WEBVTT 00:00:00.270 --> 00:00:03.450 We are diving into a piece of history today that 00:00:03.450 --> 00:00:07.269 is as fascinating as it is deeply unsettling. 00:00:07.410 --> 00:00:09.730 Truly unsettling. Yeah. If you are joining us 00:00:09.730 --> 00:00:12.349 to understand those rare pivotal moments where 00:00:12.349 --> 00:00:15.289 geography, human error, and just sheer desperation 00:00:15.289 --> 00:00:17.809 collide, you are in the right place. Today, we're 00:00:17.809 --> 00:00:20.010 looking at a comprehensive stack of source material 00:00:20.010 --> 00:00:22.390 covering the Siege of Cut. Right, in what was 00:00:22.390 --> 00:00:25.769 then Ottoman Iraq. Exactly. This is a World War 00:00:25.769 --> 00:00:28.210 I battle, and military historians actually describe 00:00:28.210 --> 00:00:31.730 it as the absolute worst defeat of the Allies 00:00:31.730 --> 00:00:34.469 in the entire First World War. It's a really 00:00:34.469 --> 00:00:37.570 profound historical event to study. What we have 00:00:37.570 --> 00:00:41.450 here is a 147 -day siege that basically serves 00:00:41.450 --> 00:00:44.070 as a masterclass in how compounding communication 00:00:44.070 --> 00:00:47.490 errors, incredibly rigid bureaucracy, and honestly, 00:00:47.689 --> 00:00:50.289 a stark lack of empathy and leadership can lead 00:00:50.289 --> 00:00:53.130 to catastrophic human suffering. As we go through 00:00:53.130 --> 00:00:54.950 this material, I really encourage you to think 00:00:54.950 --> 00:00:57.090 critically about how information is managed in 00:00:57.090 --> 00:00:59.700 high -stakes situations because You know, when 00:00:59.700 --> 00:01:01.700 the flow of truth breaks down at the top, the 00:01:01.700 --> 00:01:03.859 consequences at the bottom are incredibly dire. 00:01:04.260 --> 00:01:06.239 Yeah. The mission today is to extract the most 00:01:06.239 --> 00:01:09.840 crucial and devastating lessons from those 147 00:01:09.840 --> 00:01:13.299 days. And the materials we're pulling from outline 00:01:13.299 --> 00:01:16.219 a story that is almost hard to believe. I mean, 00:01:16.260 --> 00:01:19.060 we are going to examine a totally unprecedented, 00:01:19.480 --> 00:01:23.299 completely secret, two million pound bribe. Involving 00:01:23.299 --> 00:01:26.200 T .E. Lawrence, no less. Right. the world's first 00:01:26.200 --> 00:01:29.319 ever aerial supply drop, and a shocking contrast 00:01:29.319 --> 00:01:31.579 in how different levels of command behaved while 00:01:31.579 --> 00:01:34.319 thousands of people starved. Okay, let's unpack 00:01:34.319 --> 00:01:37.900 this. To understand how a disaster of this magnitude 00:01:37.900 --> 00:01:39.980 unfolds, you first need to look at the board. 00:01:40.319 --> 00:01:42.719 The geography here is everything. Set the scene 00:01:42.719 --> 00:01:46.099 for us. So it's December 1915, and the 6th Pune 00:01:46.099 --> 00:01:48.280 Division of the Indian Army has just retreated 00:01:48.280 --> 00:01:51.120 to the town of Kut, which sits about 160 kilometers 00:01:51.120 --> 00:01:53.739 south of Baghdad. This division was under the 00:01:53.739 --> 00:01:55.680 command of Major General Charles Townsend. And 00:01:55.680 --> 00:01:57.459 they had just been through the ringer row. Oh, 00:01:57.459 --> 00:02:00.060 absolutely. They had just fought a brutal battle 00:02:00.060 --> 00:02:02.579 at a place called Setesifon, and the retreat 00:02:02.579 --> 00:02:04.939 left them totally battered. We are talking about 00:02:04.939 --> 00:02:07.439 a force that had dwindled down to just 11 ,000 00:02:07.439 --> 00:02:10.439 soldiers, plus some cavalry. So they arrive in 00:02:10.439 --> 00:02:13.360 Kut, and Townsend makes a strategic choice. He 00:02:13.360 --> 00:02:15.719 decides to stay and hold the position right there, 00:02:16.039 --> 00:02:18.620 rather than continuing to retreat further south 00:02:18.620 --> 00:02:21.629 toward the safer base in Basra. Which is a massive 00:02:21.629 --> 00:02:25.270 decision. Huge. But if you picture a map of Cut, 00:02:25.330 --> 00:02:27.289 you can sort of see the logic, at least initially. 