WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:02.439 The Thanksgiving turkey is barely cold, but the 00:00:02.439 --> 00:00:06.139 MLB hot stove is already absolutely scorching. 00:00:06.259 --> 00:00:08.960 Welcome to the Baseball Podcast. It is. I mean, 00:00:08.960 --> 00:00:10.900 if you thought things would cool down after the 00:00:10.900 --> 00:00:12.800 Dodgers raised the trophy, you were completely 00:00:12.800 --> 00:00:16.260 wrong. Not at all. It feels like we're deep in 00:00:16.260 --> 00:00:19.000 the offseason, but the market just exploded right 00:00:19.000 --> 00:00:21.300 out of the gate. It really has. The pace this 00:00:21.300 --> 00:00:24.100 winter has been, well... Pretty much unprecedented. 00:00:24.579 --> 00:00:28.100 Usually you see teams do this slow, intricate 00:00:28.100 --> 00:00:30.899 dance, right? They wait for the winter meetings 00:00:30.899 --> 00:00:33.659 to really set the market. But this year, a couple 00:00:33.659 --> 00:00:35.740 of huge dominoes. I'm thinking of that Mets and 00:00:35.740 --> 00:00:38.219 Rangers trade and the Blue Jays signing. It's 00:00:38.219 --> 00:00:40.179 like they've just accelerated the timeline for 00:00:40.179 --> 00:00:42.420 everyone. Position players, top tier pitchers, 00:00:42.460 --> 00:00:44.079 everything is moving. We're talking about huge 00:00:44.079 --> 00:00:47.469 landscape altering moves from the jump. The New 00:00:47.469 --> 00:00:50.990 York Mets sent Brandon Nimmo, a huge fan favorite 00:00:50.990 --> 00:00:53.409 who had just signed that massive eight -year 00:00:53.409 --> 00:00:56.350 deal. Just a year ago. Exactly. Sent him packing 00:00:56.350 --> 00:00:59.649 to the Texas Rangers for Marcus Simeon. I mean, 00:00:59.670 --> 00:01:01.929 that move alone signaled a radical, immediate 00:01:01.929 --> 00:01:04.609 pivot in Queens. And then you have the Toronto 00:01:04.609 --> 00:01:07.450 Blue Jays just firing the first cannon shot. 00:01:07.769 --> 00:01:09.989 in the AL East arms race. And that's exactly 00:01:09.989 --> 00:01:11.489 what we're going to unpack today. We're going 00:01:11.489 --> 00:01:14.469 to dive into these monumental shifts, these huge 00:01:14.469 --> 00:01:16.670 financial gambles teams are taking. We'll look 00:01:16.670 --> 00:01:18.730 at the high stakes decisions facing these clubs, 00:01:18.870 --> 00:01:21.329 especially the ones trying to, you know, unseat 00:01:21.329 --> 00:01:23.280 the Dodgers' new dynasty. And we're going to 00:01:23.280 --> 00:01:25.180 get into some of the surprising trade targets 00:01:25.180 --> 00:01:27.379 and the really complicated contract situations 00:01:27.379 --> 00:01:30.120 that are already defining this winter. We've 00:01:30.120 --> 00:01:32.319 got some incredible stories for you. We're going 00:01:32.319 --> 00:01:35.280 to look into that absolutely electric 60 home 00:01:35.280 --> 00:01:37.319 run season that carried the Mariners to the brink 00:01:37.319 --> 00:01:39.680 of the World Series. And the really complicated 00:01:39.680 --> 00:01:42.879 futures for guys like Nolan Arenado and Jeff 00:01:42.879 --> 00:01:45.579 McNeil, veterans who could be on the move. And 00:01:45.579 --> 00:01:48.799 you will not want to miss this. The mindset of 00:01:48.799 --> 00:01:51.650 the Javides pitching star. who explicitly told 00:01:51.650 --> 00:01:54.530 executives he does not want to join the Dodgers 00:01:54.530 --> 00:01:57.569 super team because, in his words, he wants to 00:01:57.569 --> 00:02:00.510 take them down. It's fantastic. It's not just 00:02:00.510 --> 00:02:02.569 about who spends the most anymore. It's about 00:02:02.569 --> 00:02:05.370 who spends the smartest. We've got the analysis 00:02:05.370 --> 00:02:07.689 to show you which teams are making strategic 00:02:07.689 --> 00:02:11.870 investments and which ones. Well, which ones 00:02:11.870 --> 00:02:13.930 might be buying a very, very expensive bust? 00:02:14.460 --> 00:02:16.159 All right. Let's jump right into the biggest 00:02:16.159 --> 00:02:18.319 money move of the winter so far. Let's do it. 00:02:18.419 --> 00:02:20.139 Let's start with the most expensive commitment 00:02:20.139 --> 00:02:24.360 we've seen. The Dillon Seas mega deal. I mean, 00:02:24.379 --> 00:02:26.819 the Toronto Blue Jays were agonizingly close 00:02:26.819 --> 00:02:29.919 to winning it all in 2025. Two outs away. Just 00:02:29.919 --> 00:02:32.259 painful. Two outs away from lifting the trophy. 00:02:33.740 --> 00:02:36.300 That pain, you can just feel it, clearly fueled 00:02:36.300 --> 00:02:38.379 their urgency. They didn't just go shopping. 00:02:38.400 --> 00:02:40.560 They bought out the entire luxury store. They 00:02:40.560 --> 00:02:43.939 absolutely took a bold and, I mean, costly gamble. 00:02:44.259 --> 00:02:46.419 And you have to look at the context here. The 00:02:46.419 --> 00:02:49.520 contract is reportedly seven years, $210 million. 00:02:50.139 --> 00:02:53.340 That's a $30 million average annual value, an 00:02:53.340 --> 00:02:56.340 AAV of $30 million. For a starting pitcher in 00:02:56.340 --> 00:02:58.479 this market, that number just... jumps right 00:02:58.479 --> 00:02:59.860 off the page, especially when you look at his 00:02:59.860 --> 00:03:01.780 track record. It really does. Okay, so let's 00:03:01.780 --> 00:03:04.379 get into why this deal is being called, you know, 00:03:04.379 --> 00:03:07.860 exorbitant by some people. Cease is the definition 00:03:07.860 --> 00:03:10.479 of boon or bust. Right. The boon part, you can't 00:03:10.479 --> 00:03:14.479 deny it. 215 strikeouts in 168 innings in 2025. 00:03:15.099 --> 00:03:18.060 That level of swing and miss is absolutely elite. 00:03:18.240 --> 00:03:21.139 His stuff is just phenomenal. It is. His stuff 00:03:21.139 --> 00:03:24.560 metrics are top of the league, but... The market 00:03:24.560 --> 00:03:27.699 and the Blue Jays are pricing him as a true number 00:03:27.699 --> 00:03:30.780 one ace, and his production profile doesn't quite 00:03:30.780 --> 00:03:33.400 match that long -term reliability you want. So 00:03:33.400 --> 00:03:35.680 you have to pair that immense upside with the 00:03:35.680 --> 00:03:39.139 immediate risk. Exactly. He had a 4 .55 ERA last 00:03:39.139 --> 00:03:41.280 season. That is significantly higher than what 00:03:41.280 --> 00:03:43.879 you'd expect for a $30 million pitcher. And maybe 00:03:43.879 --> 00:03:45.979 more critically, his innings average was low. 00:03:46.080 --> 00:03:49.460 How low? Just 5 .25 innings per start. So you're 00:03:49.460 --> 00:03:51.759 paying ace money for these huge strikeout numbers, 00:03:51.900 --> 00:03:53.919 but you are absorbing the risk of, you know, 00:03:53.919 --> 00:03:56.419 mid -rotation innings length and a ton of volatility. 00:03:56.840 --> 00:03:58.639 So a part of me looks at this and just asks, 00:03:58.819 --> 00:04:03.020 Toronto, are you desperate? Are they compensating 00:04:03.020 --> 00:04:04.759 for the fact that their development system might 00:04:04.759 --> 00:04:07.580 not have a frontline starter ready right now? 00:04:07.639 --> 00:04:09.599 Or are they worried that their window, you know, 00:04:09.599 --> 00:04:12.759 with their core guys might be closing soon? Is 00:04:12.759 --> 00:04:15.699 $30 million for a volatile pitcher a sign of 00:04:15.699 --> 00:04:19.040 panic? I think it's a calculated risk born out 00:04:19.040 --> 00:04:21.300 of necessity. Yeah. The Blue Jays front office 00:04:21.300 --> 00:04:23.600 looked around and realized they had to do something 00:04:23.600 --> 00:04:25.959 big to separate themselves from the Yankees and 00:04:25.959 --> 00:04:28.720 solidify that rotation now. Before the other 00:04:28.720 --> 00:04:31.199 top arms came off the board. Precisely. If they 00:04:31.199 --> 00:04:34.060 waited, they risk losing out on everyone. So 00:04:34.060 --> 00:04:37.339 they're effectively betting $210 million that 00:04:37.339 --> 00:04:39.399 their pitching development staff can cut his 00:04:39.399 --> 00:04:42.459 walk rate and turn that 5 .25 innings per start 00:04:42.459 --> 00:04:44.699 into, say, 6 .5 innings per start. And if they 00:04:44.699 --> 00:04:46.660 can do that? If they can fix that command, they 00:04:46.660 --> 00:04:49.240 have an annual Cy Young contender. But if they 00:04:49.240 --> 00:04:51.339 can't, that contract, like you said, could become 00:04:51.339 --> 00:04:53.379 a huge, huge burden. They'd be left with a right 00:04:53.379 --> 00:04:56.000 -handed, high strikeout, high walk version of 00:04:56.000 --> 00:04:58.540 Blake Snell. But the immediate impact on that 00:04:58.540 --> 00:05:01.519 roster. is undeniable. He slumps into a rotation 00:05:01.519 --> 00:05:04.259 that already has Kevin Gausman, Shane Bieber, 00:05:04.439 --> 00:05:06.500 who they brought back. Which was a huge move 00:05:06.500 --> 00:05:08.660 in itself. And Treya Savage, that high upside 00:05:08.660 --> 00:05:10.740 prospect. I mean, all of a sudden, that looks 00:05:10.740 --> 00:05:13.180 like arguably the best rotation in the entire 00:05:13.180 --> 00:05:16.180 American League. It creates this immediate, almost 00:05:16.180 --> 00:05:20.160 overwhelming depth. The addition of Cease. presumably 00:05:20.160 --> 00:05:23.060 pushes Jose Barrios, who's a proven veteran, 00:05:23.279 --> 00:05:25.779 a guy who has performed in big games. Right. 