WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:03.779 Imagine for a second. Just put yourself in this 00:00:03.779 --> 00:00:06.799 headspace for a minute. You are a master strategist. 00:00:06.900 --> 00:00:10.919 You've spent weeks, maybe months, coming up with 00:00:10.919 --> 00:00:14.160 this completely brilliant plan. It's a military 00:00:14.160 --> 00:00:16.859 fakeout, so perfectly designed, so meticulously 00:00:16.859 --> 00:00:20.019 crafted, that it is guaranteed to fool your enemy. 00:00:20.260 --> 00:00:23.399 Completely. And you're expecting, you know, a 00:00:23.399 --> 00:00:26.329 modest, tightly contained victory. Just enough 00:00:26.329 --> 00:00:28.489 noise to pull their attention away from your 00:00:28.489 --> 00:00:31.809 actual target. Exactly. But then the unbelievable 00:00:31.809 --> 00:00:34.350 happens. Your fake out is so incredibly successful 00:00:34.350 --> 00:00:36.450 that you actually accidentally win way too much 00:00:36.450 --> 00:00:38.570 ground. Which sounds like a good thing. Right. 00:00:39.070 --> 00:00:41.189 But you shatter their front lines, you capture 00:00:41.189 --> 00:00:42.850 tens of thousands of prisoners, and suddenly 00:00:42.850 --> 00:00:44.750 you find yourself completely ruining your own 00:00:44.750 --> 00:00:47.369 master plan. Well, because you simply cannot 00:00:47.369 --> 00:00:49.850 resist the urge to chase an unplanned runaway 00:00:49.850 --> 00:00:52.729 victory. It is one of the most fascinating psychological 00:00:52.729 --> 00:00:56.009 traps a leader can fall into. It really perfectly 00:00:56.009 --> 00:00:58.689 encapsulates the utter chaos, the desperation, 00:00:58.890 --> 00:01:01.350 and just the sheer unpredictability of the Western 00:01:01.350 --> 00:01:04.290 Front in the final year of World War I. That 00:01:04.290 --> 00:01:07.109 is exactly what we are getting into today. Welcome 00:01:07.109 --> 00:01:10.769 to this deep dive. We are exploring a truly wild 00:01:10.769 --> 00:01:14.090 story of strategy gone completely rogue. Yeah, 00:01:14.209 --> 00:01:16.489 it's a crazy one. Our mission today is to break 00:01:16.489 --> 00:01:18.840 down the third battle of the AIM. which was fought 00:01:18.840 --> 00:01:22.120 in France in the spring of 1918. We have this 00:01:22.120 --> 00:01:24.780 really comprehensive stack of historical research 00:01:24.780 --> 00:01:27.859 detailing the entire operation, and we are going 00:01:27.859 --> 00:01:30.480 to extract the most critical insights for you. 00:01:31.019 --> 00:01:33.640 We want to understand how a simple diversionary 00:01:33.640 --> 00:01:36.239 tactic morphed into an unprecedented breakthrough. 00:01:36.680 --> 00:01:39.560 And more importantly, what this history teaches 00:01:39.560 --> 00:01:42.640 you and me about the very real dangers of unexpected 00:01:42.640 --> 00:01:46.829 success and deeply stubborn leadership. Because 00:01:46.829 --> 00:01:48.870 this is a pivotal moment in the 20th century. 00:01:49.250 --> 00:01:51.290 This battle perfectly illustrates the shifting 00:01:51.290 --> 00:01:53.209 dynamics of the war just before the American 00:01:53.209 --> 00:01:55.909 forces arrived in full to tip the scales. Right. 00:01:56.049 --> 00:01:58.689 It really serves as a master class in how a brilliant 00:01:58.689 --> 00:02:01.370 tactical maneuver can completely derail your 00:02:01.370 --> 00:02:03.689 grand strategy if you just lack the discipline 00:02:03.689 --> 00:02:05.950 to stick to the script. So I want to jump right 00:02:05.950 --> 00:02:08.610 into the mindset of the commanders. Paint the 00:02:08.610 --> 00:02:11.530 picture for us. What exactly is the atmosphere 00:02:11.530 --> 00:02:14.960 on the Western Front? in the spring of 1918. 00:02:15.379 --> 00:02:18.460 To really grasp the tension of this moment, you 00:02:18.460 --> 00:02:20.599 have to understand that the German Empire is 00:02:20.599 --> 00:02:22.699 fundamentally racing against the clock. They're 00:02:22.699 --> 00:02:25.520 running out of time. Exactly. The operation we 00:02:25.520 --> 00:02:28.039 are looking at is part of what was known as the 00:02:28.039 --> 00:02:31.189 Kaiserschlacht. or the Kaiser's battle. It's 00:02:31.189 --> 00:02:34.250 this series of desperate spring and summer offensives. 00:02:34.810 --> 00:02:37.750 And the reason for the rush is simple, yet totally 00:02:37.750 --> 00:02:40.449 existential. The Americans are coming. The American 00:02:40.449 --> 00:02:42.889 Expeditionary Forces are on their way across 00:02:42.889 --> 00:02:45.689 the Atlantic. The German High Command knows that 00:02:45.689 --> 00:02:48.590 once the Americans fully deploy in France, the 00:02:48.590 --> 00:02:51.370 sheer volume of fresh troops and unbroken industrial 00:02:51.370 --> 00:02:54.430 power will make a German victory virtually impossible. 