WEBVTT

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Welcome to today's deep dive. I am just so glad

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you could join us today because we are looking

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at a stack of sources that completely shifted

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my entire understanding of modern history. Yeah,

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it really is a fascinating collection of materials

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we have today. It really is. So we are diving

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into the Battle of Vimy Ridge, which took place

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from April 9th to the 12th back in 1917. And,

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you know, if you're looking at these materials

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with us, you might initially think this is just

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another grim, muddy story about a World War I

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battle. Right, just another tragic trench warfare

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scenario. Exactly. But it's not. It is an absolute

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masterclass in how meticulous planning, technological

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innovation, and just a massive radical shift

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in military tactics allowed the Canadian Corps

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to capture a fortress that literally everyone

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else believed was completely impregnable. Okay,

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let's unpack the script. It's a phenomenal case

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study, really. We're looking at a specific moment

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in time where the sheer scale and the creativity

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of the preparation fundamentally changed what

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was possible on a battlefield. Because the Canadian

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Corps, operating as part of the British First

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Army, they were given the subjective primarily

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to protect the flanks of a much larger Eris offensive,

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and also to draw German reserves away from a

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massive French offensive planned further to the

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south. But to really grasp why taking this ridge

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was considered an impossible task, we have to

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understand the geography. Right, let's set the

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scene for you. Imagine you're standing in northern

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France, you're looking out over the Douai Plains,

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which are relatively flat, and then suddenly

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there's this massive escarpment. It just rises

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right out of the landscape. Yeah, Vimy Ridge

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is seven kilometers long and rises 145 meters

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high. Now, 145 meters might not sound like Mount

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Everest to you, but in this specific flat landscape,

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it is the ultimate high ground. It offers a completely

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unobstructed view for tens of kilometers in all

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directions. What's fascinating here is how the

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Germans Sixth Army capitalized on that geography.

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By early 1917, they had held this ridge for two

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whole years. Two years is a long time to dig

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in. Exactly. They had spent that entire time

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turning it into an absolute state of the art

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fortress. Because the ridge is steep on the eastern

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side and drops off quickly, the Germans knew

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that if they ever lost the top, it would be incredibly

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difficult for them to counterattack uphill to

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take it back. So their strategy was just, well,

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never lose it. Right. Never lose it in the first

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place. They built a rigid, heavily fortified

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defensive structure packed with deep concrete

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reinforced dugouts, multi -layered trench and

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a devastating interlocking network of machine

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gun nests. And the history of the Allies trying

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to take this ridge before 1917 is just, it's

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incredibly dark. The sources outline how the

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French 10th Army had tried and failed multiple

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times to push the Germans off Vimy Ridge. In

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those attempts alone, the French suffered a staggering

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150 ,000 casualties. Yeah, that number is just

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hard to comprehend. 150 ,000. Just let that number

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sink in. And then the British took over the sector

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in 1916. And they essentially got bogged down

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in this terrifying underground tunnel warfare.

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So I really want you to imagine the psychological

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weight of that. You were a Canadian soldier standing

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in the freezing mud and you were being ordered

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to attack a hill where hundreds of thousands

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of allied troops have already been slaughtered.

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How do you not just view that as a suicide mission?

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You would absolutely view it that way if your

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commanders were using the same old tactics. And

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that is exactly why the leadership of the Canadian

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Corps realized they needed a fundamental shift

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in doctrine. They knew the old way wasn't working.

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Right. In early 1917, officers from the Canadian

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Corps actually went and attended lectures given

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by the French Army. They meticulously analyzed

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the French successes during the massive Battle

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of Verdun. General Arthur Curry, commanding the

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1st Canadian Division, really took those lessons

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to heart. He saw what worked and what didn't.

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Exactly. The major realization was that the standard

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First World War tactic, simply sending wave after

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wave of men to walk in rigid lines toward machine

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guns, was not just tragic, it was entirely ineffective.

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Wait, I want to pause on that because this is

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where the sources get really surprising for me.