00:02:28.189 --> 00:02:30.990 The town is situated inside this incredibly sharp 00:02:30.990 --> 00:02:33.610 U -shaped river loop of the Tigris. It looks 00:02:33.610 --> 00:02:36.050 exactly like a horseshoe. Right. The river wraps 00:02:36.050 --> 00:02:38.310 around the town almost completely, acting as 00:02:38.310 --> 00:02:41.150 this brilliant natural moat for defense. But 00:02:41.150 --> 00:02:43.330 there is a massive flip side to that geography. 00:02:43.770 --> 00:02:46.460 While it keeps the enemy out, it creates a terrible 00:02:46.460 --> 00:02:48.819 bottleneck for your own supply lines. You're 00:02:48.819 --> 00:02:51.240 essentially trapping yourself in a sack with 00:02:51.240 --> 00:02:53.759 only one way out. And waiting right outside the 00:02:53.759 --> 00:02:56.099 opening of that sack were the Ottoman forces. 00:02:56.539 --> 00:02:58.819 Initially, the pursuing forces commanded by Halil 00:02:58.819 --> 00:03:01.580 Pasha numbered around 11 ,000 men, which was 00:03:01.580 --> 00:03:04.259 roughly equal to the British inside cut. But 00:03:04.259 --> 00:03:06.979 they didn't stay at 11 ,000 for long. No, their 00:03:06.979 --> 00:03:09.300 numbers were increasing steadily with constant 00:03:09.300 --> 00:03:12.000 reinforcements. But more importantly, we have 00:03:12.000 --> 00:03:14.419 to look at the tactical mind advising and leading 00:03:14.419 --> 00:03:17.280 these Ottoman troops. They were commanded by 00:03:17.280 --> 00:03:20.080 a highly respected elderly German general and 00:03:20.080 --> 00:03:23.139 military historian named Baron Bondergoltz. This 00:03:23.139 --> 00:03:25.319 wasn't just some random advisor assigned to the 00:03:25.319 --> 00:03:27.889 region. Not at all. Baron von Reultz knew the 00:03:27.889 --> 00:03:30.569 Ottoman army intimately. He had actually spent 00:03:30.569 --> 00:03:35.430 12 years, from 1883 to 1895, working specifically 00:03:35.430 --> 00:03:37.689 on modernizing their military infrastructure. 00:03:37.909 --> 00:03:40.810 Wow, 12 years. Yeah. So he brings this immense 00:03:40.810 --> 00:03:44.009 granular tactical expertise to the siege. After 00:03:44.009 --> 00:03:46.469 a few initial attacks in December, Goltz assesses 00:03:46.469 --> 00:03:48.750 the geography and realizes he doesn't need to 00:03:48.750 --> 00:03:51.349 force his way into Coute. Instead, he directs 00:03:51.349 --> 00:03:53.689 the building of extensive siege fortifications 00:03:53.689 --> 00:03:55.939 facing the town to keep towns and locked in. 00:03:56.240 --> 00:03:59.199 Just seal the bag. Exactly. But here is his truly 00:03:59.199 --> 00:04:02.259 devastating tactical move. He anticipates that 00:04:02.259 --> 00:04:04.400 the British command will send relief ships up 00:04:04.400 --> 00:04:07.460 the Tigris River from Basra to rescue the garrison. 00:04:07.759 --> 00:04:10.580 So he builds robust defensive positions further 00:04:10.580 --> 00:04:13.319 downstream, specifically designed to block any 00:04:13.319 --> 00:04:16.079 river -borne relief forces. He effectively locks 00:04:16.079 --> 00:04:18.740 the door to cut and then builds a fortress around 00:04:18.740 --> 00:04:21.240 the keyhole. Which sets the stage for the crisis 00:04:21.240 --> 00:04:24.699 inside cut. And this brings us to a massive communication 00:04:24.699 --> 00:04:27.860 failure. Townsend sends a report downriver to 00:04:27.860 --> 00:04:31.100 his commander, General Sir John Nixon. In this 00:04:31.100 --> 00:04:33.160 report, Townsend states that he only has one 00:04:33.160 --> 00:04:36.019 month of food left for his men. When, in reality, 00:04:36.279 --> 00:04:38.500 the historical record shows he actually had food 00:04:38.500 --> 00:04:40.899 for more than four months. Four months? Yes. 00:04:41.040 --> 00:04:43.019 It would have meant living on reduced rations, 00:04:43.259 --> 00:04:45.360 certainly, but it was a four -month supply nonetheless. 00:04:45.579 --> 00:04:47.480 Wait, hold on. If he actually had four months 00:04:47.480 --> 00:04:49.500 of food, why intentionally tell his commanding 00:04:49.500 --> 00:04:51.819 officer he only had one? He had to know that 00:04:51.819 --> 00:04:53.839 would trigger an absolute panic, right? Right. 00:04:53.980 --> 00:04:56.639 What's fascinating here is the psychology behind 00:04:56.639 --> 00:04:59.279 that lie. And it introduces a crucial theme for 00:04:59.279 --> 00:05:02.120 you to keep in mind the immense danger of filtering 00:05:02.120 --> 00:05:05.680 information to protect your own position. Townsend 00:05:05.680 --> 00:05:08.759 absolutely refused to attempt an infantry retreat. 