00:02:54.689 --> 00:02:56.889 So the window is closing fast. It's slamming 00:02:56.889 --> 00:02:59.169 shut. The pressure on the German leadership is 00:02:59.169 --> 00:03:01.870 just staggering here. Yeah. And into this pressure 00:03:01.870 --> 00:03:04.669 cooker steps General Erich Ludendorff. He is 00:03:04.669 --> 00:03:07.090 the first quartermaster general of the German 00:03:07.090 --> 00:03:09.050 army. He's effectively the mastermind running 00:03:09.050 --> 00:03:11.370 the entire war effort at this point. Right. And 00:03:11.370 --> 00:03:14.110 he engineers this specific offensive, which is 00:03:14.110 --> 00:03:16.789 brilliantly code named Operation Blucher York, 00:03:17.169 --> 00:03:19.449 after two Prussian generals who fought Napoleon. 00:03:19.789 --> 00:03:21.729 A bit of historical flair there. Definitely. 00:03:22.569 --> 00:03:24.610 So Ludendorff is looking at the entire board 00:03:24.610 --> 00:03:27.389 and he views the British Expeditionary Force 00:03:27.389 --> 00:03:29.969 in the north as the ultimate threat. But what 00:03:29.969 --> 00:03:32.689 absolutely blew my mind in the research is that 00:03:32.689 --> 00:03:35.349 his goal at the Aisne River. It wasn't to win 00:03:35.349 --> 00:03:37.430 the war there at all. Not even remotely. If we 00:03:37.430 --> 00:03:40.199 connect this to the bigger picture. Ludendorff's 00:03:40.199 --> 00:03:42.979 grand strategy was entirely focused further north, 00:03:43.460 --> 00:03:46.039 up in the mud of Flanders. Yeah. He wanted to 00:03:46.039 --> 00:03:48.879 launch his real decisive war -ending offensive 00:03:48.879 --> 00:03:51.460 up there, which was planned as Operation Hagen. 00:03:52.379 --> 00:03:55.159 But to make Hagen work, he needed to thin out 00:03:55.159 --> 00:03:57.939 the Allied lines in Flanders. So he needs a distraction. 00:03:58.080 --> 00:04:01.060 A massive one. So Operation Blucher York down 00:04:01.060 --> 00:04:04.099 at the Aisne was designed purely as a giant terrifying 00:04:04.099 --> 00:04:06.580 distraction. He calculated that if he struck 00:04:06.580 --> 00:04:08.979 hard enough at the Aisne, it would directly threaten 00:04:08.979 --> 00:04:11.139 Paris. And if Paris looks like it's going to 00:04:11.139 --> 00:04:13.560 fall? The Allies panic. They pull their reserves 00:04:13.560 --> 00:04:16.240 out of Flanders and rush them south to defend 00:04:16.240 --> 00:04:18.319 the French capital. It's the ultimate sleight 00:04:18.319 --> 00:04:20.519 of hand. Look over here. Panic over here while 00:04:20.519 --> 00:04:22.720 I get ready to throw the knockout punch up there. 00:04:23.000 --> 00:04:25.660 That was the plan. And when you read about who 00:04:25.660 --> 00:04:28.399 was actually waiting on the allied side of this 00:04:28.399 --> 00:04:31.920 distraction, it is genuinely heartbreaking. You 00:04:31.920 --> 00:04:34.980 have several divisions of exhausted British troops 00:04:34.980 --> 00:04:38.079 stationed at the Chemin des Dames Ridge. Specifically, 00:04:38.560 --> 00:04:41.740 the British IX Corps. Right. And these veterans 00:04:41.740 --> 00:04:44.699 had just survived the brutal Michael Offensive 00:04:44.699 --> 00:04:46.819 earlier that spring. They had been through hell. 00:04:46.860 --> 00:04:49.360 They were totally depleted. And they were specifically 00:04:49.360 --> 00:04:52.519 transferred to this ridge to rest and refit. 00:04:52.620 --> 00:04:55.040 They were essentially told, go hold this line. 00:04:55.300 --> 00:04:57.639 It's a quiet sector. Nothing is going to happen 00:04:57.639 --> 00:05:00.279 here. They were battered men placed in what everyone 00:05:00.279 --> 00:05:02.459 believed was a safe haven. And the geography 00:05:02.459 --> 00:05:05.819 matters here, too. The Shemini Doms Ridge. which 00:05:05.819 --> 00:05:08.160 translates beautifully and tragically to the 00:05:08.160 --> 00:05:11.660 ladies path, was this formidable elevated position. 00:05:11.779 --> 00:05:14.100 A really strong defensive spot. Very strong. 00:05:14.300 --> 00:05:17.680 The Germans had actually held it from 1914 all 00:05:17.680 --> 00:05:21.019 the way until 1917 when the French finally captured 00:05:21.019 --> 00:05:24.160 it at a staggering cost in human life during 00:05:24.160 --> 00:05:27.300 the Neville Offensive. It was a prized, blood 00:05:27.300 --> 00:05:29.720 -soaked piece of high ground. Okay, let's unpack 00:05:29.720 --> 00:05:32.019 this because this brings us to a catastrophic 00:05:32.019 --> 00:05:35.019 failure of leadership on the Allied side. The 00:05:35.019 --> 00:05:37.720 defense of this area was controlled by French 00:05:37.720 --> 00:05:41.120 General Denis Auguste Duchesne. Yes. And Duchesne 00:05:41.120 --> 00:05:43.540 makes a decision that is just mind -boggling. 