WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:03.080 Okay, let's unpack this. Let's do it. Welcome 00:00:03.080 --> 00:00:06.419 to this custom -tailored deep dive crafted entirely 00:00:06.419 --> 00:00:10.919 to take you inside the mechanics of a truly baffling 00:00:10.919 --> 00:00:14.640 historical event. Today, we are opening up the 00:00:14.640 --> 00:00:16.780 archives. The really detailed archives. Yeah, 00:00:16.820 --> 00:00:19.039 specifically a massive collection of historical 00:00:19.039 --> 00:00:22.019 accounts and Wikipedia records chronicling a 00:00:22.019 --> 00:00:26.140 very specific, very pivotal day, March 26, 1917. 00:00:26.280 --> 00:00:28.579 Right. We are looking at the First Battle of 00:00:28.579 --> 00:00:31.780 Gaza. Now, when most people hear, you know, World 00:00:31.780 --> 00:00:34.320 War I, the immediate thought is the Western Front. 00:00:34.500 --> 00:00:37.320 Mm -hmm, mud, trenches, the Somme. Exactly, the 00:00:37.320 --> 00:00:40.359 Somme. But our mission for you today is to look 00:00:40.359 --> 00:00:42.100 at a completely different theater. We're going 00:00:42.100 --> 00:00:44.799 to explore a master class and how an incredibly 00:00:44.799 --> 00:00:48.520 powerful, well -supplied military force can just, 00:00:48.539 --> 00:00:50.840 well, how they can snatch defeat right from the 00:00:50.840 --> 00:00:53.000 jaws of absolute victory. It really is a master 00:00:53.000 --> 00:00:54.619 class in failure. And the culprits aren't what 00:00:54.619 --> 00:00:56.359 you'd expect, right? Yeah. We are talking about 00:00:56.359 --> 00:00:59.380 a patch of dense seafog, a sprawling maze of 00:00:59.380 --> 00:01:03.280 prickly pear cacti, and just a catastrophic breakdown 00:01:03.280 --> 00:01:05.599 in basic communication. What's fascinating here, 00:01:05.599 --> 00:01:08.019 I think, is that the mechanics of failure are 00:01:08.019 --> 00:01:10.939 universal. You don't need to be a military historian 00:01:10.939 --> 00:01:14.739 to understand what happens when a massive organization's 00:01:14.739 --> 00:01:17.040 communication architecture completely collapses 00:01:17.040 --> 00:01:19.519 under pressure, whether you're managing a team. 00:01:20.599 --> 00:01:22.939 Running a big corporate project or just trying 00:01:22.939 --> 00:01:25.180 to coordinate a group dinner You know how fast 00:01:25.180 --> 00:01:27.159 things fall apart when people stop talking to 00:01:27.159 --> 00:01:29.569 each other. Oh, absolutely the group text goes 00:01:29.569 --> 00:01:30.989 silent and suddenly everyone's at a different 00:01:30.989 --> 00:01:33.890 restaurant. Exactly. Now, scale that up to tens 00:01:33.890 --> 00:01:36.670 of thousands of lives. The Middle Eastern theater 00:01:36.670 --> 00:01:40.530 of the First World War is often treated as a 00:01:40.530 --> 00:01:42.829 secondary narrative to the grinding horror of 00:01:42.829 --> 00:01:46.129 France and Belgium. But the stakes were monumental. 00:01:46.430 --> 00:01:48.709 The British Empire was fighting to defend the 00:01:48.709 --> 00:01:51.890 Suez Canal. That canal was the absolute lifeblood 00:01:51.890 --> 00:01:54.090 of their global empire. It's the vital artery 00:01:54.090 --> 00:01:56.609 connecting London to India and the Persian Gulf. 00:01:56.689 --> 00:02:01.069 Right. By early 1917, the Egyptian Expeditionary 00:02:01.069 --> 00:02:03.930 Force, the EEF, which was commanded by General 00:02:03.930 --> 00:02:07.049 Sir Archibald Murray, they had decided that simply 00:02:07.049 --> 00:02:09.370 defending the canal wasn't enough anymore. They 00:02:09.370 --> 00:02:11.289 were going on the offensive. They wanted to push 00:02:11.289 --> 00:02:14.229 out. Yeah. The ultimate strategic goal was to 00:02:14.229 --> 00:02:17.289 advance deep into Palestine, capture Jerusalem, 00:02:17.810 --> 00:02:20.530 and completely cut off the Ottoman forces operating 00:02:20.530 --> 00:02:23.590 in the region. But to do any of that, to move 00:02:23.590 --> 00:02:26.490 north, they had to go through Gaza. So why Gaza? 00:02:26.629 --> 00:02:28.289 I mean, I'm looking at the map and our sources, 00:02:28.310 --> 00:02:29.949 and it seems like there's a lot of open desert 00:02:29.949 --> 00:02:32.949 out there. Why does an entire army have to funnel 00:02:32.949 --> 00:02:36.050 through this one specific town? Well, geography 00:02:36.050 --> 00:02:39.189 dictates strategy, right? And Gaza is perhaps 00:02:39.189 --> 00:02:41.509 one of the oldest strategic choke points in human 00:02:41.509 --> 00:02:44.689 history. Wow. We are talking about a 4 ,000 -year 00:02:44.689 --> 00:02:48.180 -old gateway city. For millennia, any army moving 00:02:48.180 --> 00:02:50.259 between Egypt and Levant had to pass through 00:02:50.259 --> 00:02:53.120 or take Gaza. The topography itself makes it 00:02:53.120 --> 00:02:55.280 a natural fortress. Okay, paint a picture for 00:02:55.280 --> 00:02:56.900 us. What does it actually look like on the ground? 00:02:57.120 --> 00:02:59.340 The city is built on this incredibly fertile 00:02:59.340 --> 00:03:02.280 plateau sitting about 200 feet above sea level. 00:03:02.780 --> 00:03:04.960 It's separated from the Mediterranean Sea to 00:03:04.960 --> 00:03:08.159 the west by a two -mile stretch of rolling, really 00:03:08.159 --> 00:03:10.699 difficult sand hills. Like dunes. Yeah, massive 00:03:10.699 --> 00:03:13.939 dunes that are a nightmare to cross. But the 00:03:13.939 --> 00:03:16.840 real defensive anchor, the absolute key to the 00:03:16.840 --> 00:03:21.080 area, is a single looming 300 -foot hill right 00:03:21.080 --> 00:03:23.840 at the edge of the city called Alimuntar. Alimuntar. 00:03:23.949 --> 00:03:27.050 Right. It provides this sweeping, completely 00:03:27.050 --> 00:03:30.030 unobstructed view of any approaching force. The 00:03:30.030 --> 00:03:32.090 descriptions in the archives paint such a vivid 00:03:32.090 --> 00:03:34.129 picture of the environment, too. It wasn't just 00:03:34.129 --> 00:03:37.129 a hill and some sand. Inland, the city was surrounded 00:03:37.129 --> 00:03:40.270 by these incredibly lush orchards, massive orange 00:03:40.270 --> 00:03:43.370 groves and vineyards. It's a true oasis. Yeah. 00:03:43.689 --> 00:03:46.050 There's this wild detail that the barley grown 00:03:46.050 --> 00:03:48.590 around Gaza was actually of such high quality 00:03:48.590 --> 00:03:51.810 is exported to England specifically to be brewed 00:03:51.810 --> 00:03:54.099 into beer. I love that detail. It really grounds 00:03:54.099 --> 00:03:56.379 the history in something relatable. But tactically, 00:03:56.699 --> 00:03:59.479 that lush agricultural density acts as a massive 00:03:59.479 --> 00:04:02.139 physical barrier. If we look at the Ottoman strategy, 00:04:02.340 --> 00:04:04.560 their commander, a German officer named Friedrich 00:04:04.560 --> 00:04:07.099 Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein. That is quite 00:04:07.099 --> 00:04:10.560 the name. It is. Kress von Kressenstein understood 00:04:10.560 --> 00:04:12.960 the terrain perfectly. The Ottomans had actually 00:04:12.960 --> 00:04:15.580 withdrawn their forces 14 miles north from their 00:04:15.580 --> 00:04:18.139 previous defensive lines just to establish themselves 00:04:18.139 --> 00:04:20.459 at Gaza. They gave up ground just to fight there. 00:04:20.759 --> 00:04:24.100 Exactly. They dug in, creating a formidable defensive 00:04:24.100 --> 00:04:25.959 line stretching from the Mediterranean coast 00:04:25.959 --> 00:04:28.759 eastward across a massive dry riverbed called 00:04:28.759 --> 00:04:31.300 the Wadi Guzi, all the way to a place called 00:04:31.300 --> 00:04:34.800 Tel Esh Sharia, where the Palestine railway crossed. 00:04:35.160 --> 00:04:36.819 They knew the British had to come up the coast 00:04:36.819 --> 00:04:39.810 and Gaza. was the door they had to kick in. I 00:04:39.810 --> 00:04:41.870 keep thinking about the psychological contrast 00:04:41.870 --> 00:04:44.329 for the soldiers on the ground. You have British, 00:04:44.509 --> 00:04:46.569 Australian, and New Zealand troops who have been 00:04:46.569 --> 00:04:48.910 marching for weeks through the absolute barren 00:04:48.910 --> 00:04:50.829 desolation of the Sinai desert. Right, nothing 00:04:50.829 --> 00:04:54.230 but baking sand. Heat, thirst, just miles of 00:04:54.230 --> 00:04:56.250 nothing. And then they crest a ridge and see 00:04:56.250 --> 00:04:59.230 Gaza. There's a quote in our sources from a Lieutenant 00:04:59.230 --> 00:05:01.850 Robert Wilson who described arriving in this 00:05:01.850 --> 00:05:05.180 area as seeing, delightful country. cultivated 00:05:05.180 --> 00:05:08.420 to perfection, a mass of orange, fig, and other 00:05:08.420 --> 00:05:10.579 fruit trees. The relief must have been incredible. 