WEBVTT - generated by AI 00:00:00.200 --> 00:00:03.299 Something is changing in our country, and most 00:00:03.299 --> 00:00:12.240 people feel it before they can explain it. Hello, 00:00:12.359 --> 00:00:14.140 you're listening to the Steady State Sentinel 00:00:14.140 --> 00:00:17.440 from the Steady State. I'm Jim Lawler, a former 00:00:17.440 --> 00:00:20.920 senior CIA operations officer, and joining me 00:00:20.920 --> 00:00:23.899 as my co -host today is John Seifer, my friend 00:00:23.899 --> 00:00:27.000 and another former senior CIA officer. Today, 00:00:27.140 --> 00:00:29.789 we're talking with Michael Morrell. Michael was 00:00:29.789 --> 00:00:31.510 the deputy director of the Central Intelligence 00:00:31.510 --> 00:00:36.149 Agency from 2010 to 2013, and twice he was acting 00:00:36.149 --> 00:00:39.130 director of the CIA. His book, The Great War 00:00:39.130 --> 00:00:42.250 of Our Time, The CIA's Fight Against Terrorism, 00:00:42.310 --> 00:00:45.450 was a New York Times bestseller, and it traces 00:00:45.450 --> 00:00:50.929 his three -decade -long career at the CIA. Michael, 00:00:50.969 --> 00:00:53.369 welcome to our program. You've been involved 00:00:53.369 --> 00:00:56.390 in vital national security issues now for about 00:00:56.390 --> 00:00:59.789 three decades. How is our current national security 00:00:59.789 --> 00:01:02.909 posture different today than in previous years 00:01:02.909 --> 00:01:06.370 when you were active in government? Jim, John, 00:01:06.609 --> 00:01:11.010 it's great to be with you guys. Couldn't think 00:01:11.010 --> 00:01:13.769 of a better way to spend the afternoon than talking 00:01:13.769 --> 00:01:16.790 with both of you. You know, we have two ops officers 00:01:16.790 --> 00:01:18.810 here and we have an analyst, right? So there's 00:01:18.810 --> 00:01:21.090 got to be a joke in there somewhere, but you 00:01:21.090 --> 00:01:23.450 guys are better at making up jokes than I, so 00:01:23.450 --> 00:01:25.310 I'll let you do that. We'll try to be easy on 00:01:25.310 --> 00:01:27.930 you. My joke, Michael, is whenever an analyst 00:01:27.930 --> 00:01:30.709 comes into a room full of DO officers, the average 00:01:30.709 --> 00:01:35.349 IQ goes up about 30 points. But the analyst is 00:01:35.349 --> 00:01:38.069 always looking at their shoes, right, where they're 00:01:38.069 --> 00:01:41.299 talking to you. I do want to tell one story because 00:01:41.299 --> 00:01:45.680 it puts me in context. And Jim, you mentioned 00:01:45.680 --> 00:01:49.219 that I was acting director twice. So when I was 00:01:49.219 --> 00:01:51.980 acting director the second time between Dave 00:01:51.980 --> 00:01:56.359 Petraeus and John Brennan, my wife and I went 00:01:56.359 --> 00:01:59.560 out to dinner in Arlington. And the difference 00:01:59.560 --> 00:02:02.439 between a director's security package, right, 00:02:02.500 --> 00:02:04.459 is the director gets two cars and four agents 00:02:04.459 --> 00:02:07.299 and a deputy director only gets one car. and 00:02:07.299 --> 00:02:09.439 two agents, probably because they're deemed less 00:02:09.439 --> 00:02:12.860 important. But that day we had, you know, two 00:02:12.860 --> 00:02:14.919 armored cars and four agents and we pull into 00:02:14.919 --> 00:02:17.699 this parking lot and there is this guy standing 00:02:17.699 --> 00:02:20.460 against the wall and he's looking at us and you 00:02:20.460 --> 00:02:23.620 can tell by the look on his face that he's thinking, 00:02:23.680 --> 00:02:26.400 like, who is this, right? Is this Michelle Obama? 00:02:26.659 --> 00:02:29.139 Is this Secretary of State? Like, who is this? 00:02:29.259 --> 00:02:32.530 So he's on my wife's side of the car. And when 00:02:32.530 --> 00:02:35.289 my wife gets out, he says to her, is that somebody 00:02:35.289 --> 00:02:39.349 important? And my lovely wife says, no, he's 00:02:39.349 --> 00:02:46.509 just acting important. Well played. She could 00:02:46.509 --> 00:02:52.009 be an ops officer. Yeah, she can. Let me ask 00:02:52.009 --> 00:02:53.490 you a question and we'll get back to sort of 00:02:53.490 --> 00:02:55.409 that general thing is, I mean, you were center 00:02:55.409 --> 00:02:58.229 stage when we entered what eventually became 00:02:58.229 --> 00:03:02.090 called the war on terror, right? How do you see 00:03:02.090 --> 00:03:04.710 that the IC and how it's adapting to challenges 00:03:04.710 --> 00:03:07.469 now? Did we stay focused on terrorism for too 00:03:07.469 --> 00:03:11.090 long? And then alternatively, have we overcompensated 00:03:11.090 --> 00:03:13.189 from counterterrorism to this great power competition 00:03:13.189 --> 00:03:16.129 stuff they seem to be focused on today? That's 00:03:16.129 --> 00:03:19.189 a great question. I'll caveat it by saying I 00:03:19.189 --> 00:03:23.689 really have no idea what's going on inside. Neither 00:03:23.689 --> 00:03:26.930 do we. So don't worry about it. So really important 00:03:26.930 --> 00:03:30.840 caveat. Look, I think. I think in retrospect, 00:03:31.259 --> 00:03:37.419 the country and the intelligence community, no 00:03:37.419 --> 00:03:40.319 surprise, right, given what happened to us on 00:03:40.319 --> 00:03:45.560 9 -11, overreacted. You know, the pendulum swung 00:03:45.560 --> 00:03:50.280 too far. So while we were successfully, post 00:03:50.280 --> 00:03:54.580 -9 -11, focusing on al -Qaeda, and I don't think 00:03:55.710 --> 00:04:01.229 I think CIA's performance on Al Qaeda post 9 00:04:01.229 --> 00:04:06.550 -11 was perhaps its single greatest sustained 00:04:06.550 --> 00:04:09.949 performance on anything at any time in its history. 00:04:10.050 --> 00:04:12.629 So I'm going to give us a ton of credit, right? 00:04:14.650 --> 00:04:16.750 Brought all those people who were involved in 00:04:16.750 --> 00:04:19.209 9 -11, right, to justice. And we brought bin 00:04:19.209 --> 00:04:21.589 Laden to justice and we prevented attacks on 00:04:21.589 --> 00:04:24.250 the United States. And you guys know as well 00:04:24.250 --> 00:04:26.389 as I do how many they were planning in that post 00:04:26.389 --> 00:04:31.149 9 -11 period. So great success. But did we in 00:04:31.149 --> 00:04:35.569 the country, you know, we by moving so many resources 00:04:35.569 --> 00:04:39.649 to terrorism, to counterterrorism and the country. 