WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:02.620 In the 1910s, there was this team that was just 00:00:02.620 --> 00:00:04.660 so utterly dominant they weren't even named after 00:00:04.660 --> 00:00:07.929 their city. or their mascot. They were actually 00:00:07.929 --> 00:00:10.830 named after a cold, hard cash. Which is just 00:00:10.830 --> 00:00:13.269 wild. It really is. I mean, welcome to the deep 00:00:13.269 --> 00:00:15.730 dive, everyone. Today, you are looking at a group 00:00:15.730 --> 00:00:18.510 of four men who were so incredibly valuable, 00:00:18.870 --> 00:00:21.170 so completely light years ahead of their competition 00:00:21.170 --> 00:00:25.609 that the press literally dubbed them the $100 00:00:25.609 --> 00:00:28.850 ,000 infield. It's just a phenomenal piece of 00:00:28.850 --> 00:00:33.950 history. It's not just some obscure sports footnote, 00:00:34.070 --> 00:00:36.590 you know? Yeah, definitely not. It is a literal 00:00:36.590 --> 00:00:39.649 master class in market economics, just completely 00:00:39.649 --> 00:00:41.950 colliding with athletic perfection. It says so 00:00:41.950 --> 00:00:43.969 much about not just the game they were playing, 00:00:44.210 --> 00:00:46.869 but the rabid industrialization of the world 00:00:46.869 --> 00:00:48.789 they were living in at the time. Exactly. So 00:00:48.789 --> 00:00:50.990 for this deep dive, we've got a massive stack 00:00:50.990 --> 00:00:53.810 of notes, plus a highly detailed Wikipedia breakdown 00:00:53.810 --> 00:00:56.630 of the early 1910s Philadelphia athletics. Lots 00:00:56.630 --> 00:00:58.619 of ground to cover. For sure. We're tracking 00:00:58.619 --> 00:01:01.600 the rise, the just mind -boggling individual 00:01:01.600 --> 00:01:04.599 stats of these four guys, the way they literally 00:01:04.599 --> 00:01:07.599 reinvented defensive geometry on the field, and, 00:01:07.599 --> 00:01:10.459 well, the brutal financial reality that ultimately 00:01:10.459 --> 00:01:12.519 blew the whole thing up right at their absolute 00:01:12.519 --> 00:01:14.810 peak. Yeah, it's a dramatic arc. It really is. 00:01:14.870 --> 00:01:17.510 OK, let's unpack this, because to understand 00:01:17.510 --> 00:01:20.170 why baseball historian Bill James calls them 00:01:20.170 --> 00:01:23.390 the greatest infield of all time, you first have 00:01:23.390 --> 00:01:25.670 to look at how they were actually built. And, 00:01:25.670 --> 00:01:27.489 you know, it didn't happen overnight. Oh, far 00:01:27.489 --> 00:01:30.310 from it. Manager Connie Mack essentially engineered 00:01:30.310 --> 00:01:32.849 this group piece by piece. Right. You don't just 00:01:32.849 --> 00:01:35.989 like buy a championship roster of this magnitude. 00:01:36.109 --> 00:01:38.030 Right. You cultivated over a span of several 00:01:38.030 --> 00:01:41.209 years. He was looking for a very specific type 00:01:41.209 --> 00:01:43.790 of player, which completely went against the 00:01:43.790 --> 00:01:45.629 grain of how baseball was operating at the turn 00:01:45.629 --> 00:01:47.510 of the century. Which brings up their timeline. 00:01:47.810 --> 00:01:50.209 And this is where I see a massive parallel to, 00:01:50.209 --> 00:01:53.049 like, a modern tech startup. Oh, interesting. 00:01:53.349 --> 00:01:56.049 How so? Well, think about Connie Mack as a visionary 00:01:56.049 --> 00:01:59.049 founder in the early 1900s, right? Baseball back 00:01:59.049 --> 00:02:01.870 then was largely a really gritty working class 00:02:01.870 --> 00:02:06.480 game. Very much so. But Mac, he is actively recruiting 00:02:06.480 --> 00:02:10.120 highly educated elite talent from top tier universities. 