00:05:10.959 --> 00:05:13.560 The psychological relief of smelling orange blossoms 00:05:13.560 --> 00:05:16.819 instead of dust must have been staggering. It's 00:05:16.819 --> 00:05:19.939 an oasis, but it's an oasis heavily fortified 00:05:19.939 --> 00:05:22.480 with machine guns. The contrast is striking, 00:05:22.540 --> 00:05:25.279 for sure. But before you can even fight a battle 00:05:25.279 --> 00:05:27.779 in an oasis, you have to physically move your 00:05:27.779 --> 00:05:31.139 army across that barren sand. And that brings 00:05:31.139 --> 00:05:33.779 us to the logistics. Yeah, let's talk about that. 00:05:33.819 --> 00:05:37.379 Because how do you move an army of over 22 ,000 00:05:37.379 --> 00:05:40.860 combatants, 12 ,000 infantry and 11 ,000 mounted 00:05:40.860 --> 00:05:43.579 troops across a desert without them dying of 00:05:43.579 --> 00:05:45.680 exposure before they even see the enemy? Right, 00:05:45.819 --> 00:05:47.480 because looking at the raw numbers, the math 00:05:47.480 --> 00:05:49.860 just seems impossible. You can't just drink sand. 00:05:50.379 --> 00:05:53.120 How did the EES sustain an advancing city of 00:05:53.120 --> 00:05:55.240 men and animals in the middle of nowhere? They 00:05:55.240 --> 00:05:57.920 executed a logistical miracle that is genuinely 00:05:57.920 --> 00:06:00.939 hard to comprehend. They didn't just march. They 00:06:00.939 --> 00:06:03.980 had to literally build a world to sustain themselves 00:06:03.980 --> 00:06:06.879 as they moved. Build a world. Yeah. The British 00:06:06.879 --> 00:06:10.720 laid 388 miles of standard gauge railway straight 00:06:10.720 --> 00:06:13.199 across the Sinai Peninsula. Wait, standard gauge? 00:06:13.680 --> 00:06:15.819 Like, full -size trains running across the dunes. 00:06:16.220 --> 00:06:19.879 Exactly. Full -size locomotives. And the engineering 00:06:19.879 --> 00:06:23.120 mechanics of laying heavy steel rails and wooden 00:06:23.120 --> 00:06:26.860 ties in soft shifting sand are brutal. Can't 00:06:26.860 --> 00:06:29.629 even imagine. It just sinks. It does. They had 00:06:29.629 --> 00:06:32.410 to build massive foundations of brushwood just 00:06:32.410 --> 00:06:34.970 to keep the tracks from sinking into the dunes. 00:06:35.350 --> 00:06:37.949 And they were laying this railway at a staggering 00:06:37.949 --> 00:06:41.029 rate of about one kilometer every single day. 00:06:41.110 --> 00:06:44.269 One kilometer a day. Driven by sheer human labor. 00:06:44.779 --> 00:06:47.680 But the railway only solves the problem of moving 00:06:47.680 --> 00:06:50.519 heavy equipment and ammunition. The ultimate 00:06:50.519 --> 00:06:52.980 limiting factor for human beings, especially 00:06:52.980 --> 00:06:55.339 in the desert, is water. I was going to ask about 00:06:55.339 --> 00:06:57.220 that. A train can't deliver enough water for 00:06:57.220 --> 00:06:59.300 tens of thousands of men and horses every day, 00:06:59.439 --> 00:07:01.579 can it? Maybe it could, but it would take up 00:07:01.579 --> 00:07:03.480 all the cargo space? It cannot. So they built 00:07:03.480 --> 00:07:06.040 a massive water pipeline stretching 300 miles. 00:07:06.139 --> 00:07:08.819 300 miles of pipe. They pump fresh water all 00:07:08.819 --> 00:07:10.839 the way from the sweet water canal of the Nile 00:07:10.839 --> 00:07:13.279 in Egypt, pushing it through steel pipes right 00:07:13.279 --> 00:07:16.269 behind the advancing army. That is insane. You 00:07:16.269 --> 00:07:18.490 have to imagine the massive pumping stations 00:07:18.490 --> 00:07:21.170 required to maintain pressure over hundreds of 00:07:21.170 --> 00:07:24.430 miles of scorching desert, the constant maintenance 00:07:24.430 --> 00:07:26.889 to prevent the pipes from bursting or being clogged 00:07:26.889 --> 00:07:29.449 by sand. Yeah, one leak and the whole army stops. 00:07:29.730 --> 00:07:32.689 Exactly. And alongside the pipeline and the railway, 00:07:32.990 --> 00:07:35.509 they laid down hundreds of miles of wire mesh 00:07:35.509 --> 00:07:38.870 and brushwood roads over the soft sand just so 00:07:38.870 --> 00:07:40.850 their wheeled supply vehicles could maintain 00:07:40.850 --> 00:07:43.519 traction. Let's talk about the scale of those 00:07:43.519 --> 00:07:46.019 supplies because the transport required is mind 00:07:46.019 --> 00:07:48.420 -blowing. The sources note that supplying just 00:07:48.420 --> 00:07:51.420 one brigade, just one, meant feeding and watering 00:07:51.420 --> 00:07:54.519 2 ,000 men and 2 ,000 horses every single day. 00:07:54.600 --> 00:07:57.259 And they had many brigades. Right. And it wasn't 00:07:57.259 --> 00:07:59.160 just horses out there either, was it? Not at 00:07:59.160 --> 00:08:02.240 all. The transport columns were massive, archaic 00:08:02.240 --> 00:08:05.180 beasts of burden systems. We are talking about 00:08:05.180 --> 00:08:08.480 endless convoys of camels, pack mules, and donkeys. 00:08:08.560 --> 00:08:11.139 It sounds biblical. It really does look like 00:08:11.139 --> 00:08:13.420 something from antiquity. The transport wagons 00:08:13.420 --> 00:08:16.420 were pulled by these incredibly innovative five 00:08:16.420 --> 00:08:18.839 -mule teams. They were driven by a single man 00:08:18.839 --> 00:08:21.240 sitting on the box, which proved so efficient 00:08:21.240 --> 00:08:23.680 it actually became the standard for the entire 00:08:23.680 --> 00:08:26.220 Egyptian expeditionary force. And the horses 00:08:26.220 --> 00:08:29.300 themselves had to adapt to this extreme environment. 00:08:29.439 --> 00:08:32.120 There's an incredible biological detail in the 00:08:32.120 --> 00:08:34.080 archive that blew my mind. Oh, about the water. 00:08:34.279 --> 00:08:37.539 Yes. Because the volume of water was so strictly 00:08:37.539 --> 00:08:39.840 capped by the capacity of that single pipeline 00:08:39.840 --> 00:08:42.399 we just talked about, the horses actually learned 00:08:42.399 --> 00:08:45.799 out of pure evolutionary necessity to survive 00:08:45.799 --> 00:08:48.279 on just two drinks of water a day instead of 00:08:48.279 --> 00:08:50.519 their usual three. They just adapted. The whole 00:08:50.519 --> 00:08:52.720 army is essentially redlining its biological 00:08:52.720 --> 00:08:56.379 limits just to exist in this space. Every man 00:08:56.379 --> 00:08:59.340 and animal is pushed to the absolute brink. And 00:08:59.340 --> 00:09:01.419 layered right on top of this ancient biblical 00:09:01.419 --> 00:09:04.200 style caravan of camels and thirsty horses, you 00:09:04.200 --> 00:09:06.820 have the sudden intrusion of cutting edge 20th 00:09:06.820 --> 00:09:09.580 century technology. The contrast is fascinating. 00:09:09.759 --> 00:09:12.100 Like what? Well, alongside the pack meals, you 00:09:12.100 --> 00:09:14.039 have the number seven light car patrol and the 00:09:14.039 --> 00:09:17.340 number 11 and 12 armored motor batteries. Armored 00:09:17.340 --> 00:09:20.759 cars driving on brushwood roads. Yes. Early heavy 00:09:20.759 --> 00:09:23.580 armored cars fitted with machine guns bouncing 00:09:23.580 --> 00:09:27.460 over scrub land. And above them in the sky, you 00:09:27.460 --> 00:09:30.220 have biplane from the Royal Flying Corps and 00:09:30.220 --> 00:09:32.620 the Australian Flying Corps. Oh, wow. In the 00:09:32.620 --> 00:09:34.919 weeks leading up to the battle, these open cockpit 00:09:34.919 --> 00:09:38.019 planes were flying by moonlight to bomb the Ottoman 00:09:38.019 --> 00:09:40.740 railway lines and supply depots at places like 00:09:40.740 --> 00:09:43.879 Junction Station and Beersheba. They were actively 00:09:43.879 --> 00:09:46.360 trying to disrupt the Ottoman lines of communication. 00:09:46.740 --> 00:09:48.840 So you have a war being fought with medieval 00:09:48.840 --> 00:09:51.299 cavalry tactics and modern aerial bombardment 00:09:51.299 --> 00:09:54.320 simultaneously. Exactly. It's a bizarre transitional 00:09:54.320 --> 00:09:57.399 period in warfare. Which means this incredible 00:09:57.450 --> 00:10:00.789 tail we just described completely dictated the 00:10:00.789 --> 00:10:03.309 timeline of the whole operation. You can't attack 00:10:03.309 --> 00:10:05.350 Gaza until the railways reaches a town called 00:10:05.350 --> 00:10:07.509 Rafa, which is just down the coast. You're tied 00:10:07.509 --> 00:10:09.909 to the track. Right. The entire British Army 00:10:09.909 --> 00:10:12.710 is tethered to the end of a water pipe. If the 00:10:12.710 --> 00:10:14.769 Ottomans managed to swing around and cut that 00:10:14.769 --> 00:10:17.590 pipeline or blow up the railway, the entire British 00:10:17.590 --> 00:10:19.769 Army wouldn't be defeated in battle. They would 00:10:19.769 --> 00:10:22.629 just dry up in the sun. And the commanders were 00:10:22.629 --> 00:10:25.289 acutely aware of that vulnerability. British 00:10:25.289 --> 00:10:28.549 intelligence estimated that up to 12 ,000 Ottoman 00:10:28.549 --> 00:10:31.730 soldiers were positioned inland, away from Gaza, 00:10:32.289 --> 00:10:34.570 precisely to threaten that British supply line. 00:10:35.269 --> 00:10:36.610 So they were looking over their shoulders the 00:10:36.610 --> 00:10:39.029 whole time. Yes. The British had to maintain 00:10:39.029 --> 00:10:42.409 a strong defensive posture in their rear while 00:10:42.409 --> 00:10:44.769 simultaneously preparing to punch forward into 00:10:44.769 --> 00:10:47.389 the fortress of Gaza itself. OK, keeping that 00:10:47.389 --> 00:10:50.149 immense pressure in mind, there is a detail from 00:10:50.149 --> 00:10:54.970 March 21st, 1917 that feels almost absurd. They 00:10:54.970 --> 00:10:58.049 are at Rafa. The railhead has finally arrived. 