WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:02.680 Welcome to the Deep Dive. We are thrilled you're 00:00:02.680 --> 00:00:05.200 here with us today. Our mission, well, we're 00:00:05.200 --> 00:00:06.799 taking something that sounds like it belongs 00:00:06.799 --> 00:00:09.460 in a geopolitical thriller, honestly, and we're 00:00:09.460 --> 00:00:12.220 going to demystify what it actually means for 00:00:12.220 --> 00:00:14.339 you. Yeah, for you, for the country, and really 00:00:14.339 --> 00:00:15.740 just for the way our government operates day 00:00:15.740 --> 00:00:20.620 to day. Exactly. So today we're exploring a dense, 00:00:20.640 --> 00:00:23.820 somewhat arcane, but incredibly consequential 00:00:23.820 --> 00:00:27.160 Wikipedia article on the nuclear option in the 00:00:27.160 --> 00:00:30.399 United States Senate. Our goal is to explain 00:00:30.399 --> 00:00:32.520 how this very dramatic sounding parliamentary 00:00:32.520 --> 00:00:34.799 procedure works. Right. We want to trace its 00:00:34.799 --> 00:00:38.899 history and show how. A pretty simple procedural 00:00:38.899 --> 00:00:41.439 loophole has just completely reshaped American 00:00:41.439 --> 00:00:43.799 politics. It really has. But before we dive in, 00:00:43.840 --> 00:00:45.420 we need to make something very clear right up 00:00:45.420 --> 00:00:47.439 front. A strict disclaimer for you listening, 00:00:47.500 --> 00:00:50.259 because this history involves, you know, intense 00:00:50.259 --> 00:00:52.439 battles between Democrats and Republicans. Highly 00:00:52.439 --> 00:00:54.399 politically charged events. Highly charged, yes. 00:00:54.500 --> 00:00:56.960 So we are keeping our own politics entirely out 00:00:56.960 --> 00:00:58.780 of it today. We take absolutely no sides. We 00:00:58.780 --> 00:01:00.640 do not endorse any of the political viewpoints 00:01:00.640 --> 00:01:03.340 mentioned. None at all. We are strictly here 00:01:03.340 --> 00:01:06.340 to impartially convey the factual history and 00:01:06.340 --> 00:01:09.420 the ideas exactly as they are contained within 00:01:09.420 --> 00:01:12.180 the provided source text. Just the data, the 00:01:12.180 --> 00:01:14.219 timeline, and the parliamentary chess moves. 00:01:14.400 --> 00:01:15.939 That's the most productive way to look at this, 00:01:15.980 --> 00:01:17.819 I think. We aren't here to say these maneuvers 00:01:17.819 --> 00:01:19.159 were right or wrong. It's just a fascinating 00:01:19.159 --> 00:01:21.439 look at the institutional psychology of the Senate. 00:01:21.599 --> 00:01:23.739 Yeah, how a changer that was originally designed 00:01:23.739 --> 00:01:27.849 around consensus has slowly... Sort of transformed 00:01:27.849 --> 00:01:30.349 into a majoritarian one. Right. And speaking 00:01:30.349 --> 00:01:32.069 of that transformation, let me drop a little 00:01:32.069 --> 00:01:34.090 teaser for you before we get into the actual 00:01:34.090 --> 00:01:36.629 weeds of the parliamentary procedure. You know 00:01:36.629 --> 00:01:39.329 it as the nuclear option. But originally, back 00:01:39.329 --> 00:01:42.709 in 2003, one senator actually wanted to call 00:01:42.709 --> 00:01:45.799 this maneuver. Wait for it. Hulk. Hulk. It's 00:01:45.799 --> 00:01:48.159 incredible. I mean, it really paints a vivid 00:01:48.159 --> 00:01:51.519 picture of what this procedure does to the existing 00:01:51.519 --> 00:01:54.079 Senate rules, right? It does. It's essentially 00:01:54.079 --> 00:01:57.359 a mechanism of brute force applied to a system 00:01:57.359 --> 00:02:00.159 of tradition. OK, let's unpack this. What exactly 00:02:00.159 --> 00:02:03.659 is the nuclear option? I mean, for an audience 00:02:03.659 --> 00:02:06.480 that already follows politics, we know that invoking 00:02:06.480 --> 00:02:10.580 cloture to end debate on a measure normally requires 00:02:10.580 --> 00:02:13.860 a three fifths. Super majority. Which is 60 votes 00:02:13.860 --> 00:02:16.960 in the modern Senate. 