00:04:40.360 --> 00:04:43.399 moving so many resources to the military, the 00:04:43.399 --> 00:04:46.980 long sustained campaign in Afghanistan, the war 00:04:46.980 --> 00:04:50.420 in Iraq period, right? Did we swing too far? 00:04:50.540 --> 00:04:53.600 And I think there's an argument that the answer 00:04:53.600 --> 00:04:55.939 to that question is yes. And I think it cost 00:04:55.939 --> 00:04:59.220 us because during that 20 year period, right? 00:04:59.259 --> 00:05:01.779 Certainly 10, 15 years for sure. I don't know 00:05:01.779 --> 00:05:04.100 what happened after I left, but during that 15 00:05:04.100 --> 00:05:07.860 year period, we weren't focused as much as I 00:05:07.860 --> 00:05:10.620 thought we should have been on Russia. We weren't 00:05:10.620 --> 00:05:12.399 as focused as much as I thought we should have 00:05:12.399 --> 00:05:17.720 been on China. And I think, you know, that left 00:05:17.720 --> 00:05:20.639 us not in as good a position vis -a -vis those 00:05:20.639 --> 00:05:23.300 adversaries as we should have been as an agency. 00:05:23.420 --> 00:05:27.139 So I think there is an argument to that. Did 00:05:27.139 --> 00:05:31.040 we shift too much away? I don't know because 00:05:31.040 --> 00:05:34.199 I'm not there. But it does seem to me that if 00:05:34.199 --> 00:05:36.199 you're going to track the most significant threats 00:05:36.199 --> 00:05:39.879 facing the nation right now. there was a significant 00:05:39.879 --> 00:05:43.120 shift that was necessary, right, from counterterrorism 00:05:43.120 --> 00:05:46.540 to nation states, Russia, China, Iran, North 00:05:46.540 --> 00:05:50.839 Korea. Looking, Michael, at our current national 00:05:50.839 --> 00:05:53.920 security posture, do you think we are actually 00:05:53.920 --> 00:05:58.040 safer today? than we were on 9 -11 because of 00:05:58.040 --> 00:06:00.459 current administration policies and IC leadership? 00:06:00.839 --> 00:06:03.560 Or is it simply that we've inherited a lot of 00:06:03.560 --> 00:06:06.040 the strong foundations that you and other officers 00:06:06.040 --> 00:06:08.540 put down for us? What's your thoughts on this? 00:06:09.639 --> 00:06:12.800 Let me offer, let me say something about where 00:06:12.800 --> 00:06:16.319 I think we are as a country with regard to foreign 00:06:16.319 --> 00:06:23.360 policy and maybe why we're there and maybe a 00:06:23.360 --> 00:06:28.629 little bit about how this this evolves. So, you 00:06:28.629 --> 00:06:30.610 know, my strong sense, you guys probably see 00:06:30.610 --> 00:06:34.430 it too. My strong sense is that we, to some extent 00:06:34.430 --> 00:06:39.930 have joined our adversaries in what is a might 00:06:39.930 --> 00:06:46.290 makes right world, right? That, that we are threatening 00:06:46.290 --> 00:06:50.629 countries. to get what we want, either militarily 00:06:50.629 --> 00:06:53.550 in the case of Venezuela or economically in the 00:06:53.550 --> 00:06:55.990 case of tariffs on pretty much everybody, that 00:06:55.990 --> 00:07:00.589 we're kind of acting like these adversaries that 00:07:00.589 --> 00:07:04.069 we've not thought very highly of for a very long 00:07:04.069 --> 00:07:09.189 time. This is the way they act. So why are we 00:07:09.189 --> 00:07:12.910 there? Is it just the president's approach to 00:07:12.910 --> 00:07:16.470 things or is there something deeper? And I think 00:07:17.340 --> 00:07:20.519 That there's probably two ways that the U .S. 00:07:20.540 --> 00:07:23.839 can approach the world at this moment. You know, 00:07:23.899 --> 00:07:27.579 we can't be the single hegemon in the world, 00:07:27.680 --> 00:07:31.579 right? We simply don't have the relative power 00:07:31.579 --> 00:07:36.139 that we had when we did that, right? The strength 00:07:36.139 --> 00:07:38.899 of China, right, is the emergence of China as 00:07:38.899 --> 00:07:41.959 a great power, right, is the most important reason 00:07:41.959 --> 00:07:45.199 for that. You know, we can't be that global hegemon 00:07:45.199 --> 00:07:47.980 all by ourselves. We simply don't have the resources. 00:07:48.199 --> 00:07:52.319 China's strong. And we simply can't do that. 00:07:52.439 --> 00:07:54.459 So you really, it seems to me, we have two choices. 00:07:55.319 --> 00:07:59.899 One choice is to pull together the biggest group 00:07:59.899 --> 00:08:03.920 of allies and partners that we can and work with 00:08:03.920 --> 00:08:08.420 them to sustain, to the extent we can, some sort 00:08:08.420 --> 00:08:11.560 of global international order that was somewhat, 00:08:11.620 --> 00:08:13.459 at least somewhat similar to what we had before. 00:08:14.029 --> 00:08:16.709 where we're acting certainly in our own interests, 00:08:16.870 --> 00:08:19.310 but we're also acting in the broader interests 00:08:19.310 --> 00:08:21.490 of our allies and partners, right? That's one 00:08:21.490 --> 00:08:26.410 way we could do this. That's what President Biden 00:08:26.410 --> 00:08:30.430 focused on. That was exactly how he was going 00:08:30.430 --> 00:08:32.769 to approach these difficult problems in the world. 00:08:32.970 --> 00:08:35.769 And he, you know, he built a lot of things, right? 00:08:35.830 --> 00:08:39.570 He built the Quad in East Asia to try to stand 00:08:39.570 --> 00:08:43.519 up to China a bit. But you could also argue that 00:08:43.519 --> 00:08:52.200 it didn't work very well, that the U .S. didn't 00:08:52.200 --> 00:08:57.279 seem to have as much power as it needed to have 00:08:57.279 --> 00:09:02.259 to push back on adversaries or even allies. So 00:09:02.259 --> 00:09:06.139 the best example is Ukraine, right? Biden did 00:09:06.139 --> 00:09:11.370 a lot. He felt constrained a little bit by Putin's, 00:09:11.370 --> 00:09:13.809 maybe more than a little bit. He felt constrained 00:09:13.809 --> 00:09:16.190 by Putin's escalation rhetoric, particularly 00:09:16.190 --> 00:09:22.210 with regard to nuclear weapons. But he couldn't 00:09:22.210 --> 00:09:26.289 prevent the Russian attack on Ukraine. And he 00:09:26.289 --> 00:09:29.629 couldn't dislodge Russia from Ukraine, right? 