00:05:25.899 --> 00:05:29.000 It pushes him to the number four or number five 00:05:29.000 --> 00:05:32.439 spot in the rotation. That kind of luxury, having 00:05:32.439 --> 00:05:35.540 that quality of an insurance policy, that's what 00:05:35.540 --> 00:05:37.720 championship teams are made of. And there's a 00:05:37.720 --> 00:05:40.060 stat that really underlines the potential dominance 00:05:40.060 --> 00:05:42.680 here. It's a great one. Cease and Gossman, as 00:05:42.680 --> 00:05:45.199 a pair, lead all of Major League Baseball in 00:05:45.199 --> 00:05:47.040 total strikeouts since the start of the 2020 00:05:47.040 --> 00:05:50.100 season. That's a one -two punch. That is just 00:05:50.100 --> 00:05:52.680 designed to overwhelm any lineup you face in 00:05:52.680 --> 00:05:55.019 October. Absolutely. And the mentality of the 00:05:55.019 --> 00:05:57.680 organization seems to reflect the urgency of 00:05:57.680 --> 00:06:00.240 the deal. Yeah, Max Scherzer, who they got late 00:06:00.240 --> 00:06:04.209 last year, and Vladdy Jr. They've both publicly 00:06:04.209 --> 00:06:07.310 referenced that Kobe Bryant jobs not finished 00:06:07.310 --> 00:06:09.750 Mantra after losing the World Series. So this 00:06:09.750 --> 00:06:12.529 cease signing is management basically declaring 00:06:12.529 --> 00:06:15.269 to the fans, we are doing everything we possibly 00:06:15.269 --> 00:06:18.709 can to win it all in 2026. OK, so that brings 00:06:18.709 --> 00:06:21.449 us to their biggest rival, because this huge 00:06:21.449 --> 00:06:24.430 financial commitment and the just the aggressive 00:06:24.430 --> 00:06:27.660 speed of the cease deal. makes the silence from 00:06:27.660 --> 00:06:29.920 the New York Yankees all the more striking. It 00:06:29.920 --> 00:06:32.420 really does. The Yankees are, at least publicly, 00:06:32.639 --> 00:06:35.040 just sitting on their hands. They seem fixated 00:06:35.040 --> 00:06:37.680 on their big targets, Kyle Tucker and Cody Bellinger, 00:06:37.759 --> 00:06:39.920 but they haven't made that splash that their 00:06:39.920 --> 00:06:42.379 fan base is expecting, especially now after seeing 00:06:42.379 --> 00:06:44.759 Toronto just leapfrog them in the rotation rankings. 00:06:45.040 --> 00:06:46.620 And we heard from the owner, Hal Steinbrenner, 00:06:46.759 --> 00:06:49.420 about this. He was asked about this perceived 00:06:49.420 --> 00:06:52.160 inaction, and he expressed concern over the Dodgers' 00:06:52.199 --> 00:06:54.240 dynasty for sure. He acknowledged the competitive 00:06:54.240 --> 00:06:56.769 gap. But he also pushed back pretty hard on the 00:06:56.769 --> 00:06:58.790 idea that the Yankees have to match the Dodgers 00:06:58.790 --> 00:07:01.829 dollar for dollar. He did. He gave a strong, 00:07:01.870 --> 00:07:04.790 pretty detailed argument against that whole spend 00:07:04.790 --> 00:07:07.769 to win narrative. So what was his counter argument 00:07:07.769 --> 00:07:10.310 specifically? He argued that the correlation 00:07:10.310 --> 00:07:13.329 between just raw spending and winning championships 00:07:13.329 --> 00:07:17.610 is, in his words, weak. And he used 2025 as the 00:07:17.610 --> 00:07:20.230 prime example. He pointed right at the Mets, 00:07:20.269 --> 00:07:22.990 who had that massive payroll and missed the playoffs 00:07:22.990 --> 00:07:25.709 entirely. And contrasted that with who? With 00:07:25.709 --> 00:07:28.350 the Brewers, a small payroll team that ended 00:07:28.350 --> 00:07:30.550 up with the best regular season record in the 00:07:30.550 --> 00:07:33.269 entire National League. He believes it's about 00:07:33.269 --> 00:07:35.870 the strategic efficiency of your spending, not 00:07:35.870 --> 00:07:38.110 just the total amount. But isn't it a little 00:07:38.110 --> 00:07:40.170 easy for an owner of one of the richest teams 00:07:40.170 --> 00:07:42.850 in the world to make that philosophical argument? 00:07:43.420 --> 00:07:45.519 when his team already has pretty significant 00:07:45.519 --> 00:07:47.980 financial constraints. That's the real issue 00:07:47.980 --> 00:07:50.480 here. They absolutely do. It's not just a philosophy. 00:07:50.740 --> 00:07:53.759 There are concrete hurdles. The Yankees already 00:07:53.759 --> 00:07:56.660 have a massive payroll overflow, and their flexibility 00:07:56.660 --> 00:07:59.060 got even tighter because of one specific thing. 00:07:59.160 --> 00:08:00.819 Trent Grisham accepting the qualifying offer. 00:08:00.920 --> 00:08:04.699 Okay, explain for everyone why that $22 million 00:08:04.699 --> 00:08:08.370 acceptance is so critical. to their flexibility 00:08:08.370 --> 00:08:10.889 right now. It all comes down to the competitive 00:08:10.889 --> 00:08:14.889 balance tax, the CBT and its tiers. The Yankees 00:08:14.889 --> 00:08:18.100 are already deep into the penalty zone. Now, 00:08:18.160 --> 00:08:21.100 when your own player accepts the qualifying offer, 00:08:21.339 --> 00:08:27.060 that entire salary, $22 .025 million, immediately 00:08:27.060 --> 00:08:29.779 counts against your CBT calculation. And that 00:08:29.779 --> 00:08:31.939 pushes them even further into the highest penalty 00:08:31.939 --> 00:08:34.759 bracket. Right. It dramatically increases the 00:08:34.759 --> 00:08:37.299 cost of every single additional dollar they want 00:08:37.299 --> 00:08:39.460 to spend on a big free agent like Kyle Tucker 00:08:39.460 --> 00:08:42.480 or Cody Bellinger. That acceptance didn't cost 00:08:42.480 --> 00:08:44.960 them a draft pick, but it severely, severely 00:08:44.960 --> 00:08:48.179 limited their financial wiggle room. So the Yankees 00:08:48.179 --> 00:08:50.360 have to be incredibly precise. The pressure is 00:08:50.360 --> 00:08:52.100 on, especially with the Blue Jays loading up 00:08:52.100 --> 00:08:54.480 next door. It's intense. Most analysts believe 00:08:54.480 --> 00:08:57.179 the Yankees need a huge splurge. They need to 00:08:57.179 --> 00:08:59.899 land one of those big targets, or as one insider 00:08:59.899 --> 00:09:02.600 put it, two or three swaps completely off the 00:09:02.600 --> 00:09:04.840 beaten path if they want to win the winter. And 00:09:04.840 --> 00:09:07.269 if they strike out. The narrative will be terrible. 00:09:07.669 --> 00:09:10.269 And beyond that, with the Blue Jays getting cease, 00:09:10.529 --> 00:09:13.009 a lot of people are already viewing Toronto as 00:09:13.009 --> 00:09:15.690 the prohibitive favorites to land Kyle Tucker, 00:09:15.889 --> 00:09:18.230 the best bat on the market. So New York could 00:09:18.230 --> 00:09:21.750 miss out on the top bat and a top arm and just 00:09:21.750 --> 00:09:23.809 get left behind in a division that is only getting 00:09:23.809 --> 00:09:26.529 stronger. That's the fear in the Bronx right 00:09:26.529 --> 00:09:29.070 now. OK, we've established the arms race in the 00:09:29.070 --> 00:09:31.789 AL East, but the action is definitely not limited 00:09:31.789 --> 00:09:35.029 to free agency. Let's shift over to the National 00:09:35.029 --> 00:09:38.080 League. Specifically, the New York Mets. They 00:09:38.080 --> 00:09:40.179 made a truly radical pivot with that Brandon 00:09:40.179 --> 00:09:43.440 Nimmo for Marcus Simeon trade. That was a genuine 00:09:43.440 --> 00:09:46.120 shock to the system. Trading Nimmo, who was productive, 00:09:46.460 --> 00:09:49.120 a leader, and just one year into that eight -year 00:09:49.120 --> 00:09:51.720 contract. For Simeon, a veteran infielder. Yeah. 00:09:51.860 --> 00:09:53.679 It's just such a clear statement from the new 00:09:53.679 --> 00:09:56.850 front office. It absolutely confirms David Stern's 00:09:56.850 --> 00:09:59.570 strategic goal. He's prioritizing defensive stability. 00:09:59.850 --> 00:10:02.370 He wants immediate roster flexibility. And he's 00:10:02.370 --> 00:10:04.929 shedding long -term contract risk, even if it 00:10:04.929 --> 00:10:07.090 means giving up a superior offensive player like 00:10:07.090 --> 00:10:09.490 Nimmo. Nimmo was a fan favorite, too. I mean, 00:10:09.490 --> 00:10:13.149 known for his relentless hustle. Moving him sends 00:10:13.149 --> 00:10:16.029 a really strong message to that clubhouse and 00:10:16.029 --> 00:10:18.730 that fan base. What does it tell us about the 00:10:18.730 --> 00:10:22.309 Mets' new strategy? It signals a deep philosophical 00:10:22.309 --> 00:10:26.049 commitment to asset management and future planning 00:10:26.049 --> 00:10:29.230 by taking on Semin's remaining years, which are 00:10:29.230 --> 00:10:32.039 shorter than Nemo's deal. The Mets get that flexibility. 00:10:32.299 --> 00:10:34.840 But more importantly, they're signaling that 00:10:34.840 --> 00:10:37.399 pretty much any non -untouchable player, especially 00:10:37.399 --> 00:10:40.200 anyone signed by the previous regime, is on the 00:10:40.200 --> 00:10:42.519 table. If the return is right. If the return 00:10:42.519 --> 00:10:45.159 provides that combination of defensive value 00:10:45.159 --> 00:10:47.700 and organizational flexibility, it's a ruthless 00:10:47.700 --> 00:10:49.799 approach, but it could be a really effective 00:10:49.799 --> 00:10:52.559 way to reshape the roster. So that Nemo trade 00:10:52.559 --> 00:10:55.440 immediately creates an infield surplus, which 00:10:55.440 --> 00:10:57.179 of course brings us to the growing trade speculation 00:10:57.179 --> 00:11:00.000 around Jeff McNeil. This girl. He's the next 00:11:00.000 --> 00:11:02.240 logical domino, right? After Nemo leaves and 00:11:02.240 --> 00:11:04.379 Semien arrives, the Mets are loaded with infield 00:11:04.379 --> 00:11:06.840 and utility options. You've got McNeil with his 00:11:06.840 --> 00:11:08.919 proven defensive versatility and his contact 00:11:08.919 --> 00:11:11.759 first back. And then you have the younger high 00:11:11.759 --> 00:11:14.759 upside prospect, Lisan Gil Acuna. Exactly. So 00:11:14.759 --> 00:11:16.600 the front office has this critical choice to 00:11:16.600 --> 00:11:19.539 make. Do you stick with the proven high floor 00:11:19.539 --> 00:11:21.980 player in McNeil who gives you immediate value? 