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The preparation they did to fix that problem

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sounds almost absurd compared to standard military

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practices of the time. They started doing something

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called democratizing information. Yes, a huge

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paradigm. Because before this, in most First

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World War battles, only the top aristocratic

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officers had the maps and actually knew the overall

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plan. The enlisted men were just told to walk

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forward. The problem is, if that one officer

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gets killed five seconds into the charge, the

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rest of the men are completely lost. Precisely.

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The rigid command structure was a fatal flaw.

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So for Vimy, the Canadian Corps flipped the script

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entirely. They printed upwards of 40 ,000 highly

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detailed topographical maps and handed them out

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to platoon sergeants and even section commanders.

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40 ,000 maps. Yeah, they taught the regular soldiers

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the specific jobs of the men beside them and

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the officers above them. That way, if a leader

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was killed or wounded, which was virtually guaranteed

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in this kind of warfare, the attack wouldn't

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just stall out in the mud. The surviving men

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knew exactly what the objective was and could

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keep fighting for it independently. Exactly.

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And they didn't stop there with the preparation.

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No, they didn't. The notes say they took entire

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units to Hills safely behind the front lines

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and laid out full scale replicas of the battlefield

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using colored tape. They literally practiced

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walking the exact distances over and over. They

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even build a giant plasticine model like a massive

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Play -Doh diorama at headquarters to show officers

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every single topographic dip crater and German

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trench. It's just mind -boggling. It was an unprecedented

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level of rehearsal and alongside that knowledge

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they championed small unit flexibility. Instead

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of just outfitting everyone with a standard rifle

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they gave individual platoons specialist roles.

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They equipped them with hand grenades to clear

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dugouts and crucially Lewis machine guns. Hold

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on, why was the Lewis gun such a game changer

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here? Aren't machine guns what the Germans were

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already using to defend the ridge? They were,

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but standard machine guns of the era were incredibly

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heavy and usually required a whole team to operate

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from a fixed defensive position. You couldn't

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just run across a battlefield with one. The Lewis

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gun, on the other hand, was relatively lightweight

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and portable. So one guy could carry it forward.

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Right. By giving these two advancing infantry

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platoons, it meant the attacking troops finally

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had their own mobile, suppressive firepower.

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If a Canadian unit got pinned down by a German

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bunker, they didn't have to wait for artillery

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support. They could use their own Lewis guns

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to keep the Germans' heads down while the Grenadiers

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flanked the bunker and took it out. That makes

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total sense. Now, while all of this surface training

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is happening, there is something even crazier

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going on underground. Because the ground in the

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Erasmus sector is this soft, stable chalk, it

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is actually perfect for digging. It's a tunnel

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builder's dream, relatively speaking. The British

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tunneling companies of the Royal Engineers excavated

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an entire subterranean city. They dug 12 massive

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subways, some up to 1 .2 kilometers long, buried

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up to 10 meters deep. And we aren't just talking

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about dirt tunnels here. Far from it. They installed

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light rail lines, piped water, underground hospitals,

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and command posts. All of this was so they can

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move thousands of troops securely and entirely

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unseen right up to the front lines. The sheer

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engineering of it is remarkable, but we should

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also clarify that these tunnels weren't purely

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for logistics and safety. They were actively

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designed as offensive weapons as well. The engineers

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painstakingly laid 13 massive explosive mines

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directly under the key German surface fortifications.

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But even more fascinating is their use of what

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the sources call wombat charges. Yes. I was reading

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about these wombat charges in the source material,

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and I couldn't quite wrap my head around them.

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What exactly were they doing with these? So imagine

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pushing long, explosive -filled pipes out from

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the very ends of these subways, resting just

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beneath the surface of no man's land, the deadly

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open ground between the two armies. The idea

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was that the exact moment the battle started,

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they would detonate these wombat charges. What

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would that do? It instantly blew an elongated

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crater that formed a ready -made communication

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trench. Oh, wow. It meant attacking troops and

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heavily burdened supply carriers could move across

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the most dangerous part of the battlefield while

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remaining below ground level, shielded from enemy

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fire. That is just brilliant. An instant trench

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across no man's land. So you have this massive

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operation underground. But the sources also focus

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heavily on what was happening up in the sky.

