WEBVTT

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I want you to start by trying to conjure up a

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very specific and honestly a pretty terrifying

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physical sensation. Right. Imagine you're flying,

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but you need to immediately wipe away basically

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any modern conception of what that word means.

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Right. No pressurized cabins here. Exactly. You

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are not sitting in a comfortable climate controlled

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tube, sipping a tepid cup of coffee while watching

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a movie. You are miles above a literal raging

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battlefield. Sitting on a tiny wicker seat inside

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a machine that is, for all intents and purposes,

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a motorized kite. Yeah, that's really the best

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way to describe it. It's constructed entirely

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of ash wood, piano wire, and tightly stretched

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linen fabric. That's it. That is the only thing

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between you and a 10 ,000 foot drop. Just wooden

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cloth. And the wind is howling in your face so

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loudly that it is physically deafening. Like,

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you couldn't hear yourself scream if you tried.

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You're completely exposed to the freezing cold

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in an open cockpit. And this is the kicker, you

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do not have a parachute. Oh, and if you want

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to communicate with the people on the ground,

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the people whose lives depend on the information

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you're gathering. operate a massive incredibly

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fragile 75 pound piece of early radio equipment

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that is quite literally crammed into the passenger

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seat right next to you. Welcome to the birth

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of modern air warfare. It is. It's a genuinely

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staggering mental image to put yourself in that

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wicker seat. The sheer sensory overload of that

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environment is really hard to overstate. I can't

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even imagine. You've got the deafening roar of

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a rotary engine spewing raw castor oil straight

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back into your face, freezing temperatures numbing

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your extremities. Yeah. And the constant omnipresent

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threat of the entire contraption just shaking

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itself apart midair. Right. And yet, for the

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individuals we're exploring in this deep dive,

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that wasn't an imagination. exercise, you know.

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It wasn't a hypothetical stress test. That was

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a Tuesday. Just a normal work day. It was their

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daily unvarnished reality. What we're doing today

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is looking really closely at the complete historical

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life cycle of the Royal Flying Corps, the RFC.

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which served as the air arm of the British Army

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from 1912 until 1918. And the mission of our

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deep dive today is to pull apart a transformation

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that I just find completely mind -boggling based

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on the sources we have. Oh, absolutely. We're

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charting the journey of how a tiny, incredibly

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experimental unit, a group initially dismissed

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by the military establishment, is basically just

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flying chauffeurs. Which is such a great term.

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How they rapidly mutated into the massive globally

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reaching industrialized powerhouse that is the

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Royal Air Force. And they did it in just six

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years. Six years. Six years. When you think about

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that incredibly compressed time frame, it's not

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just a story about airplanes. It is a story about

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how entirely new domains of human conflict are

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invented from absolute scratch. Right. And how

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a technology goes from this dangerous novelty

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to the absolute center of global strategy in

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the blink of an eye. I think the reason this

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specific six -year window is so vital for you

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to understand today is that it really serves

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as the ultimate historical case study in rapid,

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almost uncontrollable technological innovation.

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Yeah. If you want to understand the brutal realities

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of a startup culture, that ethos of moving fast,

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breaking things, iterating on the fly, you have

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to look at the RFC. Except? Except in this startup,

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the failure state wasn't losing venture capital.

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It was fuddling out of the sky. Yeah, the stakes

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were just a little bit higher. Just a bit. This

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is a masterclass in how human beings adapt, both

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psychologically and structurally, to operating

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in entirely unprecedented, highly lethal environments.

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They were quite literally building the airplane

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while flying it. I really love that framing.

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A militarized startup. Yeah. To really grasp

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the scale of the growth, we have to ground ourselves

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in the origins, back in that pre -war era around

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1912 to 1914. Let's do it. Let's talk about the

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absolute bare bones inception of this organization.

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The Royal Flying Corps was established by a royal

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warrant on April 13, 1912 under King George V.

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And the original vision was actually for it to

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be a joint service. It was supposed to combine

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a military wing for the army and a naval wing

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for the Navy operating under one umbrella. Which

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sounds great on paper. It does. But as with almost

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any joint military venture where budgets and

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prestige are on the line, the Navy took one look

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at the setup, decided they wanted ultimate control

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over their own toys, and very quickly split off

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to form the Royal Naval Air Service. Which is

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a classic bureaucratic move. Totally. And that

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schism left the military wing, which became the

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core of the RFC, starting with almost nothing.

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When we talk about a startup in a garage, this

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was literally a startup in a muddy field. Right.

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On day one. The entire air power of the British

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Army consisted of exactly 133 officers, 12 manned

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observation balloons, and just 36 aeroplanes.

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36. That was the entirety of their aerial capability.

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36 fragile, highly unreliable machines for the

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entire British Empire. It's wild. Yet despite

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those meager beginnings, they adopted a motto

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that remains incredibly famous, one that the

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Royal Air Force and various Commonwealth Air

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Forces still use today. Per Ardua Ad Astra. Through

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adversity to the stars. Through adversity to

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the stars. Adversity feels like the understatement

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of the century here. When you look at how they

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initially tried to organize this tiny group of

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aviators, the hierarchy is just wild to me. It's

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completely backwards to how anyone today understands

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aviation. It's a perfect illustration of how

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large established institutions like the British

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Army struggled to map their traditional thinking

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onto an entirely new paradigm. Right. They were

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trying to force a two -dimensional cavalry mindset

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into a three -dimensional battle space. In the

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early days of the RFC, the officer sitting in

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the aircraft looking down at the ground was the

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person in command of the mission and the aircraft.

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The guy with the binoculars. Exactly. The pilot,

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the person actually keeping the machine from

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plummeting into the earth, was treated merely

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as a chauffeur. Which is insane. They were viewed

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as the driver. a technical operator whose only

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job was to cart the important officer up to a

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high vantage point so he could look around. Wait,

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really? So the guy holding the steering column,

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wrestling with the wind, isn't in charge? Not

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at all. That explains so much about the early

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military disdain for pilots. They were just viewed

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as a new type of driver. Yeah. But the danger

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of simply operating these machines, even without

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an enemy shooting at you, was astronomically

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high. Let's walk through the very first fatal

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crash of the RFC to get a sense of the culture.

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It's a dark one. This happened on July 5, 1912

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near Stonehenge on the Salisbury Plain. Captain

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Eustace Lorraine and his observer, Staff Sergeant

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R .H .V. Wilson, were flying when their aircraft

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went down, killing them both. Now, obviously,

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a fatal crash in a brand new experimental unit

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is a massive crisis. How did the military brass

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handle this? The official response to that first

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tragic loss is deeply telling about the institutional

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mindset. They didn't ground the fleet to conduct

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a massive safety review. They didn't hold a long

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period of mourning. The military command issued

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an order later that same day that stated, in

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its entirety, flying will continue this evening

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as usual. That is chilling. Just a completely

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cold, pragmatic machine moving forward. Flying

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will continue. It is chilling, but it was also

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a deliberate psychological tactic. It immediately

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established a stoic, almost fatalistic culture

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within the early RFC. The underlying message

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was clear. Death is now a standardized part of

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this operation. The mission supersedes the individual,

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get back in the cockpit. Wow. And they had to

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adopt that mindset because they were dealing

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with absolute unknowns every single time the

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wheels left the grass. Give me an example. Well,

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consider the aerodynamic concept of an airplane

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spin. Today, understanding how a plane stalls

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and enters a spin and knowing exactly how to

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push the controls to recover from it is basic

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private pilot training. It's taught early on.

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Right. In 1912, a spin was an absolute undisputed

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death sentence. Nobody knew the physics of what

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was happening, and nobody knew how to get out

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of it. Because if your plane starts spinning

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toward the ground, every human instinct tells

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you to pull back on the stick to try and go up.

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Exactly. But pulling back in a stall just makes

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the spin worse, right? It tightens the rotation.

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That's it. The counterintuitive physics of flight

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just hadn't been codified yet until August 1912

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when Lieutenant Wilford Park was flying a biplane

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and accidentally entered a spin at 700 feet.

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700 feet is not a lot of room to figure things

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out. No, it's really not. We have accounts of

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this. He was plummeting toward the earth, his

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instinctive inputs weren't working, and so purely

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by trial and error, and undoubtedly driven by

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sheer unadulterated panic in what he thought

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were his final seconds, he pushed the controls

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in the opposite direction. And it worked. He

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recovered the aircraft. It was the very first

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time a spin recovery had ever been observed and

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documented. Which is an incredible moment of

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aeronautical discovery. He basically solved the

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most lethal puzzle in early aviation right before

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hitting the ground. He did. But the dark coda

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to that story is that Lieutenant Park died just

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four months later in a completely different crash.

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Oh man. It perfectly highlights the omnipresent

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peril. You could solve one deadly puzzle, but

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the machine itself was still so experimental,

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so prone to structural failure or engine death,

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that simply trying to fly was an extreme hazard.

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So we have this tiny group of fatalistic pilots

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flying incredibly fragile, dangerous machines

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in peacetime. How on earth did they transition

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from these deadly little experiments into a vital

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functional tool of global war? That's the big

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pivot. Let's move the timeline to the outbreak

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of World War I. This brings us to the period

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of 1914 to 1915, a phase I can only describe

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as a completely DIY war. Yeah, that's accurate.

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It's a period where every single innovation was

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born entirely out of desperate necessity. When

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war was declared in August 1914, the RFC deployed

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to France to support the British Expeditionary

00:10:16.879 --> 00:10:19.220
Force, or the BEF. Remember that starting number

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of 36 planes? Yeah. By the time they deployed,

00:10:21.399 --> 00:10:23.519
they managed to scrape together a bit more, but

00:10:23.519 --> 00:10:25.940
they only sent 60 machines over to France. Let

00:10:25.940 --> 00:10:28.360
me stop you there to just underline that. 60

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planes. to cover an entire massive European front

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tracking millions of troops. That is nothing.

