WEBVTT - AI generated 00:00:03.299 --> 00:00:05.700 The Steady State Sentinel is produced by the 00:00:05.700 --> 00:00:07.679 Steady State, a community of former national 00:00:07.679 --> 00:00:09.960 security professionals who spent their careers 00:00:09.960 --> 00:00:12.800 safeguarding the United States at home and abroad. 00:00:17.179 --> 00:00:20.199 Today, we continue that mission by staying true 00:00:20.199 --> 00:00:23.640 to our oaths to defend the Constitution, uphold 00:00:23.640 --> 00:00:26.500 our democracy and protect our nation's security. 00:00:27.260 --> 00:00:30.260 Join our expert hosts as they interview field 00:00:30.260 --> 00:00:33.380 -tested guests whose unique experiences shed 00:00:33.380 --> 00:00:36.719 light on the crises and challenges facing our 00:00:36.719 --> 00:00:55.219 nation. Welcome to the show. I'm John Seifer, 00:00:55.240 --> 00:00:57.740 and this is the Steady State Sentinel. Today, 00:00:57.799 --> 00:00:59.579 we're honored to be joined by Lieutenant General 00:00:59.579 --> 00:01:02.899 Retired Ben Hodges, who's here with us from Germany. 00:01:03.659 --> 00:01:05.719 General Hodges is the former commanding general 00:01:05.719 --> 00:01:08.739 of U .S. Army Europe, senior military strategist, 00:01:08.739 --> 00:01:10.540 and one of the most respected voices on NATO, 00:01:10.719 --> 00:01:12.719 Russia, and the future of European security. 00:01:13.180 --> 00:01:15.019 So, General Hodges, thanks so much for being 00:01:15.019 --> 00:01:17.420 here. John, thanks very much for the privilege. 00:01:18.819 --> 00:01:21.159 Well, let's just talk a little bit about... I 00:01:21.159 --> 00:01:24.079 mean, the idea of the steady state is to discuss 00:01:24.079 --> 00:01:27.900 the professionalism of national security professionals, 00:01:28.359 --> 00:01:31.579 public servants in this day and age where everything 00:01:31.579 --> 00:01:33.420 seems to be politicized. So I just want to talk 00:01:33.420 --> 00:01:36.439 a little bit about your background, how you got 00:01:36.439 --> 00:01:39.200 into it. What's your view in terms of, you know, 00:01:39.200 --> 00:01:42.719 country over party, those type of things. So 00:01:42.719 --> 00:01:46.239 if that's all right with you. Yeah, sure. I'm 00:01:46.239 --> 00:01:48.760 from North Florida, originally near Tallahassee. 00:01:48.760 --> 00:01:51.879 I grew up in a small town and I did not come 00:01:51.879 --> 00:01:54.819 from a military family, but almost all the men 00:01:54.819 --> 00:01:57.040 in my family had served at some point either 00:01:57.040 --> 00:02:01.200 as a draftee or volunteer. You know, the vast 00:02:01.200 --> 00:02:03.260 majority of them did their part. And so it was 00:02:03.260 --> 00:02:05.719 always an assumption that I would do something. 00:02:05.739 --> 00:02:08.800 And I really wanted to be in the Army. And I'm 00:02:08.800 --> 00:02:13.460 67 years old, so I'm in high school. junior high 00:02:13.460 --> 00:02:16.479 and high school during most of Vietnam. And I 00:02:16.479 --> 00:02:18.560 watched the news every night. You know, you see 00:02:18.560 --> 00:02:21.599 the soldiers out there and I'm not fully appreciating 00:02:21.599 --> 00:02:23.060 how terrible it was for them. And I thought, 00:02:23.099 --> 00:02:25.400 man, that is so cool. I want to be, I want to 00:02:25.400 --> 00:02:28.639 do that. I want to be a leader of soldiers. And 00:02:28.639 --> 00:02:31.759 so that was my ambition. I ended up going to 00:02:31.759 --> 00:02:35.780 West Point, graduated in 1980, which means I 00:02:35.780 --> 00:02:40.719 started in the summer of 76. Summer of 76, of 00:02:40.719 --> 00:02:43.500 course, is—I know you were probably not even 00:02:43.500 --> 00:02:47.560 born then, but— Well, I got a commission to go 00:02:47.560 --> 00:02:49.360 to West Point. I would have been graduating class 00:02:49.360 --> 00:02:52.419 of 83, and I went there. I was going to play 00:02:52.419 --> 00:02:54.740 football and lacrosse, and I went and stayed 00:02:54.740 --> 00:02:57.379 with some generals that lived on base and everything. 00:02:57.560 --> 00:03:00.500 And they went to the officers' club on Sunday, 00:03:00.560 --> 00:03:03.819 and I ate and drank so much pastries and things, 00:03:03.919 --> 00:03:06.560 I threw up in the bathroom. It was a crazy time. 00:03:07.530 --> 00:03:10.069 But the notion of making my bed every day, my 00:03:10.069 --> 00:03:11.669 parents were like sort of hippie -ish professors. 00:03:11.909 --> 00:03:14.050 And so, like, I had never made my bed. And it 00:03:14.050 --> 00:03:17.689 was just a little step too far. Like, I loved 00:03:17.689 --> 00:03:19.030 West Point. It was a beautiful place. I would 00:03:19.030 --> 00:03:22.689 have been proud to go there. Well, you can be 00:03:22.689 --> 00:03:25.530 sure I was in the bottom quartile of the people 00:03:25.530 --> 00:03:29.009 that entered with my class. But the reason I 00:03:29.009 --> 00:03:32.150 bring this up is because, you know, that was 00:03:32.150 --> 00:03:38.460 1976. Vietnam, My Lai is... right behind us. 00:03:38.500 --> 00:03:40.539 I mean, it's still fresh. All the faculty were 00:03:40.539 --> 00:03:43.539 Vietnam veterans. And so it was pounded into 00:03:43.539 --> 00:03:47.000 our head from the very beginning about, you know, 00:03:47.039 --> 00:03:50.620 your oath to the Constitution, that the military 00:03:50.620 --> 00:03:56.139 was apolitical and that the respect, of course, 00:03:56.159 --> 00:03:59.659 we wanted to regain respect to the American population 00:03:59.659 --> 00:04:03.250 after Vietnam. Because the military, the reason 00:04:03.250 --> 00:04:04.810 I got into West Point, because nobody wanted 00:04:04.810 --> 00:04:07.069 to send their kid to West Point, you know, in 00:04:07.069 --> 00:04:12.669 the 70s. So I just remember being immersed in 00:04:12.669 --> 00:04:16.110 this, the importance of the Constitution of earning 00:04:16.110 --> 00:04:19.750 and retaining the respect of our fellow citizens. 00:04:20.009 --> 00:04:22.050 And that meant, of course, operating within a 00:04:22.050 --> 00:04:28.730 legal framework and the whole, the emphasis on 00:04:28.730 --> 00:04:31.069 integrity, duty, honor, country, all of that. 00:04:31.420 --> 00:04:33.500 I mean, from the minute you walk through that 00:04:33.500 --> 00:04:37.439 gate, it's pounded into you. And I vividly remember 00:04:37.439 --> 00:04:42.600 sitting in class, a law class, law of armed conflict, 00:04:42.779 --> 00:04:46.800 and they're talking about My Lai and the massacre 00:04:46.800 --> 00:04:49.620 and how did this happen? And the U .S. Army would 00:04:49.620 --> 00:04:54.379 kill innocent civilians. And this notion or responsibility 00:04:54.379 --> 00:04:58.930 of disobeying orders that were unlawful. having 00:04:58.930 --> 00:05:01.290 the courage to say, no, we're not going to do 00:05:01.290 --> 00:05:04.589 this and to prevent others from doing it. And 00:05:04.589 --> 00:05:08.389 then so that was from the very beginning. That 00:05:08.389 --> 00:05:11.009 was at my core as an officer. It was impressive 00:05:11.009 --> 00:05:15.790 how important this was. And so as you started 00:05:15.790 --> 00:05:17.829 your career when you were young, I mean, your 00:05:17.829 --> 00:05:19.769 sort of views that you now speak on leadership, 00:05:19.769 --> 00:05:22.329 military professionalism, what were some of the 00:05:22.329 --> 00:05:24.170 key experiences early in your career that helped? 