WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:02.319 Welcome to today's deep dive. I am so glad you're 00:00:02.319 --> 00:00:05.440 here with us. We are taking a really close look 00:00:05.440 --> 00:00:08.699 at a single incredibly comprehensive source today. 00:00:09.660 --> 00:00:11.740 The Wikipedia article on the Battle of Luce. 00:00:12.099 --> 00:00:14.560 It's a heavy one, but a fascinating one. It really 00:00:14.560 --> 00:00:17.579 is. And our mission for this deep dive is pretty 00:00:17.579 --> 00:00:20.059 massive. We are going to explore the biggest 00:00:20.059 --> 00:00:22.780 British attack of 1915 on the Western Front. 00:00:23.260 --> 00:00:25.280 We're going to examine the tactical debut of 00:00:25.280 --> 00:00:28.839 a terrifying new weapon. Look at the. well, the 00:00:28.839 --> 00:00:31.660 devastating real world consequences of communication 00:00:31.660 --> 00:00:34.700 breakdowns and ultimately figure out how a battle 00:00:34.700 --> 00:00:36.880 that came incredibly close to success turned 00:00:36.880 --> 00:00:39.340 into a completely tragic learning curve. And 00:00:39.340 --> 00:00:41.219 if you are wondering why you should dedicate 00:00:41.219 --> 00:00:44.340 time to understanding a battle from 1915, it's 00:00:44.340 --> 00:00:46.780 because this conflict is a master class in the 00:00:46.780 --> 00:00:50.039 fiction between grand strategy and on the ground 00:00:50.039 --> 00:00:52.880 reality. It highlights the catastrophic human 00:00:52.880 --> 00:00:55.079 cost that happens when leaders struggle to adapt 00:00:55.079 --> 00:00:57.219 to new technologies. Whether you're studying 00:00:57.200 --> 00:00:59.520 military history or just looking at how large 00:00:59.520 --> 00:01:02.340 organizations fail under pressure, the systemic 00:01:02.340 --> 00:01:04.799 flaws exposed here are incredibly relevant to 00:01:04.799 --> 00:01:07.060 how we operate today. OK, let's unpack this. 00:01:07.519 --> 00:01:12.099 It is late 1915. Set the scene for us. What is 00:01:12.099 --> 00:01:14.640 the overall situation on the Western Front that 00:01:14.640 --> 00:01:18.140 leads to this massive offensive? Well, we're 00:01:18.140 --> 00:01:21.079 looking at a state of complete strategic stalemate. 00:01:21.230 --> 00:01:25.090 The first half of 1915 saw both French and British 00:01:25.090 --> 00:01:27.209 efforts to break through the German defenses 00:01:27.209 --> 00:01:30.549 and in localized very costly failures. Just a 00:01:30.549 --> 00:01:33.450 total deadlock. Exactly. But a broader window 00:01:33.450 --> 00:01:36.469 of opportunity seemed to open up. Erich von Falkenhayn, 00:01:36.590 --> 00:01:38.230 who was the professional head of the German army, 00:01:38.670 --> 00:01:40.709 had been forced to withdraw about 14 divisions 00:01:40.709 --> 00:01:42.709 from the Western Front to reinforce the Eastern 00:01:42.709 --> 00:01:44.709 Front. Oh, wow. So suddenly the line is much 00:01:44.709 --> 00:01:47.450 thinner. Right. And the French commander General 00:01:47.450 --> 00:01:49.930 Joseph Jauffre saw this thinning out of German 00:01:49.930 --> 00:01:52.069 troops as his golden opportunity to break through 00:01:52.069 --> 00:01:54.530 the field fortifications. He wanted to shatter 00:01:54.530 --> 00:01:56.569 the trench network and restore a war of movement. 00:01:57.090 --> 00:01:59.010 And the British part of this grand plan was an 00:01:59.010 --> 00:02:01.790 attack at the village of Luce. Now, reading through 00:02:01.790 --> 00:02:05.290 the source, there's a glaring irony here. The 00:02:05.290 --> 00:02:07.370 British commanders on the ground, specifically 00:02:07.370 --> 00:02:09.830 Sir John French and Douglas Haig, who was commanding 00:02:09.830 --> 00:02:12.650 the First Army, looked at the geography of Luce 00:02:12.650 --> 00:02:15.680 and essentially said, Absolutely not. They hated 00:02:15.680 --> 00:02:18.000 it. Why were they so opposed to fighting in this 00:02:18.000 --> 00:02:20.500 specific location? Because the terrain south 00:02:20.500 --> 00:02:24.219 of the Lobosay Canal was... Frankly, an attacker's 00:02:24.219 --> 00:02:26.539 nightmare. It wasn't the open rolling fields 00:02:26.539 --> 00:02:28.719 people sometimes picture when they think of France. 