Something is changing in our country, and most
people feel it before they can explain it. Hello,
you're listening to the Steady State Sentinel
from the Steady State. I'm Jim Lawler, a former
senior CIA operations officer, and joining me
as my co -host today is John Seifer, my friend
and another former senior CIA officer. Today,
we're talking with Michael Morrell. Michael was
the deputy director of the Central Intelligence
Agency from 2010 to 2013, and twice he was acting
director of the CIA. His book, The Great War
of Our Time, The CIA's Fight Against Terrorism,
was a New York Times bestseller, and it traces
his three -decade -long career at the CIA. Michael,
welcome to our program. You've been involved
in vital national security issues now for about
three decades. How is our current national security
posture different today than in previous years
when you were active in government? Jim, John,
it's great to be with you guys. Couldn't think
of a better way to spend the afternoon than talking
with both of you. You know, we have two ops officers
here and we have an analyst, right? So there's
got to be a joke in there somewhere, but you
guys are better at making up jokes than I, so
I'll let you do that. We'll try to be easy on
you. My joke, Michael, is whenever an analyst
comes into a room full of DO officers, the average
IQ goes up about 30 points. But the analyst is
always looking at their shoes, right, where they're
talking to you. I do want to tell one story because
it puts me in context. And Jim, you mentioned
that I was acting director twice. So when I was
acting director the second time between Dave
Petraeus and John Brennan, my wife and I went
out to dinner in Arlington. And the difference
between a director's security package, right,
is the director gets two cars and four agents
and a deputy director only gets one car. and
two agents, probably because they're deemed less
important. But that day we had, you know, two
armored cars and four agents and we pull into
this parking lot and there is this guy standing
against the wall and he's looking at us and you
can tell by the look on his face that he's thinking,
like, who is this, right? Is this Michelle Obama?
Is this Secretary of State? Like, who is this?
So he's on my wife's side of the car. And when
my wife gets out, he says to her, is that somebody
important? And my lovely wife says, no, he's
just acting important. Well played. She could
be an ops officer. Yeah, she can. Let me ask
you a question and we'll get back to sort of
that general thing is, I mean, you were center
stage when we entered what eventually became
called the war on terror, right? How do you see
that the IC and how it's adapting to challenges
now? Did we stay focused on terrorism for too
long? And then alternatively, have we overcompensated
from counterterrorism to this great power competition
stuff they seem to be focused on today? That's
a great question. I'll caveat it by saying I
really have no idea what's going on inside. Neither
do we. So don't worry about it. So really important
caveat. Look, I think. I think in retrospect,
the country and the intelligence community, no
surprise, right, given what happened to us on
9 -11, overreacted. You know, the pendulum swung
too far. So while we were successfully, post
-9 -11, focusing on al -Qaeda, and I don't think
I think CIA's performance on Al Qaeda post 9
-11 was perhaps its single greatest sustained
performance on anything at any time in its history.
So I'm going to give us a ton of credit, right?
Brought all those people who were involved in
9 -11, right, to justice. And we brought bin
Laden to justice and we prevented attacks on
the United States. And you guys know as well
as I do how many they were planning in that post
9 -11 period. So great success. But did we in
the country, you know, we by moving so many resources
to terrorism, to counterterrorism and the country.
moving so many resources to the military, the
long sustained campaign in Afghanistan, the war
in Iraq period, right? Did we swing too far?
And I think there's an argument that the answer
to that question is yes. And I think it cost
us because during that 20 year period, right?
Certainly 10, 15 years for sure. I don't know
what happened after I left, but during that 15
year period, we weren't focused as much as I
thought we should have been on Russia. We weren't
as focused as much as I thought we should have
been on China. And I think, you know, that left
us not in as good a position vis -a -vis those
adversaries as we should have been as an agency.
So I think there is an argument to that. Did
we shift too much away? I don't know because
I'm not there. But it does seem to me that if
you're going to track the most significant threats
facing the nation right now. there was a significant
shift that was necessary, right, from counterterrorism
to nation states, Russia, China, Iran, North
Korea. Looking, Michael, at our current national
security posture, do you think we are actually
safer today? than we were on 9 -11 because of
current administration policies and IC leadership?
