WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:03.040 Imagine you're sitting in a performance review, 00:00:03.459 --> 00:00:05.980 your manager is going over your recent projects, 00:00:06.339 --> 00:00:08.779 and they describe your approach to the company 00:00:08.779 --> 00:00:12.480 budget as thrifty. Oh, yeah. That's a good word. 00:00:12.500 --> 00:00:14.660 You'd probably smile. Right. Right. You'd take 00:00:14.660 --> 00:00:16.899 it as a compliment, maybe even expect a bonus. 00:00:17.420 --> 00:00:21.460 But what if instead a different manager looked 00:00:21.460 --> 00:00:24.399 at the exact same spending habits, the exact 00:00:24.399 --> 00:00:26.920 same spreadsheets, and called you cheap? Rouch. 00:00:27.260 --> 00:00:30.219 Yeah, completely different vibe. Exactly. I mean, 00:00:30.440 --> 00:00:32.439 one word gets you promoted, and the other might 00:00:32.439 --> 00:00:35.359 totally stall your career. And the crazy thing 00:00:35.359 --> 00:00:37.719 is, they're describing the exact same physical 00:00:37.719 --> 00:00:40.560 actions in the world, yet the impact is, well, 00:00:40.600 --> 00:00:42.500 it's entirely different. So today, we're looking 00:00:42.500 --> 00:00:44.840 at the secret agents of human language. It's 00:00:44.840 --> 00:00:46.759 so true. We usually think of the words we use 00:00:46.759 --> 00:00:50.240 every day as just Neutral messengers like kind 00:00:50.240 --> 00:00:52.520 of like tiny delivery drivers just dropping off 00:00:52.520 --> 00:00:55.119 a fact just clocking in and clocking out right 00:00:55.119 --> 00:00:57.960 exactly You say a word it describes a piece of 00:00:57.960 --> 00:01:00.000 reality and that's the end of the transaction 00:01:00.000 --> 00:01:02.600 It's supposed to be this simple one -to -one 00:01:02.600 --> 00:01:04.900 exchange of information because you know We really 00:01:04.900 --> 00:01:06.739 like things to be categorized neatly either. 00:01:06.739 --> 00:01:10.200 It's a cold hard fact or it's a subjective opinion 00:01:10.310 --> 00:01:12.829 Totally. And when I first realized that some 00:01:12.829 --> 00:01:15.430 of the most common words we use are basically 00:01:15.430 --> 00:01:18.250 actively refusing to play by those rules, it 00:01:18.859 --> 00:01:21.579 Completely broke my brain. So we're doing a deep 00:01:21.579 --> 00:01:24.879 dive today into this dense but amazing philosophical 00:01:24.879 --> 00:01:27.700 concept from Wikipedia called thick concepts. 00:01:28.500 --> 00:01:30.239 Fantastic topic. It really is. And for you listening, 00:01:30.299 --> 00:01:32.079 once you see how these words are doing double 00:01:32.079 --> 00:01:35.200 duty, I mean, pretending to just describe reality 00:01:35.200 --> 00:01:37.439 while simultaneously forcing a moral opinion 00:01:37.439 --> 00:01:39.540 about it right into your brain, you will literally 00:01:39.540 --> 00:01:42.219 never read a news headline or argue with a coworker 00:01:42.219 --> 00:01:45.140 the exact same way again. And exploring this 00:01:45.140 --> 00:01:47.540 goes way beyond just linguistic wordplay or, 00:01:47.540 --> 00:01:49.849 you know, debating. dictionary definitions, the 00:01:49.849 --> 00:01:52.629 whole debate over thick concepts sits at the 00:01:52.629 --> 00:01:55.090 very heart of how we understand ethical knowledge. 00:01:55.310 --> 00:01:57.670 It gets deep fast. It really does. It's this 00:01:57.670 --> 00:02:00.569 profound inquiry into whether the universe is 00:02:00.569 --> 00:02:03.750 just a collection of cold, neutral atoms or if 00:02:03.750 --> 00:02:06.950 human values are, well, actually woven into the 00:02:06.950 --> 00:02:09.530 fabric of reality itself. Okay, so to even wrap 00:02:09.530 --> 00:02:11.449 our heads around what makes a concept thick. 