WEBVTT

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Welcome to the Deep Dive. We are, we're really

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glad you're here with us today. Absolutely. Because

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today we have a mission. We are taking a dense,

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frankly massive, historical source, a very detailed

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breakdown of the 1917 Second Battle of the Aisne.

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It is a massive source. Yeah, it's huge. And

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we are going to unpack the incredible strategic

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blunders, the tactical innovations, and really

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the truly shocking human elements hidden right

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inside of it. to kind of set the stage for you.

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We are looking at the spring of 1917 on the Western

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front of World War I. Right. And at this point,

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the British and the French are absolutely desperate

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to end the brutal grinding stalemate against

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the German army. The bloodbaths of Verdun and

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the Somme have already taken a horrific toll

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in the previous year. Horrific. Yeah. And the

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pressure to finally achieve a breakthrough is

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immense. It is the ultimate strategic pressure

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cooker. But we aren't just here to recite a timeline

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of a battle to you. No, definitely not. This

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deep dive, it's really a profound case study

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in the dangers of hubris. It explores the intense

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friction between rigid, top -down planning and

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ground -level adaptability. And it ultimately

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reveals how the very way we frame success or

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failure can be manipulated by the way history

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is written. Exactly. OK, let's unpack this. We

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have to start with the architect of this entire

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offensive, French general Robert Nivelle. Right,

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Nivelle. He had just replaced Joseph Joffrey

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as commander in chief of the French army in December

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of 1916. And Nivelle looks across the trenches

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at a German army that is, you know, exhausted

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from Verdun, and he makes a wild, almost unbelievable

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promise. Oh, it's wild. He claims he has the

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precise formula for a breakthrough offensive

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that will definitively end the war in 24 to 48

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hours. A 48 -hour promise in the middle of a

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war defined by months -long stalemates. Which

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is just crazy to think about. It really is. I

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mean, Neville had achieved localized success

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at Verdun using a concentrated creeping artillery

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barrage, and he was convinced that simply scaling

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up that specific method would inflict a decisive

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war -ending defeat on the German Empire. He was

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banking entirely on overwhelming mass and speed.

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Yeah. And the sheer scale of what he is proposing

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to pull off in those 48 hours is staggering.

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We are talking about marshaling 1 .2 million

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French troops, 1 .2 million, 1 .2 million men

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and 7000 guns stretched across the front from

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Reims to Roy. Getting all those men and all that

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artillery into position is a logistical mountain.

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It requires perfect execution, which is why highly

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experienced figures in the French command structure.

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structure, were horrified by the plan. They saw

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the red flags right away. Absolutely. War Minister

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Hubert Liotti and Chief of Staff General Philippe

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Petain looked at the logistics, the terrain and

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the actual conditions on the ground and concluded

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it was entirely premature. Right. They saw a

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supply chain that simply couldn't support an

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advance of that speed. And they also knew the

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recent Russian revolution was pulling pressure

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off the eastern front, which was allowing the

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Germans to shift reinforcements to the west.

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And this pushback from the military realism camp

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actually triggered a massive political crisis.

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It did. War Minister Liotti clashed so intensely

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with the Chamber of Deputies over the secrecy

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and the viability of Nivelle's plan that he resigned

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in mid -March. His walk away. Rocked away. And

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that single resignation was the domino that caused

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the entire government under Aristide Briand to

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collapse. Nivelle remained completely unyielding.

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Totally unyielding. He threatened to resign his

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command if his grand offensive wasn't approved?

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Because he was viewed as the hero of Verdun and

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had the enthusiastic backing of the British Prime

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Minister David Lloyd George. Who wanted to subordinate

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the British military to French command? Right,

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exactly. So the newly formed French government

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felt they had no political choice but to green

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light the operation. It's a terrifying scenario.

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You have this charismatic leader selling a high

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stakes, rapid timeline victory to a desperate

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government. And he's completely overriding the

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tactical commanders who are waving red flags

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about the actual conditions on the battlefield.

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Yeah. And while Navelle is fighting these political

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battles in Paris, Ludendorff and Hindenburg are

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looking at the exact same map. And they're not

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just sitting idle. Not at all. The German High

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Command anticipated the blow. Instead of absorbing

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it on unfavorable ground, they executed Operation

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Alberich. Operation Alberich. Yes, which was

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a massive strategic retreat to the highly fortified

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Hindenburg Line, known to them as the Siegfried

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Stelling. And as they fell back, they didn't

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just abandon the territory. They engineered a

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belt of devastated earth up to 40 kilometers

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deep, directly in front of the advancing French

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forces. They made it impossible to traverse.

