WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:04.099 Welcome. I want you to picture a scene with me 00:00:04.099 --> 00:00:06.559 for a second. We are going to travel back in 00:00:06.559 --> 00:00:09.960 time. It's the early hours of August 7th, 1915, 00:00:10.019 --> 00:00:13.820 and we are standing on this narrow, really windswept, 00:00:14.039 --> 00:00:16.339 utterly barren strip of land. Right, in the Ottoman 00:00:16.339 --> 00:00:19.320 Empire. Exactly. And in the trenches all around 00:00:19.320 --> 00:00:22.100 us, there are hundreds of men just silently waiting 00:00:22.100 --> 00:00:24.500 in the dark. Just waiting for the whistle. Yeah. 00:00:24.660 --> 00:00:26.640 Because in just a few moments, they're going 00:00:26.640 --> 00:00:29.519 to climb out of those trenches and charge head 00:00:29.519 --> 00:00:33.340 first into what history will record as an absolute 00:00:33.340 --> 00:00:36.539 textbook military disaster. It really is one 00:00:36.539 --> 00:00:40.780 of those moments in history where You find yourself 00:00:40.780 --> 00:00:42.880 wanting to shout back through time. Like you're 00:00:42.880 --> 00:00:44.520 trying to stop the inevitable from happening. 00:00:44.899 --> 00:00:46.460 Because you can see all the terrible decisions 00:00:46.460 --> 00:00:48.719 just lining up perfectly to create a catastrophe. 00:00:48.920 --> 00:00:50.840 And that catastrophe is what we are focusing 00:00:50.840 --> 00:00:52.780 on today. For this deep dive, we're pulling from 00:00:52.780 --> 00:00:55.799 a remarkably detailed Wikipedia article covering 00:00:55.799 --> 00:00:58.299 the Battle of the Neck. Which took place during 00:00:58.299 --> 00:01:01.039 the Gallipoli campaign of World War I. Right. 00:01:01.840 --> 00:01:04.219 But... We aren't just here to, you know, recite 00:01:04.219 --> 00:01:06.719 the dates and the casualty numbers of a tragic 00:01:06.719 --> 00:01:09.560 battle. Our mission today is to look at this 00:01:09.560 --> 00:01:12.700 event as a master class in what goes wrong when 00:01:12.700 --> 00:01:16.019 systems fail. A massive systemic failure. We 00:01:16.019 --> 00:01:19.480 are dissecting a spectacular failure of leadership, 00:01:19.879 --> 00:01:23.060 of communication and really the devastating cost 00:01:23.060 --> 00:01:25.739 of inflexible decision making. OK, let's unpack 00:01:25.739 --> 00:01:28.519 this, starting with the geography itself, because 00:01:28.519 --> 00:01:30.920 you really can't understand the madness of this 00:01:30.920 --> 00:01:33.310 battle. without understanding the ground they 00:01:33.310 --> 00:01:36.129 were fighting on. The terrain is everything here. 00:01:36.329 --> 00:01:38.370 It completely dictated the horrific mechanics 00:01:38.370 --> 00:01:40.569 of how this tragedy would unfold. So the area 00:01:40.569 --> 00:01:42.530 was called the neck. And looking through the 00:01:42.530 --> 00:01:44.469 sources, there's a fascinating little linguistic 00:01:44.469 --> 00:01:47.269 nugget here. The name actually comes from the 00:01:47.269 --> 00:01:49.969 Africans word for mountain pass or neck. Which 00:01:49.969 --> 00:01:51.810 is strange, right? Yeah, you might be wondering 00:01:51.810 --> 00:01:54.370 why Australian and Ottoman Turkish troops in 00:01:54.370 --> 00:01:56.709 World War One are using a South African Dutch 00:01:56.709 --> 00:01:58.989 word for their battlefield. Right. It's because 00:01:58.989 --> 00:02:01.349 many of the senior Australian officers had actually 00:02:01.349 --> 00:02:03.790 previously fought in the Boer War in South Africa 00:02:03.790 --> 00:02:06.650 about 15 years prior. They brought that vocabulary 00:02:06.650 --> 00:02:09.370 with them. Which is actually a brilliant subtle 00:02:09.370 --> 00:02:12.120 indicator of the mindset at play. here. These 00:02:12.120 --> 00:02:14.280 commanders were bringing the vocabulary and more 00:02:14.280 --> 00:02:16.659 importantly the tactical mindset of a completely 00:02:16.659 --> 00:02:20.360 different older war into a modern mechanized 00:02:20.360 --> 00:02:23.319 conflict. They were fighting the last war? Exactly. 