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It's a drop in the ocean. Yeah. And yet those

00:10:38.440 --> 00:10:41.820
60 incredibly primitive planes proved their strategic

00:10:41.820 --> 00:10:44.980
worth almost immediately. How so? On August 20,

00:10:45.139 --> 00:10:48.200
1914, Captain Charlton and Lieutenant Wadham

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were in the air, puttering along at maybe 60

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miles an hour when they spotted the German First

00:10:53.759 --> 00:10:57.580
Army. executing a massive sweeping flanking movement.

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So they see the whole German army moving. The

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Germans were trying to encircle the British.

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Charlton and Wadham landed, reported this intelligence,

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and that single piece of aerial reconnaissance

00:11:07.620 --> 00:11:10.240
allowed the BEF commander to realign his front

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and retreat in good order, effectively saving

00:11:12.759 --> 00:11:14.940
the entire British army around the town of Mons

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from being wiped out. That is the ultimate proof

00:11:17.179 --> 00:11:19.580
of concept. One flight basically saves an army.

00:11:19.799 --> 00:11:22.059
It justified the existence of the entire RSC

00:11:22.059 --> 00:11:24.870
in one afternoon. Suddenly, the generals on the

00:11:24.870 --> 00:11:26.889
ground realized they needed these flying chauffeurs.

00:11:26.929 --> 00:11:30.190
Right. But as the military inevitably began demanding

00:11:30.190 --> 00:11:33.909
more heel, expanding the aircraft's roles from

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simple visual observation to wireless telegraphy

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to complex photo reconnaissance to aerial bombardment,

00:11:42.490 --> 00:11:44.870
they slammed headfirst into incredible friction.

00:11:45.029 --> 00:11:47.629
Because the planes just couldn't do it. The rudimentary

00:11:47.629 --> 00:11:50.490
technology of 1914 was simply not capable of

00:11:50.490 --> 00:11:52.399
handling the demands being placed on it. I think

00:11:52.399 --> 00:11:54.860
my favorite example of this friction and the

00:11:54.860 --> 00:11:57.379
sheer absurdity of early aviation is the weight

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issue. Oh yeah. The engines on these early planes

00:12:00.120 --> 00:12:03.080
were so pitifully weak and the planes themselves

00:12:03.080 --> 00:12:05.919
were so underpowered that when the commander

00:12:05.919 --> 00:12:08.600
started asking pilots to fly further distances

00:12:08.600 --> 00:12:11.539
to scout behind enemy lines, they had a major

00:12:11.539 --> 00:12:14.179
problem. A huge problem. They needed more fuel.

00:12:14.320 --> 00:12:16.639
But if they added more fuel, the plane literally

00:12:16.639 --> 00:12:18.799
couldn't take off. So what do they do to save

00:12:18.799 --> 00:12:20.700
weight? They just left the observers behind.

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Which is a brilliant example of a hardware limitation.

00:12:24.269 --> 00:12:27.409
forcing a catastrophic tactical decision. Let's

00:12:27.409 --> 00:12:29.629
think about the pilot's workload here. You're

00:12:29.629 --> 00:12:32.509
flying an open cockpit biplane that requires

00:12:32.509 --> 00:12:35.929
two hands and two feet of constant physical exertion

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just to keep it level. There is no autopilot.

00:12:39.350 --> 00:12:43.230
Now, remove the navigator. You, the pilot, are

00:12:43.230 --> 00:12:45.809
flying completely alone, often in terrible weather

00:12:45.809 --> 00:12:49.009
or low cloud cover, over unfamiliar French and

00:12:49.009 --> 00:12:51.330
Belgian countryside. And trying to read a paper

00:12:51.330 --> 00:12:53.250
map while the wind is trying to rip it out of

00:12:53.250 --> 00:12:56.110
your hands? Exactly. The inevitable result was

00:12:56.110 --> 00:12:59.169
that pilots simply got lost. You have these high

00:12:59.169 --> 00:13:02.029
stakes, critical reconnaissance missions completely

00:13:02.029 --> 00:13:04.809
failing because the aircraft's engine couldn't

00:13:04.809 --> 00:13:06.929
generate enough horsepower to lift two grown

00:13:06.929 --> 00:13:10.909
men and a full tank of gas. The technology was

00:13:10.909 --> 00:13:13.370
dictating the limits of strategy. But the flip

00:13:13.370 --> 00:13:15.350
side of those technological limits is how the

00:13:15.350 --> 00:13:17.990
pilots reacted to them. The weaponization of

00:13:17.990 --> 00:13:19.970
these planes is absolutely fascinating because

00:13:19.970 --> 00:13:23.309
it was so profoundly improvised. It was chaotic.

00:13:23.409 --> 00:13:25.570
I mean, there were no built -in bomb bays on

00:13:25.570 --> 00:13:28.570
a 1914 biplane. The aeronautical engineers back

00:13:28.570 --> 00:13:30.250
in England hadn't thought that far ahead. They

00:13:30.250 --> 00:13:32.129
were just trying to get the things to fly. Just

00:13:32.129 --> 00:13:35.190
keeping them airborne was the goal. The innovation

00:13:35.190 --> 00:13:37.769
of aerial warfare came entirely from the bottom

00:13:37.769 --> 00:13:40.399
up. It was driven by the 20 -year -old pilots

00:13:40.399 --> 00:13:43.019
in the field who were flying over German troop

00:13:43.019 --> 00:13:46.279
columns and realizing, hey, I have the ultimate

00:13:46.279 --> 00:13:48.299
high ground here. I should probably be dropping

00:13:48.299 --> 00:13:51.200
something on them. The ingenuity born of frustration.

00:13:51.259 --> 00:13:53.480
Yeah. You have incredible historical accounts

00:13:53.480 --> 00:13:55.679
from this period. For instance, there's Lieutenant

00:13:55.679 --> 00:13:58.940
Conran. Oh, this guy. He would fly low over an

00:13:58.940 --> 00:14:01.440
enemy troop column, take his hands off the controls

00:14:01.440 --> 00:14:04.399
for a split second, literally pull the pins on

00:14:04.399 --> 00:14:06.539
infantry hand grenades with his teeth or his

00:14:06.539 --> 00:14:09.039
free hand, and just toss him over the side of

00:14:09.039 --> 00:14:11.649
his wicker cockpit. It's just wild to picture.

00:14:11.769 --> 00:14:13.990
He wasn't aiming for massive structural damage.

00:14:14.350 --> 00:14:16.850
He was dropping them to stampede the German cavalry

00:14:16.850 --> 00:14:19.629
horses and cause chaos on the roads. I just picture

00:14:19.629 --> 00:14:21.889
him leaning over the edge of a flying canvas

00:14:21.889 --> 00:14:24.450
tent shucking grenades. Or what about Captain

00:14:24.450 --> 00:14:27.490
Louis Strange? This guy took DIY warfare to another

00:14:27.490 --> 00:14:30.570
level. Louis Strange is a legend of early aviation.

00:14:30.950 --> 00:14:33.549
He wasn't satisfied with hand grenades. He started

00:14:33.549 --> 00:14:35.809
fabricating his own homemade petrol bombs. Like

00:14:35.809 --> 00:14:38.929
Molotov cocktails. Exactly. He would rig these

00:14:38.929 --> 00:14:42.009
incendiary devices, fly over enemy lines and

00:14:42.009 --> 00:14:44.730
manually drop them onto canvas covered German

00:14:44.730 --> 00:14:47.870
supply trucks to set them on fire. It is pure

00:14:47.870 --> 00:14:51.129
unregulated improvisation. But that wild improvisation

00:14:51.129 --> 00:14:53.629
is exactly how formalized systems begin, right?

00:14:53.649 --> 00:14:56.090
Right. Because strange as homemade fire bombs

00:14:56.090 --> 00:14:59.149
proved effective, the military apparatus eventually

00:14:59.149 --> 00:15:02.250
caught up. They went from a guy tossing a petrol

00:15:02.250 --> 00:15:04.529
bomb by hand to actually modifying the wings

00:15:04.529 --> 00:15:07.379
of the planes to carry specialized 20 -pound

00:15:07.379 --> 00:15:10.039
Cooper bombs on metal racks. And the pilot would

00:15:10.039 --> 00:15:12.879
release them by yanking a wire cable routed into

00:15:12.879 --> 00:15:15.600
the cockpit. The pipeline from chaotic field

00:15:15.600 --> 00:15:17.840
experiment to standardized military hardware

00:15:17.840 --> 00:15:20.639
was incredibly short. They were willing to try

00:15:20.639 --> 00:15:22.779
absolutely anything regardless of how absurd

00:15:22.779 --> 00:15:25.879
or dangerous it seemed on paper. A perfect illustration

00:15:25.879 --> 00:15:28.899
of this is a bizarre highly classified mission

00:15:28.899 --> 00:15:31.899
they attempted in September 1915. Let's hear

00:15:31.899 --> 00:15:34.120
it. They decided they were going to use an airplane

00:15:34.120 --> 00:15:38.000
to covertly drop an espionage agent, a sky behind

00:15:38.000 --> 00:15:39.820
German lines. Which sounds like something out

00:15:39.820 --> 00:15:41.559
of a James Bond movie, except they're trying

00:15:41.559 --> 00:15:44.200
to do it in a rattling wooden box. Keep in mind,

00:15:44.379 --> 00:15:46.360
this had never been attempted before in the history

00:15:46.360 --> 00:15:49.539
of warfare. And it failed spectacularly. Of course

00:15:49.539 --> 00:15:52.500
it did. The insertion didn't work. The aircraft

00:15:52.500 --> 00:15:55.860
ended up crashing behind enemy lines. Both the

00:15:55.860 --> 00:15:58.519
pilot and the spy were badly injured in the wreck,

00:15:58.659 --> 00:16:01.480
and the German forces immediately captured both

00:16:01.480 --> 00:16:04.820
of them. So a total disaster. Total. Although

00:16:04.820 --> 00:16:08.519
there is a wild postscript to that story. The

00:16:08.519 --> 00:16:10.960
pilot who was captured actually managed to escape

00:16:10.960 --> 00:16:13.179
a German prisoner of war camp two years later

00:16:13.179 --> 00:16:15.059
and make it back to Britain. Which is an amazing

00:16:15.059 --> 00:16:17.039
story on its own. But you're right, it speaks

00:16:17.039 --> 00:16:20.159
volumes about their appetite for risk. But while

00:16:20.159 --> 00:16:22.480
certain pilots were trying to drop spies or leaning

00:16:22.480 --> 00:16:24.480
over the side of their planes throwing grenades,

00:16:24.840 --> 00:16:27.899
there was a much more sophisticated, though admittedly

00:16:27.899 --> 00:16:30.820
clunky, technological revolution happening. Yes.