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They call it Bloody April. The Royal Flying Corps

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was taking these unbelievable risks just to gain

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air superiority and photograph the German defenses.

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The air war was brutal. The reconnaissance was

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so incredibly dangerous that they lost 131 aircraft

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in just the first week of April alone. The casualty

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rate for those pilots was horrific, but the intelligence

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they gathered was the linchpin of the entire

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operation. They brought back vital aerial photographs,

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but they also engaged in cutting -edge target

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acquisition techniques known as flash spotting

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and sound ranging. Okay, you have to explain

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sound ranging to me. Because trying to isolate

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a specific sound in a battle where a million

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shells are dropping sounds literally impossible.

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How does that even work? It's a brilliant piece

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of applied physics, actually. Essentially, they

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set up an array of microphones at precisely known

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locations along the allied lines. When a hidden

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German artillery gun fired, the sound wave of

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that boom would reach each microphone at a slightly

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different millisecond. Because sound travels

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at a fixed speed. Exactly. By using specialized

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oscilloscopes and stopwatches, technicians could

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calculate the time difference it took for the

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sound to arrive at each post. Using that math,

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they could draw intersects arcs on a map and

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pinpoint the exact coordinates of the German

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gun, even if it was hidden miles away behind

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a hill. Wow. So they are literally triangulating

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the sound of the guns to find them. And then

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they hand those coordinates over to the Canadian

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artillery, which, looking at these numbers, was

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absolutely massive. The scale of the artillery

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was unprecedented. They were allocated 1 .6 million

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shells for this battle. To give you the listener

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an idea of the density here. They had one heavy

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gun for every 20 yards of the front and one field

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gun for every 10 yards. That is three times the

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heavy artillery power they had at the incredibly

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destructive Battle of the Somme. The firepower

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was staggering, but arguably just as important

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as the number of shells was the technology inside

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them. Specifically, the introduction of the number

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106 instantaneous fuse. Right. The number 106

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fuse. The sources emphasize this heavily. Before

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this invention, a typical artillery shell would

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often plunge deep into the soft muddy ground

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before detonating. It would explode like a geyser

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throwing mud everywhere, but it did almost nothing

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to destroy the thick belts of barbed wire sitting

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on the surface. How did the 106 change that?

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Well, the number 106 was designed with a highly

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sensitive contact mechanism. The absolute millisecond

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it brushed against anything, even a single strand

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of barbed wire, detonated laterally above the

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ground. So it didn't dig in at all? No. Instead

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of blowing a hole in the dirt, it acted like

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a giant explosive pair of scissors. It completely

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shredded the German barbed wire and cleared a

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physical path for the infantry to walk through.

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And the effect this artillery had on the German

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defenders was completely catastrophic. The preliminary

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bombardment started on March 20th, and then the

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second phase, utilizing every single gun they

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had, began on April 2nd. If we look at this entirely

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impartially, just from the German perspective,

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their own sources refer to this terrifying period

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as the week of suffering. An incredibly apt name

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for what they endured. The bombardment was so

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intense and so unrelenting that their trenches

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were basically leveled. But more importantly,

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the shelling was so heavy that German ration

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parties couldn't even make it up to the front

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lines. The defenders were trapped underground

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in those deep bunkers, exhausted, starving and

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enduring the profound psychological torment.

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of 11 straight days of earth -shattering noise.

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Which sets the stage perfectly for the main assault,

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Easter Monday, April 9th, 1917. At exactly five

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through a year in the morning, the operation

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commences. The coordination of this moment is

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just incredible to visualize. The mines detonate

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on the German lines. One thousand guns open fire

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at the exact same second. And then there is this

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massive, unpredictable stroke of luck. A northwest

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storm blows in, sending freezing sleet and snow

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directly into the faces of the defending German

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troops. absolutely miserable for the Canadian

00:12:35.620 --> 00:12:38.059
troops advancing through the mud, provided a

00:12:38.059 --> 00:12:40.860
massive tactical advantage by blinding the defenders.