00:02:23.479 --> 00:02:26.000 That sets the stage perfectly. But calling it 00:02:26.000 --> 00:02:29.560 a mountain pass almost sounds too grand. In reality, 00:02:29.639 --> 00:02:32.719 it was just a perfect deadly bottleneck. Imagine 00:02:32.719 --> 00:02:35.879 a strip of land only about 30 to 50 meters wide. 00:02:36.000 --> 00:02:37.639 That's barely the width of a football field. 00:02:37.840 --> 00:02:41.000 Right. And flanking this tiny strip on both sides 00:02:41.000 --> 00:02:45.240 are these terrifying sheer drops 150 meters straight 00:02:45.240 --> 00:02:48.150 down to deep valleys called Monash Valley and 00:02:48.150 --> 00:02:50.909 Malone's Gully. And at the end of this incredibly 00:02:50.909 --> 00:02:54.289 narrow, totally exposed land bridge, the Ottoman 00:02:54.289 --> 00:02:56.110 defenders were holding the high ground. They 00:02:56.110 --> 00:02:59.009 had the advantage. Huge advantage. They were 00:02:59.009 --> 00:03:02.509 entrenched on a knoll, known as Baby 700. From 00:03:02.509 --> 00:03:05.389 there, they had a perfect unobstructed view down 00:03:05.389 --> 00:03:07.930 the slope. There was no vegetation, nowhere to 00:03:07.930 --> 00:03:10.990 hide, just bare ground covered in potholes. It 00:03:10.990 --> 00:03:13.710 was arguably the strongest defensive position 00:03:13.710 --> 00:03:16.169 in the entire Anzac sector. Which makes you look 00:03:16.169 --> 00:03:18.789 at the map and ask why on earth would any commander 00:03:18.789 --> 00:03:22.629 launch an attack up a narrow, exposed slope directly 00:03:22.629 --> 00:03:24.870 into fortified trenches? To understand that, 00:03:24.889 --> 00:03:26.889 we need to look at the broader context of the 00:03:26.889 --> 00:03:29.650 Gallipoli campaign at that exact moment. By August 00:03:29.650 --> 00:03:32.870 1915, the Allied forces had been deadlocked there 00:03:32.870 --> 00:03:35.289 since the initial landings in April. Three months. 00:03:35.469 --> 00:03:38.810 three months of brutal grinding stalemate. The 00:03:38.810 --> 00:03:40.830 high command was desperate to break the deadlock 00:03:40.830 --> 00:03:43.050 and get off the beaches. So they planned a major 00:03:43.050 --> 00:03:45.289 offensive to capture the high ground of the Saree 00:03:45.289 --> 00:03:47.530 Bear Range. The attack at the neck wasn't even 00:03:47.530 --> 00:03:49.770 meant to be the main event. It was designed as 00:03:49.770 --> 00:03:51.969 a feint. A distraction. They were sending men 00:03:51.969 --> 00:03:54.090 into a meat grinder just to look busy so the 00:03:54.090 --> 00:03:56.110 enemy would look the other way. Essentially, 00:03:56.389 --> 00:03:59.569 yes. The Australian troops were ordered to attack 00:03:59.569 --> 00:04:02.530 across the neck to draw Ottoman fire and attention. 00:04:02.860 --> 00:04:06.280 The theoretical goal was to support New Zealand 00:04:06.280 --> 00:04:08.879 troops who were supposed to be assaulting a nearby 00:04:08.879 --> 00:04:11.900 peak from the rear. Ah, like a pincer movement. 00:04:12.039 --> 00:04:13.879 Think of it exactly like a coordinated pincer 00:04:13.879 --> 00:04:16.079 movement. They were trying to catch the defenders 00:04:16.079 --> 00:04:19.540 in a vice store. The Australians make a massive 00:04:19.540 --> 00:04:21.920 loud distraction at the front door while the 00:04:21.920 --> 00:04:24.079 New Zealanders sneak in and break down the back 00:04:24.079 --> 00:04:26.240 door. But the back door team never showed up 00:04:26.240 --> 00:04:28.759 on time and the orders given to the Australians 00:04:28.759 --> 00:04:31.180 at the front door were just they're hard to even 00:04:31.180 --> 00:04:33.560 comprehend. Keep in mind these were light horsemen. 