00:05:08.879 --> 00:05:11.079 Because of the terrain. Breaking out of that 00:05:11.079 --> 00:05:13.540 horseshoe bend would have meant marching his 00:05:13.540 --> 00:05:16.420 battered men south through hostile tribal lands 00:05:16.420 --> 00:05:18.779 without the protection of river transport, which 00:05:18.779 --> 00:05:21.860 he didn't have. By artificially shrinking his 00:05:21.860 --> 00:05:25.180 survival window down to just one month, he essentially 00:05:25.180 --> 00:05:28.240 forced General Nixon's hand. He manufactured 00:05:28.240 --> 00:05:31.420 a ticking clock to compel a rapid, fully protected 00:05:31.420 --> 00:05:33.680 rescue by river. But forcing a ticking clock 00:05:33.680 --> 00:05:36.579 means forcing an unready rescue. General Nixon 00:05:36.579 --> 00:05:38.779 now believes his men will scarve in 30 days, 00:05:39.100 --> 00:05:41.259 so he frantically starts demanding transport 00:05:41.259 --> 00:05:43.639 ships from London to evacuate Townsend's division. 00:05:43.850 --> 00:05:46.050 And the delays in getting that rescue force together 00:05:46.050 --> 00:05:48.529 are a prime example of administrative paralysis. 00:05:48.750 --> 00:05:50.449 Put yourself in London at this time. It's an 00:05:50.449 --> 00:05:53.129 absolute bureaucratic nightmare. Exactly. This 00:05:53.129 --> 00:05:55.589 connects directly to the broader systemic dysfunction. 00:05:56.069 --> 00:05:58.769 You have General Nixon screaming for ships, but 00:05:58.769 --> 00:06:01.029 the War Office in London was right in the middle 00:06:01.029 --> 00:06:03.610 of this agonizing reorganization of its military 00:06:03.610 --> 00:06:05.689 command structure. Right. Shifting power around. 00:06:06.050 --> 00:06:08.629 Previously, orders and logistics for this specific 00:06:08.629 --> 00:06:11.029 region had come from the Viceroy and the Indy 00:06:11.029 --> 00:06:14.379 office. Now power is shifting. thousands of miles 00:06:14.379 --> 00:06:17.319 away to London. You had an aging military official, 00:06:17.399 --> 00:06:19.980 General Maurice, who insisted on being briefed 00:06:19.980 --> 00:06:22.920 on every single detail as evidence trickled into 00:06:22.920 --> 00:06:25.199 the Committee of Imperial Defense. This endless 00:06:25.199 --> 00:06:27.579 red tape? Endless cabinet debates over whether 00:06:27.579 --> 00:06:30.120 to send one division or two. Imagine trying to 00:06:30.120 --> 00:06:32.420 get an emergency sign off, but the chain of command 00:06:32.420 --> 00:06:34.980 spans thousands of miles and requires unanimous 00:06:34.980 --> 00:06:37.779 approval from a reorganizing committee. This 00:06:37.779 --> 00:06:39.899 bureaucratic friction meant the transports Nixon 00:06:39.899 --> 00:06:42.800 ordered simply never arrived in time. And because 00:06:42.800 --> 00:06:45.480 the transports didn't arrive, but the manufactured 00:06:45.480 --> 00:06:48.199 one -month clock was ticking, the military had 00:06:48.199 --> 00:06:51.420 to attempt land rescues. Starting in January 00:06:51.420 --> 00:06:54.939 1916, Lieutenant General Elmer led these desperately 00:06:54.939 --> 00:06:57.500 rushed relief expeditions upriver to save Koot. 00:06:58.240 --> 00:07:01.160 These became the battles of Sheikh Taad, Wadi, 00:07:01.480 --> 00:07:04.339 and Hana. And the conditions were just appalling. 00:07:04.579 --> 00:07:06.699 You really have to visualize the horrors of this 00:07:06.699 --> 00:07:08.800 environment. The troops aren't just fighting 00:07:08.800 --> 00:07:10.860 the Ottomans, they are fighting the earth itself. 00:07:11.480 --> 00:07:14.040 Heavy rains made the primitive roads completely 00:07:14.040 --> 00:07:16.339 impassable. Men are trying to march through freezing 00:07:16.339 --> 00:07:18.379 mud, pushing into those downstream entrenched 00:07:18.379 --> 00:07:21.000 positions that Goltz had specifically designed 00:07:21.000 --> 00:07:23.800 to stop them. The casualties were horrific. Just 00:07:23.800 --> 00:07:26.040 at the Battle of Hanna alone, the British lost 00:07:26.040 --> 00:07:28.899 2 ,700 men killed and wounded fighting in that 00:07:28.899 --> 00:07:31.740 freezing mud. Elmer tried time and time again 00:07:31.740 --> 00:07:33.879 to break through. There was a failed attack in 00:07:33.879 --> 00:07:36.160 March on the Dujayla Redoubt. That was a temporary 00:07:36.160 --> 00:07:39.649 fortification, right? Yes, a temporary but formidable 00:07:39.649 --> 00:07:42.029 supplementary fortification built by the Ottomans. 