00:02:11.949 --> 00:02:14.150 I think we first need to look at the extremes 00:02:14.150 --> 00:02:17.349 on either end of the linguistic spectrum, the 00:02:17.349 --> 00:02:20.110 thin concepts. Yeah, that's the best place to 00:02:20.110 --> 00:02:22.389 start. Because you really can't appreciate how 00:02:22.389 --> 00:02:25.729 sneaky a thick concept is until you realize what 00:02:25.729 --> 00:02:28.509 a normal, well -behaved word looks like. Let's 00:02:28.509 --> 00:02:30.490 look at the purely factual side of things first, 00:02:30.669 --> 00:02:33.389 what philosophers call thin descriptive concepts. 00:02:33.729 --> 00:02:36.210 So the quintessential examples of thin descriptive 00:02:36.210 --> 00:02:40.009 concepts are words like water, gold, length, 00:02:40.370 --> 00:02:42.840 mass. Just the basics. Right. These are terms 00:02:42.840 --> 00:02:45.180 that simply pick out genuine, measurable features 00:02:45.180 --> 00:02:47.680 of the physical world. They're completely, totally 00:02:47.680 --> 00:02:50.060 morally neutral. So if I tell you a ring is made 00:02:50.060 --> 00:02:52.860 of gold, I'm not judging it. Exactly. When you 00:02:52.860 --> 00:02:55.199 tell someone that a ring is gold or a box has 00:02:55.199 --> 00:02:58.180 a certain mass, you aren't projecting any kind 00:02:58.180 --> 00:03:00.539 of moral judgment onto those objects. You're 00:03:00.539 --> 00:03:03.340 just pointing to physical reality. Those words 00:03:03.340 --> 00:03:07.879 do not in themselves provide you with any any 00:03:07.879 --> 00:03:09.900 reasons for action. Like, if I tell you a glass 00:03:09.900 --> 00:03:12.199 is full of water, I haven't told you if it's 00:03:12.199 --> 00:03:15.099 pristine delicious water or, you know, stagnant 00:03:15.099 --> 00:03:17.240 dangerous water. No, not at all. I haven't told 00:03:17.240 --> 00:03:18.979 you if you should drink it. I've literally just 00:03:18.979 --> 00:03:21.580 handed you raw data. But then, on the complete 00:03:21.580 --> 00:03:23.740 opposite end of the spectrum, we have the other 00:03:23.740 --> 00:03:27.240 extreme, right? the thin, evaluative concepts. 00:03:27.560 --> 00:03:29.379 Right. And the classic examples here are words 00:03:29.379 --> 00:03:33.520 like right, wrong, good, and bad. And these function 00:03:33.520 --> 00:03:35.759 in the exact opposite way of the descriptive 00:03:35.759 --> 00:03:38.039 concepts. Opposite how? Well, they don't pick 00:03:38.039 --> 00:03:40.759 out genuine, measurable features of the physical 00:03:40.759 --> 00:03:43.800 world. Instead, they provide you with reasons 00:03:43.800 --> 00:03:47.659 for action. They are pure evaluation. Oh, I see 00:03:47.659 --> 00:03:49.479 because you can't take a tape measure and find 00:03:49.479 --> 00:03:52.879 the goodness of a couch Like good doesn't describe 00:03:52.879 --> 00:03:55.819 the physics of the upholstery or the wood It 00:03:55.819 --> 00:03:58.620 just tells you how we are evaluating the experience 00:03:58.620 --> 00:04:00.919 of sitting on it. It's a great way to put it 00:04:00.919 --> 00:04:02.580 Okay, let's untack this because this is where 00:04:02.580 --> 00:04:05.419 the star of our show comes in the thick concept 00:04:05.979 --> 00:04:09.360 This is a concept that occupies a middle position. 00:04:09.800 --> 00:04:12.520 It merges both of those extremes together. It 00:04:12.520 --> 00:04:15.300 does. It has a significant degree of descriptive 00:04:15.300 --> 00:04:18.019 content, so it points to physical reality, but 00:04:18.019 --> 00:04:21.540 it is also heavily evaluatively loaded. The classic 00:04:21.540 --> 00:04:24.459 examples philosophers use are virtues and vices. 00:04:25.379 --> 00:04:28.720 So, courage, cruelty, truthfulness, kindness. 00:04:28.980 --> 00:04:30.800 So it's basically doing two things at once. Right, 00:04:30.879 --> 00:04:33.120 it acts as a double feature. It's carrying both 00:04:33.120 --> 00:04:35.519 a fact about the world and a judgment about that 00:04:35.519 --> 00:04:38.060 fact simultaneously packed into a single word. 00:04:38.800 --> 00:04:41.139 Let's throw out the standard academic examples 00:04:41.139 --> 00:04:43.079 for just a second to really visualize how this 00:04:43.079 --> 00:04:45.079 works for everyone listening. Think about baking. 