00:16:30.940 --> 00:16:32.980
A system of communication was being developed

00:16:32.980 --> 00:16:35.019
that would fundamentally change how the war on

00:16:35.019 --> 00:16:37.360
the ground was fought. And that transition is

00:16:37.360 --> 00:16:40.539
critical because tossing a few 20 pound bombs

00:16:40.539 --> 00:16:44.059
is a nuisance to the enemy, but it doesn't win

00:16:44.059 --> 00:16:46.960
a war. What changes the course of a battle is

00:16:46.960 --> 00:16:50.620
information. as the Western Front locked into

00:16:50.620 --> 00:16:54.019
static trench warfare. The primary, absolute,

00:16:54.019 --> 00:16:57.159
most critical roles of the RFC solidified into

00:16:57.159 --> 00:17:00.759
two highly technical disciplines, artillery observation

00:17:00.759 --> 00:17:03.639
and photo reconnaissance. Let's dive into that.

00:17:03.710 --> 00:17:05.910
This brings us to what we can call the data war

00:17:05.910 --> 00:17:09.890
spanning roughly in 1915 to 1916. This is the

00:17:09.890 --> 00:17:13.329
era of cameras, giant radios, and a deeply fascinating

00:17:13.329 --> 00:17:15.869
psychological phenomenon called optimism bias.

00:17:16.069 --> 00:17:18.549
It's a great era to study. But first, let's look

00:17:18.549 --> 00:17:20.609
at the problem they were trying to solve. In

00:17:20.609 --> 00:17:23.049
trench warfare, you have massive artillery guns

00:17:23.049 --> 00:17:25.910
situated miles behind your own front lines. They're

00:17:25.910 --> 00:17:27.970
firing at German targets that the gunners cannot

00:17:27.970 --> 00:17:30.269
visually see. Right. They're firing blind over

00:17:30.269 --> 00:17:32.630
hills and forests. They desperately needed eyes

00:17:32.630 --> 00:17:35.150
in the sky to tell them, hey, your massive, highly

00:17:35.150 --> 00:17:37.849
explosive artillery shell landed 500 yards to

00:17:37.849 --> 00:17:39.970
the left of the enemy bunker. To solve the visual

00:17:39.970 --> 00:17:42.359
side of that equation. The RFC introduced the

00:17:42.359 --> 00:17:44.799
more brabbers on semi -automatic camera. Now

00:17:44.799 --> 00:17:46.960
we use the term semi -automatic very loosely

00:17:46.960 --> 00:17:49.259
compared to today's standards, right? Oh, absolutely.

00:17:49.579 --> 00:17:52.200
This was a heavy, cumbersome piece of equipment.

00:17:52.519 --> 00:17:55.740
bolted to the outside of the fuselage. The pilot

00:17:55.740 --> 00:17:59.660
or observer had to manually pull a lever to change

00:17:59.660 --> 00:18:02.200
the heavy glass photographic plates after every

00:18:02.200 --> 00:18:05.059
single exposure. Imagine doing that at 16 ,000

00:18:05.059 --> 00:18:07.160
feet. It's rough. The air is incredibly thin,

00:18:07.279 --> 00:18:09.579
you're hypoxic, your fingers are completely numb

00:18:09.579 --> 00:18:12.319
from the sub -zero freezing temperatures, and

00:18:12.319 --> 00:18:15.200
you're trying to swap out fragile glass plates

00:18:15.200 --> 00:18:17.960
while someone on the ground is shooting anti

00:18:17.960 --> 00:18:20.519
-aircraft flak at you. It was grueling physical

00:18:20.519 --> 00:18:24.089
labor. But the results were revolutionary. Those

00:18:24.089 --> 00:18:27.009
sharp glass plate photos could capture a massive

00:18:27.009 --> 00:18:29.970
2 by 3 mile grid of the front line in incredible

00:18:29.970 --> 00:18:33.349
detail. By mid 1915, these aerial photographs

00:18:33.349 --> 00:18:35.410
became the exclusive source material used by

00:18:35.410 --> 00:18:37.750
cartographers to compile the highly detailed

00:18:37.750 --> 00:18:40.670
1 to 10 ,000 scale maps that the entire British

00:18:40.670 --> 00:18:42.809
army relied on. So they were making the maps

00:18:42.809 --> 00:18:45.609
from the sky? Put the strategic value into perspective.

00:18:46.089 --> 00:18:48.990
The entire massive sum offensive in 1916 involving

00:18:48.990 --> 00:18:51.670
millions of men was planned using maps derived

00:18:51.670 --> 00:18:54.890
entirely from RFC aerial photography. They were

00:18:54.890 --> 00:18:57.589
mapping the battlefield in near real time. Okay,

00:18:57.650 --> 00:19:00.769
so the photography solves the map problem, but

00:19:00.940 --> 00:19:04.240
Taking a photo, flying back, landing, developing

00:19:04.240 --> 00:19:06.420
the glass plate and handing it to a general takes

00:19:06.420 --> 00:19:09.700
hours. Right. If you want to direct live artillery

00:19:09.700 --> 00:19:12.980
fire in real time, you need radio communication.

00:19:13.369 --> 00:19:16.069
And this is where the technology gets beautifully

00:19:16.069 --> 00:19:18.769
absurd. To communicate with the artillery batteries,

00:19:18.970 --> 00:19:21.589
they developed the Sterling lightweight wireless

00:19:21.589 --> 00:19:24.289
transmitter. I always laugh at the military designation

00:19:24.289 --> 00:19:26.269
of lightweight here. Right. Lightweight meaning

00:19:26.269 --> 00:19:29.569
it weighed 75 pounds. Yeah. It was a massive

00:19:29.569 --> 00:19:32.710
wooden and brass box that literally took up the

00:19:32.710 --> 00:19:35.210
entire observer's seat in the cockpit. It was

00:19:35.210 --> 00:19:38.410
a behemoth. But if a pilot could manage to get

00:19:38.410 --> 00:19:40.910
this massive weight into the air, it unlocked

00:19:40.910 --> 00:19:43.269
a brilliant piece of operational engineering

00:19:43.269 --> 00:19:46.009
known as the Zone Call Procedure. How did that

00:19:46.009 --> 00:19:48.670
work? They divided the maps into alphanumeric

00:19:48.670 --> 00:19:52.289
grids. An RSC pilot would fly over the lines,

00:19:52.890 --> 00:19:55.829
spot a high value target, say a concealed enemy

00:19:55.829 --> 00:19:58.130
artillery battery that was hammering British

00:19:58.130 --> 00:20:00.789
troops, and he would use a physical Morse code

00:20:00.789 --> 00:20:03.329
telegraph key strapped to his leg or the dashboard

00:20:03.329 --> 00:20:06.130
to tap out the target's specific grid location.

00:20:06.450 --> 00:20:09.009
That signal was beamed directly back to a British

00:20:09.009 --> 00:20:11.509
artillery battery. So the pilot taps out the

00:20:11.509 --> 00:20:14.190
grid, the British artillery miles away, receives

00:20:14.190 --> 00:20:16.529
the Morse code, and they fire a shell. Right.

00:20:16.630 --> 00:20:18.890
But it doesn't end there. Then the pilot has

00:20:18.890 --> 00:20:21.769
to circle around, watch where that massive shell

00:20:21.769 --> 00:20:24.829
actually explodes on the ground, and report the

00:20:24.829 --> 00:20:27.829
fall of shot. Exactly. They used a clock code.

00:20:28.210 --> 00:20:30.369
So he'd tap out something indicating the shell

00:20:30.369 --> 00:20:32.490
landed at three o 'clock, 200 yards from the

00:20:32.490 --> 00:20:34.990
target, allowing the artillery to adjust their

00:20:34.990 --> 00:20:37.430
dials and fire again until they hit it. It's

00:20:37.430 --> 00:20:40.230
an incredibly tight, effective data loop, except

00:20:40.230 --> 00:20:43.829
for one glaring, almost comical, technological

00:20:43.829 --> 00:20:46.569
bottleneck. The 75 pounds sterling radio was

00:20:46.569 --> 00:20:49.410
a transmitter only it was completely incapable

00:20:49.410 --> 00:20:52.009
of receiving messages the communication was strictly

00:20:52.009 --> 00:20:54.490
one way from the plane to the ground which begs

00:20:54.490 --> 00:20:56.930
the obvious question how on earth does the artillery

00:20:56.930 --> 00:20:59.490
battery tell the pilot hey we received your Morse

00:20:59.490 --> 00:21:02.630
code we're adjusting our aim standby to observe

00:21:02.630 --> 00:21:04.930
the next shot this is where you see the collision

00:21:04.930 --> 00:21:08.569
of high tech and absolute low tech to reply to

00:21:08.569 --> 00:21:11.490
the pilot Ground crews attached to the artillery

00:21:11.490 --> 00:21:14.650
batteries had to run out into an open field and

00:21:14.650 --> 00:21:17.509
physically lay out massive strips of white canvas

00:21:17.509 --> 00:21:20.630
cloth in specific geometric patterns on the mud.

00:21:20.869 --> 00:21:23.589
Unbelievable. The pilot thousands of feet in

00:21:23.589 --> 00:21:25.450
the air, peering over the side of his cockpit

00:21:25.450 --> 00:21:28.569
through binoculars, had to read these giant cloth

00:21:28.569 --> 00:21:30.849
symbols to know what the artillery was doing.