00:11:22.600 --> 00:11:25.779 Or do you commit to Acuna who offers more speed? 00:11:26.279 --> 00:11:28.779 more positional flexibility, and that untapped 00:11:28.779 --> 00:11:32.440 power potential. Trading McNeil now, while his 00:11:32.440 --> 00:11:34.820 value is at its highest, feels like the classic 00:11:34.820 --> 00:11:37.460 David Stearns move. It really does. And if they 00:11:37.460 --> 00:11:40.039 do decide to move him, the Angels seem to be 00:11:40.039 --> 00:11:42.759 the primary trade partner. The Mets are specifically 00:11:42.759 --> 00:11:45.419 targeting pitching in return to replenish their 00:11:45.419 --> 00:11:47.720 system. Okay, let's look at the two pitchers 00:11:47.720 --> 00:11:49.480 they're reportedly focused on from the Angels. 00:11:49.679 --> 00:11:52.460 The main target, the highest value option, is 00:11:52.460 --> 00:11:55.190 a guy named George Klassen. He's rated by some 00:11:55.190 --> 00:11:57.509 as a top five Angels prospect, and his appeal 00:11:57.509 --> 00:11:59.730 is pretty simple. The velocity. Trickle -digit 00:11:59.730 --> 00:12:01.809 heat. He has an electric fastball that sits in 00:12:01.809 --> 00:12:03.789 the upper 90s, so he's pretty close to being 00:12:03.789 --> 00:12:07.090 MLB ready with mid -rotation upside. He was great 00:12:07.090 --> 00:12:09.789 in AA recently. But every high -velocity arm 00:12:09.789 --> 00:12:12.049 comes with that detailed scouting report on the 00:12:12.049 --> 00:12:14.669 risk factors. What's the catch with Klassen? 00:12:14.830 --> 00:12:17.789 It's significant control risk. They call it reliever 00:12:17.789 --> 00:12:20.769 risk. He was a control challenge arm in college, 00:12:20.809 --> 00:12:23.639 and while he's worked on it, The high walk rates 00:12:23.639 --> 00:12:26.659 are still there. It's common for guys who throw 00:12:26.659 --> 00:12:29.519 100 miles an hour to struggle to harness it consistently. 00:12:29.879 --> 00:12:31.759 So the Mets would be betting on their player 00:12:31.759 --> 00:12:33.740 development system. Exactly. Betting that they 00:12:33.740 --> 00:12:36.179 can convert that high -octane stuff into sustainable 00:12:36.179 --> 00:12:39.460 command. The second name is Sammy Natera Jr., 00:12:39.460 --> 00:12:42.879 a lower -cost, high -intrigue lefty. Tell us 00:12:42.879 --> 00:12:46.019 about his profile. Natera is a fascinating story. 00:12:46.179 --> 00:12:48.620 He's a late bloomer. He didn't even start pitching 00:12:48.620 --> 00:12:50.899 until he was 17, so even though he's 26, he has 00:12:50.899 --> 00:12:53.100 a really low mileage on his arm. That's a huge 00:12:53.100 --> 00:12:55.860 plus. And he broke out recently. Big time in 00:12:55.860 --> 00:12:58.139 the Arizona Fall League. He showed off a mid 00:12:58.139 --> 00:13:01.379 -90s fastball, even touched 98, and paired it 00:13:01.379 --> 00:13:03.460 with a sweeping slider that gets a ton of swing 00:13:03.460 --> 00:13:05.440 and miss. So he could be a fast mover. Yeah. 00:13:05.769 --> 00:13:08.830 Big frame, lefty profile, and the potential to 00:13:08.830 --> 00:13:11.029 move quickly through the upper minors as either 00:13:11.029 --> 00:13:13.870 a high leverage bullpen arm or just a low cost 00:13:13.870 --> 00:13:16.049 rotation option. He'd be a value play for them. 00:13:16.289 --> 00:13:19.190 And the Angels' ability to even make these trades 00:13:19.190 --> 00:13:22.429 is driven by a massive internal financial shift 00:13:22.429 --> 00:13:25.149 of their own. The Anthony Rendon contract situation. 00:13:25.549 --> 00:13:28.570 This is the definition of clearing a legacy burden 00:13:28.570 --> 00:13:31.190 off the books. A new era in Anaheim. It really 00:13:31.190 --> 00:13:34.049 is. After Rendon's retirement and these contract 00:13:34.049 --> 00:13:36.549 buyout discussions, plus trading Taylor Ward, 00:13:36.769 --> 00:13:39.450 the Angels are executing a major financial reboot. 00:13:39.669 --> 00:13:41.909 They're moving on from those past big money mistakes. 00:13:42.350 --> 00:13:44.850 So how does the Rendon buyout specifically help 00:13:44.850 --> 00:13:47.549 their spending power this offseason? This is 00:13:47.549 --> 00:13:49.509 where it gets a little complicated. It is, but 00:13:49.509 --> 00:13:51.990 it's all about that competitive balance tax accounting. 00:13:52.190 --> 00:13:54.250 Right now, the Angels have about $40 million 00:13:54.250 --> 00:13:56.899 they could comfortably spend. Rendon was owed 00:13:56.899 --> 00:13:59.340 a massive amount of money. If they can execute 00:13:59.340 --> 00:14:01.779 this pragmatic buyout, they're looking at eating 00:14:01.779 --> 00:14:04.220 over two thirds of his remaining deal right now. 00:14:04.320 --> 00:14:06.679 That's a big immediate cash hit. It is, but it 00:14:06.679 --> 00:14:09.100 allows them to defer the final, more manageable 00:14:09.100 --> 00:14:13.179 chunk, about $12 .8 million across 2026 and 2027. 00:14:13.519 --> 00:14:16.179 And the CBT implication of that. That's the key. 00:14:16.419 --> 00:14:19.139 By deferring that last bit and accelerating the 00:14:19.139 --> 00:14:21.840 rest, they free up an additional $30 million 00:14:21.840 --> 00:14:25.929 this year in immediate CBT space. Wow. So that 00:14:25.929 --> 00:14:27.789 could potentially double their free agency budget. 00:14:27.950 --> 00:14:30.549 It could. It catapults them from being a mid 00:14:30.549 --> 00:14:32.610 -market player to being competitive for guys 00:14:32.610 --> 00:14:35.250 like Cody Bellinger, Boba Shett, or even the 00:14:35.250 --> 00:14:37.970 Japanese superstar Munataka Murakami. They are 00:14:37.970 --> 00:14:40.029 clearing the decks now so they can play at the 00:14:40.029 --> 00:14:42.370 top of the market this winter. That is fascinating. 00:14:42.450 --> 00:14:45.690 A classic case of short -term pain for long -term 00:14:45.690 --> 00:14:48.909 strategic gain. Let's turn to another veteran 00:14:48.909 --> 00:14:50.889 third baseman who's dominating trade rumors, 00:14:51.110 --> 00:14:53.730 also dealing with a big contract. Nolan Arenado 00:14:53.730 --> 00:14:56.259 in St. Louis. Yeah, the Cardinals, after trading 00:14:56.259 --> 00:14:59.240 Sonny Gray to the Red Sox, are now entirely focused 00:14:59.240 --> 00:15:01.860 on moving Arenado. And the new team president, 00:15:02.059 --> 00:15:04.360 Shane Bloom, has been unusually blunt about it. 00:15:04.419 --> 00:15:06.860 What did he say? He stated publicly that after 00:15:06.860 --> 00:15:09.019 some internal discussions, quote, we all feel 00:15:09.019 --> 00:15:11.509 like it's best to find a different fit. I mean, 00:15:11.529 --> 00:15:13.909 that level of public admission all but guarantees 00:15:13.909 --> 00:15:16.610 a trade is coming. But finding a trade partner 00:15:16.610 --> 00:15:18.769 is going to be incredibly difficult given his 00:15:18.769 --> 00:15:21.809 recent performance. His 2025 season was just 00:15:21.809 --> 00:15:24.269 a continuation of a slide we've seen since his 00:15:24.269 --> 00:15:28.019 great 2022 campaign. The numbers are stark. Especially 00:15:28.019 --> 00:15:30.600 for a player of his caliber, he posted a career 00:15:30.600 --> 00:15:36.639 low slash line of .237, .289, .377. That gives 00:15:36.639 --> 00:15:40.779 him an 87 OPS plus in 2025. So significantly 00:15:40.779 --> 00:15:44.100 below league average offense from a corner infielder. 00:15:44.159 --> 00:15:46.399 Way below. And if you look at the underlying 00:15:46.399 --> 00:15:49.039 analytics, the real concern is his hard hit rate. 00:15:49.259 --> 00:15:51.879 It has just plummeted down to the 12th percentile 00:15:51.879 --> 00:15:53.539 over the last two years. What's the reason for 00:15:53.539 --> 00:15:56.710 that? Is it mechanical or just age? Most analysts 00:15:56.710 --> 00:15:59.549 point to an age -related decline in bat speed. 00:15:59.649 --> 00:16:01.929 He's turning 35 in April. And that's coupled 00:16:01.929 --> 00:16:03.730 with a tendency to chase more breaking balls 00:16:03.730 --> 00:16:05.730 out of the zone, which leads to weak contact. 00:16:05.990 --> 00:16:07.669 The defense is still elite, though. That's the 00:16:07.669 --> 00:16:09.509 thing. He's still a gold glover. Oh, yeah. Plus 00:16:09.509 --> 00:16:11.450 six defensive runs saved, plus three outs above 00:16:11.450 --> 00:16:13.929 average last year. But teams need more than just 00:16:13.929 --> 00:16:16.269 a great glove at that salary. And what exactly 00:16:16.269 --> 00:16:19.389 is that salary commitment? He's owed $37 million 00:16:19.389 --> 00:16:22.190 for two more seasons, plus the Rockies are still 00:16:22.190 --> 00:16:25.279 kicking in $5 million. So a team is acquiring 00:16:25.279 --> 00:16:27.799 a declining bat, albeit with that great glove, 00:16:28.019 --> 00:16:32.799 for $37 million a year. So who can possibly afford 00:16:32.799 --> 00:16:35.580 that risk? Who are the fits? The only viable 00:16:35.580 --> 00:16:38.379 fits are major market teams with a big, obvious 00:16:38.379 --> 00:16:41.179 hole at third base. So the most plausible destinations 00:16:41.179 --> 00:16:44.259 are the Red Sox. especially if Alex Bregman signs 00:16:44.259 --> 00:16:46.779 elsewhere, and the Phillies if they decide to 00:16:46.779 --> 00:16:48.860 trade Alec Boehm, who's entering his final year 00:16:48.860 --> 00:16:50.899 before free agency. So both have the payroll 00:16:50.899 --> 00:16:53.059 and the immediate need to absorb that contract. 