00:09:30.690 --> 00:09:32.710 Perhaps Ronald Reagan would have taken a different 00:09:32.710 --> 00:09:36.399 approach. Maybe not. President Reagan was deeply 00:09:36.399 --> 00:09:40.539 concerned about nuclear war as President Biden 00:09:40.539 --> 00:09:44.279 was, so who knows? But he wasn't able to resolve 00:09:44.279 --> 00:09:46.919 that. He helped Ukraine stand on its own two 00:09:46.919 --> 00:09:49.720 feet and fight and push back the Russians and 00:09:49.720 --> 00:09:51.399 all that's really good, but he didn't dislodge 00:09:51.399 --> 00:09:56.200 them. And then on Gaza with an ally, he was incredibly 00:09:56.200 --> 00:09:58.519 supportive of Israel in the aftermath of October 00:09:58.519 --> 00:10:01.779 7th, as he should have been in my view. But when 00:10:01.779 --> 00:10:05.200 he wanted... When he wanted Netanyahu to ease 00:10:05.200 --> 00:10:08.419 up in Gaza, he completely failed. He was not 00:10:08.419 --> 00:10:10.500 able to do that, right? Netanyahu did what he 00:10:10.500 --> 00:10:15.620 wanted. So this allies and partners thing, you 00:10:15.620 --> 00:10:23.440 know, really didn't deliver. So I think probably 00:10:23.440 --> 00:10:26.519 our current approach is rooted in the philosophy, 00:10:26.840 --> 00:10:30.480 maybe not philosophy, but in the mindset and 00:10:30.480 --> 00:10:34.100 personality of our president. It's really the 00:10:34.100 --> 00:10:38.039 alternative to the allies and partners approach. 00:10:38.980 --> 00:10:42.580 I don't think it's going to work any better. 00:10:42.639 --> 00:10:44.840 And I think arguably it's going to work a lot 00:10:44.840 --> 00:10:49.240 worse, that we're going to be in worse shape 00:10:49.240 --> 00:10:51.179 in the world than we would have in the allies 00:10:51.179 --> 00:10:54.519 partners approach. But we'll see how this plays 00:10:54.519 --> 00:10:56.700 out. And I think people are going to start comparing 00:10:56.700 --> 00:11:01.840 these things. One of the implications of. The 00:11:01.840 --> 00:11:07.100 the the might make right approach is that it 00:11:07.100 --> 00:11:10.899 forces Russia, China and the United States into 00:11:10.899 --> 00:11:14.159 spheres of influence. Because where you where 00:11:14.159 --> 00:11:18.379 you where where your might matters most is in 00:11:18.379 --> 00:11:21.340 your neighborhood. Right. So that's where you're 00:11:21.340 --> 00:11:22.919 going to that's where you're going to focus the 00:11:22.919 --> 00:11:27.000 might makes right approach. And it seems to me 00:11:27.000 --> 00:11:31.250 that the U .S. is is is flipping into this. might 00:11:31.250 --> 00:11:34.169 make right's approach in the Western hemisphere. 00:11:34.690 --> 00:11:38.789 And we risk China doing the same in East Asia 00:11:38.789 --> 00:11:41.809 in a very significant way, I think. And we risk 00:11:41.809 --> 00:11:44.509 letting Putin do that right in his backyard or 00:11:44.509 --> 00:11:45.669 neighborhood or whatever you want to call it. 00:11:46.809 --> 00:11:49.870 So I think the spheres of influence thing is 00:11:49.870 --> 00:11:52.629 a real possibility. And we seem to be heading 00:11:52.629 --> 00:11:54.429 in that direction. And spheres of influence, 00:11:54.629 --> 00:12:00.220 as you guys know, seem stable. until the spheres 00:12:00.220 --> 00:12:02.379 of influence bump up against each other. And 00:12:02.379 --> 00:12:04.700 then they're not so stable, right? This is world 00:12:04.700 --> 00:12:08.080 war kind of stuff, right? So I think that's where 00:12:08.080 --> 00:12:11.179 we are. I don't think it's particularly helpful, 00:12:11.299 --> 00:12:15.440 but I understand it to some degree. I mean, your 00:12:15.440 --> 00:12:17.820 insights like this are really very useful and 00:12:17.820 --> 00:12:19.440 you've written a lot of op -ed pieces. You've 00:12:19.440 --> 00:12:21.340 written a book. You had an excellent podcast 00:12:21.340 --> 00:12:24.879 series. Let me ask you a question that Jim and 00:12:24.879 --> 00:12:26.909 all of us have to sort of... deal with since 00:12:26.909 --> 00:12:29.470 we spent a career in a secret intelligence agency? 00:12:29.769 --> 00:12:32.129 How should people like us, how should intelligence 00:12:32.129 --> 00:12:35.490 agencies that operate largely in secrecy maintain 00:12:35.490 --> 00:12:38.049 public trust? How should people like us, former 00:12:38.049 --> 00:12:41.129 intelligence officers, engage publicly without 00:12:41.129 --> 00:12:43.389 undermining these sort of political norms of 00:12:43.389 --> 00:12:45.610 the profession or finding ourselves being sort 00:12:45.610 --> 00:12:48.210 of like played around with by politicians who 00:12:48.210 --> 00:12:49.730 just create their own narratives based on what 00:12:49.730 --> 00:12:53.830 they want us to have said? Yeah. So it's a great 00:12:53.830 --> 00:12:57.870 question. And you guys know that there are a 00:12:57.870 --> 00:13:02.070 number of our former colleagues, right, who think 00:13:02.070 --> 00:13:04.429 that we shouldn't even be doing this, right? 00:13:04.509 --> 00:13:07.429 That once you leave CIA, you shouldn't speak. 00:13:07.850 --> 00:13:09.669 But many of them say that when they're in. Then 00:13:09.669 --> 00:13:11.289 when they come out, they do the same damn thing. 00:13:11.669 --> 00:13:14.350 Here's the other thing. Many of them on the outside 00:13:14.350 --> 00:13:17.230 are doing the same thing while they're telling 00:13:17.230 --> 00:13:20.389 us not to speak. Exactly. That's the best part, 00:13:20.490 --> 00:13:23.610 right? And many of them who are saying to us, 00:13:23.649 --> 00:13:26.169 don't be political, are being political when 00:13:26.169 --> 00:13:28.230 they're saying, don't be political. So I don't 00:13:28.230 --> 00:13:33.490 have any time for those people. But I always 00:13:33.490 --> 00:13:38.570 thought, and I think one of our really great 00:13:38.570 --> 00:13:41.669 directors, Mike Hayden, felt the same way, that 00:13:41.669 --> 00:13:45.889 we keep the fence line of what we're willing 00:13:45.889 --> 00:13:50.600 to talk about too close in. that there is a lot 00:13:50.600 --> 00:13:53.580 of room to push that fence line out. There is 00:13:53.580 --> 00:13:57.059 a lot of things that we can talk about, stories 00:13:57.059 --> 00:14:00.340 we can tell, successes that we can talk about, 00:14:00.399 --> 00:14:04.539 failures that we should talk about, right? And 00:14:04.539 --> 00:14:07.559 you can still protect the classified information 00:14:07.559 --> 00:14:10.309 that you need to protect. by pushing that fence 00:14:10.309 --> 00:14:12.909 line out. In fact, you actually strengthen your 00:14:12.909 --> 00:14:14.690 ability to protect that classified information 00:14:14.690 --> 00:14:17.509 because all the reporters out there are focusing 00:14:17.509 --> 00:14:19.330 on the things you're talking about, right? They're 00:14:19.330 --> 00:14:20.769 not focusing on the things you're not talking 00:14:20.769 --> 00:14:25.049 about. So I've always thought there's room for 00:14:25.049 --> 00:14:27.049 the agency itself and the intelligence community 00:14:27.049 --> 00:14:29.889 