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Poisoned wells, mined the roads, leveled entire

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villages. They turned the ground Nivelle needed

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to cross into an absolute wasteland. But the

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geography of that retreat is the real master

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stroke. It really is. By falling back to a straighter,

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pre -prepared line, the Germans shortened their

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own defensive front by about 40 kilometers. Which

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changes everything. What's fascinating here is

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the cascading mathematical effect of yielding

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that territory. Shortening the line immediately

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freed up 13 to 14 German divisions. Wow. Suddenly,

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the German garrison defending the Aisne sector

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is bulked up to 38 divisions facing the 53 French

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divisions. So that overwhelming numerical advantage

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Nivelle was banking on started evaporating before

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the French even finalized their deployment. Evaporated.

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And beyond the troop numbers, the Germans completely

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rewrote the doctrine of how to fight a defensive

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war. Because the French are planning a massive

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heavy artillery bombardment to obliterate the

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front line. Right. But Hindenburg and Ludendorff

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had realized the immense material strength of

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the allied artillery made traditional static

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trench defense suicidal. You just sit there and

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get blown up. Exactly. So they published new

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defensive manuals, specifically the conduct of

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the defensive battle in late 1916 and early 1917.

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Key figures like Ludendorff and von Lohsberg

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were instrumental here. And the rigid defend

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the front line at all costs mentality was completely

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abandoned. Abandoned. They formalized what military

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historians now call defense in depth. The mechanics

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of defense in depth are brilliant in their lethality.

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Instead of packing your infantry into the front

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line to be slaughtered by a creeping barrage,

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you hold the very front extremely lightly. Right.

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You absorb the initial attack, let the enemy

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stretch their supply lines and exhaust themselves

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pushing forward. And then you strike back with

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overwhelming force while they are disorganized.

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And the tactical vocabulary they developed for

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this doctrine is still studied today. That lightly

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held front area became the four post and field

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or. outpost zone, manned only by sentries and

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small detachments acting as a net. Yes, and the

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main line of resistance was deliberately hidden

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on a reverse slope. This meant the defensive

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emplacements were on the back side of the ridges,

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which completely neutralizes the French artillery.

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The French spotters can't see over the ridge

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to pinpoint the defensive emplacements, making

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their bombardments largely blind. Exactly the

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point of the doctrine. Behind that reverse slope

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was the gross camp zone. The deep battle zone.

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The gross camp zone. Right, a web of fortified

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strong points where fresh relief divisions waited

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to launch immediate decentralized counterattacks.

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The gangstos. Yes, striking the exhausted French

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infantry the moment they crested the hills. And

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the physical terrain of the Ainz Offensive made

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this defensive doctrine even more devastating.

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The main objective was the Chemin des Dames.

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An 80 kilometer east -west ridge that had been

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quarried for stone for centuries. Which is key.

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The Germans weren't just digging dirt trenches,

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they were fortifying a massive ancient warren

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of underground caves and tunnels. Completely

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immune to the French high explosive shells. So

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we see the catastrophic result of these two opposing

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philosophies colliding on April 16th, 1917. Nivelle's

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grand offensive kicks off at 6 a .m. And the

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conditions are uniquely terrible. It is cold

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rain alternating with driving snow showers. The

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French infantry is advancing under a tactical

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doctrine of brutal A continue. A brutal and continuous

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assault meant to shatter the enemy in one fluid,

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unstoppable motion. But a continuous assault

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relies on the artillery destroying the obstacles

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in front of the infantry. Right. Because of the

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snow, the rain, and the fact that the German

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lines were hidden on those reverse slopes. The

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French artillery simply couldn't hit the targets.

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They couldn't see them. No. The creeping barrage

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moved forward on a strict timetable, but the

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infantry bogged down in mud and facing intact

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defenses couldn't keep up. The artillery moved

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on, leaving the advancing French troops completely

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exposed. The French troops crest the ridge expecting

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the German defenses to be shattered. Instead,

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the German machine gunners simply bring their

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weapons up from the deep stone quarries and open

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fire directly into the advancing lines. It's

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devastating. The infantry is met with a wall

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of organized resistance they were promised had

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been wiped out. And the sheer tactical mismatch

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of the battle is perhaps best illustrated by

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the French deployment of their early armor. Yes,

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let's talk about the tanks. They utilized the

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Schneider and Saint -Germain tanks, hoping this

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new technology would break the deadlock. But

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south of the Miette River, 23 of these French

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tanks were destroyed almost immediately. While

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they were still assembling behind their own front

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lines. Exactly. They haven't even crossed no

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man's land, and the heavy armor is already being

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systematically picked off. Because the German

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artillery observers were perched high up on the

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east end of the ridge at Crohn, they had a perfect

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unimpeded vantage point of the valley below.