00:02:10.340 --> 00:02:12.199 Right. The first piece of the puzzle is Eddie 00:02:12.199 --> 00:02:15.300 Collins. He debuts way back on September 17th, 00:02:15.300 --> 00:02:18.240 1906, coming straight out of Columbia University. 00:02:18.360 --> 00:02:20.580 Yeah, bringing an actual Ivy League intellect 00:02:20.580 --> 00:02:23.780 to the middle of the diamond. Exactly. Then two 00:02:23.780 --> 00:02:28.000 years later in 1908, Mac pulls Jack Barry out 00:02:28.000 --> 00:02:30.080 of the College of the Holy Cross. Another highly 00:02:30.080 --> 00:02:32.729 educated guy. Right. And that exact same year, 00:02:32.949 --> 00:02:35.509 he brings in Frank Baker. And then finally, to 00:02:35.509 --> 00:02:37.210 just complete this whole laboratory experiment, 00:02:37.389 --> 00:02:40.849 he adds this absolute wild card stuffy McInnis. 00:02:40.969 --> 00:02:43.490 Right, the teenager. Yeah, an 18 -year -old teenage 00:02:43.490 --> 00:02:46.830 prodigy who joins the team in 1909 as a backup. 00:02:47.000 --> 00:02:49.979 So Mack is essentially mixing elite collegiate 00:02:49.979 --> 00:02:52.960 intellect with raw, unfiltered teenage talent 00:02:52.960 --> 00:02:55.979 to just disrupt the entire American League. What's 00:02:55.979 --> 00:02:58.360 fascinating here is the sheer intentionality 00:02:58.360 --> 00:03:00.580 of that strategy. Right. I mean, Mack had these 00:03:00.580 --> 00:03:03.000 incredible young assets, but he forced them to 00:03:03.000 --> 00:03:04.780 marinate. He didn't rush the process at all. 00:03:04.819 --> 00:03:07.539 Which is so rare today. Exactly. Like, McGinnis, 00:03:07.560 --> 00:03:09.460 for example, spent his first couple of years 00:03:09.460 --> 00:03:12.360 strictly on the bench backing up Barry at shortstop. 00:03:12.680 --> 00:03:17.319 Wow. Two years just waiting. Yep. Mack was slowly 00:03:17.319 --> 00:03:20.520 phasing out older veterans, just waiting for 00:03:20.520 --> 00:03:23.419 the exact right moment. And that moment finally 00:03:23.419 --> 00:03:26.759 hit in 1911, when Mack made the decisive move 00:03:26.759 --> 00:03:29.379 to insert McInnis as the regular first baseman. 00:03:29.800 --> 00:03:32.479 Replacing Harry Davis, right? Right, who was 00:03:32.479 --> 00:03:34.800 a very popular veteran. But Mack knew it was 00:03:34.800 --> 00:03:37.639 time. The circuit was finally closed. So the 00:03:37.639 --> 00:03:39.500 circuit is closed, the machine is turned on, 00:03:39.520 --> 00:03:41.780 and the output is just terrifying for the rest 00:03:41.780 --> 00:03:43.919 of the league. Absolutely terrifying. We really 00:03:43.919 --> 00:03:45.919 need to look at the mechanics of this ecosystem, 00:03:46.199 --> 00:03:49.400 because you have four highly distinct skill sets 00:03:49.400 --> 00:03:51.979 interlocking flawlessly. Let's do it. Let's start 00:03:51.979 --> 00:03:54.060 with the anchor, Eddie Collins at second base. 00:03:54.659 --> 00:03:58.139 So between 1910 and 1914, he plays 738 games 00:03:58.139 --> 00:04:01.159 and hits .344. We really have to pause on that 00:04:01.159 --> 00:04:02.919 number to appreciate the content. Yeah, please. 00:04:03.280 --> 00:04:06.659 Because it sounds high, but... A .344 batting 00:04:06.659 --> 00:04:08.780 average over a five -year span is staggering 00:04:08.780 --> 00:04:11.139 in any era. But you have to remember, this is 00:04:11.139 --> 00:04:13.860 the dead ball era. The baseball itself was essentially 00:04:13.860 --> 00:04:18.160 a soft, scuffed up lump of yarn. Pitchers were 00:04:18.160 --> 00:04:20.439 actively spitting on it, rubbing it with dirt. 00:04:21.579 --> 00:04:23.639 It was practically invisible by the late innings, 00:04:24.079 --> 00:04:27.040 and it just didn't travel. Runs were at an absolute 00:04:27.040 --> 00:04:30.220 premium. So hitting .344 in that environment. 