00:21:30.990 --> 00:21:34.009
It is so wildly inefficient. Very. You have wireless

00:21:34.009 --> 00:21:36.049
radio waves bouncing through the ether going

00:21:36.049 --> 00:21:38.190
one way and guys playing giant arts and crafts

00:21:38.190 --> 00:21:40.150
in the mud going the other way. It was clumsy,

00:21:40.250 --> 00:21:43.890
but it was revolutionary for 1915. However, the

00:21:43.890 --> 00:21:46.089
introduction of this data loop highlights an

00:21:46.089 --> 00:21:48.630
incredibly important and timeless issue regarding

00:21:48.630 --> 00:21:51.329
the human element within complex technological

00:21:51.329 --> 00:21:53.809
systems. And this is the optimism bias. Right.

00:21:54.230 --> 00:21:56.849
Observing artillery fire from above amidst clouds,

00:21:56.990 --> 00:21:59.829
smoke, and enemy fire requires intense specialized

00:21:59.829 --> 00:22:02.789
training. But because of high casualties, many

00:22:02.789 --> 00:22:05.509
RFC pilots were rushed to the front inexperienced.

00:22:05.950 --> 00:22:08.369
And this leads to a phenomenon explicitly detailed

00:22:08.369 --> 00:22:11.450
in the historical records known as optimism bias.

00:22:11.690 --> 00:22:14.470
This is such a profound psychological insight.

00:22:15.049 --> 00:22:17.630
Walk me through exactly what optimism bias looked

00:22:17.630 --> 00:22:27.660
like for an RFC pilot. boosting black clouds

00:22:27.660 --> 00:22:30.380
of shrapnel all around you. Terrifying. You're

00:22:30.380 --> 00:22:32.720
desperately trying to be helpful to the men dying

00:22:32.720 --> 00:22:35.099
in the trenches below you. You want the mission

00:22:35.099 --> 00:22:37.299
to be a success. You tap out your coordinates,

00:22:37.460 --> 00:22:40.000
the artillery fires, and an explosion goes off

00:22:40.000 --> 00:22:42.220
somewhere near the target. OK. Inexperienced

00:22:42.220 --> 00:22:45.059
pilots driven by a psychological need to deliver

00:22:45.059 --> 00:22:47.680
good news and validate their own perilous effort

00:22:47.680 --> 00:22:50.420
would frequently and falsely report over the

00:22:50.420 --> 00:22:52.859
Morse Key that the artillery rounds were hitting

00:22:52.859 --> 00:22:55.599
the target dead on. when in reality they were

00:22:55.599 --> 00:22:58.099
missing by hundreds of yards. Their brains literally

00:22:58.099 --> 00:22:59.880
tricked them into seeing what they desperately

00:22:59.880 --> 00:23:02.700
wanted to see. Precisely. It's misinterpreting

00:23:02.700 --> 00:23:05.559
raw data in a high -stakes environment because

00:23:05.559 --> 00:23:08.779
human optimism overrode objective analysis. Wow.

00:23:09.119 --> 00:23:11.420
It meant British artillery was wasting thousands

00:23:11.420 --> 00:23:14.579
of shells pulverizing empty mud because the data

00:23:14.579 --> 00:23:16.420
feed from the sky was being corrupted by human

00:23:16.420 --> 00:23:19.170
psychology. That is fascinating. And while we're

00:23:19.170 --> 00:23:20.789
talking about the beta loop, we have to spare

00:23:20.789 --> 00:23:22.750
a thought for the men on the receiving end of

00:23:22.750 --> 00:23:25.450
those Morse code signals. We really do. The pilots

00:23:25.450 --> 00:23:28.369
had it rough, but the sources paint a horrific

00:23:28.369 --> 00:23:32.190
picture of the ground -based RFC wireless operators.

00:23:32.490 --> 00:23:35.670
It was an absolute nightmare assignment. We have

00:23:35.670 --> 00:23:38.329
accounts of men like Henry Taber, who served

00:23:38.329 --> 00:23:41.769
as a wireless operator. These men weren't safely

00:23:41.769 --> 00:23:45.660
back at an airfield. They were stationed in makeshift

00:23:45.660 --> 00:23:49.119
rat -infested dugouts right next to the heavy

00:23:49.119 --> 00:23:51.279
artillery batteries on the front line. Right.

00:23:51.700 --> 00:23:53.799
And because those British batteries were firing

00:23:53.799 --> 00:23:57.400
constantly, they were the prime targets for German

00:23:57.400 --> 00:23:59.940
counter -battery artillery fire. So they're sitting

00:23:59.940 --> 00:24:02.380
in a hole in the ground trying to listen to a

00:24:02.380 --> 00:24:04.980
faint Morse code ticking sound in their headphones

00:24:04.980 --> 00:24:07.559
while thousands of pounds of high explosives

00:24:07.559 --> 00:24:10.019
are literally raining down on their heads. Yes.

00:24:10.039 --> 00:24:12.279
And to make matters worse, these operators were

00:24:13.319 --> 00:24:15.799
They belonged to the flying squadrons miles to

00:24:15.799 --> 00:24:17.980
the rear, but were detached to the Army, so they

00:24:17.980 --> 00:24:20.259
were basically abandoned. They had to scrounge

00:24:20.259 --> 00:24:23.319
for their own food, fight to get their pay, all

00:24:23.319 --> 00:24:25.940
while doing this incredibly technical job. And

00:24:25.940 --> 00:24:29.000
their equipment was fragile. The antennas required

00:24:29.000 --> 00:24:31.160
to pick up the signals from the planes were constantly

00:24:31.160 --> 00:24:33.900
being blown to pieces by German shells. Right.

00:24:34.240 --> 00:24:37.099
So in the middle of a massive artillery barrage,

00:24:37.440 --> 00:24:39.880
operators like Tabor would have to scramble out

00:24:39.880 --> 00:24:42.359
of their deep dugouts, run through a landscape

00:24:42.359 --> 00:24:45.619
of exploding mud and shrapnel, splice a broken

00:24:45.619 --> 00:24:47.539
copper wire together with freezing hands, and

00:24:47.539 --> 00:24:50.039
dive back into the hole just to keep the data

00:24:50.039 --> 00:24:53.279
flowing. It was a massive decentralized data

00:24:53.279 --> 00:24:56.019
processing operation conducted under the absolute

00:24:56.019 --> 00:24:58.539
worst conditions imaginable. And it scaled up

00:24:58.539 --> 00:25:02.819
rapidly. By 1918, the RFC employed over 3 ,000

00:25:02.819 --> 00:25:05.660
personnel whose entire job was just to sit in

00:25:05.660 --> 00:25:08.039
rooms behind the lines and interpret the aerial

00:25:08.039 --> 00:25:10.779
photographs brought back by the planes. 3 ,000

00:25:10.779 --> 00:25:13.059
people just processing visual data. But here

00:25:13.059 --> 00:25:15.279
is the grim reality of being that successful

00:25:15.279 --> 00:25:17.670
at intelligence gathering. What's that? Because

00:25:17.670 --> 00:25:21.349
the RFC became so vital to the ground war, their

00:25:21.349 --> 00:25:25.069
slow heavy observation planes became the absolute

00:25:25.069 --> 00:25:27.190
highest priority targets for the German military.

00:25:27.470 --> 00:25:29.609
Makes sense. The Germans realized that if they

00:25:29.609 --> 00:25:31.890
blinded the cameras and silenced the radios,

00:25:32.369 --> 00:25:34.710
the British artillery became useless. They had

00:25:34.710 --> 00:25:37.670
to sweep the RFC from the sky. And that strategic

00:25:37.670 --> 00:25:40.150
imperative leads directly to the invention of

00:25:40.150 --> 00:25:43.250
fighter planes, armed escorts, the romanticized

00:25:43.250 --> 00:25:46.509
but horrific reality of dogfights, and a truly

00:25:46.509 --> 00:25:49.430
staggering human cost. It changes everything.

00:25:49.609 --> 00:25:52.049
Let's move into Section 4, a period covering

00:25:52.049 --> 00:25:55.990
1916 to 1917, which is dominated by a month so

00:25:55.990 --> 00:25:58.569
horrific it earned the title Bloody April. It's

00:25:58.569 --> 00:26:01.230
the era where the sky turned into an absolute

00:26:01.230 --> 00:26:03.549
meat grinder. This period marks a fundamental

00:26:03.549 --> 00:26:07.079
doctrinal shift. We move from is primarily an

00:26:07.079 --> 00:26:09.700
observation tool to aggressive aerial combat

00:26:09.700 --> 00:26:11.920
and direct ground attack. In the driving force

00:26:11.920 --> 00:26:14.019
behind this radical shift was the commander of

00:26:14.019 --> 00:26:17.000
the RFC in France, Major General Hugh Trenchard.

00:26:17.099 --> 00:26:19.579
Trenchard is a massive figure in aviation history,

00:26:19.640 --> 00:26:22.980
but his philosophy was and remains incredibly

00:26:22.980 --> 00:26:25.299
controversial. Trenchard was a visionary, but

00:26:25.299 --> 00:26:27.779
he was ruthless. His entire military doctrine

00:26:27.779 --> 00:26:30.319
was built on one uncompromising pillar, relentless

00:26:30.319 --> 00:26:33.099
offensive action. He believed with absolute certainty

00:26:33.099 --> 00:26:35.680
that the RFC must constantly take the fight to

00:26:35.680 --> 00:26:37.920
the enemy. They couldn't just patrol their own

00:26:37.920 --> 00:26:39.819
side of the trenches. No, they had to operate

00:26:39.819 --> 00:26:42.299
deeply over German lines, constantly attacking

00:26:42.299 --> 00:26:45.099
to force the German air force onto the defensive

00:26:45.099 --> 00:26:47.799
and pin them back. But his logic went beyond

00:26:47.799 --> 00:26:50.680
just shooting down enemy planes or bombing railways,

00:26:50.819 --> 00:26:53.440
right? He was heavily focused on the psychology

00:26:53.440 --> 00:26:55.500
of the infantrymen. That's the key to Trenchard.