00:05:24.540 --> 00:05:26.420 shaped that, the things you had to face, or were 00:05:26.420 --> 00:05:28.100 there mentors and leaders that really influenced 00:05:28.100 --> 00:05:29.660 you at that time? Well, obviously, I was the 00:05:29.660 --> 00:05:35.319 beneficiary of decades of really good commanders. 00:05:36.259 --> 00:05:39.300 Not all of them were perfect, but I was lucky. 00:05:39.379 --> 00:05:42.019 I benefited from some very good commanders who 00:05:42.019 --> 00:05:46.339 had been veterans or had so much experience, 00:05:46.560 --> 00:05:51.899 let's say. I also was surrounded by really good 00:05:51.899 --> 00:05:54.199 sergeants, you know, and so many of the NCOs 00:05:54.199 --> 00:05:56.740 have been killed in Vietnam. So the ones that 00:05:56.740 --> 00:05:59.740 have survived had some real life experiences 00:05:59.740 --> 00:06:05.100 to pass on. And I was smart enough to realize 00:06:05.100 --> 00:06:07.120 that, number one, I was never the smartest guy 00:06:07.120 --> 00:06:10.660 in the room. And number two, that if I listened 00:06:10.660 --> 00:06:13.600 to the NCO sergeants, they could probably save 00:06:13.600 --> 00:06:16.800 me from myself, but that I was still responsible. 00:06:17.389 --> 00:06:19.769 You know, if it went bad. So these are the kind 00:06:19.769 --> 00:06:22.870 of that was the culture I grew up in. And I started 00:06:22.870 --> 00:06:26.029 off in West Germany in 1981. I reported to my 00:06:26.029 --> 00:06:29.230 first unit. It was a mechanized infantry battalion 00:06:29.230 --> 00:06:33.389 up in West Germany. And I was very lucky because 00:06:33.389 --> 00:06:35.990 this was right at the beginning of the Reagan 00:06:35.990 --> 00:06:39.170 buildup. So there was huge emphasis to rebuild 00:06:39.170 --> 00:06:44.889 the army, emphasis on training. And my battalion 00:06:44.889 --> 00:06:48.139 commander. had served in Vietnam three different 00:06:48.139 --> 00:06:50.500 tours. He had commanded three different companies 00:06:50.500 --> 00:06:53.199 in combat. And I mean, the guy was, you could 00:06:53.199 --> 00:06:56.920 imagine how hard he was, how focused he was on 00:06:56.920 --> 00:07:00.720 readiness. And so I spent three years in West 00:07:00.720 --> 00:07:03.839 Germany, knowing that the huge Soviet Union and 00:07:03.839 --> 00:07:06.579 Warsaw Pact were just across the border. And 00:07:06.579 --> 00:07:09.579 so we were focused on readiness all the time. 00:07:09.899 --> 00:07:12.279 You know, you didn't go home on Friday if you 00:07:12.279 --> 00:07:13.779 had a vehicle in the motor pool that was still 00:07:13.779 --> 00:07:15.720 broken down. It was just... That was the mindset, 00:07:15.879 --> 00:07:19.959 the culture, fight tonight. And so that set me 00:07:19.959 --> 00:07:23.519 on, for the rest of my Army life, it was all 00:07:23.519 --> 00:07:26.040 about readiness. Are soldiers properly trained? 00:07:26.199 --> 00:07:29.740 Do we have the systems in place? And then finally, 00:07:29.779 --> 00:07:32.399 the importance of working with allies, because 00:07:32.399 --> 00:07:34.680 obviously we were surrounded by German, British, 00:07:34.759 --> 00:07:38.120 and other Allied forces there. The post -Vietnam 00:07:38.120 --> 00:07:40.879 Army, I mean, it must have been quite a hill 00:07:40.879 --> 00:07:43.480 to climb because it... because of what happened 00:07:43.480 --> 00:07:46.480 and the politics and, you know, drug use and 00:07:46.480 --> 00:07:48.699 the sort of views that happened. But it was rebuilt 00:07:48.699 --> 00:07:50.360 and it was rebuilt. I think, you know, I think 00:07:50.360 --> 00:07:53.300 some senior leaders really took it upon themselves 00:07:53.300 --> 00:07:56.180 to rebuild the army. So that by the time in the 00:07:56.180 --> 00:07:58.839 early 90s, when, you know, you're going to war 00:07:58.839 --> 00:08:01.620 in Iraq, I think we had built obviously the best 00:08:01.620 --> 00:08:05.240 military in the world. But I think I think it 00:08:05.240 --> 00:08:07.439 took a lot of effort to get there. I mean, so 00:08:07.439 --> 00:08:09.100 did you did you feel that were there leaders 00:08:09.100 --> 00:08:11.899 that are trying to, you know, change? Because 00:08:11.899 --> 00:08:13.459 I think we're going to end up having to do some 00:08:13.459 --> 00:08:16.199 rebuilding possibly after this period. You're 00:08:16.199 --> 00:08:20.019 exactly right. You know, I had a former commander 00:08:20.019 --> 00:08:22.699 tell me one time, he said, Ben, three things 00:08:22.699 --> 00:08:26.259 saved the U .S. Army after Vietnam. And I thought 00:08:26.259 --> 00:08:27.920 he was going to say, you know, the Abrams tank, 00:08:28.100 --> 00:08:30.139 the Bradley fighting vehicle, the Apache. And 00:08:30.139 --> 00:08:32.980 it was none of it was equipment oriented. He 00:08:32.980 --> 00:08:35.539 said three things. Number one was the creation 00:08:35.539 --> 00:08:38.399 of the National Training Center. And the NTC 00:08:38.399 --> 00:08:40.720 out in the desert at Fort Irwin is where you 00:08:40.720 --> 00:08:45.080 go and you just get hammered with your unit because 00:08:45.080 --> 00:08:47.679 it's a competitive environment, not like the 00:08:47.679 --> 00:08:50.879 old traditional exercises that are so rare. Yes. 00:08:51.120 --> 00:08:54.169 And the dreaded OPFOR. You know, they live there, 00:08:54.230 --> 00:08:56.730 so they do this all the time. They cheat like 00:08:56.730 --> 00:09:01.590 hell. And so Blue Four gets hammered until you 00:09:01.590 --> 00:09:05.669 finally learn to do things, how to fight. So 00:09:05.669 --> 00:09:08.570 it was the creation of a training environment 00:09:08.570 --> 00:09:13.970 that was realistic, very demanding. Everybody 00:09:13.970 --> 00:09:16.850 talks about doing tough training. NTC was hell. 00:09:17.370 --> 00:09:20.799 And that was a critical part of it. helping us 00:09:20.799 --> 00:09:23.299 learn how to fight again. The second part of 00:09:23.299 --> 00:09:26.860 this goes hand in hand with it was the institutionalization 00:09:26.860 --> 00:09:30.299 of the AAR, the After Action Review. This seems 00:09:30.299 --> 00:09:33.860 kind of pedestrian, but the After Action Review, 00:09:34.220 --> 00:09:37.000 which you had to do after every event at the 00:09:37.000 --> 00:09:38.620 National Training Center, and then it became 00:09:38.620 --> 00:09:42.120 part and parcel of the entire Army. This is critical 00:09:42.120 --> 00:09:46.159 self -reflection. What happened? Why did it happen? 00:09:46.299 --> 00:09:48.720 How do you fix it? And so commanders would have 00:09:48.720 --> 00:09:50.759 to start off themselves like, well, you know, 00:09:50.779 --> 00:09:52.860 I probably didn't give clear orders about this 00:09:52.860 --> 00:09:56.139 or I didn't understand this. And it really did 00:09:56.139 --> 00:10:03.340 so much to improve the, not just the integrity, 00:10:03.519 --> 00:10:07.639 but the professional integrity of how we look 00:10:07.639 --> 00:10:10.980 at ourself and to evaluate. So that was essential. 