00:10:58.129 --> 00:11:00.970 They are days away from launching a massive bloody 00:11:00.970 --> 00:11:03.570 assault on a fortified city. And what do the 00:11:03.570 --> 00:11:06.190 troops do? They hold a horse race, a literal 00:11:06.190 --> 00:11:08.389 race meeting in the desert. It sounds like fiction, 00:11:08.429 --> 00:11:11.070 but it's entirely true. The archives say the 00:11:11.070 --> 00:11:13.450 Yeomanry. which were the British volunteer cavalry 00:11:13.450 --> 00:11:16.049 units, along with the Australians and New Zealanders, 00:11:16.110 --> 00:11:18.289 set up an enclosed paddock. They built jumps, 00:11:18.710 --> 00:11:20.629 marked out a course, and even printed up official 00:11:20.629 --> 00:11:22.690 programs. They went all out. They even set up 00:11:22.690 --> 00:11:25.250 a totalizator. For anyone unfamiliar with the 00:11:25.250 --> 00:11:28.190 term, a totalizator was an early mechanical computer 00:11:28.190 --> 00:11:30.450 used to calculate and display bedding pools. 00:11:30.470 --> 00:11:32.909 Right. In the middle of a war zone, sitting at 00:11:32.909 --> 00:11:35.090 the very edge of their supply line, they were 00:11:35.090 --> 00:11:37.440 running a fully functioning racetrack. and placing 00:11:37.440 --> 00:11:40.399 bets on their cavalry mounts. It perfectly captures 00:11:40.399 --> 00:11:43.799 the bizarre reality of military campaigns. It's 00:11:43.799 --> 00:11:46.860 an extreme example of normalcy bias. Normacy 00:11:46.860 --> 00:11:50.080 bias. Yeah. When human beings are placed in highly 00:11:50.080 --> 00:11:53.759 stressful, entirely abnormal situations, like 00:11:53.759 --> 00:11:56.539 waiting to assault a heavily fortified machine 00:11:56.539 --> 00:11:59.419 gun position, they will often go to incredible 00:11:59.419 --> 00:12:02.259 lengths to construct pockets of bizarre familiar 00:12:02.259 --> 00:12:04.879 routine to cope with the impending trauma. Just 00:12:04.879 --> 00:12:06.980 trying to feel normal for an after - Exactly. 00:12:07.399 --> 00:12:09.740 But that waiting period was short -lived. By 00:12:09.740 --> 00:12:12.620 March 25th, the logistics were set, the railway 00:12:12.620 --> 00:12:15.179 was in place, it was time to execute the master 00:12:15.179 --> 00:12:17.500 plan. So let's break down the chessboard. What 00:12:17.500 --> 00:12:20.200 exactly was General Dobell's grand strategy to 00:12:20.200 --> 00:12:22.779 take Gaza? The plan was essentially a coup de 00:12:22.779 --> 00:12:26.360 main. A Swiss trike. Right. A swift, overwhelming, 00:12:26.659 --> 00:12:29.179 synchronized strike intended to capture Gaza 00:12:29.179 --> 00:12:31.799 and its entire garrison before those inland Ottoman 00:12:31.799 --> 00:12:34.259 reinforcements could march to their aid. The 00:12:34.259 --> 00:12:37.139 strategy had two main components, the hammer 00:12:37.139 --> 00:12:39.539 and the net. OK, let's start with the hammer. 00:12:40.039 --> 00:12:42.620 First, the hammer. The infantry, specifically 00:12:42.620 --> 00:12:45.600 the 53rd Welsh Division commanded by Major General 00:12:45.600 --> 00:12:47.840 Alistair Dallas, was ordered to march up from 00:12:47.840 --> 00:12:50.019 the south and east and punch straight into the 00:12:50.019 --> 00:12:52.740 Ottoman defenses. Their primary objective was 00:12:52.740 --> 00:12:54.940 to assault and capture that looming high ground 00:12:54.940 --> 00:12:58.539 we talked about, Alimentar. The net was the mounted 00:12:58.539 --> 00:13:00.980 troops. The Anzac Mounted Division under Major 00:13:00.980 --> 00:13:03.279 General Harry Chevelle and the Imperial Mounted 00:13:03.279 --> 00:13:05.539 Division under Major General Henry West Hodgson. 00:13:06.159 --> 00:13:09.019 They were tasked with creating a massive 15 -mile 00:13:09.019 --> 00:13:11.799 long screen encircling Gaza to the north and 00:13:11.799 --> 00:13:14.740 east. 15 miles? That's a huge perimeter. It is. 00:13:14.980 --> 00:13:17.419 Their job was to isolate the town, cut the roads, 00:13:17.759 --> 00:13:20.120 stop the garrison from escaping and, crucially, 00:13:20.419 --> 00:13:22.580 block any of those Ottoman reinforcements from 00:13:22.580 --> 00:13:24.980 reaching Gaza from the inland garrisons. It sounds 00:13:24.980 --> 00:13:27.539 perfectly logical on paper. The infantry takes 00:13:27.539 --> 00:13:30.340 the hill, the cavalry holds the perimeter. When 00:13:30.340 --> 00:13:32.120 you look at the command structure they set up 00:13:32.120 --> 00:13:36.299 to execute this, it is a master class in decentralized 00:13:36.299 --> 00:13:39.399 command gone completely wrong. Oh, absolutely. 00:13:39.559 --> 00:13:41.340 It's like the ultimate disconnected corporate 00:13:41.340 --> 00:13:44.200 structure. How so? Let's trace the chain of command 00:13:44.200 --> 00:13:46.200 for the listener. Well, you have General Murray, 00:13:46.440 --> 00:13:48.580 the commander -in -chief. He isn't even on the 00:13:48.580 --> 00:13:50.720 battlefield. Not even close. He establishes his 00:13:50.720 --> 00:13:52.940 headquarters in a railway carriage miles and 00:13:52.940 --> 00:13:56.970 miles away back at El Arish. His role is essentially 00:13:56.970 --> 00:14:00.350 to advise, like a CEO, phoning it in from a golf 00:14:00.350 --> 00:14:02.870 course. A very apt comparison. Then you have 00:14:02.870 --> 00:14:05.590 General Dobell commanding the Eastern Force, 00:14:05.789 --> 00:14:08.529 sitting at a place called Inserat. Subordinate 00:14:08.529 --> 00:14:11.289 to him is General Philip Chetwood, commanding 00:14:11.289 --> 00:14:13.929 the Desert Column, who is also near Inserat, 00:14:14.090 --> 00:14:16.350 but actively moving forward. Getting a little 00:14:16.350 --> 00:14:18.230 closer to the action. Right. And finally you 00:14:18.230 --> 00:14:20.850 have General Dallas, commanding the 53rd Welsh 00:14:20.850 --> 00:14:23.370 Division, who is actually on the ground, leading 00:14:23.370 --> 00:14:26.399 the infantry assault. This entire chain of command 00:14:26.399 --> 00:14:29.320 is stretched over miles of barren desert. And 00:14:29.320 --> 00:14:31.779 you have to remember the technology they're relying 00:14:31.779 --> 00:14:34.399 on to connect that chain. They don't have encrypted 00:14:34.399 --> 00:14:37.899 radios or satellite feeds. No cell phones. Exactly. 00:14:38.059 --> 00:14:40.879 They are relying on visual signals flags and 00:14:40.879 --> 00:14:43.480 heliographs and World War I field telephones. 00:14:43.639 --> 00:14:46.600 Which brings us to the morning of March 26th. 00:14:46.779 --> 00:14:49.120 The approach marches begin in the pitch black 00:14:49.120 --> 00:14:52.850 right around 1 a .m. The infantry is moving out. 00:14:53.210 --> 00:14:55.210 The mounted divisions are moving into position 00:14:55.210 --> 00:14:58.529 to cross the dry Wadi Ghazi. Everyone is moving 00:14:58.529 --> 00:15:01.529 into place. The plan requires absolute synchronization. 00:15:02.210 --> 00:15:05.690 And then, at 3 .50 a .m., the environment intervenes. 00:15:06.090 --> 00:15:09.049 A dense, blinding sea fog rolls in off the Mediterranean. 00:15:09.200 --> 00:15:11.200 And we are not talking about a light morning 00:15:11.200 --> 00:15:13.519 mist here. The historical accounts state that 00:15:13.519 --> 00:15:16.240 visibility dropped to a mere 20 yards. 20 yards. 00:15:16.460 --> 00:15:18.759 That's nothing. A man could not see his own horse's 00:15:18.759 --> 00:15:20.779 head clearly, let alone the soldier marching 00:15:20.779 --> 00:15:23.679 20 paces ahead of him. The sun technically comes 00:15:23.679 --> 00:15:26.320 up around 5 a .m., but the battlefield is just 00:15:26.320 --> 00:15:29.039 a solid wall of white. How does weather like 00:15:29.039 --> 00:15:32.200 that impact a synchronized multi -division plan? 00:15:32.480 --> 00:15:33.700 It seems like you would just shut everything 00:15:33.700 --> 00:15:36.370 down immediately. It acts as a massive disruption, 00:15:36.549 --> 00:15:39.690 but it does so in two completely opposite ways 00:15:39.690 --> 00:15:42.129 for the two different parts of the British force. 