Or is it simply that we've inherited a lot of
the strong foundations that you and other officers
put down for us? What's your thoughts on this?
Let me offer, let me say something about where
I think we are as a country with regard to foreign
policy and maybe why we're there and maybe a
little bit about how this this evolves. So, you
know, my strong sense, you guys probably see
it too. My strong sense is that we, to some extent
have joined our adversaries in what is a might
makes right world, right? That, that we are threatening
countries. to get what we want, either militarily
in the case of Venezuela or economically in the
case of tariffs on pretty much everybody, that
we're kind of acting like these adversaries that
we've not thought very highly of for a very long
time. This is the way they act. So why are we
there? Is it just the president's approach to
things or is there something deeper? And I think
That there's probably two ways that the U .S.
can approach the world at this moment. You know,
we can't be the single hegemon in the world,
right? We simply don't have the relative power
that we had when we did that, right? The strength
of China, right, is the emergence of China as
a great power, right, is the most important reason
for that. You know, we can't be that global hegemon
all by ourselves. We simply don't have the resources.
China's strong. And we simply can't do that.
So you really, it seems to me, we have two choices.
One choice is to pull together the biggest group
of allies and partners that we can and work with
them to sustain, to the extent we can, some sort
of global international order that was somewhat,
at least somewhat similar to what we had before.
where we're acting certainly in our own interests,
but we're also acting in the broader interests
of our allies and partners, right? That's one
way we could do this. That's what President Biden
focused on. That was exactly how he was going
to approach these difficult problems in the world.
And he, you know, he built a lot of things, right?
He built the Quad in East Asia to try to stand
up to China a bit. But you could also argue that
it didn't work very well, that the U .S. didn't
seem to have as much power as it needed to have
to push back on adversaries or even allies. So
the best example is Ukraine, right? Biden did
a lot. He felt constrained a little bit by Putin's,
maybe more than a little bit. He felt constrained
by Putin's escalation rhetoric, particularly
with regard to nuclear weapons. But he couldn't
prevent the Russian attack on Ukraine. And he
couldn't dislodge Russia from Ukraine, right?
Perhaps Ronald Reagan would have taken a different
approach. Maybe not. President Reagan was deeply
concerned about nuclear war as President Biden
was, so who knows? But he wasn't able to resolve
that. He helped Ukraine stand on its own two
feet and fight and push back the Russians and
all that's really good, but he didn't dislodge
them. And then on Gaza with an ally, he was incredibly
supportive of Israel in the aftermath of October
7th, as he should have been in my view. But when
he wanted... When he wanted Netanyahu to ease
up in Gaza, he completely failed. He was not
able to do that, right? Netanyahu did what he
wanted. So this allies and partners thing, you
know, really didn't deliver. So I think probably
our current approach is rooted in the philosophy,
maybe not philosophy, but in the mindset and
personality of our president. It's really the
alternative to the allies and partners approach.
I don't think it's going to work any better.
And I think arguably it's going to work a lot
worse, that we're going to be in worse shape
in the world than we would have in the allies
partners approach. But we'll see how this plays
out. And I think people are going to start comparing
these things. One of the implications of. The
the the might make right approach is that it
forces Russia, China and the United States into
spheres of influence. Because where you where
you where where your might matters most is in
your neighborhood. Right. So that's where you're
going to that's where you're going to focus the
might makes right approach. And it seems to me
that the U .S. is is is flipping into this. might
make right's approach in the Western hemisphere.
And we risk China doing the same in East Asia
in a very significant way, I think. And we risk
letting Putin do that right in his backyard or
neighborhood or whatever you want to call it.
So I think the spheres of influence thing is
a real possibility. And we seem to be heading
in that direction. And spheres of influence,
as you guys know, seem stable. until the spheres
of influence bump up against each other. And
then they're not so stable, right? This is world
war kind of stuff, right? So I think that's where
we are. I don't think it's particularly helpful,
but I understand it to some degree. I mean, your
insights like this are really very useful and
you've written a lot of op -ed pieces. You've
written a book. You had an excellent podcast
series. Let me ask you a question that Jim and
all of us have to sort of... deal with since
we spent a career in a secret intelligence agency?