60 votes. Right. So the 00:02:16.960 --> 00:02:19.900 nuclear option is the procedural workaround that 00:02:19.900 --> 00:02:23.099 allows the majority party to bypass that 60 vote 00:02:23.099 --> 00:02:26.000 hurdle and just end debate with a simple majority 00:02:26.000 --> 00:02:30.770 of 51 votes or 50 plus. the vice president. Yeah, 00:02:30.830 --> 00:02:33.030 that's the core of it. But the mechanics of how 00:02:33.030 --> 00:02:36.069 they actually pull that off, that's where it 00:02:36.069 --> 00:02:38.370 gets complicated. It's entirely based on exploiting 00:02:38.370 --> 00:02:40.430 the appeals process. Like a loophole. Exactly 00:02:40.430 --> 00:02:42.150 like a loophole. It's a multi -step sequence 00:02:42.150 --> 00:02:45.210 of parliamentary gymnastics. So first, a senator 00:02:45.210 --> 00:02:47.349 raises what's called a point of order. And this 00:02:47.349 --> 00:02:49.430 point of order directly contradicts the written 00:02:49.430 --> 00:02:52.110 rule. Okay. They might stand up and say, I raise 00:02:52.110 --> 00:02:53.969 a point of order that the vote on cloture for 00:02:53.969 --> 00:02:56.520 this nomination is by majority vote. Which flies 00:02:56.520 --> 00:02:58.500 directly in the face of the standing rulebook 00:02:58.500 --> 00:03:00.919 sitting right there on the presiding officer's 00:03:00.919 --> 00:03:03.159 desk. Right there in front of them. So the presiding 00:03:03.159 --> 00:03:05.719 officer has no choice but to look at the rulebook, 00:03:05.860 --> 00:03:08.400 see the 60 vote requirement, and overrule the 00:03:08.400 --> 00:03:10.639 senator's point of order. Because they have to 00:03:10.639 --> 00:03:12.819 stick to the established rules and precedents. 00:03:12.939 --> 00:03:16.620 That is step two. But step three is the actual 00:03:16.620 --> 00:03:19.300 trigger. The senator who raised the point of 00:03:19.300 --> 00:03:22.120 order immediately appeals the ruling of the presiding 00:03:22.120 --> 00:03:25.949 officer. And under Senate procedure, an appeal 00:03:25.949 --> 00:03:28.689 regarding a non -debatable question, an ending 00:03:28.689 --> 00:03:31.569 debate, which is what cloture is, is inherently 00:03:31.569 --> 00:03:34.889 non -debatable. That appeal must be decided immediately 00:03:34.889 --> 00:03:37.750 without any further debate. I see. And here is 00:03:37.750 --> 00:03:40.590 the crucial part. Sustaining or overturning the 00:03:40.590 --> 00:03:43.729 chair's ruling on an appeal only requires a simple 00:03:43.729 --> 00:03:46.719 majority vote. So the majority party simply bands 00:03:46.719 --> 00:03:49.060 together and votes to overturn the presiding 00:03:49.060 --> 00:03:51.180 officer's ruling. Exactly. So it's basically 00:03:51.180 --> 00:03:52.520 like if you're playing a board game with your 00:03:52.520 --> 00:03:54.099 friends and the rule book clearly says you need 00:03:54.099 --> 00:03:56.759 67 points to change a rule. Right. But the group 00:03:56.759 --> 00:03:58.740 gets frustrated. So they simply take a majority 00:03:58.740 --> 00:04:00.960 vote to just ignore the rule book for the rest 00:04:00.960 --> 00:04:03.860 of the game. That is a perfect analogy. Because 00:04:03.860 --> 00:04:06.360 formally rewriting a Senate rule would require 00:04:06.360 --> 00:04:10.319 67 votes. The nuclear option sidesteps that entirely. 00:04:10.500 --> 00:04:13.020 They leave the actual text of the rule book untouched. 00:04:13.060 --> 00:04:15.539 Right. But they create a binding, simple majority 00:04:15.539 --> 00:04:18.240 precedent that essentially says from now on. 00:04:18.600 --> 00:04:20.879 We interpret this rule to mean something else 00:04:20.879 --> 00:04:23.720 entirely. It's wild. And doing that obviously 00:04:23.720 --> 00:04:25.939 escalates tensions dramatically in the chamber, 00:04:26.060 --> 00:04:28.240 which brings us back to the terminology we teased 00:04:28.240 --> 00:04:31.500 earlier. The Hulk option. Yes, Hulk. So Republican 00:04:31.500 --> 00:04:34.379 Senator Ted Stevens suggested using this maneuver 00:04:34.379 --> 00:04:37.439 in February 2003 to push through judicial nominees. 