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They could see everything. They watched the French

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tanks marshaling in the staging areas and simply

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directed highly accurate artillery fire straight

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down onto them. And the few tanks that did survive

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the initial barrage couldn't advance through

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the turned up mud, right? They basically just

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acted as stationary pillboxes to help the desperate

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infantry fight off the German counterattacks.

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It's a complete structural failure of the offensive.

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The French artillery is firing blind into empty

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slopes. The observation planes are grounded by

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the snow or shot down by German air superiority.

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Meanwhile, the German machine gunners and artillery

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observers have perfect visibility and highly

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fortified subterranean positions. The Slaughter

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immediate. Immediate and massive. By May 10th

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the French Army suffered an overall casualty

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rate of 20 % with some frontline divisions hitting

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a devastating 60%. The human cost of the offensive

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was astronomical. Over the course of the battle,

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it resulted in roughly 187 ,000 French casualties

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and 163 ,000 German casualties. The Western Front

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had just consumed hundreds of thousands more

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men for minimal territorial gain. Yeah. And here's

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where it gets really interesting. General Nivelle

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had explicitly promised these men a breakthrough

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in 48 hours. He told them this was it? He told

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them this was the final push, the battle that

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would end the war. When they found themselves

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dying in the freezing mud against uncut barbed

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wire, fighting a hidden enemy, the psychological

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collapse across the French military was unprecedented.

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The army simply broke. On May 3rd, the French

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Second Division, which was a veteran unit that

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had already suffered terrible losses, refused

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orders to attack. They just refused. And it is

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crucial to understand the nature of this mutiny.

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This wasn't an armed, violent rebellion aiming

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to march on Paris and overthrow the government.

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It was largely passive resistance. It was a military

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strike. The soldiers essentially drew a line

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in the sand. They agreed to hold the trenches

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and defend France against German assaults, but

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they flatly refused to participate in another

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suicidal, futile offensive over the top. And

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that passive resistance spread like a contagion.

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Across dozens of divisions, men were refusing

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to attack, singing revolutionary songs, or simply

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ignoring their officers. It created an existential

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crisis for the French command. Huge crisis. If

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Ludendorff had realized the true extent of the

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paralysis, that half the French army was effectively

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on strike, the Germans could have launched an

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offensive and potentially march straight to Paris.

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The level of secrecy required to keep that mutiny

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hidden from the German intelligence network is

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staggering. Truly. But internally, the political

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fallout is immediate. By May 16th, General Nivelle

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is sacked. He is removed from command entirely

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and eventually shipped off to a posting in North

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Africa. General Philippe Petain, the very man

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who had warned against the plan from the beginning,

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is appointed commander -in -chief. And Petain

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inherited a fractured, demoralized military.

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He immediately implemented a strategy he called

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healing and defense. Healing and defense? Yes.

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He knew he had to improve the lived reality of

00:12:50.009 --> 00:12:52.190
these soldiers to win back their compliance,

00:12:52.549 --> 00:12:55.350
so he implemented desperately needed welfare

00:12:55.350 --> 00:12:58.610
reforms. He overhauled the logistics of the soldiers'

00:12:58.889 --> 00:13:01.370
daily life. He ensured the men got better food,

00:13:01.730 --> 00:13:04.110
increased their pay, built actual rest camps

00:13:04.110 --> 00:13:07.009
behind the lines. And completely revamped the

00:13:07.009 --> 00:13:09.169
leave system, so... Soldiers actually got to

00:13:09.169 --> 00:13:11.470
go home to their families. Which was huge for

00:13:11.470 --> 00:13:15.250
morale. Massive. He also paused all major costly

00:13:15.250 --> 00:13:17.350
offenses to conserve the strength of the infantry.

00:13:18.070 --> 00:13:19.769
But Petain was still a general in the middle

00:13:19.769 --> 00:13:22.570
of a world war dealing with mass insubordination.