00:16:53.320 --> 00:16:55.139 Exactly. And they'd be betting that the defensive 00:16:55.139 --> 00:16:57.700 value and the leadership he brings outweighs 00:16:57.700 --> 00:16:59.860 that offensive decline. And are there teams that 00:16:59.860 --> 00:17:01.679 should absolutely be running in the other direction 00:17:01.679 --> 00:17:04.220 from this deal? Oh, absolutely. Analysts are 00:17:04.220 --> 00:17:06.480 practically screaming warnings at small market 00:17:06.480 --> 00:17:08.599 clubs that already have internal solutions. Take 00:17:08.599 --> 00:17:10.900 the A's, for example. They need offense, sure, 00:17:11.079 --> 00:17:14.039 but they have Brett Harris, who is cost controlled 00:17:14.039 --> 00:17:16.700 and actually provided superior defense on a per 00:17:16.700 --> 00:17:18.960 inning basis last year. What about the Royals? 00:17:19.079 --> 00:17:21.539 The Royals have Michael Garcia established at 00:17:21.539 --> 00:17:24.779 third. For a team like Kansas City, that $16 00:17:24.779 --> 00:17:27.500 million net salary is just, it's called excessive. 00:17:28.160 --> 00:17:30.920 Pursuing Orinato would be a financially and strategically 00:17:30.920 --> 00:17:33.500 terrible decision for them. They just cannot 00:17:33.500 --> 00:17:36.099 afford a below -average offensive bat with that 00:17:36.099 --> 00:17:38.259 kind of price tag. The trade market is so intricate, 00:17:38.440 --> 00:17:41.200 so much financial cleanup. But the biggest dollars, 00:17:41.359 --> 00:17:43.140 they're still waiting for the top free agent 00:17:43.140 --> 00:17:47.019 bats. Yeah. And leading that chase is Kyle Tucker. 00:17:47.529 --> 00:17:49.750 who some are calling the market's apex predator. 00:17:49.950 --> 00:17:52.069 And that's a pretty well -earned nickname. Tutler 00:17:52.069 --> 00:17:54.289 is widely expected to get the biggest contract 00:17:54.289 --> 00:17:56.509 this offseason. Some projections are putting 00:17:56.509 --> 00:18:00.809 his value up to a staggering $427 million. Wow. 00:18:01.150 --> 00:18:04.130 At age 28, he is right in his prime. He's got 00:18:04.130 --> 00:18:06.509 power, plate discipline, consistency, five -tool 00:18:06.509 --> 00:18:08.670 ability, and he plays solid defense in the corner 00:18:08.670 --> 00:18:11.450 outfield. Okay, let's talk about that $427 million 00:18:11.450 --> 00:18:14.150 number. What's the comparison that's driving 00:18:14.150 --> 00:18:16.579 a projection that high? It's the comparison to 00:18:16.579 --> 00:18:19.920 guys like Juan Soto and Ronald Acuna Jr., who 00:18:19.920 --> 00:18:22.380 signed those long -term, team -friendly deals 00:18:22.380 --> 00:18:25.440 earlier in their careers. Tucker has sustained 00:18:25.440 --> 00:18:27.460 elite production all through his arbitration 00:18:27.460 --> 00:18:29.720 years, and now he's hitting the market at the 00:18:29.720 --> 00:18:32.440 perfect age to command maximum length and value. 00:18:32.890 --> 00:18:34.789 So he's projected to have, what, five or six 00:18:34.789 --> 00:18:37.569 years of peak performance left? At least. And 00:18:37.569 --> 00:18:39.650 in today's market, where superstar contracts 00:18:39.650 --> 00:18:43.670 are easily breaking 350, that 427 number represents 00:18:43.670 --> 00:18:46.670 the premium for a highly durable, complete offensive 00:18:46.670 --> 00:18:48.650 threat. And of course, we have to talk about 00:18:48.650 --> 00:18:51.190 the Dodgers. They are back -to -back World Series 00:18:51.190 --> 00:18:53.670 champions, yet they are strongly linked to the 00:18:53.670 --> 00:18:55.589 biggest name available. How is that even possible? 00:18:55.950 --> 00:18:58.490 It just speaks to their relentless pursuit of 00:18:58.490 --> 00:19:01.150 perfection. They're champions, yes. But their 00:19:01.150 --> 00:19:03.990 2025 outfield offense was, believe it or not, 00:19:04.029 --> 00:19:06.230 a real liability. It was described as pretty 00:19:06.230 --> 00:19:09.150 mediocre and even an offensive black hole for 00:19:09.150 --> 00:19:11.369 long stretches of the season. I remember that. 00:19:11.470 --> 00:19:13.250 Yeah, their overall offense was great, but the 00:19:13.250 --> 00:19:16.650 outfield posted a dismal .299 on -base percentage 00:19:16.650 --> 00:19:19.509 and just lacked consistent power. Tucker changes 00:19:19.509 --> 00:19:22.170 all of that overnight. So they're fixing a glaring 00:19:22.170 --> 00:19:24.240 weakness. even though they just won a title. 00:19:24.380 --> 00:19:27.079 Exactly. And Tucker is the perfect fit for their 00:19:27.079 --> 00:19:30.519 young core strategy. He's 28, so he aligns perfectly 00:19:30.519 --> 00:19:34.019 with the window of Yamamoto and Otani. They see 00:19:34.019 --> 00:19:36.279 an opportunity to replace a position of weakness 00:19:36.279 --> 00:19:39.519 with an immediate superstar who can stabilize 00:19:39.519 --> 00:19:42.099 their lineup for the next decade. And then on 00:19:42.099 --> 00:19:44.319 the other end of the spectrum, you have a team 00:19:44.319 --> 00:19:48.759 like the Brewers. Won 97 games, but they recognize 00:19:48.759 --> 00:19:51.990 they just cannot compete in this arena. The Brewers 00:19:51.990 --> 00:19:54.150 are the perfect example of that market disparity. 00:19:54.470 --> 00:19:57.170 They won through superior drafting and development. 00:19:57.529 --> 00:20:00.069 And while analysts agree Tucker would be an excellent 00:20:00.069 --> 00:20:02.049 fit for their needs. Of course he would. The 00:20:02.049 --> 00:20:04.250 club knows they won't even be in the sweepstakes. 00:20:04.349 --> 00:20:07.369 Their strategy is to identify cheaper, high floor 00:20:07.369 --> 00:20:09.809 veterans. And that's just the reality of operating 00:20:09.809 --> 00:20:11.990 with a constrained budget against teams like 00:20:11.990 --> 00:20:14.049 the Dodgers. All right. The next big offensive 00:20:14.049 --> 00:20:17.450 name is Cody Bellinger. who seems to have finally 00:20:17.450 --> 00:20:19.690 put together the season he needed to earn that 00:20:19.690 --> 00:20:23.089 massive long -term deal. Bellinger timed his 00:20:23.089 --> 00:20:25.430 opt -out perfectly. He had his best season since 00:20:25.430 --> 00:20:31.549 his 2019 MVP year, slashed .272, .334, .480 with 00:20:31.549 --> 00:20:35.910 29 homers, 98 RBI. And crucially... He maintained 00:20:35.910 --> 00:20:38.390 that defensive versatility. Oh, yeah. Stellar 00:20:38.390 --> 00:20:41.170 defensively. Plus seven outs above average across 00:20:41.170 --> 00:20:43.430 first base and the outfield. That versatility 00:20:43.430 --> 00:20:45.950 just significantly boosts his market value. And 00:20:45.950 --> 00:20:48.289 the battle for him is going to be intense. Who 00:20:48.289 --> 00:20:50.579 are the main competitors here? The competition 00:20:50.579 --> 00:20:53.079 is reportedly confined to the five richest teams 00:20:53.079 --> 00:20:55.539 in baseball. The Yankees are desperate to bring 00:20:55.539 --> 00:20:57.720 him back. His left -handed swing is just tailor 00:20:57.720 --> 00:20:59.819 -made for that ballpark. He just owns that ballpark. 00:20:59.900 --> 00:21:02.240 He does. The Mets have an immediate outfield 00:21:02.240 --> 00:21:04.539 opening after the Nimmo trade, so he's a natural 00:21:04.539 --> 00:21:07.019 fit for their power needs. A Dodgers reunion 00:21:07.019 --> 00:21:09.940 is always possible, but the primary bidding war 00:21:09.940 --> 00:21:12.440 really seems to be between the two New York rivals. 00:21:12.720 --> 00:21:15.480 Let's pivot to Pete Alonzo and the extremely 00:21:15.480 --> 00:21:18.299 messy situation his free agency is creating for 00:21:18.299 --> 00:21:20.799 the Boston Red Sox, who are reportedly very interested. 00:21:21.240 --> 00:21:23.259 Alonzo opted out. He's looking for an ambitious 00:21:23.259 --> 00:21:26.859 seven -year deal. And Boston's interest on paper, 00:21:26.880 --> 00:21:29.319 it makes a lot of sense. He hit 38 homers with 00:21:29.319 --> 00:21:33.319 141 WRC plus last season. And he's that right 00:21:33.319 --> 00:21:35.819 -handed power bat that Boston's left -skewing 00:21:35.819 --> 00:21:38.420 lineup desperately needs for balance. Exactly. 00:21:38.559 --> 00:21:41.720 But signing him means someone else gets displaced. 00:21:42.259 --> 00:21:45.640 Specifically, Triskan Kassas and Masataka Yoshida. 00:21:46.170 --> 00:21:48.730 This feels like a recipe for some internal chaos. 00:21:49.029 --> 00:21:51.190 It creates a huge domino effect for that front 00:21:51.190 --> 00:21:53.890 office. If Alondo comes in, he is the full -time 00:21:53.890 --> 00:21:56.150 first baseman. That means Christian Casas, a 00:21:56.150 --> 00:21:58.630 recent top prospect, is either relegated to a 00:21:58.630 --> 00:22:01.930 DH bench role or, more likely, he gets traded. 00:22:02.150 --> 00:22:05.329 And Casas struggled mightily in 2025 before that 00:22:05.329 --> 00:22:07.789 knee injury, so trading him now while his value 00:22:07.789 --> 00:22:09.950 is low is a really complicated decision given 00:22:09.950 --> 00:22:11.950 his team control. And what about Yoshida, who 00:22:11.950 --> 00:22:14.329 is also a massive recent signing? The consensus 00:22:14.329 --> 00:22:16.589 among analysts is that Yoshida's production as 00:22:16.589 --> 00:22:19.390 a DH doesn't warrant a starting job for a serious 00:22:19.390 --> 00:22:21.369 contender, especially a team that has other holes 00:22:21.369 --> 00:22:24.470 to fix. If Alonzo takes first base, Boston probably 00:22:24.470 --> 00:22:26.769 needs to trade Yoshida to open up that DH slot 00:22:26.769 --> 00:22:29.029 or just to free up cash. It's a real conflict. 00:22:29.430 --> 00:22:32.130 Spend big on Alonzo, but then you have to sacrifice 00:22:32.130 --> 00:22:35.170 a recent big investment in either Casas or Yoshida. 