The Steady State Sentinel is produced by the
Steady State, a community of former national
security professionals who spent their careers
safeguarding the United States at home and abroad.
Today, we continue that mission by staying true
to our oaths to defend the Constitution, uphold
our democracy and protect our nation's security.
Join our expert hosts as they interview field
-tested guests whose unique experiences shed
light on the crises and challenges facing our
nation. Welcome to the show. I'm John Seifer,
and this is the Steady State Sentinel. Today,
we're honored to be joined by Lieutenant General
Retired Ben Hodges, who's here with us from Germany.
General Hodges is the former commanding general
of U .S. Army Europe, senior military strategist,
and one of the most respected voices on NATO,
Russia, and the future of European security.
So, General Hodges, thanks so much for being
here. John, thanks very much for the privilege.
Well, let's just talk a little bit about... I
mean, the idea of the steady state is to discuss
the professionalism of national security professionals,
public servants in this day and age where everything
seems to be politicized. So I just want to talk
a little bit about your background, how you got
into it. What's your view in terms of, you know,
country over party, those type of things. So
if that's all right with you. Yeah, sure. I'm
from North Florida, originally near Tallahassee.
I grew up in a small town and I did not come
from a military family, but almost all the men
in my family had served at some point either
as a draftee or volunteer. You know, the vast
majority of them did their part. And so it was
always an assumption that I would do something.
And I really wanted to be in the Army. And I'm
67 years old, so I'm in high school. junior high
and high school during most of Vietnam. And I
watched the news every night. You know, you see
the soldiers out there and I'm not fully appreciating
how terrible it was for them. And I thought,
man, that is so cool. I want to be, I want to
do that. I want to be a leader of soldiers. And
so that was my ambition. I ended up going to
West Point, graduated in 1980, which means I
started in the summer of 76. Summer of 76, of
course, is—I know you were probably not even
born then, but— Well, I got a commission to go
to West Point. I would have been graduating class
of 83, and I went there. I was going to play
football and lacrosse, and I went and stayed
with some generals that lived on base and everything.
And they went to the officers' club on Sunday,
and I ate and drank so much pastries and things,
I threw up in the bathroom. It was a crazy time.
But the notion of making my bed every day, my
parents were like sort of hippie -ish professors.
And so, like, I had never made my bed. And it
was just a little step too far. Like, I loved
West Point. It was a beautiful place. I would
have been proud to go there. Well, you can be
sure I was in the bottom quartile of the people
that entered with my class. But the reason I
bring this up is because, you know, that was
1976. Vietnam, My Lai is... right behind us.
I mean, it's still fresh. All the faculty were
Vietnam veterans. And so it was pounded into
our head from the very beginning about, you know,
your oath to the Constitution, that the military
was apolitical and that the respect, of course,
we wanted to regain respect to the American population
after Vietnam. Because the military, the reason
I got into West Point, because nobody wanted
to send their kid to West Point, you know, in
the 70s. So I just remember being immersed in
this, the importance of the Constitution of earning
and retaining the respect of our fellow citizens.
And that meant, of course, operating within a
legal framework and the whole, the emphasis on
integrity, duty, honor, country, all of that.
I mean, from the minute you walk through that
gate, it's pounded into you. And I vividly remember
sitting in class, a law class, law of armed conflict,
and they're talking about My Lai and the massacre
and how did this happen? And the U .S. Army would
kill innocent civilians. And this notion or responsibility
of disobeying orders that were unlawful. having
the courage to say, no, we're not going to do
this and to prevent others from doing it. And
then so that was from the very beginning. That
was at my core as an officer. It was impressive
how important this was. And so as you started
your career when you were young, I mean, your
sort of views that you now speak on leadership,
military professionalism, what were some of the
key experiences early in your career that helped?
shaped that, the things you had to face, or were
there mentors and leaders that really influenced
you at that time? Well, obviously, I was the
beneficiary of decades of really good commanders.
Not all of them were perfect, but I was lucky.
I benefited from some very good commanders who
had been veterans or had so much experience,
let's say. I also was surrounded by really good
sergeants, you know, and so many of the NCOs
have been killed in Vietnam. So the ones that
have survived had some real life experiences
to pass on. And I was smart enough to realize
that, number one, I was never the smartest guy
in the room. And number two, that if I listened
to the NCO sergeants, they could probably save
me from myself, but that I was still responsible.