00:02:29.259 --> 00:02:32.180 It was an industrial wasteland. The landscape 00:02:32.180 --> 00:02:34.840 was completely dominated by colliery towers and 00:02:34.840 --> 00:02:36.580 slag heaps. And the source mentioned something 00:02:36.580 --> 00:02:39.080 called the double crassier. What exactly is that? 00:02:39.219 --> 00:02:41.960 A crassier is essentially a massive towering 00:02:41.960 --> 00:02:44.719 heap of coal waste generated by the mining industry. 00:02:44.759 --> 00:02:47.259 Like just a big pile of dirt. Not just small 00:02:47.259 --> 00:02:50.219 piles, no. These are enormous elevated structures, 00:02:50.520 --> 00:02:53.300 almost like small artificial mountains. For a 00:02:53.300 --> 00:02:55.819 defending army, they are absolute gifts. The 00:02:55.819 --> 00:02:58.759 Germans use these slag heaps to establish perfect 00:02:58.759 --> 00:03:01.460 vantage points for snipers and artillery spotters. 00:03:01.460 --> 00:03:03.840 Because they can just look down. Exactly, allowing 00:03:03.840 --> 00:03:06.000 them to look directly down into the British lines. 00:03:06.250 --> 00:03:08.969 So the geography practically guarantees a slaughter 00:03:08.969 --> 00:03:11.669 for anyone trying to advance. And yet the attack 00:03:11.669 --> 00:03:13.930 happens anyway. Yeah, the objections of the British 00:03:13.930 --> 00:03:16.509 commanders were entirely valid, especially when 00:03:16.509 --> 00:03:18.490 they discovered in July that the Germans were 00:03:18.490 --> 00:03:21.069 already building a second, heavily reinforced 00:03:21.069 --> 00:03:23.509 defensive position behind their front line. Just 00:03:23.509 --> 00:03:26.409 making it even harder. Right. But grand strategy 00:03:26.409 --> 00:03:30.530 often overrules local reality. At a conference 00:03:30.530 --> 00:03:33.129 in August, Joffrey sided with Ferdinand Foch, 00:03:33.469 --> 00:03:36.219 another French commander, and ultimately Herbert 00:03:36.219 --> 00:03:38.319 Kitchener, the British secretary of state for 00:03:38.319 --> 00:03:41.919 war, forced the British hand. The political alliance 00:03:41.919 --> 00:03:44.219 required a joint offensive. They were attacking 00:03:44.219 --> 00:03:46.620 Atlus, whether the geography suited them or not. 00:03:46.919 --> 00:03:49.439 Since they're forced to attack this heavily fortified 00:03:49.439 --> 00:03:52.240 industrial position, conventional artillery and 00:03:52.240 --> 00:03:54.219 infantry charges just aren't going to cut it. 00:03:54.340 --> 00:03:57.659 They need a trump card. And that leads to a massive 00:03:57.659 --> 00:04:01.319 tactical pivot. Poison gas. Yeah. The use of 00:04:01.319 --> 00:04:03.879 gas represents a very dark turning point in the 00:04:03.879 --> 00:04:06.550 morality of industrial warfare. Previously, the 00:04:06.550 --> 00:04:08.449 British government considered the use of poison 00:04:08.449 --> 00:04:10.909 gas to be a violation of the Hague Conventions. 00:04:11.349 --> 00:04:13.870 It was seen as completely outside the acceptable 00:04:13.870 --> 00:04:16.149 balance of warfare. They thought it was unsporting. 00:04:16.449 --> 00:04:19.389 Unsporting, unethical. But the brutal reality 00:04:19.389 --> 00:04:23.029 of 1915 shifted those boundaries. After the Germans 00:04:23.029 --> 00:04:25.709 used gas at the Second Battle of Ypres in April 00:04:25.709 --> 00:04:28.310 of that year, the British High Command felt the 00:04:28.310 --> 00:04:31.100 moral high ground had been compromised. The decision 00:04:31.100 --> 00:04:33.899 to use gas as an offensive weapon was officially 00:04:33.899 --> 00:04:37.079 authorized in May. So if they decide to use gas, 00:04:37.100 --> 00:04:39.860 how do they actually pull that off in 1915? I 00:04:39.860 --> 00:04:42.220 imagine they didn't exactly have modern chemical 00:04:42.220 --> 00:04:45.379 weapons delivery systems ready to go. Far from 00:04:45.379 --> 00:04:47.759 it. The technology was incredibly rudimentary. 