00:04:45.759 --> 00:04:47.620 Okay, I like where this is going. So the thin 00:04:47.620 --> 00:04:49.980 descriptive concepts, those are like your raw 00:04:49.980 --> 00:04:52.259 list of ingredients. You've got flour, sugar, 00:04:52.819 --> 00:04:56.600 eggs. Just physical facts. Right. Morally neutral 00:04:56.600 --> 00:04:59.360 ingredients. Exactly. And the thin evaluative 00:04:59.360 --> 00:05:01.120 concept is like someone just standing in the 00:05:01.120 --> 00:05:03.920 kitchen yelling, yum. Just pure feeling. Right. 00:05:04.300 --> 00:05:07.160 But the thick concept, that's the actual baked 00:05:07.160 --> 00:05:10.379 cake. It's the combination of the physical ingredients 00:05:10.379 --> 00:05:12.920 and the resulting enjoyment all baked into one 00:05:12.920 --> 00:05:14.899 thing that you can't just easily pull apart. 00:05:15.199 --> 00:05:18.259 Or here's another one. Think about a weed growing 00:05:18.259 --> 00:05:21.399 in your garden. Oh, that's a classic one. Descriptively, 00:05:21.720 --> 00:05:24.610 what is a weed? I mean, it's just a plant. It 00:05:24.610 --> 00:05:27.269 has leaves, roots, it photosynthesizes. Those 00:05:27.269 --> 00:05:30.310 are thin descriptive facts. Yes. But evaluatively, 00:05:30.649 --> 00:05:33.930 the word weed means something bad. It means an 00:05:33.930 --> 00:05:36.089 undesirable plant that needs to be, you know, 00:05:36.389 --> 00:05:38.350 destroyed or pulled out. And the crucial thing 00:05:38.350 --> 00:05:41.870 there is you really cannot separate the physical 00:05:41.870 --> 00:05:44.189 plant from the negative judgment. Why not? Because 00:05:44.189 --> 00:05:46.329 the only thing that makes that specific plant 00:05:46.329 --> 00:05:49.439 a weed is our negative evaluation of where it's 00:05:49.439 --> 00:05:51.699 growing. I mean, a dandelion is a beautiful flower 00:05:51.699 --> 00:05:53.680 to a toddler, right? No, totally. They love them. 00:05:53.800 --> 00:05:56.120 But it's a wheat to a landscaper. The judgment 00:05:56.120 --> 00:05:58.740 actually creates the category itself. That is 00:05:58.740 --> 00:06:01.220 wild. What's fascinating here is how this plays 00:06:01.220 --> 00:06:04.199 out when we look at the specific example of courage 00:06:04.199 --> 00:06:07.519 from the source material. So, descriptively, 00:06:07.879 --> 00:06:10.180 courage can be given this rough characterization 00:06:10.180 --> 00:06:14.629 as... opposing danger to promote a valued end. 00:06:14.870 --> 00:06:17.129 Opposing danger to promote a valued end. Right. 00:06:17.370 --> 00:06:19.430 That's the factual, physical part of the action. 00:06:19.910 --> 00:06:22.389 You can physically observe someone opposing danger. 00:06:23.410 --> 00:06:26.329 But evaluatively, characterizing someone as courageous 00:06:26.329 --> 00:06:28.730 typically involves expressing an attitude of 00:06:28.730 --> 00:06:30.750 esteem. Like giving them a mental high five. 00:06:30.970 --> 00:06:33.189 Basically, yeah. The text actually refers to 00:06:33.189 --> 00:06:35.959 this as a pro attitude. It asserts that the action 00:06:35.959 --> 00:06:38.720 has a prima facie good -making quality. Wait, 00:06:38.819 --> 00:06:40.959 prima facie good -making quality? That is some 00:06:40.959 --> 00:06:43.220 seriously heavy academic jargon right there. 00:06:43.279 --> 00:06:46.660 It is a bit of a mouthful. So you mean that on 00:06:46.660 --> 00:06:49.519 its face, just at first glance, the very act 00:06:49.519 --> 00:06:51.439 of doing this thing inherently makes the world 00:06:51.439 --> 00:06:53.819 a slightly better place. You've got it perfectly. 