00:26:55.940 --> 00:26:58.400
He prioritized the morale effect above almost

00:26:58.400 --> 00:27:01.380
everything else. He knew that for a British soldier

00:27:01.380 --> 00:27:04.220
sitting in a muddy, terrifying trench, seeing

00:27:04.220 --> 00:27:07.440
a friendly airplane overhead, provided a massive

00:27:07.440 --> 00:27:09.519
psychological boost. Yeah, you feel like someone

00:27:09.519 --> 00:27:12.500
has your back. Conversely, he believed the sheer

00:27:12.500 --> 00:27:14.980
terror an aircraft instilled in German ground

00:27:14.980 --> 00:27:18.160
troops, the constant threat from above, was just

00:27:18.160 --> 00:27:20.619
as strategically valuable as the physical damage

00:27:20.619 --> 00:27:23.900
the bombs caused. The psychological dominance

00:27:23.900 --> 00:27:26.779
was the goal. Okay, so that's the theory. But

00:27:26.779 --> 00:27:28.920
what does Trenchard's doctrine of relentless

00:27:28.920 --> 00:27:31.359
offense mean for a 19 -year -old pilot sitting

00:27:31.359 --> 00:27:34.000
in a squadron? It's grim. It means they were

00:27:34.000 --> 00:27:36.720
ordered into the air constantly, aggressively,

00:27:37.099 --> 00:27:38.960
regardless of the weather, regardless of fatigue,

00:27:39.440 --> 00:27:41.720
and most importantly, regardless of the tactical

00:27:41.720 --> 00:27:45.859
odds. Right. And in early 1917, those odds turned

00:27:45.859 --> 00:27:49.119
terribly, terribly against the British. The technological

00:27:49.119 --> 00:27:53.009
pendulum of war swung hard. The German Air Service

00:27:53.009 --> 00:27:56.289
recognized the threat and fundamentally reorganized.

00:27:56.569 --> 00:27:58.509
How did they do that? They grouped their best

00:27:58.509 --> 00:28:01.509
fighter pilots into specialized hunting squadrons

00:28:01.509 --> 00:28:04.250
called the Jastas. And more importantly, they

00:28:04.250 --> 00:28:06.950
equipped these Jastas with technologically superior

00:28:06.950 --> 00:28:09.910
aircraft, most notably the Albatross series of

00:28:09.910 --> 00:28:14.029
fighters. What made the German Albatross so vastly

00:28:14.029 --> 00:28:16.069
superior to what the British were flying at that

00:28:16.069 --> 00:28:18.990
moment? It was a combination of speed, structural

00:28:18.990 --> 00:28:22.150
strength, and firepower. The Albatross was streamlined,

00:28:22.470 --> 00:28:25.069
it had a powerful inline engine, and crucially,

00:28:25.269 --> 00:28:27.609
it was armed with twin, synchronized machine

00:28:27.609 --> 00:28:29.529
guns that fired straight through the propeller

00:28:29.529 --> 00:28:32.410
arc. Many of the British planes, conversely,

00:28:32.730 --> 00:28:35.730
were still slower pusher types, where the propeller

00:28:35.730 --> 00:28:38.619
was behind the pilot. or older biplanes that

00:28:38.619 --> 00:28:41.480
simply couldn't climb as fast or dive as steeply

00:28:41.480 --> 00:28:43.559
without their wings ripping off. So they were

00:28:43.559 --> 00:28:46.880
outclassed. Completely. So when these outclassed

00:28:46.880 --> 00:28:49.400
British observation planes and early fighters

00:28:49.400 --> 00:28:52.599
met the highly organized, technically superior

00:28:52.599 --> 00:28:55.180
German Jastas during the buildup to the Battle

00:28:55.180 --> 00:28:59.430
of Arras in early 1917, a slaughter ensued. This

00:28:59.430 --> 00:29:02.369
became known in RSC history as Bloody April.

00:29:02.549 --> 00:29:05.670
Yes. The numbers from Bloody April are just sickening.

00:29:06.049 --> 00:29:08.450
The life expectancy of a new pilot arriving at

00:29:08.450 --> 00:29:10.769
a squadron on the Western Front during this period.

00:29:11.160 --> 00:29:14.259
plummeted to a matter of weeks. Or days. In some

00:29:14.259 --> 00:29:16.339
squadrons, a new replacement was statistically

00:29:16.339 --> 00:29:18.839
likely to be dead or shot down within days of

00:29:18.839 --> 00:29:21.059
arriving. And the casualties weren't just from

00:29:21.059 --> 00:29:23.000
high -altitude dogfights with the Red Baron.

00:29:23.220 --> 00:29:25.660
Right. Trenchers' relentless aggression meant

00:29:25.660 --> 00:29:27.920
ordering pilots to conduct direct ground attack

00:29:27.920 --> 00:29:30.579
missions. Which meant. This meant. taking a fragile,

00:29:30.900 --> 00:29:33.359
fabric -covered biplane, loading it with those

00:29:33.359 --> 00:29:36.180
20 -pound Cooper bombs, and flying at incredibly

00:29:36.180 --> 00:29:38.359
low altitude, sometimes 50 or under feet off

00:29:38.359 --> 00:29:41.039
the ground, to directly strafe enemy trenches

00:29:41.039 --> 00:29:43.539
and drop explosives on troop concentrations.

00:29:43.619 --> 00:29:45.740
Oh, which strips away all the romantic mythology

00:29:45.740 --> 00:29:47.579
of Knights of the Sky dueling in the clouds.

00:29:47.779 --> 00:29:50.539
Exactly. If you're flying at 50 feet over a trench

00:29:50.539 --> 00:29:53.299
containing a thousand angry infantrymen, you

00:29:53.299 --> 00:29:55.859
aren't being shot at by specialized anti -aircraft

00:29:55.859 --> 00:29:58.759
guns. You are being shot at by ordinary guys

00:29:58.759 --> 00:30:01.650
with bolt -action rifles. Basic infantry small

00:30:01.650 --> 00:30:04.269
arms fire from the mud was shredding these aircraft.

00:30:04.990 --> 00:30:07.410
A single rifle bullet hitting a fuel line or

00:30:07.410 --> 00:30:10.269
the pilot meant certain death at that altitude.

00:30:10.529 --> 00:30:13.630
Wow. Because of this the casualty rate for squadrons

00:30:13.630 --> 00:30:15.950
tasked with ground attack missions approached

00:30:15.950 --> 00:30:19.130
an unimaginable 30%. You go out with ten planes

00:30:19.130 --> 00:30:22.869
only seven come back day after day. The sheer

00:30:22.869 --> 00:30:25.690
industrialized scale of the danger is incredibly

00:30:25.690 --> 00:30:27.750
hard to wrap your head around today. We aren't

00:30:27.750 --> 00:30:30.009
talking about a dozen guys. By the end of the

00:30:30.009 --> 00:30:33.349
SOMA offensive in November 1916, the RFC had

00:30:33.349 --> 00:30:36.410
lost 800 aircraft. And in the following year,

00:30:36.589 --> 00:30:41.150
the meat grinder year of 1917 alone, 2 ,094 RFC

00:30:41.150 --> 00:30:44.390
aircrew were officially listed as killed in action

00:30:44.390 --> 00:30:47.660
or missing. Over 2 ,000 young men wiped out in

00:30:47.660 --> 00:30:50.759
a 12 -month span. It was a brutal, uncompromising

00:30:50.759 --> 00:30:52.960
rate of attrition. They were feeding young men

00:30:52.960 --> 00:30:55.900
into a machine just to maintain Trenchard's offensive

00:30:55.900 --> 00:30:58.400
posture. They really were. But here is the twist

00:30:58.400 --> 00:31:00.519
that absolutely floored me when I was reviewing

00:31:00.519 --> 00:31:02.599
the history for this deep dive. What's that?

00:31:02.890 --> 00:31:05.650
The German fighter pilots, the anti -aircraft

00:31:05.650 --> 00:31:08.329
flak, the infantry rifles, all of those things

00:31:08.329 --> 00:31:11.349
combined weren't the only major killers of RFC

00:31:11.349 --> 00:31:13.529
pilots. In fact, they might not even have been

00:31:13.529 --> 00:31:16.049
the biggest danger. Learning how to fly the airplane

00:31:16.049 --> 00:31:18.289
in the first place was almost as lethal as taking

00:31:18.289 --> 00:31:21.720
it into combat. we have to examine section five,

00:31:21.880 --> 00:31:24.819
the training crisis, and the parachute paradox.

00:31:25.200 --> 00:31:27.420
The statistics regarding training from this era

00:31:27.420 --> 00:31:30.779
are truly horrifying, and they speak to a monumental

00:31:30.779 --> 00:31:33.099
systemic failure. Give us the numbers. By the

00:31:33.099 --> 00:31:36.359
time the armistice was signed in 1918, approximately

00:31:36.359 --> 00:31:39.779
8 ,000 men in the British flying services had

00:31:39.779 --> 00:31:42.220
died in training or routine flying accidents.

00:31:42.339 --> 00:31:44.960
Let me just pause on that number. 8 ,000 men.

00:31:45.279 --> 00:31:48.710
8 ,000. 8 ,000 young guys who volunteered to

00:31:48.710 --> 00:31:51.369
fight, who kissed their families goodbye, and

00:31:51.369 --> 00:31:54.150
who were killed in crashes in quiet fields in

00:31:54.150 --> 00:31:57.109
England or Scotland before they ever saw a single

00:31:57.109 --> 00:32:00.670
German trench. How does a military apparatus

00:32:00.670 --> 00:32:03.569
allow that to happen? It happened because, in

00:32:03.569 --> 00:32:05.849
the desperate rush to feed pilots into the meat

00:32:05.849 --> 00:32:08.410
grinder of the Western Front, early training

00:32:08.410 --> 00:32:11.279
was practically nonexistent. It was dangerously

00:32:11.279 --> 00:32:14.059
brief and methodologically flawed. How brief?

00:32:14.339 --> 00:32:16.140
The historical records state that observers,

00:32:16.359 --> 00:32:18.519
the men handling the radios and cameras, were

00:32:18.519 --> 00:32:20.500
frequently sent up on their very first combat

00:32:20.500 --> 00:32:23.099
sortie over enemy lines with nothing more than

00:32:23.099 --> 00:32:26.079
a brief verbal introduction to the aircraft yelled

00:32:26.079 --> 00:32:28.019
at them by the pilot over the noise of the engine.