00:04:33.699 --> 00:04:35.980 Right. Cavalry troops. Cavalry troops who had 00:04:35.980 --> 00:04:38.500 left their horses behind in Egypt to fight as 00:04:38.500 --> 00:04:41.120 infantry. They were eager, but they were not 00:04:41.120 --> 00:04:44.600 highly trained, dedicated infantrymen. And for 00:04:44.600 --> 00:04:46.620 this assault, the commanders ordered them to 00:04:46.620 --> 00:04:49.000 attack the Ottoman trenches using bayonets and 00:04:49.000 --> 00:04:51.779 grenades only. Only. Their rifles were ordered 00:04:51.779 --> 00:04:55.399 to be completely unloaded. To modern ears, sending 00:04:55.399 --> 00:04:58.040 men into heavy combat without the ability to 00:04:58.040 --> 00:05:00.740 shoot back sounds like absolute madness. But 00:05:00.740 --> 00:05:03.360 if we look at the psychology and the rigid military 00:05:03.360 --> 00:05:06.569 doctrine of the time, The planners had a specific 00:05:06.569 --> 00:05:09.250 rationale. Which was? They believed that if the 00:05:09.250 --> 00:05:11.610 men had loaded rifles, their natural instinct 00:05:11.610 --> 00:05:14.649 would be to stop, take cover, and return fire 00:05:14.649 --> 00:05:17.449 the second they met resistance. And on a narrow 00:05:17.449 --> 00:05:20.069 30 -meter strip, stopping means the momentum 00:05:20.069 --> 00:05:22.819 dies. So by taking away their bullets, the commanders 00:05:22.819 --> 00:05:25.500 were actively trying to remove human instinct 00:05:25.500 --> 00:05:28.360 from the equation. They were forcing a behavior, 00:05:28.560 --> 00:05:30.600 keep running at the enemy trenches no matter 00:05:30.600 --> 00:05:32.439 what, because you literally have no other option. 00:05:32.540 --> 00:05:34.939 That is the ultimate example of top -down theory 00:05:34.939 --> 00:05:38.019 completely ignoring the bottom -up reality. It 00:05:38.019 --> 00:05:39.740 looks perfectly logical on a piece of paper in 00:05:39.740 --> 00:05:42.139 a headquarters tent a mile away. They think the 00:05:42.139 --> 00:05:44.040 men will simply sprint across the gap. Right. 00:05:44.319 --> 00:05:46.860 But it completely discounts the human element, 00:05:47.180 --> 00:05:49.560 the terrain, and the fact that the enemy has 00:05:49.560 --> 00:05:52.160 heavily fortified machine guns pointing right 00:05:52.160 --> 00:05:55.360 at that specific gap. It's institutional arrogance. 00:05:56.180 --> 00:05:59.279 And that clash between a rigid, abstract plan 00:05:59.279 --> 00:06:01.579 and the messy, violent reality of the battlefield 00:06:01.579 --> 00:06:04.139 is the core system failure we see unraveling 00:06:04.139 --> 00:06:06.660 here. The planners assumed everything would go 00:06:06.660 --> 00:06:08.899 exactly as scripted. But in conflict systems, 00:06:08.939 --> 00:06:11.279 and especially in war, the script is usually 00:06:11.279 --> 00:06:13.639 the first casualty. And this script fell apart 00:06:13.639 --> 00:06:15.839 almost immediately because of a massive timing 00:06:15.839 --> 00:06:19.079 failure. The attack was scheduled for 430 a .m. 00:06:19.120 --> 00:06:22.019 on August 7th. It was supposed to be preceded 00:06:22.019 --> 00:06:24.879 by an intense naval and artillery bombardment 00:06:24.879 --> 00:06:27.360 designed to completely daze the Ottoman defenders 00:06:27.360 --> 00:06:29.379 right before the Australians jumped out of their 00:06:29.379 --> 00:06:31.660 trenches. And the bombardment did start. It did. 00:06:31.980 --> 00:06:34.300 But then, inexplicably, the field artillery stopped 00:06:34.300 --> 00:06:38.019 firing at 4 .23 a .m. seven minutes early. In 00:06:38.019 --> 00:06:40.350 a coordinated assault, where your survival depends 00:06:40.350 --> 00:06:42.209 on catching the enemy while their heads are down, 00:06:42.730 --> 00:06:45.430 seven minutes is an absolute eternity. Put yourself 00:06:45.430 --> 00:06:47.790 in those trenches for a second. You are standing 00:06:47.790 --> 00:06:50.670 there in the dark. You are holding a rifle that 00:06:50.670 --> 00:06:53.269 you've been ordered to empty. The bombardment, 00:06:53.310 --> 00:06:55.470 which is supposed to be your only cover, suddenly 00:06:55.470 --> 00:06:58.550 goes dead silent. You know the enemy is getting 00:06:58.550 --> 00:07:01.399 back on their machine guns. What do you do? And 00:07:01.399 --> 00:07:03.600 the military doctrine at the time didn't give 00:07:03.600 --> 00:07:06.759 these local commanders the agency to adapt. Right. 00:07:06.939 --> 00:07:08.980 The local commanders on the ground didn't adjust 00:07:08.980 --> 00:07:11.339 their plans to account for the early cutoff. 