 this is just how the way things work. And obviously, 00:33:46.069 --> 00:33:48.369 you know, so much has changed and globalization 00:33:48.369 --> 00:33:51.509 and trade and the rest of it. And I think you're 00:33:51.509 --> 00:33:53.410 right that presidents who have long believed 00:33:53.410 --> 00:33:55.450 in the strength of those alliances did not do 00:33:55.450 --> 00:33:57.430 a good job of explaining to people. I mean, Biden 00:33:57.430 --> 00:33:59.650 tried with this whole notion that he had of like, 00:33:59.710 --> 00:34:03.400 we need to articulate. Why foreign policy is 00:34:03.400 --> 00:34:05.799 domestic policy. And he was trying, I think, 00:34:05.799 --> 00:34:08.639 to make connections around the economy. And but 00:34:08.639 --> 00:34:11.280 it always felt very like. And he didn't have 00:34:11.280 --> 00:34:13.159 that skill. He didn't have that skill to communicate. 00:34:13.199 --> 00:34:14.880 He didn't have the skill. And it all kind of 00:34:14.880 --> 00:34:16.840 felt like underbaked a little bit. It's like, 00:34:16.860 --> 00:34:18.599 yeah, you need to do a little more work and like 00:34:18.599 --> 00:34:21.800 give me some more concrete examples. And then 00:34:21.800 --> 00:34:26.579 I think he thought that, you know. The war in 00:34:26.579 --> 00:34:29.889 Ukraine would. maybe provide an object lesson 00:34:29.889 --> 00:34:32.349 for Americans of like, no, right, this is why 00:34:32.349 --> 00:34:34.889 this is important, because, hi, the Russians, 00:34:34.929 --> 00:34:37.550 you know, are trying to take over countries in 00:34:37.550 --> 00:34:40.090 Europe. And then you have a Republican Party 00:34:40.090 --> 00:34:44.590 that is, you know, at the very least, not willing 00:34:44.590 --> 00:34:47.489 to stand up for the proposition that, no, we 00:34:47.489 --> 00:34:49.070 shouldn't have, you know, a Russian dictator 00:34:49.070 --> 00:34:51.170 trying to take over free countries in Europe, 00:34:51.250 --> 00:34:53.230 which is just mind boggling, because, I mean, 00:34:53.269 --> 00:34:56.690 I grew up, you know. reagan kid you know um uh 00:34:56.690 --> 00:35:02.110 and uh you know it's the we it's we don't have 00:35:02.110 --> 00:35:05.449 the public doesn't i think broadly understand 00:35:05.449 --> 00:35:08.530 or appreciate why these alliances matter so much 00:35:08.530 --> 00:35:13.510 um and uh you know i i think that our allies 00:35:13.510 --> 00:35:17.300 look at that and are now planning for a future 00:35:17.300 --> 00:35:19.539 in which they can't depend on us and they would 00:35:19.539 --> 00:35:21.699 be crazy not to do that frankly they would be 00:35:21.699 --> 00:35:24.139 crazy not to start spending more of their gdp 00:35:24.139 --> 00:35:25.820 on defense and being prepared to go their own 00:35:25.820 --> 00:35:27.780 way because they can't depend on us politically 00:35:27.780 --> 00:35:30.920 right and i hope i hope they do but i also just 00:35:30.920 --> 00:35:33.000 having lived overseas from a strike i think they're 00:35:33.000 --> 00:35:37.130 still people want People want an America that's 00:35:37.130 --> 00:35:39.849 serious. They don't want China to be the leader 00:35:39.849 --> 00:35:42.429 of the free world. China, in fact, itself has 00:35:42.429 --> 00:35:45.010 benefited tremendously economically from U .S. 00:35:45.010 --> 00:35:47.429 national security. So with that, you know, you've 00:35:47.429 --> 00:35:48.989 been really kind with your time and I don't want 00:35:48.989 --> 00:35:52.170 to take up much more of your time. So can you 00:35:52.170 --> 00:35:54.230 just give us a sense of. Some of the issues you're 00:35:54.230 --> 00:35:56.909 working on now, how people can find your reporting, 00:35:57.110 --> 00:36:00.949 that type of thing before we sign off here. Yeah. 00:36:00.969 --> 00:36:02.489 So, I mean, broadly, like I said, I'm interested 00:36:02.489 --> 00:36:05.110 in like, you know, the whole dismantling of the 00:36:05.110 --> 00:36:08.389 order. I continue to be deeply interested in, 00:36:08.409 --> 00:36:10.909 you know, what the intelligence agencies are 00:36:10.909 --> 00:36:14.489 doing with regards to trying to understand China. 