You know, if it went bad. So these are the kind
of that was the culture I grew up in. And I started
off in West Germany in 1981. I reported to my
first unit. It was a mechanized infantry battalion
up in West Germany. And I was very lucky because
this was right at the beginning of the Reagan
buildup. So there was huge emphasis to rebuild
the army, emphasis on training. And my battalion
commander. had served in Vietnam three different
tours. He had commanded three different companies
in combat. And I mean, the guy was, you could
imagine how hard he was, how focused he was on
readiness. And so I spent three years in West
Germany, knowing that the huge Soviet Union and
Warsaw Pact were just across the border. And
so we were focused on readiness all the time.
You know, you didn't go home on Friday if you
had a vehicle in the motor pool that was still
broken down. It was just... That was the mindset,
the culture, fight tonight. And so that set me
on, for the rest of my Army life, it was all
about readiness. Are soldiers properly trained?
Do we have the systems in place? And then finally,
the importance of working with allies, because
obviously we were surrounded by German, British,
and other Allied forces there. The post -Vietnam
Army, I mean, it must have been quite a hill
to climb because it... because of what happened
and the politics and, you know, drug use and
the sort of views that happened. But it was rebuilt
and it was rebuilt. I think, you know, I think
some senior leaders really took it upon themselves
to rebuild the army. So that by the time in the
early 90s, when, you know, you're going to war
in Iraq, I think we had built obviously the best
military in the world. But I think I think it
took a lot of effort to get there. I mean, so
did you did you feel that were there leaders
that are trying to, you know, change? Because
I think we're going to end up having to do some
rebuilding possibly after this period. You're
exactly right. You know, I had a former commander
tell me one time, he said, Ben, three things
saved the U .S. Army after Vietnam. And I thought
he was going to say, you know, the Abrams tank,
the Bradley fighting vehicle, the Apache. And
it was none of it was equipment oriented. He
said three things. Number one was the creation
of the National Training Center. And the NTC
out in the desert at Fort Irwin is where you
go and you just get hammered with your unit because
it's a competitive environment, not like the
old traditional exercises that are so rare. Yes.
And the dreaded OPFOR. You know, they live there,
so they do this all the time. They cheat like
hell. And so Blue Four gets hammered until you
finally learn to do things, how to fight. So
it was the creation of a training environment
that was realistic, very demanding. Everybody
talks about doing tough training. NTC was hell.
And that was a critical part of it. helping us
learn how to fight again. The second part of
this goes hand in hand with it was the institutionalization
of the AAR, the After Action Review. This seems
kind of pedestrian, but the After Action Review,
which you had to do after every event at the
National Training Center, and then it became
part and parcel of the entire Army. This is critical
self -reflection. What happened? Why did it happen?
How do you fix it? And so commanders would have
to start off themselves like, well, you know,
I probably didn't give clear orders about this
or I didn't understand this. And it really did
so much to improve the, not just the integrity,
but the professional integrity of how we look
at ourself and to evaluate. So that was essential.
And then the third thing, I think, aren't junior
officers enlisted? allowed to like speak up and
what happened to them even with their you know
so like everybody has a place right it's not
just ready you have to do it the best AERs will
probably be where some sergeant said I never
knew we were supposed to do this you know and
then you realize okay the orders did not get
transmitted clearly or or whatever the third
thing was the establishment of a non -commissioned
officer education system where as the army began
to realize we have to decentralize more. It can't
be all top down. And so if we're going to put
more responsibility on sergeants, then we need
to give them the educational opportunities so
that they're prepared. And I've never forgotten
those three things because they really were all
about people leadership. Yeah, culture. Culture
changes. Changing culture is hard. you know,
doing it. But also in that time, and I don't
know if it would have affected someone who was
sort of working their way up in the Army, isn't
the Goldwater reforms and the purple and, you
know, moving the different Army, Navy, everybody
was sort of closer together. Did that have an
effect that you saw in your career? Absolutely.