00:07:11.759 --> 00:07:13.639 They were supposed to attack as soon as the bombardment 00:07:13.639 --> 00:07:16.879 lifted, but instead they just waited. The sources 00:07:16.879 --> 00:07:19.519 point to unsynchronized watches between the artillery 00:07:19.519 --> 00:07:22.480 officers and the assault officers. Wow. A simple 00:07:22.480 --> 00:07:25.339 mechanical oversight, a failure to calibrate 00:07:25.339 --> 00:07:28.540 before a major operation. So the attackers sat 00:07:28.540 --> 00:07:31.060 in their trenches for seven agonizing minutes 00:07:31.060 --> 00:07:34.040 waiting for the designated 430 a .m. Start time 00:07:34.040 --> 00:07:36.319 while the enemy recovered and the Ottoman troops 00:07:36.319 --> 00:07:39.230 were not amateurs This area was defended by the 00:07:39.230 --> 00:07:42.269 Ottoman 19th Division under the command of Mustafa 00:07:42.269 --> 00:07:44.430 Kemal, who would later become the founder of 00:07:44.430 --> 00:07:46.970 modern Turkey. Exactly. Because the artillery 00:07:46.970 --> 00:07:49.069 had stopped, they knew exactly what was coming. 00:07:49.569 --> 00:07:51.949 Those seven minutes gave them ample time to leave 00:07:51.949 --> 00:07:54.069 their dugouts, return to their trenches, which 00:07:54.069 --> 00:07:56.810 were largely undamaged, and man their weapons. 00:07:57.310 --> 00:07:59.490 They had at least 30 machine guns positioned 00:07:59.490 --> 00:08:02.870 in depth across multiple tiers of trenches, all 00:08:02.870 --> 00:08:06.329 trained perfectly on that tiny bottleneck. What's 00:08:06.329 --> 00:08:08.800 fascinating here? we have to look at the analysis 00:08:08.800 --> 00:08:12.899 from author Graham Wilson. in 2017. For a century, 00:08:13.379 --> 00:08:16.019 the accepted historical narrative was that this 00:08:16.019 --> 00:08:18.800 tragic seven -minute delay allowed the Ottomans 00:08:18.800 --> 00:08:21.980 to recover and doomed the attack. But Wilson 00:08:21.980 --> 00:08:24.240 argues that there actually wasn't a timing delay 00:08:24.240 --> 00:08:25.980 at all. I was reading ahead in the notes about 00:08:25.980 --> 00:08:28.279 this. He looked at the historical accounts and 00:08:28.279 --> 00:08:30.779 realized that the artillery barrage wasn't early, 00:08:30.879 --> 00:08:33.320 it was just completely ineffective. He contends 00:08:33.320 --> 00:08:35.639 that the Allied artillerymen were terrified of 00:08:35.639 --> 00:08:37.840 hitting their own troops massing in those forward 00:08:37.840 --> 00:08:40.720 trenches. Remember how narrow the neck is? And 00:08:40.720 --> 00:08:42.759 in some places the opposing trenches were only 00:08:42.759 --> 00:08:45.600 20 to 70 meters apart. That's incredibly close. 00:08:45.860 --> 00:08:48.000 Firing artillery into that tight of a window 00:08:48.000 --> 00:08:51.600 is incredibly risky. So, to avoid friendly fire, 00:08:52.039 --> 00:08:54.600 they deliberately aimed their guns too far behind 00:08:54.600 --> 00:08:57.360 the Ottoman front lines. The shells were just 00:08:57.360 --> 00:08:59.299 sailing harmlessly over the defenders' heads 00:08:59.299 --> 00:09:01.899 and exploding in the rear. So even if the watches 00:09:01.899 --> 00:09:04.399 had been perfectly synchronized, even if the 00:09:04.399 --> 00:09:06.860 Australians had charged the very second the gun 00:09:06.860 --> 00:09:09.259 stopped, they still would have been running into 00:09:09.259 --> 00:09:12.159 fully conscious, fully prepared defenders. Exactly. 00:09:12.460 --> 00:09:14.820 The plan was mechanically doomed before anyone 00:09:14.820 --> 00:09:17.100 even blew a whistle. Which brings us to the actual 00:09:17.100 --> 00:09:20.620 charge. It was organized into four waves of 150 00:09:20.620 --> 00:09:24.139 men each. At exactly 430 a .m., the first wave 00:09:24.139 --> 00:09:26.480 went over the top. They hopped the bags as the 00:09:26.480 --> 00:09:28.460 slang went. And the reality of what happened 00:09:28.460 --> 00:09:31.169 next is difficult to even process. They were 00:09:31.169 --> 00:09:34.120 met with an absolute wall of lead. Within 30 00:09:34.120 --> 00:09:36.019 seconds, the commander of that first wave and 00:09:36.019 --> 00:09:39.000 almost all 150 of his men were gunned down. 30 00:09:39.000 --> 00:09:42.139 seconds. 