itself to push the fence line out and talk more 00:14:29.889 --> 00:14:32.129 about what we do to the American people and not 00:14:32.129 --> 00:14:34.289 let somebody else do it on our behalf because 00:14:34.289 --> 00:14:37.460 nobody's going to do it as well as we do. The 00:14:37.460 --> 00:14:40.919 second thing I'd say is, obviously, you know, 00:14:40.919 --> 00:14:43.720 when I left the government, I wrote a book. I 00:14:43.720 --> 00:14:47.580 worked for CBS News. I had a podcast. I was out 00:14:47.580 --> 00:14:52.840 there talking all the time. And I think that's 00:14:52.840 --> 00:14:56.279 just as important for former senior officials 00:14:56.279 --> 00:15:01.480 to do because we do live in a democracy. The 00:15:01.480 --> 00:15:04.080 American people do have a right to know as much 00:15:04.080 --> 00:15:07.480 as we can possibly share with them. And when 00:15:07.480 --> 00:15:09.259 you're a senior official like all three of us, 00:15:09.360 --> 00:15:12.580 we know where the lines are. We know what we 00:15:12.580 --> 00:15:14.860 can say here and what we can't. We know what's 00:15:14.860 --> 00:15:17.100 been declassified and what hasn't, right? So 00:15:17.100 --> 00:15:23.919 I think we're part of the system for helping 00:15:23.919 --> 00:15:25.919 the American people understand what intelligence 00:15:25.919 --> 00:15:30.019 is, why we do it as a nation, how we approach 00:15:30.019 --> 00:15:33.179 it as ethically as we possibly can, you know, 00:15:33.179 --> 00:15:35.899 talk about our successes. and why their successes 00:15:35.899 --> 00:15:38.620 and talk about our failures and why they failed 00:15:38.620 --> 00:15:39.980 and what we're doing to make sure it never happens 00:15:39.980 --> 00:15:42.980 again. I think it's incredibly valuable. That's 00:15:42.980 --> 00:15:47.139 helpful. Michael, if you were currently in power 00:15:47.139 --> 00:15:50.659 as either director of CIA or a major policymaker, 00:15:50.779 --> 00:15:54.320 and my question may be a little overtaken by 00:15:54.320 --> 00:15:57.320 events very quickly, but what should we be doing 00:15:57.320 --> 00:15:59.960 vis -a -vis Iran? Should we be just a cheerleader 00:15:59.960 --> 00:16:03.559 on the sidelines? How should we encourage these 00:16:03.559 --> 00:16:08.220 people to throw off the mullahs and perhaps pursue 00:16:08.220 --> 00:16:12.559 their own democracy or whatever system they choose? 00:16:13.840 --> 00:16:19.299 We're in a pretty delicate moment as of this 00:16:19.299 --> 00:16:24.120 taping with Iran. It's quite possible before 00:16:24.120 --> 00:16:26.299 the podcast comes out that we could be at war. 00:16:27.960 --> 00:16:35.370 But I think... I think Iran is a very complex 00:16:35.370 --> 00:16:41.990 problem. It's not easy. It's wickedly hard. I 00:16:41.990 --> 00:16:45.470 think it's fair to say, and I've heard Prime 00:16:45.470 --> 00:16:49.230 Minister Netanyahu say this, that the United 00:16:49.230 --> 00:16:56.029 States and Israel pummeled the Iranian nuclear 00:16:56.029 --> 00:17:01.610 program and we didn't destroy it. And there's 00:17:01.610 --> 00:17:04.890 no way the Iranians are going to negotiate on 00:17:04.890 --> 00:17:08.029 missiles because it is their only defense, particularly 00:17:08.029 --> 00:17:11.150 now that the proxies have been weakened. There's 00:17:11.150 --> 00:17:12.890 no way they're going to give up missiles, put 00:17:12.890 --> 00:17:14.630 limits on missiles. They're just not going to 00:17:14.630 --> 00:17:17.490 do that. And those missiles, right, are aimed 00:17:17.490 --> 00:17:23.069 right at Israel. And there's no way they're going 00:17:23.069 --> 00:17:25.289 to stop dealing with the proxies, even if they 00:17:25.289 --> 00:17:27.619 promise not to. Right. We know how covert action 00:17:27.619 --> 00:17:30.039 works. It works the same way. Right. You can 00:17:30.039 --> 00:17:32.299 deny it and deny it till the ends of the earth 00:17:32.299 --> 00:17:34.119 come home. So they're not going to do that either. 00:17:34.420 --> 00:17:38.119 So the argument of those who are in favor of 00:17:38.119 --> 00:17:45.619 war is Iran's going to keep being Iran, the Iran 00:17:45.619 --> 00:17:49.539 we don't like until the regime is gone. And we're 00:17:49.539 --> 00:17:51.599 never going to have a better chance than we have 00:17:51.599 --> 00:17:53.279 right now to get rid of this regime. This is 00:17:53.279 --> 00:17:55.259 the argument of those people who are saying we 00:17:55.259 --> 00:18:00.299 should go. And it's true that we've probably 00:18:00.299 --> 00:18:03.960 never been in a better position to change the 00:18:03.960 --> 00:18:07.920 regime than we are now. Iran is weaker militarily 00:18:07.920 --> 00:18:10.920 than it's been in a very, very long time as a 00:18:10.920 --> 00:18:13.819 result of the war last June. And Iran is weaker 00:18:13.819 --> 00:18:16.529 politically. The regime is weaker politically 00:18:16.529 --> 00:18:20.089 than it's probably been at any point in its history. 00:18:21.089 --> 00:18:25.069 So now's a good time. And if you're Prime Minister 00:18:25.069 --> 00:18:27.410 Netanyahu, you're never going to have a better 00:18:27.410 --> 00:18:30.710 partner in the White House, right? And if you're 00:18:30.710 --> 00:18:32.730 Prime Minister Netanyahu, you got an election 00:18:32.730 --> 00:18:35.329 that you have to call by October, right? And 00:18:35.329 --> 00:18:38.910 if you can go to the voters and say, I defeated 00:18:38.910 --> 00:18:42.269 Hamas, I defeated Hezbollah, and I defeated the 00:18:42.269 --> 00:18:44.559 head of the snake. I have brought us permanent 00:18:44.559 --> 00:18:46.339 security. You could see him saying this, right? 00:18:46.460 --> 00:18:52.539 I brought us permanent security. You know, he 00:18:52.539 --> 00:18:55.359 might win, right? Which is kind of astonishing, 00:18:55.579 --> 00:18:57.920 you know, given October 7th and all the failures, 00:18:58.039 --> 00:19:01.099 you know, surrounding October 7th. So that's 00:19:01.099 --> 00:19:07.500 the reasons, right, to go. The reasons not to 00:19:07.500 --> 00:19:11.279 go are number one, there is no guarantee that 00:19:11.279 --> 00:19:16.319 either a... a significant, sustained military 00:19:16.319 --> 00:19:20.099 campaign is going to dislodge the regime. In 00:19:20.099 --> 00:19:22.839 fact, the probability is less than 50 % that 00:19:22.839 --> 00:19:25.079 only an air campaign can dislodge the regime. 