00:05:43.899 --> 00:05:46.160 The French commander -in -chief, Philippe Petain, 00:05:46.379 --> 00:05:48.699 had given explicit written instructions to all 00:05:48.699 --> 00:05:51.600 his commanders. He said, you must defend in depth. 00:05:51.819 --> 00:05:54.240 It was standard doctrine by that point. But Duchesne 00:05:54.240 --> 00:05:56.959 flat out refuses. He decides he is not going 00:05:56.959 --> 00:05:58.920 to abandon the ridge, not even a little bit. 00:05:59.000 --> 00:06:01.279 This is a textbook example of a commander letting 00:06:01.279 --> 00:06:04.639 ego and past trauma override sound military doctrine. 00:06:04.819 --> 00:06:06.779 Wait, before we get into his reasoning for a 00:06:06.779 --> 00:06:09.360 second, can you explain defend in depth for us? 00:06:09.480 --> 00:06:11.480 How is that different from what armies were normally 00:06:11.480 --> 00:06:14.319 doing in the trenches? Absolutely. Think of defending 00:06:14.319 --> 00:06:16.740 in depth like the crumple zone on your car. If 00:06:16.740 --> 00:06:19.600 you put all your strongest steel right on the 00:06:19.600 --> 00:06:22.360 front bumper, the whole car shatters on impact. 00:06:22.540 --> 00:06:25.480 But if you design the front to absorb the blow 00:06:25.480 --> 00:06:28.000 and crumple, the passenger cabin stays safe. 00:06:28.279 --> 00:06:31.300 That makes sense. In World War I terms, defending 00:06:31.300 --> 00:06:33.819 in depth meant leaving your front trenches lightly 00:06:33.819 --> 00:06:36.720 guarded. Just a skeleton crew to slow the enemy 00:06:36.720 --> 00:06:39.959 down and absorb the initial terrifying artillery 00:06:39.959 --> 00:06:42.339 bombardment. So you let them take the front. 00:06:42.519 --> 00:06:44.819 Right. Because the bulk of your forces are kept 00:06:44.819 --> 00:06:48.089 safely miles back out of artillery range. Once 00:06:48.089 --> 00:06:50.589 the enemy infantry advances and tires themselves 00:06:50.589 --> 00:06:53.269 out, taking those empty front trenches, your 00:06:53.269 --> 00:06:55.930 main force sweeps in for a devastating counterattack. 00:06:56.069 --> 00:06:58.850 You bend so you don't break. Exactly. So Petain 00:06:58.850 --> 00:07:02.129 orders the crumple zone, but Duchesne refuses. 00:07:02.269 --> 00:07:03.949 It's like putting all your chess pieces in the 00:07:03.949 --> 00:07:06.670 very front row. He forces all his troops, including 00:07:06.670 --> 00:07:09.050 those exhausted British veterans we talked about, 00:07:09.430 --> 00:07:11.170 right up to the very front lip of the trenches 00:07:11.170 --> 00:07:13.769 on the ridge. Why would a seasoned general do 00:07:13.769 --> 00:07:16.550 something so obviously reckless? because of the 00:07:16.550 --> 00:07:19.550 psychological weight of the ridge itself. Duchene's 00:07:19.550 --> 00:07:21.629 reasoning was deeply rooted in the staggering 00:07:21.629 --> 00:07:24.430 cost paid to capture the ladies path the previous 00:07:24.430 --> 00:07:27.389 year. The sunk cost fallacy. Exactly. He was 00:07:27.389 --> 00:07:29.990 paralyzed by it because tens of thousands of 00:07:29.990 --> 00:07:32.250 French soldiers had bled and died to take that 00:07:32.250 --> 00:07:35.509 specific dirt in 1917. He could not bear the 00:07:35.509 --> 00:07:38.029 political or psychological thought of yielding 00:07:38.029 --> 00:07:41.089 a single inch of it back to the Germans, even 00:07:41.089 --> 00:07:43.769 temporarily to gain a tactical advantage. That 00:07:43.769 --> 00:07:46.379 is something I want you the listener to really 00:07:46.379 --> 00:07:49.040 let sink in. Think about a time you refused to 00:07:49.040 --> 00:07:51.379 abandon a failing project or a bad investment 00:07:51.379 --> 00:07:53.519 simply because you had already poured months 00:07:53.519 --> 00:07:55.800 of work or thousands of dollars into it. It's 00:07:55.800 --> 00:07:58.040 a very human reaction. It is. You tell yourself 00:07:58.040 --> 00:08:00.860 I can't quit now or all that effort was for nothing. 00:08:01.560 --> 00:08:03.699 Now imagine the cost of that stubbornness isn't 00:08:03.699 --> 00:08:06.379 a missed deadline at work but the lives of tens 00:08:06.379 --> 00:08:09.420 of thousands of men. Duchenne's inability to 00:08:09.420 --> 00:08:11.639 let go of the past completely blinded him to 00:08:11.639 --> 00:08:14.290 the reality of the present. And by huddling his 00:08:14.290 --> 00:08:16.410 men together in defiance of Petain's orders, 00:08:16.949 --> 00:08:19.209 by putting all his most valuable chess pieces 00:08:19.209 --> 00:08:22.189 in the front row, Duchesne turned his army into 00:08:22.189 --> 00:08:25.050 an unprecedentedly easy target for what the Germans 00:08:25.050 --> 00:08:27.509 were about to unleash. Which brings us to the 00:08:27.509 --> 00:08:31.389 morning of May 27th, 1918, the attack begins. 