00:32:28.200 --> 00:32:30.059
Here's the done. Don't shoot the tail off. Good

00:32:30.059 --> 00:32:32.359
luck. Quite literally. And the training for the

00:32:32.359 --> 00:32:34.880
pilots themselves wasn't much better. A cadet

00:32:34.880 --> 00:32:38.680
might receive maybe 10 to 20 hours of primary

00:32:38.680 --> 00:32:41.299
flight instruction before being deemed qualified

00:32:41.299 --> 00:32:44.279
and set up to fly solo in a high -performance

00:32:44.279 --> 00:32:47.299
unforgiving machine. And the scariest part of

00:32:47.299 --> 00:32:49.240
that 10 hours of instruction is the hardware

00:32:49.240 --> 00:32:51.480
they were using. Oh, yeah. I learned that many

00:32:51.480 --> 00:32:53.259
of the early training airplanes didn't even have

00:32:53.259 --> 00:32:56.119
dual controls. It's true. So you have an instructor

00:32:56.119 --> 00:32:59.180
sitting in one seat and the terrified 18 -year

00:32:59.180 --> 00:33:01.880
-old student sitting in the other, but the controls

00:33:01.880 --> 00:33:04.279
are only linked to the student. If the student

00:33:04.279 --> 00:33:07.039
panics, freezes up, or puts the plane into a

00:33:07.039 --> 00:33:09.700
fatal dive, the instructor couldn't just grab

00:33:09.700 --> 00:33:11.660
a secondary stick and wrestle the plane back

00:33:11.660 --> 00:33:13.660
to level flight. They just crashed together.

00:33:13.900 --> 00:33:16.559
It was pedagogical madness. The fatality rate

00:33:16.559 --> 00:33:19.119
in the training squadrons was a dark joke among

00:33:19.119 --> 00:33:21.859
the cadets. It wasn't until a man named Colonel

00:33:21.859 --> 00:33:25.099
Robert Smith Barry, who was absolutely appalled

00:33:25.099 --> 00:33:27.740
by the senseless slaughter of trainees, took

00:33:27.740 --> 00:33:30.859
command and revolutionized the process. He formulated

00:33:30.859 --> 00:33:34.160
a comprehensive standardized curriculum at Gosport,

00:33:34.359 --> 00:33:37.319
which became known as the Gosport system. Wait,

00:33:37.460 --> 00:33:39.599
what did the Gosport system actually change?

00:33:39.740 --> 00:33:42.880
Everything. First, he mandated the use of aircraft

00:33:42.880 --> 00:33:45.380
with fully functioning dual controls for instruction.

00:33:46.180 --> 00:33:48.059
The instructor could override the student at

00:33:48.059 --> 00:33:50.529
any moment. That seems like a no -brainer. You'd

00:33:50.529 --> 00:33:53.849
think. Second, and most importantly, he changed

00:33:53.849 --> 00:33:57.109
the philosophy of training. Instead of just teaching

00:33:57.109 --> 00:33:59.569
a student how to keep the plane level in calm

00:33:59.569 --> 00:34:03.089
air, the Gosport system forced students to intentionally

00:34:03.089 --> 00:34:06.309
put the aircraft into highly dangerous maneuvers,

00:34:06.670 --> 00:34:09.650
like stalls and spins, with the instructor right

00:34:09.650 --> 00:34:12.119
there. So they learned how to crash, basically.

00:34:12.360 --> 00:34:14.820
They practiced entering and recovering from the

00:34:14.820 --> 00:34:17.699
deadliest situations in a controlled environment

00:34:17.699 --> 00:34:19.860
so that when it happened accidentally, they had

00:34:19.860 --> 00:34:22.199
the muscle memory to survive. That's brilliant.

00:34:22.460 --> 00:34:25.079
Implementing this system alone effectively halved

00:34:25.079 --> 00:34:27.119
the training fatality rate almost overnight.

00:34:27.500 --> 00:34:29.400
It's amazing what happens when you actually teach

00:34:29.400 --> 00:34:31.659
someone how to survive the machine. Really is.

00:34:31.840 --> 00:34:34.519
But the training fatalities, as horrific as they

00:34:34.519 --> 00:34:37.449
are, are only one part of the tragedy here. We

00:34:37.449 --> 00:34:39.929
have to talk about parachutes. This is the part

00:34:39.929 --> 00:34:41.989
of the history that just makes my blood boil

00:34:41.989 --> 00:34:44.469
because it is so fundamentally avoidable. The

00:34:44.469 --> 00:34:48.070
parachute controversy is a stark, enraging example

00:34:48.070 --> 00:34:51.469
of institutional coldness and archaic military

00:34:51.469 --> 00:34:54.409
dogma overriding basic human logic. Can you be

00:34:54.409 --> 00:34:56.849
clear? The technology existed, right? Parachutes

00:34:56.849 --> 00:34:59.869
were not science fiction. No, not at all. Inventors,

00:35:00.070 --> 00:35:02.940
most notably a man named Everard Calthrop. had

00:35:02.940 --> 00:35:05.480
developed and were actively offering patented

00:35:05.480 --> 00:35:08.420
functional parachutes to the RFC as early as

00:35:08.420 --> 00:35:10.800
1915. Okay, so maybe the military thought they

00:35:10.800 --> 00:35:14.099
were unreliable. No, they knew they worked. In

00:35:14.099 --> 00:35:17.179
1917, to prove the viability of the technology,

00:35:17.639 --> 00:35:20.300
a New Zealander serving in the RFC, Captain Clive

00:35:20.300 --> 00:35:23.119
Collett, successfully demonstrated a parachute

00:35:23.119 --> 00:35:25.500
jump from a military airplane moving at speed,

00:35:25.900 --> 00:35:28.239
safely descending from 600 feet. And it worked.

00:35:28.460 --> 00:35:31.340
The demonstration was flawless. So the technology

00:35:31.340 --> 00:35:34.159
exists. The military has seen a live demonstration

00:35:34.159 --> 00:35:36.719
that proves it safely brings a man to the ground.

00:35:37.719 --> 00:35:39.639
Thousands of their highly trained, expensive

00:35:39.639 --> 00:35:41.719
pilots are currently burning to death in the

00:35:41.719 --> 00:35:44.639
sky or jumping from flaming planes to their deaths.

00:35:44.980 --> 00:35:46.699
Do they order the parachutes and put them in

00:35:46.699 --> 00:35:50.000
the planes? No, they do not. Why? Let's unpack

00:35:50.000 --> 00:35:54.139
the exact mindset of the military brass. specifically

00:35:54.139 --> 00:35:57.519
the Air Board, because it is a fascinating, if

00:35:57.519 --> 00:36:01.300
morbid, study in organizational psychology. Now

00:36:01.300 --> 00:36:03.760
it's important to note, they did issue parachutes

00:36:03.760 --> 00:36:07.679
to one specific group. Who? The men sitting in

00:36:07.679 --> 00:36:10.280
the observation balloons. Right, because an observation

00:36:10.280 --> 00:36:13.780
balloon is basically a giant stationary target

00:36:13.780 --> 00:36:17.440
filled with highly flammable hydrogen gas. The

00:36:17.440 --> 00:36:19.460
German fighters would specifically target them

00:36:19.460 --> 00:36:22.460
with incendiary bullets. The lifespan of a balloon

00:36:22.460 --> 00:36:24.320
observer during an offensive was measured in

00:36:24.320 --> 00:36:27.280
days. Exactly. When the balloon caught fire,

00:36:27.719 --> 00:36:29.539
the observer strapped on a parachute and jumped.

00:36:29.760 --> 00:36:31.480
The military accepted that because a balloon

00:36:31.480 --> 00:36:33.519
can't be saved or maneuvered. Makes sense. But

00:36:33.519 --> 00:36:36.059
the Air Board deliberately, explicitly issued

00:36:36.059 --> 00:36:38.480
orders denying parachutes to airplane pilots.

00:36:38.719 --> 00:36:40.400
Because they were worried that if a pilot had

00:36:40.400 --> 00:36:42.599
a parachute it would somehow sap his courage.

00:36:42.800 --> 00:36:44.500
They literally thought it would make them cowards.

00:36:44.800 --> 00:36:47.670
That was the core of the argument. The official

00:36:47.670 --> 00:36:50.309
documented fear of the senior commanders was

00:36:50.309 --> 00:36:52.610
that if a pilot was equipped with a parachute

00:36:52.610 --> 00:36:55.170
and his aircraft was damaged in combat or suffered

00:36:55.170 --> 00:36:58.329
an engine failure, he might be tempted to prematurely

00:36:58.329 --> 00:37:01.010
abandon an expensive piece of military hardware

00:37:01.010 --> 00:37:03.530
rather than fighting to the very end to glide

00:37:03.530 --> 00:37:06.269
it back to friendly lines. They prioritized the

00:37:06.269 --> 00:37:08.989
wood and the canvas over the pilot's life. They

00:37:08.989 --> 00:37:11.670
absolutely did. They dressed it up in Victorian

00:37:11.670 --> 00:37:14.690
ideals of fighting spirit and offensive zeal.

00:37:14.829 --> 00:37:17.530
That's infuriating. There were secondary excuses,

00:37:17.550 --> 00:37:19.909
of course. They argued that early parachutes

00:37:19.909 --> 00:37:22.469
were bulky and added weight, which degraded the

00:37:22.469 --> 00:37:24.750
plane's climbing performance. But the foundational

00:37:24.750 --> 00:37:27.630
issue was an antiquated, almost aristocratic

00:37:27.630 --> 00:37:30.409
belief that a true warrior stays with his mount.