00:04:47.779 --> 00:04:49.819 They actually set up an experimental laboratory 00:04:49.819 --> 00:04:51.899 at a place called Hellfowl under the command 00:04:51.899 --> 00:04:54.339 of major folks. General Haig was brought out 00:04:54.339 --> 00:04:56.319 for a demonstration in August. And what did that 00:04:56.319 --> 00:04:59.540 look like? The setup they devised relied on steel 00:04:59.500 --> 00:05:02.639 cylinders of chlorine gas, which they would place 00:05:02.639 --> 00:05:04.800 below the firing step of their own frontline 00:05:04.800 --> 00:05:08.259 trenches. They connected a flexible copper pipe 00:05:08.259 --> 00:05:11.139 to the cylinder, which then attached to an ordinary 00:05:11.139 --> 00:05:13.199 half -inch iron pipe that they just pointed out 00:05:13.199 --> 00:05:16.000 over the sandbags toward the German lines. That 00:05:16.000 --> 00:05:18.420 sounds incredibly haphazard. It's just a pipe 00:05:18.420 --> 00:05:21.120 pointing over a sandbag. To picture it in modern 00:05:21.120 --> 00:05:23.980 terms, the source actually compares it to a soda 00:05:23.980 --> 00:05:27.269 water siphon. Like a pressurized whip cream canister 00:05:27.269 --> 00:05:29.189 or something. Exactly. You turn a valve, the 00:05:29.189 --> 00:05:31.569 pressure releases, and the contents spray out. 00:05:31.970 --> 00:05:33.730 That was the extent of the delivery mechanism. 00:05:33.850 --> 00:05:36.769 Which seems to introduce a terrifying variable. 00:05:37.269 --> 00:05:39.310 If you are just opening a valve and spraying 00:05:39.310 --> 00:05:41.829 gas into the open air, aren't you entirely at 00:05:41.829 --> 00:05:44.129 the mercy of the environment? And that is the 00:05:44.129 --> 00:05:47.029 fatal flaw in the entire strategy. The plan relied 00:05:47.029 --> 00:05:49.649 heavily on the specific physics of chlorine gas, 00:05:49.810 --> 00:05:52.300 which is heavier than air. The military architects 00:05:52.300 --> 00:05:54.699 hoped the gas would roll out of the pipes, stay 00:05:54.699 --> 00:05:56.879 low to the ground, and sink into the subterranean 00:05:56.879 --> 00:05:59.540 shelters. The dugouts and stuff. Right. The deep 00:05:59.540 --> 00:06:01.819 dugouts in village cellars where regular artillery 00:06:01.819 --> 00:06:04.379 shells couldn't reach, forcing the German defenders 00:06:04.379 --> 00:06:07.660 out into the open. But to get the gas across 00:06:07.660 --> 00:06:10.379 no man's land in the first place, it absolutely 00:06:10.379 --> 00:06:12.899 required a cooperative wind glowing directly 00:06:12.899 --> 00:06:15.740 toward the enemy. They were staking the success 00:06:15.740 --> 00:06:18.300 of the largest British attack of the year on 00:06:18.300 --> 00:06:20.689 the unpredictability of the weather. Wow. And 00:06:20.689 --> 00:06:23.089 that brings us to zero hour, the morning of September 00:06:23.089 --> 00:06:28.009 25th, 1915. It's 630 a .m. Well, the infantry 00:06:28.009 --> 00:06:30.750 is set to advance then, but the gas attack actually 00:06:30.750 --> 00:06:33.850 started about 40 minutes earlier. And the engineers 00:06:33.850 --> 00:06:35.689 manning those cylinders, the ones who actually 00:06:35.689 --> 00:06:38.209 understood the weapon, they warned against turning 00:06:38.209 --> 00:06:40.250 the valves. Because the weather conditions were 00:06:40.250 --> 00:06:42.790 completely unsuitable, the wind was weak and 00:06:42.790 --> 00:06:45.149 highly unpredictable. But the engineers on the 00:06:45.149 --> 00:06:47.350 ground were overruled by Lieutenant General Huber 00:06:47.350 --> 00:06:50.470 Goh. The order was given to release the gas and 00:06:50.470 --> 00:06:53.410 the result was chaotic and horrific. Yeah. In 00:06:53.410 --> 00:06:56.470 some sectors the breeze eddied and the gas literally 00:06:56.470 --> 00:06:59.209 blew backward into the British lines. The physical 00:06:59.209 --> 00:07:01.389 reality of that for the soldiers in the trenches 00:07:01.389 --> 00:07:04.209 must have been absolute terror. The source notes 00:07:04.209 --> 00:07:07.110 that in those specific sectors the gas caused 00:07:07.110 --> 00:07:09.529 more British casualties than German. It was a 00:07:09.529 --> 00:07:11.709 catastrophic start. Yeah. Even where it didn't 00:07:11.709 --> 00:07:14.790 blow back the weak wind meant the gas cloud clung 00:07:14.790 --> 00:07:17.569 too close to the ground or just dispersed harmlessly. 