How should people like us, how should intelligence
agencies that operate largely in secrecy maintain
public trust? How should people like us, former
intelligence officers, engage publicly without
undermining these sort of political norms of
the profession or finding ourselves being sort
of like played around with by politicians who
just create their own narratives based on what
they want us to have said? Yeah. So it's a great
question. And you guys know that there are a
number of our former colleagues, right, who think
that we shouldn't even be doing this, right?
That once you leave CIA, you shouldn't speak.
But many of them say that when they're in. Then
when they come out, they do the same damn thing.
Here's the other thing. Many of them on the outside
are doing the same thing while they're telling
us not to speak. Exactly. That's the best part,
right? And many of them who are saying to us,
don't be political, are being political when
they're saying, don't be political. So I don't
have any time for those people. But I always
thought, and I think one of our really great
directors, Mike Hayden, felt the same way, that
we keep the fence line of what we're willing
to talk about too close in. that there is a lot
of room to push that fence line out. There is
a lot of things that we can talk about, stories
we can tell, successes that we can talk about,
failures that we should talk about, right? And
you can still protect the classified information
that you need to protect. by pushing that fence
line out. In fact, you actually strengthen your
ability to protect that classified information
because all the reporters out there are focusing
on the things you're talking about, right? They're
not focusing on the things you're not talking
about. So I've always thought there's room for
the agency itself and the intelligence community
itself to push the fence line out and talk more
about what we do to the American people and not
let somebody else do it on our behalf because
nobody's going to do it as well as we do. The
second thing I'd say is, obviously, you know,
when I left the government, I wrote a book. I
worked for CBS News. I had a podcast. I was out
there talking all the time. And I think that's
just as important for former senior officials
to do because we do live in a democracy. The
American people do have a right to know as much
as we can possibly share with them. And when
you're a senior official like all three of us,
we know where the lines are. We know what we
can say here and what we can't. We know what's
been declassified and what hasn't, right? So
I think we're part of the system for helping
the American people understand what intelligence
is, why we do it as a nation, how we approach
it as ethically as we possibly can, you know,
talk about our successes. and why their successes
and talk about our failures and why they failed
and what we're doing to make sure it never happens
again. I think it's incredibly valuable. That's
helpful. Michael, if you were currently in power
as either director of CIA or a major policymaker,
and my question may be a little overtaken by
events very quickly, but what should we be doing
vis -a -vis Iran? Should we be just a cheerleader
on the sidelines? How should we encourage these
people to throw off the mullahs and perhaps pursue
their own democracy or whatever system they choose?
We're in a pretty delicate moment as of this
taping with Iran. It's quite possible before
the podcast comes out that we could be at war.
But I think... I think Iran is a very complex
problem. It's not easy. It's wickedly hard. I
think it's fair to say, and I've heard Prime
Minister Netanyahu say this, that the United
States and Israel pummeled the Iranian nuclear
program and we didn't destroy it. And there's
no way the Iranians are going to negotiate on
missiles because it is their only defense, particularly
now that the proxies have been weakened. There's
no way they're going to give up missiles, put
limits on missiles. They're just not going to
do that. And those missiles, right, are aimed
right at Israel. And there's no way they're going
to stop dealing with the proxies, even if they
promise not to. Right. We know how covert action
works. It works the same way. Right. You can
deny it and deny it till the ends of the earth
come home. So they're not going to do that either.
So the argument of those who are in favor of
war is Iran's going to keep being Iran, the Iran
we don't like until the regime is gone. And we're
never going to have a better chance than we have
right now to get rid of this regime. This is
the argument of those people who are saying we
should go. And it's true that we've probably
never been in a better position to change the
regime than we are now. Iran is weaker militarily
than it's been in a very, very long time as a
result of the war last June. And Iran is weaker
politically. The regime is weaker politically
than it's probably been at any point in its history.
So now's a good time. And if you're Prime Minister
Netanyahu, you're never going to have a better
partner in the White House, right? And if you're
Prime Minister Netanyahu, you got an election
that you have to call by October, right? And
if you can go to the voters and say, I defeated
Hamas, I defeated Hezbollah, and I defeated the
head of the snake. I have brought us permanent
security. You could see him saying this, right?