00:36:15.150 --> 00:36:17.130 which is arguably one of the most important and 00:36:17.130 --> 00:36:20.389 hardest intelligence topics right now, how the 00:36:20.389 --> 00:36:23.929 world of technology is changing both what our 00:36:23.929 --> 00:36:27.190 intelligence agencies can do, but also the environments 00:36:27.190 --> 00:36:29.590 in which they operate. I mean, the degree to 00:36:29.590 --> 00:36:32.030 which AI and persistent surveillance changes 00:36:32.030 --> 00:36:35.130 everything about the nature of how people who 00:36:35.130 --> 00:36:38.030 do what you used to do go about trying to recruit 00:36:38.030 --> 00:36:39.949 human assets in these countries. I mean, this 00:36:39.949 --> 00:36:45.159 whole world is just kind of changing. And, you 00:36:45.159 --> 00:36:47.760 know, these are the kinds of stories that interest 00:36:47.760 --> 00:36:49.639 me, right? Because I've always found that the 00:36:49.639 --> 00:36:51.599 intelligence agencies are this great kind of 00:36:51.599 --> 00:36:54.579 front line for what the big conflicts are in 00:36:54.579 --> 00:36:56.360 the world and what those fault lines really are, 00:36:56.420 --> 00:36:58.079 because that's where they need to be in understanding 00:36:58.079 --> 00:37:00.579 them. So you can find me at The Atlantic. You 00:37:00.579 --> 00:37:03.420 can find me on Twitter at Shane Harris. I'm not 00:37:03.420 --> 00:37:04.920 tweeting a whole lot, but if I write something, 00:37:05.079 --> 00:37:07.739 I'll put it out there. But that's probably the 00:37:07.739 --> 00:37:10.539 best way to find me these days. Well, very good. 00:37:10.659 --> 00:37:12.820 Well, I would suggest to our listeners that. 00:37:13.320 --> 00:37:15.719 They should follow you. Your reporting is excellent. 00:37:15.900 --> 00:37:18.260 You have great sources. You have a great understanding 00:37:18.260 --> 00:37:21.539 of the territory. So thank you for spending some 00:37:21.539 --> 00:37:24.659 time with us. And, you know, I hope we will be 00:37:24.659 --> 00:37:26.420 able to talk again. I got to get you on my other 00:37:26.420 --> 00:37:28.539 podcast, too. I love that. Thanks, John. It's 00:37:28.539 --> 00:37:30.000 always great to see you and to talk to you. Thanks 00:37:30.000 --> 00:37:32.280 for having me. Great for talking to you, too. 00:37:32.340 --> 00:37:34.420 So for those of you who have been listening, 00:37:34.539 --> 00:37:36.579 this is the Steady State Sentinel. It's a product 00:37:36.579 --> 00:37:38.980 of the Steady State. a group of former national 00:37:38.980 --> 00:37:41.340 security professionals committed to defending 00:37:41.340 --> 00:37:43.320 American democracy. And if you like it, please 00:37:43.320 --> 00:37:46.980 leave us a rating. It really helps to get new 00:37:46.980 --> 00:37:49.219 followers. And so thank you very much, everybody. 00:37:49.320 --> 00:37:55.460 And thank you, Shane. Thank you for listening 00:37:55.460 --> 00:37:59.199 to the Steady State Sentinel podcast. Don't miss 00:37:59.199 --> 00:38:02.239 out on more insights and exposes from America's 00:38:02.239 --> 00:38:05.780 premier global security experts. Also, subscribe 00:38:05.780 --> 00:38:10.090 to our Substack. at substack .com slash at steady 00:38:10.090 --> 00:38:13.590 state one and follow our social media and join 00:38:13.590 --> 00:38:15.389 us right here next week for another exciting 00:38:15.389 --> 00:38:19.369 edition. The Steady State is a nonprofit organization 00:38:19.369 --> 00:38:22.349 working to sustain our democracy and national 00:38:22.349 --> 00:38:26.130 security. 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