00:07:17.680 --> 00:07:20.480 As the British infantry climbed out of their 00:07:20.480 --> 00:07:23.459 trenches to advance, they expected to find paralyzed 00:07:23.459 --> 00:07:25.600 defenders. But they didn't. Instead, they were 00:07:25.600 --> 00:07:27.800 met with a fusillade of rifle and machine gun 00:07:27.800 --> 00:07:30.560 fire from German soldiers who had largely not 00:07:30.560 --> 00:07:33.600 been neutralized by the gas at all. Adding to 00:07:33.600 --> 00:07:36.079 the friction, the British artillery bombardment 00:07:36.079 --> 00:07:39.240 that preceded the attack was too short and completely 00:07:39.240 --> 00:07:41.939 failed to cut the dense thickets of German barbed 00:07:41.939 --> 00:07:44.680 wire. But despite the gas blowing back into their 00:07:44.680 --> 00:07:47.420 own trenches and despite the uncut wire, the 00:07:47.420 --> 00:07:49.540 British actually make some astonishing initial 00:07:49.540 --> 00:07:53.379 gains. The 47th London Division manages to penetrate 00:07:53.379 --> 00:07:56.019 the front trench. How did they pull that off 00:07:56.019 --> 00:07:59.100 amidst all that chaos? They utilized a relatively 00:07:59.100 --> 00:08:01.800 new piece of technology called Stokes Mortars. 00:08:02.579 --> 00:08:04.980 These were highly portable trench mortars that 00:08:04.980 --> 00:08:07.819 allowed the advancing troops to lay down immediate 00:08:07.819 --> 00:08:11.100 localized smoke and fire cover, creating their 00:08:11.100 --> 00:08:13.279 own artificial concealment when the gas failed. 00:08:13.399 --> 00:08:15.740 Oh, that's clever. Yeah, moving behind that thick 00:08:15.740 --> 00:08:19.240 cloud of smoke, they punched through. By 930 00:08:19.240 --> 00:08:21.420 a .m., they had captured the village of Loose 00:08:21.420 --> 00:08:24.019 itself, secured a strategic location known as 00:08:24.019 --> 00:08:26.899 the Chalk Pit, and cleared out several mine buildings. 00:08:27.180 --> 00:08:29.720 The source mentions a striking visual detail 00:08:29.720 --> 00:08:32.820 from that specific charge. Rifleman Frank Edwards 00:08:32.820 --> 00:08:35.759 of the London Irish. He is famous for actually 00:08:35.759 --> 00:08:38.100 kicking a football out into no man's land while 00:08:38.100 --> 00:08:40.259 leading the advance. It's an incredible story. 00:08:40.379 --> 00:08:42.519 It's just a surreal image of the human spirit, 00:08:42.960 --> 00:08:45.059 bringing a piece of normal life into the middle 00:08:45.059 --> 00:08:47.500 of an industrial meat grinder. It's a powerful 00:08:47.500 --> 00:08:50.259 symbol of morale under impossible conditions. 00:08:51.100 --> 00:08:53.659 And further north, the 15th Scottish Division 00:08:53.659 --> 00:08:57.320 also saw incredible early success. These troops 00:08:57.320 --> 00:08:59.179 fought their way through the village of Luce 00:08:59.179 --> 00:09:02.659 and began the steep ascent of Hill 70, a critical 00:09:02.659 --> 00:09:06.299 vantage point. About 900 British troops crossed 00:09:06.299 --> 00:09:08.919 over the crest of Hill 70 and advanced toward 00:09:08.919 --> 00:09:11.490 the second German defensive line. They were really 00:09:11.490 --> 00:09:14.070 pushing through. What's fascinating here is the 00:09:14.070 --> 00:09:16.409 tragic turning point of the entire battle. You 00:09:16.409 --> 00:09:18.409 have these remarkable early breakthroughs where 00:09:18.409 --> 00:09:20.169 they literally punch a hole through the first 00:09:20.169 --> 00:09:22.789 lines. But the momentum couldn't be sustained. 00:09:23.070 --> 00:09:25.690 The troops from the 15th Scottish Division, often 00:09:25.690 --> 00:09:28.049 referred to as the jocks in the source, were 00:09:28.049 --> 00:09:30.789 completely exhausted from a morning of intense 00:09:30.789 --> 00:09:33.169 hand -to -hand fighting and marching under heavy 00:09:33.169 --> 00:09:35.330 fire. And as they pushed forward, they are suddenly 00:09:35.330 --> 00:09:37.710 met with blistering fire from a new threat. All 00:09:37.710 --> 00:09:40.070 right. The Germans had positioned hidden machine 00:09:40.070 --> 00:09:42.490 guns in a series of factory buildings in a place 00:09:42.490 --> 00:09:45.370 called St. August. The British troops had breached 00:09:45.370 --> 00:09:46.950 the line, but they were now sitting ducks without 00:09:46.950 --> 00:09:49.769 support. The Germans brought up reinforcements 00:09:49.769 --> 00:09:52.450 around 1130 a .m. and launched a fierce counter 00:09:52.450 --> 00:09:55.750 -attack. pushing them back. By 1 p .m., the Germans 00:09:55.750 --> 00:09:59.070 had recaptured the redoubt on Hill 70. For the 00:09:59.070 --> 00:10:01.009 British to finish the job and hold the ground 00:10:01.009 --> 00:10:03.450 they had bled for, they desperately needed two 00:10:03.450 --> 00:10:06.509 things, artillery ammunition to blast those hidden 00:10:06.509 --> 00:10:09.509 machine guns out of the factories and fresh reserve 00:10:09.509 --> 00:10:11.789 troops to relieve the exhausted men at the front. 