I brought us permanent security. You know, he
might win, right? Which is kind of astonishing,
you know, given October 7th and all the failures,
you know, surrounding October 7th. So that's
the reasons, right, to go. The reasons not to
go are number one, there is no guarantee that
either a... a significant, sustained military
campaign is going to dislodge the regime. In
fact, the probability is less than 50 % that
only an air campaign can dislodge the regime.
So there's no guarantee that this military action,
even a significant one, is actually going to
accomplish what you're trying to accomplish.
And then the second is, even if it does dislodge
this regime, there's no guarantee that the next
one is going to be any better than this one in
fact the most likely outcome it seems to me um
of this regime disappearing the clerics right
the clerics who rule the way they rule and with
the ideology that they rule with um that resulted
right in thousands and thousands and thousands
of deaths of the protesters you talked about
jim that the most likely outcome is the irgc
takes over right they got the money They got
the guns. They got the power. They have the know
-how. Now, they might cut a deal with Trump because
they're not ideologues, right? They're in it
for the money. They own all these industries,
right? They're in it for the money. They want
to sustain that. They might cut a deal with the
president visa, you know, the way Delce Rodriguez
has. I was going to say, it sounds a lot like
Venezuela. Yeah. So they could do that, but maybe
not too. Yeah. The other thing I remind people
of is even a democratic. A truly democratic Iran
might not be Iran we like. This Iranian desire
for hegemony in the Middle East, what the proxies
are about, what the missiles are about, what
the nuclear program's about, that's not a clerical
regime thing. That's not an Iranian thing. That
is a deeply Persian thing. They had one third
of the world's population under their control
when it was the Persian Empire. They think they
have a right to that again, just like Vladimir
Putin thinks that Russia has a right to, you
know, the Russian Empire. The Shah used to talk
openly about his desire for nuclear weapons someday,
right? And the father of the current Iranian
nuclear weapons program is a guy named Rafsanjani,
who was a moderate in this regime. So, even a
truly democratic Iran is going to be at odds
at many times with the United States and our
other allies in the region. And I guess the last
point I'd make on the why not now, right, those
are all why not nows. The other why not now is
the risks are enormous. You know, one risk. is
that the Iranians are successful militarily either
in Israel, killing a large number of citizens,
or successful vis -a -vis us in sinking a warship.
You know, remember the Falklands War? Out of
nowhere, the Argentinians, you know, had a missile
that nobody knew about, and they sunk a British
warship, right? Massive fallout in the UK over
that. You know, I'm not predicting that because
I don't know if they have any special weapons,
but who knows? It's always possible. The other
possibility is that in a significant war, Gulf
oil infrastructure gets mixed up in the fight.
Saudi, Emirati, I don't think anybody wants to
have an oil war here, but you never know. If
the Iranians feel that this is existential to
them, they might want to escalate. as high as
they can go, right, which is attacking oil and
trying to escalate so high that we say, oh, my
God, and we pull out. They might think that.
You know, that could take oil to $250 a barrel,
right? In that case, right, forget about the
midterms. Forget about the midterms, right? It
looks like a bloodbath to begin with. So there
are massive economic risks, strategic risks,
and political risks for the president. So he's
got to weigh all this. I guess he's even doing
that today, right? But there's an argument for
and there's a strong argument for and a strong
argument against. But I think we learned from
our experience, too, that this notion that these
things are easy are sort of not true. And I think
this administration, this president in particular,
likes to think that he can pull off things that
are easy. And he's had a little bit of success
with that. So I think it's. So there is some
danger there. But let me ask you a more general
question based on your long experience as a very
senior analyst in the CIA. How do you see AI
impacting intelligence going forward? And what
does intelligence advantage mean in AI, deep
data, big data, better collection, faster analysis
world that we're going to be living in? How is
it going to affect decision making, do you think?
From an intelligence perspective, right? Yeah.
that's a great question so i think it has a very
significant use in cyber security in cyber both
defensively and offensively right um you know
the way these cyber attacks are done both by
us and by our adversaries is you you get a foothold
in a network and then you got to figure out how
to get from where you are to where the good stuff
is and it it it means making a jump And then
evaluating and exploring where you are and figuring
out where your next jump is, right? You don't
have a map, right, of the whole network. You
got to sort of figure out the map as you go,
put it that way. That's a time -consuming process.