00:08:32.049 --> 00:08:34.250 And reading the descriptions of this in the sources, 00:08:34.330 --> 00:08:36.750 it is just apocalyptic. The Germans unleashed 00:08:36.750 --> 00:08:40.539 what they called a Feuerwaltz. A rolling bombardment. 00:08:40.960 --> 00:08:43.879 But the scale of it is hard to comprehend. We 00:08:43.879 --> 00:08:46.500 are talking about over 4 ,000 artillery pieces 00:08:46.500 --> 00:08:49.379 opening fire simultaneously on the tightly packed 00:08:49.379 --> 00:08:52.120 allied front lines. 4 ,000 guns. All at once. 00:08:52.480 --> 00:08:54.700 Because Duchenne had compressed his troops so 00:08:54.700 --> 00:08:57.120 densely into those forward positions, the sheer 00:08:57.120 --> 00:08:59.539 volume of high explosives absolutely decimated 00:08:59.539 --> 00:09:01.889 them. The British and French forces suffered 00:09:01.889 --> 00:09:04.929 unimaginable losses before a single German soldier 00:09:04.929 --> 00:09:06.889 even stepped out of their trench. And it wasn't 00:09:06.889 --> 00:09:08.929 just traditional explosives tearing up the earth. 00:09:09.309 --> 00:09:11.330 The historical accounts detail how this barrage 00:09:11.330 --> 00:09:13.629 was immediately followed by a faturated poison 00:09:13.629 --> 00:09:16.009 gas drop. It was relentless. So you have these 00:09:16.009 --> 00:09:18.889 soldiers standing shoulder to shoulder, surviving 00:09:18.889 --> 00:09:22.110 the concussive terror of thousands of artillery 00:09:22.110 --> 00:09:25.029 shells only to be enveloped in a cloud of poison 00:09:25.029 --> 00:09:28.110 gas. The physical and psychological devastation 00:09:28.110 --> 00:09:32.240 is complete. And then, once the gas began to 00:09:32.240 --> 00:09:34.759 clear, the real assault started. This is where 00:09:34.759 --> 00:09:37.200 the tactical innovation of the German Army really 00:09:37.200 --> 00:09:41.320 showed. They sent in 17 divisions of Sturmtruppen, 00:09:41.720 --> 00:09:44.080 or stormtroopers. And these weren't your average 00:09:44.080 --> 00:09:46.179 infantrymen marching in straight lines across 00:09:46.179 --> 00:09:48.620 no man's land, right? Not at all. They were highly 00:09:48.620 --> 00:09:51.259 trained in infiltration tactics. What exactly 00:09:51.259 --> 00:09:53.259 did that look like on the ground? How do you 00:09:53.259 --> 00:09:55.960 infiltrate a heavily fortified trench network? 00:09:56.240 --> 00:09:58.539 Instead of a rigid sweeping line that just gets 00:09:58.539 --> 00:10:01.220 mowed down by machine guns, storm troopers moved 00:10:01.220 --> 00:10:04.120 in small autonomous squads. Think of them like 00:10:04.120 --> 00:10:06.259 water finding the cracks in a dam. Oh, I see. 00:10:06.279 --> 00:10:08.019 If they encountered a heavily defended strong 00:10:08.019 --> 00:10:09.980 point, they didn't stop and fight it. They bypassed 00:10:09.980 --> 00:10:11.940 it entirely, slipping through the weak points 00:10:11.940 --> 00:10:14.240 in the line, cutting communication wires and 00:10:14.240 --> 00:10:16.419 causing chaos deep in the rear. And they just 00:10:16.419 --> 00:10:18.759 leave the strong point. They left them for the 00:10:18.759 --> 00:10:21.000 regular infantry following behind to mop up. 00:10:21.460 --> 00:10:24.139 The Allies were entirely blindsided. Because 00:10:24.139 --> 00:10:25.940 Duchenne loaded everyone at the front, there 00:10:25.940 --> 00:10:28.659 was no backup. The dam broke and there was nothing 00:10:28.659 --> 00:10:31.019 behind it to stop the flood. Nothing at all. 00:10:31.220 --> 00:10:33.620 The Germans smashed through eight Allied divisions, 00:10:33.840 --> 00:10:37.610 creating a staggering 40 kilometer gap. That 00:10:37.610 --> 00:10:41.710 is about 25 miles of completely undefended territory 00:10:41.710 --> 00:10:44.090 between Rhimes and Soissons. They moved with 00:10:44.090 --> 00:10:46.929 such terrifying speed that they reached the Aisne 00:10:46.929 --> 00:10:50.110 River in under six hours. Under six hours. To 00:10:50.110 --> 00:10:52.149 advance that quickly in the context of World 00:10:52.149 --> 00:10:54.990 War One trench warfare, where armies literally 00:10:54.990 --> 00:10:56.970 fought for months to gain a few hundred yards, 00:10:57.289 --> 00:11:00.289 is almost unheard of. By nightfall, the German 00:11:00.289 --> 00:11:03.389 army had pushed the allies back an extra 15 kilometers 00:11:03.389 --> 00:11:06.509 in a single day. The entire allied defensive 00:11:06.570 --> 00:11:09.350 structure in that sector had completely evaporated. 