00:12:41.360 --> 00:12:43.840
But the real key to the advance was a highly

00:12:43.840 --> 00:12:46.600
choreographed tactic called the Creeping Barrage.

00:12:47.159 --> 00:12:49.779
The field guns laid down a continuous curtain

00:12:49.779 --> 00:12:52.539
of explosive fire that advanced forward roughly

00:12:52.539 --> 00:12:55.740
100 yards every three minutes. But wait, advancing

00:12:55.740 --> 00:12:58.320
100 yards every three minutes? That means the

00:12:58.320 --> 00:13:00.480
soldiers are walking almost directly inside their

00:13:00.480 --> 00:13:03.240
own artillery fire. That requires a terrifying

00:13:03.240 --> 00:13:05.879
amount of trust. It did. It was incredibly dangerous,

00:13:05.919 --> 00:13:08.519
but it was necessary. The infantry was trained

00:13:08.519 --> 00:13:11.539
to walk just yards behind this moving wall of

00:13:11.539 --> 00:13:13.519
explosions. So they're just hugging the barrage.

00:13:13.620 --> 00:13:16.779
Yes. The logic was that the barrage forces the

00:13:16.779 --> 00:13:19.360
Germans to stay huddled deep inside their concrete

00:13:19.360 --> 00:13:22.159
dugouts. By hugging the barrage closely, the

00:13:22.159 --> 00:13:24.039
Canadians would arrive at the lip of the German

00:13:24.039 --> 00:13:26.360
trench the very second the artillery lifted,

00:13:26.840 --> 00:13:28.919
giving the defenders absolute no time to climb

00:13:28.919 --> 00:13:31.480
up the stairs and man their machine guns. And

00:13:31.480 --> 00:13:33.460
to make sure the men didn't just collapse from

00:13:33.460 --> 00:13:36.379
exhaustion while doing this, they used a leapfrogging

00:13:36.379 --> 00:13:39.440
tactic. The planners had drawn out four colored

00:13:39.440 --> 00:13:41.899
objective lines on those thousands of maps we

00:13:41.899 --> 00:13:44.580
talked about earlier. The black, red, blue, and

00:13:44.580 --> 00:13:47.269
brown lines. Instead of one group trying to run

00:13:47.269 --> 00:13:49.450
the entire chaotic distance to the top of the

00:13:49.450 --> 00:13:52.590
ridge, the initial wave would fight to the black

00:13:52.590 --> 00:13:55.230
line and immediately stop to consolidate and

00:13:55.230 --> 00:13:57.370
defend it. They'd lock that position down. Right.

00:13:57.769 --> 00:14:00.230
Then a completely fresh unit behind them would

00:14:00.230 --> 00:14:02.750
physically leapfrog past them to attack the red

00:14:02.750 --> 00:14:06.070
line and so on. It kept the momentum relentlessly

00:14:06.070 --> 00:14:10.179
fresh. Exactly. And for the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd

00:14:10.179 --> 00:14:12.980
Canadian divisions, this plan was executed almost

00:14:12.980 --> 00:14:15.820
flawlessly. They hit their objective lines right

00:14:15.820 --> 00:14:18.299
on schedule. The speed of the Canadian advance

00:14:18.299 --> 00:14:20.960
was so rapid that even though the German commanders

00:14:20.960 --> 00:14:22.860
in the rear could communicate with their front

00:14:22.860 --> 00:14:25.240
lines, they simply didn't have the time to react

00:14:25.240 --> 00:14:27.539
or move their reserve troops forward before their

00:14:27.539 --> 00:14:30.440
positions were completely overrun. But, looking

00:14:30.440 --> 00:14:32.360
at the sources to make sure we give you a fully

00:14:32.360 --> 00:14:34.919
balanced view of this, it wasn't the perfect

00:14:34.919 --> 00:14:37.840
operation everywhere. The 4th Canadian Division,

00:14:37.879 --> 00:14:40.419
which was tasked with taking the extreme northern

00:14:40.419 --> 00:14:43.059
portion of the advance, faced an absolute nightmare.