00:22:35.289 --> 00:22:38.259 Right. And meanwhile, the Phillies are dealing 00:22:38.259 --> 00:22:40.799 with a standoff of their own with their star 00:22:40.799 --> 00:22:43.799 slugger, Kyle Schwarber. Schwarber was the NL 00:22:43.799 --> 00:22:47.900 MVP runner up in 2025 after clubbing a monstrous 00:22:47.900 --> 00:22:50.779 56 home runs. The Phillies have said re -signing 00:22:50.779 --> 00:22:53.799 him is their number one priority. But his agents 00:22:53.799 --> 00:22:57.500 are wisely capitalizing on that monumental season. 00:22:57.660 --> 00:23:00.630 And the reports are that the two sides are. not 00:23:00.630 --> 00:23:02.869 close to a deal. And the critique we're seeing 00:23:02.869 --> 00:23:05.910 is that this delay is creating a sort of organizational 00:23:05.910 --> 00:23:09.559 opportunity cost. How does that paralysis actually 00:23:09.559 --> 00:23:12.059 manifest itself? It's simple market leverage. 00:23:12.240 --> 00:23:13.900 Until the Phillies know Schwarber's intentions 00:23:13.900 --> 00:23:16.680 and the final number on his deal, they're financially 00:23:16.680 --> 00:23:19.539 and structurally paralyzed. They can't seriously 00:23:19.539 --> 00:23:21.700 pursue other high -end bats like Alex Bregman 00:23:21.700 --> 00:23:24.000 or make a trade for someone like Cattell Marte. 00:23:24.119 --> 00:23:25.660 Because they don't know if they'll have the payroll 00:23:25.660 --> 00:23:28.339 flexibility or if the DH spot will even be open. 00:23:28.440 --> 00:23:31.119 Exactly. The longer this negotiation drags on, 00:23:31.240 --> 00:23:33.160 the more likely it is they miss out on other 00:23:33.160 --> 00:23:34.880 market opportunities that are moving quickly. 00:23:35.359 --> 00:23:37.960 And we had that rumor about the Pittsburgh Pirates 00:23:37.960 --> 00:23:40.339 being linked to Schwarber. That seems absolutely 00:23:40.339 --> 00:23:42.740 ludicrous given their spending history. It did. 00:23:42.940 --> 00:23:46.559 That rumor got a 9 .9 out of 10 on the industry's 00:23:46.559 --> 00:23:49.259 skepticism meter because, frankly, it just defies 00:23:49.259 --> 00:23:51.359 all reality. The Pirates have never spent more 00:23:51.359 --> 00:23:53.680 than, what, $17 million on an external free agent? 00:23:53.819 --> 00:23:55.680 In franchise history, right. So while it would 00:23:55.680 --> 00:23:58.339 be a phenomenal move for their fan base, analysts 00:23:58.339 --> 00:24:01.500 are viewing this as pure lip service. They're 00:24:01.500 --> 00:24:04.500 trying to convince the MLBPA and their own fans. 00:24:04.680 --> 00:24:06.779 that they're trying to spend without any real 00:24:06.779 --> 00:24:09.039 intention of paying Schwarber the $25 million 00:24:09.039 --> 00:24:11.880 a year he's going to command. Finally, let's 00:24:11.880 --> 00:24:15.000 wrap this segment up with the bizarre JT RealMutal 00:24:15.000 --> 00:24:17.819 market. He's the top free agent catcher, but 00:24:17.819 --> 00:24:20.680 the reported interest from the Red Sox is baffling 00:24:20.680 --> 00:24:23.960 a lot of analysts. It truly is confusing. It 00:24:23.960 --> 00:24:26.319 highlights a potential lack of strategic focus 00:24:26.319 --> 00:24:29.000 in Boston. Look, Rio Muto is a clear upgrade 00:24:29.000 --> 00:24:31.640 over almost any catcher. He still hit a consistent 00:24:31.640 --> 00:24:35.460 .257 with 12 homers last year, and his arm is 00:24:35.460 --> 00:24:37.240 a legitimate weapon against the running game. 00:24:37.460 --> 00:24:39.799 So if he's an upgrade, what makes the interest 00:24:39.799 --> 00:24:41.740 so baffling? It's about their organizational 00:24:41.740 --> 00:24:45.670 priorities. Boston has gaping holes at first 00:24:45.670 --> 00:24:47.849 base, third base, and in the middle of their 00:24:47.849 --> 00:24:50.710 bullpen. What they don't need is another catcher. 00:24:50.789 --> 00:24:52.990 They already have Connor Wong and Carlos Narvaez. 00:24:53.109 --> 00:24:55.250 Right. They just tendered contracts to both of 00:24:55.250 --> 00:24:57.950 them. They're controlled through 2028, and they'll 00:24:57.950 --> 00:25:01.720 cost a combined $2 million next year. So why 00:25:01.720 --> 00:25:04.700 would you spend $18 to $20 million a year on 00:25:04.700 --> 00:25:07.920 Real Muto when you have cheap young options and 00:25:07.920 --> 00:25:10.440 far more pressing needs elsewhere? And his defensive 00:25:10.440 --> 00:25:12.420 profile is getting more complicated too, isn't 00:25:12.420 --> 00:25:15.240 it? It is. While that arm is elite, his pitch 00:25:15.240 --> 00:25:17.759 framing was among the league's worst last year. 00:25:17.880 --> 00:25:20.700 He was measured at negative nine runs. And in 00:25:20.700 --> 00:25:22.900 the modern game, framing is arguably the most 00:25:22.900 --> 00:25:25.549 critical defensive skill for a catcher. It is, 00:25:25.569 --> 00:25:27.829 outside of blocking. So signing Ryomuto means 00:25:27.829 --> 00:25:30.450 you're sacrificing value in that critical area 00:25:30.450 --> 00:25:33.569 for an expensive and frankly unnecessary upgrade 00:25:33.569 --> 00:25:35.549 at a position where you already have depth. It 00:25:35.549 --> 00:25:37.650 just seems strategically backward. The free agent 00:25:37.650 --> 00:25:40.349 market for bats is moving fast, but the pitching 00:25:40.349 --> 00:25:42.990 market is just as dramatic, especially with the 00:25:42.990 --> 00:25:45.309 global interest focused on Japanese star right 00:25:45.309 --> 00:25:49.029 -hander Tatsuya Imai, who is arguably the best 00:25:49.029 --> 00:25:51.740 pitcher available after Cease. Imei's free agency 00:25:51.740 --> 00:25:54.299 story is fantastic because it brings us right 00:25:54.299 --> 00:25:56.380 back to the dynamic of the Dodgers super team. 00:25:56.680 --> 00:25:59.359 He made headlines by stating very explicitly 00:25:59.359 --> 00:26:01.859 that he does not want to join the Los Angeles 00:26:01.859 --> 00:26:04.960 Dodgers. Who already have Otani, Yamamoto, and 00:26:04.960 --> 00:26:07.740 Sasaki. Right. He sees that as the easy way out. 00:26:07.799 --> 00:26:11.059 He wants to, in his words, take them down. That 00:26:11.059 --> 00:26:13.609 is a massive competitive statement. It speaks 00:26:13.609 --> 00:26:16.210 to this profound competitive edge and a really 00:26:16.210 --> 00:26:19.349 unique desire for self -reliance. He said he 00:26:19.349 --> 00:26:21.890 wants to seek the sense of survival that comes 00:26:21.890 --> 00:26:24.769 from overcoming cultural and linguistic differences 00:26:24.769 --> 00:26:27.349 on his own. So playing with other Japanese stars 00:26:27.349 --> 00:26:30.210 would be a crutch in his mind. Basically. He 00:26:30.210 --> 00:26:32.470 feels like he could just ask questions and take 00:26:32.470 --> 00:26:35.009 the path of least resistance. Instead, he wants 00:26:35.009 --> 00:26:37.539 the ultimate challenge. Competing against baseball's 00:26:37.539 --> 00:26:39.460 reigning dynasty and proving he can dominate 00:26:39.460 --> 00:26:41.799 independently. So that immediately changes the 00:26:41.799 --> 00:26:43.900 conversation about where he might land. Where 00:26:43.900 --> 00:26:46.880 are executives predicting he'll actually sign? 00:26:47.099 --> 00:26:50.140 An ESPN executive survey has the Giants as the 00:26:50.140 --> 00:26:53.180 favorite with five votes. The idea of pairing 00:26:53.180 --> 00:26:55.259 him with Logan Webb to immediately challenge 00:26:55.259 --> 00:26:57.880 the Dodgers is really appealing. And behind them. 00:26:57.960 --> 00:27:00.819 The Yankees and, surprisingly, the Dodgers were 00:27:00.819 --> 00:27:03.940 tied for second with three votes each. Despite 00:27:03.940 --> 00:27:06.420 what Emea said, teams still believe money and 00:27:06.420 --> 00:27:09.099 comfort could end up swaying him. If the Yankees 00:27:09.099 --> 00:27:11.859 landed him, that would be a huge statement. It 00:27:11.859 --> 00:27:14.180 would create a phenomenal rotation. What's the 00:27:14.180 --> 00:27:16.539 general contract prediction? The expectation 00:27:16.539 --> 00:27:18.799 is that the Yankees will ultimately land him 00:27:18.799 --> 00:27:22.740 for something around seven years and $196 million. 00:27:23.819 --> 00:27:26.240 Even with Hal Steinbrenner talking about financial 00:27:26.240 --> 00:27:28.970 restraint. The Yankees still have the ability 00:27:28.970 --> 00:27:32.029 to outbid almost anyone when they target a specific 00:27:32.029 --> 00:27:34.650 international free agent they believe will define 00:27:34.650 --> 00:27:37.329 their rotation for years. Another team scrambling 00:27:37.329 --> 00:27:39.930 for pitching is the Cubs. They desperately need 00:27:39.930 --> 00:27:42.109 to make a move after missing out on both Sonny 00:27:42.109 --> 00:27:44.700 Gray and Dylan Cease. The urgency in Chicago 00:27:44.700 --> 00:27:48.680 is acute. They view the 27 -year -old Imai as 00:27:48.680 --> 00:27:51.720 the ideal philosophical fit for them, a young 00:27:51.720 --> 00:27:54.240 star they can pay for future performance, which 00:27:54.240 --> 00:27:56.759 aligns with Jed Hoyer's long -term plan. And 00:27:56.759 --> 00:27:58.940 what is it about his stuff that they like so 00:27:58.940 --> 00:28:01.609 much? He has a really high ceiling because of 00:28:01.609 --> 00:28:04.450 his unique pitch mix. It's led by a spitter -changeup 00:28:04.450 --> 00:28:07.009 combination that generates just unusual movement 00:28:07.009 --> 00:28:10.329 and really low contact rates. And even with the 00:28:10.329 --> 00:28:12.430 emergence of that rookie, Kate Horton, who had 00:28:12.430 --> 00:28:15.950 that incredible 1 .03 ERA in the second half 00:28:15.950 --> 00:28:19.049 of last season, they still need major upgrades. 