00:07:42.589 --> 00:07:45.250 And that single attack cost another 4 ,000 men. 00:07:45.910 --> 00:07:48.790 After that, Aylmer was dismissed. General George 00:07:48.790 --> 00:07:50.810 Goranj replaced him and tried again in April. 00:07:51.290 --> 00:07:53.990 Goranj amassed a massive force of about 30 ,000 00:07:53.990 --> 00:07:56.750 men. But even with those numbers, they just couldn't 00:07:56.750 --> 00:07:58.930 break through the Ottoman defenses at Senayat. 00:07:59.199 --> 00:08:01.720 The human cost is staggering to think about. 00:08:02.019 --> 00:08:04.519 In total, all these failed relief expeditions 00:08:04.519 --> 00:08:07.199 under Elmer and Goranj cost the Allies around 00:08:07.199 --> 00:08:10.360 30 ,000 dead or wounded. To put that in perspective, 00:08:10.800 --> 00:08:12.920 the Ottoman casualties during these same defensive 00:08:12.920 --> 00:08:15.610 engagements were around 10 ,000. The Allies suffered 00:08:15.610 --> 00:08:17.810 three times the losses purely because they were 00:08:17.810 --> 00:08:20.290 forced to repeatedly hurl men at heavily fortified 00:08:20.290 --> 00:08:22.850 choke points on a completely artificial panicked 00:08:22.850 --> 00:08:25.569 timeline. And despite sacrificing 30 ,000 men, 00:08:25.569 --> 00:08:27.350 they still couldn't reach the starving garrison 00:08:27.350 --> 00:08:29.949 in Coote. When you lose 30 ,000 men trying to 00:08:29.949 --> 00:08:32.389 break down the front door, have to look for a 00:08:32.389 --> 00:08:35.570 window or in this case, the sky. Here's where 00:08:35.570 --> 00:08:38.929 it gets really interesting. Desperation breeds 00:08:38.929 --> 00:08:42.700 innovation. And in April 1916, the military tried 00:08:42.700 --> 00:08:45.250 something that had never been done before. The 00:08:45.250 --> 00:08:48.110 Royal Flying Corps No. 30 Squadron carried out 00:08:48.110 --> 00:08:50.830 the first aerial supply operation in human history. 00:08:50.889 --> 00:08:53.769 It was a completely groundbreaking concept. The 00:08:53.769 --> 00:08:56.590 idea was to bypass the impenetrable land blockades 00:08:56.590 --> 00:09:00.129 entirely and use aircraft to drop food and ammunition 00:09:00.129 --> 00:09:02.750 directly to the defenders inside that river loop. 00:09:02.909 --> 00:09:05.070 But the technology just wasn't there yet to match 00:09:05.070 --> 00:09:07.389 the ambition. It's not like today where we have 00:09:07.389 --> 00:09:09.429 precision -guided air drops. They were dealing 00:09:09.429 --> 00:09:12.389 with strong winds, primitive planes, and no real 00:09:12.389 --> 00:09:14.049 delivery mechanism. Right, they were just basically 00:09:14.059 --> 00:09:17.659 throwing things over the side. Reverend H. Spooner, 00:09:17.659 --> 00:09:20.299 who was there, noted that as often as not, the 00:09:20.299 --> 00:09:22.120 parcels of food went straight into the Tigris 00:09:22.120 --> 00:09:24.980 River, or the wind blew them directly into the 00:09:24.980 --> 00:09:27.639 Ottoman trenches. They ran this operation for 00:09:27.639 --> 00:09:29.919 almost three weeks in April, and the total food 00:09:29.919 --> 00:09:32.299 they managed to successfully drop was barely 00:09:32.299 --> 00:09:35.340 enough for three days of rations. It was an incredible 00:09:35.340 --> 00:09:38.440 historical first, but operationally, it was a 00:09:38.440 --> 00:09:40.159 complete failure. And while those planes are 00:09:40.159 --> 00:09:42.480 dropping vital supplies into the river, life 00:09:42.480 --> 00:09:45.220 inside the siege is deteriorating into something 00:09:45.220 --> 00:09:48.259 unimaginable. We get a very clear, visceral picture 00:09:48.259 --> 00:09:50.879 of this from the account of a Sergeant Munn who 00:09:50.879 --> 00:09:53.580 was trapped inside. He details how desperate 00:09:53.580 --> 00:09:56.080 the measures became just to trick the body into 00:09:56.080 --> 00:09:58.740 feeling sustained. By mid -February, all the 00:09:58.740 --> 00:10:00.799 tobacco was gone, so the men started smoking 00:10:00.799 --> 00:10:03.480 dried green leaves or tea leaves mixed with sawdust. 