00:14:43.179 --> 00:14:45.179
They had the toughest assignment. They were attacking

00:14:45.179 --> 00:14:47.299
the highest point of the ridge, a place called

00:14:47.299 --> 00:14:51.179
Hill 145. And there's this one detail in the

00:14:51.179 --> 00:14:53.919
sources that just stopped me in my tracks. A

00:14:53.919 --> 00:14:56.919
commanding officer of one of the assaulting battalions

00:14:56.919 --> 00:15:00.179
actually asked the artillery to leave a specific

00:15:00.179 --> 00:15:03.000
portion of the German trench completely undamaged.

00:15:03.340 --> 00:15:06.460
Why on earth would he request that? It was intended

00:15:06.460 --> 00:15:08.860
to preserve the trench so that his own men could

00:15:08.860 --> 00:15:11.779
use it for cover once they captured it, but tactically

00:15:11.779 --> 00:15:14.600
it was a fatal miscalculation. A massive mistake.

00:15:14.759 --> 00:15:17.179
When the infantry advanced, the surviving machine

00:15:17.179 --> 00:15:19.759
gun nests in that deliberately undamaged section

00:15:19.759 --> 00:15:23.440
of the trench immediately opened fire. They completely

00:15:23.440 --> 00:15:25.860
devastated the advancing Canadian troops on the

00:15:25.860 --> 00:15:28.220
right flank. That is just heartbreaking. And

00:15:28.220 --> 00:15:30.179
to make matters worse, while they were pinned

00:15:30.179 --> 00:15:32.820
down, their left flank was taking heavy, harassing

00:15:32.820 --> 00:15:35.379
fire from another fortified knoll known as the

00:15:35.379 --> 00:15:38.179
Pimple. The 4th Division's advance collapsed

00:15:38.179 --> 00:15:40.899
almost immediately. It took persistent, desperate,

00:15:41.100 --> 00:15:43.299
and bloody attacks by reserve units later in

00:15:43.299 --> 00:15:45.539
the day to finally force the Germans off the

00:15:45.539 --> 00:15:48.340
southwestern portion of Hill 145. And the fighting

00:15:48.340 --> 00:15:51.080
didn't end on the 9th. It wasn't until days later,

00:15:51.279 --> 00:15:54.000
on April 12th, fighting through a literal snowstorm,

00:15:54.379 --> 00:15:56.720
that they finally managed to take that last northern

00:15:56.720 --> 00:15:59.759
objective, the pimple. By nightfall on April

00:15:59.759 --> 00:16:02.779
12th, the entire length of Vimy Ridge was firmly

00:16:02.779 --> 00:16:05.440
in Canadian hands. Which brings us to the grim

00:16:05.440 --> 00:16:07.899
reality of the aftermath. By the time the ridge

00:16:07.899 --> 00:16:10.480
was finally secured, the Canadian Corps had suffered

00:16:10.480 --> 00:16:14.799
10 ,602 casualties, with nearly 300 -600 of those

00:16:14.799 --> 00:16:17.360
men killed. On the German side, later historical

00:16:17.360 --> 00:16:19.500
sources estimate they suffered around 20 ,000

00:16:19.500 --> 00:16:22.419
casualties, with roughly 4 ,000 men taken prisoner.

00:16:22.759 --> 00:16:24.700
The strategic fallout for the German command

00:16:24.700 --> 00:16:27.320
was immediate and severe. The German Supreme

00:16:27.320 --> 00:16:29.580
Army Command was furious at the loss of such

00:16:29.580 --> 00:16:33.179
a vital position. Field Marshal von Hindenburg

00:16:33.179 --> 00:16:35.759
launched a formal court of inquiry and ended

00:16:35.759 --> 00:16:38.580
up firing the Sixth Army Commander, General von

00:16:38.580 --> 00:16:40.759
Falkenhausen. The source mentions he was fired

00:16:40.759 --> 00:16:43.519
specifically for failing to use a new doctrine

00:16:43.519 --> 00:16:46.940
called Defense in Depth. What actually is that?