00:13:22.769 --> 00:13:25.149
Right. He couldn't just ignore it. He calculated

00:13:25.149 --> 00:13:27.250
that he couldn't simply hand out better rations

00:13:27.250 --> 00:13:30.610
and let a mutiny go unpunished. The discipline

00:13:30.610 --> 00:13:33.190
he enforced to restore the chain of command was

00:13:33.190 --> 00:13:36.090
brutal and highly calculated. He orchestrates

00:13:36.090 --> 00:13:39.029
a series of strict court marshals. Thousands

00:13:39.029 --> 00:13:41.509
of men are tried for mutiny. And while the vast

00:13:41.509 --> 00:13:43.370
majority of the death sentences are commuted

00:13:43.370 --> 00:13:46.129
by the president of France, Petain ensures that

00:13:46.129 --> 00:13:49.769
between 40 and 62 mutineers are executed by firing

00:13:49.769 --> 00:13:54.029
squad. He deliberately targeted perceived ringleaders

00:13:54.029 --> 00:13:56.629
to make a fatal example of them. To send a message.

00:13:56.889 --> 00:13:59.960
Exactly. He kept the number of executions relatively

00:13:59.960 --> 00:14:02.360
low compared to the scale of the mutiny, but

00:14:02.360 --> 00:14:04.679
made them highly visible to terrify the rest

00:14:04.679 --> 00:14:07.440
of the army back into strict obedience while

00:14:07.440 --> 00:14:09.620
simultaneously improving their living conditions.

00:14:09.919 --> 00:14:12.879
It was a dark logistical master class in restoring

00:14:12.879 --> 00:14:15.919
military order. It really was. So history paints

00:14:15.919 --> 00:14:19.519
Nivelle as the ultimate villain of 1917 and this

00:14:19.519 --> 00:14:22.639
offensive as a complete unmitigated catastrophe.

00:14:23.220 --> 00:14:25.220
But looking at the sources, particularly the

00:14:25.220 --> 00:14:27.250
territorial gains the French did manage to seize

00:14:27.250 --> 00:14:29.889
and hold, it raises a really compelling question.

00:14:30.090 --> 00:14:32.870
It does. Are we misjudging the Ayn offensive

00:14:32.870 --> 00:14:35.509
just because of how the historical timeline is

00:14:35.509 --> 00:14:38.470
cut off? Was it really a total failure? It's

00:14:38.470 --> 00:14:40.730
a crucial question regarding historical framing.

00:14:41.730 --> 00:14:44.210
Because if we look strictly at the tactical reality

00:14:44.210 --> 00:14:46.970
at the end of May, the French actually achieved

00:14:46.970 --> 00:14:49.769
significant operational goals. They did. They

00:14:49.769 --> 00:14:53.330
took around 29 ,000 German prisoners and captured

00:14:53.330 --> 00:14:57.559
187 artillery pieces. And strategically, they

00:14:57.559 --> 00:15:00.139
forced the Germans out of the most heavily fortified

00:15:00.139 --> 00:15:02.960
positions on the Chemin -de -Dame ridge. They

00:15:02.960 --> 00:15:05.080
took ground the Germans had spent two entire

00:15:05.080 --> 00:15:08.039
years turning into a subterranean fortress. They

00:15:08.039 --> 00:15:10.120
pushed the Germans off the most advantageous

00:15:10.120 --> 00:15:12.179
parts of the ridge and forced them to cling to

00:15:12.179 --> 00:15:14.860
the vulnerable northern and eastern edges. Right.

00:15:14.899 --> 00:15:17.500
If we connect this to the bigger picture, historian

00:15:17.500 --> 00:15:20.700
Andrew Uffendale's 2015 analysis is incredibly

00:15:20.700 --> 00:15:23.440
revealing. Standard military histories draw a

00:15:23.440 --> 00:15:25.820
hard line and end the narrative of the second

00:15:25.820 --> 00:15:28.259
battle of the Aisne in mid -May. And ending the

00:15:28.259 --> 00:15:30.460
narrative in May guarantees the story is solely

00:15:30.460 --> 00:15:33.039
about Nivelle's hubris, the horrific casualty

00:15:33.039 --> 00:15:36.139
rates, and the army mutinies. But O 'Fadil argues

00:15:36.139 --> 00:15:39.000
that this cutoff is politically convenient. It

00:15:39.000 --> 00:15:41.860
creates a clean, simple narrative of failure.

00:15:42.059 --> 00:15:44.740
A neat little bow. Exactly. Because if you look

00:15:44.740 --> 00:15:46.779
just a few months down the timeline to October

00:15:46.779 --> 00:15:50.379
of 1917, you find the Battle of La Malmaison.