00:15:42.350 --> 00:15:45.529 What do you mean? Well, for the mounted troops 00:15:45.529 --> 00:15:48.769 forming the net, the Anzac and Imperial divisions, 00:15:49.370 --> 00:15:52.409 the fog was actually a bizarre, incredibly lucky 00:15:52.409 --> 00:15:54.450 blessing. Because they were trying to sneak past 00:15:54.450 --> 00:15:57.870 the city to encircle it. Exactly. The movement 00:15:57.870 --> 00:16:01.269 of thousands of horses kicks up massive clouds 00:16:01.269 --> 00:16:04.190 of dust that can usually be seen for miles by 00:16:04.190 --> 00:16:06.970 artillery observers. Oh, right. Dust in the desert 00:16:06.970 --> 00:16:09.830 is a dead giveaway. But hidden entirely by the 00:16:09.830 --> 00:16:12.450 thick mist, the cavalry was able to rapidly push 00:16:12.450 --> 00:16:14.610 forward across the roads leading north and east 00:16:14.610 --> 00:16:17.769 out of Gaza and completely cut the Ottoman telegraph 00:16:17.769 --> 00:16:20.409 lines without being spotted. Wow. They moved 00:16:20.409 --> 00:16:23.289 like ghosts. They even stumbled upon and captured 00:16:23.289 --> 00:16:26.429 30 German pioneers, combat engineers, and their 00:16:26.429 --> 00:16:28.950 packhorses who had absolutely no idea the British 00:16:28.950 --> 00:16:31.509 were even in the area. The sources mentioned 00:16:31.509 --> 00:16:34.070 one specific unit pulling off an incredible maneuver 00:16:34.070 --> 00:16:37.409 in the fog. The 7th Light Horse Regiment pushed 00:16:37.409 --> 00:16:40.250 all the way to the Mediterranean coast, successfully 00:16:40.250 --> 00:16:42.350 completing the northern encirclement. Right to 00:16:42.350 --> 00:16:44.350 the water. And in the process, they actually 00:16:44.350 --> 00:16:46.629 captured the commander of the Ottoman 53rd Division 00:16:46.629 --> 00:16:48.909 and his entire staff. Just bumped right into 00:16:48.909 --> 00:16:50.870 them. Yeah, they were riding in to strengthen 00:16:50.870 --> 00:16:53.149 the Gaza garrison and they just rode right into 00:16:53.149 --> 00:16:54.789 the British net because they couldn't see past 00:16:54.789 --> 00:16:57.049 their own noses. So the cavalry achieves its 00:16:57.049 --> 00:17:00.889 objectives flawlessly, thanks to the fog, but... 00:17:00.909 --> 00:17:03.990 For the infantry, for General Dallas and the 00:17:03.990 --> 00:17:06.069 53rd Welsh Division, who are supposed to be the 00:17:06.069 --> 00:17:09.890 hammer, the fog is a total paralyzing curse. 00:17:10.190 --> 00:17:12.289 Because they have to attack. Dallas's orders 00:17:12.289 --> 00:17:16.029 are to launch a direct coordinated assault on 00:17:16.029 --> 00:17:19.049 fortified entrenched trenches. But he cannot 00:17:19.049 --> 00:17:22.210 see the trenches. He cannot reconnoiter the ground 00:17:22.210 --> 00:17:24.950 to align his battalions. And what about the planes? 00:17:25.450 --> 00:17:27.349 Couldn't the Royal Flying Corps just fly over 00:17:27.349 --> 00:17:29.609 and spot for them, like give them some aerial 00:17:29.609 --> 00:17:32.140 recon? They tried. The biplanes took off, but 00:17:32.140 --> 00:17:34.059 when they reached the battlefield, the pilots 00:17:34.059 --> 00:17:36.880 looked down and saw nothing but an unbroken blanket 00:17:36.880 --> 00:17:39.720 of white clouds. They couldn't spot targets, 00:17:39.759 --> 00:17:41.680 so they had to turn around and land. So they're 00:17:41.680 --> 00:17:44.279 blind in the sky, too. More critically, the British 00:17:44.279 --> 00:17:46.660 artillery, which requires visual confirmation 00:17:46.660 --> 00:17:49.420 to register its guns and adjust its fire, is 00:17:49.420 --> 00:17:52.359 completely blind. You cannot fire heavy artillery 00:17:52.359 --> 00:17:55.400 into a fog bank when your own infantry is somewhere 00:17:55.400 --> 00:17:57.240 out there in the whiteout. You'd hit your own 00:17:57.240 --> 00:18:00.589 men. Exactly. So what does Dallas do? He's sitting 00:18:00.589 --> 00:18:02.990 there with an entire division of men, the clock 00:18:02.990 --> 00:18:05.799 is ticking, and he's completely blind. He makes 00:18:05.799 --> 00:18:08.160 the only logical choice a frontline commander 00:18:08.160 --> 00:18:11.000 can make in that situation. He waits. He stops. 00:18:11.180 --> 00:18:13.680 He halts his advance at a place called El Brej, 00:18:14.019 --> 00:18:17.119 and waits for the fog to lift. He refuses to 00:18:17.119 --> 00:18:19.799 send thousands of men charging blindly into an 00:18:19.799 --> 00:18:22.019 unseen machine gun crossfire. Which makes sense. 00:18:22.119 --> 00:18:24.500 It does. But remember that stretched command 00:18:24.500 --> 00:18:26.279 structure you mentioned earlier? This is where 00:18:26.279 --> 00:18:29.519 it fractures. As Dallas halts and waits, his 00:18:29.519 --> 00:18:31.680 moving headquarters loses communication with 00:18:31.680 --> 00:18:34.279 General Chetwood in the rear for two excruciating 00:18:34.279 --> 00:18:36.640 hours. Wait, I need to stop you there. Two hours. 00:18:36.740 --> 00:18:39.579 Two hours. How did two generals, in the middle 00:18:39.579 --> 00:18:42.519 of a major offensive, just lose touch for two 00:18:42.519 --> 00:18:45.170 hours? Are they relying on couriers just wandering 00:18:45.170 --> 00:18:47.390 around in the fog? They are trying to use those 00:18:47.390 --> 00:18:50.569 field telephones. But field telephones in 1917 00:18:50.569 --> 00:18:54.049 rely on physical spools of heavy copper wire 00:18:54.049 --> 00:18:56.309 that signalmen have to drag across the desert 00:18:56.309 --> 00:18:59.529 floor. Oh, right. The wire. As Dallas' headquarters 00:18:59.529 --> 00:19:02.170 moved forward, the wires had to be laid and connected. 00:19:02.549 --> 00:19:04.650 In the fog and the confusion, the connections 00:19:04.650 --> 00:19:07.109 aren't made. The wires get tangled or cut by 00:19:07.109 --> 00:19:09.569 movement or simply run out. So the line is just 00:19:09.569 --> 00:19:12.750 dead. So Chetwood, sitting miles back, has no 00:19:12.750 --> 00:19:16.029 idea why Dallas has stopped. Meanwhile, the British 00:19:16.029 --> 00:19:18.849 artillery, which Dallas believes is lost or delayed 00:19:18.849 --> 00:19:21.289 in the fog, is actually already in position. 00:19:21.349 --> 00:19:24.190 Oh no. But because of the communication blackout, 00:19:24.289 --> 00:19:26.230 the artillery commanders don't know where the 00:19:26.230 --> 00:19:27.910 infantry is and the infantry doesn't know the 00:19:27.910 --> 00:19:30.789 artillery is ready. So a perfectly synchronized 00:19:30.789 --> 00:19:34.130 attack has become entirely fatally disjointed. 00:19:34.680 --> 00:19:37.319 The cavalry is in position by mid -morning, waiting 00:19:37.319 --> 00:19:40.319 in the net. But the infantry is just standing 00:19:40.319 --> 00:19:42.700 there. Doing nothing. Think about the physical 00:19:42.700 --> 00:19:45.200 toll of that on the soldiers. You've marched 00:19:45.200 --> 00:19:47.519 all night, the adrenaline of the approach is 00:19:47.519 --> 00:19:50.099 pumping, and then you are forced to just stand 00:19:50.099 --> 00:19:53.180 in the cold, damp morning fog for hours. The 00:19:53.180 --> 00:19:55.740 chill really sets in. The adrenaline fades, the 00:19:55.740 --> 00:19:57.859 muscles stiffen. You were just waiting for orders 00:19:57.859 --> 00:20:00.220 while the sun slowly begins to burn off the cover. 00:20:00.380 --> 00:20:04.019 By 8 0 a .m. the fog is finally lifting. Visibility 00:20:04.019 --> 00:20:07.359 returns. But this reveals a catastrophic new 00:20:07.359 --> 00:20:10.960 reality. The Ottoman defenders on Ali Muntar 00:20:10.960 --> 00:20:13.960 can now see exactly what is happening. The curtain 00:20:13.960 --> 00:20:16.059 goes up. The element of surprise for the main 00:20:16.059 --> 00:20:19.779 assault is completely gone. Hostile Ottoman planes 00:20:19.779 --> 00:20:23.339 immediately fly over the exposed British infantry, 00:20:23.880 --> 00:20:26.380 strafing them with machine gun fire. And I imagine 00:20:26.380 --> 00:20:28.599 the commanders in the rear are losing their minds 00:20:28.599 --> 00:20:30.920 looking at their watches. The frustration at 00:20:30.920 --> 00:20:33.400 the higher headquarters boils over into outright 00:20:33.400 --> 00:20:36.619 hostility. Chet Wode is sitting miles back, looking 00:20:36.619 --> 00:20:40.200 at his map, realizing the entire carefully choreographed 00:20:40.200 --> 00:20:42.279 timetable is shot. Because the reinforcements 00:20:42.279 --> 00:20:45.819 could be marching. Exactly. At 1130 a .m., the 00:20:45.819 --> 00:20:48.779 Desert Column staff sends Dallas a blistering, 00:20:48.980 --> 00:20:51.539 incredibly aggressive message. It reads, and 00:20:51.539 --> 00:20:54.119 this is a quote, I am directed to observe that 00:20:54.119 --> 00:20:56.359 you have been out of touch for over two hours, 00:20:56.539 --> 00:20:58.720 that time is passing, and that you are still 00:20:58.720 --> 00:21:01.559 far from your objective. You must launch your 00:21:01.559 --> 00:21:03.920 attack forthwith. Basically, hurry up and attack 00:21:03.920 --> 00:21:06.420 right now. They send it again at noon. The pressure 00:21:06.420 --> 00:21:08.279 from the disconnected executives at the rear 00:21:08.279 --> 00:21:10.859 is immense, completely disregarding the physical 00:21:10.859 --> 00:21:13.200 reality of the terrain and the delays on the 00:21:13.200 --> 00:21:16.180 ground. And so the meat grinder begins. It is 00:21:16.180 --> 00:21:19.180 noon. The sun is blazing in the desert sky. Now 00:21:19.180 --> 00:21:22.539 the fog is completely gone. Dallas finally issues 00:21:22.539 --> 00:21:25.559 the order for the 53rd Welsh to attack. What 00:21:25.559 --> 00:21:27.940 exactly are these infantrymen walking into? They 00:21:27.940 --> 00:21:30.279 are walking into a tactical nightmare. The approach 00:21:30.279 --> 00:21:32.819 to Ali Muntar from the south involves advancing 00:21:32.819 --> 00:21:36.390 over completely open bare slopes. There is no 00:21:36.390 --> 00:21:38.990 cover. No trees, no rocks, no defiles to hide 00:21:38.990 --> 00:21:42.150 in. Just coarse grass and firm soil leading steadily 00:21:42.150 --> 00:21:44.490 upward. And at the top of these slopes are the 00:21:44.490 --> 00:21:46.990 entrenched Ottoman defenders, a highly capable 00:21:46.990 --> 00:21:49.529 unit designated as Group Tiller, who now have 00:21:49.529 --> 00:21:52.029 a perfectly clear, elevated view of the entire 00:21:52.029 --> 00:21:54.369 British line of advance. What about that artillery 00:21:54.369 --> 00:21:56.329 support? You said the guns were in position right. 