00:19:25.259 --> 00:19:27.579 So there's no guarantee that this military action, 00:19:27.740 --> 00:19:29.740 even a significant one, is actually going to 00:19:29.740 --> 00:19:31.119 accomplish what you're trying to accomplish. 00:19:31.779 --> 00:19:36.500 And then the second is, even if it does dislodge 00:19:36.500 --> 00:19:39.960 this regime, there's no guarantee that the next 00:19:39.960 --> 00:19:43.049 one is going to be any better than this one in 00:19:43.049 --> 00:19:46.829 fact the most likely outcome it seems to me um 00:19:46.829 --> 00:19:49.150 of this regime disappearing the clerics right 00:19:49.150 --> 00:19:52.349 the clerics who rule the way they rule and with 00:19:52.349 --> 00:19:55.349 the ideology that they rule with um that resulted 00:19:55.349 --> 00:19:58.069 right in thousands and thousands and thousands 00:19:58.069 --> 00:19:59.750 of deaths of the protesters you talked about 00:19:59.750 --> 00:20:04.390 jim that the most likely outcome is the irgc 00:20:04.390 --> 00:20:07.960 takes over right they got the money They got 00:20:07.960 --> 00:20:10.500 the guns. They got the power. They have the know 00:20:10.500 --> 00:20:14.720 -how. Now, they might cut a deal with Trump because 00:20:14.720 --> 00:20:16.920 they're not ideologues, right? They're in it 00:20:16.920 --> 00:20:18.779 for the money. They own all these industries, 00:20:18.960 --> 00:20:20.240 right? They're in it for the money. They want 00:20:20.240 --> 00:20:22.619 to sustain that. They might cut a deal with the 00:20:22.619 --> 00:20:24.900 president visa, you know, the way Delce Rodriguez 00:20:24.900 --> 00:20:27.240 has. I was going to say, it sounds a lot like 00:20:27.240 --> 00:20:29.440 Venezuela. Yeah. So they could do that, but maybe 00:20:29.440 --> 00:20:32.160 not too. Yeah. The other thing I remind people 00:20:32.160 --> 00:20:38.799 of is even a democratic. A truly democratic Iran 00:20:38.799 --> 00:20:46.160 might not be Iran we like. This Iranian desire 00:20:46.160 --> 00:20:51.299 for hegemony in the Middle East, what the proxies 00:20:51.299 --> 00:20:54.319 are about, what the missiles are about, what 00:20:54.319 --> 00:20:58.779 the nuclear program's about, that's not a clerical 00:20:58.779 --> 00:21:02.700 regime thing. That's not an Iranian thing. That 00:21:02.700 --> 00:21:07.839 is a deeply Persian thing. They had one third 00:21:07.839 --> 00:21:10.200 of the world's population under their control 00:21:10.200 --> 00:21:13.160 when it was the Persian Empire. They think they 00:21:13.160 --> 00:21:15.039 have a right to that again, just like Vladimir 00:21:15.039 --> 00:21:17.960 Putin thinks that Russia has a right to, you 00:21:17.960 --> 00:21:23.680 know, the Russian Empire. The Shah used to talk 00:21:23.680 --> 00:21:27.160 openly about his desire for nuclear weapons someday, 00:21:27.359 --> 00:21:30.299 right? And the father of the current Iranian 00:21:30.299 --> 00:21:33.180 nuclear weapons program is a guy named Rafsanjani, 00:21:33.279 --> 00:21:39.779 who was a moderate in this regime. So, even a 00:21:39.779 --> 00:21:45.000 truly democratic Iran is going to be at odds 00:21:45.000 --> 00:21:48.039 at many times with the United States and our 00:21:48.039 --> 00:21:51.039 other allies in the region. And I guess the last 00:21:51.039 --> 00:21:53.640 point I'd make on the why not now, right, those 00:21:53.640 --> 00:21:57.160 are all why not nows. The other why not now is 00:21:57.160 --> 00:22:05.900 the risks are enormous. You know, one risk. is 00:22:05.900 --> 00:22:09.960 that the Iranians are successful militarily either 00:22:09.960 --> 00:22:12.940 in Israel, killing a large number of citizens, 00:22:13.180 --> 00:22:17.140 or successful vis -a -vis us in sinking a warship. 00:22:17.880 --> 00:22:20.220 You know, remember the Falklands War? Out of 00:22:20.220 --> 00:22:23.099 nowhere, the Argentinians, you know, had a missile 00:22:23.099 --> 00:22:25.819 that nobody knew about, and they sunk a British 00:22:25.819 --> 00:22:29.359 warship, right? Massive fallout in the UK over 00:22:29.359 --> 00:22:32.779 that. You know, I'm not predicting that because 00:22:32.779 --> 00:22:34.000 I don't know if they have any special weapons, 00:22:34.119 --> 00:22:37.069 but who knows? It's always possible. The other 00:22:37.069 --> 00:22:42.049 possibility is that in a significant war, Gulf 00:22:42.049 --> 00:22:46.009 oil infrastructure gets mixed up in the fight. 00:22:46.670 --> 00:22:50.690 Saudi, Emirati, I don't think anybody wants to 00:22:50.690 --> 00:22:53.289 have an oil war here, but you never know. If 00:22:53.289 --> 00:22:57.250 the Iranians feel that this is existential to 00:22:57.250 --> 00:23:01.380 them, they might want to escalate. as high as 00:23:01.380 --> 00:23:03.859 they can go, right, which is attacking oil and 00:23:03.859 --> 00:23:06.440 trying to escalate so high that we say, oh, my 00:23:06.440 --> 00:23:08.460 God, and we pull out. They might think that. 00:23:08.799 --> 00:23:11.500 You know, that could take oil to $250 a barrel, 00:23:11.619 --> 00:23:14.819 right? In that case, right, forget about the 00:23:14.819 --> 00:23:18.180 midterms. Forget about the midterms, right? It 00:23:18.180 --> 00:23:21.539 looks like a bloodbath to begin with. So there 00:23:21.539 --> 00:23:24.079 are massive economic risks, strategic risks, 00:23:24.160 --> 00:23:29.329 and political risks for the president. So he's 00:23:29.329 --> 00:23:32.069 got to weigh all this. I guess he's even doing 00:23:32.069 --> 00:23:35.769 that today, right? But there's an argument for 00:23:35.769 --> 00:23:38.569 and there's a strong argument for and a strong 00:23:38.569 --> 00:23:41.309 argument against. But I think we learned from 00:23:41.309 --> 00:23:43.849 our experience, too, that this notion that these 00:23:43.849 --> 00:23:47.569 things are easy are sort of not true. And I think 00:23:47.569 --> 00:23:49.289 this administration, this president in particular, 00:23:49.329 --> 00:23:52.309 likes to think that he can pull off things that 00:23:52.309 --> 00:23:54.329 are easy. And he's had a little bit of success 00:23:54.329 --> 00:23:56.720 with that. So I think it's. So there is some 00:23:56.720 --> 00:23:58.220 danger there. But let me ask you a more general 00:23:58.220 --> 00:24:00.700 question based on your long experience as a very 00:24:00.700 --> 00:24:05.059 senior analyst in the CIA. How do you see AI 00:24:05.059 --> 00:24:08.420 impacting intelligence going forward? And what 00:24:08.420 --> 00:24:11.279 does intelligence advantage mean in AI, deep 00:24:11.279 --> 00:24:17.039 data, big data, better collection, faster analysis 00:24:17.039 --> 00:24:19.480 world that we're going to be living in? How is 00:24:19.480 --> 00:24:20.960 it going to affect decision making, do you think? 