00:11:09.610 --> 00:11:11.750 Here's where it gets really interesting. To really 00:11:11.750 --> 00:11:15.289 grasp how bizarrely successful and entirely disconnected 00:11:15.289 --> 00:11:17.509 the German High Command was during this breakthrough, 00:11:18.049 --> 00:11:20.289 there is this surreal anecdote from the front 00:11:20.289 --> 00:11:22.090 lines that I couldn't believe when I read it. 00:11:22.210 --> 00:11:24.970 Oh, the Kaiser's visit. Yes. Right in the middle 00:11:24.970 --> 00:11:27.590 of this catastrophic collapse of the Allied lines, 00:11:27.929 --> 00:11:30.889 Kaiser Wilhelm II himself decides to visit the 00:11:30.889 --> 00:11:33.710 battlefield to inspect the progress. As one does. 00:11:33.870 --> 00:11:36.320 Right. And while he is touring the devastation, 00:11:36.740 --> 00:11:39.279 he asks to interview a captured British prisoner 00:11:39.279 --> 00:11:42.299 of war. He specifically sits down with Brigadier 00:11:42.299 --> 00:11:45.259 General Hubert Reese, a British commander whose 00:11:45.259 --> 00:11:47.919 brigade had just been overrun. And the Kaiser, 00:11:48.360 --> 00:11:50.539 surrounded by the smoke and ruin of one of the 00:11:50.539 --> 00:11:54.259 most brutal offensives of the war, finds it immensely, 00:11:54.559 --> 00:11:57.460 genuinely amusing to learn that General Rees 00:11:57.460 --> 00:11:59.860 is Welsh. Because the British Prime Minister, 00:12:00.059 --> 00:12:02.419 David Lloyd George, was also Welsh. Exactly. 00:12:02.840 --> 00:12:05.820 It is this bizarre, almost polite moment of royal 00:12:05.820 --> 00:12:08.799 cocktail party amusement happening while tens 00:12:08.799 --> 00:12:11.490 of thousands of men are dying in the mud. just 00:12:11.490 --> 00:12:13.870 a few miles away. It really speaks volumes about 00:12:13.870 --> 00:12:16.009 the detached reality of the high command. They 00:12:16.009 --> 00:12:18.990 viewed it as a grand game. But back on the strategic 00:12:18.990 --> 00:12:21.769 level, the sheer success of this game was about 00:12:21.769 --> 00:12:24.789 to become Ludendorff's undoing. How so? Because 00:12:24.789 --> 00:12:27.549 by May 30, just three days into the offensive, 00:12:28.169 --> 00:12:31.070 the Germans had captured over 50 ,000 Allied 00:12:31.070 --> 00:12:34.370 soldiers. They had seized over 800 artillery 00:12:34.370 --> 00:12:38.159 guns. They had pushed so far and with such speed 00:12:38.159 --> 00:12:41.519 that they were now within 35 miles or 56 kilometers 00:12:41.519 --> 00:12:43.360 of the Paris city limits. Hold on. You were telling 00:12:43.360 --> 00:12:45.919 me he engineered the perfect trap, the exact 00:12:45.919 --> 00:12:48.419 diversion he needed, and it worked flawlessly. 00:12:48.940 --> 00:12:51.399 But instead of springing the real trap in Flanders, 00:12:51.720 --> 00:12:54.460 he changes his mind. He does. How does a supposedly 00:12:54.460 --> 00:12:57.820 brilliant military mastermind make that kind 00:12:57.820 --> 00:13:00.440 of error? He becomes blinded by the shiny object 00:13:00.440 --> 00:13:03.340 in front of him. This raises an incredibly important 00:13:03.340 --> 00:13:06.519 question for anyone studying leadership. Ludendorff 00:13:06.519 --> 00:13:08.960 abruptly changes the entire operational objective. 00:13:09.100 --> 00:13:11.159 He just pivots. Instead of sticking to his grand 00:13:11.159 --> 00:13:13.379 strategy and merely using this to draw enemy 00:13:13.379 --> 00:13:15.940 forces away from Flanders, he orders his 7th 00:13:15.940 --> 00:13:18.039 Army to push the advance fully toward Paris. 00:13:18.379 --> 00:13:20.899 He commits his reserves to the Aisne Drive, making 00:13:20.899 --> 00:13:23.779 it a primary offensive. Wow. The historical records 00:13:23.779 --> 00:13:26.620 show this was never at any point the intention 00:13:26.620 --> 00:13:29.100 of the operation. It is the ultimate example 00:13:29.100 --> 00:13:31.690 of strategic scope creep. For anyone listening 00:13:31.690 --> 00:13:34.950 who manages a team or runs a business, you know 00:13:34.950 --> 00:13:37.909 exactly what scope creep feels like. You start 00:13:37.909 --> 00:13:40.970 a project with a clear, tight goal, but then 00:13:40.970 --> 00:13:43.330 you get a little early success. And suddenly 00:13:43.330 --> 00:13:45.809 you start adding features, expanding the timeline, 00:13:46.289 --> 00:13:48.389 chasing new ideas that weren't in the original 00:13:48.389 --> 00:13:52.230 brief until the project becomes a bloated, unmanageable 00:13:52.230 --> 00:13:54.570 mess. And that's exactly what happened here. 00:13:54.950 --> 00:13:57.149 Ludendorff suffered from catastrophic success. 00:13:57.580 --> 00:14:00.500 By pushing his armies toward Paris, he essentially 00:14:00.500 --> 00:14:03.879 drove his own military machine right off a cliff. 