00:10:11.139 --> 00:10:13.440 And then the third thing, I think, aren't junior 00:10:13.440 --> 00:10:17.080 officers enlisted? allowed to like speak up and 00:10:17.080 --> 00:10:19.679 what happened to them even with their you know 00:10:19.679 --> 00:10:21.639 so like everybody has a place right it's not 00:10:21.639 --> 00:10:24.440 just ready you have to do it the best AERs will 00:10:24.440 --> 00:10:26.580 probably be where some sergeant said I never 00:10:26.580 --> 00:10:28.899 knew we were supposed to do this you know and 00:10:28.899 --> 00:10:31.100 then you realize okay the orders did not get 00:10:31.100 --> 00:10:34.220 transmitted clearly or or whatever the third 00:10:34.220 --> 00:10:39.419 thing was the establishment of a non -commissioned 00:10:39.419 --> 00:10:44.730 officer education system where as the army began 00:10:44.730 --> 00:10:48.389 to realize we have to decentralize more. It can't 00:10:48.389 --> 00:10:50.309 be all top down. And so if we're going to put 00:10:50.309 --> 00:10:53.570 more responsibility on sergeants, then we need 00:10:53.570 --> 00:10:56.529 to give them the educational opportunities so 00:10:56.529 --> 00:11:00.950 that they're prepared. And I've never forgotten 00:11:00.950 --> 00:11:03.129 those three things because they really were all 00:11:03.129 --> 00:11:06.889 about people leadership. Yeah, culture. Culture 00:11:06.889 --> 00:11:10.279 changes. Changing culture is hard. you know, 00:11:10.279 --> 00:11:12.940 doing it. But also in that time, and I don't 00:11:12.940 --> 00:11:14.340 know if it would have affected someone who was 00:11:14.340 --> 00:11:17.799 sort of working their way up in the Army, isn't 00:11:17.799 --> 00:11:21.120 the Goldwater reforms and the purple and, you 00:11:21.120 --> 00:11:24.720 know, moving the different Army, Navy, everybody 00:11:24.720 --> 00:11:26.440 was sort of closer together. Did that have an 00:11:26.440 --> 00:11:29.679 effect that you saw in your career? Absolutely. 00:11:30.080 --> 00:11:33.000 The Goldwater -Nichols Act was the law enacted 00:11:33.000 --> 00:11:35.399 because the Congress realized that the services 00:11:35.399 --> 00:11:37.740 were never going to become joint. I mean, we 00:11:37.740 --> 00:11:40.879 talk about it. But we were never truly going 00:11:40.879 --> 00:11:43.700 to become joint. You know, the Army, the Navy, 00:11:43.799 --> 00:11:46.379 the Air Force, the Marines were all, you know, 00:11:46.379 --> 00:11:49.759 fighting for their share of the budget pie. And, 00:11:49.779 --> 00:11:52.639 you know, this sounds worse than it was, but 00:11:52.639 --> 00:11:55.320 nonetheless, we were not optimizing all the capabilities. 00:11:55.519 --> 00:11:57.419 And so the Congress said, all right, well, we're 00:11:57.419 --> 00:12:00.320 going to make you do it. And so if you want to 00:12:00.320 --> 00:12:02.820 become a general, you have to have served in 00:12:02.820 --> 00:12:05.159 certain joint assignments and you have to have 00:12:05.159 --> 00:12:09.470 certain joint education requirements. Then that 00:12:09.470 --> 00:12:12.049 tells the Army, OK, if you want Hodges to ever 00:12:12.049 --> 00:12:14.029 be a general, I better start making sure he's 00:12:14.029 --> 00:12:16.970 getting these assignments and education along 00:12:16.970 --> 00:12:20.490 the way. And so, of course, then the joint force, 00:12:20.590 --> 00:12:25.870 the joint staff became the dominant part of the 00:12:25.870 --> 00:12:29.710 services. And then the services had to fulfill 00:12:29.710 --> 00:12:32.370 their Title 10 responsibility of the Army provide 00:12:32.370 --> 00:12:35.789 trained and equipped land forces. Same for the 00:12:35.789 --> 00:12:38.190 Air Force and Navy and so on. So, yes, I mean, 00:12:38.190 --> 00:12:42.429 that was what I grew up in. And it forced the 00:12:42.429 --> 00:12:47.610 services to think more joint. Right. I mean, 00:12:47.629 --> 00:12:50.149 the professionalism. So, I mean, a lot of retired 00:12:50.149 --> 00:12:53.070 military leaders prefer to stay silent on sort 00:12:53.070 --> 00:12:54.610 of political matters and what's happening now. 00:12:55.169 --> 00:12:57.370 And what compelled you to speak publicly when 00:12:57.370 --> 00:12:59.549 you believed that norms or institutions were 00:12:59.549 --> 00:13:02.330 at risk? And what do you hope Americans understand 00:13:02.330 --> 00:13:05.120 better about? military service and national defense 00:13:05.120 --> 00:13:10.320 in this day and age? You know, that oath, my 00:13:10.320 --> 00:13:13.539 oath to the Constitution, which I started way 00:13:13.539 --> 00:13:17.399 back when I was a cadet and then have continued 00:13:17.399 --> 00:13:21.080 it up through my service. I retired in 2018 after 00:13:21.080 --> 00:13:26.460 38 years as an officer. I never believed or even 00:13:26.460 --> 00:13:28.740 thought about whether or not my oath would still 00:13:28.740 --> 00:13:32.480 be in effect or not. I mean, it didn't have a... 00:13:32.639 --> 00:13:34.980 OK, you're retired. You have nothing to do with 00:13:34.980 --> 00:13:37.559 the Constitution anymore. I assume the opposite. 00:13:38.179 --> 00:13:42.960 And so when I see that it is in danger, of course, 00:13:43.059 --> 00:13:45.019 you know, I'm trying to think, OK, how can I 00:13:45.019 --> 00:13:48.519 help defend it? Now, one of the things we have 00:13:48.519 --> 00:13:51.539 done in the services or certainly my experience 00:13:51.539 --> 00:13:55.039 in the Army was every time a soldier or somebody 00:13:55.039 --> 00:13:58.120 was promoted at the ceremony, you would reaffirm 00:13:58.120 --> 00:14:01.899 the oath. So everybody hears it being. reaffirmed. 00:14:01.899 --> 00:14:06.240 Whenever an enlisted soldier would reenlist for 00:14:06.240 --> 00:14:09.100 another two, three, six years, whatever, affirm 00:14:09.100 --> 00:14:14.879 the oath. And then you just constantly are reminding 00:14:14.879 --> 00:14:18.440 people so that it's in the fiber of who you are. 00:14:19.700 --> 00:14:26.230 And, you know, retaining the respect. of our 00:14:26.230 --> 00:14:28.870 fellow citizens is important because, number 00:14:28.870 --> 00:14:32.330 one, they have given the military the authority 00:14:32.330 --> 00:14:36.009 to use lethal force to defend the state. So that 00:14:36.009 --> 00:14:39.149 respect is important. Plus, if you're an all 00:14:39.149 --> 00:14:43.509 -volunteer force, parents and influencers need 00:14:43.509 --> 00:14:47.850 to be confident that the military is based on 00:14:47.850 --> 00:14:52.789 legal activities or legal framework and it's 00:14:52.789 --> 00:14:55.500 an institution that can be trusted. So these 00:14:55.500 --> 00:14:59.659 were important. That's why I kept doing it. But 00:14:59.659 --> 00:15:03.580 now, more recently, of course, I'm not surprised 00:15:03.580 --> 00:15:09.100 that the current administration just tramples 00:15:09.100 --> 00:15:11.639 all over the Constitution in so many different 00:15:11.639 --> 00:15:16.820 ways. I'm not surprised. I am surprised how quiet 00:15:16.820 --> 00:15:22.139 others have been. You know, I'm a retired three 00:15:22.139 --> 00:15:25.570 -star. Nobody except my mother could ever believe 00:15:25.570 --> 00:15:29.230 I made that. But the fact is, it's the four stars 00:15:29.230 --> 00:15:32.429 that are the real power. I mean, they have the 00:15:32.429 --> 00:15:37.509 real authoritative voice. And I think these guys, 00:15:37.669 --> 00:15:40.409 these men and women should be speaking out much 00:15:40.409 --> 00:15:43.309 more to protect the ones in uniform, the four 00:15:43.309 --> 00:15:45.850 stars in uniform now, because they they can't 00:15:45.850 --> 00:15:47.490 and they shouldn't be speaking out publicly. 