00:24:22.339 --> 00:24:24.640 From an intelligence perspective, right? Yeah. 00:24:25.740 --> 00:24:29.220 that's a great question so i think it has a very 00:24:29.220 --> 00:24:33.880 significant use in cyber security in cyber both 00:24:33.880 --> 00:24:38.059 defensively and offensively right um you know 00:24:38.059 --> 00:24:40.940 the way these cyber attacks are done both by 00:24:40.940 --> 00:24:44.400 us and by our adversaries is you you get a foothold 00:24:44.400 --> 00:24:47.880 in a network and then you got to figure out how 00:24:47.880 --> 00:24:50.900 to get from where you are to where the good stuff 00:24:50.900 --> 00:24:56.130 is and it it it means making a jump And then 00:24:56.130 --> 00:24:59.829 evaluating and exploring where you are and figuring 00:24:59.829 --> 00:25:01.970 out where your next jump is, right? You don't 00:25:01.970 --> 00:25:04.150 have a map, right, of the whole network. You 00:25:04.150 --> 00:25:06.009 got to sort of figure out the map as you go, 00:25:06.109 --> 00:25:08.990 put it that way. That's a time -consuming process. 00:25:09.150 --> 00:25:11.990 So somebody might get a foothold in a network 00:25:11.990 --> 00:25:14.569 because of a successful hack, and it might be 00:25:14.569 --> 00:25:19.450 two months before the offensive cyber guys figure 00:25:19.450 --> 00:25:21.769 out exactly where the good stuff is and start 00:25:21.769 --> 00:25:26.680 their exfiltration. With AI, you can do that 00:25:26.680 --> 00:25:28.859 as much faster because you're going to have that 00:25:28.859 --> 00:25:31.500 AI do the analysis for you. And maybe it makes 00:25:31.500 --> 00:25:34.279 some mistakes, but who cares, right? It's just 00:25:34.279 --> 00:25:37.759 moving so much faster. So that's a place both 00:25:37.759 --> 00:25:41.420 offensively and you respond to it, right, by 00:25:41.420 --> 00:25:46.940 using AI on the defense too. So that's one place. 00:25:48.279 --> 00:25:52.119 You know, I've seen since I left government all 00:25:52.119 --> 00:25:56.869 sorts of... both collection tools and analytic 00:25:56.869 --> 00:26:00.750 tools that are AI driven. And they're incredibly 00:26:00.750 --> 00:26:03.990 impressive. You can see all sorts of interesting 00:26:03.990 --> 00:26:07.450 intelligence use cases. And you say to yourself, 00:26:07.529 --> 00:26:09.829 I wonder if the CIA has this because they absolutely 00:26:09.829 --> 00:26:13.549 should, right? And then you learn that they don't. 00:26:13.650 --> 00:26:16.430 And you're like scratching your head. And we 00:26:16.430 --> 00:26:18.730 all know our organization, right? We absolutely 00:26:18.730 --> 00:26:21.950 love it, but not invented here, right, is a pretty 00:26:21.950 --> 00:26:26.980 strong. pretty strong character trait. So I think 00:26:26.980 --> 00:26:31.039 that's changing. Director Ratcliffe just put 00:26:31.039 --> 00:26:34.859 out new guidance on how small tech firms can 00:26:34.859 --> 00:26:36.519 get into the building, which I think is terrific. 00:26:37.660 --> 00:26:39.599 We'll see if that makes a difference. Other people 00:26:39.599 --> 00:26:42.039 have tried things like this, another attempt 00:26:42.039 --> 00:26:45.759 at that. I think there's room for both collection 00:26:45.759 --> 00:26:49.200 tools and analytic tools. They're already experimenting 00:26:49.200 --> 00:26:53.990 with this stuff inside. I don't know if it'll 00:26:53.990 --> 00:26:57.549 affect decision -making, right, operational decision 00:26:57.549 --> 00:27:00.930 -making or analytic decision -making, because 00:27:00.930 --> 00:27:03.150 you have a little bit of time, right? You're 00:27:03.150 --> 00:27:05.369 not forced by the adversary to move quickly, 00:27:05.509 --> 00:27:10.630 except in cyber. So I think the impact's going 00:27:10.630 --> 00:27:15.049 to be massive. I think probably the best approach, 00:27:15.230 --> 00:27:17.509 right, if I was in my old job and we were having 00:27:17.509 --> 00:27:20.349 a meeting about AI and intelligence, you know. 00:27:20.650 --> 00:27:23.089 I think the best approach is let a thousand flowers 00:27:23.089 --> 00:27:26.349 bloom. Let people at the working level experiment 00:27:26.349 --> 00:27:29.109 with it. And then let's all compare notes, right? 00:27:29.170 --> 00:27:31.690 What worked, what didn't, rather than trying 00:27:31.690 --> 00:27:33.849 to straightjacket the whole organization into 00:27:33.849 --> 00:27:36.650 something, right? That might not end up working. 00:27:37.109 --> 00:27:39.890 Yeah. And we see, for example, like you've seen 00:27:39.890 --> 00:27:41.950 groups like Bellingcat and these other guys that 00:27:41.950 --> 00:27:44.190 do collection piece of this, not the, well, I 00:27:44.190 --> 00:27:46.750 guess that's an analytical in a sense too. And 00:27:46.750 --> 00:27:48.670 you see how, you know, those kind of things would 00:27:48.670 --> 00:27:51.690 be beneficial inside the building. And yeah, 00:27:52.170 --> 00:27:54.670 the mindset has to change a little bit to bring 00:27:54.670 --> 00:27:56.750 those in. But the other thing that I tell companies, 00:27:56.990 --> 00:27:59.450 right, companies will come in with these great 00:27:59.450 --> 00:28:03.230 analytic tools and it sits on top of open source 00:28:03.230 --> 00:28:07.029 data. And guys, what I say to them is, guys, 00:28:07.049 --> 00:28:10.950 that's great. But when you take it to CIA, they're 00:28:10.950 --> 00:28:13.329 going to want it to sit on top of all of the 00:28:13.329 --> 00:28:17.119 data. both the open source data and all of our 00:28:17.119 --> 00:28:21.220 classified holdings, right? The open source data 00:28:21.220 --> 00:28:25.279 is great, but we've got so much more. So let's 00:28:25.279 --> 00:28:28.119 use it, right? And companies got to get in that 00:28:28.119 --> 00:28:30.920 mindset that they got to figure out a way how 00:28:30.920 --> 00:28:34.140 to integrate all of that special data, right? 00:28:34.380 --> 00:28:36.900 And we as an intelligence agency have to figure 00:28:36.900 --> 00:28:40.920 out a way because so much stuff is compartmented 00:28:40.920 --> 00:28:43.299 now, right? I mean, it was always compartmented, 00:28:43.299 --> 00:28:45.960 right? But so much stuff is compartmented now 00:28:45.960 --> 00:28:49.880 that, you know, you run the risk that if not 00:28:49.880 --> 00:28:53.019 all the data is there and you miss something 00:28:53.019 --> 00:28:55.660 and you find out that in some compartments, this 00:28:55.660 --> 00:28:58.359 was George Tenet's big worry after 9 -11, right? 