00:14:04.259 --> 00:14:06.779 The mechanics of moving an army in 1918 were 00:14:06.779 --> 00:14:09.299 brutally unforgiving. The German forces simply 00:14:09.299 --> 00:14:12.200 outran their own logistics. They advanced too 00:14:12.200 --> 00:14:14.340 quickly for their horse -drawn supply lines to 00:14:14.340 --> 00:14:16.879 keep up over the shell cratered roads. They couldn't 00:14:16.879 --> 00:14:19.710 get food or ammo. Right. The soldiers were dealing 00:14:19.710 --> 00:14:21.909 with extreme physical exhaustion from days of 00:14:21.909 --> 00:14:24.169 rapid, constant fighting, they lacked the fresh 00:14:24.169 --> 00:14:26.049 reserves necessary to maintain the momentum, 00:14:26.509 --> 00:14:28.389 and their casualties were mounting heavily as 00:14:28.389 --> 00:14:31.149 the Allies finally shook off the shock, regrouped, 00:14:31.330 --> 00:14:33.610 and began launching coordinated counterattacks. 00:14:33.889 --> 00:14:36.629 So the runaway train runs out of track. By June 00:14:36.629 --> 00:14:39.509 6 at the Marna River, the whole offensive just 00:14:39.529 --> 00:14:42.769 grinds to a dead halt. Just days after coming 00:14:42.769 --> 00:14:45.070 within striking distance of Paris, the German 00:14:45.070 --> 00:14:47.789 advance is completely neutralized. And the human 00:14:47.789 --> 00:14:50.370 cost of Ludendorff's sudden pivot was staggering. 00:14:51.269 --> 00:14:53.570 Despite penetrating the Allied lines deeper than 00:14:53.570 --> 00:14:56.629 they had at any time since the war began in 1914, 00:14:57.230 --> 00:15:00.090 the offensive bled the German army dry. How bad 00:15:00.090 --> 00:15:02.639 were the losses? By the time the guns fell silent 00:15:02.639 --> 00:15:05.659 on this Pacific battle, German casualties reached 00:15:05.659 --> 00:15:09.980 130 ,000 men. 130 ,000 men lost for a diversion 00:15:09.980 --> 00:15:12.620 that mutated into a failed primary objective. 00:15:13.080 --> 00:15:14.980 And the combined total for the Allies was just 00:15:14.980 --> 00:15:18.139 as horrific, reaching up to 127 ,000 casualties. 00:15:18.600 --> 00:15:20.259 We're looking at over a quarter of a million 00:15:20.259 --> 00:15:22.620 human beings killed, wounded, or captured in 00:15:22.620 --> 00:15:25.139 just over a week of fighting. The immediate fallout 00:15:25.139 --> 00:15:27.909 on the Allied side was swift, too. General Duchesne, 00:15:28.009 --> 00:15:30.230 the man whose stubborn refusal to defend in depth 00:15:30.230 --> 00:15:32.190 created the conditions for this slaughter, was 00:15:32.190 --> 00:15:34.870 promptly sacked. Fired on spot. Bettane removed 00:15:34.870 --> 00:15:36.690 him for his disastrous handling of the troops 00:15:36.690 --> 00:15:38.830 and replaced him with Jean de Gouda's commander 00:15:38.830 --> 00:15:40.970 of the Sixth Army. You really have to wonder 00:15:40.970 --> 00:15:43.409 how entirely different the battle would have 00:15:43.409 --> 00:15:45.850 played out if Duchesne had just checked his ego 00:15:45.850 --> 00:15:49.059 and listened to his boss. But looking at the 00:15:49.059 --> 00:15:51.500 broader picture of who was actually fighting 00:15:51.500 --> 00:15:54.539 to halt this German advance, the Third Battle 00:15:54.539 --> 00:15:57.399 of the Aisne involved an incredibly diverse coalition. 00:15:57.879 --> 00:16:00.399 It really did. The research points out that Italian 00:16:00.399 --> 00:16:02.500 troops were present in the trenches alongside 00:16:02.500 --> 00:16:06.100 the French and British. But crucially, this battle 00:16:06.100 --> 00:16:08.899 marks a monumental turning point for the United 00:16:08.899 --> 00:16:11.860 States military. It absolutely does. We noted 00:16:11.860 --> 00:16:13.820 earlier that the Germans were racing the clock 00:16:13.820 --> 00:16:16.120 against the American arrival. Well, time was 00:16:16.120 --> 00:16:18.200 up. They made it. This battle marked one of the 00:16:18.200 --> 00:16:20.759 very first instances where an appreciable number 00:16:20.759 --> 00:16:23.519 of American troops, specifically the second and 00:16:23.519 --> 00:16:25.960 third infantry divisions, actually stepped into 00:16:25.960 --> 00:16:28.720 the fray and proved themselves in major sustained 00:16:28.720 --> 00:16:31.039 combat on the Western Front. What I found so 00:16:31.039 --> 00:16:33.500 fascinating about this is the logistical reality 00:16:33.500 --> 00:16:36.240 of trying to integrate American forces into a 00:16:36.240 --> 00:16:38.460 European trench system that had been entrenched 00:16:38.460 --> 00:16:41.960 for years. It was a logistical nightmare, primarily 00:16:41.960 --> 00:16:44.610 because of how the forces were structured. The 00:16:44.610 --> 00:16:46.629 divisions of the American Expeditionary Force 00:16:46.629 --> 00:16:49.149 were essentially double the size of those fielded 00:16:49.149 --> 00:16:51.409 by the British, the French, or the Germans. Double 00:16:51.409 --> 00:16:53.669 the size. A full -strength American division 00:16:53.669 --> 00:16:57.409 boasted around 20 ,000 men. Because of their 00:16:57.409 --> 00:17:00.649 sheer overwhelming size, the French often referred 00:17:00.649 --> 00:17:03.750 to them as Grande's divisions. Put yourself in 00:17:03.750 --> 00:17:06.250 the boots of an exhausted German soldier. You 00:17:06.250 --> 00:17:08.630 have been fighting nonstop, living in the mud, 00:17:09.109 --> 00:17:12.529 surviving on meager ratchets for four long years. 