00:04:30.620 --> 00:04:32.759 It means Collins was diagnosing pitches and placing 00:04:32.759 --> 00:04:35.000 the ball with surgical precision. It's unbelievable. 00:04:35.160 --> 00:04:37.779 And he was a menace on the base paths, too. He 00:04:37.779 --> 00:04:41.980 racked up 922 hits in that five -year span. Wow. 00:04:42.199 --> 00:04:44.560 He led the American League in stolen bases in 00:04:44.560 --> 00:04:49.319 1910, runs in 1912, 1913, and 1914, singles in 00:04:49.319 --> 00:04:52.740 1913, and times on base in 1914. It's truly leadless. 00:04:52.740 --> 00:04:55.459 It's truly. He finished in the top 10. an MVP 00:04:55.459 --> 00:04:58.579 voting every single year from 1911 through 1914, 00:04:58.720 --> 00:05:01.240 and actually took home the actual MVP award in 00:05:01.240 --> 00:05:03.560 1914. He's the ultimate table setter. Exactly. 00:05:03.740 --> 00:05:05.379 And hitting right behind him, you have the heavy 00:05:05.379 --> 00:05:07.540 artillery Frank Baker at third base. The premier 00:05:07.540 --> 00:05:10.000 power hitter of the dead ball era. Baker batted 00:05:10.000 --> 00:05:14.019 .324 in that same five year window, but his true 00:05:14.019 --> 00:05:17.000 differentiator was just raw power. He led the 00:05:17.000 --> 00:05:18.779 American League in home runs every single year 00:05:18.779 --> 00:05:22.089 from 1911 through 1914. And he led the league 00:05:22.089 --> 00:05:27.350 in RBI's in 1912 and 1913. Which earns him literally 00:05:27.350 --> 00:05:29.850 the most literal nickname in sports history, 00:05:30.209 --> 00:05:32.629 Frank Home Run Baker. Right, Home Run Baker. 00:05:32.910 --> 00:05:35.850 Because he hits two home runs in the 1911 World 00:05:35.850 --> 00:05:38.310 Series to become the hero, and the press just 00:05:38.310 --> 00:05:41.089 calls him Home Run forever. Which is so funny. 00:05:41.350 --> 00:05:43.689 It perfectly encapsulates how the game was played 00:05:43.689 --> 00:05:45.569 back then, right? Like hitting two homers in 00:05:45.569 --> 00:05:47.389 a whole series was so mind -blowing, they just 00:05:47.389 --> 00:05:49.430 named you after the concept itself. It was unheard 00:05:49.430 --> 00:05:51.870 of. So you've got Collins creating chaos on the 00:05:51.870 --> 00:05:55.069 bases, Baker driving them in, and over at first 00:05:55.069 --> 00:05:57.649 base, Stuffy McInnis is hitting an incredible 00:05:57.649 --> 00:06:02.230 .321. Also a huge average. But defensively, the 00:06:02.230 --> 00:06:04.730 source material notes, McInnis was a geometric 00:06:04.730 --> 00:06:07.689 nightmare for hitters because of his reach. That's 00:06:07.689 --> 00:06:09.370 the perfect way to describe it. He wasn't just 00:06:09.389 --> 00:06:12.170 throws, you know? Right. His flexibility allowed 00:06:12.170 --> 00:06:14.930 the other infielders to play deeper. If you know 00:06:14.930 --> 00:06:17.250 your first baseman can stretch out like a gymnast 00:06:17.250 --> 00:06:20.110 to dig a ball out of the dirt, you can position 00:06:20.110 --> 00:06:22.970 yourself an extra step or two backward. Ah, okay. 00:06:23.050 --> 00:06:25.709 And that expands your defensive range exponentially. 00:06:26.110 --> 00:06:28.329 Which leads me to a major question I had reading 00:06:28.329 --> 00:06:31.339 through these stats. I really need to push back 00:06:31.339 --> 00:06:33.300 on the fourth guy in this group, Jack Barry. 