00:10:03.500 --> 00:10:06.100 Just brutal. When the tea ran out, they drank 00:10:06.100 --> 00:10:08.620 crushed ginger steeped in boiling water just 00:10:08.620 --> 00:10:11.019 to have something hot. All the milk, all the 00:10:11.019 --> 00:10:14.200 sugar, completely gone. The situation was particularly 00:10:14.200 --> 00:10:16.700 agonizing for the Indian troops. Remember, this 00:10:16.700 --> 00:10:19.299 is the Pune Division, and many of these Indian 00:10:19.299 --> 00:10:21.840 soldiers were strictly vegetarian for deeply 00:10:21.840 --> 00:10:26.059 held religious reasons. By April, the sheer reality 00:10:26.059 --> 00:10:28.720 of starvation forced them to abandon their religious 00:10:28.720 --> 00:10:31.299 beliefs and eat horse meat just to stay alive. 00:10:31.559 --> 00:10:34.399 The medical facilities, headed by Major General 00:10:34.399 --> 00:10:38.320 Patrick Heher, were completely overwhelmed. Severe 00:10:38.320 --> 00:10:41.240 dysentery and scurvy ran rampant through the 00:10:41.240 --> 00:10:43.659 entire garrison. And if the starvation and disease 00:10:43.659 --> 00:10:46.200 weren't enough, they were under constant bombardment. 00:10:46.740 --> 00:10:48.779 At the beginning of March, the Ottomans opened 00:10:48.779 --> 00:10:51.679 up a heavy bombardment using Krupp artillery. 00:10:52.220 --> 00:10:54.360 And the name Krupp is significant here. This 00:10:54.360 --> 00:10:57.129 signifies state -of -the -art devastatingly effective 00:10:57.129 --> 00:10:59.649 German engineering, raining fire down on them, 00:10:59.730 --> 00:11:01.669 destroying a huge portion of the town. They had 00:11:01.669 --> 00:11:04.789 no safe haven. None. They also had three German 00:11:04.789 --> 00:11:07.909 aircraft actively bombing Kut from above. There 00:11:07.909 --> 00:11:10.470 was even a heavy psychological warfare element. 00:11:11.129 --> 00:11:13.190 The Ottomans were seen unloading these strange 00:11:13.190 --> 00:11:15.769 metal cylinders from barges on the Tigris, and 00:11:15.769 --> 00:11:17.889 the British assumed they contained chemical weapons 00:11:17.889 --> 00:11:20.909 sent from Germany. Townsend wrote in his diary 00:11:20.909 --> 00:11:24.789 about this fear, calling chemical warfare a cowardly 00:11:24.789 --> 00:11:29.879 barbarism worthy of Chinese pirates. The dissonance 00:11:29.879 --> 00:11:31.820 between the suffering of the men and the behavior 00:11:31.820 --> 00:11:34.720 of command is truly shocking. You have a garrison 00:11:34.720 --> 00:11:37.320 and a civilian population starving to death, 00:11:37.639 --> 00:11:39.919 suffering from scurvy, breaking their religious 00:11:39.919 --> 00:11:43.039 vows just to eat horses, being blasted by state 00:11:43.039 --> 00:11:45.620 -of -the -art artillery. And what is General 00:11:45.620 --> 00:11:47.740 Townsend doing during all of this? This part 00:11:47.740 --> 00:11:50.340 is just infuriating. He is actively using the 00:11:50.340 --> 00:11:52.539 radio to send a series of messages asking command 00:11:52.539 --> 00:11:55.090 for a promotion. He wanted to be elevated from 00:11:55.090 --> 00:11:57.629 major general to lieutenant general, citing his 00:11:57.629 --> 00:12:00.070 earlier successes before the retreat. Asking 00:12:00.070 --> 00:12:02.389 for a promotion while your men are drinking ginger 00:12:02.389 --> 00:12:05.769 water and eating sawdust is an astonishing lack 00:12:05.769 --> 00:12:08.789 of empathy. And that bizarre disconnect wasn't 00:12:08.789 --> 00:12:11.090 just happening with Townsend. There was a wild 00:12:11.090 --> 00:12:13.429 desperate negotiation happening behind the scenes 00:12:13.429 --> 00:12:15.570 that sounds like something out of a spy novel. 00:12:16.210 --> 00:12:18.330 The British leadership was so determined to avoid 00:12:18.330 --> 00:12:20.870 the sheer humiliation of a military surrender 00:12:20.870 --> 00:12:23.389 that they actually tried to buy the army's freedom. 00:12:23.600 --> 00:12:26.559 Yes, a team of officers was secretly dispatched 00:12:26.559 --> 00:12:29.559 to negotiate with the Ottomans. Remarkably, this 00:12:29.559 --> 00:12:32.460 team included Aubrey Herbert and a young intelligence 00:12:32.460 --> 00:12:34.879 officer who would soon become world -famous T 00:12:34.879 --> 00:12:37.200 .E. Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia. 00:12:37.519 --> 00:12:39.960 And the offer they put on the table is staggering. 00:12:40.720 --> 00:12:43.080 They offered the Ottoman leadership two million 00:12:43.080 --> 00:12:45.399 pounds. To put that in perspective, adjusted 00:12:45.399 --> 00:12:47.960 for inflation, that is the equivalent of 190 00:12:47.960 --> 00:12:50.299 million pounds today. Incredible sum. Nearly 00:12:50.299 --> 00:12:52.480 200 million pounds, along with a sworn promise 00:12:52.480 --> 00:12:54.259 that the freed troops would never take up arms 00:12:54.259 --> 00:12:56.580 against the Ottomans again just to let Townsend 00:12:56.580 --> 00:12:58.730 and his men walk away. But the Ottoman leader, 00:12:58.850 --> 00:13:01.929 Enver Pasha, handled this with brilliant, cold 00:13:01.929 --> 00:13:04.289 calculation. He didn't just reject it outright. 00:13:04.389 --> 00:13:07.389 He pretended to negotiate in good faith. He strung 00:13:07.389 --> 00:13:10.149 the British officers along, maximizing his leverage 00:13:10.149 --> 00:13:13.190 and watching them sweat. Then, once he had extracted 00:13:13.190 --> 00:13:15.929 all the political capital he could, he publicly 00:13:15.929 --> 00:13:18.529 publicized the secret offer and formally rejected 00:13:18.529 --> 00:13:21.330 it. It was a masterclass in psychological warfare, 00:13:21.669 --> 00:13:24.090 designed as a final, crushing humiliation to 00:13:24.090 --> 00:13:26.480 the British Empire. They were completely out 00:13:26.480 --> 00:13:28.580 of options. They had even held out hope for a 00:13:28.580 --> 00:13:31.320 Russian force under General Baratov, who commanded 00:13:31.320 --> 00:13:35.000 20 ,000 Cossacks in Persia. He had started advancing 00:13:35.000 --> 00:13:37.279 toward Baghdad in April, but when he got the 00:13:37.279 --> 00:13:39.299 news of the situation, he turned his forces back. 00:13:39.720 --> 00:13:42.019 The inevitable has finally arrived. On April 00:13:42.019 --> 00:13:46.120 29, 1916, after 147 agonizing days of siege, 00:13:46.620 --> 00:13:48.200 Townsend arranged a ceasefire and surrendered. 00:13:48.399 --> 00:13:51.159 Around 13 ,000 allied soldiers were taken prisoner. 00:13:51.419 --> 00:13:54.100 Now what happens next to those 13 ,000 prisoners 00:13:54.100 --> 00:13:58.070 is a subject of profound polarizing historical 00:13:58.070 --> 00:14:01.269 debate. History is rarely agreed upon, and the 00:14:01.269 --> 00:14:03.210 aftermath of Kuwait looks incredibly different 00:14:03.210 --> 00:14:05.570 depending on whose accounts you read. We have 00:14:05.570 --> 00:14:07.570 to be strictly impartial here, and we want to 00:14:07.570 --> 00:14:09.129 make it clear to you that we're presenting these 00:14:09.129 --> 00:14:11.309 conflicting historical accounts exactly as they 00:14:11.309 --> 00:14:14.129 are in the source text. Multiple perspectives 00:14:14.129 --> 00:14:16.429 exist, and we are not endorsing either side, 00:14:16.490 --> 00:14:18.690 just laying out the sources. Absolutely. For 00:14:18.690 --> 00:14:21.090 example, the Turkish writer Elbert or Tylan presents 00:14:21.090 --> 00:14:24.129 a specific view of the surrender. He states that 00:14:24.129 --> 00:14:26.710 the Ottoman commander, Halil Pasha, acted like 00:14:26.710 --> 00:14:29.090 a gentleman to the surrendering British officers. 00:14:29.850 --> 00:14:31.950 Ortailou's account notes that Halil Pasha even 00:14:31.950 --> 00:14:33.990 offered to take the prisoners of war up towards 00:14:33.990 --> 00:14:36.330 the north in comfortable riverboats, provided 00:14:36.330 --> 00:14:38.330 that fuel could be supplied from nearby British 00:14:38.330 --> 00:14:40.730 bases. But when you look at the accounts from 00:14:40.730 --> 00:14:43.710 French historian Mark Farrow, or British historians 00:14:43.710 --> 00:14:46.190 like Russell Bradden and Paul Knight, they describe 00:14:46.190 --> 00:14:48.809 a vastly different, horrific reality for the 00:14:48.809 --> 00:14:51.629 enlisted men. According to these historians, 00:14:52.070 --> 00:14:54.929 the surrendered were subjected to a brutal death 00:14:54.929 --> 00:14:58.389 march. They detail accounts of starving POWs 00:14:58.389 --> 00:15:00.929 being forced to march across the desert and over 00:15:00.929 --> 00:15:03.750 mountains deep into Anatolia, constantly whipped 00:15:03.750 --> 00:15:06.149 by Ottoman guards to force them to move faster. 