00:15:48.809 --> 00:15:52.779 But it would be very useful if. Former chairman, 00:15:52.940 --> 00:15:55.940 former army chiefs, for example, were speaking 00:15:55.940 --> 00:16:00.240 out about what's going on, about the improper 00:16:00.240 --> 00:16:05.700 use of the military. I think and then, you know, 00:16:05.700 --> 00:16:08.960 after that Quantico gathering, I've been reflecting 00:16:08.960 --> 00:16:12.639 on Quantico a lot lately after this Caribbean 00:16:12.639 --> 00:16:16.100 boat strike incident. And of course, you know, 00:16:16.100 --> 00:16:17.679 they're they're throwing the admiral under the 00:16:17.679 --> 00:16:20.919 bus. If this happened, you know. he would have 00:16:20.919 --> 00:16:23.480 been in the chain and he would bear responsibility. 00:16:23.779 --> 00:16:27.480 But the fact is, it was the secretary. You remember, 00:16:27.539 --> 00:16:33.600 he talked to everybody. He said, you exist to 00:16:33.600 --> 00:16:37.500 break things and kill people. Now, in his mind, 00:16:37.539 --> 00:16:39.000 he thought he was getting a real good locker 00:16:39.000 --> 00:16:41.419 room speech, you know, to a room full of hundreds 00:16:41.419 --> 00:16:44.799 of admirals and generals. But so that's setting 00:16:44.799 --> 00:16:49.299 a culture. You exist to break things and kill 00:16:49.299 --> 00:16:53.389 people. And then he said, no more woke rules 00:16:53.389 --> 00:16:56.789 of engagement. And I'm listening to that. And 00:16:56.789 --> 00:16:59.029 I'm like, you've got I can't believe what I'm 00:16:59.029 --> 00:17:02.309 hearing, because clearly he doesn't understand 00:17:02.309 --> 00:17:06.450 what rules of engagement are about. I mean, I 00:17:06.450 --> 00:17:08.150 think we have an obligation. I mean, I worked 00:17:08.150 --> 00:17:12.089 in CIA. It's a secret organization. And both 00:17:12.089 --> 00:17:14.809 of our organizations are actually large, complex, 00:17:15.089 --> 00:17:18.750 huge responsibility, lots of moving parts. I 00:17:18.750 --> 00:17:21.000 think we have an obligation. In the CIA, it was, 00:17:21.039 --> 00:17:22.819 I think, really General Hayden when he came from 00:17:22.819 --> 00:17:25.099 the military and brought some of the discipline 00:17:25.099 --> 00:17:27.700 that he had learned growing up through the joint 00:17:27.700 --> 00:17:30.880 military to say, you know, American citizens 00:17:30.880 --> 00:17:35.299 don't need to understand what we do. Like, we 00:17:35.299 --> 00:17:38.059 can't tell them the secret stuff we do. That's 00:17:38.059 --> 00:17:39.859 not part of it. But they need to understand we 00:17:39.859 --> 00:17:42.299 work on behalf of them and the extent that we 00:17:42.299 --> 00:17:44.180 can tell them the things we do and how we do 00:17:44.180 --> 00:17:46.160 it so that they're more comfortable with what 00:17:46.160 --> 00:17:49.059 we're doing. We should do that. I think that 00:17:49.059 --> 00:17:51.460 even goes further when we see threats to things 00:17:51.460 --> 00:17:54.000 that are happening to us now and threats to the 00:17:54.000 --> 00:17:57.039 system. I think the military, the intelligence 00:17:57.039 --> 00:17:59.160 community, the law enforcement community, the 00:17:59.160 --> 00:18:01.559 federal law enforcement community are gems. I 00:18:01.559 --> 00:18:03.299 mean, I think the public, if they got to sit 00:18:03.299 --> 00:18:06.240 in our meeting, sit in day by day, the decisions, 00:18:06.299 --> 00:18:08.279 the kind of hard things that people are doing 00:18:08.279 --> 00:18:10.759 around the world, they would be proud of what 00:18:10.759 --> 00:18:13.819 we do. And it hurts to see that thing just used 00:18:13.819 --> 00:18:19.000 for whatever today's political football is. And 00:18:19.000 --> 00:18:22.119 it weakens those professionals and they fire 00:18:22.119 --> 00:18:24.539 a lot of the senior people who they think are 00:18:24.539 --> 00:18:26.640 threats to them who aren't threats to them. I 00:18:26.640 --> 00:18:28.779 mean, you know, when you work in the military 00:18:28.779 --> 00:18:31.220 or CIA or in the government, you work on something 00:18:31.220 --> 00:18:32.819 for a couple of years and then you're moved on 00:18:32.819 --> 00:18:35.420 to something else by your leadership. And they're 00:18:35.420 --> 00:18:38.119 taking me and saying, oh, you know, General Hodges, 00:18:38.140 --> 00:18:40.500 you worked under General Milley. Therefore, we 00:18:40.500 --> 00:18:43.420 can't trust you. What do you mean? Like, I worked 00:18:43.420 --> 00:18:45.119 under lots of people at different times, lots 00:18:45.119 --> 00:18:47.200 of presidents and things. So I think it's an 00:18:47.200 --> 00:18:49.599 obligation we have. And it's a tough time because 00:18:49.599 --> 00:18:52.079 you get attacked for these things. But it needs 00:18:52.079 --> 00:18:54.980 to be done. It needs to be done. Well, and this 00:18:54.980 --> 00:18:57.640 is why I think it's important that the retired 00:18:57.640 --> 00:19:00.119 guys, and I would say probably the same in your 00:19:00.119 --> 00:19:03.519 community as well, speak out because you can 00:19:03.519 --> 00:19:07.940 speak out in a way and explain why these administration 00:19:07.940 --> 00:19:11.779 policies and the way they're doing things. why 00:19:11.779 --> 00:19:15.619 it is detrimental to the United States. You know, 00:19:15.660 --> 00:19:21.500 we see over and over now our allies, their intelligence 00:19:21.500 --> 00:19:24.539 services are saying, not so sure that we can 00:19:24.539 --> 00:19:28.119 share. And you would know better than me how 00:19:28.119 --> 00:19:31.799 much we depend on foreign intelligence to piece 00:19:31.799 --> 00:19:38.720 things together. And I think you don't have to 00:19:38.720 --> 00:19:42.180 be political to recognize. that this is a danger 00:19:42.180 --> 00:19:43.720 to the United States. It's not going to be an 00:19:43.720 --> 00:19:46.279 American satellite that identifies a terrorist 00:19:46.279 --> 00:19:48.059 attack that's coming. It's going to be somebody 00:19:48.059 --> 00:19:50.880 in two or three different foreign intelligence 00:19:50.880 --> 00:19:53.920 services that are talking to their American counterparts 00:19:53.920 --> 00:19:57.700 saying, hey, watch this. Yeah, let's talk more 00:19:57.700 --> 00:20:00.299 about allies. Obviously, one of your senior jobs 00:20:00.299 --> 00:20:02.240 is working in Europe, you know, and you live 00:20:02.240 --> 00:20:04.660 in Europe and you work with allies. And your 00:20:04.660 --> 00:20:07.079 point about intelligence is true. I think in 00:20:07.079 --> 00:20:09.240 the clandestine service where I work, the bulk 00:20:09.240 --> 00:20:12.420 by far of the information we got was from partners 00:20:12.420 --> 00:20:14.700 and not always partners that are just bye -byes 00:20:14.700 --> 00:20:17.359 allies. Like, you know, I worked in Indonesia 00:20:17.359 --> 00:20:20.059 and Pakistan and we got information from them 00:20:20.059 --> 00:20:22.859 that saved American lives by building relationships 00:20:22.859 --> 00:20:25.920 and professionalism over time. And so like to 00:20:25.920 --> 00:20:28.240 throw those allies under the bus on the intelligence 00:20:28.240 --> 00:20:30.650 side, I see the danger of that. Tell me. Your 00:20:30.650 --> 00:20:33.650 experience, how important is it that the U .S. 00:20:33.670 --> 00:20:38.390 has friends and allies around the world? So we 00:20:38.390 --> 00:20:40.650 don't have enough capacity to do everything that's 00:20:40.650 --> 00:20:42.809 needed. When I became the commander of U .S. 00:20:42.809 --> 00:20:46.869 Army Europe in 2014, I had followed two or three 00:20:46.869 --> 00:20:50.710 superb officers who had all tried to stop the 00:20:50.710 --> 00:20:57.670 reduction of capabilities in Europe. The last 00:20:57.670 --> 00:21:03.569 two heavy brigades went home like in 2008, 2009, 00:21:03.569 --> 00:21:07.029 something like that. So we had no American tanks 00:21:07.029 --> 00:21:10.690 in Europe for the first time since 1944. And 00:21:10.690 --> 00:21:13.029 so but just like we don't need that anymore. 