00:06:33.420 --> 00:06:35.300 OK, let's hear it. We've established Collins 00:06:35.300 --> 00:06:39.480 hitting 0 .344, Baker at 0 .324, McGuinness at 00:06:39.480 --> 00:06:42.519 0 .321. They are offensive tight ends. But then 00:06:42.519 --> 00:06:44.199 you have Jack Barry, the shortstop. He's hitting 00:06:44.199 --> 00:06:47.980 0 .260. Right. Yet the source material explicitly 00:06:47.980 --> 00:06:50.279 notes that Barry still finished in the top 20 00:06:50.279 --> 00:06:53.920 in MVP voting. every single year from 1911 to 00:06:53.920 --> 00:06:57.980 1914 even finishing ninth in 1913. Yes he did. 00:06:58.259 --> 00:07:00.879 How I mean how does a guy hitting point two six 00:07:00.879 --> 00:07:04.100 zero in a lineup of point three two zero plus 00:07:04.100 --> 00:07:07.360 hitters command that kind of MVP respect. Was 00:07:07.360 --> 00:07:10.160 defensive synergy really valued that highly over 00:07:10.160 --> 00:07:12.279 batting averages back then. It absolutely was 00:07:12.279 --> 00:07:14.500 because of how Barry played the position. The 00:07:14.500 --> 00:07:16.420 value wasn't in his values in his processing 00:07:16.420 --> 00:07:19.060 speed and his arm. OK. Barry was defensive innovator. 00:07:19.300 --> 00:07:21.279 We mentioned earlier that mocked. drafted these 00:07:21.279 --> 00:07:23.040 guys from Columbia and Holland Cross, right? 00:07:23.060 --> 00:07:26.240 The Ivy League intellect. Exactly. That intellect 00:07:26.240 --> 00:07:28.819 translated directly to the dirt. Barry and Collins 00:07:28.819 --> 00:07:31.439 actually invented defensive plays together. Like 00:07:31.439 --> 00:07:34.800 what? Like a highly specific trap. to kill the 00:07:34.800 --> 00:07:37.160 double steal. The double steal defense? Yes. 00:07:37.240 --> 00:07:38.800 Let's actually walk through the mechanics of 00:07:38.800 --> 00:07:41.040 that because it's brilliant. It really is. Normally, 00:07:41.199 --> 00:07:43.519 if the offense has runners on first and third 00:07:43.519 --> 00:07:46.759 and the guy on first breaks for second, it puts 00:07:46.759 --> 00:07:49.279 the defense in a terrible bind. Because you have 00:07:49.279 --> 00:07:51.160 to make a choice. Right. If the catcher throws 00:07:51.160 --> 00:07:54.319 to second base to get the out, the guy on third 00:07:54.319 --> 00:07:57.620 instantly sprints home to score. Exactly. It 00:07:57.620 --> 00:08:00.199 forces the defense to choose between giving up 00:08:00.199 --> 00:08:03.490 a base or giving up a run. Which is the Leeslews. 00:08:03.569 --> 00:08:07.269 It is. So what Barry and Collins designed was 00:08:07.269 --> 00:08:10.470 a calibrated funnel to weaponize the offense's 00:08:10.470 --> 00:08:13.230 aggression. Okay, how did that work? They choreographed 00:08:13.230 --> 00:08:16.670 a play where the second baseman Collins would 00:08:16.670 --> 00:08:20.009 sprint toward the bag to look like he was taking 00:08:20.009 --> 00:08:22.050 the throw. Drawing the runner off third base? 00:08:22.290 --> 00:08:25.379 Precisely. But Barry... the shortstop, would 00:08:25.379 --> 00:08:28.899 deliberately cut across the throwing lane, intercept 00:08:28.899 --> 00:08:30.620 the catcher's thrower before it ever reached 00:08:30.620 --> 00:08:33.279 second base, and instantly fire it back home 00:08:33.279 --> 00:08:35.500 to gun down the lead runner. It's a total bait 00:08:35.500 --> 00:08:37.919 and switch. Completely. They created an illusion. 00:08:38.360 --> 00:08:41.059 That is exactly why Barry was getting MVP votes. 00:08:41.480 --> 00:08:43.519 You combine his massive range and his baseball 00:08:43.519 --> 00:08:46.539 IQ with McGuinness's exceptional reach at first 00:08:46.539 --> 00:08:49.179 base, and you have this impenetrable defensive 00:08:49.179 --> 00:08:52.299 trap. Exactly. Barry didn't need to hit .340 00:08:52.299 --> 00:08:55.139 because his defensive innovations were suffocating 00:08:55.139 --> 00:08:57.419 the other team's run production. Right. He was 00:08:57.419 --> 00:09:00.019 the structural integrity of the entire operation. 