So somebody might get a foothold in a network
because of a successful hack, and it might be
two months before the offensive cyber guys figure
out exactly where the good stuff is and start
their exfiltration. With AI, you can do that
as much faster because you're going to have that
AI do the analysis for you. And maybe it makes
some mistakes, but who cares, right? It's just
moving so much faster. So that's a place both
offensively and you respond to it, right, by
using AI on the defense too. So that's one place.
You know, I've seen since I left government all
sorts of... both collection tools and analytic
tools that are AI driven. And they're incredibly
impressive. You can see all sorts of interesting
intelligence use cases. And you say to yourself,
I wonder if the CIA has this because they absolutely
should, right? And then you learn that they don't.
And you're like scratching your head. And we
all know our organization, right? We absolutely
love it, but not invented here, right, is a pretty
strong. pretty strong character trait. So I think
that's changing. Director Ratcliffe just put
out new guidance on how small tech firms can
get into the building, which I think is terrific.
We'll see if that makes a difference. Other people
have tried things like this, another attempt
at that. I think there's room for both collection
tools and analytic tools. They're already experimenting
with this stuff inside. I don't know if it'll
affect decision -making, right, operational decision
-making or analytic decision -making, because
you have a little bit of time, right? You're
not forced by the adversary to move quickly,
except in cyber. So I think the impact's going
to be massive. I think probably the best approach,
right, if I was in my old job and we were having
a meeting about AI and intelligence, you know.
I think the best approach is let a thousand flowers
bloom. Let people at the working level experiment
with it. And then let's all compare notes, right?
What worked, what didn't, rather than trying
to straightjacket the whole organization into
something, right? That might not end up working.
Yeah. And we see, for example, like you've seen
groups like Bellingcat and these other guys that
do collection piece of this, not the, well, I
guess that's an analytical in a sense too. And
you see how, you know, those kind of things would
be beneficial inside the building. And yeah,
the mindset has to change a little bit to bring
those in. But the other thing that I tell companies,
right, companies will come in with these great
analytic tools and it sits on top of open source
data. And guys, what I say to them is, guys,
that's great. But when you take it to CIA, they're
going to want it to sit on top of all of the
data. both the open source data and all of our
classified holdings, right? The open source data
is great, but we've got so much more. So let's
use it, right? And companies got to get in that
mindset that they got to figure out a way how
to integrate all of that special data, right?
And we as an intelligence agency have to figure
out a way because so much stuff is compartmented
now, right? I mean, it was always compartmented,
right? But so much stuff is compartmented now
that, you know, you run the risk that if not
all the data is there and you miss something
and you find out that in some compartments, this
was George Tenet's big worry after 9 -11, right?
That somewhere in our building was going to be,
you know, the next attack and we're going to
miss it because it's compartmented. So they got
to figure that out too. You know, that's interesting.
You say that Michael's a professor from Stanford
and a retired army general asked me how AI would
affect. human recruitment, recruitment of foreign
spies. And I said exactly what you did. I said,
if you could combine an AI tool to scoop up all
the overt information and all the covert information
about particular people that we wanted to recruit,
all their financials, their medical, everything
else, it would be a fabulous tool enabling case
officers how to make the proper recruitment approach.
So you've talked about Ukraine. We've talked
a little bit about Russia. Any thoughts that
you have on China? Sure. Like I said, I'm a little
worried that we are headed toward some sort of
a deal, right, where we get a good bit of what
we want on economics. And Xi gets a good bit
of what he wants on national security, right?
Like not sell weapons to Taiwan. Distance ourselves
a bit from Taiwan. There's a risk there. There's
a real risk of that happening, I think. With
regard to Taiwan, I'll say a couple things about
China. One, with regard to Taiwan, I do not believe...
that a Chinese attack on Taiwan is likely in
the near term. I think without a doubt, actually,
I think without a doubt that Xi, President Xi,
sees military action against Taiwan as a last
resort. It would be a massive risk for him. Imagine
trying and failing. Not only would he lose his
job, but the Communist Party would be out of
power. This issue is so important to the Chinese
public. If he does it, he's got to make sure
that he can do it. And when he told his military
to be ready by 2027, he was admitting that they
weren't ready yet. And the reason you see so
much discussion about a possible blockade is
because they can't do an invasion yet. They don't
have what they need. So his goal is to build
such a massive military force across the straits
from Taiwan that a Taiwan president wakes up
someday and a U .S. president at the same time
wakes up someday and says, this is not worth
it. This is not worth it. Let's find a way out
of this. Let's find a way to give China what
they want here. That's what Xi wants. I don't
know if that's possible, but that's what he wants.