00:21:13.190 --> 00:21:16.349 And then the decision was to to bring home the 00:21:16.349 --> 00:21:18.849 Apaches. We don't need that anymore. Of course, 00:21:18.869 --> 00:21:20.490 this is right about the time that Putin started, 00:21:20.710 --> 00:21:22.490 you know, doing what he was doing. But anyway, 00:21:22.670 --> 00:21:28.980 so I had to. find help from allies. We didn't 00:21:28.980 --> 00:21:31.000 have enough bridging. So we started working with 00:21:31.000 --> 00:21:34.000 the British and German engineer units. My chief 00:21:34.000 --> 00:21:35.819 of staff was the German officer because the army 00:21:35.819 --> 00:21:37.799 wouldn't even resource the brigadier to be the 00:21:37.799 --> 00:21:39.720 chief of staff because we were so low in priority. 00:21:40.039 --> 00:21:42.660 So you start looking for people that, you know, 00:21:42.660 --> 00:21:47.380 who can you trust? Who can you depend on? And 00:21:47.380 --> 00:21:52.839 so the... Air defense, the American unit that's 00:21:52.839 --> 00:21:54.900 in Poland right now as part of NATO's enhanced 00:21:54.900 --> 00:21:59.039 forward presence, is in fact a Romanian air defense 00:21:59.039 --> 00:22:01.359 battery. We just don't have enough. So we have 00:22:01.359 --> 00:22:05.160 to depend on allies. The problem will be if they, 00:22:05.400 --> 00:22:08.559 and I'm going to connect this back to the Quantico 00:22:08.559 --> 00:22:13.319 and our legal framework, you can be sure that 00:22:13.319 --> 00:22:17.200 some of our allies will be reluctant to put their 00:22:17.200 --> 00:22:20.869 soldiers under American command. if they see 00:22:20.869 --> 00:22:23.990 that there are no rules of engagement that are 00:22:23.990 --> 00:22:31.089 part of this. Yeah, I agree. And take it one 00:22:31.089 --> 00:22:32.750 step further. We'll talk about a couple of the 00:22:32.750 --> 00:22:35.410 things that have happened recently. But do you 00:22:35.410 --> 00:22:39.009 see that that's going to affect the military 00:22:39.009 --> 00:22:41.109 itself and its ability to recruit and retain 00:22:41.109 --> 00:22:45.269 people, its readiness? Do you worry about that? 00:22:45.720 --> 00:22:48.720 working with allies that the administration is 00:22:48.720 --> 00:22:50.799 pushing against, it's going to affect us for 00:22:50.799 --> 00:22:55.380 the long term? Well, you know, we have air bases, 00:22:55.640 --> 00:23:00.900 naval facilities, land facilities in the UK, 00:23:01.200 --> 00:23:07.980 Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, obviously Germany, 00:23:08.220 --> 00:23:14.380 Poland, all over Europe that help us. Those forces, 00:23:14.420 --> 00:23:17.220 those bases are not to defend the Netherlands 00:23:17.220 --> 00:23:21.500 or to defend Germany. They are there as platforms 00:23:21.500 --> 00:23:25.200 for American strategic power projection into 00:23:25.200 --> 00:23:28.119 Africa, the Middle East, but also our contribution 00:23:28.119 --> 00:23:31.319 to NATO's collective defense. The number of American 00:23:31.319 --> 00:23:34.019 troops, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines that are 00:23:34.019 --> 00:23:37.279 in Europe is less than 100 ,000. It's like 95 00:23:37.279 --> 00:23:39.940 ,000. That would not even fill up the University 00:23:39.940 --> 00:23:42.799 of Michigan's football stadium. So we're not 00:23:42.799 --> 00:23:44.539 talking about a lot of people, but these are 00:23:44.539 --> 00:23:48.839 bases that when you fly or sail or deploy to 00:23:48.839 --> 00:23:52.700 Europe to go somewhere else, it helps us. It's 00:23:52.700 --> 00:23:54.880 to our advantage. And you just can't take that 00:23:54.880 --> 00:23:58.019 for granted that European countries will always 00:23:58.019 --> 00:24:01.099 say, yeah, no problem. You can have your headquarters 00:24:01.099 --> 00:24:03.380 or your maintenance or your training areas or 00:24:03.380 --> 00:24:07.160 your seaports, use our seaports. That's because 00:24:07.160 --> 00:24:12.059 of decades of trust. and investment by us and 00:24:12.059 --> 00:24:16.039 those allies. So this is more than just, you 00:24:16.039 --> 00:24:18.799 know, 2%. They should be paying more. And by 00:24:18.799 --> 00:24:21.900 the way, almost all of them are by now. Yeah, 00:24:21.980 --> 00:24:24.299 that's right. Tell me a little bit. So you're 00:24:24.299 --> 00:24:25.900 there in Europe and you travel around and you 00:24:25.900 --> 00:24:28.339 meet leaders. And I'm going to ask you about 00:24:28.339 --> 00:24:30.240 your experience with Russia, Ukraine, and those 00:24:30.240 --> 00:24:34.839 things in a minute. But how do you see that Europe 00:24:34.839 --> 00:24:37.200 is responding to this moment? They're seeing 00:24:37.200 --> 00:24:40.380 from Washington less engagement. even some nervousness 00:24:40.380 --> 00:24:42.900 that NATO might not have the backing of NATO 00:24:42.900 --> 00:24:45.259 like we may have had. We obviously seem more 00:24:45.259 --> 00:24:48.599 inclined towards Russia, but the war is going 00:24:48.599 --> 00:24:51.519 on in Ukraine. There's pressure on Europe to 00:24:51.519 --> 00:24:54.140 maybe change their defense strategies either 00:24:54.140 --> 00:24:56.099 individually or as a group. What is it you're 00:24:56.099 --> 00:24:57.859 learning? What are you seeing? How are they handling 00:24:57.859 --> 00:25:01.039 it? Are you optimistic about their ability to 00:25:01.039 --> 00:25:04.640 defend themselves? I am cautiously optimistic. 00:25:05.779 --> 00:25:10.500 What we're seeing is in several countries, a 00:25:10.500 --> 00:25:14.559 recognition that they have taken it easy too 00:25:14.559 --> 00:25:17.559 long. They hid behind the U .S. or many of them 00:25:17.559 --> 00:25:19.779 hid behind Germany because Germany was not doing 00:25:19.779 --> 00:25:21.539 its part. So they were able to stay out of the 00:25:21.539 --> 00:25:24.259 glare from the White House because the Germans 00:25:24.259 --> 00:25:27.259 were taking all the heat. But it kind of depends 00:25:27.259 --> 00:25:30.519 on where you are. You know, Finland has this 00:25:30.519 --> 00:25:34.200 enormous border with Russia and only a population 00:25:34.200 --> 00:25:36.740 of five million. But they have more artillery 00:25:36.740 --> 00:25:39.680 than any other country in Europe. They have a 00:25:39.680 --> 00:25:41.880 mobilization system that they practice all the 00:25:41.880 --> 00:25:44.880 time and that they can put 200 ,000 troops in 00:25:44.880 --> 00:25:47.460 the field in two weeks. The troops that are already 00:25:47.460 --> 00:25:49.619 trained and equipped and have their weapons. 00:25:49.859 --> 00:25:53.480 So the Finns have never been confused. Poland 00:25:53.480 --> 00:25:58.640 obviously has moved out very quickly to improve 00:25:58.640 --> 00:26:01.160 their own defensive capabilities. They now have 00:26:01.160 --> 00:26:05.400 the largest tank force. in all of Europe. Other 00:26:05.400 --> 00:26:09.839 countries are doing better, but not as well as 00:26:09.839 --> 00:26:13.420 they should. I would say the Nordic countries, 00:26:13.660 --> 00:26:18.680 especially Norway. Russia seemed to get it better. 