00:09:00.100 --> 00:09:02.299 And the ultimate proof of that system is the 00:09:02.299 --> 00:09:04.200 hardware they collected. I mean, when you zoom 00:09:04.200 --> 00:09:06.220 out and look at the collective success of this 00:09:06.220 --> 00:09:08.860 ecosystem, it is just staggering. The numbers 00:09:08.860 --> 00:09:11.779 speak for themselves. Between 1910 and 1914, 00:09:12.159 --> 00:09:14.399 the Philadelphia Athletics won four American 00:09:14.399 --> 00:09:19.500 League pennants, 1910, 1911, 1913 and 1914. Dumb. 00:09:19.470 --> 00:09:22.830 And they won three World Series titles in 1910, 00:09:23.110 --> 00:09:25.710 1911, and 1913. Complete and utter domination. 00:09:26.070 --> 00:09:29.470 Yeah. Bill James, the legendary baseball historian, 00:09:29.769 --> 00:09:32.250 he actually ranks the 1914 edition of this group 00:09:32.250 --> 00:09:34.710 as the number one greatest infield of all time. 00:09:34.809 --> 00:09:37.950 The best ever. And he ranks the 1912 and 1913 00:09:37.950 --> 00:09:40.389 editions in the top five. Like, they weren't 00:09:40.389 --> 00:09:43.149 just the best in their era, they are statistically 00:09:43.149 --> 00:09:45.649 considered the absolute pinnacle of baseball 00:09:45.649 --> 00:09:48.429 history. They were a perfectly calibrated machine. 00:09:48.690 --> 00:09:50.889 Here's where it gets really interesting though. 00:09:50.929 --> 00:09:53.549 Okay. We have to talk about the money. Ah, yes. 00:09:54.169 --> 00:09:57.029 The name. Right. According to the Encyclopedia 00:09:57.029 --> 00:10:01.970 Britannica, that famous $100 ,000 infield nickname 00:10:01.970 --> 00:10:04.970 reflected the purported combined market value 00:10:04.970 --> 00:10:08.669 of these four guys. $100 ,000. Which was a massive 00:10:08.669 --> 00:10:11.710 sum. Huge. But when you adjust that for inflation 00:10:11.710 --> 00:10:16.350 to $2024, it equates to about $2 .44 million. 00:10:16.929 --> 00:10:19.590 Wow. Think about the irony there for a modern 00:10:19.590 --> 00:10:24.259 sports fan. Today, $2 .44 million is what a team 00:10:24.259 --> 00:10:26.539 might pay, like a middle -ending relief pitcher 00:10:26.539 --> 00:10:29.200 or a backup utility guy to sit on the bench. 00:10:29.539 --> 00:10:31.740 Barely enough for backup these days. Right. But 00:10:31.740 --> 00:10:34.759 back in the early 1910s, that was the awe -inspiring 00:10:34.759 --> 00:10:37.240 astronomical valuation for the four best players 00:10:37.240 --> 00:10:39.700 on the planet combined. The contrast is striking, 00:10:39.799 --> 00:10:41.740 for sure, but if we connect this to the bigger 00:10:41.740 --> 00:10:43.980 picture, that nickname was entirely double -edged. 00:10:44.019 --> 00:10:47.529 How so? Yes. It was a testament to their unparalleled 00:10:47.529 --> 00:10:50.809 skill, but it was also a massive glowing price 00:10:50.809 --> 00:10:54.389 tag. When you define a group of men by their 00:10:54.389 --> 00:10:57.210 monetary value in the press and the public eye, 00:10:57.950 --> 00:11:00.870 economics will inevitably override athletics. 00:11:01.129 --> 00:11:03.210 Oh, that makes sense. The public was marveling 00:11:03.210 --> 00:11:06.169 at this hundred thousand dollar valuation, but 00:11:06.169 --> 00:11:08.190 the players themselves were listening, too. They 00:11:08.190 --> 00:11:12.159 weren't dumb. Exactly. Remember. Ivy League intellects. 