30 seconds. The machine gun and rifle 00:09:42.139 --> 00:09:44.720 fire was so dense that most of them barely made 00:09:44.720 --> 00:09:47.639 it a few steps out of the trench. A handful of 00:09:47.639 --> 00:09:49.759 men miraculously reached the Ottoman trenches 00:09:49.759 --> 00:09:52.419 and threw some grenades, but they were immediately 00:09:52.419 --> 00:09:54.899 overwhelmed. It was a complete massacre. And 00:09:54.899 --> 00:09:57.080 this is where the inflexibility we've been tracking 00:09:57.080 --> 00:09:59.840 becomes genuinely criminal. The futility of the 00:09:59.840 --> 00:10:02.360 attack was instantly obvious to anyone with eyes 00:10:02.360 --> 00:10:05.110 on the back. The men in the second wave were 00:10:05.110 --> 00:10:07.889 standing right there. They saw exactly what had 00:10:07.889 --> 00:10:09.710 just happened to their friends. But two minutes 00:10:09.710 --> 00:10:14.169 later, at 4 .32 a .m., the second wave of 150 00:10:14.169 --> 00:10:17.330 men followed the first. without question, and 00:10:17.330 --> 00:10:20.009 they met the exact same fate, cut down before 00:10:20.009 --> 00:10:22.529 they even got halfway across the neck. It's a 00:10:22.529 --> 00:10:24.629 staggering display of bravery by the soldiers, 00:10:25.049 --> 00:10:26.990 but an equally staggering failure of command 00:10:26.990 --> 00:10:29.250 by the leadership. The officers in charge of 00:10:29.250 --> 00:10:31.889 the assault saw two entire ways obliterated in 00:10:31.889 --> 00:10:34.129 under three minutes, yet the machinery of the 00:10:34.129 --> 00:10:36.330 plan just kept grinding forward. Here's where 00:10:36.330 --> 00:10:38.750 it gets really interesting, because we have a 00:10:38.750 --> 00:10:41.070 direct point of comparison happening at the exact 00:10:41.070 --> 00:10:43.940 same time, just down the line. Over at a nearby 00:10:43.940 --> 00:10:46.620 position called Quinn's Post, another regiment 00:10:46.620 --> 00:10:49.200 was also launching a simultaneous attack. Right. 00:10:49.379 --> 00:10:52.919 They set 50 men over the top, and 49 became casualties 00:10:52.919 --> 00:10:55.779 almost instantly. But in that case, the local 00:10:55.779 --> 00:10:57.919 commander on the ground recognized the reality 00:10:57.919 --> 00:11:00.860 of the situation immediately. He saw the futility, 00:11:01.159 --> 00:11:04.240 he used his brain, and he made the crucial decision 00:11:04.240 --> 00:11:07.320 to cancel all further waves. He stopped the slaughter. 00:11:07.539 --> 00:11:10.740 That contrast. perfectly highlights the complete 00:11:10.740 --> 00:11:12.799 collapse of communication and leadership at the 00:11:12.799 --> 00:11:14.940 NAIC. Before the third wave was scheduled to 00:11:14.940 --> 00:11:17.159 go, you had the local commander of the regiment 00:11:17.159 --> 00:11:20.100 in the trenches, a man named Brezier, actively 00:11:20.100 --> 00:11:23.059 trying to halt the attack. He knew it was suicide. 00:11:23.500 --> 00:11:25.159 He went looking for his commanding officer to 00:11:25.159 --> 00:11:27.600 call it off. But his commander had moved to an 00:11:27.600 --> 00:11:30.080 observation post and couldn't be found. So instead 00:11:30.080 --> 00:11:32.379 of finding the man who could actually authorize 00:11:32.379 --> 00:11:35.779 a retreat, Brezier runs into the brigade major. 00:11:36.159 --> 00:11:38.960 a man named Antil. And the sources point out 00:11:38.960 --> 00:11:42.299 a really toxic dynamic here. Antil was a very 00:11:42.299 --> 00:11:45.799 strong personality, a Boer war veteran who exerted 00:11:45.799 --> 00:11:48.480 a lot of influence over the brigade. And he personally 00:11:48.480 --> 00:11:50.980 disliked Brésier. He felt Brésier was just being 00:11:50.980 --> 00:11:53.759 insubordinate by questioning the grand plan. 00:11:53.759 --> 00:11:56.419 Yeah. And this clash of personalities happens 00:11:56.419 --> 00:11:58.740 at the worst possible moment in the worst possible 00:11:58.740 --> 00:12:01.700 place. And Hill had just received a fragmented, 00:12:02.059 --> 00:12:04.899 unverified report claiming that someone had seen 00:12:04.899 --> 00:12:07.549 red and yellow marker flags flying in the enemy 00:12:07.549 --> 00:12:10.509 trenches. The flags? Right. The standard operating 00:12:10.509 --> 00:12:12.350 procedure was that if a trench was captured, 00:12:12.750 --> 00:12:14.710 the attackers would raise these flags to signal 00:12:14.710 --> 00:12:17.590 success to the rear echelons. We know now from 00:12:17.590 --> 00:12:20.289 post -war Turkish accounts that a couple of incredibly 00:12:20.289 --> 00:12:22.789 brave Australian soldiers from that very first 00:12:22.789 --> 00:12:25.370 wave actually did manage to survive the sprint, 00:12:25.889 --> 00:12:28.149 reach the trench, raise a flag, and were immediately 00:12:28.149 --> 00:12:30.309 killed. But Antille didn't know that context. 00:12:30.600 --> 00:12:33.000 He didn't go up to the line to verify the situation. 00:12:33.360 --> 00:12:35.059 He didn't check to see if the flags were still 00:12:35.059 --> 00:12:37.120 there or if anyone was actually holding ground. 00:12:37.600 --> 00:12:40.620 He sat in his bunker, heard the word flags, and 00:12:40.620 --> 00:12:43.740 decided his plan was working perfectly. Despite 00:12:43.740 --> 00:12:46.320 Brazier standing right in front of him, covered 00:12:46.320 --> 00:12:48.320 in the dust of the battlefield, telling him his 00:12:48.320 --> 00:12:51.419 men were being massacred, Antil refused to adapt. 00:12:51.919 --> 00:12:54.659 He ordered the third wave to proceed. He didn't 00:12:54.659 --> 00:12:56.460 even try to escalate the matter up the chain 00:12:56.460 --> 00:12:58.940 of command. It was a decision made in a vacuum 00:12:58.940 --> 00:13:02.500 based on phantom flags and sheer personal stubbornness. 00:13:02.820 --> 00:13:04.340 Without the ability to reach the general on the 00:13:04.340 --> 00:13:06.620 beach, Rizier had to go back to his men in the 00:13:06.620 --> 00:13:09.299 trenches. The quote that survives from that moment 00:13:09.299 --> 00:13:11.779 is just heartbreaking. He looked at the men of 00:13:11.779 --> 00:13:13.259 the third wave who had been sitting there listening 00:13:13.259 --> 00:13:15.259 to the gunfire that killed the first two waves, 00:13:15.419 --> 00:13:17.519 knowing exactly what was waiting for them, and 00:13:17.519 --> 00:13:20.299 he simply said, sorry lads, but the order is 00:13:20.299 --> 00:13:23.559 to go. And so, at 4 .45 a .m., the third wave 00:13:23.559 --> 00:13:26.259 goes over the top. And the result is identical. 00:13:26.759 --> 00:13:29.299 They are cut to pieces in seconds. Brezier makes 00:13:29.299 --> 00:13:31.480 another desperate attempt to reason with Antil. 00:13:31.960 --> 00:13:35.139 Another officer tries to intervene as well. Antilus 00:13:35.139 --> 00:13:38.100 still blindly orders the men forward. Finally, 00:13:38.419 --> 00:13:41.200 Brezier manages to locate his actual commanding 00:13:41.200 --> 00:13:43.980 officer, who eventually realizes the sheer scale 00:13:43.980 --> 00:13:46.360 of the disaster and calls it off. But it was 00:13:46.360 --> 00:13:49.659 too late. Amidst the chaos and the broken communication 00:13:49.659 --> 00:13:52.539 lines, parts of the fourth wave had already begun 00:13:52.539 --> 00:13:55.919 to charge. Some men stayed low, trying to be 00:13:55.919 --> 00:13:58.419 cautious, but the damage was already done. In 00:13:58.419 --> 00:14:00.899 a matter of minutes, the charge at the neck was 00:14:00.899 --> 00:14:03.549 over. The speed of the destruction is what makes 00:14:03.549 --> 00:14:06.809 it so chilling. Hundreds of lives ended not because 00:14:06.809 --> 00:14:08.909 of a brilliant enemy maneuver, but because a 00:14:08.909 --> 00:14:11.549 plan dictated they must advance regardless of 00:14:11.549 --> 00:14:13.610 the physical evidence screaming at them to stop. 00:14:13.990 --> 00:14:15.490 Looking at the numbers here in the sources, it's 00:14:15.490 --> 00:14:17.570 just staggering. Am I reading this right? Out 00:14:17.570 --> 00:14:19.690 of the 600 Australian light horsemen who took 00:14:19.690 --> 00:14:22.570 part in the attack, 372 were killed or wounded. 00:14:22.789 --> 00:14:25.730 Yes, well over half the force wiped out in minutes. 