00:21:56.440 --> 00:21:59.119 Did they soften up the hill before the infantry 00:21:59.119 --> 00:22:01.420 marched up? The British artillery bombardment 00:22:01.420 --> 00:22:03.740 finally began at noon, right as the infantry 00:22:03.740 --> 00:22:05.960 stepped off. But because of the morning's chaos 00:22:05.960 --> 00:22:08.380 and the lack of communication, there was no time 00:22:08.380 --> 00:22:11.140 to develop a coordinated artillery program. So 00:22:11.140 --> 00:22:12.839 they didn't know what they were aiming at. They 00:22:12.839 --> 00:22:15.779 hadn't properly identified the specific Ottoman 00:22:15.779 --> 00:22:18.859 redoubts or machine gun nests, so they were essentially 00:22:18.859 --> 00:22:22.059 firing blind, scattered barrages. The infantry 00:22:22.059 --> 00:22:24.700 is advancing up a bare slope with completely 00:22:24.700 --> 00:22:27.640 inadequate artillery support against determined, 00:22:28.019 --> 00:22:30.240 entrenched defenders equipped with heavy machine 00:22:30.240 --> 00:22:32.680 guns. The casualties must have been immediate. 00:22:32.960 --> 00:22:36.390 They were severe. The 14th Royal Sussex Regiment, 00:22:36.789 --> 00:22:38.250 advancing up the center of what was known as 00:22:38.250 --> 00:22:41.809 the Essire Ridge, walked directly into intense 00:22:41.809 --> 00:22:44.759 concentrated fire. Wow. They lost their commanding 00:22:44.759 --> 00:22:47.339 officer almost immediately. They managed to reach 00:22:47.339 --> 00:22:50.160 the crest through sheer grit, but the volume 00:22:50.160 --> 00:22:52.640 of Ottoman fire was so overwhelming it broke 00:22:52.640 --> 00:22:55.339 their line, forcing the survivors to fall back 00:22:55.339 --> 00:22:57.160 down the slope in disorder before they could 00:22:57.160 --> 00:23:00.220 finally rally. That's devastating. It was a brutal, 00:23:00.339 --> 00:23:02.700 bleeding frontal assault that was chewing up 00:23:02.700 --> 00:23:05.319 the Welsh division. By 13 zero, one o 'clock 00:23:05.319 --> 00:23:07.859 in the afternoon, it becomes clear to General 00:23:07.859 --> 00:23:10.680 Chet Wode that the infantry is completely bogged 00:23:10.680 --> 00:23:14.140 down. The 53rd Welsh is bleeding out on these 00:23:14.140 --> 00:23:16.900 open slopes, fighting for every inch, and the 00:23:16.900 --> 00:23:19.099 timeline for taking the city before the Ottoman 00:23:19.099 --> 00:23:21.720 reinforcements arrive is rapidly evaporating. 00:23:22.140 --> 00:23:24.880 He has to make a change. Right. Chet Wode looks 00:23:24.880 --> 00:23:27.359 at the map and makes a massive tactical pivot. 00:23:28.099 --> 00:23:30.500 He realizes the hammer isn't working fast enough. 00:23:30.700 --> 00:23:33.700 So he contacts General Chauvel, who is commanding 00:23:33.700 --> 00:23:36.180 the Anzac mounted troops sitting up north forming 00:23:36.180 --> 00:23:38.819 the net, and says, I need you to attack Gaza 00:23:38.819 --> 00:23:41.339 from the north. Which fundamentally changes the 00:23:41.339 --> 00:23:43.220 entire nature of the battle for those mounted 00:23:43.220 --> 00:23:46.099 troops. How so? Well, they weren't equipped or 00:23:46.099 --> 00:23:47.859 positioned to be an assault force. They were 00:23:47.859 --> 00:23:50.640 supposed to be a static blockade. But now the 00:23:50.640 --> 00:23:52.460 Anzac mounted division is ordered to dismount 00:23:52.460 --> 00:23:54.740 from their horses and attack the town directly. 00:23:55.140 --> 00:23:57.380 And the terrain they have to attack through on 00:23:57.380 --> 00:23:59.900 the northern and eastern sides of Gaza is the 00:23:59.900 --> 00:24:02.920 exact opposite of the bare slopes the Welsh are 00:24:02.920 --> 00:24:06.700 fighting on. It is a dense, suffocating labyrinth. 00:24:06.940 --> 00:24:09.819 The archives literally capitalize it. Yeah. The 00:24:09.819 --> 00:24:12.119 labyrinth. We mentioned those beautiful orchards 00:24:12.119 --> 00:24:13.740 and vineyards earlier. What we didn't mention 00:24:13.740 --> 00:24:16.230 is what surrounded them. The hedges. Yes, they 00:24:16.230 --> 00:24:18.890 were partitioned by prickly pear cactus hedges 00:24:18.890 --> 00:24:22.329 and a mature prickly pear hedge is not a garden 00:24:22.329 --> 00:24:26.069 bush. No, it's not. It is a massive, impenetrable, 00:24:26.390 --> 00:24:29.890 spiky wall, often several feet thick and incredibly 00:24:29.890 --> 00:24:32.700 tall. You cannot walk through it. You certainly 00:24:32.700 --> 00:24:34.599 cannot ride a horse through it. The only way 00:24:34.599 --> 00:24:37.440 through is to hack a path with machetes and bayonets. 00:24:37.619 --> 00:24:39.920 From a tactical command perspective, committing 00:24:39.920 --> 00:24:42.400 cavalry to fight on foot inside a cactus maze 00:24:42.400 --> 00:24:45.240 is a worst -case scenario. I can see why. First, 00:24:45.420 --> 00:24:48.170 you lose your primary advantage mobility. Second, 00:24:48.450 --> 00:24:50.589 a mounted brigade, when forced to dismount and 00:24:50.589 --> 00:24:52.589 leave a significant portion of its men behind 00:24:52.589 --> 00:24:55.450 just to hold the horses, is reduced to the functional 00:24:55.450 --> 00:24:58.109 rifle strength of a single infantry battalion. 00:24:58.190 --> 00:25:00.089 Oh, because every fourth guy has to hold the 00:25:00.089 --> 00:25:02.829 horses. Exactly. So they are instantly fighting 00:25:02.829 --> 00:25:05.890 at a massive numerical disadvantage. Third, you 00:25:05.890 --> 00:25:09.779 lose all unit cohesion. Platoons and squads become 00:25:09.779 --> 00:25:11.960 instantly isolated from one another in these 00:25:11.960 --> 00:25:14.460 narrow winding pathways between the towering 00:25:14.460 --> 00:25:16.859 hedges. You can't see your squad mates. Right. 00:25:17.039 --> 00:25:19.259 And finally, they are entirely vulnerable to 00:25:19.259 --> 00:25:21.839 Ottoman snipers hiding in the stone buildings 00:25:21.839 --> 00:25:24.200 and camouflaged rifle pits scattered throughout 00:25:24.200 --> 00:25:26.720 the orchards. The physical toll of this is hard 00:25:26.720 --> 00:25:29.640 to fathom. These are Australian light horsemen 00:25:29.640 --> 00:25:32.759 and New Zealand mounted riflemen. They marched 00:25:32.759 --> 00:25:36.099 all night. They sat in the freezing fog all morning. 00:25:36.750 --> 00:25:39.509 Now, in the blazing heat of the afternoon, they're 00:25:39.509 --> 00:25:41.730 off their horses, on foot, physically hacking 00:25:41.730 --> 00:25:45.309 through thick, spiky cacti while unseen snipers 00:25:45.309 --> 00:25:47.390 shoot down at them from the windows of stone 00:25:47.390 --> 00:25:50.430 houses. It's a nightmare. It is absolute, chaotic, 00:25:50.789 --> 00:25:53.450 brutal, close quarters combat. But despite the 00:25:53.450 --> 00:25:55.710 horrific conditions, the aggression and tactical 00:25:55.710 --> 00:25:57.950 skill of these troops is remarkable. They don't 00:25:57.950 --> 00:26:00.289 stall. They push forward, clearing the labyrinth 00:26:00.289 --> 00:26:03.650 yard by bloody yard. There is one highly specific, 00:26:04.130 --> 00:26:06.970 incredibly cinematic moment detailed in the sources 00:26:06.970 --> 00:26:10.710 that perfectly illustrates this aggression. The 00:26:10.710 --> 00:26:12.869 Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiment is fighting 00:26:12.869 --> 00:26:14.789 their way through the eastern outskirts of the 00:26:14.789 --> 00:26:17.990 maze. They are taking heavy, accurate fire from 00:26:17.990 --> 00:26:20.410 snipers holed up in several reinforced stone 00:26:20.410 --> 00:26:23.609 houses. During the assault, the regiment manages 00:26:23.609 --> 00:26:26.549 to overrun an artillery position and capture 00:26:26.549 --> 00:26:30.170 two 77 -millimeter Austrian Krupp field guns 00:26:30.170 --> 00:26:32.529 from the defenders. Let's contextualize what 00:26:32.529 --> 00:26:34.789 a Krupp field gun is for a second. This is not 00:26:34.789 --> 00:26:37.450 a rifle. Right. This is heavy artillery designed 00:26:37.450 --> 00:26:40.670 to fire high -explosive shells across miles of 00:26:40.670 --> 00:26:42.730 battlefield to shatter trenches. It weighs over 00:26:42.730 --> 00:26:45.450 a ton. A ton. And instead of just securing these 00:26:45.450 --> 00:26:47.910 massive guns and moving on, the Wellington troops 00:26:47.910 --> 00:26:50.359 physically turn them around. They improvise. 