00:11:12.159 --> 00:11:14.360 They realized they were generating massive revenue 00:11:14.360 --> 00:11:16.559 for the franchise, but they weren't seeing it 00:11:16.559 --> 00:11:18.559 reflected in their paychecks. Which leads us 00:11:18.559 --> 00:11:21.200 directly into the tragedy of this story. A fall. 00:11:21.399 --> 00:11:23.440 The sudden brutal collapse of the whole thing 00:11:23.440 --> 00:11:26.240 because the hundred thousand dollar infield Wasn't 00:11:26.240 --> 00:11:28.299 beaten by a better team and they didn't just 00:11:28.299 --> 00:11:30.460 age out of their prime. They were destroyed by 00:11:30.460 --> 00:11:32.700 the harsh realities of sports economics Yeah, 00:11:32.799 --> 00:11:34.480 and the Braving Point really kicks off with them 00:11:34.480 --> 00:11:37.500 shockingly losing the 1914 World Series It was 00:11:37.500 --> 00:11:40.960 a grueling sweep by the Boston Braves which completely 00:11:40.960 --> 00:11:43.639 shattered their aura of invincibility that loss 00:11:43.639 --> 00:11:45.899 shook the foundation certainly Yeah, but the 00:11:45.899 --> 00:11:47.820 real earthquake was happening in the front offices 00:11:47.820 --> 00:11:50.700 with the emergence of the Federal League This 00:11:50.700 --> 00:11:54.620 was a newly formed third major league that decided 00:11:54.620 --> 00:11:56.779 the fastest way to compete with the established 00:11:56.779 --> 00:11:59.700 American and national leagues was to just outbid 00:11:59.700 --> 00:12:03.039 them for top -tier talent. And suddenly, Connie 00:12:03.039 --> 00:12:05.600 Mack's perfectly balanced ecosystem is under 00:12:05.600 --> 00:12:08.600 siege. You have this rival federal league offering 00:12:08.600 --> 00:12:12.200 enormous, unprecedented contracts. Money they 00:12:12.200 --> 00:12:14.200 had never seen before. For the first time in 00:12:14.200 --> 00:12:16.960 baseball history, these players have massive 00:12:16.960 --> 00:12:19.720 leverage. If Mack won't pay them what the newly 00:12:19.720 --> 00:12:22.379 disrupted market dictates, they can simply threaten 00:12:22.379 --> 00:12:25.480 to jump ship. And Mack found himself in an impossible 00:12:25.480 --> 00:12:27.500 position financially. Because he couldn't match 00:12:27.500 --> 00:12:30.580 it. Right. In the 1910s, baseball owners didn't 00:12:30.580 --> 00:12:33.220 have multi -billion dollar television broadcasting 00:12:33.220 --> 00:12:36.539 deals or massive corporate sponsorships to fall 00:12:36.539 --> 00:12:39.220 back on. It was all ticket sales. Almost entirely 00:12:39.220 --> 00:12:42.500 tied to gate receipts, daily ticket sales. Mack 00:12:42.500 --> 00:12:44.559 couldn't simply absorb a massive spike in his 00:12:44.559 --> 00:12:46.519 payroll to match these federal league offers 00:12:46.519 --> 00:12:49.080 because his stadium only held a finite number 00:12:49.080 --> 00:12:51.320 of people. He could only charge so much for a 00:12:51.320 --> 00:12:54.039 ticket. Exactly. He was completely financially 00:12:54.039 --> 00:12:56.899 squeezed. So rather than bleed money trying to 00:12:56.899 --> 00:13:00.120 keep them, Mack initiates one of the most infamous 00:13:00.120 --> 00:13:02.659 fire sales in sports history. It was brutal. 00:13:02.879 --> 00:13:06.129 And the speed of it is just dizzying. Right after 00:13:06.129 --> 00:13:09.710 that 1914 World Series loss, Mack sells Eddie 00:13:09.710 --> 00:13:12.490 Collins, the reigning league MVP, mind you, to 00:13:12.490 --> 00:13:15.009 the Chicago White Sox. Just gone. Then, right 00:13:15.009 --> 00:13:17.909 in the middle of the 1915 season, he sells his 00:13:17.909 --> 00:13:20.450 defensive maestro, Jack Barry, to the Boston 00:13:20.450 --> 00:13:23.330 Red Sox. Which brings us to Frank Baker, whose 00:13:23.330 --> 00:13:25.629 response to this situation is perhaps the most 00:13:25.629 --> 00:13:28.570 defining moment of player agency in this entire 00:13:28.570 --> 00:13:31.200 saga. Oh, I love this part. Baker. didn't get 00:13:31.200 --> 00:13:33.899 sold off immediately. Instead, he demanded a 00:13:33.899 --> 00:13:36.419 salary increase that Connie Mack flatly refused 00:13:36.419 --> 00:13:38.820 to pay. And Baper doesn't just complain to the 00:13:38.820 --> 00:13:41.379 press. He literally packs up and goes home. Yeah, 00:13:41.519 --> 00:13:44.740 he does. He holds out for the entire 1915 season. 