00:14:25.929 --> 00:14:27.970 And the Ottoman losses for repelling this entire 00:14:27.970 --> 00:14:31.409 assault were roughly 12 dead. 12. It wasn't a 00:14:31.409 --> 00:14:34.289 battle, it was an execution. And because of the 00:14:34.289 --> 00:14:36.889 tactical situation, the ridge was just covered 00:14:36.889 --> 00:14:40.129 in bodies. Most of those men lay exactly where 00:14:40.129 --> 00:14:42.450 they fell for the entire rest of the war. They 00:14:42.450 --> 00:14:44.509 couldn't be recovered safely. Just left there. 00:14:44.909 --> 00:14:47.250 There's a particularly famous epitaph for a trooper 00:14:47.250 --> 00:14:49.389 named Harold Rush. He died in that third wave. 00:14:49.750 --> 00:14:52.389 His body was one of the very few that was actually 00:14:52.389 --> 00:14:56.250 identified later. His grave marker reads His 00:14:56.250 --> 00:15:00.269 last words, goodbye, Cobber. God bless you. It's 00:15:00.269 --> 00:15:04.169 a gut punch. It takes these grand, terrible systems 00:15:04.169 --> 00:15:07.409 failures and makes the statistics intensely human. 00:15:07.970 --> 00:15:10.169 And inevitably, after a tragedy of this scale, 00:15:10.649 --> 00:15:13.429 the organizational blame game began. The surviving 00:15:13.429 --> 00:15:15.990 soldiers were furious. They started calling the 00:15:15.990 --> 00:15:18.669 battlefield Godley's Abattoir, placing the blame 00:15:18.669 --> 00:15:21.429 squarely on Major General Alexander Godley, who 00:15:21.429 --> 00:15:23.470 was the tactical commander of the entire offensive. 00:15:23.629 --> 00:15:25.879 It's the ultimate corporate a failing upward 00:15:25.879 --> 00:15:28.340 scenario just with infinitely higher deadlier 00:15:28.340 --> 00:15:30.740 stakes. You orchestrate a disaster and what happens 00:15:30.740 --> 00:15:33.080 to Godly? A few months later, shortly before 00:15:33.080 --> 00:15:35.080 the Allies withdrew entirely from Gallipoli, 00:15:35.200 --> 00:15:37.399 he was temporarily promoted to Lieutenant General. 00:15:37.659 --> 00:15:40.240 Unbelievable. And after the evacuation, he was 00:15:40.240 --> 00:15:42.620 made a Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath. 00:15:43.059 --> 00:15:46.179 He got a promotion and a knighthood. Meanwhile, 00:15:46.340 --> 00:15:49.000 the guys who actually realized the plan was broken 00:15:49.000 --> 00:15:52.240 were treated like insubordinate employees. It's 00:15:52.240 --> 00:15:54.820 a bitter pill to swallow. when you contrast the 00:15:54.820 --> 00:15:56.740 knighthood of the commander safe on the beach 00:15:56.740 --> 00:15:59.659 with the unrecovered bones of the men left on 00:15:59.659 --> 00:16:02.679 the ridge. While the sources note that local 00:16:02.679 --> 00:16:05.039 commanders like Antill were chiefly responsible 00:16:05.039 --> 00:16:07.220 for failing to stop the localized slaughter, 00:16:08.019 --> 00:16:10.379 the higher -level conceptual errors rested with 00:16:10.379 --> 00:16:12.840 the generals who designed a flawed plan, stripped 00:16:12.840 --> 00:16:14.899 their men of agency by unloading their rifles, 00:16:15.299 --> 00:16:17.620 and failed to establish functional communication 00:16:17.620 --> 00:16:19.750 lines. So what does this all mean? We promised 00:16:19.750 --> 00:16:21.789 at the start that we weren't just reciting a 00:16:21.789 --> 00:16:23.970 grim history lesson. We're looking at why the 00:16:23.970 --> 00:16:26.250 mechanics of this disaster matter to you listening 00:16:26.250 --> 00:16:29.149 right now. If we connect this to the bigger picture, 00:16:29.629 --> 00:16:32.110 the battle of the neck is a terrifyingly clear 00:16:32.110 --> 00:16:35.690 extreme example of the sunk cost fallacy combined 00:16:35.690 --> 00:16:38.330 with blind obedience to authority. The commanders 00:16:38.330 --> 00:16:41.730 had invested so much time, prestige, and eventually 00:16:41.730 --> 00:16:45.679 blood into this specific plan. When the prerequisite 00:16:45.679 --> 00:16:48.139 conditions failed, when the artillery proved 00:16:48.139 --> 00:16:50.700 ineffective, when the New Zealanders didn't reach 00:16:50.700 --> 00:16:52.679 their target to create the backdoor pressure, 00:16:53.159 --> 00:16:56.600 the logical rational choice was to abort. But 00:16:56.600 --> 00:16:59.379 the institutional momentum was simply too strong. 