00:10:12.090 --> 00:10:14.169 Which brings us to the biggest controversy of 00:10:14.169 --> 00:10:17.720 the Battle of Luz, the reserves. The source is 00:10:17.720 --> 00:10:20.100 very clear that Sir John French kept the reserve 00:10:20.100 --> 00:10:22.399 troops way too far back from the front line. 00:10:22.620 --> 00:10:25.580 Why would he do that? He was fundamentally doubtful 00:10:25.580 --> 00:10:27.360 that a breakthrough would even happen on the 00:10:27.360 --> 00:10:29.700 first day, given the terrain and the defenses. 00:10:30.360 --> 00:10:32.120 So he didn't want to commit his reserves until 00:10:32.120 --> 00:10:34.440 the second day. even though his commanders wanted 00:10:34.440 --> 00:10:37.500 them closer. Exactly. This completely contradicted 00:10:37.500 --> 00:10:40.080 the requests of commanders like Haig and Fosch, 00:10:40.179 --> 00:10:42.179 who wanted those reserves positioned close at 00:10:42.179 --> 00:10:44.440 hand so they could immediately pour through any 00:10:44.440 --> 00:10:46.340 gap that opened up. And we need to talk about 00:10:46.340 --> 00:10:48.659 who these reserves actually were, because these 00:10:48.659 --> 00:10:51.159 aren't hardened veterans. This is the 24th and 00:10:51.159 --> 00:10:54.299 24th divisions of the new army. These were brand 00:10:54.299 --> 00:10:57.879 new, inexperienced recruits. Just months prior, 00:10:58.320 --> 00:11:01.480 these men were factory workers, clerks, tradesmen. 00:11:01.580 --> 00:11:04.720 They had no experience with the sheer scale of 00:11:04.720 --> 00:11:06.759 industrial warfare they were about to walk into. 00:11:07.200 --> 00:11:09.000 When the call finally comes for them to move 00:11:09.000 --> 00:11:11.720 up, they have to endure a logistical nightmare 00:11:11.720 --> 00:11:15.360 just to reach the battlefield. The source details 00:11:15.360 --> 00:11:18.299 a 20 -mile march, but it's not a simple hike. 00:11:18.600 --> 00:11:20.899 No. They are forced to march entirely at night 00:11:20.899 --> 00:11:23.340 to avoid being spotted by German observation 00:11:23.340 --> 00:11:25.879 aircraft. Just resting in cramped billets during 00:11:25.879 --> 00:11:27.659 the day and marching through the pitch black. 00:11:27.860 --> 00:11:30.299 Orders get delayed. The roads are choked with 00:11:30.299 --> 00:11:33.120 military traffic and retreating wounded. Battalions 00:11:33.120 --> 00:11:35.460 get disoriented in the dark and wander into the 00:11:35.460 --> 00:11:37.980 wrong sectors. By the time they finally arrive 00:11:37.980 --> 00:11:40.759 at the front lines, these new recruits are exhausted, 00:11:41.100 --> 00:11:44.059 unfed, carrying incredibly heavy gear and completely 00:11:44.059 --> 00:11:46.100 bewildered by the noise and confusion of the 00:11:46.100 --> 00:11:48.350 battlefield. It was a recipe for disaster. Here's 00:11:48.350 --> 00:11:50.450 where it gets really interesting. And by interesting, 00:11:50.490 --> 00:11:53.750 I mean incredibly dark because this bureaucratic 00:11:53.750 --> 00:11:56.789 delay and logistical failure leads directly to 00:11:56.789 --> 00:11:59.549 the slaughter of September 26th. The grim reality 00:11:59.549 --> 00:12:02.629 of that second day cannot be overstated. The 00:12:02.629 --> 00:12:05.350 British High Command, completely disconnected 00:12:05.350 --> 00:12:08.549 from the reality on the ground, ordered the exhausted 00:12:08.549 --> 00:12:12.029 remnants of those newly arrived 21st and 24th 00:12:12.029 --> 00:12:15.470 divisions to attack the German second line. Knowing 00:12:15.470 --> 00:12:18.350 they were totally fresh to combat and already 00:12:18.350 --> 00:12:20.830 exhausted. Right. To do this they had to advance 00:12:20.830 --> 00:12:23.870 on a frontage of just under a mile, walking up 00:12:23.870 --> 00:12:26.509 a gently rising slope for about a thousand yards. 