00:13:45.000 --> 00:13:46.539 Think about what that meant if you were a player 00:13:46.539 --> 00:13:48.799 back then. You are the premier power hitter of 00:13:48.799 --> 00:13:51.480 your generation at the absolute physical peak 00:13:51.480 --> 00:13:54.059 of your career, and you voluntarily sit out a 00:13:54.059 --> 00:13:56.360 full year. He just stayed at his farm in Maryland. 00:13:56.559 --> 00:13:59.440 Just farming. The fans were completely stunned. 00:13:59.759 --> 00:14:02.399 It's a staggering display of leverage and sheer 00:14:02.399 --> 00:14:05.909 stubbornness. Baker inherently understood his 00:14:05.909 --> 00:14:08.950 worth. He knew the athletics needed his bat far 00:14:08.950 --> 00:14:11.450 more than he needed Connie Mack's lowball contract 00:14:11.450 --> 00:14:14.409 offer. This wasn't just a minor contract dispute. 00:14:14.509 --> 00:14:16.769 It was a standoff that threatened the competitive 00:14:16.769 --> 00:14:19.710 integrity of the entire American League. It got 00:14:19.710 --> 00:14:23.269 so bad and the standoff lasted so long that Ben 00:14:23.269 --> 00:14:26.049 Johnson, the powerful president of the American 00:14:26.049 --> 00:14:28.879 League, personally had to step in and mediate 00:14:28.879 --> 00:14:31.220 the situation. It literally takes the president 00:14:31.220 --> 00:14:33.879 of the league to end the standoff. Yep. Johnson 00:14:33.879 --> 00:14:37.679 finally brokers a deal in 1916 and Baker is sold 00:14:37.679 --> 00:14:40.399 to the New York Yankees, which leaves Stuffy 00:14:40.399 --> 00:14:42.679 McInnis as the lone survivor of the original 00:14:42.679 --> 00:14:44.679 four in Philadelphia. The last man standing. 00:14:44.860 --> 00:14:47.320 He sticks around until 1918 before he's eventually 00:14:47.320 --> 00:14:50.440 traded to the Red Sox, too. The dynasty is officially 00:14:50.440 --> 00:14:53.360 dismantled, piece by piece. This raises an important 00:14:53.360 --> 00:14:55.620 question regarding how we view sports history 00:14:55.620 --> 00:14:58.899 as fans. OK, what's that? We love to romanticize 00:14:58.899 --> 00:15:01.620 team loyalty. Fans want to believe that athletes 00:15:01.620 --> 00:15:04.080 play purely for the love of the city or the logo 00:15:04.080 --> 00:15:05.740 on the front of the jersey. Right, the romance 00:15:05.740 --> 00:15:09.179 of the game. But the saga of the $100 ,000 infield 00:15:09.179 --> 00:15:12.220 teaches us that underneath the romance, these 00:15:12.220 --> 00:15:15.129 are labor disputes. Yeah. The nickname they were 00:15:15.129 --> 00:15:17.529 given was meant to marvel at how expensive they 00:15:17.529 --> 00:15:20.490 were. But it actually taught the players that 00:15:20.490 --> 00:15:23.269 they were being drastically undervalued by their 00:15:23.269 --> 00:15:26.190 owner. When the Federal League provided the competition 00:15:26.190 --> 00:15:29.269 necessary to expose that wage suppression, the 00:15:29.269 --> 00:15:30.970 players realized they didn't have to settle. 00:15:31.049 --> 00:15:33.090 That is a brilliant way to look at it. They became 00:15:33.090 --> 00:15:35.529 acutely aware of the price tag hanging around 00:15:35.529 --> 00:15:37.710 their necks. Exactly. And what proves that this 00:15:37.710 --> 00:15:40.350 was purely about money and not about a decline 00:15:40.350 --> 00:15:42.570 in skill is what happened next. It's not like 00:15:42.570 --> 00:15:44.379 Connie Mack traded them. because they were washed 00:15:44.379 --> 00:15:46.519 up. Oh no, the talent was absolutely still there. 