00:37:30.639 --> 00:37:33.380
even if that mount is on fire. It is just a bitter,

00:37:33.380 --> 00:37:35.840
bitter irony. Yeah. And the epilogue to that

00:37:35.840 --> 00:37:38.659
specific tragedy is that reality finally forced

00:37:38.659 --> 00:37:40.980
their hand. Yes. The sources point out that official

00:37:40.980 --> 00:37:43.420
orders were finally issued to equip all single

00:37:43.420 --> 00:37:45.539
-seat fighter planes with parachutes. But that

00:37:45.539 --> 00:37:48.780
order was issued on September 16, 1918. Which,

00:37:48.980 --> 00:37:51.199
if you know your history, was less than two months

00:37:51.199 --> 00:37:53.039
before the armistice was signed in November.

00:37:53.449 --> 00:37:56.610
The war was effectively over. It arrived far,

00:37:56.809 --> 00:37:59.550
far too late. Far too late to save the vast majority

00:37:59.550 --> 00:38:02.690
of the thousands of pilots who perish needlessly

00:38:02.690 --> 00:38:05.010
in disintegrating aircraft. It's heartbreaking.

00:38:05.369 --> 00:38:08.329
It really is. But pulling back from the individual

00:38:08.329 --> 00:38:10.590
tragedies, we have to look at the macro picture.

00:38:11.329 --> 00:38:13.969
Despite these massive internal doctrinal failures,

00:38:14.530 --> 00:38:17.070
despite the horrifying casualty rates, and despite

00:38:17.070 --> 00:38:19.840
the technological friction, The organization

00:38:19.840 --> 00:38:22.460
itself was succeeding at its primary mission.

00:38:22.500 --> 00:38:25.460
It was. And because it was succeeding, it was

00:38:25.460 --> 00:38:29.099
ballooning in size at an exponential rate. They

00:38:29.099 --> 00:38:31.599
were recruiting tens of thousands of men from

00:38:31.599 --> 00:38:34.780
all over the world, which forced a complete structural

00:38:34.780 --> 00:38:37.360
reimagining of how an Air Force operates. This

00:38:37.360 --> 00:38:40.480
takes us to our final act scaling up going global

00:38:40.480 --> 00:38:44.480
and the birth of the RAF from 1917 to 1918. Let's

00:38:44.480 --> 00:38:46.539
get into it. We talked earlier about the militarized

00:38:46.539 --> 00:38:48.579
startup concept. Well, this is the phase where

00:38:48.579 --> 00:38:50.739
the startup goes public and becomes a multinational

00:38:50.739 --> 00:38:53.059
conglomerate. The logistical expansion of the

00:38:53.059 --> 00:38:55.860
RFC is breathtaking. Tell me about it. You start

00:38:55.860 --> 00:38:59.239
in 1912 with a few guys in a tent with 36 planes.

00:38:59.980 --> 00:39:03.940
By 1917, the organizational chart had exploded.

00:39:04.760 --> 00:39:07.019
Squadrons, which were groups of a dozen or so

00:39:07.019 --> 00:39:09.460
planes, were grouped together to form wings.

00:39:09.900 --> 00:39:11.900
Wings were then grouped together to form massive

00:39:11.900 --> 00:39:14.559
brigades. And the physical infrastructure required

00:39:14.559 --> 00:39:17.619
to support that many aircraft completely transformed

00:39:17.619 --> 00:39:19.739
the landscape of Britain and France. Completely.

00:39:19.940 --> 00:39:21.679
They weren't operating out of grassy tactics

00:39:21.679 --> 00:39:24.860
anymore. They established these sprawling industrialized

00:39:24.650 --> 00:39:28.210
stations. To house the planes, they erected dozens

00:39:28.210 --> 00:39:32.269
of massive Bessonot canvas hangars, these huge

00:39:32.269 --> 00:39:34.650
semi -permanent wood and canvas structures. To

00:39:34.650 --> 00:39:36.829
give you a sense of the scale, let's look at

00:39:36.829 --> 00:39:38.869
one specific station mentioned in the historical

00:39:38.869 --> 00:39:41.889
data, Narborough Airfield in Norfolk. Okay. Narborough

00:39:41.889 --> 00:39:44.329
wasn't a field. It was a self -sustaining aviation

00:39:44.329 --> 00:39:48.329
city. It grew to encompass 908 acres of land.

00:39:48.449 --> 00:39:51.590
900 acres. It featured seven massive hangars,

00:39:51.809 --> 00:39:54.150
incredibly complex motorized transport garages,

00:39:53.869 --> 00:39:56.969
to maintain the fleet of trucks, dedicated engineering

00:39:56.969 --> 00:39:59.889
workshops, sprawling coal yards for heating and

00:39:59.889 --> 00:40:03.090
power, and barracks for thousands of men. And

00:40:03.090 --> 00:40:05.510
this incredible infrastructure expansion wasn't

00:40:05.510 --> 00:40:09.070
limited to the UK and France. The RFC literally

00:40:09.070 --> 00:40:11.949
went global to solve its insatiable appetite

00:40:11.949 --> 00:40:14.510
for trained pilots and operational reach. They

00:40:14.510 --> 00:40:16.710
had to. They realized they couldn't train enough

00:40:16.710 --> 00:40:19.710
pilots in the cloudy, cramped skies over England,

00:40:20.010 --> 00:40:23.050
so they established massive training bases internationally.

00:40:23.659 --> 00:40:25.619
They went to Canada and built facilities like

00:40:25.619 --> 00:40:28.539
Camp Borden, which trained thousands of Canadian

00:40:28.539 --> 00:40:30.860
and American volunteers. They set up training

00:40:30.860 --> 00:40:33.539
schools in the sunny, clear skies of Egypt. They

00:40:33.539 --> 00:40:35.980
even went to the United States. During the brutal

00:40:35.980 --> 00:40:39.900
winter of 1917 to 1918, the RFC actually set

00:40:39.900 --> 00:40:43.199
up a massive complex called Camp Taliaferro in

00:40:43.199 --> 00:40:45.619
Texas to take advantage of the flying weather

00:40:45.619 --> 00:40:48.239
and to train alongside the newly formed American

00:40:48.239 --> 00:40:51.619
Air Service, which sadly just exported the hazard

00:40:51.619 --> 00:40:54.670
of flight to a new continent. Yeah, 39 RFC members

00:40:54.670 --> 00:40:56.809
actually died in training accidents just in the

00:40:56.809 --> 00:40:59.789
skies over Texas. But operationally, they were

00:40:59.789 --> 00:41:02.469
expanding too. RFC squadrons were deployed to

00:41:02.469 --> 00:41:04.429
fight in Italy. They were bombing targets in

00:41:04.429 --> 00:41:06.650
the Middle East and flying reconnaissance in

00:41:06.650 --> 00:41:09.610
the Balkans. It became a truly global force.

00:41:09.969 --> 00:41:12.230
But the sheer scale and complexity of managing

00:41:12.230 --> 00:41:15.909
this massive, global, highly technical force

00:41:15.909 --> 00:41:19.269
led directly to a monumental political crisis

00:41:19.269 --> 00:41:21.969
back in London. Pee in the Army and Navy. Exactly.

00:41:22.110 --> 00:41:24.690
The RFC belonged to the Army. The Royal Naval

00:41:24.690 --> 00:41:26.829
Air Service belonged to the Navy, and they were

00:41:26.829 --> 00:41:28.769
viciously competing against each other for the

00:41:28.769 --> 00:41:31.989
same limited supply of aircraft engines, spruce

00:41:31.989 --> 00:41:34.369
wood, and factory production lines. Sounds like

00:41:34.369 --> 00:41:36.929
a nightmare. It was a toxic procurement rivalry

00:41:36.929 --> 00:41:39.949
that was actively hurting the war effort. This

00:41:39.949 --> 00:41:42.150
crisis led to one of the most important documents

00:41:42.150 --> 00:41:45.059
in military aviation history. The Smuts Report.

00:41:45.360 --> 00:41:49.159
Yes. In August 1917, a South African general

00:41:49.159 --> 00:41:52.159
named Jan Smuts presented a comprehensive report

00:41:52.159 --> 00:41:54.579
to the War Council. Smuts was a visionary. He

00:41:54.579 --> 00:41:57.199
really was. He looked past the tactical mud of

00:41:57.199 --> 00:42:00.260
the trenches. He recognized the ultimate terrifying

00:42:00.260 --> 00:42:03.269
potential of air power. He foresaw a future where

00:42:03.269 --> 00:42:05.710
aircraft wouldn't just support armies. They would

00:42:05.710 --> 00:42:08.050
fly right over the armies to unleash strategic

00:42:08.050 --> 00:42:10.869
devastation upon enemy industrial centers, cities,

00:42:11.070 --> 00:42:13.449
and civilian populations on a vast scale. And

00:42:13.449 --> 00:42:15.849
he knew you needed a dedicated force for that.

00:42:16.269 --> 00:42:19.050
Smuts argued that to unlock this strategic bombing

00:42:19.050 --> 00:42:22.329
potential and to permanently end the toxic infighting

00:42:22.329 --> 00:42:24.849
between the army and the Navy, a radical step

00:42:24.849 --> 00:42:27.219
had to be taken. And his recommendation was a

00:42:27.219 --> 00:42:29.539
total break from the past. He said you have to

00:42:29.539 --> 00:42:31.500
take the airplanes away from the Army generals

00:42:31.500 --> 00:42:33.599
and take them away from the Navy admirals and

00:42:33.599 --> 00:42:36.440
create a completely new, unified, independent

00:42:36.440 --> 00:42:38.940
air service. An institution that stood on equal

00:42:38.940 --> 00:42:40.659
footing with the traditional branches of the

00:42:40.659 --> 00:42:42.500
military. And the British government agreed.