00:28:19.210 --> 00:28:22.029 They do. Horton and the return of Shota Imanaga, 00:28:22.170 --> 00:28:24.089 who took the qualifying offer, that's a good 00:28:24.089 --> 00:28:26.710 foundation. But the rest of their rotation is 00:28:26.710 --> 00:28:29.420 either volatile or aging. The Cubs have made 00:28:29.420 --> 00:28:31.519 it clear they're pursuing multiple trade options 00:28:31.519 --> 00:28:34.119 to get two more reliable starters. Guys like 00:28:34.119 --> 00:28:36.400 Michael King, Mackenzie Gore, and Joe Ryan are 00:28:36.400 --> 00:28:38.099 on their list. They have to turn that rotation 00:28:38.099 --> 00:28:39.819 into a strength if they want to get out of the 00:28:39.819 --> 00:28:42.240 NL Central. Let's talk about a fascinating experiment. 00:28:43.140 --> 00:28:46.819 The closer turn starter. Free agent Ryan Helsley, 00:28:46.920 --> 00:28:49.960 an elite closer, is being pursued as a potential 00:28:49.960 --> 00:28:52.420 starting pitcher, with the Detroit Tigers as 00:28:52.420 --> 00:28:55.619 the main suitor. This is a classic. Cheap, buy 00:28:55.619 --> 00:28:58.660 low, high upside gamble for a financially constrained 00:28:58.660 --> 00:29:01.420 team like Detroit. And it's not coming out of 00:29:01.420 --> 00:29:04.099 nowhere. Helsley was primarily a starter in the 00:29:04.099 --> 00:29:07.680 minors. He had a 2 .84 ERA across 69 starts down 00:29:07.680 --> 00:29:09.779 there. So the Tigers need pitching help. And 00:29:09.779 --> 00:29:12.319 Helsley is a way to potentially acquire a front 00:29:12.319 --> 00:29:14.779 end arm without paying top end for agent prices. 00:29:15.339 --> 00:29:17.960 That's the idea. But the risk of converting a 00:29:17.960 --> 00:29:20.259 high leverage reliever back into a starter is 00:29:20.259 --> 00:29:22.859 immense. There are a lot of pitfalls. What are 00:29:22.859 --> 00:29:25.259 the main ones? The biggest risks are injury and 00:29:25.259 --> 00:29:27.640 a decline in velocity past the 60 pitch mark. 00:29:27.980 --> 00:29:30.180 Closers train for max effort over one inning. 00:29:30.519 --> 00:29:32.420 Converting to a starter requires building up 00:29:32.420 --> 00:29:34.119 to 100 pitches while maintaining efficiency. 00:29:34.519 --> 00:29:36.599 And that often results in a one or two mile per 00:29:36.599 --> 00:29:38.859 hour drop in velocity as the game goes on. But 00:29:38.859 --> 00:29:41.180 if it fails, you can always go back to the bullpen. 00:29:41.480 --> 00:29:44.140 Right, which is the safety net here. He can revert 00:29:44.140 --> 00:29:46.319 to being a high leverage reliever, which Detroit 00:29:46.319 --> 00:29:48.980 still needs. But they are gambling their rotation 00:29:48.980 --> 00:29:51.720 hopes on a massive structural change to his arm 00:29:51.720 --> 00:29:54.180 care and his workload. Switching to bullpen health. 00:29:54.319 --> 00:29:57.420 Yeah. Josh Hader. He suffered that capsule sprain 00:29:57.420 --> 00:29:59.480 in his throwing shoulder that ended his 2025 00:29:59.480 --> 00:30:02.440 season in August. Where does his recovery stand? 00:30:02.680 --> 00:30:05.059 The reports are that Hader is back to normal. 00:30:05.220 --> 00:30:08.380 He avoided surgery, which is huge, and has completed 00:30:08.380 --> 00:30:10.750 his throwing program. he's expected to be ready 00:30:10.750 --> 00:30:13.250 to go for spring training. But that injury raised 00:30:13.250 --> 00:30:16.529 some serious workload concerns, especially after 00:30:16.529 --> 00:30:19.470 he kind of reversed his long -standing approach 00:30:19.470 --> 00:30:21.869 to multi -inning appearances after he signed 00:30:21.869 --> 00:30:24.230 that big contract. That's the critical narrative 00:30:24.230 --> 00:30:26.930 that has to worry the Astros. Hader historically 00:30:26.930 --> 00:30:29.730 avoided multi -inning outings before he signed 00:30:29.730 --> 00:30:32.730 that five -year, $95 million deal. And after 00:30:32.730 --> 00:30:34.789 he signed it. He reversed course. He made seven 00:30:34.789 --> 00:30:38.170 multi -inning appearances in 2025. That significantly 00:30:38.170 --> 00:30:40.859 increased... the stress on his arm, and it culminated 00:30:40.859 --> 00:30:43.160 in a season -high 36 pitches right before he 00:30:43.160 --> 00:30:46.599 got hurt. And given his unique mechanics, what's 00:30:46.599 --> 00:30:49.279 the long -term prognosis for a recurring injury 00:30:49.279 --> 00:30:51.940 here? His mechanics are the issue. Hayter uses 00:30:51.940 --> 00:30:54.680 a really pronounced cross -body pitching action. 00:30:54.920 --> 00:30:57.180 And while that's great for deception and movement, 00:30:57.400 --> 00:31:00.000 it places significantly more strain on the shoulder 00:31:00.000 --> 00:31:03.299 capsule and the labrum than a pure over -the 00:31:03.299 --> 00:31:05.789 -top delivery. So analysts see this as a potential 00:31:05.789 --> 00:31:08.809 recurring problem. They do. And while Hader insists 00:31:08.809 --> 00:31:11.470 he's still open to multi -inning work, his long 00:31:11.470 --> 00:31:13.750 -term health is a serious question for the Astros. 00:31:13.849 --> 00:31:16.349 That violent delivery style is just inherently 00:31:16.349 --> 00:31:18.529 higher risk. Before we move on from pitching, 00:31:18.589 --> 00:31:21.250 we have to talk about Paul Skeens and the pre 00:31:21.250 --> 00:31:23.869 -arbitration bonus pool. Skeens, the Parrots' 00:31:23.869 --> 00:31:26.250 righty, was the unanimous National League Cy 00:31:26.250 --> 00:31:29.670 Young winner in 2025, led the majors with a 1 00:31:29.670 --> 00:31:33.099 .97 ERA. Just an incredible season. And because 00:31:33.099 --> 00:31:36.859 of that, he received a record $3 million from 00:31:36.859 --> 00:31:39.740 the pre -arbitration bonus pool. We hear about 00:31:39.740 --> 00:31:41.859 this pool a lot. But for the listener who doesn't 00:31:41.859 --> 00:31:44.859 try player economics, how exactly does this bonus 00:31:44.859 --> 00:31:47.559 pool work? And how did Skeens get such a huge 00:31:47.559 --> 00:31:49.839 payout? It's a mechanism that was established 00:31:49.839 --> 00:31:53.400 in the 2022 CBA. And it's designed to make sure 00:31:53.400 --> 00:31:56.079 top young players get paid fairly before they're 00:31:56.079 --> 00:31:58.930 eligible for arbitration. It's a massive multi 00:31:58.930 --> 00:32:01.430 -million dollar pool that gets distributed every 00:32:01.430 --> 00:32:04.400 year. And players qualify based on performance. 00:32:04.539 --> 00:32:06.460 Right, performance metrics. Finishing in the 00:32:06.460 --> 00:32:09.720 top five for MVP or Cy Young, which Skeens did, 00:32:09.859 --> 00:32:12.720 or being named Rookie of the Year, or achieving 00:32:12.720 --> 00:32:14.980 high war metrics in your first three seasons. 00:32:15.339 --> 00:32:17.960 Skeens' Cy Young win triggered the top payout 00:32:17.960 --> 00:32:20.680 bracket, and it raised his two -year pre -arb 00:32:20.680 --> 00:32:24.579 earnings to over $5 .5 million. It's a direct 00:32:24.579 --> 00:32:27.599 financial reward for elite performance. And finally, 00:32:27.660 --> 00:32:29.500 a fascinating technical development involving 00:32:29.500 --> 00:32:32.240 the new... automated ball strike challenge system. 00:32:32.359 --> 00:32:34.799 This is great. Guardians prospect Trenton Denholm 00:32:34.799 --> 00:32:37.019 is already adapting his pitch mix to exploit 00:32:37.019 --> 00:32:39.240 the new system, which is set to debut officially 00:32:39.240 --> 00:32:42.400 in 2026. He's added both a knuckleball and a 00:32:42.400 --> 00:32:45.200 sinker to his repertoire. The strategy here is 00:32:45.200 --> 00:32:47.519 brilliant. Why a knuckleball? Of all pitches, 00:32:47.680 --> 00:32:49.460 how is that effective against an automated system? 00:32:49.880 --> 00:32:52.079 The Baby S system relies on predictive models 00:32:52.079 --> 00:32:55.519 based on spin and trajectory. Pitches with extremely 00:32:55.519 --> 00:32:58.460 low or chaotic spin, like a knuckleball or a 00:32:58.460 --> 00:33:01.099 high -movement sinker, they challenge the AI's 00:33:01.099 --> 00:33:03.680 ability to accurately predict the ball's final 00:33:03.680 --> 00:33:06.279 location over the plate. So he thinks the knuckleball 00:33:06.279 --> 00:33:08.779 could steal more strikes. That's the theory, 00:33:08.880 --> 00:33:11.039 that the unpredictable flutter could make the 00:33:11.039 --> 00:33:13.839 zone definition more generous to non -traditional 00:33:13.839 --> 00:33:16.559 pitches. It's just a great example of players 00:33:16.559 --> 00:33:19.220 immediately strategizing around new technologies. 00:33:19.680 --> 00:33:21.559 Okay, let's turn our attention out west to the 00:33:21.559 --> 00:33:24.559 Seattle Mariners. The 2025 season will be remembered 00:33:24.559 --> 00:33:27.119 for one of the most incredible individual power 00:33:27.119 --> 00:33:30.380 displays in history. Cal Raleigh, becoming the 00:33:30.380 --> 00:33:32.960 first catcher and only the seventh player ever 00:33:32.960 --> 00:33:36.119 to hit 60 home runs in a single season. It was 00:33:36.119 --> 00:33:38.259 just the stuff of legend. He carried that team 00:33:38.259 --> 00:33:40.740 offensively, finished just four votes shy of 00:33:40.740 --> 00:33:43.779 the AL MVP award, and he powered the Mariners 00:33:43.779 --> 00:33:45.259 all the way to the American League Championship 00:33:45.259 --> 00:33:47.740 Series. They fell just one game short of the 00:33:47.740 --> 00:33:49.839 World Series, but that team proved they were 00:33:49.839 --> 00:33:52.779 a true contender. And he had incredible support 00:33:52.779 --> 00:33:56.019 from that core. Julio Rodriguez continues to 00:33:56.019 --> 00:33:58.440 be an all -around superstar. He logged a career 00:33:58.440 --> 00:34:03.000 -high 6 .8 B vol in a 128 OPS plus man and finished 00:34:03.000 --> 00:34:05.940 sixth in MVP voting. And you can't forget the 00:34:05.940 --> 00:34:08.420 bullpen. Andres Munoz established himself as 00:34:08.420 --> 00:34:13.199 a true lockdown closer. 