00:26:19.299 --> 00:26:21.859 Well, the geography is a big part of it. Exactly 00:26:21.859 --> 00:26:24.440 right. You have a history and you see, you can 00:26:24.440 --> 00:26:28.579 feel the threat. The Estonians. Also not confused. 00:26:28.799 --> 00:26:32.859 But Germany has really taken some important steps 00:26:32.859 --> 00:26:35.859 over the past year. They no longer argue about 00:26:35.859 --> 00:26:38.000 whether or not to grow the size of the army. 00:26:38.519 --> 00:26:41.500 Now it's how do we do it? Do we go back to conscription 00:26:41.500 --> 00:26:44.539 or can we recruit enough? You know, that sort 00:26:44.539 --> 00:26:46.480 of thing. So that's a completely different argument. 00:26:46.920 --> 00:26:49.299 Money is not a problem. They have changed their 00:26:49.299 --> 00:26:51.839 laws to allow them to do what we do, which is 00:26:51.839 --> 00:26:55.750 to, you know, go into debt. to modernize and 00:26:55.750 --> 00:26:59.509 grow your defensive capabilities. So you can 00:26:59.509 --> 00:27:05.769 feel it changing in that regard. But still, you've 00:27:05.769 --> 00:27:10.150 got so much Russian penetration into parts of 00:27:10.150 --> 00:27:15.009 Europe. In many European countries, even if the 00:27:15.009 --> 00:27:17.569 government is not a right -wing government, the 00:27:17.569 --> 00:27:20.539 biggest political party in the country is a right 00:27:20.539 --> 00:27:23.599 -wing party. So like AFD in Germany, Marine Le 00:27:23.599 --> 00:27:31.180 Pen in France, you've got the, in Slovakia, I 00:27:31.180 --> 00:27:36.240 mean, so these guys are a problem. And the Russians 00:27:36.240 --> 00:27:39.339 have poured money in their reform party in UK, 00:27:39.480 --> 00:27:43.400 for example, as well. So this is something that's 00:27:43.400 --> 00:27:46.440 got to be addressed internally if the allies 00:27:46.440 --> 00:27:49.339 are going to come together. and recognize that 00:27:49.339 --> 00:27:52.819 Russia really is the threat. Now, there was a 00:27:52.819 --> 00:27:56.680 meeting, a phone call between President Macron 00:27:56.680 --> 00:28:00.200 of France, the German Bundeskanzler Merz, the 00:28:00.200 --> 00:28:03.680 Finnish President Stubb, and some others, Ruda, 00:28:03.799 --> 00:28:06.400 Secretary General of NATO. And they were talking 00:28:06.400 --> 00:28:10.740 about how concerned they are about Ukraine. And 00:28:10.740 --> 00:28:12.579 one of them said, and of course, the reason I 00:28:12.579 --> 00:28:15.920 know this is because it was leaked. And Der Spiegel 00:28:15.920 --> 00:28:19.299 published it. One of them said, we have got to 00:28:19.299 --> 00:28:21.819 help Macron. I mean, we have got to help Zelensky. 00:28:21.900 --> 00:28:25.400 We've got to protect him from these guys. And 00:28:25.400 --> 00:28:29.359 they're talking about Witkoff, Kushner, and Trump, 00:28:29.480 --> 00:28:35.039 not the Russians. Because they see, unfortunately, 00:28:35.500 --> 00:28:43.119 they see that the U .S. is not the U .S. It's 00:28:43.119 --> 00:28:45.400 focused on the U .S. and transaction and getting 00:28:45.400 --> 00:28:50.000 to business with Russia and that Europe and Ukraine, 00:28:50.140 --> 00:28:52.980 Ukraine as a part of Europe, is going to have 00:28:52.980 --> 00:28:56.579 to fend for itself by and large. And they see 00:28:56.579 --> 00:29:00.119 this now. And so this is going to accelerate 00:29:00.119 --> 00:29:04.119 what they're trying to do. So you were in Europe 00:29:04.119 --> 00:29:07.619 in a command position 2014 and on, you know, 00:29:07.619 --> 00:29:11.700 when Russia took the Crimea and this. These problems 00:29:11.700 --> 00:29:13.700 started to reach the height that within 2022, 00:29:13.980 --> 00:29:17.079 the second invasion of Ukraine by the Russians. 00:29:17.700 --> 00:29:20.599 What is your experience there in terms of working 00:29:20.599 --> 00:29:23.900 with the Europeans to understand that threat, 00:29:24.059 --> 00:29:26.359 starting to work with the Ukrainians to the extent 00:29:26.359 --> 00:29:28.400 we could? Give us a little bit of your experience 00:29:28.400 --> 00:29:30.599 as a commander on the ground during that period. 00:29:31.180 --> 00:29:34.839 Well, of course, there were an awful lot of people 00:29:34.839 --> 00:29:37.099 in different nations, smart, well -educated. 00:29:37.719 --> 00:29:39.980 responsible people that were like, come on, Russia, 00:29:40.059 --> 00:29:43.759 there's no way are they going to do what we now 00:29:43.759 --> 00:29:45.859 refer to as the large -scale invasion. They're 00:29:45.859 --> 00:29:48.579 never going to do this. It would be so stupid. 00:29:48.660 --> 00:29:50.099 They would be screwing themselves economically, 00:29:50.480 --> 00:29:54.259 for example. That was a common mindset from countries 00:29:54.259 --> 00:29:56.680 in Central and Western Europe. The countries 00:29:56.680 --> 00:29:58.759 in Eastern Europe, they knew what was coming, 00:29:58.859 --> 00:30:05.869 but the rest of them, not so much. The Germans 00:30:05.869 --> 00:30:11.089 were still building Nord Stream 2 deep into 2021, 00:30:11.569 --> 00:30:14.230 until just a few months before Russia's large 00:30:14.230 --> 00:30:16.630 scale. The Germans were still building Nord Stream 00:30:16.630 --> 00:30:23.690 2. That was, unfortunately, a mindset. We had 00:30:23.690 --> 00:30:27.029 started working with Ukrainians back in 2015. 00:30:27.190 --> 00:30:30.269 We got the mission to help. help them as they 00:30:30.269 --> 00:30:32.730 were dealing with Russia's initial invasion in 00:30:32.730 --> 00:30:38.289 2014 to, yeah, to help them. But the policy was 00:30:38.289 --> 00:30:41.410 still, you know, helmets and blankets and night 00:30:41.410 --> 00:30:43.309 vision goggles and first aid kits, but there 00:30:43.309 --> 00:30:45.410 was no lethal aid. This was during the Obama 00:30:45.410 --> 00:30:48.930 administration. And, you know, we didn't have 00:30:48.930 --> 00:30:50.410 a policy. We didn't know what the hell we were 00:30:50.410 --> 00:30:55.470 doing for sure. So my task was to create a training 00:30:55.470 --> 00:30:59.829 center. somewhere in western Ukraine, and we 00:30:59.829 --> 00:31:03.190 used an old Soviet training area called Yavariv, 00:31:03.309 --> 00:31:07.190 which is outside the city of Lviv, and began 00:31:07.190 --> 00:31:10.170 to turn it into a training center, not just a 00:31:10.170 --> 00:31:14.730 big range. And we immediately began to realize 00:31:14.730 --> 00:31:18.289 that, wow, these guys have real experience. I 00:31:18.289 --> 00:31:19.869 mean, they've all been under Russian artillery 00:31:19.869 --> 00:31:23.150 fire, rocket fire, drones, electronic warfare, 00:31:23.289 --> 00:31:27.809 stuff that we had not faced. And so I remember 00:31:27.809 --> 00:31:30.369 asking one of my NCOs who had been out there 00:31:30.369 --> 00:31:33.210 with him for a few weeks. And this is a typical 00:31:33.210 --> 00:31:36.710 paratrooper. You know, a guy from the airborne 00:31:36.710 --> 00:31:39.950 tends to have a slightly higher degree of perception 00:31:39.950 --> 00:31:42.309 of himself than maybe the average soldier does. 00:31:42.809 --> 00:31:45.289 So they're very cocky and confident. And this 00:31:45.289 --> 00:31:47.109 guy had probably been in Afghanistan and Iraq 00:31:47.109 --> 00:31:50.170 like six times. I said, so what do you think? 00:31:50.289 --> 00:31:53.630 He said, sir, these dudes are not Iraqis. And 00:31:53.630 --> 00:31:56.170 of course, what he was saying was they. They 00:31:56.170 --> 00:31:57.710 are committed. They already have experience. 