00:15:06.429 --> 00:15:08.870 The granular details from the troops themselves 00:15:08.870 --> 00:15:11.730 paint a very grim picture of those early days 00:15:11.730 --> 00:15:14.649 of captivity. On the actual day of the surrender, 00:15:15.029 --> 00:15:17.230 the Ottomans handed out biscuits to the starving 00:15:17.230 --> 00:15:20.009 prisoners. But according to British historian 00:15:20.009 --> 00:15:22.409 Russell Braddon, the very next morning, the men 00:15:22.409 --> 00:15:24.529 began to die rapidly. Just from the biscuits? 00:15:24.850 --> 00:15:27.509 Yes, they were afflicted by enteritis from contaminated 00:15:27.509 --> 00:15:30.210 biscuits. Enteritis is a severe inflammation 00:15:30.210 --> 00:15:32.769 of the intestines, and in bodies already weakened 00:15:32.769 --> 00:15:36.159 by months of starvation, it was fatal. Braddon 00:15:36.159 --> 00:15:39.220 describes the men suffering from extreme dehydration, 00:15:39.559 --> 00:15:42.080 frothing at the mouth, and dying one after another. 00:15:42.399 --> 00:15:44.500 We also have the writings of one of the POW's 00:15:44.500 --> 00:15:47.399 Sergeant Long. He described the forced march 00:15:47.399 --> 00:15:50.799 from Coote as an appalling misery. He wrote of 00:15:50.799 --> 00:15:53.720 men who had fought and starved for months being 00:15:53.720 --> 00:15:56.480 driven across the pitiless waste under a scorching 00:15:56.480 --> 00:15:59.419 sun, herded along by a brutal and callous escort. 00:15:59.799 --> 00:16:02.299 He described the men arriving at camps looking 00:16:02.299 --> 00:16:05.340 like animated skeletons hung about with filthy 00:16:05.340 --> 00:16:08.139 rags, living in literal holes in the ground. 00:16:08.559 --> 00:16:10.440 To give you a sense of how these events are analyzed 00:16:10.440 --> 00:16:13.059 by modern historians, Paul Knight draws a direct 00:16:13.059 --> 00:16:15.399 comparison between the treatment of the cut prisoners 00:16:15.399 --> 00:16:18.159 and the horrific conditions endured by Allied 00:16:18.159 --> 00:16:20.200 prisoners taken by the Japanese in World War 00:16:20.200 --> 00:16:23.580 II. Knight goes even further, contextualizing 00:16:23.580 --> 00:16:25.860 this captivity against the backdrop of the Armenian 00:16:25.860 --> 00:16:29.220 massacres. He raises the complex historical question 00:16:29.220 --> 00:16:31.159 of whether the deaths of the prisoners at Kut 00:16:31.159 --> 00:16:33.639 were the result of deliberate, state -sanctioned 00:16:33.639 --> 00:16:35.940 policy to murder through overwork and underfeeding, 00:16:36.399 --> 00:16:38.659 or if it was the tragic byproduct of official 00:16:38.659 --> 00:16:41.399 negligence and incompetence. He notes that this 00:16:41.399 --> 00:16:43.379 debate mirrors the ongoing discussions around 00:16:43.379 --> 00:16:45.539 the Armenian massacres, which he states are still 00:16:45.539 --> 00:16:51.629 denied by the modern Turkish state. Ortisloe's 00:16:51.629 --> 00:16:53.789 account of gentlemanly conduct and offers of 00:16:53.789 --> 00:16:56.649 river transport versus the harrowing accounts 00:16:56.649 --> 00:16:59.190 of Pharaoh, Braden, and Knight detailing abuse, 00:16:59.730 --> 00:17:02.850 severe enteritis, and death marches. But amidst 00:17:02.850 --> 00:17:04.490 all of this debate over the suffering of the 00:17:04.490 --> 00:17:06.769 enlisted men, there is zero debate about what 00:17:06.769 --> 00:17:09.440 happened to General Townsend. And it is the ultimate 00:17:09.440 --> 00:17:12.539 infuriating irony of this entire deep dive. Kaunzen 00:17:12.539 --> 00:17:14.940 was not sent on a desert march. He wasn't placed 00:17:14.940 --> 00:17:17.700 in a camp. He was taken to the island of Hebeleada, 00:17:18.059 --> 00:17:20.039 located on the Sea of Marmara, where he sat out 00:17:20.039 --> 00:17:22.670 the rest of the war in relative luxury. The author 00:17:22.670 --> 00:17:25.329 Norman Dixon actually analyzed Townsend's mindset 00:17:25.329 --> 00:17:27.829 in a book called On the Psychology of Military 00:17:27.829 --> 00:17:30.710 Incompetence. Dixon noted that during his comfortable 00:17:30.710 --> 