00:04:37.620 --> 00:04:40.740 And his code word for the plan was Hulk. Smashing 00:04:40.740 --> 00:04:42.720 the rules. Yeah. But then a few weeks later, 00:04:42.860 --> 00:04:46.660 in March 2003, Senator Trent Lott coined the 00:04:46.660 --> 00:04:49.920 term nuclear option. And that term stuck because 00:04:49.920 --> 00:04:51.839 it reflects the sheer gravity of the maneuver. 00:04:52.079 --> 00:04:54.300 The metaphor implies that if the majority party 00:04:54.300 --> 00:04:57.160 unilaterally imposes a change to the rules through 00:04:57.160 --> 00:04:59.600 this loophole, it is the ultimate escalation. 00:04:59.660 --> 00:05:01.959 Because the fear was that it would provoke massive 00:05:01.959 --> 00:05:04.420 scorched earth retaliation from the minority 00:05:04.420 --> 00:05:07.220 party, essentially blowing up all normal collegial 00:05:07.220 --> 00:05:10.449 relations in the Senate. Exactly. Though, it 00:05:10.449 --> 00:05:12.790 is worth noting that proponents of the maneuver 00:05:12.790 --> 00:05:15.730 often prefer a totally different term. They call 00:05:15.730 --> 00:05:17.949 it the constitutional option. The constitutional 00:05:17.949 --> 00:05:20.370 option. OK, why? This usually comes up regarding 00:05:20.370 --> 00:05:22.529 the confirmation of the president's executive 00:05:22.529 --> 00:05:25.750 and judicial nominees. The argument there is 00:05:25.750 --> 00:05:28.050 that the U .S. Constitution requires these nominations 00:05:28.050 --> 00:05:30.370 to receive the advice and consent of the Senate. 00:05:30.470 --> 00:05:33.149 Right. So proponents argue the Constitution implies 00:05:33.149 --> 00:05:36.629 the Senate should act by a simple majority vote 00:05:36.629 --> 00:05:39.949 for these duties, unless a supermajority is explicitly 00:05:39.949 --> 00:05:43.089 demanded by the text, like it is for ratifying 00:05:43.089 --> 00:05:45.819 treaties. For example, I see. So they view the 00:05:45.819 --> 00:05:48.100 supermajority requirement for nominees as an 00:05:48.100 --> 00:05:51.480 unconstitutional bottleneck. Exactly. Which naturally 00:05:51.480 --> 00:05:53.920 leads us to ask, why does the Senate even need 00:05:53.920 --> 00:05:56.399 60 votes in the first place? What is the origin 00:05:56.399 --> 00:05:59.279 story of this bottleneck? Well, the 60 vote rule 00:05:59.279 --> 00:06:01.800 is definitely not in the Constitution. In the 00:06:01.800 --> 00:06:04.100 early days, the Senate rules had no procedure 00:06:04.100 --> 00:06:07.240 to end debate at all. None. None. And that open 00:06:07.240 --> 00:06:10.009 ended structure. gave birth to the filibuster, 00:06:10.110 --> 00:06:12.970 the practice of blocking a bill by just talking 00:06:12.970 --> 00:06:16.750 endlessly. It wasn't until 1917 that the Senate 00:06:16.750 --> 00:06:19.829 finally introduced a procedure to invoke cloture, 00:06:19.949 --> 00:06:22.829 and they set the threshold at a two -thirds majority. 00:06:23.490 --> 00:06:27.670 Then decades later, in 1975, they lowered it 00:06:27.670 --> 00:06:30.769 to three -fifths, which gives us the modern 60 00:06:30.769 --> 00:06:33.279 -vote threshold. But the way the filibuster was 00:06:33.279 --> 00:06:35.839 actually utilized changed dramatically around 00:06:35.839 --> 00:06:38.560 that same time, right? Because senators weren't 00:06:38.560 --> 00:06:40.620 standing at our desks reading the phone book 00:06:40.620 --> 00:06:42.980 for 24 hours straight anymore. What's fascinating 00:06:42.980 --> 00:06:44.980 here is the introduction of the two -track system 00:06:44.980 --> 00:06:48.639 in the 1970s. Before this, a filibuster brought 00:06:48.639 --> 00:06:51.759 all Senate business to a grinding halt. Nothing 00:06:51.759 --> 00:06:53.779 else could happen. Just total gridlock. Right. 