00:26:50.740 --> 00:26:52.720 They manually muscle these ton heavy artillery 00:26:52.720 --> 00:26:54.940 pieces forward, pushing them through the orchards 00:26:54.940 --> 00:26:57.680 on their wheels. They load them, aim them at 00:26:57.680 --> 00:26:59.500 the stone houses where the snipers are hiding, 00:26:59.940 --> 00:27:02.799 and fire them at point blank range. Firing a 00:27:02.799 --> 00:27:05.880 77 millimeter high explosive shell into a stone 00:27:05.880 --> 00:27:09.539 structure at zero range is devastating. The concussion 00:27:09.539 --> 00:27:11.900 alone would shatter the building and anyone inside 00:27:11.900 --> 00:27:14.700 it. They literally blow the sniper houses to 00:27:14.700 --> 00:27:17.660 rubble. The psychological shock is so immense 00:27:17.660 --> 00:27:21.059 that 20 hostile soldiers immediately surrender 00:27:21.059 --> 00:27:24.160 on the spot. It's an incredible display of tactical 00:27:24.160 --> 00:27:26.900 improvisation. And it is exactly this kind of 00:27:26.900 --> 00:27:29.579 sheer localized willpower that finally starts 00:27:29.579 --> 00:27:32.119 to turn the tide of the entire battle. The momentum 00:27:32.119 --> 00:27:36.529 shifts. Between 16 .30 and 17 .0, the combined 00:27:36.529 --> 00:27:38.910 relentless pressure of the bloody frontal assault 00:27:38.910 --> 00:27:42.069 from the south and the grinding explosive advance 00:27:42.069 --> 00:27:44.509 through the cactus hedges from the north finally 00:27:44.509 --> 00:27:46.769 breaks the Ottoman lines. They push through. 00:27:47.029 --> 00:27:50.269 The 53rd Welsh Division, reinforced by dismounted 00:27:50.269 --> 00:27:52.369 New Zealanders who had swung south to aid the 00:27:52.369 --> 00:27:54.670 assault, finally storm the crest and capture 00:27:54.670 --> 00:27:57.910 the heavily fortified Alimantar Hill. The commanding 00:27:57.910 --> 00:28:00.390 heights, the key to the entire fortress, are 00:28:00.390 --> 00:28:05.980 firmly in British hands. I mean, by 18 .0, as 00:28:05.980 --> 00:28:09.000 dusk is starting to approach, the Anzac -mounted 00:28:09.000 --> 00:28:11.059 troops have fought their way entirely out of 00:28:11.059 --> 00:28:13.759 the orchards and are fighting in the actual streets 00:28:13.759 --> 00:28:16.200 of Gaza's northern and western outskirts. They're 00:28:16.200 --> 00:28:18.859 in the city? The Ottoman defenders are breaking. 00:28:19.259 --> 00:28:21.359 They're retreating into the very center of the 00:28:21.359 --> 00:28:24.779 town in disarray. The British hold the high ground. 00:28:24.960 --> 00:28:28.019 They hold the outskirts. They have captured 462 00:28:28.019 --> 00:28:30.000 prisoners, including the German general who was 00:28:30.000 --> 00:28:32.240 the divisional commander. That's a huge prize. 00:28:32.400 --> 00:28:34.839 They have captured the Austrian artillery battery 00:28:34.839 --> 00:28:38.660 and an entire supply convoy. The men on the ground, 00:28:39.000 --> 00:28:41.059 the soldiers bleeding in the streets and standing 00:28:41.059 --> 00:28:43.759 exhausted on the hill know beyond a shadow of 00:28:43.759 --> 00:28:46.220 a doubt that they have won. The garrison is moments 00:28:46.220 --> 00:28:49.119 away from total capitulation. But here is where 00:28:49.119 --> 00:28:52.319 the tragedy of this deep dive truly begins. The 00:28:52.319 --> 00:28:54.279 men on the ground know they are winning, but 00:28:54.279 --> 00:28:56.380 the generals sitting miles away in their headquarters 00:28:56.380 --> 00:28:59.500 do not. The map in the general tent does not 00:28:59.500 --> 00:29:02.079 match the mud on the soldiers' boots. Exactly. 00:29:02.339 --> 00:29:04.500 Let's look at what General Dobell and General 00:29:04.500 --> 00:29:06.420 Chetwode are seeing from their vantage point 00:29:06.420 --> 00:29:09.539 at Insarat. They aren't seeing the captured Krupp 00:29:09.539 --> 00:29:12.640 guns or the retreating garrison. What they are 00:29:12.640 --> 00:29:14.960 seeing are the frantic reports coming in from 00:29:14.960 --> 00:29:18.059 the cavalry screen holding the outer perimeter. 00:29:18.440 --> 00:29:20.200 Oh, right. The screen that was supposed to block 00:29:20.200 --> 00:29:22.299 the reinforcements. Because while the brutal 00:29:22.299 --> 00:29:25.240 assault on Gaza was happening, Chris von Kressenstein's 00:29:25.240 --> 00:29:28.900 massive Ottoman reinforcements, the 3rd and 16th 00:29:28.900 --> 00:29:32.039 divisions, were finally arriving from the east 00:29:32.039 --> 00:29:34.539 and the north. And the defense against these 00:29:34.539 --> 00:29:37.259 reinforcements is an epic battle all on its own. 00:29:37.740 --> 00:29:40.000 You have thousands of fresh Ottoman infantry 00:29:40.000 --> 00:29:43.000 and cavalry bearing down on the thin British 00:29:43.000 --> 00:29:46.420 perimeter and who is holding them back. The screen 00:29:46.420 --> 00:29:48.680 is this incredible mix of specialized units. 00:29:48.819 --> 00:29:50.960 You have the Imperial Mounted Division. You have 00:29:50.960 --> 00:29:52.960 the Imperial Camel Brigade. Soldiers fighting 00:29:52.960 --> 00:29:54.640 from camel back, which presents a completely 00:29:54.640 --> 00:29:56.920 different logistical and tactical profile than 00:29:56.920 --> 00:29:59.279 horse cavalry. Exactly. I mean, imagine the height 00:29:59.279 --> 00:30:01.380 advantage, but also just how strange that looks. 00:30:01.819 --> 00:30:03.680 And alongside the camels, you have the armored 00:30:03.680 --> 00:30:05.799 motor batteries and the light car patrols. The 00:30:05.799 --> 00:30:08.819 cars again. It is like a steampunk desert movie 00:30:08.819 --> 00:30:11.660 playing out in real life. heavy armored cars 00:30:11.660 --> 00:30:14.559 with machine guns driving over scrubland, laying 00:30:14.559 --> 00:30:17.319 down covering fire alongside ranks of kneeling 00:30:17.319 --> 00:30:20.259 camels, desperately trying to hold off a massive 00:30:20.259 --> 00:30:23.140 advancing army in the fading evening light. And 00:30:23.140 --> 00:30:26.099 remarkably, they do it. The screen holds the 00:30:26.099 --> 00:30:29.079 armored cars and the cavalry units, particularly 00:30:29.079 --> 00:30:31.099 the 3rd Light Horse Brigade and the 6th Mounted 00:30:31.099 --> 00:30:34.000 Brigade, engage the Ottoman reinforcements and 00:30:34.000 --> 00:30:36.799 stop their advance dead in its tracks. They hold 00:30:36.799 --> 00:30:39.319 the line. The Ottoman columns are halted before 00:30:39.319 --> 00:30:42.099 they can even get halfway to Gaza. But the sheer 00:30:42.099 --> 00:30:44.819 size of the approaching Ottoman force terrifies 00:30:44.819 --> 00:30:47.619 the British command. Dobell and Chetwood are 00:30:47.619 --> 00:30:49.559 looking at the reports of thousands of incoming 00:30:49.559 --> 00:30:51.799 troops. They are looking at their maps. And most 00:30:51.799 --> 00:30:54.079 importantly, they are looking at the sky. The 00:30:54.079 --> 00:30:56.799 sky is the absolute key here. It's 18 .0. The 00:30:56.799 --> 00:31:00.279 sun is setting in Cairo time. And in 1917, nightfall 00:31:00.279 --> 00:31:02.460 meant absolute loss of control for a military 00:31:02.460 --> 00:31:04.440 commander. You're completely blind. You can't 00:31:04.440 --> 00:31:06.859 see your troops. You can't signal them with flags 00:31:06.859 --> 00:31:09.700 or heliographs. Plus, you have the water issue 00:31:09.700 --> 00:31:12.339 again. The horses of the mounted divisions have 00:31:12.339 --> 00:31:14.539 been fighting all day in the intense desert heat. 00:31:14.859 --> 00:31:16.599 They haven't had their carefully rationed two 00:31:16.599 --> 00:31:19.299 drinks. Right. They're dying of thirst. Chetwood 00:31:19.299 --> 00:31:22.140 is terrified. that if he leaves his cavalry engaged 00:31:22.140 --> 00:31:24.380 in the streets of Gaza overnight, surrounded 00:31:24.380 --> 00:31:26.720 by approaching Ottoman reinforcements, without 00:31:26.720 --> 00:31:29.319 access to the water pipeline, he might lose the 00:31:29.319 --> 00:31:32.660 entire mounted force. Fear completely overrides 00:31:32.660 --> 00:31:36.579 the reality on the ground. At 1810, Dobell and 00:31:36.579 --> 00:31:38.799 Chetwode, who are completely unaware that Ali 00:31:38.799 --> 00:31:41.039 -Muntar has been fully secured and the garrison 00:31:41.039 --> 00:31:44.259 is breaking, make the most fateful decision of 00:31:44.259 --> 00:31:46.799 the campaign. The big mistake. They conclude 00:31:46.799 --> 00:31:49.339 that Gaza cannot be completely taken before dark. 00:31:49.640 --> 00:31:52.519 And so Chetwo issues the order to General Chevelle, 00:31:52.980 --> 00:31:55.460 break off the action, withdraw the entire mounted 00:31:55.460 --> 00:31:58.500 force, retire across the Wadigooza. The fatal 00:31:58.500 --> 00:32:01.740 order, snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. 00:32:02.559 --> 00:32:04.680 General Chevelle receives this order while his 00:32:04.680 --> 00:32:06.660 men are standing victorious in the streets of 00:32:06.660 --> 00:32:08.900 the town they just bled to capture. Unbelievable. 