00:15:46.740 --> 00:15:48.620 Eddie Collins goes on to win more championships 00:15:48.620 --> 00:15:50.820 with the White Sox and eventually returns to 00:15:50.820 --> 00:15:53.799 the athletics years later to win even more rings 00:15:53.799 --> 00:15:56.399 in 1929 and 1930. And it's the Hall of Fame. 00:15:56.570 --> 00:16:00.129 Right. In 1939, Frank Baker goes to the Yankees, 00:16:00.269 --> 00:16:03.370 wins pennants, and hits the Hall of Fame in 1955. 00:16:03.549 --> 00:16:06.549 Incredible. And Jack Barry and Stuffy McInnis. 00:16:06.990 --> 00:16:09.669 They actually reunite in Boston and win a World 00:16:09.669 --> 00:16:12.210 Series together with the Red Sox. They were champions 00:16:12.210 --> 00:16:14.769 before, during, and after their time together. 00:16:15.049 --> 00:16:17.809 Exactly. The athletics management simply couldn't 00:16:17.809 --> 00:16:20.690 afford to keep all that championship DNA under 00:16:20.690 --> 00:16:23.309 one roof once the free market intervened. It's 00:16:23.309 --> 00:16:26.590 true. So what does this all mean? We look back 00:16:26.590 --> 00:16:29.990 at the early 1910s and we see a five year window 00:16:29.990 --> 00:16:33.149 that was essentially lightning in a bottle. For 00:16:33.149 --> 00:16:37.100 five fleeting years, four men Collins, Baker, 00:16:37.559 --> 00:16:40.679 Berry, and McInnis formed a perfectly interlocking 00:16:40.679 --> 00:16:43.480 baseball machine. A literal machine. They dominated 00:16:43.480 --> 00:16:45.860 the sport, they literally invented new geometric 00:16:45.860 --> 00:16:48.179 ways to play the infield, and they captured three 00:16:48.179 --> 00:16:50.759 World Series titles. Only to be ripped apart 00:16:50.759 --> 00:16:52.899 by the exact same market forces that made them 00:16:52.899 --> 00:16:56.179 so famous to begin with. It is a beautiful, brutal 00:16:56.179 --> 00:16:59.379 chapter of sports history. An era -defining collision 00:16:59.379 --> 00:17:02.500 of elite athletic talent and cold, hard economics 00:17:02.500 --> 00:17:04.480 that we may never see replicated in quite the 00:17:04.480 --> 00:17:06.650 same way. I want to leave you with a final thought 00:17:06.650 --> 00:17:08.910 to mull over today. Imagine an alternate history. 00:17:09.029 --> 00:17:11.289 Think about the New York Yankees of the 1920s 00:17:11.289 --> 00:17:14.529 with Babe Ruth and Lou Gehrig, or the 1990s Chicago 00:17:14.529 --> 00:17:17.799 Bulls. The Great Dynasties. Dynasties that were 00:17:17.799 --> 00:17:20.980 largely allowed to stay together and build compounding 00:17:20.980 --> 00:17:24.079 historic legacies. If the Federal League hadn't 00:17:24.079 --> 00:17:27.000 emerged in 1914 to artificially spike the market, 00:17:27.440 --> 00:17:29.640 if Connie Mack had somehow found the money to 00:17:29.640 --> 00:17:32.180 pay his guys what they were actually worth, how 00:17:32.180 --> 00:17:34.660 many more consecutive championships could Collins, 00:17:34.980 --> 00:17:37.180 Baker, Berry, and McGuinness have won together? 00:17:37.339 --> 00:17:39.660 It's a fascinating what if. Would we look back 00:17:39.660 --> 00:17:41.660 at them today and consider them not just the 00:17:41.660 --> 00:17:44.259 greatest infield of all time, but the undisputed 00:17:44.259 --> 00:17:46.339 core of the greatest single team in the entire 00:17:46.339 --> 00:17:48.779 history of sports? Thank you for joining us on 00:17:48.779 --> 00:17:51.259 this deep dive. Keep asking questions, keep exploring, 00:17:51.480 --> 00:17:52.339 and we'll see you next time.