The Goldwater -Nichols Act was the law enacted
because the Congress realized that the services
were never going to become joint. I mean, we
talk about it. But we were never truly going
to become joint. You know, the Army, the Navy,
the Air Force, the Marines were all, you know,
fighting for their share of the budget pie. And,
you know, this sounds worse than it was, but
nonetheless, we were not optimizing all the capabilities.
And so the Congress said, all right, well, we're
going to make you do it. And so if you want to
become a general, you have to have served in
certain joint assignments and you have to have
certain joint education requirements. Then that
tells the Army, OK, if you want Hodges to ever
be a general, I better start making sure he's
getting these assignments and education along
the way. And so, of course, then the joint force,
the joint staff became the dominant part of the
services. And then the services had to fulfill
their Title 10 responsibility of the Army provide
trained and equipped land forces. Same for the
Air Force and Navy and so on. So, yes, I mean,
that was what I grew up in. And it forced the
services to think more joint. Right. I mean,
the professionalism. So, I mean, a lot of retired
military leaders prefer to stay silent on sort
of political matters and what's happening now.
And what compelled you to speak publicly when
you believed that norms or institutions were
at risk? And what do you hope Americans understand
better about? military service and national defense
in this day and age? You know, that oath, my
oath to the Constitution, which I started way
back when I was a cadet and then have continued
it up through my service. I retired in 2018 after
38 years as an officer. I never believed or even
thought about whether or not my oath would still
be in effect or not. I mean, it didn't have a...
OK, you're retired. You have nothing to do with
the Constitution anymore. I assume the opposite.
And so when I see that it is in danger, of course,
you know, I'm trying to think, OK, how can I
help defend it? Now, one of the things we have
done in the services or certainly my experience
in the Army was every time a soldier or somebody
was promoted at the ceremony, you would reaffirm
the oath. So everybody hears it being. reaffirmed.
Whenever an enlisted soldier would reenlist for
another two, three, six years, whatever, affirm
the oath. And then you just constantly are reminding
people so that it's in the fiber of who you are.
And, you know, retaining the respect. of our
fellow citizens is important because, number
one, they have given the military the authority
to use lethal force to defend the state. So that
respect is important. Plus, if you're an all
-volunteer force, parents and influencers need
to be confident that the military is based on
legal activities or legal framework and it's
an institution that can be trusted. So these
were important. That's why I kept doing it. But
now, more recently, of course, I'm not surprised
that the current administration just tramples
all over the Constitution in so many different
ways. I'm not surprised. I am surprised how quiet
others have been. You know, I'm a retired three
-star. Nobody except my mother could ever believe
I made that. But the fact is, it's the four stars
that are the real power. I mean, they have the
real authoritative voice. And I think these guys,
these men and women should be speaking out much
more to protect the ones in uniform, the four
stars in uniform now, because they they can't
and they shouldn't be speaking out publicly.
But it would be very useful if. Former chairman,
former army chiefs, for example, were speaking
out about what's going on, about the improper
use of the military. I think and then, you know,
after that Quantico gathering, I've been reflecting
on Quantico a lot lately after this Caribbean
boat strike incident. And of course, you know,
they're they're throwing the admiral under the
bus. If this happened, you know. he would have
been in the chain and he would bear responsibility.