00:06:54.279 --> 00:06:56.620 The word itself carries this built -in assumption 00:06:56.620 --> 00:06:59.399 that the action is commendable. By choosing the 00:06:59.399 --> 00:07:02.420 word courage, you aren't just saying the person 00:07:02.420 --> 00:07:04.879 faced danger, you're literally cheering them 00:07:04.879 --> 00:07:07.480 on. The approval is just baked right into the 00:07:07.480 --> 00:07:09.819 vocabulary. And this brings up a massive problem 00:07:09.819 --> 00:07:11.699 for a certain group of philosophers, doesn't 00:07:11.699 --> 00:07:14.040 it? Oh, a huge problem. Because if courage is 00:07:14.040 --> 00:07:17.680 this inextricable mix of fact and feeling, it 00:07:17.680 --> 00:07:20.879 completely ruins the neat categorization of a 00:07:20.879 --> 00:07:23.959 purely objective reality. Like, if I'm someone 00:07:23.959 --> 00:07:26.399 who believes the universe is just math and physics, 00:07:26.920 --> 00:07:29.339 Thick concepts must be absolutely terrifying. 00:07:29.420 --> 00:07:31.879 They are. This double feature is the absolute 00:07:31.879 --> 00:07:34.860 center of a war between two groups, the moral 00:07:34.860 --> 00:07:37.540 expressivists and the moral realists. And you 00:07:37.540 --> 00:07:40.019 hit on exactly why the expressivists are so troubled 00:07:40.019 --> 00:07:42.639 by thick concepts. Let's talk about the expressivists 00:07:42.639 --> 00:07:44.800 first. What's their deal? Well, expressivists 00:07:44.800 --> 00:07:47.480 favor an account of moral values as simply being 00:07:47.480 --> 00:07:50.439 attitudes that humans project onto a blank, neutral 00:07:50.439 --> 00:07:52.899 world. For them, the universe itself doesn't 00:07:52.899 --> 00:07:55.019 contain goodness or badness. So it's all just 00:07:55.019 --> 00:07:58.199 in our heads. Exactly. Those are just human emotions 00:07:58.199 --> 00:08:01.120 we're pasting onto physical events. They want 00:08:01.120 --> 00:08:03.699 a tidy universe, right? Like facts over here 00:08:03.699 --> 00:08:05.500 in the science department and feelings over there 00:08:05.500 --> 00:08:07.620 in the poetry department. That is exactly what 00:08:07.620 --> 00:08:10.199 they want. And to maintain that clean division, 00:08:10.319 --> 00:08:13.000 They desperately need to prove that we can maintain 00:08:13.000 --> 00:08:16.480 a strict distinction between the morally neutral 00:08:16.480 --> 00:08:19.620 descriptive features of a thick concept and the 00:08:19.620 --> 00:08:21.759 evaluative attitudes that typically go with them. 00:08:22.100 --> 00:08:24.220 So they want to prove that you can always pull 00:08:24.220 --> 00:08:27.060 the fact and the feeling apart, like unbaking 00:08:27.060 --> 00:08:31.120 the cake. Yes, precisely. OK, so if I'm an expressivist, 00:08:31.259 --> 00:08:33.360 I must look at the word courage and think it's 00:08:33.360 --> 00:08:36.210 just a math equation. I'm guessing they think 00:08:36.210 --> 00:08:38.370 you can just decouple the feeling from the fact, 00:08:38.850 --> 00:08:41.409 isolate the two variables, and prove that the 00:08:41.409 --> 00:08:43.789 word is just a mashup of two entirely separate 00:08:43.789 --> 00:08:46.429 things. You just described the conjunctive account 00:08:46.429 --> 00:08:48.889 perfectly. The conjunctive account. Yeah. Many 00:08:48.889 --> 00:08:51.710 theorists in the expressivist camp argue that 00:08:51.710 --> 00:08:54.269 a thick concept should be analyzed as a conjunction, 00:08:54.990 --> 00:08:57.169 basically a simple joining of a descriptive part 00:08:57.169 --> 00:09:00.289 and an evaluative part. A fundamental feature 00:09:00.289 --> 00:09:03.730 of this analysis is the claim that the descriptive 00:09:03.730 --> 00:09:07.149 content of a thick concept can be perfectly understood 00:09:07.149 --> 00:09:09.710 in the complete absence of the evaluative content. 00:09:10.149 --> 00:09:13.009 Wait, really? So how does the conjunctive account 00:09:13.009 --> 00:09:15.769 handle our courage example mechanically? Do they 00:09:15.769 --> 00:09:18.409 just treat it like two separate clauses in a 00:09:18.409 --> 00:09:21.230 sentence? Pretty much. On this account, saying 00:09:21.230 --> 00:09:24.129 someone is courageous is just sticking two completely 00:09:24.129 --> 00:09:27.210 separate ideas together. Idea one is the descriptive 00:09:27.210 --> 00:09:30.019 part. you know, opposing danger to promote a 00:09:30.019 --> 00:09:32.259 valued end. Okay, the facts. Right. And idea 00:09:32.259 --> 00:09:34.059 two is the evaluative part, and I approve of 00:09:34.059 --> 00:09:36.259 this. The evaluative part is really just a label. 