00:12:26.730 --> 00:12:28.809 A thousand yards in the open. Waiting for them 00:12:28.809 --> 00:12:31.870 at the crest of that slope was a single, strongly 00:12:31.870 --> 00:12:35.490 held German trench. Now normally artillery would 00:12:35.490 --> 00:12:37.669 soften up a target like that, but the British 00:12:37.669 --> 00:12:40.149 artillery bombardment beforehand had been virtually 00:12:40.149 --> 00:12:42.720 useless. Why was that? The heavy guns had struggled 00:12:42.720 --> 00:12:44.700 to get into position through the congested roads 00:12:44.700 --> 00:12:47.279 and were easily targeted by German counter battery 00:12:47.279 --> 00:12:49.559 fire. Yeah. Consequently, the German defensive 00:12:49.559 --> 00:12:51.779 wire in front of that trench was completely intact. 00:12:51.899 --> 00:12:54.120 And we are talking about a farm fence here. This 00:12:54.120 --> 00:12:56.500 was an industrial entanglement four feet high 00:12:56.500 --> 00:13:00.460 and 20 feet deep. Oh, my God. So you have exhausted, 00:13:00.779 --> 00:13:03.379 inexperienced soldiers walking up an open slope 00:13:03.379 --> 00:13:06.759 into uncut wire. The result, according to the 00:13:06.759 --> 00:13:10.490 source, is a staggering human cost. 8 ,000 men 00:13:10.490 --> 00:13:13.490 were lost in a single hour. The machine gun fire 00:13:13.490 --> 00:13:16.149 from the reinforced German positions was so intense 00:13:16.149 --> 00:13:19.429 and the slaughter was so absolute that the source 00:13:19.429 --> 00:13:21.870 notes a deep and poignant and disturbing detail. 00:13:22.570 --> 00:13:25.029 The German machine gunners actually ceased fire 00:13:25.029 --> 00:13:28.190 out of sheer compassion. They just stopped shooting. 00:13:28.370 --> 00:13:30.049 The British troops were trapped against the dense 00:13:30.049 --> 00:13:33.269 wire, unable to advance, unable to retreat, just 00:13:33.269 --> 00:13:35.960 being mowed down. The sheer scale of the carnage 00:13:35.960 --> 00:13:37.980 prompted the defenders to simply stop pulling 00:13:37.980 --> 00:13:40.460 the trigger, allowing the few survivors to retreat. 00:13:40.960 --> 00:13:43.179 I want to read a quote from the source that really 00:13:43.179 --> 00:13:45.059 chills you to the bone when you think about the 00:13:45.059 --> 00:13:47.740 scale of this failure. General Rawlinson wrote 00:13:47.740 --> 00:13:49.960 to the King's advisor shortly after the attack, 00:13:50.000 --> 00:13:52.399 and he said, From what I can ascertain, some 00:13:52.399 --> 00:13:54.799 of the divisions did actually reach the enemy's 00:13:54.799 --> 00:13:57.139 trenches, for their bodies can now be seen on 00:13:57.139 --> 00:14:00.500 the barbed wire. It is a devastating image, and 00:14:00.500 --> 00:14:02.659 it highlights the total breakdown in command 00:14:02.659 --> 00:14:05.559 and control. The troops on the ground were attempting 00:14:05.559 --> 00:14:08.919 the impossible, ordered forward by commanders 00:14:08.919 --> 00:14:11.519 who were looking at maps rather than the reality 00:14:11.519 --> 00:14:14.440 of the intact defenses. It's just tragic. By 00:14:14.440 --> 00:14:17.379 the end of that day, the survivors of the 21st 00:14:17.379 --> 00:14:20.120 and 24th Divisions had to be withdrawn completely 00:14:20.120 --> 00:14:22.740 and the Guards Division had to be brought up 00:14:22.740 --> 00:14:25.539 just to stabilize the line. And even the Guards 00:14:25.539 --> 00:14:28.600 Division, who were elite troops, faced the exact 00:14:28.600 --> 00:14:31.879 same systemic problems. Over the next few days, 00:14:31.960 --> 00:14:33.879 they attacked places like the Chalk Pits and 00:14:33.879 --> 00:14:37.919 Pute 14, facing massed machine gun fire, confusion 00:14:37.919 --> 00:14:40.879 from lingering gas shells, and a severe lack 00:14:40.879 --> 00:14:43.679 of artillery support. Major General George Theziger, 00:14:43.740 --> 00:14:45.860 commander of the 9th Division, was actually killed 00:14:45.860 --> 00:14:48.500 while simply trying to assess the chaotic situation. 