00:16:59.980 --> 00:17:02.539 They felt they had to do something, even if that 00:17:02.539 --> 00:17:05.519 something was clearly demonstrably fatal. They 00:17:05.519 --> 00:17:07.839 couldn't deviate from the script. They had their 00:17:07.839 --> 00:17:09.799 orders. They had literally unloaded their rifles 00:17:09.799 --> 00:17:12.240 and they just push the button over and over again, 00:17:12.720 --> 00:17:15.079 sacrificing wave after wave, expecting a different 00:17:15.079 --> 00:17:17.079 result. This raises an important question for 00:17:17.079 --> 00:17:19.619 all of us. Obviously, the stakes in our daily 00:17:19.619 --> 00:17:22.720 lives are rarely life and death. But how often 00:17:22.720 --> 00:17:25.279 in our own professional or personal lives do 00:17:25.279 --> 00:17:27.859 we continue a doomed charge simply because the 00:17:27.859 --> 00:17:30.440 plan was already set? Too often. How often do 00:17:30.440 --> 00:17:32.480 you ignore the reality right in front of you, 00:17:32.900 --> 00:17:35.819 the project that is clearly failing? the business 00:17:35.819 --> 00:17:38.420 strategy that isn't working, the investment that's 00:17:38.420 --> 00:17:41.200 bleeding money because changing course would 00:17:41.200 --> 00:17:44.460 mean admitting the initial plan was flawed, or 00:17:44.460 --> 00:17:47.900 defying a superior who refuses to look at the 00:17:47.900 --> 00:17:49.779 ground truth. It's so much easier to just say, 00:17:49.920 --> 00:17:51.339 well, those were the orders or that's how we've 00:17:51.339 --> 00:17:52.920 always done it in this industry than it is to 00:17:52.920 --> 00:17:55.680 stand up and say, stop, this isn't working. Look 00:17:55.680 --> 00:17:57.940 at the data. The local commander at Quinn's Post 00:17:57.940 --> 00:18:00.680 did it. Yes, he did. He looked at reality and 00:18:00.680 --> 00:18:03.099 saved his men. The commanders at the neck didn't. 00:18:03.099 --> 00:18:05.319 And that made all the difference. The tragedy 00:18:05.319 --> 00:18:08.240 of the neck is a profound enduring lesson in 00:18:08.240 --> 00:18:10.720 the absolute necessity of critical thinking, 00:18:11.200 --> 00:18:13.779 adaptability, and the courage to challenge a 00:18:13.779 --> 00:18:15.680 failing system before it destroys everything 00:18:15.680 --> 00:18:18.700 it touches. It's a stark reminder that loyalty 00:18:18.700 --> 00:18:21.799 to a theoretical plan should never supersede 00:18:21.799 --> 00:18:24.359 loyalty to actual reality. I want to leave you 00:18:24.359 --> 00:18:26.839 with one final provocative thought to mull over. 00:18:27.099 --> 00:18:29.660 We mentioned earlier that the Allies ultimately 00:18:29.660 --> 00:18:32.240 evacuated Gallipoli. That happened in December 00:18:32.240 --> 00:18:35.140 1915 as winter set in and the stalemate became 00:18:35.140 --> 00:18:38.299 unbearable. But right before they completely 00:18:38.299 --> 00:18:40.740 withdrew, they finally managed to breach the 00:18:40.740 --> 00:18:42.880 Ottoman defenses at the neck. They did. Do you 00:18:42.880 --> 00:18:45.180 know how they did it? They didn't order another 00:18:45.180 --> 00:18:48.299 brave, futile frontal charge with unloaded rifles. 00:18:48.720 --> 00:18:50.880 They didn't send waves of men into machine gun 00:18:50.880 --> 00:18:54.230 fire to prove a point. Instead, Allied troops 00:18:54.230 --> 00:18:56.930 quietly tunneled deep under that narrow ridge, 00:18:57.569 --> 00:18:59.930 planted a massive mine directly underneath the 00:18:59.930 --> 00:19:02.910 Ottoman trenches, and detonated it. It killed 00:19:02.910 --> 00:19:05.710 70 defenders in an absolute instant, and the 00:19:05.710 --> 00:19:08.210 Allies simply walked away to their ships. It 00:19:08.210 --> 00:19:10.309 forces you to wonder, is the most effective way 00:19:10.309 --> 00:19:12.730 to win an unwinnable battle not to push harder, 00:19:13.170 --> 00:19:15.589 but to completely rewrite the rules of engagement 00:19:15.589 --> 00:19:18.029 just as you decide to walk away? Think about 00:19:18.029 --> 00:19:19.470 it. We'll catch you on the next Deep Dive.