00:42:42.679 --> 00:42:45.460
They did. And so the end point of this massive

00:42:45.460 --> 00:42:49.179
six year sprint arrives. On April 1st, 1918,

00:42:49.840 --> 00:42:52.199
the Royal Flying Corps officially merged with

00:42:52.199 --> 00:42:55.210
the Royal Naval Air Service. Wow. On that day,

00:42:55.409 --> 00:42:58.329
the RFC ceased to exist and the Royal Air Force,

00:42:58.409 --> 00:43:01.710
the RAF, was born. It was the world's first Air

00:43:01.710 --> 00:43:03.949
Force independent of Army or Navy control. And

00:43:03.949 --> 00:43:06.329
the scale of this new organization, the RAF,

00:43:06.510 --> 00:43:08.369
compared to where they started, is the punchline

00:43:08.369 --> 00:43:11.329
of this entire deep dive. It really is. By 1919,

00:43:11.650 --> 00:43:14.510
just after the war ended, the RAF comprised an

00:43:14.510 --> 00:43:18.789
astonishing 114 ,000 personnel and over 4 ,000

00:43:18.789 --> 00:43:21.469
top -tier combat aircraft. Let's just hold those

00:43:21.469 --> 00:43:26.309
two data points next to each other. April, 1912,

00:43:26.869 --> 00:43:33.130
133 officers and 36 frail planes. April, 1918,

00:43:33.869 --> 00:43:38.869
114 ,000 personnel and 4 ,000 highly lethal war

00:43:38.869 --> 00:43:41.670
planes. It is an industrial miracle. It's unbelievable.

00:43:41.809 --> 00:43:44.690
And they achieve that final transformation while

00:43:44.690 --> 00:43:47.150
fighting the desperate climax of a global war.

00:43:47.740 --> 00:43:51.159
In April 1918, during a massive final German

00:43:51.159 --> 00:43:53.039
offensive designed to win the war before the

00:43:53.039 --> 00:43:55.900
Americans fully arrived, the newly formed RAF

00:43:55.900 --> 00:43:58.300
was thrown into the breach. What happened? They

00:43:58.300 --> 00:44:00.440
flew unceasingly to halt the advancing German

00:44:00.440 --> 00:44:03.340
infantry. On April 12 alone, they flew more missions,

00:44:03.559 --> 00:44:05.699
dropped more bombs, and fired more ammunition

00:44:05.699 --> 00:44:08.260
than on any other single day in the entire four

00:44:08.260 --> 00:44:10.139
-year war. And the cost of holding that line

00:44:10.139 --> 00:44:12.980
was astronomical. They lost over 1 ,000 aircraft

00:44:12.980 --> 00:44:15.300
to enemy action and accidents in that short period.

00:44:15.559 --> 00:44:17.539
It was the ultimate industrial scale meat grinder.

00:44:17.739 --> 00:44:19.679
But they held the line. The German offensive

00:44:19.679 --> 00:44:21.840
stalled largely because the RAF destroyed their

00:44:21.840 --> 00:44:23.920
logistical supply lines from the air. They proved

00:44:23.920 --> 00:44:26.780
General Smuss right. Air power was now a decisive

00:44:26.780 --> 00:44:29.619
independent factor in victory. It's a completely

00:44:29.619 --> 00:44:31.980
different universe from where they started. And

00:44:31.980 --> 00:44:34.559
before we wrap up, I think the cultural footprint

00:44:34.559 --> 00:44:37.159
this crucible left behind is fascinating too.

00:44:37.300 --> 00:44:39.440
Oh, absolutely. When you look at the young men

00:44:39.440 --> 00:44:42.219
who survived the RFC, you find individuals who

00:44:42.219 --> 00:44:45.079
went on to shape the 20th century in completely

00:44:45.079 --> 00:44:48.139
unexpected ways. You have veterans like W .E.

00:44:48.239 --> 00:44:51.079
Johns, who took his experiences and wrote the

00:44:51.079 --> 00:44:54.099
incredibly famous Biggles aviation adventure

00:44:54.099 --> 00:44:56.739
books that inspired generations of pilots. Yeah,

00:44:56.739 --> 00:44:59.199
those are classic. Yeah. You also find Jack Cohen,

00:44:59.860 --> 00:45:02.360
who survived the war and used his demobilization

00:45:02.360 --> 00:45:05.380
money to found a little market stall that eventually

00:45:05.380 --> 00:45:08.320
became the massive Tesco supermarket empire.

00:45:08.599 --> 00:45:10.820
Tesco? I didn't know that. You even have William

00:45:10.820 --> 00:45:14.480
Stevenson, a decorated RFC fighter ace who later

00:45:14.480 --> 00:45:16.860
played a foundational role in intelligence during

00:45:16.860 --> 00:45:19.400
World War II, helping to form the organization

00:45:19.400 --> 00:45:22.019
that would eventually become the CIA. The extreme

00:45:22.019 --> 00:45:25.559
pressure of the RFC forged people who learned

00:45:25.559 --> 00:45:28.280
how to operate in chaos, how to innovate rapidly,

00:45:28.400 --> 00:45:30.519
and they carried those skills into the post -war

00:45:30.519 --> 00:45:33.280
world. It really did. So to bring this entire

00:45:33.280 --> 00:45:35.780
massive deep dive together for you listening,

00:45:36.440 --> 00:45:38.780
think about the sheer trajectory of the six -year

00:45:38.780 --> 00:45:41.599
journey we just unpacked. We started with a handful

00:45:41.599 --> 00:45:44.340
of guys in riding booths acting as glorified

00:45:44.340 --> 00:45:46.619
flying chauffeurs, trying to figure out how to

00:45:46.619 --> 00:45:49.119
recover from a spin, literally throwing hand

00:45:49.119 --> 00:45:51.139
grenades out of wooden biplanes just to scare

00:45:51.139 --> 00:45:54.760
horses. Six years later, that same organization

00:45:54.760 --> 00:45:58.480
is conducting synchronized, massive -scale aerial

00:45:58.480 --> 00:46:01.320
warfare across multiple continents. They are

00:46:01.320 --> 00:46:03.800
using specialized glass plate photography to

00:46:03.800 --> 00:46:06.539
map battlefields, wireless radios to direct heavy

00:46:06.539 --> 00:46:09.179
artillery, and they are managing a logistical

00:46:09.179 --> 00:46:11.980
supply chain chain of over 100 ,000 people. It

00:46:11.980 --> 00:46:14.760
is a profound, almost terrifying testament to

00:46:14.760 --> 00:46:17.360
human ingenuity. It shows our incredible resilience

00:46:17.360 --> 00:46:19.820
in the face of horrifying attrition. And quite

00:46:19.820 --> 00:46:22.519
frankly, it shows the terrible accelerating catalyst

00:46:22.519 --> 00:46:25.199
for technological growth that is total war. It's

00:46:25.199 --> 00:46:27.280
the ultimate double -edged sword of innovation.

00:46:27.480 --> 00:46:29.239
And I want to leave you with a conceptual thought

00:46:29.239 --> 00:46:31.800
to mull over as we conclude today, building on

00:46:31.800 --> 00:46:33.940
something we spent a lot of time discussing earlier.

00:46:34.119 --> 00:46:37.699
The optimism bias. Exactly. Consider the concept

00:46:37.699 --> 00:46:40.900
of optimism bias that afflicted those early RFC

00:46:40.900 --> 00:46:43.920
pilots. We talked about how these young men sitting

00:46:43.920 --> 00:46:46.659
in an entirely novel, highly complex technological

00:46:46.659 --> 00:46:49.480
environment under immense psychological stress

00:46:49.480 --> 00:46:52.480
routinely reported what they wanted to see regarding

00:46:52.480 --> 00:46:54.780
those artillery strikes rather than the objective

00:46:54.780 --> 00:46:56.639
reality of what was actually happening on the

00:46:56.639 --> 00:46:58.840
ground. They wanted the system to work so badly

00:46:58.840 --> 00:47:01.579
that their brains altered the data. Yeah, the

00:47:01.579 --> 00:47:04.139
deep human desire for the new tech to just be

00:47:04.139 --> 00:47:06.739
a silver bullet that solves the terrifying problem.

00:47:07.159 --> 00:47:09.639
Precisely. And as we look at our own world today,

00:47:10.079 --> 00:47:13.239
as we rapidly adopt new, highly complex, and

00:47:13.239 --> 00:47:15.780
somewhat opaque technologies, whether it's artificial

00:47:15.780 --> 00:47:18.039
intelligence algorithms making legal or medical

00:47:18.039 --> 00:47:20.860
decisions, or autonomous systems driving our

00:47:20.860 --> 00:47:23.780
cars and flying our modern drones, we have to

00:47:23.780 --> 00:47:25.579
ask ourselves a difficult question. What's that?

00:47:25.789 --> 00:47:29.130
How much of our own inherent optimism bias is

00:47:29.130 --> 00:47:31.170
currently being built into our feedback loops?

00:47:31.969 --> 00:47:34.929
Are we, much like those early RFC pilots leaning

00:47:34.929 --> 00:47:37.730
out of a vibrating canvas cockpit over the Somme,

00:47:38.130 --> 00:47:40.570
so incredibly eager for our new technology to

00:47:40.570 --> 00:47:43.750
work perfectly to be the silver bullet that we

00:47:43.750 --> 00:47:46.690
risk misinterpreting or ignoring the actual reality

00:47:46.690 --> 00:47:48.929
of the failures on the ground? That's a great

00:47:48.929 --> 00:47:51.289
point. A fundamental question of human nature

00:47:51.289 --> 00:47:55.539
interacting with rapid poorly understood innovation.

00:47:56.300 --> 00:47:58.099
And clearly, looking at the history of the RFC,

00:47:58.519 --> 00:48:00.539
it is a psychological challenge we've been grappling

00:48:00.539 --> 00:48:04.199
with for over a century. Wow. That is a fantastic

00:48:04.199 --> 00:48:06.860
and deeply unsettling point to end on. A century

00:48:06.860 --> 00:48:08.659
later, and we are still fighting our own blind

00:48:08.659 --> 00:48:11.199
optimism when we build new machines. Thank you

00:48:11.199 --> 00:48:13.079
so much for joining us on this deep dive into

00:48:13.079 --> 00:48:16.179
the dawn of aviation. Keep questioning the technological

00:48:16.179 --> 00:48:18.420
systems around you. Keep exploring history for

00:48:18.420 --> 00:48:21.239
those hidden, very human lessons. And as the

00:48:21.239 --> 00:48:23.380
pilots of the RFC would tell you, Keep looking

00:48:23.380 --> 00:48:23.679
up.