00:31:58.150 --> 00:32:02.529 And so we started learning from them. And actually, 00:32:02.690 --> 00:32:06.630 we changed our training model. Remember what 00:32:06.630 --> 00:32:09.650 I said earlier about how training centers save 00:32:09.650 --> 00:32:12.809 the Army? So we changed our training center at 00:32:12.809 --> 00:32:16.009 Hohenfels, Germany, from something that was about 00:32:16.009 --> 00:32:19.269 security, cooperation, and assistance to the 00:32:19.269 --> 00:32:22.250 OPFOR is going to have all the capabilities that 00:32:22.250 --> 00:32:24.839 the Russians do. Long range precision strike, 00:32:25.039 --> 00:32:27.799 massive amounts of rockets, electronic warfare, 00:32:28.039 --> 00:32:31.839 drones, so that now our troops had to compete 00:32:31.839 --> 00:32:35.559 in that training cauldron, if you will. Otherwise, 00:32:35.700 --> 00:32:38.099 they would never get better. And then General 00:32:38.099 --> 00:32:39.599 Milley, who was the chief of the army at the 00:32:39.599 --> 00:32:42.240 time, he came and saw that. And then he directed 00:32:42.240 --> 00:32:44.039 the same thing happened at the training center 00:32:44.039 --> 00:32:46.960 back in the States, because that's where you 00:32:46.960 --> 00:32:49.259 that's where you change. And that was all because 00:32:49.259 --> 00:32:53.529 we started learning from the Ukrainians. I think 00:32:53.529 --> 00:32:55.750 that's an important thing, is not having the 00:32:55.750 --> 00:32:57.509 arrogance to think we can answer every question. 00:32:57.670 --> 00:33:00.269 I mean, Ukrainians have been facing the Russians, 00:33:00.430 --> 00:33:04.009 obviously, forever and decades, but even since 00:33:04.009 --> 00:33:07.690 2014, constant misinformation, constant disinformation, 00:33:07.970 --> 00:33:10.109 constant covert attacks, constant efforts to 00:33:10.109 --> 00:33:13.670 cyber attacks, and then obviously military attacks 00:33:13.670 --> 00:33:16.670 and low -level military attacks even before the 00:33:16.670 --> 00:33:20.690 invasion. And so I think that's, you know, the 00:33:20.690 --> 00:33:22.900 military... And all of our institutions need 00:33:22.900 --> 00:33:26.380 to learn and change and learn and change. And 00:33:26.380 --> 00:33:30.900 I think this arrogance that, you know, we need 00:33:30.900 --> 00:33:33.079 to be the center of everything and tell people 00:33:33.079 --> 00:33:35.400 what to do is a potential problem for us. That's 00:33:35.400 --> 00:33:38.579 a great point, John. I always thought the best 00:33:38.579 --> 00:33:41.819 organizations were learning organizations, that 00:33:41.819 --> 00:33:44.220 you have a culture of how do I get better? And, 00:33:44.220 --> 00:33:46.319 of course, that means you have to acknowledge 00:33:46.319 --> 00:33:48.789 that you screwed something up first. Or that 00:33:48.789 --> 00:33:50.430 a mistake was made. And you also have to have 00:33:50.430 --> 00:33:53.289 a culture that tolerates that unless it was a 00:33:53.289 --> 00:33:56.970 mistake of willful negligence. But these have 00:33:56.970 --> 00:33:58.730 always, my experience, these are always the best 00:33:58.730 --> 00:34:03.609 outfits. Let's take that idea and put it to right 00:34:03.609 --> 00:34:06.089 now. Like one of the things as we're talking, 00:34:06.170 --> 00:34:09.329 the issue has been this attack on supposed drug 00:34:09.329 --> 00:34:13.110 boats in the Caribbean. And as we speak, the 00:34:13.110 --> 00:34:15.469 discussion is the Secretary of Defense talking 00:34:15.469 --> 00:34:18.239 about. telling to kill everybody in the boat. 00:34:18.300 --> 00:34:20.199 So even after they'd taken the first strike and 00:34:20.199 --> 00:34:21.860 there's people in the water who are no longer 00:34:21.860 --> 00:34:25.480 a direct threat, can you shoot and kill those 00:34:25.480 --> 00:34:27.699 people? So that's the issue we're dealing with 00:34:27.699 --> 00:34:30.940 now. And that suggests to me this arrogant attitude, 00:34:31.019 --> 00:34:33.659 because essentially the way they respond to it 00:34:33.659 --> 00:34:36.559 when this comes out is, nope, we did nothing 00:34:36.559 --> 00:34:40.039 wrong. And then Haig talks about when he used 00:34:40.039 --> 00:34:42.059 the signal chat to talk about attacks with the 00:34:42.059 --> 00:34:44.800 Houthis in Yemen. Nope, did nothing wrong. There's 00:34:44.800 --> 00:34:48.829 nothing we do wrong. blame others. Do you worry 00:34:48.829 --> 00:34:51.670 that that learning capability of the military 00:34:51.670 --> 00:34:53.750 might be under threat because of sort of political 00:34:53.750 --> 00:34:58.769 pressures from on top? Well, yes, because if 00:34:58.769 --> 00:35:03.690 you're in an environment where questioning of 00:35:03.690 --> 00:35:07.969 orders or pushback on stupid policies or maybe 00:35:07.969 --> 00:35:12.869 even unlawful policies is, if that's part of 00:35:12.869 --> 00:35:16.150 the culture, then And also, if you see a lot 00:35:16.150 --> 00:35:19.769 of people getting sacked without cause, you know, 00:35:19.769 --> 00:35:23.829 that that change, that's that's a culture change 00:35:23.829 --> 00:35:28.210 or that that that creates a climate where, number 00:35:28.210 --> 00:35:29.989 one, you don't want to raise your head above 00:35:29.989 --> 00:35:34.010 the parapet. You and also there will be really 00:35:34.010 --> 00:35:37.070 good people who know that they should not or 00:35:37.070 --> 00:35:39.329 cannot obey an unlawful order. But they're also 00:35:39.329 --> 00:35:41.230 trying to protect their soldiers, because if 00:35:41.230 --> 00:35:43.190 they're gone, then they'll find somebody who 00:35:43.190 --> 00:35:46.530 will do it. And so there's a I think probably 00:35:46.530 --> 00:35:49.230 a lot of good people are dealing with it. I'm 00:35:49.230 --> 00:35:52.190 sure of it are dealing with this right now. Do 00:35:52.190 --> 00:35:58.730 I go or do I stay and try to fight back? I think 00:35:58.730 --> 00:36:03.349 that the and so far, I guess at least what we've 00:36:03.349 --> 00:36:06.110 read from the admiral who was the South Com commander 00:36:06.110 --> 00:36:09.449 and then he resigned or was he left. And now 00:36:09.449 --> 00:36:13.679 we know that he was told by Hexeth. You either 00:36:13.679 --> 00:36:16.420 you're on the team or you're out. And so after 00:36:16.420 --> 00:36:18.659 a few months of this kind of contentious relationship, 00:36:19.159 --> 00:36:24.400 the admiral was told to leave. So it's not always 00:36:24.400 --> 00:36:26.579 as simple as, you know, screw you. I'm not doing 00:36:26.579 --> 00:36:31.300 that. It's that you have. And you, by the way, 00:36:31.340 --> 00:36:34.559 while everybody makes it work, you try to help 00:36:34.559 --> 00:36:36.639 people understand the seriousness of what you're 00:36:36.639 --> 00:36:38.699 dealing with. Everyone's trying to make it work. 00:36:38.780 --> 00:36:40.949 They're not like. I think people think there's 00:36:40.949 --> 00:36:43.929 a partisanship in our institutions where we're 00:36:43.929 --> 00:36:46.050 trying to work against whatever political leader 00:36:46.050 --> 00:36:47.550 we have if we don't like them. And that's just 00:36:47.550 --> 00:36:50.530 not the case. It's the opposite. We are a mission 00:36:50.530 --> 00:36:53.730 -oriented institution like you are. How do I 00:36:53.730 --> 00:36:57.590 get it done? I remember being told when I was 00:36:57.590 --> 00:36:59.650 young, you will never have all the resources 00:36:59.650 --> 00:37:02.429 you need. Never. But you will always be expected 00:37:02.429 --> 00:37:04.489 to still accomplish the mission. So you're going 00:37:04.489 --> 00:37:07.210 to have to figure it out. And so that's our mindset. 