00:28:58.519 --> 00:29:00.799 That somewhere in our building was going to be, 00:29:00.859 --> 00:29:03.619 you know, the next attack and we're going to 00:29:03.619 --> 00:29:05.680 miss it because it's compartmented. So they got 00:29:05.680 --> 00:29:08.339 to figure that out too. You know, that's interesting. 00:29:08.500 --> 00:29:11.119 You say that Michael's a professor from Stanford 00:29:11.119 --> 00:29:14.480 and a retired army general asked me how AI would 00:29:14.480 --> 00:29:17.000 affect. human recruitment, recruitment of foreign 00:29:17.000 --> 00:29:20.019 spies. And I said exactly what you did. I said, 00:29:20.039 --> 00:29:24.279 if you could combine an AI tool to scoop up all 00:29:24.279 --> 00:29:26.599 the overt information and all the covert information 00:29:26.599 --> 00:29:29.420 about particular people that we wanted to recruit, 00:29:29.579 --> 00:29:32.319 all their financials, their medical, everything 00:29:32.319 --> 00:29:35.960 else, it would be a fabulous tool enabling case 00:29:35.960 --> 00:29:38.859 officers how to make the proper recruitment approach. 00:29:39.799 --> 00:29:41.819 So you've talked about Ukraine. We've talked 00:29:41.819 --> 00:29:44.799 a little bit about Russia. Any thoughts that 00:29:44.799 --> 00:29:52.799 you have on China? Sure. Like I said, I'm a little 00:29:52.799 --> 00:29:59.599 worried that we are headed toward some sort of 00:29:59.599 --> 00:30:04.619 a deal, right, where we get a good bit of what 00:30:04.619 --> 00:30:08.710 we want on economics. And Xi gets a good bit 00:30:08.710 --> 00:30:12.690 of what he wants on national security, right? 00:30:12.769 --> 00:30:18.609 Like not sell weapons to Taiwan. Distance ourselves 00:30:18.609 --> 00:30:20.730 a bit from Taiwan. There's a risk there. There's 00:30:20.730 --> 00:30:25.089 a real risk of that happening, I think. With 00:30:25.089 --> 00:30:29.750 regard to Taiwan, I'll say a couple things about 00:30:29.750 --> 00:30:35.490 China. One, with regard to Taiwan, I do not believe... 00:30:35.880 --> 00:30:43.500 that a Chinese attack on Taiwan is likely in 00:30:43.500 --> 00:30:47.059 the near term. I think without a doubt, actually, 00:30:47.180 --> 00:30:50.500 I think without a doubt that Xi, President Xi, 00:30:50.640 --> 00:30:54.440 sees military action against Taiwan as a last 00:30:54.440 --> 00:30:58.559 resort. It would be a massive risk for him. Imagine 00:30:58.559 --> 00:31:02.829 trying and failing. Not only would he lose his 00:31:02.829 --> 00:31:05.170 job, but the Communist Party would be out of 00:31:05.170 --> 00:31:09.390 power. This issue is so important to the Chinese 00:31:09.390 --> 00:31:12.170 public. If he does it, he's got to make sure 00:31:12.170 --> 00:31:15.369 that he can do it. And when he told his military 00:31:15.369 --> 00:31:20.130 to be ready by 2027, he was admitting that they 00:31:20.130 --> 00:31:23.829 weren't ready yet. And the reason you see so 00:31:23.829 --> 00:31:27.490 much discussion about a possible blockade is 00:31:27.490 --> 00:31:30.250 because they can't do an invasion yet. They don't 00:31:30.250 --> 00:31:39.430 have what they need. So his goal is to build 00:31:39.430 --> 00:31:42.650 such a massive military force across the straits 00:31:42.650 --> 00:31:45.269 from Taiwan that a Taiwan president wakes up 00:31:45.269 --> 00:31:48.450 someday and a U .S. president at the same time 00:31:48.450 --> 00:31:50.630 wakes up someday and says, this is not worth 00:31:50.630 --> 00:31:54.109 it. This is not worth it. Let's find a way out 00:31:54.109 --> 00:31:58.589 of this. Let's find a way to give China what 00:31:58.589 --> 00:32:02.559 they want here. That's what Xi wants. I don't 00:32:02.559 --> 00:32:04.599 know if that's possible, but that's what he wants. 00:32:05.200 --> 00:32:08.539 Would he go to war if Taiwan declared independence 00:32:08.539 --> 00:32:11.759 or if the U .S. changed its one China policy? 00:32:12.759 --> 00:32:16.799 Probably because he would have to. But that's 00:32:16.799 --> 00:32:18.579 where the blockade might happen. That's why they've 00:32:18.579 --> 00:32:22.799 been practicing the blockade, just in case. You 00:32:22.799 --> 00:32:24.900 know, if the U .S. changed its one China policy, 00:32:25.180 --> 00:32:27.200 China might grab one of those Taiwan islands 00:32:27.200 --> 00:32:30.680 that is really close to China. That would be 00:32:30.680 --> 00:32:33.039 an easy grab. And they would say, okay, what 00:32:33.039 --> 00:32:35.940 are you gonna do about it? And in a blockade 00:32:35.940 --> 00:32:40.900 situation, they would say, we're blockading you, 00:32:41.019 --> 00:32:44.539 no weapons in, we decide what comes in and out. 00:32:44.619 --> 00:32:46.599 And if anybody wants to take the first shot, 00:32:46.859 --> 00:32:51.940 Taiwan, US, go ahead. So I don't think Taiwan 00:32:51.940 --> 00:32:55.400 is a near -term issue. I don't think there's 00:32:55.400 --> 00:32:58.839 any evidence that she... has given up on his 00:32:58.839 --> 00:33:02.599 goal of coercing them back into the fold rather 00:33:02.599 --> 00:33:06.119 than forcing them second thing i'd say is that 00:33:06.119 --> 00:33:08.759 is that look we got a lot of problems here right 00:33:08.759 --> 00:33:12.220 for sure china's got a lot of problems too a 00:33:12.220 --> 00:33:14.700 lot of problems they got a massive demographic 00:33:14.700 --> 00:33:19.599 problem you know the the number of workers per 00:33:19.599 --> 00:33:23.740 non -worker you know is falling rapidly that 00:33:23.740 --> 00:33:27.460 is a real economic problem they are they are 00:33:27.460 --> 00:33:31.819 massively in debt. They overinvested. There are 00:33:31.819 --> 00:33:34.779 so many buildings in Beijing, for example, that 00:33:34.779 --> 00:33:38.660 there's nobody in. There are so many factories 00:33:38.660 --> 00:33:41.980 that are idle because they simply overinvested. 00:33:42.000 --> 00:33:44.000 This is what Japan did that got Japan into so 00:33:44.000 --> 00:33:51.220 much trouble. They also have a leadership problem. 