00:17:12.910 --> 00:17:14.970 Your army has just pushed itself to the point 00:17:14.970 --> 00:17:17.630 of total physical collapse, chasing Ludendorff's 00:17:17.630 --> 00:17:20.809 dream of taking Paris. Yeah. And suddenly, looking 00:17:20.809 --> 00:17:23.289 across the battlefield, you are facing these 00:17:23.289 --> 00:17:26.569 massive, fresh, highly equipped Grande's divisions 00:17:26.569 --> 00:17:29.130 entering the line. The psychological blow of 00:17:29.130 --> 00:17:31.309 that alone must have been devastating. signaled 00:17:31.309 --> 00:17:34.329 the definitive end of German numerical superiority. 00:17:35.390 --> 00:17:37.910 But diving even deeper into the historical lineages 00:17:37.910 --> 00:17:40.329 of who exactly was fighting within those American 00:17:40.329 --> 00:17:43.069 ranks, there is a profound detail that deserves 00:17:43.069 --> 00:17:45.470 our full attention. Let's hear it. The legendary 00:17:45.470 --> 00:17:47.750 African -American regiments, famously known as 00:17:47.750 --> 00:17:50.269 the Buffalo Soldiers, are officially tied to 00:17:50.269 --> 00:17:52.250 the campaigns of the Third Battle of the Aisne. 00:17:52.430 --> 00:17:54.230 This is a piece of history that doesn't get talked 00:17:54.230 --> 00:17:58.119 about nearly enough. Who were the Buffalo Soldiers, 00:17:58.220 --> 00:18:00.799 and how did they end up fighting in this specific 00:18:00.799 --> 00:18:03.460 pocket of France? The legacy of the Buffalo Soldiers 00:18:03.460 --> 00:18:06.980 stretches far back into the 19th century. These 00:18:06.980 --> 00:18:10.180 original units, specifically the 9th and 10th 00:18:10.180 --> 00:18:13.079 Cavalry Regiments and the 24th and 25th Infantry 00:18:13.079 --> 00:18:15.640 Regiments, had a long storied histories in the 00:18:15.640 --> 00:18:17.619 American West and the Spanish -American War. 00:18:17.640 --> 00:18:20.579 Right. But their presence in World War I comes 00:18:20.579 --> 00:18:23.980 with a deep tragic irony. Because the United 00:18:23.980 --> 00:18:26.039 States military was strictly segregated at the 00:18:26.039 --> 00:18:29.259 time, many high ranking American commanders refused 00:18:29.259 --> 00:18:31.539 to let African American troops fight alongside 00:18:31.539 --> 00:18:34.279 white American troops. So their own country's 00:18:34.279 --> 00:18:36.920 military leadership marginalizes them. How do 00:18:36.920 --> 00:18:39.220 they end up on the front lines, halting a German 00:18:39.220 --> 00:18:41.599 breakthrough? The French army, which was bleeding 00:18:41.599 --> 00:18:44.579 out and desperately needed men, had no such reservations 00:18:44.579 --> 00:18:47.460 about race. They gladly welcomed these African 00:18:47.460 --> 00:18:49.559 American regiments. They just needed soldiers 00:18:49.559 --> 00:18:52.400 who could fight. Exactly. The French integrated 00:18:52.400 --> 00:18:55.500 them, equipped them with French helmets and weapons, 00:18:55.940 --> 00:18:57.980 and sent them into the absolute worst of the 00:18:57.980 --> 00:19:00.220 fighting. Their involvement in the campaigns 00:19:00.220 --> 00:19:02.759 of the Third Battle of the Aisne and the subsequent 00:19:02.759 --> 00:19:05.640 offenses that finally broke the German army is 00:19:05.640 --> 00:19:09.660 a testament to their incredible resilience. The 00:19:09.660 --> 00:19:12.299 records note they fought with immense distinction 00:19:12.299 --> 00:19:15.500 for a global coalition, even while facing systemic 00:19:15.500 --> 00:19:18.000 discrimination from their own government back 00:19:18.000 --> 00:19:22.599 home. cinematic picture of a world converging 00:19:22.599 --> 00:19:26.299 on this one stretch of river in France. You have 00:19:26.299 --> 00:19:29.319 exhausted British troops hoping for arrest. You 00:19:29.319 --> 00:19:32.140 have a stubborn French commander refusing to 00:19:32.140 --> 00:19:34.839 yield an inch of ground out of pure pride. You've 00:19:34.839 --> 00:19:37.579 got highly trained German stormtroopers infiltrating 00:19:37.579 --> 00:19:40.039 the lines. Italian forces holding the flanks 00:19:40.039 --> 00:19:43.440 and these enormous