00:09:36.820 --> 00:09:39.419 The text notes that on this view, the evaluative 00:09:39.419 --> 00:09:41.440 part can be characterized as a prescriptive flag. 00:09:41.700 --> 00:09:43.700 A prescriptive flag. Yeah, we just happen to 00:09:43.700 --> 00:09:45.940 pin this little flag of approval onto the physical 00:09:45.940 --> 00:09:47.840 action. It's just pinning a little ribbon that 00:09:47.840 --> 00:09:51.679 says, yay, onto the cold factual mechanics of 00:09:51.679 --> 00:09:53.860 someone running into a burning building. That's 00:09:53.860 --> 00:09:57.200 a great visual, yes. So under this theory, the 00:09:57.200 --> 00:09:59.659 expressivists are arguing I could theoretically 00:09:59.659 --> 00:10:02.980 strip away the goodness of courage, invent a 00:10:02.980 --> 00:10:05.519 totally new, purely descriptive word for the 00:10:05.519 --> 00:10:08.299 exact same physical action, and I'd have a completely 00:10:08.299 --> 00:10:11.779 accurate leftover concept that means the exact 00:10:11.779 --> 00:10:13.860 same thing just without the emotion. That is 00:10:13.860 --> 00:10:16.480 exactly what they argue. They say it is, in principle, 00:10:17.039 --> 00:10:20.299 completely possible to construct a totally descriptive 00:10:20.299 --> 00:10:23.500 concept with zero evaluative force that picks 00:10:23.500 --> 00:10:25.919 out the exact same features of the world. Wow. 00:10:26.399 --> 00:10:28.240 One theorist in the references actually calls 00:10:28.240 --> 00:10:31.259 this the skeleton account. You strip away the 00:10:31.259 --> 00:10:33.480 flesh of the human moral judgment and you are 00:10:33.480 --> 00:10:36.080 left with a neutral bony skeleton of the physical 00:10:36.080 --> 00:10:38.720 action. I gotta say, that feels incredibly robotic 00:10:38.720 --> 00:10:40.799 to me. It does feel a bit clinical. Like if I 00:10:40.799 --> 00:10:43.340 just described someone opposing danger to promote 00:10:43.340 --> 00:10:45.940 a valued end without any of the admiration or 00:10:45.940 --> 00:10:48.179 the pro attitude that comes with the word courage, 00:10:48.460 --> 00:10:50.860 it feels like I'm missing the entire point of 00:10:50.860 --> 00:10:52.799 what is actually happening. I completely agree. 00:10:53.000 --> 00:10:55.259 It's like describing a beautiful, heartbreaking 00:10:55.259 --> 00:11:00.559 symphony as just a series of varying air pressure 00:11:00.559 --> 00:11:02.759 waves hitting an eardrum. I mean, it's technically 00:11:02.759 --> 00:11:04.940 true on a physical level, but you've lost the 00:11:04.940 --> 00:11:06.860 actual reality of the music. And that feeling 00:11:06.860 --> 00:11:09.399 you have, that raises the pivotal question of 00:11:09.399 --> 00:11:12.840 the entire debate. If the skeleton account feels 00:11:12.840 --> 00:11:16.500 robotic and incomplete, is it actually an accurate 00:11:16.500 --> 00:11:19.059 model of how human language and ethics work? 00:11:19.259 --> 00:11:21.299 I'm guessing not everyone thinks so. Definitely 00:11:21.299 --> 00:11:23.679 not. That lingering feeling you have of missing 00:11:23.679 --> 00:11:26.659 the point is exactly the fuel for the opposing 00:11:26.659 --> 00:11:30.389 philosophical camp. the moral realists. Ah, the 00:11:30.389 --> 00:11:32.370 realists. The rebellion against the skeleton 00:11:32.370 --> 00:11:34.929 account. Exactly. So if the expressivists want 00:11:34.929 --> 00:11:37.350 to separate the facts from the feelings, I assume 00:11:37.350 --> 00:11:39.210 the realists are arguing that the fact and the 00:11:39.210 --> 00:11:41.490 feeling are permanently fused together. Yes. 00:11:41.870 --> 00:11:44.049 The realists entirely reject the