00:17:34.009 captivity, Townsend seemed almost amused by the 00:17:34.009 --> 00:17:36.349 plight of the men he had commanded. He treated 00:17:36.349 --> 00:17:38.329 the whole catastrophic surrender as if he had 00:17:38.329 --> 00:17:40.730 pulled off some clever trick. According to Dixon, 00:17:40.910 --> 00:17:43.089 Townsend was entirely unable to understand why 00:17:43.089 --> 00:17:45.049 his friends and comrades back home in Britain 00:17:45.049 --> 00:17:47.890 judged his behavior so harshly. So what does 00:17:47.890 --> 00:17:50.299 this all mean? We've covered a siege that trapped 00:17:50.299 --> 00:17:53.279 thousands in a horseshoe riverbend, a bureaucracy 00:17:53.279 --> 00:17:56.200 that paralyzed a rescue, a pioneering airdrop 00:17:56.200 --> 00:17:59.460 that failed to deliver, a massive secret bribe 00:17:59.460 --> 00:18:02.319 that was weaponized for humiliation, and a general 00:18:02.319 --> 00:18:04.660 who lied about his food supply and then lived 00:18:04.660 --> 00:18:07.539 in luxury while his men died. This raises an 00:18:07.539 --> 00:18:09.400 important question for you to consider as you 00:18:09.400 --> 00:18:12.420 digest this history. The Siege of Cut is a harsh, 00:18:12.720 --> 00:18:14.839 enduring lesson on the incredible dangers of 00:18:14.839 --> 00:18:17.619 filtering information. Townsend's lie about having 00:18:17.619 --> 00:18:20.259 only one month of food wasn't just a miscommunication. 00:18:20.500 --> 00:18:22.859 It was an ego -driven manipulation that forced 00:18:22.859 --> 00:18:25.880 a premature, disastrous rescue attempt, costing 00:18:25.880 --> 00:18:28.940 30 ,000 casualties. It perfectly illustrates 00:18:28.940 --> 00:18:31.279 how a systemic bureaucracy like the War Office 00:18:31.279 --> 00:18:33.660 reorganizing in London can become completely 00:18:33.660 --> 00:18:35.819 paralyzed by its own procedures when rapid action 00:18:35.819 --> 00:18:38.950 is needed most. But most chillingly, it demonstrates 00:18:38.950 --> 00:18:41.049 how a fundamental lack of empathy at the highest 00:18:41.049 --> 00:18:43.730 levels of command can directly dictate the survival 00:18:43.730 --> 00:18:46.349 of thousands of lives at the bottom. The decisions 00:18:46.349 --> 00:18:48.710 made by leadership trying to protect their own 00:18:48.710 --> 00:18:53.210 comfort had devastating, very real -world consequences 00:18:53.210 --> 00:18:55.789 for the men who had to eat sawdust in the mud. 00:18:56.839 --> 00:18:58.839 We want to thank you for joining us on this deep 00:18:58.839 --> 00:19:02.359 dive. It is heavy dense material, but understanding 00:19:02.359 --> 00:19:06.200 how these massive failures compound is so important. 00:19:06.660 --> 00:19:08.039 Absolutely. Before we go, we want to leave you 00:19:08.039 --> 00:19:10.700 with one final haunting detail from the source 00:19:10.700 --> 00:19:13.140 material to mull over. We talked about how the 00:19:13.140 --> 00:19:15.220 Indian troops were forced to abandon their deepest 00:19:15.220 --> 00:19:18.839 religious beliefs just to survive, only to be 00:19:18.839 --> 00:19:22.029 marched into brutal captivity. Think about what 00:19:22.029 --> 00:19:24.750 happens to the human psyche when the system you 00:19:24.750 --> 00:19:27.690 trust completely, entirely abandons you. It's 00:19:27.690 --> 00:19:30.190 a dark thought. The sources reveal that during 00:19:30.190 --> 00:19:32.609 their captivity, some of the abandoned Indian 00:19:32.609 --> 00:19:35.410 POWs from Qud were approached by the German High 00:19:35.410 --> 00:19:37.589 Command. They were recruited into something called 00:19:37.589 --> 00:19:40.849 the Ottoman Indian Volunteer Corps. These surviving 00:19:40.849 --> 00:19:43.130 men actually took up arms and fought alongside 00:19:43.130 --> 00:19:45.490 the Ottomans against the very British army they 00:19:45.490 --> 00:19:47.549 had originally served. Think about that for a 00:19:47.549 --> 00:19:50.390 moment. Consider the profound psychological shift, 00:19:50.750 --> 00:19:53.150 the absolute breaking of trust, required for 00:19:53.150 --> 00:19:55.849 a starving prisoner of war to turn around and 00:19:55.849 --> 00:19:58.410 fight for the very army that besieged them. Something 00:19:58.410 --> 00:20:00.410 to explore on your own. Until next time.