00:33:51.440 --> 00:33:53.900 And here's the leadership problem. China had 00:33:53.900 --> 00:33:58.160 figured out How to have an authoritarian government, 00:33:58.359 --> 00:34:00.680 which they need, right, to put the Communist 00:34:00.680 --> 00:34:03.500 Party to stay in power, but having a change in 00:34:03.500 --> 00:34:08.300 leadership every number of years. That's actually 00:34:08.300 --> 00:34:10.800 brilliant, right? You have a change in leadership, 00:34:10.900 --> 00:34:13.480 so you get fresh ideas. Not only the leader has 00:34:13.480 --> 00:34:16.119 fresh ideas and new energy, but the people they 00:34:16.119 --> 00:34:20.420 bring with them, right, have fresh ideas, more 00:34:20.420 --> 00:34:24.719 creativity. But by Xi making himself leader for 00:34:24.719 --> 00:34:29.630 life? there's a real risk of sclerosis in chinese 00:34:29.630 --> 00:34:32.690 policy going forward i think you can actually 00:34:32.690 --> 00:34:38.389 see that a little bit um and that is not in the 00:34:38.389 --> 00:34:40.889 long -term interest of china so that's a that's 00:34:40.889 --> 00:34:42.809 a downside the other downside right is that she 00:34:42.809 --> 00:34:47.070 became so the other problem they have she became 00:34:47.070 --> 00:34:53.630 so fearful of the Chinese who were getting rich 00:34:53.630 --> 00:34:56.670 because of capitalism, that he shut down economic 00:34:56.670 --> 00:35:00.210 reform and actually rolled it back because he 00:35:00.210 --> 00:35:02.550 was afraid of those people, the political power 00:35:02.550 --> 00:35:05.530 that they would get by being rich. He actually 00:35:05.530 --> 00:35:08.309 saw a couple of individuals who he focused on. 00:35:08.590 --> 00:35:12.210 And by turning off economic reform and rolling 00:35:12.210 --> 00:35:16.690 it back, you undermine Chinese growth. All of 00:35:16.690 --> 00:35:19.630 that Chinese growth We saw over the years those 00:35:19.630 --> 00:35:22.590 really high rates of growth wasn't because China's 00:35:22.590 --> 00:35:25.969 socialist communist model was was a good, you 00:35:25.969 --> 00:35:28.389 know, was a great thing and a successful thing. 00:35:28.469 --> 00:35:30.949 It's because they unleashed capitalism. Right. 00:35:31.010 --> 00:35:35.969 It was pure, unordinated, pure capitalism that 00:35:35.969 --> 00:35:38.869 led to 400, 500 million Chinese being lifted 00:35:38.869 --> 00:35:42.170 out of poverty. And he said, can't do that because 00:35:42.170 --> 00:35:44.130 the political consequences are too great. So 00:35:44.130 --> 00:35:46.760 they got their own set of problems. And they 00:35:46.760 --> 00:35:48.579 don't have immigration that really can fill up 00:35:48.579 --> 00:35:51.300 the demographic thing. Exactly. And so, yeah. 00:35:51.400 --> 00:35:53.519 So listen, you've been really generous with your 00:35:53.519 --> 00:35:55.440 time. We generally try to keep these sort of 00:35:55.440 --> 00:35:58.039 at a short rate with us. So I know you're not 00:35:58.039 --> 00:36:01.199 doing the podcast anymore. I mean, we and our 00:36:01.199 --> 00:36:04.099 listeners will be on our lookout for your writing 00:36:04.099 --> 00:36:06.260 and the things you're saying. But is there anything 00:36:06.260 --> 00:36:08.420 you'd like to tell us that you're thinking about, 00:36:08.500 --> 00:36:11.179 working about, or family businesses you could 00:36:11.179 --> 00:36:14.880 tell our listeners about? No family businesses. 00:36:14.980 --> 00:36:19.380 What I will say is I think it's great that you 00:36:19.380 --> 00:36:23.980 guys do this. You're not going to hack the bookstore? 00:36:24.559 --> 00:36:28.400 No. Okay. All right. Good. All right. Go ahead. 00:36:29.440 --> 00:36:32.159 Oh, that's what you meant by family business. 00:36:32.599 --> 00:36:34.880 I thought you meant other things. Yes. Middleburg 00:36:34.880 --> 00:36:37.099 Books, my wife's bookstore, Middleburg, Virginia. 00:36:37.300 --> 00:36:40.320 It's fantastic. She's built an incredible, I 00:36:40.320 --> 00:36:43.500 have no responsibility in this. I carry boxes 00:36:43.500 --> 00:36:46.380 when necessary. She built something really special. 00:36:46.460 --> 00:36:48.760 Thank you. But the last thing I wanted to say 00:36:48.760 --> 00:36:54.440 is, you know, if you spend any time at CIA, you 00:36:54.440 --> 00:36:57.460 know that the vast majority of people there are 00:36:57.460 --> 00:37:01.280 amazing Americans who are working really hard 00:37:01.280 --> 00:37:04.619 for the security of their country. And that's 00:37:04.619 --> 00:37:07.460 you two, right? And they see that. I listen to 00:37:07.460 --> 00:37:09.539 your podcast, right? They see that every week. 00:37:10.579 --> 00:37:13.320 I think it's really important that you do this. 00:37:13.400 --> 00:37:15.840 And to those people who think we shouldn't be 00:37:15.840 --> 00:37:21.219 talking publicly. Thank you, Michael, for those 00:37:21.219 --> 00:37:23.519 kind words. And thank you especially for this 00:37:23.519 --> 00:37:26.360 very interesting discussion for joining us today. 00:37:26.800 --> 00:37:29.159 So if you like what you heard on today's show. 00:37:29.559 --> 00:37:31.920 Please subscribe to the Steady State Sentinel 00:37:31.920 --> 00:37:35.199 wherever you get your podcasts and give us a 00:37:35.199 --> 00:37:38.000 five -star review on Google if possible. These 00:37:38.000 --> 00:37:40.380 subscriptions and the five -star reviews help 00:37:40.380 --> 00:37:43.460 us get the important content to the widest audience 00:37:43.460 --> 00:37:46.579 possible. The Steady State Sentinel is for you, 00:37:46.679 --> 00:37:48.960 our listeners, and we want to hear from you. 00:37:49.099 --> 00:37:52.880 So please stay informed, stay engaged, and join 00:37:52.880 --> 00:37:55.679 us next week for another episode of the Steady 00:37:55.679 --> 00:37:58.289 State Sentinel. For the SteadyState Sentinel, 00:37:58.550 --> 00:38:05.590 I'm Jim Lawler, still standing watch. Thank you 00:38:05.590 --> 00:38:08.150 for listening to the SteadyState Sentinel podcast. 00:38:08.849 --> 00:38:12.190 Don't miss out on more insights and exposes from 00:38:12.190 --> 00:38:15.809 America's premier global security experts. Also, 00:38:15.869 --> 00:38:19.670 subscribe to our Substack at substack .com slash 00:38:19.670 --> 00:38:23.329 at SteadyState1 and follow our social media. 00:38:23.840 --> 00:38:25.559 And join us right here next week for another 00:38:25.559 --> 00:38:29.219 exciting edition. The Steady State is a nonprofit 00:38:29.219 --> 00:38:32.159 organization working to sustain our democracy 00:38:32.159 --> 00:38:35.659 and national security. Join us and support our 00:38:35.659 --> 00:38:39.880 mission by visiting www .thesteadysate .org.