conjunctive 00:11:44.049 --> 00:11:46.129 account. They heavily criticize the whole idea 00:11:46.129 --> 00:11:48.289 that you can just unpin the prescriptive flag 00:11:48.289 --> 00:11:50.570 from a thick concept. They don't buy the flag 00:11:50.570 --> 00:11:53.570 analogy at all. Not even a little bit. In their 00:11:53.570 --> 00:11:56.610 view, the world -guided content The facts and 00:11:56.610 --> 00:11:59.669 the action -guiding content, the values, cannot 00:11:59.669 --> 00:12:02.490 be usefully separated at all. The source points 00:12:02.490 --> 00:12:05.350 out that for a moral realist, competent use of 00:12:05.350 --> 00:12:08.070 a thick concept actually constitutes ethical 00:12:08.070 --> 00:12:10.830 knowledge. Ethical knowledge, meaning it's not 00:12:10.830 --> 00:12:12.830 just a subjective opinion you're projecting onto 00:12:12.830 --> 00:12:15.850 a blank canvas. It's an objective truth that 00:12:15.850 --> 00:12:18.350 you know about the world. You are perceiving 00:12:18.350 --> 00:12:21.570 something real. Exactly. For the realist, the 00:12:21.570 --> 00:12:23.809 only way to understand a thick concept is to 00:12:23.809 --> 00:12:26.289 understand the descriptive and the evaluative 00:12:26.289 --> 00:12:28.830 aspects as a unified whole. You just can't reduce 00:12:28.830 --> 00:12:31.110 it to its parts. So the emotion is part of the 00:12:31.110 --> 00:12:33.610 definition. The evaluative aspect is profoundly 00:12:33.610 --> 00:12:35.789 involved in the very practice of using the word. 00:12:36.269 --> 00:12:38.809 You literally cannot understand a thick concept 00:12:38.809 --> 00:12:41.009 without also understanding its evaluative point. 00:12:41.169 --> 00:12:42.710 Okay, here's where it gets really interesting. 00:12:43.090 --> 00:12:45.029 Let's look at the mechanism of how this actually 00:12:45.029 --> 00:12:47.250 works. Like, how did the evaluation fuse with 00:12:47.250 --> 00:12:49.870 the fact? Let's apply this to another example 00:12:49.870 --> 00:12:52.970 from the text, the concept of cruelty. Oh, that's 00:12:52.970 --> 00:12:55.509 a powerful example. Let's say I try to play the 00:12:55.509 --> 00:12:59.070 expressivist game, right? And I use neutral, 00:12:59.470 --> 00:13:02.750 thin terms to describe someone causing harm to 00:13:02.750 --> 00:13:06.850 someone else. Maybe I say person A inflicted 00:13:06.850 --> 00:13:09.309 severe physical damage on person B. OK, purely 00:13:09.309 --> 00:13:11.769 descriptive. Right. But according to the realist, 00:13:11.830 --> 00:13:14.320 if I stop there, I haven't just removed a Boo 00:13:14.320 --> 00:13:17.100 flag. I am actually failing to capture the reality 00:13:17.100 --> 00:13:19.659 of the situation. That's right. The text specifically 00:13:19.659 --> 00:13:21.779 notes that the rationale for choosing the word 00:13:21.779 --> 00:13:24.720 cruel, rather than merely describing it in neutral 00:13:24.720 --> 00:13:28.399 terms, is to tune into that specific evaluative 00:13:28.399 --> 00:13:31.539 aspect. Why is that tuning in so important? Because 00:13:31.539 --> 00:13:34.299 inflicting severe physical damage could describe 00:13:34.299 --> 00:13:36.820 a sadistic torturer, but it could also describe 00:13:36.820 --> 00:13:39.100 a trauma surgeon performing a desperate life 00:13:39.100 --> 00:13:42.529 -saving amputation without anesthesia. Oh, wow. 00:13:42.909 --> 00:13:46.070 Yeah. Both cause severe physical harm. Both cause 00:13:46.070 --> 00:13:48.769 immense pain. That is a boundary drawing mechanism. 