00:37:09.239 --> 00:37:14.260 If you've got a situation where the secretary, 00:37:14.559 --> 00:37:16.599 especially at that level, is saying we're going 00:37:16.599 --> 00:37:19.280 to do this and this and this, of course, what 00:37:19.280 --> 00:37:21.800 the chairman of the Joint Chiefs should be doing 00:37:21.800 --> 00:37:24.679 and the service chiefs and the secretary's inner 00:37:24.679 --> 00:37:26.780 circle should be saying, Mr. Secretary, I know 00:37:26.780 --> 00:37:29.460 what you're trying to accomplish. How about if 00:37:29.460 --> 00:37:32.719 we do this? Because, you know, it's also inappropriate. 00:37:33.079 --> 00:37:36.809 You don't want uniforms out in public. humiliating 00:37:36.809 --> 00:37:38.809 the civilian leadership. I mean, that's also 00:37:38.809 --> 00:37:41.289 ingrained civilian leadership over the military. 00:37:41.690 --> 00:37:44.949 But you have to have the backbone to do this 00:37:44.949 --> 00:37:47.190 behind closed doors and say, this is bullshit. 00:37:47.289 --> 00:37:50.070 This is illegal. We can't do that. We absolutely 00:37:50.070 --> 00:37:52.409 are not going to do that. And then they say, 00:37:52.469 --> 00:37:55.230 thanks for your service. There's the door. OK, 00:37:55.349 --> 00:37:58.429 now, you know, we're in a different situation. 00:37:58.849 --> 00:38:01.750 And this is why the retirees I've talked about 00:38:01.750 --> 00:38:04.690 are so important and also the Congress. I mean. 00:38:05.360 --> 00:38:08.900 And hopefully hearings will expose some of these 00:38:08.900 --> 00:38:13.699 things in such a way that most people watching 00:38:13.699 --> 00:38:16.300 it will say, OK, this is not partisan. This is 00:38:16.300 --> 00:38:19.880 legitimate. And I think this is an important 00:38:19.880 --> 00:38:23.460 part of it. There's legal ways to meet the mission 00:38:23.460 --> 00:38:26.639 and to support policies. Exactly. You've been 00:38:26.639 --> 00:38:27.920 really generous with your time. So I'll just 00:38:27.920 --> 00:38:29.579 ask a couple sort of more personal questions 00:38:29.579 --> 00:38:33.449 as we move on here. One is. What message would 00:38:33.449 --> 00:38:35.690 you give to young officers entering this deeply 00:38:35.690 --> 00:38:39.349 polarized political environment? Well, when you 00:38:39.349 --> 00:38:42.570 enter the military, and I imagine it's the same 00:38:42.570 --> 00:38:47.329 in your professional community as well, you've 00:38:47.329 --> 00:38:51.030 got so much work to do that you don't need to 00:38:51.030 --> 00:38:53.690 be debating, worrying about what's going on happening 00:38:53.690 --> 00:38:57.050 way up at the top. You accomplish your mission, 00:38:57.150 --> 00:39:01.250 and you take care of the men and women, uniformed 00:39:01.250 --> 00:39:04.070 and civilian. under your responsibility. You 00:39:04.070 --> 00:39:07.449 focus on those two things. And not only is it 00:39:07.449 --> 00:39:10.289 fun, it is so rewarding. You're doing something. 00:39:10.389 --> 00:39:11.650 You're going to be learning. You're going to 00:39:11.650 --> 00:39:13.909 be so impressed with all the fellow Americans 00:39:13.909 --> 00:39:18.369 that you meet. So I encourage people who are 00:39:18.369 --> 00:39:20.349 asking, I don't know if I want my daughter to 00:39:20.349 --> 00:39:22.230 go in the Army now or the Air Force or whatever. 00:39:22.389 --> 00:39:24.590 I said, hell yeah, get in there. This is not 00:39:24.590 --> 00:39:26.710 going to last forever, but we're going to need 00:39:26.710 --> 00:39:30.179 quality women and men to serve forever. No, I 00:39:30.179 --> 00:39:33.400 think that's right. I hope that that's right. 00:39:33.500 --> 00:39:35.920 I hope the damage isn't making its way down that 00:39:35.920 --> 00:39:38.500 deep. There are very, very serious people, very 00:39:38.500 --> 00:39:40.059 serious professionals in these organizations. 00:39:40.699 --> 00:39:42.880 And again, if the American citizens can see what 00:39:42.880 --> 00:39:44.260 we're doing every day, they'd be proud of it. 00:39:44.300 --> 00:39:46.420 So one last sort of final reflection, if you 00:39:46.420 --> 00:39:48.239 could leave the listeners with sort of one idea 00:39:48.239 --> 00:39:51.940 about the relationship between military professionalism, 00:39:51.980 --> 00:39:54.579 good governance and national unity, what would 00:39:54.579 --> 00:39:57.780 it be? How do you see the military in a modern 00:39:57.780 --> 00:40:00.840 political space? I think we have to be a rules 00:40:00.840 --> 00:40:08.039 -based, constitutionally loyal institution that 00:40:08.039 --> 00:40:11.219 nobody ever questions whether or not we are going 00:40:11.219 --> 00:40:12.960 to carry out lawful orders and we're going to 00:40:12.960 --> 00:40:15.860 do our best. And we're going to make sure that 00:40:15.860 --> 00:40:17.639 not only do we always accomplish the mission, 00:40:17.800 --> 00:40:20.340 but that we're going to do it in a way that doesn't 00:40:20.340 --> 00:40:23.280 waste the life of a single man or woman in uniform. 00:40:23.980 --> 00:40:26.079 I like what Colin Powell used to say. He goes, 00:40:26.159 --> 00:40:28.750 I'm not interested in a fair fight. You know, 00:40:28.750 --> 00:40:31.329 we're going to do overwhelming everything that 00:40:31.329 --> 00:40:33.610 they need to accomplish mission. We don't want 00:40:33.610 --> 00:40:37.309 a fair fight with any enemy. But I would say 00:40:37.309 --> 00:40:39.550 the thing that has been missing for so long is 00:40:39.550 --> 00:40:42.530 our civilian leadership has to clearly identify 00:40:42.530 --> 00:40:46.250 the strategic objective. What is it we're trying 00:40:46.250 --> 00:40:47.889 to accomplish? We didn't have it in Afghanistan. 00:40:48.110 --> 00:40:50.210 We didn't have it in Iraq. Did not have it in 00:40:50.210 --> 00:40:54.190 Vietnam. Not really. And so and right now we 00:40:54.190 --> 00:40:55.849 don't have a strategic objective with regards 00:40:55.849 --> 00:40:58.610 to Ukraine. What are we trying to accomplish? 00:40:58.750 --> 00:41:00.769 And if you do that, then you can develop the 00:41:00.769 --> 00:41:02.750 right policies. But if you don't have a clear 00:41:02.750 --> 00:41:06.590 objective, it's very difficult to develop the 00:41:06.590 --> 00:41:09.929 right policies. I agree with that. Thank you 00:41:09.929 --> 00:41:12.690 very much. So General Hodges, thank you for your 00:41:12.690 --> 00:41:15.869 time. I think it's enlightening and that we really 00:41:15.869 --> 00:41:19.050 appreciate, not we, me as an American citizen 00:41:19.050 --> 00:41:20.969 appreciates what you're doing and speaking on 00:41:20.969 --> 00:41:23.710 and in fact, you know, helping the Europeans 00:41:23.710 --> 00:41:26.599 deal with this difficult. time. So thank you 00:41:26.599 --> 00:41:28.800 so much. I really appreciate it. John, thank 00:41:28.800 --> 00:41:35.860 you. I'm really grateful for the privilege. Thank 00:41:35.860 --> 00:41:38.139 you for listening to the Steady State Sentinel 00:41:38.139 --> 00:41:41.619 podcast. Don't miss out on more insights and 00:41:41.619 --> 00:41:44.400 exposes from America's premier global security 00:41:44.400 --> 00:41:49.019 experts. 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