38 saves, a 1 .73 ERA. 00:34:13.519 --> 00:34:16.420 The fact that the Mariners had both a generational 00:34:16.420 --> 00:34:19.260 power season and a dominant core clicking at 00:34:19.260 --> 00:34:22.300 the same time, it led to some incredible playoff 00:34:22.300 --> 00:34:24.760 moments. Let's just revisit those emotional moments 00:34:24.760 --> 00:34:27.019 for a second. They provided heroics that will 00:34:27.019 --> 00:34:29.340 define that franchise for years. You had Jorge 00:34:29.340 --> 00:34:31.619 Polanco with the walk -off RBI single in the 00:34:31.619 --> 00:34:34.119 15th inning of ALDS Game 5 against the Tigers. 00:34:34.400 --> 00:34:36.960 An unbelievable game. And then in the ALCS, Eugenio 00:34:36.960 --> 00:34:39.780 Suarez blasted a grand slam in Game 5 in a tie 00:34:39.780 --> 00:34:41.960 game, which briefly gave them the series lead. 00:34:42.159 --> 00:34:44.960 Those emotional highs just cemented that core 00:34:44.960 --> 00:34:47.300 as a legitimate force. So now that they're firmly 00:34:47.300 --> 00:34:49.519 in contention mode, the Mariners face that really 00:34:49.519 --> 00:34:51.639 challenging balancing act that every successful 00:34:51.639 --> 00:34:53.800 team has to deal with. Integrating their next 00:34:53.800 --> 00:34:56.320 wave of high -ceiling hitting prospects without 00:34:56.320 --> 00:34:59.619 disrupting that established core. This is the 00:34:59.619 --> 00:35:02.420 critical, really delicate stage of their draft, 00:35:02.599 --> 00:35:05.519 develop, and trade strategy. Management Jerry 00:35:05.519 --> 00:35:08.360 DiPoto and Justin Hollander, they've made a promise 00:35:08.360 --> 00:35:10.519 to the players and the fans. They've committed 00:35:10.519 --> 00:35:13.400 to letting young players tell us it's their time, 00:35:13.500 --> 00:35:15.880 and they've promised not to artificially block 00:35:15.880 --> 00:35:18.519 them. That sounds great in theory, but rookie 00:35:18.519 --> 00:35:21.500 volatility can absolutely kill a contention window. 00:35:22.320 --> 00:35:24.179 How are they navigating the pressure from guys 00:35:24.179 --> 00:35:27.380 like Cole Young, Colt Emerson, Ben Williamson, 00:35:27.380 --> 00:35:30.219 and the catcher Harry Ford all hitting the upper 00:35:30.219 --> 00:35:32.880 minors at the same time? They have to rely heavily 00:35:32.880 --> 00:35:35.239 on positional flexibility and veteran insurance. 00:35:36.230 --> 00:35:38.570 Hollander stressed how much they rely on versatile 00:35:38.570 --> 00:35:40.909 guys like Jorge Polanco and Leo Rivas, who were 00:35:40.909 --> 00:35:43.909 so vital last year, just to provide cover when 00:35:43.909 --> 00:35:46.789 a top prospect inevitably struggles. Cole Young's 00:35:46.789 --> 00:35:48.730 debut is the perfect example of this challenge. 00:35:48.969 --> 00:35:50.969 It is. Young started off rough. I mean, he went 00:35:50.969 --> 00:35:53.949 a miserable one for 19. That can crush a team's 00:35:53.949 --> 00:35:55.889 morale and a player's confidence if you don't 00:35:55.889 --> 00:35:57.849 have support. But management showed patience. 00:35:58.210 --> 00:36:01.349 They did. And he stabilized. He had a great... 00:36:01.670 --> 00:36:04.150 six or seven weeks before he just ran out of 00:36:04.150 --> 00:36:07.190 gas. Their whole philosophy is that you're never 00:36:07.190 --> 00:36:08.909 going to have the team that you want to have 00:36:08.909 --> 00:36:12.489 in September, in April. You have to rely on depth 00:36:12.489 --> 00:36:14.809 and that versatility to handle those natural 00:36:14.809 --> 00:36:17.530 rookie performance peaks and valleys. So the 00:36:17.530 --> 00:36:20.070 goal is just to acquire as many versatile players 00:36:20.070 --> 00:36:22.630 as possible so they can deploy the next young 00:36:22.630 --> 00:36:25.429 guy without sacrificing wins. Flexibility is 00:36:25.429 --> 00:36:28.320 paramount. Think about Harry Ford. He's a high 00:36:28.320 --> 00:36:31.139 -end catching prospect, but Cal Raleigh is entrenched 00:36:31.139 --> 00:36:33.800 after hitting 60 home runs. Right. So Ford needs 00:36:33.800 --> 00:36:36.340 to play. They need the versatility to let him 00:36:36.340 --> 00:36:38.920 get reps at DH, corner infield, maybe even corner 00:36:38.920 --> 00:36:41.980 outfield, just to keep his bat developing. It's 00:36:41.980 --> 00:36:44.340 about managing high -value assets and making 00:36:44.340 --> 00:36:46.619 sure they stay motivated and productive, even 00:36:46.619 --> 00:36:48.800 if their primary position is blocked. We also 00:36:48.800 --> 00:36:51.000 saw the Mariners looking for some veteran depth 00:36:51.000 --> 00:36:53.219 with the signing of the 38 -year -old journeyman 00:36:53.219 --> 00:36:55.719 righty Casey Lawrence. Yeah. Lawrence, who has 00:36:55.719 --> 00:36:59.780 a career 6 .42 ERA, threw five games with Seattle 00:36:59.780 --> 00:37:02.420 last year. And that signing, it's usually just 00:37:02.420 --> 00:37:04.800 a footnote, but it really highlights that constant 00:37:04.800 --> 00:37:08.219 search for non -roster, high mileage organizational 00:37:08.219 --> 00:37:10.659 depth. When your payroll is committed to the 00:37:10.659 --> 00:37:13.619 core, you need those low cost insurance policies 00:37:13.619 --> 00:37:16.159 in AAA. Ready to soak up innings if an injury 00:37:16.159 --> 00:37:19.429 hits. Exactly. And speaking of depth. The Brewers, 00:37:19.449 --> 00:37:22.269 coming off their 97 -win season, are also looking 00:37:22.269 --> 00:37:24.489 for some familiar faces to fill out their rotation. 00:37:24.789 --> 00:37:27.329 The obvious candidate for a reunion there is 00:37:27.329 --> 00:37:30.489 the lefty, Jose Quintana. The 36 -year -old declined 00:37:30.489 --> 00:37:33.590 his $15 million mutual option, but he's still 00:37:33.590 --> 00:37:37.170 a workmanlike starter. He's logged over 165 innings 00:37:37.170 --> 00:37:39.829 nine times in his career. Including 24 starts 00:37:39.829 --> 00:37:42.210 for Milwaukee last season. Right. And his ERA 00:37:42.210 --> 00:37:44.699 has been sub -4 for the last four seasons. That 00:37:44.699 --> 00:37:47.539 consistency, even if the advanced metrics aren't 00:37:47.539 --> 00:37:50.400 stellar, that is immensely valuable. It is. Milwaukee 00:37:50.400 --> 00:37:52.820 desperately needs rotation depth and bulk innings. 00:37:53.199 --> 00:37:55.599 Quintana could be a high -end swingman for them, 00:37:55.739 --> 00:37:58.360 soak up innings out of the bullpen, or fill in 00:37:58.360 --> 00:38:01.059 as a back -end starter. It saves innings for 00:38:01.059 --> 00:38:03.380 their younger, higher -velocity arms over the 00:38:03.380 --> 00:38:05.699 long season. They should be highly motivated 00:38:05.699 --> 00:38:07.800 to strike another deal if he's willing to take 00:38:07.800 --> 00:38:10.099 a short -term contract at a slightly lower salary. 00:38:10.619 --> 00:38:13.199 As we move into the quieter, more reflective 00:38:13.199 --> 00:38:15.920 parts of the offseason, let's look back on some 00:38:15.920 --> 00:38:18.059 of the biggest moments and stories that shape 00:38:18.059 --> 00:38:21.199 baseball culture. And we have to start with the 00:38:21.199 --> 00:38:25.460 dramatic conclusion of the 2025 season. The Dodgers 00:38:25.460 --> 00:38:28.519 winning Game 7 of the World Series. The drama 00:38:28.519 --> 00:38:30.880 was immense. The Dodgers getting their second 00:38:30.880 --> 00:38:33.300 straight trophy in a nail -biting Game 7 against 00:38:33.300 --> 00:38:35.880 the Blue Jays was a modern classic. We have to 00:38:35.880 --> 00:38:37.780 rewind to the late innings to really appreciate 00:38:37.780 --> 00:38:40.039 the chaos. The Blue Jays had the lead late. The 00:38:40.039 --> 00:38:42.659 Dodgers were facing elimination. And then Miguel 00:38:42.659 --> 00:38:45.539 Rojas, of all people, hits the game -tying home 00:38:45.539 --> 00:38:48.059 run. And that wasn't even the most dramatic moment 00:38:48.059 --> 00:38:50.960 in the ninth. With one out and the bases loaded, 00:38:51.179 --> 00:38:53.699 a sharp grounder was hit to Rojas, who was playing 00:38:53.699 --> 00:38:56.559 in. He had to rush the throw home to a stretching 00:38:56.559 --> 00:38:58.760 Will Smith to get the bang -bang out at the plate 00:38:58.760 --> 00:39:01.619 and stop the winning run from scoring. That defensive 00:39:01.619 --> 00:39:05.090 play forced extra innings. It did. And then the 00:39:05.090 --> 00:39:07.949 11th inning heroics. Will Smith, who had just 00:39:07.949 --> 00:39:10.489 made that crucial defensive play, hits the game 00:39:10.489 --> 00:39:12.889 -winning solo home run. But the moment that truly 00:39:12.889 --> 00:39:15.730 defined that series and maybe cemented the Dodgers' 00:39:15.829 --> 00:39:18.769 dynasty mentality was the performance of the 00:39:18.769 --> 00:39:22.010 World Series MVP Yoshinobu Yamamoto. He pitched 00:39:22.010 --> 00:39:25.389 his third inning of relief in Game 7 after throwing 00:39:25.389 --> 00:39:29.210 96 pitches just the day before in Game 6. That 00:39:29.210 --> 00:39:31.110 kind of workload is almost unheard of in modern 00:39:31.110 --> 00:39:33.429 baseball. It's unbelievable. It is. He was running 00:39:33.429 --> 00:39:35.489 on pure adrenaline and just competitive fire. 00:39:36.329 --> 00:39:39.170 He induced the final two outs on a single play. 00:39:39.769 --> 00:39:42.750 Mookie Betts cleanly catching a fly ball, touching 00:39:42.750 --> 00:39:45.010 second, and throwing to Freddie Freeman at first 00:39:45.010 --> 00:39:47.329 to clinch the championship. Yamamoto's sacrifice 00:39:47.329 --> 00:39:50.289 