00:13:48.990 --> 00:13:51.370 To know where the boundary is, to know which 00:13:51.370 --> 00:13:53.330 acts of causing physical harm are cruel and which 00:13:53.330 --> 00:13:55.309 ones are not, you have to understand the badness 00:13:55.309 --> 00:13:57.970 of cruelty. Exactly. The badness isn't just a 00:13:57.970 --> 00:14:00.710 flag you pin on the action after the fact. The 00:14:00.710 --> 00:14:03.009 badness is the lens you need to even be able 00:14:03.009 --> 00:14:05.090 to see the boundary of the action in the first 00:14:05.090 --> 00:14:08.009 place. The evaluation itself draws the boundary 00:14:08.009 --> 00:14:11.840 line around the facts. If you do not grasp the 00:14:11.840 --> 00:14:15.279 evaluative perspective of cruelty, if you don't 00:14:15.279 --> 00:14:18.720 understand why it is bad, you will not be able 00:14:18.720 --> 00:14:21.759 to reliably identify new instances of cruelty 00:14:21.759 --> 00:14:23.960 in the real world. Because they look the same 00:14:23.960 --> 00:14:26.360 physically. Exactly. You'd look at the surgeon 00:14:26.360 --> 00:14:29.279 and the torturer and be totally unable to distinguish 00:14:29.279 --> 00:14:31.519 them based purely on their physical movements. 00:14:31.919 --> 00:14:34.779 So the evaluation is part of the fact. That completely 00:14:34.779 --> 00:14:37.120 destroys the skeleton account. It really does. 00:14:37.309 --> 00:14:39.610 If you strip away the moral flesh, the skeleton 00:14:39.610 --> 00:14:42.850 literally falls apart. You cannot invent a totally 00:14:42.850 --> 00:14:45.629 neutral, purely descriptive word for cruelty, 00:14:46.009 --> 00:14:48.330 because the badness is what actually groups those 00:14:48.330 --> 00:14:50.750 specific actions together. Which is exactly how 00:14:50.750 --> 00:14:53.049 the realists explain the process of someone learning 00:14:53.049 --> 00:14:55.889 one of these words. The source outlines this 00:14:55.889 --> 00:14:58.490 fascinating distinction between the novice and 00:14:58.490 --> 00:15:00.769 the competent user. How does that work? Well, 00:15:01.110 --> 00:15:03.899 a descriptive summary. like our phrase inflicting 00:15:03.899 --> 00:15:06.399 physical damage, might allow a novice to see 00:15:06.399 --> 00:15:08.899 the salient features of what is happening. It 00:15:08.899 --> 00:15:11.399 gives them the general shape of the action. But 00:15:11.399 --> 00:15:13.940 descriptive terms alone... cannot completely 00:15:13.940 --> 00:15:16.399 fill in the blanks. So the novice can memorize 00:15:16.399 --> 00:15:18.159 the physical traits, but they don't really get 00:15:18.159 --> 00:15:20.740 the word yet? Right. To fully understand the 00:15:20.740 --> 00:15:23.600 thick concept and become a competent user, a 00:15:23.600 --> 00:15:26.919 person has to perform a hooking on to the evaluative 00:15:26.919 --> 00:15:29.159 perspective. Hooking on. I like that. Yeah, they 00:15:29.159 --> 00:15:31.580 have to basically step inside the moral framework. 00:15:32.100 --> 00:15:34.360 And this is why realists argue that the descriptive 00:15:34.360 --> 00:15:37.200 and evaluative just cannot be untangled. The 00:15:37.200 --> 00:15:39.580 evaluative point guides the descriptive application. 00:15:40.080 --> 00:15:42.860 In the realist's view, the world itself contains 00:15:42.860 --> 00:15:45.259 these moral dimensions, and our sick concepts 00:15:45.259 --> 00:15:47.340 are the tools we use to perceive them. So what 00:15:47.340 --> 00:15:49.799 does this all mean? Like, why does this philosophical 00:15:49.799 --> 00:15:51.720 tug of war matter for you, listening to this 00:15:51.720 --> 00:15:54.240 deep dive right now? It's a great question. It 00:15:54.240 --> 00:15:57.139 matters because the words you use, and the words 00:15:57.139 --> 00:16:00.460 used against you, are incredibly powerful tools. 00:16:01.100 --> 00:16:03.200 When someone in a meeting calls a business strategy 00:16:03.200 --> 00:16:05.419 bold instead of reckless... Ah, happens all the 00:16:05.419 --> 00:16:07.830 time. You know, when a news article describes 00:16:07.830 --> 00:16:10.409 a political protester as a freedom fighter instead 00:16:10.409 --> 00:16:13.009 of a terrorist, they are not just giving you 00:16:13.009 --> 00:16:15.149 a neutral sequence of events. No, not at all. 00:16:15.490 --> 00:16:18.149 They are deploying thick concepts. They're handing 00:16:18.149 --> 00:16:21.350 you a fact that has an ethical judgment, a pro 