00:14:48.740 --> 00:14:50.820 If we connect this to the bigger picture, we 00:14:50.820 --> 00:14:52.679 have to look at the final toll of this offensive. 00:14:53.129 --> 00:14:55.690 By mid -October, the battle had completely fizzled 00:14:55.690 --> 00:14:57.730 out. Heavy autumn rain turned the battlefield 00:14:57.730 --> 00:15:00.029 to mud, there was a severe shortage of hand grenades, 00:15:00.330 --> 00:15:02.190 and the German defenses remained too strong. 00:15:02.370 --> 00:15:04.629 And the casualties. The human cost is hard to 00:15:04.629 --> 00:15:08.490 fathom. The British suffered nearly 60 ,000 casualties. 00:15:09.210 --> 00:15:11.610 To put that in perspective, the total German 00:15:11.610 --> 00:15:13.690 casualties for the Battle of Luz were roughly 00:15:13.690 --> 00:15:17.110 26 ,000. With a failure of that magnitude, the 00:15:17.110 --> 00:15:19.549 political fallout must have been immediate. It 00:15:19.549 --> 00:15:22.850 was severe. Sir John French... who was already 00:15:22.850 --> 00:15:25.789 facing quiet criticism before the battle, lost 00:15:25.789 --> 00:15:27.629 whatever remaining support he had in the government 00:15:27.629 --> 00:15:30.529 and the army. He was largely blamed for the poor 00:15:30.529 --> 00:15:32.509 handling and positioning of the reserve divisions. 00:15:33.330 --> 00:15:35.429 By December 15th, he was officially replaced 00:15:35.429 --> 00:15:37.690 as commander in chief of the British Expeditionary 00:15:37.690 --> 00:15:40.970 Force. He was replaced by Douglas Haig, the same 00:15:40.970 --> 00:15:42.970 Douglas Haig who was commanding the first army 00:15:42.970 --> 00:15:45.860 during this attack. How does Haig manage to secure 00:15:45.860 --> 00:15:48.419 the top job after overseeing such a disaster? 00:15:48.700 --> 00:15:51.240 The transition reveals the deep flaws in military 00:15:51.240 --> 00:15:53.860 bureaucracy and how easily narratives can be 00:15:53.860 --> 00:15:56.600 shaped by those in proximity to power. Haig wrote 00:15:56.600 --> 00:15:59.200 a highly influential and very self -serving letter 00:15:59.200 --> 00:16:01.860 to Lord Kitchener just four days after the battle 00:16:01.860 --> 00:16:04.740 began. What did he say? In it, he laid the blame 00:16:04.740 --> 00:16:07.240 squarely on Sir John French for keeping the reserves 00:16:07.240 --> 00:16:09.240 four and a half miles away from the front line. 00:16:09.519 --> 00:16:11.980 Haig claimed that if those troops had been released 00:16:11.980 --> 00:16:14.139 to him earlier, he could have won the battle 00:16:14.139 --> 00:16:17.759 between 9am and 11am on the first day. But the 00:16:17.759 --> 00:16:20.720 source material heavily scrutinizes that narrative, 00:16:20.940 --> 00:16:22.779 doesn't it? It seems like Haig was passing the 00:16:22.779 --> 00:16:25.740 buck to save his own career. Absolutely. The 00:16:25.740 --> 00:16:28.440 historical analysis points out the severe logistical 00:16:28.440 --> 00:16:32.039 realities of 1915 warfare that Haig completely 00:16:32.039 --> 00:16:34.759 ignored in his letter. Even if Sir John French 00:16:34.759 --> 00:16:37.100 had handed over the reserves earlier, soldiers 00:16:37.100 --> 00:16:39.799 laden with heavy equipment simply could not advance 00:16:39.799 --> 00:16:42.100 more than a mile an hour. Just one mile an hour. 00:16:42.179 --> 00:16:44.500 Right. When you factor in the damage communication 00:16:44.500 --> 00:16:47.220 lines, the heavily congested roads, and the total 00:16:47.220 --> 00:16:49.759 reliance on precise wind conditions for the gas, 00:16:50.600 --> 00:16:53.120 timely coordination of those reserves was literally 00:16:53.120 --> 00:16:55.600 impossible. Furthermore, the source reveals that 00:16:55.600 --> 00:16:58.179 Hague's own staff work was deeply flawed. He 00:16:58.179 --> 00:17:00.899 issued an order to attack at 1130 a .m., but 00:17:00.899 --> 00:17:03.059 because of the communication breakdowns, that 00:17:03.059 --> 00:17:05.039 order didn't reach the relevant divisions until 00:17:05.039 --> 00:17:08.259 1 a .m. the next day. Hague blamed the reserves 00:17:08.259 --> 00:17:11.019 for being inexperienced, but he failed to acknowledge 00:17:11.019 --> 00:17:13.700 his own delayed orders or the broader strategic 00:17:13.700 --> 00:17:16.579 nightmare of sending men against unbroken machine 00:17:16.579 --> 00:17:19.480 gun nests without artillery cover. He manipulated 00:17:19.480 --> 00:17:21.740 the narrative to protect his reputation and the 00:17:21.740 --> 00:17:24.440 bureaucracy accepted it. they bought it entirely. 