00:32:09.339 --> 00:32:11.839 According to some historical accounts, Chevelle 00:32:11.839 --> 00:32:14.500 protested the order strongly, arguing that they 00:32:14.500 --> 00:32:17.039 had essentially won, though the official British 00:32:17.039 --> 00:32:19.740 records conveniently note there's no written 00:32:19.740 --> 00:32:22.900 record of his protest. Of course not. But regardless 00:32:22.900 --> 00:32:25.640 of his objections, orders from the desert column 00:32:25.640 --> 00:32:29.660 are orders. The withdrawal begins, and it is 00:32:29.660 --> 00:32:33.799 slow, confusing, and absolutely agonizing. It's 00:32:33.799 --> 00:32:36.420 a logistical nightmare to disengage a fighting 00:32:36.420 --> 00:32:38.839 force in the dark, especially in an environment 00:32:38.839 --> 00:32:40.940 like the Labyrinth. Trying to find your way back 00:32:40.940 --> 00:32:43.160 through the cactus. The dismounted troops are 00:32:43.160 --> 00:32:45.940 heavily intermixed. Some units, like the 7th 00:32:45.940 --> 00:32:48.519 Light Horse Regiment, are nearly four miles away 00:32:48.519 --> 00:32:50.359 from where their horses are being held in the 00:32:50.359 --> 00:32:52.980 rear. They have to walk those four miles in the 00:32:52.980 --> 00:32:55.259 pitch black hacking back through the cactus maze 00:32:55.259 --> 00:32:57.720 while desperately trying to locate and collect 00:32:57.720 --> 00:33:00.259 all their wounded comrades and transport the 00:33:00.259 --> 00:33:02.200 hundreds of prisoners they just captured. Must 00:33:02.200 --> 00:33:05.059 have taken forever. It takes hours of miserable, 00:33:05.119 --> 00:33:08.019 exhausted effort. But the withdrawal of the cavalry 00:33:08.019 --> 00:33:10.460 is only the first half of the disaster. The second 00:33:10.460 --> 00:33:13.039 half is a communication breakdown so catastrophic 00:33:13.039 --> 00:33:15.599 it belongs in a textbook on organizational failure. 00:33:16.059 --> 00:33:17.700 Okay, let's look at the timeline of this phone 00:33:17.700 --> 00:33:20.900 call because it's unbelievable. It is 1900, seven 00:33:20.900 --> 00:33:23.279 o 'clock at night. The cavalry in the north is 00:33:23.279 --> 00:33:26.700 pulling back. General Chetwode, still miles in 00:33:26.700 --> 00:33:29.259 the rear, gets on the field telephone to call 00:33:29.259 --> 00:33:32.230 General Dallas. the commander of the 53rd Welsh, 00:33:32.690 --> 00:33:35.509 who is sitting squarely on top of the captured 00:33:35.509 --> 00:33:38.289 Ali -Muntar Hill. Right. He's holding the prize. 00:33:39.089 --> 00:33:41.849 Chetwood tells Dallas that the cavalry is withdrawing, 00:33:42.049 --> 00:33:44.410 and because of that, Dallas' right flank is going 00:33:44.410 --> 00:33:47.039 to be exposed to the dark. So Chetwood gives 00:33:47.039 --> 00:33:49.220 him an order to adjust his defensive lines for 00:33:49.220 --> 00:33:51.460 the night. He tells Dallas to move his right 00:33:51.460 --> 00:33:54.799 flank back to gain touch with the 54th division. 00:33:55.119 --> 00:33:58.599 Gain touch. It's a remarkably vague phrase spoken 00:33:58.599 --> 00:34:01.240 over a degraded, crackly copper wire stretched 00:34:01.240 --> 00:34:03.759 across miles of active battlefield. It's just 00:34:03.759 --> 00:34:06.140 terrible phrasing. To understand why this fails, 00:34:06.359 --> 00:34:08.539 we have to look at the two vastly different realities 00:34:08.539 --> 00:34:11.289 these men are operating in. Chetwood, looking 00:34:11.289 --> 00:34:14.190 at his static headquarters map, assumes the 54th 00:34:14.190 --> 00:34:16.829 division is positioned relatively close to Dallas's 00:34:16.829 --> 00:34:19.170 current position, maybe a mile north of a spot 00:34:19.170 --> 00:34:21.329 called Mancira. There's just a slight adjustment 00:34:21.329 --> 00:34:24.090 to him. So in Chetwood's mind, gain touch simply 00:34:24.090 --> 00:34:26.469 means Dallas needs to bend his defensive line 00:34:26.469 --> 00:34:29.530 back slightly, maybe a mile, to link up and form 00:34:29.530 --> 00:34:32.269 a continuous front. But Dallas, on the ground, 00:34:32.530 --> 00:34:35.030 has outdated information about where the 54th 00:34:35.030 --> 00:34:38.170 actually is. He thinks the 54th division is still 00:34:38.170 --> 00:34:40.940 way back at a place called Shake… which is four 00:34:40.940 --> 00:34:43.880 miles to the rear. Precisely. So when Dallas 00:34:43.880 --> 00:34:47.039 hears the order, gain touch with the 54th, he 00:34:47.039 --> 00:34:49.559 translates that in his head to mean, abandon 00:34:49.559 --> 00:34:52.559 everything you just captured, including the vital 00:34:52.559 --> 00:34:55.239 heights of Ali -Muntar, and retreat four miles 00:34:55.239 --> 00:34:57.460 back into the desert. Dallas actually protests 00:34:57.460 --> 00:35:00.320 this over the phone. He realizes how insane it 00:35:00.320 --> 00:35:02.739 is to give up the hill. He asks for reinforcements 00:35:02.739 --> 00:35:04.659 to hold the position instead of retreating. Because 00:35:04.659 --> 00:35:06.840 he knows he's holding the key to the city. But 00:35:06.840 --> 00:35:09.489 Chet Wode... oblivious to Dallas's misunderstanding 00:35:09.489 --> 00:35:12.210 of the map, denies the reinforcements and repeats 00:35:12.210 --> 00:35:14.869 the order verbally. And because of this massive 00:35:14.869 --> 00:35:17.969 tragic misunderstanding over a faulty wire, Dallas 00:35:17.969 --> 00:35:21.429 issues orders at 22 .30 for his entire force 00:35:21.429 --> 00:35:24.219 to withdraw. It's heartbreaking. The 53rd Welsh 00:35:24.219 --> 00:35:26.639 Division physically abandons the high ground 00:35:26.639 --> 00:35:29.900 they just sacrificed, over 500 dead and wounded 00:35:29.900 --> 00:35:32.800 men to capture. They pack up their gear and walk 00:35:32.800 --> 00:35:34.940 away from the prize in the pitch black. And here 00:35:34.940 --> 00:35:37.280 is the ultimate irony, the detail that makes 00:35:37.280 --> 00:35:39.840 this entire sequence so excruciating to analyze. 00:35:40.380 --> 00:35:43.900 At 23 -0, just 30 minutes after Dallas issues 00:35:43.900 --> 00:35:46.739 the retreat order, and as the infantry is actively 00:35:46.739 --> 00:35:49.880 walking away from the hill, General Dobell at 00:35:49.880 --> 00:35:52.460 Eastern Force headquarters receives a delayed 00:35:53.179 --> 00:35:55.119 intercepted a wireless message. What did the 00:35:55.119 --> 00:35:57.619 message say? It was a direct communication between 00:35:57.619 --> 00:36:00.019 the Ottoman commander Kress von Kressenstein 00:36:00.019 --> 00:36:02.719 and Major Tiller, the German officer commanding 00:36:02.719 --> 00:36:05.920 the Gaza garrison. The intercepted message clearly 00:36:05.920 --> 00:36:08.300 and unequivocally indicated that the Gaza garrison 00:36:08.300 --> 00:36:10.619 was completely out of ammunition in a desperate 00:36:10.619 --> 00:36:13.099 situation and on the verge of total collapse. 00:36:13.159 --> 00:36:15.159 They were giving up. It was the hard proof that 00:36:15.159 --> 00:36:17.920 the British had won. Dobel reads this intercept 00:36:17.920 --> 00:36:20.280 and immediately realizes the massive error he 00:36:20.280 --> 00:36:23.019 has made. He sends frantic, urgent orders to 00:36:23.019 --> 00:36:25.000 Chetwood and Dallas to cancel the withdrawal, 00:36:25.460 --> 00:36:27.679 to dig in and to hold their captured positions 00:36:27.679 --> 00:36:31.179 at all costs. But it's too late. The momentum 00:36:31.179 --> 00:36:33.800 is completely gone. The troops are already moving 00:36:33.800 --> 00:36:36.360 back into the desert. The communication lag was 00:36:36.360 --> 00:36:38.900 just too great. So the sun comes up the next 00:36:38.900 --> 00:36:42.409 day, March 27th. The morning hangover. What do 00:36:42.409 --> 00:36:45.309 the commanders do when the Sun reveals the magnitude 00:36:45.309 --> 00:36:48.690 of their mistake? Panic, essentially. At 5 a 00:36:48.690 --> 00:36:51.599 .m. Chetwood finally learns the truth. Dallas 00:36:51.599 --> 00:36:53.739 didn't just bend his line back. He completely 00:36:53.739 --> 00:36:56.639 abandoned the entirety of the Ali -Muntar Ridge. 00:36:56.900 --> 00:36:59.079 He gave up the whole thing. Chetwood frantically 00:36:59.079 --> 00:37:01.280 issues counter orders for the infantry to turn 00:37:01.280 --> 00:37:04.199 around and immediately reoccupy the exact positions 00:37:04.199 --> 00:37:07.739 they had just left. The exhausted 53rd and 54th 00:37:07.739 --> 00:37:10.519 divisions send patrols pushing back up the slopes. 00:37:10.639 --> 00:37:12.159 Marching right back up the hill, they just walk 00:37:12.159 --> 00:37:14.199 down. And initially in the early morning light, 00:37:14.400 --> 00:37:16.909 they find the hill unoccupied. Some companies 00:37:16.909 --> 00:37:19.010 of the Essex Regiment actually managed to climb 00:37:19.010 --> 00:37:21.889 back up and reoccupy Alimantar and a neighboring 00:37:21.889 --> 00:37:24.510 crest called Green Hill. But the window of opportunity 00:37:24.510 --> 00:37:28.010 has slammed shut. By daylight, the Ottoman reinforcements, 00:37:28.489 --> 00:37:30.349 those thousands of troops that the cavalry and 00:37:30.349 --> 00:37:32.289 armored cars that so brilliantly held off the 00:37:32.289 --> 00:37:34.909 night before, realize the British have left the 00:37:34.909 --> 00:37:37.329 door open. They see the mistake. They simply 00:37:37.329 --> 00:37:40.050 walk forward. They flood into the empty trenches 00:37:40.050 --> 00:37:42.090 that the Welsh had abandoned. When the British 00:37:42.090 --> 00:37:44.090 attempt to properly counterattack to take the 00:37:44.090 --> 00:37:46.309 hill back for a second time, they aren't fighting 00:37:46.309 --> 00:37:49.329 a broken garrison. They are hit by fresh, heavily 00:37:49.329 --> 00:37:52.010 armed Ottoman troops and coordinated artillery 00:37:52.010 --> 00:37:54.710 fire. It's a completely different fight now. 00:37:54.949 --> 00:37:57.809 The British suffer severe, rapid losses and are 00:37:57.809 --> 00:38:00.719 completely repulsed. By the end of the day, on 00:38:00.719 --> 00:38:04.099 March 27th, Dobell realizes the situation is 00:38:04.099 --> 00:38:07.219 entirely hopeless. He issues orders for the complete, 00:38:07.539 --> 00:38:09.860 humiliating withdrawal of the entire British 00:38:09.860 --> 00:38:13.639 force back across the Wadigooza. The final casualty 00:38:13.639 --> 00:38:16.429 figures underscore the tragedy. The British suffered 00:38:16.429 --> 00:38:20.070 roughly 4 ,000 casualties, including 523 dead 00:38:20.070 --> 00:38:22.690 and over 500 missing, many of whom were wounded 00:38:22.690 --> 00:38:24.909 men taken prisoner during the highly confused 00:38:24.909 --> 00:38:26.989 night retreat through the cactus hedges. Those 00:38:26.989 --> 00:38:29.190 poor guys in the labyrinth. The Ottoman forces 00:38:29.190 --> 00:38:33.050 suffered around 2 ,447 casualties. The British 00:38:33.050 --> 00:38:35.730 had expended over 300 heavy artillery shells 00:38:35.730 --> 00:38:39.050 and an astounding 150 ,000 rounds of small arms 00:38:39.050 --> 00:38:41.989 ammunition to capture a fortress, only to voluntarily 00:38:41.989 --> 00:38:44.829 hand it right back to the enemy. And the aftermath? 