and the managerial decision to even push him 00:39:50.289 --> 00:39:53.110 to that limit, it just spoke volumes about that 00:39:53.110 --> 00:39:55.550 team's win -at -all -costs mentality. Away from 00:39:55.550 --> 00:39:58.389 the field, Shohei Otani continues to cement his 00:39:58.389 --> 00:40:01.750 status as a philanthropic icon. He recently launched 00:40:01.750 --> 00:40:04.539 the Shohei Otani Family Foundation. The foundation 00:40:04.539 --> 00:40:07.679 has a dual, very personal mission. It focuses 00:40:07.679 --> 00:40:10.500 heavily on rescuing animals, which is fitting 00:40:10.500 --> 00:40:13.340 since he's a proud owner of his dog, Decoy, and 00:40:13.340 --> 00:40:16.019 on inspiring children globally to stay active 00:40:16.019 --> 00:40:18.820 and live well. This is part of a deliberate pattern 00:40:18.820 --> 00:40:20.840 of generosity we've seen from him since he came 00:40:20.840 --> 00:40:23.199 to Los Angeles. This isn't just a new celebrity 00:40:23.199 --> 00:40:26.000 foundation either. He has a documented history 00:40:26.000 --> 00:40:30.039 of significant giving. Absolutely. In 2025 alone, 00:40:30.340 --> 00:40:33.320 he donated half a million dollars for L .A. wildfire 00:40:33.320 --> 00:40:36.170 relief. And back in 2024, he and the Dodgers 00:40:36.170 --> 00:40:38.230 committed a million dollars for earthquake relief 00:40:38.230 --> 00:40:40.869 in Japan. His foundation work is a clear sign 00:40:40.869 --> 00:40:42.530 that his connection to both the L .A. community 00:40:42.530 --> 00:40:45.150 and his home country is a major personal commitment. 00:40:45.409 --> 00:40:47.969 Now let's turn to a rare moment of cross -rivalry 00:40:47.969 --> 00:40:51.469 respect. The Boston Red Sox gave their Tony Conigliaro 00:40:51.469 --> 00:40:54.590 Award to a New York Yankee. Yeah, to the reliever 00:40:54.590 --> 00:40:58.030 Tim Hill. This award, which recognizes a player 00:40:58.030 --> 00:41:00.389 who overcomes adversity through spirit and determination, 00:41:00.730 --> 00:41:03.650 is a huge honor. And Hill is the first Yankee 00:41:03.650 --> 00:41:06.590 ever to receive it in its 25 -year history, which 00:41:06.590 --> 00:41:09.090 just underscores the severity of what he overcame. 00:41:09.250 --> 00:41:11.389 And what was the specific adversity he overcame? 00:41:11.650 --> 00:41:14.150 Hill was diagnosed with stage 3 colon cancer 00:41:14.150 --> 00:41:16.889 back in 2015 while he was still a minor leaguer. 00:41:17.010 --> 00:41:19.050 He went through eight months of chemotherapy, 00:41:19.469 --> 00:41:22.289 lost a lot of weight, but he persevered and eventually 00:41:22.289 --> 00:41:25.480 made his MLB debut in 2018. And the adversity 00:41:25.480 --> 00:41:27.199 was compounded by the fact that he'd previously 00:41:27.199 --> 00:41:29.940 lost his own father to the same cancer in 2007. 00:41:30.219 --> 00:41:32.440 That's right. It's an incredible story of resilience. 00:41:32.900 --> 00:41:35.119 Hill is also known for his unique pitching style 00:41:35.119 --> 00:41:38.230 as a side -armer. He is. He's a ground ball specialist 00:41:38.230 --> 00:41:40.710 known for his sinker and that sidearm delivery. 00:41:41.030 --> 00:41:43.389 He ranked second in the majors in ground ball 00:41:43.389 --> 00:41:46.869 percentage in 2025. This cross rivalry praise 00:41:46.869 --> 00:41:48.730 just highlights that while the Yankees and Red 00:41:48.730 --> 00:41:51.349 Sox have that fierce competitive spirit, the 00:41:51.349 --> 00:41:53.329 human element overcoming a life -threatening 00:41:53.329 --> 00:41:55.389 illness is something that transcends the game. 00:41:55.650 --> 00:41:58.030 Finally, let's look at the baseball history explored 00:41:58.030 --> 00:42:00.989 in the documentary United by Baseball, which 00:42:00.989 --> 00:42:03.949 shines a light on Colorado's really diverse baseball 00:42:03.949 --> 00:42:07.400 past. The documentary illustrates how deep baseball 00:42:07.400 --> 00:42:10.199 history runs in Colorado. It arrived with the 00:42:10.199 --> 00:42:14.340 gold rush back in 1858, 18 years before the territory 00:42:14.340 --> 00:42:17.500 even became a state. It details the early teams 00:42:17.500 --> 00:42:19.719 in mining towns like the Leadville Blues and 00:42:19.719 --> 00:42:22.360 farming communities like the Greeley Grays. But 00:42:22.360 --> 00:42:24.599 the section on race and the color barrier is 00:42:24.599 --> 00:42:27.260 the most historically significant part. Absolutely. 00:42:27.320 --> 00:42:30.340 The focus is on the Denver Post Tournament, which 00:42:30.340 --> 00:42:32.539 was known as the Little World Series of the West. 00:42:33.070 --> 00:42:35.809 In 1934, it became a landmark event because it 00:42:35.809 --> 00:42:38.170 was the first major tournament to invite black 00:42:38.170 --> 00:42:40.929 and white teams to play against each other. Specifically 00:42:40.929 --> 00:42:43.429 featuring the Kansas City Monarchs from the Negro 00:42:43.429 --> 00:42:45.309 Leagues. Right, playing against white teams. 00:42:45.409 --> 00:42:47.949 And historians credit this event with actively 00:42:47.949 --> 00:42:49.989 accelerating the breaking of the color barrier. 00:42:50.389 --> 00:42:53.750 Yeah. One historian in the film argues that without 00:42:53.750 --> 00:42:56.309 the Denver Post tournament, Jackie Robinson would 00:42:56.309 --> 00:42:58.849 not have broken the color barrier in 1947. It 00:42:58.849 --> 00:43:01.619 would have happened later. This public... Highly 00:43:01.619 --> 00:43:04.420 successful integration forced owners and fans 00:43:04.420 --> 00:43:07.079 to confront their biases and see Black players 00:43:07.079 --> 00:43:10.179 competing at the highest level. It's a key, often 00:43:10.179 --> 00:43:12.760 overlooked, moment in baseball history. And the 00:43:12.760 --> 00:43:14.860 documentary also highlights the powerful resilience 00:43:14.860 --> 00:43:17.719 of Japanese Americans during World War II. It 00:43:17.719 --> 00:43:20.159 did. It covered the Japanese Americans who were 00:43:20.159 --> 00:43:22.820 interned in camps like Amashé between 1942 and 00:43:22.820 --> 00:43:26.159 1945. They formed their own baseball teams and 00:43:26.159 --> 00:43:28.500 leagues. playing for a sense of community and 00:43:28.500 --> 00:43:30.619 joy, and partly as a demonstration of loyalty 00:43:30.619 --> 00:43:33.000 to the United States, even while being confined 00:43:33.000 --> 00:43:35.440 in those awful conditions. It's just a powerful 00:43:35.440 --> 00:43:38.239 testament to the game's ability to provide hope 00:43:38.239 --> 00:43:40.780 and structure, even in the darkest, most divided 00:43:40.780 --> 00:43:43.679 times. This offseason is already defined by strategic 00:43:43.679 --> 00:43:46.360 aggression and these huge financial gambles. 00:43:46.619 --> 00:43:48.860 We covered the exorbitant cost of the Blue Jays' 00:43:48.860 --> 00:43:50.760 bid for the World Series with that Dylan Cease 00:43:50.760 --> 00:43:53.300 signing, and we analyzed whether that massive 00:43:53.300 --> 00:43:55.860 risk is worth the potential reward. We looked 00:43:55.860 --> 00:43:58.340 at the radical shifting dynamics for the Yankees 00:43:58.340 --> 00:44:01.159 and Mets as they chased top bats and the necessary 00:44:01.159 --> 00:44:03.340 financial cleanup that teams like the Angels 00:44:03.340 --> 00:44:05.719 have to do just to participate in the superstar 00:44:05.719 --> 00:44:08.159 market. The recurring theme really is that battle 00:44:08.159 --> 00:44:10.820 between the high spending teams and disciplined 00:44:10.820 --> 00:44:14.000 organizational strategy. Hal Steinbrenner argued 00:44:14.000 --> 00:44:16.739 that money doesn't guarantee success, pointing 00:44:16.739 --> 00:44:19.400 to past failures. Yet the sheer dominance of 00:44:19.400 --> 00:44:22.780 the Dodgers, fueled by money, is actively challenging 00:44:22.780 --> 00:44:26.019 their competitors. It's even inspiring guys like 00:44:26.019 --> 00:44:28.659 Tatsuya Imai to declare he wants to take them 00:44:28.659 --> 00:44:31.380 down rather than join them. The ultimate question 00:44:31.380 --> 00:44:34.019 isn't just how much money is spent, but how effectively 00:44:34.019 --> 00:44:36.840 that money is used to fix your weaknesses. We've 00:44:36.840 --> 00:44:39.380 seen the Mariners have a historic season carried 00:44:39.380 --> 00:44:42.260 by a 60 home run catcher. And now they face the 00:44:42.260 --> 00:44:44.730 challenge of balancing that winning core. with 00:44:44.730 --> 00:44:47.809 debuting a huge wave of hitting prospects, a 00:44:47.809 --> 00:44:50.170 real strategic tightrope walk. And we saw the 00:44:50.170 --> 00:44:52.590 Blue Jays, already one win away from a title, 00:44:52.769 --> 00:44:54.909 decide to throw caution to the wind and pay an 00:44:54.909 --> 00:44:57.369 exorbitant price for a high -risk pitcher. So 00:44:57.369 --> 00:44:59.369 this leaves us with a final provocative thought 00:44:59.369 --> 00:45:01.920 for you to consider. When a team that is already 00:45:01.920 --> 00:45:04.400 this close, like the Mariners or the Blue Jays, 00:45:04.400 --> 00:45:06.920 decides to throw caution to the wind and pay 00:45:06.920 --> 00:45:09.380 whatever it takes, whether it's $210 million 00:45:09.380 --> 00:45:12.000 for a volatile arm or a potential $400 million 00:45:12.000 --> 00:45:15.780 contract for a superstar outfielder, will that 00:45:15.780 --> 00:45:19.099 financial risk always justify the ultimate reward 00:45:19.099 --> 00:45:21.860 of lifting the trophy? Or will the cost of a 00:45:21.860 --> 00:45:24.519 bad contract ultimately sink a legitimate contender? 00:45:24.639 --> 00:45:27.039 The 2026 season may soon give us the answer.