Would he go to war if Taiwan declared independence
or if the U .S. changed its one China policy?
Probably because he would have to. But that's
where the blockade might happen. That's why they've
been practicing the blockade, just in case. You
know, if the U .S. changed its one China policy,
China might grab one of those Taiwan islands
that is really close to China. That would be
an easy grab. And they would say, okay, what
are you gonna do about it? And in a blockade
situation, they would say, we're blockading you,
no weapons in, we decide what comes in and out.
And if anybody wants to take the first shot,
Taiwan, US, go ahead. So I don't think Taiwan
is a near -term issue. I don't think there's
any evidence that she... has given up on his
goal of coercing them back into the fold rather
than forcing them second thing i'd say is that
is that look we got a lot of problems here right
for sure china's got a lot of problems too a
lot of problems they got a massive demographic
problem you know the the number of workers per
non -worker you know is falling rapidly that
is a real economic problem they are they are
massively in debt. They overinvested. There are
so many buildings in Beijing, for example, that
there's nobody in. There are so many factories
that are idle because they simply overinvested.
This is what Japan did that got Japan into so
much trouble. They also have a leadership problem.
And here's the leadership problem. China had
figured out How to have an authoritarian government,
which they need, right, to put the Communist
Party to stay in power, but having a change in
leadership every number of years. That's actually
brilliant, right? You have a change in leadership,
so you get fresh ideas. Not only the leader has
fresh ideas and new energy, but the people they
bring with them, right, have fresh ideas, more
creativity. But by Xi making himself leader for
life? there's a real risk of sclerosis in chinese
policy going forward i think you can actually
see that a little bit um and that is not in the
long -term interest of china so that's a that's
a downside the other downside right is that she
became so the other problem they have she became
so fearful of the Chinese who were getting rich
because of capitalism, that he shut down economic
reform and actually rolled it back because he
was afraid of those people, the political power
that they would get by being rich. He actually
saw a couple of individuals who he focused on.
And by turning off economic reform and rolling
it back, you undermine Chinese growth. All of
that Chinese growth We saw over the years those
really high rates of growth wasn't because China's
socialist communist model was was a good, you
know, was a great thing and a successful thing.
It's because they unleashed capitalism. Right.
It was pure, unordinated, pure capitalism that
led to 400, 500 million Chinese being lifted
out of poverty. And he said, can't do that because
the political consequences are too great. So
they got their own set of problems. And they
don't have immigration that really can fill up
the demographic thing. Exactly. And so, yeah.
So listen, you've been really generous with your
time. We generally try to keep these sort of
at a short rate with us. So I know you're not
doing the podcast anymore. I mean, we and our
listeners will be on our lookout for your writing
and the things you're saying. But is there anything
you'd like to tell us that you're thinking about,
working about, or family businesses you could
tell our listeners about? No family businesses.
What I will say is I think it's great that you
guys do this. You're not going to hack the bookstore?
No. Okay. All right. Good. All right. Go ahead.
Oh, that's what you meant by family business.
I thought you meant other things. Yes. Middleburg
Books, my wife's bookstore, Middleburg, Virginia.
It's fantastic. She's built an incredible, I
have no responsibility in this. I carry boxes
when necessary. She built something really special.
Thank you. But the last thing I wanted to say
is, you know, if you spend any time at CIA, you
know that the vast majority of people there are
amazing Americans who are working really hard
for the security of their country. And that's
you two, right? And they see that. I listen to
your podcast, right? They see that every week.
I think it's really important that you do this.
And to those people who think we shouldn't be
talking publicly. Thank you, Michael, for those
kind words. And thank you especially for this
very interesting discussion for joining us today.
So if you like what you heard on today's show.
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