00:17:25.259 --> 00:17:28.039 So what does this all mean? I want you to reflect 00:17:28.039 --> 00:17:30.559 on an observation from forward observation officer 00:17:30.559 --> 00:17:33.160 Major General Richard Hilton who was actually 00:17:33.160 --> 00:17:35.849 on the ground during the battle. He wrote that 00:17:35.849 --> 00:17:38.349 the real tragedy of Luce was its nearness to 00:17:38.349 --> 00:17:41.109 complete success. It was so close. He firmly 00:17:41.109 --> 00:17:42.869 believed they had broken through on that first 00:17:42.869 --> 00:17:45.210 Sunday. There was nothing ahead of them but unoccupied 00:17:45.210 --> 00:17:48.609 trenches. But that brilliant fleeting breakthrough 00:17:48.609 --> 00:17:51.349 was doomed by a lack of ammunition to take out 00:17:51.349 --> 00:17:53.910 the factory machine guns, the physical exhaustion 00:17:53.910 --> 00:17:56.990 of the troops and terrible high level communication. 00:17:57.450 --> 00:18:00.130 It's a profound summary. The Battle of Luce wasn't 00:18:00.130 --> 00:18:02.549 just a military defeat. It was a harsh awakening 00:18:02.549 --> 00:18:05.400 for the British Army. It definitively proved 00:18:05.400 --> 00:18:08.220 that sheer human bravery and even the introduction 00:18:08.220 --> 00:18:11.240 of new wonder weapons like poison gas simply 00:18:11.240 --> 00:18:14.480 couldn't overcome poor logistics, rigid command 00:18:14.480 --> 00:18:17.140 stretchers, and the brutal mechanized reality 00:18:17.140 --> 00:18:19.960 of industrial defense. You cannot win a modern 00:18:19.960 --> 00:18:22.920 war if your artillery cannot cut the wire and 00:18:22.920 --> 00:18:24.960 if your generals cannot effectively communicate 00:18:24.960 --> 00:18:27.039 with their reserves. And bringing it back to 00:18:27.039 --> 00:18:29.500 you, listening to this today, whether you are 00:18:29.500 --> 00:18:31.640 managing a complex corporate project, leading 00:18:31.640 --> 00:18:33.720 a team, or just trying to understand the mechanics 00:18:33.720 --> 00:18:36.380 of history, the lesson of Luce is incredibly 00:18:36.380 --> 00:18:39.420 stark. Very much so. poor communication, relying 00:18:39.420 --> 00:18:42.019 on variables you cannot control, like hoping 00:18:42.019 --> 00:18:44.660 the wind blows the right way, and a failure to 00:18:44.660 --> 00:18:46.500 adapt your strategy to changing environments 00:18:46.500 --> 00:18:48.799 on the ground will neutralize even your absolute 00:18:48.799 --> 00:18:51.339 best -laid plans. The men on the ground at Luz 00:18:51.339 --> 00:18:53.720 did everything asked of them, but they were failed 00:18:53.720 --> 00:18:55.819 by the systemic flaws above them. This raises 00:18:55.819 --> 00:18:58.700 an important question. Consider the Luz Memorial. 00:18:58.940 --> 00:19:01.660 It stands today, and it holds the names of over 00:19:01.660 --> 00:19:03.799 20 ,000 soldiers of Britain and the Commonwealth 00:19:03.799 --> 00:19:06.500 who fell in this battle and have no known grave. 00:19:06.980 --> 00:19:10.160 Over 20 ,000. That's staggering. When a single 00:19:10.160 --> 00:19:12.579 battlefield swallows that many identities whole, 00:19:13.319 --> 00:19:15.559 leaving no physical trace for families to bury, 00:19:16.039 --> 00:19:19.240 how does a society ever properly mourn? And how 00:19:19.240 --> 00:19:21.400 does that immense physical absence permanently 00:19:21.400 --> 00:19:24.420 alter the way a nation justifies the very concept 00:19:24.420 --> 00:19:27.029 of war moving forward? That is a heavy, heavy 00:19:27.029 --> 00:19:29.490 thought to leave on, but a vital one to consider. 00:19:29.910 --> 00:19:31.730 Thank you so much for joining us on this deep 00:19:31.730 --> 00:19:33.690 dive into the Battle of Loos. We appreciate your 00:19:33.690 --> 00:19:35.970 time, your curiosity, and for exploring these 00:19:35.970 --> 00:19:38.029 complex chapters of history with us. We'll catch 00:19:38.029 --> 00:19:38.690 you on the next one.