00:16:21.350 --> 00:16:23.769 attitude, or a negative attitude already baked 00:16:23.769 --> 00:16:26.309 right into the DNA of the sentence. If we connect 00:16:26.309 --> 00:16:29.009 this to the bigger picture, this entire debate 00:16:29.009 --> 00:16:32.210 over thick concepts is really a profound argument 00:16:32.210 --> 00:16:35.799 about the nature of reality. It asks us to consider 00:16:35.799 --> 00:16:38.490 our place in the universe. Are we just observers 00:16:38.490 --> 00:16:41.549 or are we part of it? Exactly. Are our values 00:16:41.549 --> 00:16:44.570 just arbitrary, prescriptive flags that we invent 00:16:44.570 --> 00:16:47.490 to comfort ourselves in a cold, neutral, mechanical 00:16:47.490 --> 00:16:50.809 universe? Or are our values actually woven into 00:16:50.809 --> 00:16:53.409 the very fabric of how we experience and understand 00:16:53.409 --> 00:16:56.529 the world? It's massive. It is. Because if competent 00:16:56.529 --> 00:16:59.049 use of these words constitutes actual ethical 00:16:59.049 --> 00:17:01.470 knowledge, then ethics isn't just a matter of 00:17:01.470 --> 00:17:03.889 personal taste. It is a matter of accurately 00:17:03.889 --> 00:17:06.809 perceiving the world around you. It changes everything 00:17:06.809 --> 00:17:08.990 about how you listen to people talk. You start 00:17:08.990 --> 00:17:11.269 looking for these secret agents hiding in plain 00:17:11.269 --> 00:17:14.210 sight. You realize that true neutrality might 00:17:14.210 --> 00:17:16.970 honestly be an illusion. It's very hard to unsee 00:17:16.970 --> 00:17:19.170 it once you notice it. And the source material 00:17:19.170 --> 00:17:21.630 leaves us with a brilliant breadcrumb trail at 00:17:21.630 --> 00:17:24.069 the very end in the related concepts section 00:17:24.069 --> 00:17:26.589 that perfectly illustrates this. It mentions 00:17:26.589 --> 00:17:29.930 a phenomenon called emotive conjugation. Oh yes. 00:17:30.329 --> 00:17:33.109 It is a devastatingly simple demonstration of 00:17:33.109 --> 00:17:35.539 everything we've discussed today. A mode of conjugation 00:17:35.539 --> 00:17:38.180 is basically the idea that we change the thick 00:17:38.180 --> 00:17:40.819 concept we use depending on who we are talking 00:17:40.819 --> 00:17:43.579 about, even if the physical action is exactly 00:17:43.579 --> 00:17:46.119 the same. The classic example goes like this, 00:17:46.220 --> 00:17:49.400 I am firm. You are obstinate. He is a pig -headed 00:17:49.400 --> 00:17:51.839 fool. That is so good. Right. It's the exact 00:17:51.839 --> 00:17:54.359 same behavior, basically refusing to change your 00:17:54.359 --> 00:17:57.079 mind. But when I do it, I use a word with a built 00:17:57.079 --> 00:17:59.759 -in pro attitude. When you do it, I use a word 00:17:59.759 --> 00:18:02.059 with a negative attitude. The physical reality 00:18:02.059 --> 00:18:04.859 remains completely static. But the ethical knowledge 00:18:04.859 --> 00:18:07.400 conveyed shifts entirely based on the speaker's 00:18:07.400 --> 00:18:10.099 perspective. So it leaves you wondering the next 00:18:10.099 --> 00:18:12.119 time you're describing a frustrating situation 00:18:12.119 --> 00:18:15.839 to a friend or reading a headline about a controversial 00:18:15.839 --> 00:18:18.950 event. Are you actively, consciously choosing 00:18:18.950 --> 00:18:22.309 the facts? Or is the thick concept you've selected 00:18:22.309 --> 00:18:24.529 secretly doing all the judging for you without 00:18:24.529 --> 00:18:26.750 you even realizing it? A very unsettling thought. 00:18:26.990 --> 00:18:30.349 It is. And if values and facts are as deeply, 00:18:30.690 --> 00:18:32.710 beautifully intertwined as the moral realists 00:18:32.710 --> 00:18:35.529 claim, is it even possible for any of us to ever 00:18:35.529 --> 00:18:38.750 be truly, completely objective? A question that 00:18:38.750 --> 00:18:40.769 ensures you will definitely never look at a dictionary 00:18:40.769 --> 00:18:41.569 the same way again.