But the fact is, it was the secretary. You remember,
he talked to everybody. He said, you exist to
break things and kill people. Now, in his mind,
he thought he was getting a real good locker
room speech, you know, to a room full of hundreds
of admirals and generals. But so that's setting
a culture. You exist to break things and kill
people. And then he said, no more woke rules
of engagement. And I'm listening to that. And
I'm like, you've got I can't believe what I'm
hearing, because clearly he doesn't understand
what rules of engagement are about. I mean, I
think we have an obligation. I mean, I worked
in CIA. It's a secret organization. And both
of our organizations are actually large, complex,
huge responsibility, lots of moving parts. I
think we have an obligation. In the CIA, it was,
I think, really General Hayden when he came from
the military and brought some of the discipline
that he had learned growing up through the joint
military to say, you know, American citizens
don't need to understand what we do. Like, we
can't tell them the secret stuff we do. That's
not part of it. But they need to understand we
work on behalf of them and the extent that we
can tell them the things we do and how we do
it so that they're more comfortable with what
we're doing. We should do that. I think that
even goes further when we see threats to things
that are happening to us now and threats to the
system. I think the military, the intelligence
community, the law enforcement community, the
federal law enforcement community are gems. I
mean, I think the public, if they got to sit
in our meeting, sit in day by day, the decisions,
the kind of hard things that people are doing
around the world, they would be proud of what
we do. And it hurts to see that thing just used
for whatever today's political football is. And
it weakens those professionals and they fire
a lot of the senior people who they think are
threats to them who aren't threats to them. I
mean, you know, when you work in the military
or CIA or in the government, you work on something
for a couple of years and then you're moved on
to something else by your leadership. And they're
taking me and saying, oh, you know, General Hodges,
you worked under General Milley. Therefore, we
can't trust you. What do you mean? Like, I worked
under lots of people at different times, lots
of presidents and things. So I think it's an
obligation we have. And it's a tough time because
you get attacked for these things. But it needs
to be done. It needs to be done. Well, and this
is why I think it's important that the retired
guys, and I would say probably the same in your
community as well, speak out because you can
speak out in a way and explain why these administration
policies and the way they're doing things. why
it is detrimental to the United States. You know,
we see over and over now our allies, their intelligence
services are saying, not so sure that we can
share. And you would know better than me how
much we depend on foreign intelligence to piece
things together. And I think you don't have to
be political to recognize. that this is a danger
to the United States. It's not going to be an
American satellite that identifies a terrorist
attack that's coming. It's going to be somebody
in two or three different foreign intelligence
services that are talking to their American counterparts
saying, hey, watch this. Yeah, let's talk more
about allies. Obviously, one of your senior jobs
is working in Europe, you know, and you live
in Europe and you work with allies. And your
point about intelligence is true. I think in
the clandestine service where I work, the bulk
by far of the information we got was from partners
and not always partners that are just bye -byes
allies. Like, you know, I worked in Indonesia
and Pakistan and we got information from them
that saved American lives by building relationships
and professionalism over time. And so like to
throw those allies under the bus on the intelligence
side, I see the danger of that. Tell me. Your
experience, how important is it that the U .S.
has friends and allies around the world? So we
don't have enough capacity to do everything that's
needed. When I became the commander of U .S.
Army Europe in 2014, I had followed two or three
superb officers who had all tried to stop the
reduction of capabilities in Europe. The last
two heavy brigades went home like in 2008, 2009,
something like that. So we had no American tanks
in Europe for the first time since 1944. And
so but just like we don't need that anymore.
And then the decision was to to bring home the
Apaches. We don't need that anymore. Of course,
this is right about the time that Putin started,
you know, doing what he was doing. But anyway,
so I had to. find help from allies. We didn't
have enough bridging. So we started working with
the British and German engineer units. My chief
of staff was the German officer because the army
wouldn't even resource the brigadier to be the
chief of staff because we were so low in priority.
So you start looking for people that, you know,
who can you trust? Who can you depend on? And
so the... Air defense, the American unit that's
in Poland right now as part of NATO's enhanced
forward presence, is in fact a Romanian air defense
battery. We just don't have enough. So we have
to depend on allies. The problem will be if they,
and I'm going to connect this back to the Quantico
and our legal framework, you can be sure that
some of our allies will be reluctant to put their
soldiers under American command. if they see
that there are no rules of engagement that are
part of this. Yeah, I agree. And take it one
step further. We'll talk about a couple of the
things that have happened recently. But do you
see that that's going to affect the military
itself and its ability to recruit and retain
people, its readiness? Do you worry about that?