00:16:47.100 --> 00:16:49.639
Defense in depth or elastic defense was a new

00:16:49.639 --> 00:16:51.679
strategy where you don't put all your men in

00:16:51.679 --> 00:16:54.220
the very front trench to be slaughtered by artillery.

00:16:54.740 --> 00:16:56.940
Instead, you keep your best reserve divisions

00:16:56.940 --> 00:16:59.860
further back, out of artillery range, ready to

00:16:59.860 --> 00:17:02.179
rush forward and counterattack the enemy exactly

00:17:02.179 --> 00:17:04.160
when they're most exhausted and disorganized

00:17:04.160 --> 00:17:06.299
from taking the front line. Let them tire themselves

00:17:06.299 --> 00:17:09.039
out and then hit them. Precisely. But Volkenhausen

00:17:09.039 --> 00:17:11.859
completely failed to do this. He kept his reserve

00:17:11.859 --> 00:17:14.519
divisions up to 15 miles away from the battlefield,

00:17:15.079 --> 00:17:17.359
far too distant to launch any kind of timely

00:17:17.359 --> 00:17:19.799
counterattack against the rapid Canadian advance.

00:17:20.660 --> 00:17:23.099
Because of this failure, the Germans had no choice

00:17:23.099 --> 00:17:26.059
but to retreat eastward to a completely new defensive

00:17:26.059 --> 00:17:29.160
line, employing a scorched earth policy as they

00:17:29.160 --> 00:17:31.119
went. So they just destroyed everything as they

00:17:31.119 --> 00:17:33.359
pulled back? Yes. If we connect this to the bigger

00:17:33.359 --> 00:17:36.920
picture, the legacy of this battle is huge. The

00:17:36.920 --> 00:17:39.519
sources point out that tactically, Vimy was just

00:17:39.519 --> 00:17:42.000
one piece of the much larger Eris offensive.

00:17:42.730 --> 00:17:45.589
But historically and culturally, its significance

00:17:45.589 --> 00:17:47.730
took on a life of its own. It became something

00:17:47.730 --> 00:17:50.309
much larger than just a battle. That's a crucial

00:17:50.309 --> 00:17:52.630
distinction. In terms of the First World War,

00:17:52.869 --> 00:17:56.599
it was a localized tactical victory. But symbolically,

00:17:56.619 --> 00:17:59.319
it represents the very first time that all four

00:17:59.319 --> 00:18:02.119
Canadian divisions, meaning men from every region

00:18:02.119 --> 00:18:05.119
across the country, fought together side by side

00:18:05.119 --> 00:18:09.259
as a single unified force. In historical narratives

00:18:09.259 --> 00:18:11.359
that developed in the decades following the war,

00:18:11.740 --> 00:18:14.400
Vimy Ridge is frequently cited as the exact moment

00:18:14.400 --> 00:18:17.440
Canada came of age as a nation. It is widely

00:18:17.440 --> 00:18:19.380
viewed as the point where Canada stepped out

00:18:19.380 --> 00:18:21.259
from the shadow of the British Empire to forge

00:18:21.259 --> 00:18:24.140
its own distinct, confident national identity.

00:18:24.490 --> 00:18:26.809
So what does this all mean for you? Well, the

00:18:26.809 --> 00:18:28.829
legacy of Vimy Ridge isn't just something trapped

00:18:28.829 --> 00:18:31.329
in textbooks. It is physically carved in stone.

00:18:31.849 --> 00:18:34.410
Following the war, France actually granted Canada

00:18:34.410 --> 00:18:37.490
perpetual use of a massive section of the land

00:18:37.490 --> 00:18:40.960
at Vimy to create a battlefield park. Today,

00:18:41.119 --> 00:18:43.640
the Canadian National Vimy Memorial sits right

00:18:43.640 --> 00:18:46.160
on the highest point of the ridge, Hill 145.