fresh American divisions including 00:19:43.440 --> 00:19:46.920 the deeply historic Buffalo soldiers all colliding 00:19:46.920 --> 00:19:50.400 in this chaotic bloody week in 1918. And as we 00:19:50.400 --> 00:19:52.660 pull back from the trenches and synthesize all 00:19:52.660 --> 00:19:55.380 of this information, there are two monumental 00:19:55.380 --> 00:19:57.460 lessons about human nature and decision making 00:19:57.460 --> 00:19:59.779 that emerge from the smoke. The first is the 00:19:59.779 --> 00:20:02.779 sheer peril of the sunk cost fallacy, which General 00:20:02.779 --> 00:20:05.680 Duchesne perfectly tragically illustrates. Yeah. 00:20:05.920 --> 00:20:08.720 He could not separate the past bloody cost of 00:20:08.720 --> 00:20:11.640 capturing the Chemin des Dames Ridge from the 00:20:11.640 --> 00:20:14.079 present tactical reality of how to effectively 00:20:14.079 --> 00:20:17.380 defend it. Right. His inability to let go of 00:20:17.380 --> 00:20:20.400 a piece of ground out of pride cost him his command 00:20:20.400 --> 00:20:23.519 and nearly cost the Allies the war. That is the 00:20:23.519 --> 00:20:25.720 cautionary tale of holding on too tight. But 00:20:25.720 --> 00:20:28.200 the second lesson is the exact opposite. It's 00:20:28.200 --> 00:20:30.339 the danger of abandoning your principles when 00:20:30.339 --> 00:20:33.200 things go incredibly well. Ludendorff's mistake. 00:20:33.599 --> 00:20:37.059 Exactly. Ludendorff had a brilliant grand strategy. 00:20:37.619 --> 00:20:40.380 But the moment he tasted an unexpected, shiny 00:20:40.380 --> 00:20:43.039 tactical victory, he threw his master plan out 00:20:43.039 --> 00:20:45.900 the window. He chased the runaway train, falling 00:20:45.900 --> 00:20:48.440 victim to strategic scope creep until his army 00:20:48.440 --> 00:20:50.640 was completely exhausted and bled out on the 00:20:50.640 --> 00:20:53.400 road to Paris. It is vital to remember that Ludendorff's 00:20:53.400 --> 00:20:55.799 diversionary attack at the Aisne actually worked. 00:20:56.420 --> 00:20:58.059 It achieved exactly what it was supposed to do. 00:20:58.240 --> 00:20:59.759 It panicked the allies. But he couldn't just 00:20:59.759 --> 00:21:02.690 take the win. Instead of taking that win, halting 00:21:02.690 --> 00:21:05.289 his advance and shifting his focus back to his 00:21:05.289 --> 00:21:07.789 main war -winning objective in Flanders, he got 00:21:07.789 --> 00:21:10.529 greedy. And by the time his forces stalled in 00:21:10.529 --> 00:21:14.230 June, he had lost 130 ,000 men and the window 00:21:14.230 --> 00:21:16.609 for German victory had permanently slammed shut 00:21:16.609 --> 00:21:18.710 with the arrival of the Americans. It is the 00:21:18.710 --> 00:21:20.910 ultimate story of a fake out that was simply 00:21:20.910 --> 00:21:23.710 too successful for its own good. It is a reminder 00:21:23.710 --> 00:21:26.250 that sometimes winning the wrong battle can cost 00:21:26.250 --> 00:21:28.829 you the entire war. Which brings us to a final 00:21:28.829 --> 00:21:31.109 thought for you to ponder as we wrap up. Go for 00:21:31.109 --> 00:21:33.470 it. Think about Ludendorff's fateful decision 00:21:33.470 --> 00:21:37.049 to abandon his original plan when the aimed attacks 00:21:37.049 --> 00:21:40.029 succeeded beyond his wildest dreams. If he had 00:21:40.029 --> 00:21:42.170 maintained his discipline, if he had halted the 00:21:42.170 --> 00:21:44.269 advance once the Allies were sufficiently distracted 00:21:44.269 --> 00:21:46.589 and launched his true offensive in Flanders as 00:21:46.589 --> 00:21:48.990 planned, would the entire outcome of World War 00:21:48.990 --> 00:21:50.910 I have been different? Does a leader's inability 00:21:50.910 --> 00:21:53.430 to handle unexpected success ultimately doom 00:21:53.430 --> 00:21:56.369 their grandest ambitions? That is a phenomenal 00:21:56.369 --> 00:21:58.970 question to leave you with today. It really forces 00:21:58.970 --> 00:22:01.789 you to examine how you handle your own unexpected 00:22:01.789 --> 00:22:04.549 victories. When you get a sudden win, do you 00:22:04.549 --> 00:22:07.309 stick to the grand plan, or do you lose your 00:22:07.309 --> 00:22:09.730 discipline and chase the runaway train? Thank 00:22:09.730 --> 00:22:11.869 you so much for joining us on this deep dive 00:22:11.869 --> 00:22:14.450 into the third battle of the Azzane. We hope 00:22:14.450 --> 00:22:16.769 this exploration has given you a fresh perspective 00:22:16.769 --> 00:22:19.269 on the hidden complexities of history and leadership. 00:22:19.690 --> 00:22:21.369 Keep questioning the history you think you know, 00:22:21.529 --> 00:22:23.650 stay insanely curious, and we will catch you 00:22:23.650 --> 00:22:24.940 on the next Deep Dive.