working with allies that the administration is
pushing against, it's going to affect us for
the long term? Well, you know, we have air bases,
naval facilities, land facilities in the UK,
Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, obviously Germany,
Poland, all over Europe that help us. Those forces,
those bases are not to defend the Netherlands
or to defend Germany. They are there as platforms
for American strategic power projection into
Africa, the Middle East, but also our contribution
to NATO's collective defense. The number of American
troops, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines that are
in Europe is less than 100 ,000. It's like 95
,000. That would not even fill up the University
of Michigan's football stadium. So we're not
talking about a lot of people, but these are
bases that when you fly or sail or deploy to
Europe to go somewhere else, it helps us. It's
to our advantage. And you just can't take that
for granted that European countries will always
say, yeah, no problem. You can have your headquarters
or your maintenance or your training areas or
your seaports, use our seaports. That's because
of decades of trust. and investment by us and
those allies. So this is more than just, you
know, 2%. They should be paying more. And by
the way, almost all of them are by now. Yeah,
that's right. Tell me a little bit. So you're
there in Europe and you travel around and you
meet leaders. And I'm going to ask you about
your experience with Russia, Ukraine, and those
things in a minute. But how do you see that Europe
is responding to this moment? They're seeing
from Washington less engagement. even some nervousness
that NATO might not have the backing of NATO
like we may have had. We obviously seem more
inclined towards Russia, but the war is going
on in Ukraine. There's pressure on Europe to
maybe change their defense strategies either
individually or as a group. What is it you're
learning? What are you seeing? How are they handling
it? Are you optimistic about their ability to
defend themselves? I am cautiously optimistic.
What we're seeing is in several countries, a
recognition that they have taken it easy too
long. They hid behind the U .S. or many of them
hid behind Germany because Germany was not doing
its part. So they were able to stay out of the
glare from the White House because the Germans
were taking all the heat. But it kind of depends
on where you are. You know, Finland has this
enormous border with Russia and only a population
of five million. But they have more artillery
than any other country in Europe. They have a
mobilization system that they practice all the
time and that they can put 200 ,000 troops in
the field in two weeks. The troops that are already
trained and equipped and have their weapons.
So the Finns have never been confused. Poland
obviously has moved out very quickly to improve
their own defensive capabilities. They now have
the largest tank force. in all of Europe. Other
countries are doing better, but not as well as
they should. I would say the Nordic countries,
especially Norway. Russia seemed to get it better.
Well, the geography is a big part of it. Exactly
right. You have a history and you see, you can
feel the threat. The Estonians. Also not confused.
But Germany has really taken some important steps
over the past year. They no longer argue about
whether or not to grow the size of the army.
Now it's how do we do it? Do we go back to conscription
or can we recruit enough? You know, that sort
of thing. So that's a completely different argument.
Money is not a problem. They have changed their
laws to allow them to do what we do, which is
to, you know, go into debt. to modernize and
grow your defensive capabilities. So you can
feel it changing in that regard. But still, you've
got so much Russian penetration into parts of
Europe. In many European countries, even if the
government is not a right -wing government, the
biggest political party in the country is a right
-wing party. So like AFD in Germany, Marine Le
Pen in France, you've got the, in Slovakia, I
mean, so these guys are a problem. And the Russians
have poured money in their reform party in UK,
for example, as well. So this is something that's
got to be addressed internally if the allies
are going to come together. and recognize that
Russia really is the threat. Now, there was a
meeting, a phone call between President Macron
of France, the German Bundeskanzler Merz, the
Finnish President Stubb, and some others, Ruda,
Secretary General of NATO. And they were talking
about how concerned they are about Ukraine. And
one of them said, and of course, the reason I
know this is because it was leaked. And Der Spiegel
published it. One of them said, we have got to
help Macron. I mean, we have got to help Zelensky.
We've got to protect him from these guys. And
they're talking about Witkoff, Kushner, and Trump,
not the Russians. Because they see, unfortunately,
they see that the U .S. is not the U .S. It's
focused on the U .S. and transaction and getting
to business with Russia and that Europe and Ukraine,
Ukraine as a part of Europe, is going to have
to fend for itself by and large. And they see
this now. And so this is going to accelerate
what they're trying to do. So you were in Europe
in a command position 2014 and on, you know,
when Russia took the Crimea and this. These problems
started to reach the height that within 2022,
the second invasion of Ukraine by the Russians.
What is your experience there in terms of working
with the Europeans to understand that threat,
starting to work with the Ukrainians to the extent
we could? Give us a little bit of your experience
as a commander on the ground during that period.
Well, of course, there were an awful lot of people
in different nations, smart, well -educated.
responsible people that were like, come on, Russia,
there's no way are they going to do what we now
refer to as the large -scale invasion. They're
never going to do this. It would be so stupid.
They would be screwing themselves economically,
for example. That was a common mindset from countries
in Central and Western Europe. The countries
in Eastern Europe, they knew what was coming,
but the rest of them, not so much. The Germans
were still building Nord Stream 2 deep into 2021,
until just a few months before Russia's large
scale. The Germans were still building Nord Stream
2. That was, unfortunately, a mindset. We had
started working with Ukrainians back in 2015.