00:38:45.099 --> 00:38:47.920 The way the leadership handles this, it's just 00:38:47.920 --> 00:38:51.639 a master class in toxic self -preservation. The 00:38:51.639 --> 00:38:53.800 spin is unbelievable. You have General Murray 00:38:53.800 --> 00:38:56.219 and General Dobell sending official telegrams 00:38:56.219 --> 00:38:59.800 to the war office in London claiming a brilliant 00:38:59.800 --> 00:39:02.400 victory. A brilliant victory. Murray literally 00:39:02.400 --> 00:39:05.219 writes, we inflicted very heavy losses upon him. 00:39:05.659 --> 00:39:08.699 All troops behave splendidly. Dobell writes in 00:39:08.699 --> 00:39:10.920 his official report that, had the early part 00:39:10.920 --> 00:39:12.820 of the day been normal, victory would have been 00:39:12.820 --> 00:39:15.139 secured. Blaming the weather. He blames the morning 00:39:15.139 --> 00:39:17.860 fog completely, entirely ignoring the catastrophic 00:39:17.860 --> 00:39:20.539 communication failures, the misunderstood phone 00:39:20.539 --> 00:39:23.179 calls, and his own panic decision to withdraw 00:39:23.179 --> 00:39:25.219 a victorious army because the sun went down. 00:39:25.309 --> 00:39:28.610 They try to sell this absolute unmitigated disaster 00:39:28.610 --> 00:39:31.670 as a triumph of British arms. Which is deeply 00:39:31.670 --> 00:39:33.789 indicative of the culture of high command at 00:39:33.789 --> 00:39:36.030 the time. There was immense political pressure 00:39:36.030 --> 00:39:38.690 from London to show positive results, especially 00:39:38.690 --> 00:39:41.010 with the war bogging down into a bloody stalemate 00:39:41.010 --> 00:39:43.460 on the Western Front. They needed a win. Admitting 00:39:43.460 --> 00:39:45.639 that they ordered a victorious army to retreat 00:39:45.639 --> 00:39:48.039 because of a misunderstood phone call and a fear 00:39:48.039 --> 00:39:50.500 of the dark was politically impossible for Murray. 00:39:51.159 --> 00:39:54.380 He had to construct a narrative of success, but 00:39:54.380 --> 00:39:57.440 the delusion of their own reporting had dire 00:39:57.440 --> 00:40:00.500 immediate consequences. Right. because they believed 00:40:00.500 --> 00:40:03.219 their own lies. Because they convinced themselves, 00:40:03.340 --> 00:40:05.900 and London, that they were on the very verge 00:40:05.900 --> 00:40:08.840 of taking Gaza, it led directly to the Second 00:40:08.840 --> 00:40:11.460 Battle of Gaza just a few weeks later in April. 00:40:11.480 --> 00:40:13.199 And the Second Battle was even worse, wasn't 00:40:13.199 --> 00:40:15.780 it? Much worse. Because the Ottomans had time 00:40:15.780 --> 00:40:18.599 to reinforce the city massively. The Second Battle 00:40:18.599 --> 00:40:22.440 of Gaza was a disastrous World War I -style frontal 00:40:22.440 --> 00:40:25.360 assault against heavily fortified trenches. It 00:40:25.360 --> 00:40:27.820 failed completely, cost even more lives than 00:40:27.820 --> 00:40:30.300 the first attempt, and eventually led to both 00:40:30.300 --> 00:40:32.780 Murray and Dobell being quietly relieved of their 00:40:32.780 --> 00:40:35.619 commands. I think the ultimate insult, the detail 00:40:35.619 --> 00:40:38.199 that truly caps off this tragic comedy, comes 00:40:38.199 --> 00:40:41.039 from the Ottomans themselves. A few days after 00:40:41.039 --> 00:40:43.059 the battle, while the British press in London 00:40:43.059 --> 00:40:45.260 is printing all these sanitized reports of a 00:40:45.260 --> 00:40:47.260 great Middle Eastern success based on Murray's 00:40:47.260 --> 00:40:50.139 telegrams, an Ottoman airplane flies over the 00:40:50.139 --> 00:40:53.159 British lines. Oh, the message dropped. And the 00:40:53.159 --> 00:40:55.559 pilot drops a physical message down into the 00:40:55.559 --> 00:40:58.079 British camp. The message reads, you beat us 00:40:58.079 --> 00:41:01.559 at communiques, but we beat you at Gaza. With 00:41:01.559 --> 00:41:03.889 absolute audacity. But they were right. They 00:41:03.889 --> 00:41:06.409 were entirely right. And that message synthesizes 00:41:06.409 --> 00:41:09.150 the grand lessons of this battle perfectly. You 00:41:09.150 --> 00:41:11.550 can engineer the greatest logistical miracle 00:41:11.550 --> 00:41:15.130 in the world. You can lay 388 miles of railway 00:41:15.130 --> 00:41:17.570 across a desert. You can pump water from the 00:41:17.570 --> 00:41:20.510 Nile. You can execute a brilliant cavalry encirclement 00:41:20.510 --> 00:41:23.849 under the cover of fog. But warfare, like any 00:41:23.849 --> 00:41:26.449 massive organizational effort, is fundamentally 00:41:26.449 --> 00:41:28.989 a human endeavor. And if the humans in charge 00:41:28.989 --> 00:41:31.530 cannot communicate a clear shared reality to 00:41:31.530 --> 00:41:33.769 one another, if the map in the general's tent 00:41:33.769 --> 00:41:36.010 does not match the blood and mud on the soldier's 00:41:36.010 --> 00:41:38.590 boots, all that engineering, all that technology, 00:41:38.730 --> 00:41:41.010 and all that bravery amounts to nothing. That 00:41:41.010 --> 00:41:43.170 is the ultimate takeaway for you here today. 00:41:43.500 --> 00:41:46.699 The First Battle of Gaza wasn't lost by the soldiers 00:41:46.699 --> 00:41:48.800 hacking through the cactus hedges with machetes. 00:41:49.320 --> 00:41:51.820 It wasn't lost by the armored cars holding the 00:41:51.820 --> 00:41:54.340 line against cavalry in the dark. It was lost 00:41:54.340 --> 00:41:57.519 by a fog -induced delay, an institutional fear 00:41:57.519 --> 00:42:00.539 of the dark, and a tragically misunderstood phone 00:42:00.539 --> 00:42:05.719 call. It is a profound historical lesson in the 00:42:05.719 --> 00:42:07.619 illusion of control. You can have all the data, 00:42:07.840 --> 00:42:09.880 all the resources, and all the manpower, but 00:42:09.880 --> 00:42:11.719 if you don't communicate clearly with the person 00:42:11.719 --> 00:42:14.320 on the exact other end of the line, you lose 00:42:14.320 --> 00:42:16.920 the whole thing. Precisely. It highlights the 00:42:16.920 --> 00:42:20.119 friction of war, the way small errors, a delayed 00:42:20.119 --> 00:42:23.340 headquarters, a cracked telephone wire, a vague 00:42:23.340 --> 00:42:26.420 phrase compound into systemic catastrophic failures. 00:42:26.900 --> 00:42:29.139 And it forces us to look at our own systems of 00:42:29.139 --> 00:42:31.519 communication, our own organizational structures, 00:42:31.579 --> 00:42:34.139 and ask where our own field telephones might 00:42:34.139 --> 00:42:36.739 be dropping the signal. Exactly. And I want to 00:42:36.739 --> 00:42:38.420 leave you with a final thought to mull over, 00:42:38.679 --> 00:42:40.539 something to explore on your own that built on 00:42:40.539 --> 00:42:42.559 everything we've just uncovered. Think about 00:42:42.559 --> 00:42:45.059 that precise moment General Dobell received that 00:42:45.059 --> 00:42:48.840 delayed intercepted wireless message at 23000. 00:42:49.239 --> 00:42:51.699 The intercept. The message confirming the Ottoman 00:42:51.699 --> 00:42:54.340 garrison was out of ammo, desperate and ready 00:42:54.340 --> 00:42:57.139 to surrender. He read that hard proof of victory 00:42:57.139 --> 00:43:00.159 just hours after he had personally ordered his 00:43:00.159 --> 00:43:03.039 own victorious army to turn around and walk away 00:43:03.039 --> 00:43:05.949 into the night. It makes you wonder how many 00:43:05.949 --> 00:43:08.550 times in our own lives, in our careers, or in 00:43:08.550 --> 00:43:11.030 history have we completely abandoned a pursuit 00:43:11.030 --> 00:43:13.969 just moments before the invisible breaking point 00:43:13.969 --> 00:43:16.750 of success, simply because we couldn't see through 00:43:16.750 --> 00:43:19.329 our own proverbial fog. A haunting thought. It 00:43:19.329 --> 00:43:21.889 really is. Thank you so much for joining us on 00:43:21.889 --> 00:43:24.349 this deep dive. Until next time, keep questioning 00:43:24.349 --> 00:43:26.690 the narrative and always double check your communications.