00:18:46.299 --> 00:18:48.779
And the grounds of that memorial serve as a very

00:18:48.779 --> 00:18:51.759
stark, very literal reminder of the battle. The

00:18:51.759 --> 00:18:54.759
250 -acre park is still so incredibly honeycombed

00:18:54.759 --> 00:18:57.400
with collapsed tunnels, massive artillery craters

00:18:57.400 --> 00:18:59.859
and unexploded munitions that large portions

00:18:59.859 --> 00:19:01.660
of the surrounding forest remain permanently

00:19:01.660 --> 00:19:04.180
closed to the public for safety reasons. Even

00:19:04.180 --> 00:19:06.039
over a century later, the earth itself hasn't

00:19:06.039 --> 00:19:08.349
recovered. When the memorial was finally unveiled

00:19:08.349 --> 00:19:12.130
in 1936, it was a massive event. It took 11 years

00:19:12.130 --> 00:19:14.789
to build and cost millions. It drew a crowd of

00:19:14.789 --> 00:19:18.190
over 50 ,000 people, including over 6 ,000 Canadian

00:19:18.190 --> 00:19:21.029
veterans. King Edward VIII was there to unveil

00:19:21.029 --> 00:19:23.069
it. The sources note that the Canadian prime

00:19:23.069 --> 00:19:25.089
minister actually skipped the event due to some

00:19:25.089 --> 00:19:27.089
bitter domestic political disputes back home

00:19:27.089 --> 00:19:29.769
regarding veterans. But regardless, the unveiling

00:19:29.769 --> 00:19:32.579
was a monumental moment. But as we wrap up, I

00:19:32.579 --> 00:19:34.819
want to leave you with a final provocative thought

00:19:34.819 --> 00:19:37.220
to mull over. The memorial's architect, a man

00:19:37.220 --> 00:19:40.259
named Walter Seymour Alward, created this breathtaking

00:19:40.259 --> 00:19:43.440
towering limestone structure. But he didn't actually

00:19:43.440 --> 00:19:45.740
design it to celebrate a brilliant military victory.

00:19:45.839 --> 00:19:48.079
No, he had a very different vision for it. He

00:19:48.079 --> 00:19:50.740
explicitly described his masterpiece as a sermon

00:19:50.740 --> 00:19:53.720
against the futility of war. This raises an incredibly

00:19:53.720 --> 00:19:55.819
important question for anyone studying military

00:19:55.819 --> 00:19:58.880
history. How do you reconcile those two deeply

00:19:58.880 --> 00:20:01.700
conflicting ideas? On one hand, you have a young

00:20:01.700 --> 00:20:04.599
nation's proudest military triumph, a master

00:20:04.599 --> 00:20:07.119
class in modern tactical innovation, bravery,

00:20:07.259 --> 00:20:09.660
and absolute resilience. And on the other hand,

00:20:09.740 --> 00:20:12.079
the very monument built to honor that triumph

00:20:12.079 --> 00:20:14.559
stands as a permanent sermon against the violent

00:20:14.559 --> 00:20:17.960
nature of war itself. It forces us to ask, does

00:20:17.960 --> 00:20:20.700
even the most brilliantly executed, technologically

00:20:20.700 --> 00:20:23.390
advanced tactical masterpiece, ultimately just

00:20:23.390 --> 00:20:26.289
underscore the sheer unfathomable tragedy of

00:20:26.289 --> 00:20:28.430
the 10 ,000 casualties it cost to achieve it.

00:20:28.809 --> 00:20:30.710
It really makes you pause and think about the

00:20:30.710 --> 00:20:33.289
true lasting cost of these historic breakthroughs.

00:20:33.769 --> 00:20:35.390
That is all the time we have for today. Thank

00:20:35.390 --> 00:20:37.170
you so much for joining us on this deep dive.