We got the mission to help. help them as they
were dealing with Russia's initial invasion in
2014 to, yeah, to help them. But the policy was
still, you know, helmets and blankets and night
vision goggles and first aid kits, but there
was no lethal aid. This was during the Obama
administration. And, you know, we didn't have
a policy. We didn't know what the hell we were
doing for sure. So my task was to create a training
center. somewhere in western Ukraine, and we
used an old Soviet training area called Yavariv,
which is outside the city of Lviv, and began
to turn it into a training center, not just a
big range. And we immediately began to realize
that, wow, these guys have real experience. I
mean, they've all been under Russian artillery
fire, rocket fire, drones, electronic warfare,
stuff that we had not faced. And so I remember
asking one of my NCOs who had been out there
with him for a few weeks. And this is a typical
paratrooper. You know, a guy from the airborne
tends to have a slightly higher degree of perception
of himself than maybe the average soldier does.
So they're very cocky and confident. And this
guy had probably been in Afghanistan and Iraq
like six times. I said, so what do you think?
He said, sir, these dudes are not Iraqis. And
of course, what he was saying was they. They
are committed. They already have experience.
And so we started learning from them. And actually,
we changed our training model. Remember what
I said earlier about how training centers save
the Army? So we changed our training center at
Hohenfels, Germany, from something that was about
security, cooperation, and assistance to the
OPFOR is going to have all the capabilities that
the Russians do. Long range precision strike,
massive amounts of rockets, electronic warfare,
drones, so that now our troops had to compete
in that training cauldron, if you will. Otherwise,
they would never get better. And then General
Milley, who was the chief of the army at the
time, he came and saw that. And then he directed
the same thing happened at the training center
back in the States, because that's where you
that's where you change. And that was all because
we started learning from the Ukrainians. I think
that's an important thing, is not having the
arrogance to think we can answer every question.
I mean, Ukrainians have been facing the Russians,
obviously, forever and decades, but even since
2014, constant misinformation, constant disinformation,
constant covert attacks, constant efforts to
cyber attacks, and then obviously military attacks
and low -level military attacks even before the
invasion. And so I think that's, you know, the
military... And all of our institutions need
to learn and change and learn and change. And
I think this arrogance that, you know, we need
to be the center of everything and tell people
what to do is a potential problem for us. That's
a great point, John. I always thought the best
organizations were learning organizations, that
you have a culture of how do I get better? And,
of course, that means you have to acknowledge
that you screwed something up first. Or that
a mistake was made. And you also have to have
a culture that tolerates that unless it was a
mistake of willful negligence. But these have
always, my experience, these are always the best
outfits. Let's take that idea and put it to right
now. Like one of the things as we're talking,
the issue has been this attack on supposed drug
boats in the Caribbean. And as we speak, the
discussion is the Secretary of Defense talking
about. telling to kill everybody in the boat.
So even after they'd taken the first strike and
there's people in the water who are no longer
a direct threat, can you shoot and kill those
people? So that's the issue we're dealing with
now. And that suggests to me this arrogant attitude,
because essentially the way they respond to it
when this comes out is, nope, we did nothing
wrong. And then Haig talks about when he used
the signal chat to talk about attacks with the
Houthis in Yemen. Nope, did nothing wrong. There's
nothing we do wrong. blame others. Do you worry
that that learning capability of the military
might be under threat because of sort of political
pressures from on top? Well, yes, because if
you're in an environment where questioning of
orders or pushback on stupid policies or maybe
even unlawful policies is, if that's part of
the culture, then And also, if you see a lot
of people getting sacked without cause, you know,
that that change, that's that's a culture change
or that that that creates a climate where, number
one, you don't want to raise your head above
the parapet. You and also there will be really
good people who know that they should not or
cannot obey an unlawful order. But they're also
trying to protect their soldiers, because if
they're gone, then they'll find somebody who
will do it. And so there's a I think probably
a lot of good people are dealing with it. I'm
sure of it are dealing with this right now. Do
I go or do I stay and try to fight back? I think
that the and so far, I guess at least what we've
read from the admiral who was the South Com commander
and then he resigned or was he left. And now
we know that he was told by Hexeth. You either
you're on the team or you're out. And so after
a few months of this kind of contentious relationship,
the admiral was told to leave. So it's not always
as simple as, you know, screw you. I'm not doing
that. It's that you have. And you, by the way,
while everybody makes it work, you try to help
people understand the seriousness of what you're
dealing with. Everyone's trying to make it work.