00:15:50.590 --> 00:15:53.769
In October, the French launch a highly coordinated

00:15:53.769 --> 00:15:56.769
attack, and they use the exact ground they bled

00:15:56.769 --> 00:15:59.860
for in April and May. the ground Nivelle's offensive

00:15:59.860 --> 00:16:02.600
captured as their strategic jumping off point.

00:16:02.899 --> 00:16:05.659
And that October offensive was a resounding success.

00:16:06.059 --> 00:16:08.460
Utilizing those forward positions, the French

00:16:08.460 --> 00:16:10.860
finally pushed the German forces completely off

00:16:10.860 --> 00:16:13.320
the Chemin des Dames ridge, forcing them into

00:16:13.320 --> 00:16:16.059
a full retreat across the Ayelet Valley. Wow.

00:16:16.299 --> 00:16:19.039
In fact, General Franchet Desperé explicitly

00:16:19.039 --> 00:16:21.460
viewed that October victory not as a separate

00:16:21.460 --> 00:16:24.340
event, but as the decisive concluding phase of

00:16:24.340 --> 00:16:26.860
the operation that began back on April 16th under

00:16:26.860 --> 00:16:29.549
Nivelle. By artificially severing that October

00:16:29.549 --> 00:16:31.830
victory from the narrative of the Spring Offensive,

00:16:32.230 --> 00:16:34.309
historians basically manipulated the legacy of

00:16:34.309 --> 00:16:36.750
the battle. They did. They separated the painful

00:16:36.750 --> 00:16:38.889
groundwork from the eventual payoff. The French

00:16:38.889 --> 00:16:41.370
military and public needed a scapegoat for the

00:16:41.370 --> 00:16:44.470
immense trauma of 1917. And drawing the finish

00:16:44.470 --> 00:16:48.070
line in May made Nivelle the perfect, definitive

00:16:48.070 --> 00:16:50.389
villain. It perfectly illustrates how the boundaries

00:16:50.389 --> 00:16:53.429
of a historical event dictate our understanding

00:16:53.429 --> 00:16:56.009
of it. We construct narratives by choosing where

00:16:56.009 --> 00:16:58.870
a story ends. So what does this all mean for

00:16:58.870 --> 00:17:01.570
you listening today? We started this deep dive

00:17:01.570 --> 00:17:04.680
looking at a massive historical event. But the

00:17:04.680 --> 00:17:08.039
underlying themes, rigid planning versus adaptability,

00:17:08.559 --> 00:17:11.259
the consequences of hubris, and the way we define

00:17:11.259 --> 00:17:13.920
success, these are incredibly relevant concepts.

00:17:14.000 --> 00:17:16.119
They apply to everything. The French faltered

00:17:16.119 --> 00:17:18.380
initially because their leadership clung to an

00:17:18.380 --> 00:17:21.119
unyielding top -down plan, refusing to listen

00:17:21.119 --> 00:17:23.579
to the operational realities on the ground. And

00:17:23.579 --> 00:17:25.619
the Germans held out against superior numbers

00:17:25.619 --> 00:17:28.099
because they decentralized their problem -solving,

00:17:28.359 --> 00:17:30.740
abandoned rigid traditions, and adapted their

00:17:30.740 --> 00:17:33.000
doctrine to the reality of the threat. Exactly.

00:17:33.130 --> 00:17:35.089
Think about the last time a major initiative,

00:17:35.210 --> 00:17:37.869
a long -term goal, or a complex project in your

00:17:37.869 --> 00:17:40.809
own life or career was officially deemed a failure.

00:17:41.170 --> 00:17:43.049
If you shifted the timeline of that judgment,

00:17:43.569 --> 00:17:45.529
if you looked at the results six months later,

00:17:46.109 --> 00:17:48.190
just like the French success at La Maison in

00:17:48.190 --> 00:17:51.309
October, would it still be a failure? That's

00:17:51.309 --> 00:17:53.509
a great question. Or does the exact moment we

00:17:53.509 --> 00:17:56.490
choose to draw the finish line completely dictate

00:17:56.490 --> 00:17:58.849
who we label as the hero and who we label as

00:17:58.849 --> 00:18:01.640
the fool? That is a fascinating perspective to

00:18:01.640 --> 00:18:03.819
leave off on. Thank you so much for joining us

00:18:03.819 --> 00:18:06.240
on this deep dive. Keep asking those hard questions.

00:18:06.400 --> 00:18:09.119
Keep analyzing the hidden context behind the

00:18:09.119 --> 00:18:11.339
accepted narratives. And we will catch you next

00:18:11.339 --> 00:18:11.579
time.