They're not like. I think people think there's
a partisanship in our institutions where we're
trying to work against whatever political leader
we have if we don't like them. And that's just
not the case. It's the opposite. We are a mission
-oriented institution like you are. How do I
get it done? I remember being told when I was
young, you will never have all the resources
you need. Never. But you will always be expected
to still accomplish the mission. So you're going
to have to figure it out. And so that's our mindset.
If you've got a situation where the secretary,
especially at that level, is saying we're going
to do this and this and this, of course, what
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs should be doing
and the service chiefs and the secretary's inner
circle should be saying, Mr. Secretary, I know
what you're trying to accomplish. How about if
we do this? Because, you know, it's also inappropriate.
You don't want uniforms out in public. humiliating
the civilian leadership. I mean, that's also
ingrained civilian leadership over the military.
But you have to have the backbone to do this
behind closed doors and say, this is bullshit.
This is illegal. We can't do that. We absolutely
are not going to do that. And then they say,
thanks for your service. There's the door. OK,
now, you know, we're in a different situation.
And this is why the retirees I've talked about
are so important and also the Congress. I mean.
And hopefully hearings will expose some of these
things in such a way that most people watching
it will say, OK, this is not partisan. This is
legitimate. And I think this is an important
part of it. There's legal ways to meet the mission
and to support policies. Exactly. You've been
really generous with your time. So I'll just
ask a couple sort of more personal questions
as we move on here. One is. What message would
you give to young officers entering this deeply
polarized political environment? Well, when you
enter the military, and I imagine it's the same
in your professional community as well, you've
got so much work to do that you don't need to
be debating, worrying about what's going on happening
way up at the top. You accomplish your mission,
and you take care of the men and women, uniformed
and civilian. under your responsibility. You
focus on those two things. And not only is it
fun, it is so rewarding. You're doing something.
You're going to be learning. You're going to
be so impressed with all the fellow Americans
that you meet. So I encourage people who are
asking, I don't know if I want my daughter to
go in the Army now or the Air Force or whatever.
I said, hell yeah, get in there. This is not
going to last forever, but we're going to need
quality women and men to serve forever. No, I
think that's right. I hope that that's right.
I hope the damage isn't making its way down that
deep. There are very, very serious people, very
serious professionals in these organizations.
And again, if the American citizens can see what
we're doing every day, they'd be proud of it.
So one last sort of final reflection, if you
could leave the listeners with sort of one idea
about the relationship between military professionalism,
good governance and national unity, what would
it be? How do you see the military in a modern
political space? I think we have to be a rules
-based, constitutionally loyal institution that
nobody ever questions whether or not we are going
to carry out lawful orders and we're going to
do our best. And we're going to make sure that
not only do we always accomplish the mission,
but that we're going to do it in a way that doesn't
waste the life of a single man or woman in uniform.
I like what Colin Powell used to say. He goes,
I'm not interested in a fair fight. You know,
we're going to do overwhelming everything that
they need to accomplish mission. We don't want
a fair fight with any enemy. But I would say
the thing that has been missing for so long is
our civilian leadership has to clearly identify
the strategic objective. What is it we're trying
to accomplish? We didn't have it in Afghanistan.
We didn't have it in Iraq. Did not have it in
Vietnam. Not really. And so and right now we
don't have a strategic objective with regards
to Ukraine. What are we trying to accomplish?
And if you do that, then you can develop the
right policies. But if you don't have a clear
objective, it's very difficult to develop the
right policies. I agree with that. Thank you
very much. So General Hodges, thank you for your
time. I think it's enlightening and that we really
appreciate, not we, me as an American citizen
appreciates what you're doing and speaking on
and in fact, you know, helping the Europeans
deal with this difficult. time. So thank you
so much. I really appreciate it. John, thank
you. I'm really grateful for the privilege. Thank
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