00:06:53.839 --> 00:06:56.019 So the two -track system allowed the Senate to 00:06:56.019 --> 00:06:58.740 continue working on other legislation while one 00:06:58.740 --> 00:07:01.180 specific item was being filibustered in the background. 00:07:01.610 --> 00:07:03.790 Oh, wow. So it basically made the filibuster 00:07:03.790 --> 00:07:06.550 painless for the person doing it? Because senators 00:07:06.550 --> 00:07:08.689 no longer had to physically hold the floor and 00:07:08.689 --> 00:07:11.209 exhaust themselves, the mere threat of a filibuster 00:07:11.209 --> 00:07:14.310 was enough to stall a bill. Exactly. And because 00:07:14.310 --> 00:07:17.139 it became painless, it became the default. That 00:07:17.139 --> 00:07:19.600 makes total sense. That psychological shift is 00:07:19.600 --> 00:07:21.839 why almost any major measure in the modern Senate 00:07:21.839 --> 00:07:25.339 effectively requires 60 votes to advance. It 00:07:25.339 --> 00:07:27.819 went from being a rare emergency break to just 00:07:27.819 --> 00:07:30.000 the standard operating speed limit. And because 00:07:30.000 --> 00:07:32.720 formally changing that speed limit requires 67 00:07:32.720 --> 00:07:36.500 votes, the 60 vote threshold was locked in. That 00:07:36.500 --> 00:07:39.800 tension. Having a 60 vote reality in a fiercely 00:07:39.800 --> 00:07:42.920 partisan chamber is what fueled the arms race 00:07:42.920 --> 00:07:45.680 we see in the sources. The gradual dismantling 00:07:45.680 --> 00:07:48.399 of the supermajority requirements piece by piece. 00:07:48.480 --> 00:07:50.399 Yes. So let's trace that escalation timeline. 00:07:50.620 --> 00:07:53.319 The arms race. The groundwork was actually laid 00:07:53.319 --> 00:07:55.800 with a couple of early, somewhat minor precedents 00:07:55.800 --> 00:07:59.060 in the 1990s. Right. In 1995, Republican Senator 00:07:59.060 --> 00:08:01.339 Kay Bailey Hutchison used the appeal process 00:08:01.339 --> 00:08:03.819 to bypass a rule prohibiting legislative material 00:08:03.819 --> 00:08:06.319 and appropriations bills. This was specifically 00:08:06.319 --> 00:08:09.120 regarded. endangered species. And the Senate 00:08:09.120 --> 00:08:11.300 voted to overturn the chair. Though it's important 00:08:11.300 --> 00:08:13.279 to note they formally overturned that precedent 00:08:13.279 --> 00:08:16.779 in 1999 and restored the rule. True. And then 00:08:16.779 --> 00:08:19.399 in 1996, Republican Majority Leader Trent Lutt 00:08:19.399 --> 00:08:22.040 did something similar regarding provisions about 00:08:22.040 --> 00:08:24.740 FedEx in a conference report. And that precedent 00:08:24.740 --> 00:08:26.920 was also reversed later. So they were testing 00:08:26.920 --> 00:08:30.420 the procedural fences. Testing the fences. But... 00:08:30.589 --> 00:08:33.649 The modern era of the nuclear option really starts 00:08:33.649 --> 00:08:37.450 heating up in 2005. Yes. In 2005, Republican 00:08:37.450 --> 00:08:40.350 Majority Leader Bill Frist threatened to use 00:08:40.350 --> 00:08:43.250 the nuclear option to end Democratic filibusters 00:08:43.250 --> 00:08:46.529 of President George W. Bush's judicial nominees. 00:08:46.549 --> 00:08:49.759 OK. Democrats countered by threatening to obstruct 00:08:49.759 --> 00:08:52.360 all routine Senate business, to shut it down. 00:08:52.500 --> 00:08:54.919 And a massive confrontation was only avoided 00:08:54.919 --> 00:08:57.360 by the Gang of 14. Right, the Gang of 14. That 00:08:57.360 --> 00:08:59.659 was a coalition of seven Democratic and seven 00:08:59.659 --> 00:09:01.799 Republican senators. Right. They banded together, 00:09:02.039 --> 00:09:04.759 agreeing to oppose the nuclear option, and in 00:09:04.759 --> 00:09:07.320 exchange, agreeing not to filibuster judicial 00:09:07.320 --> 00:09:09.879 nominees, except in extraordinary circumstances. 00:09:10.360 --> 00:09:12.659 So they pulled the Senate back from the brink. 00:09:12.799 --> 00:09:14.940 For a while. For a while. But that truce was 00:09:14.940 --> 00:09:16.919 temporary. Here's where it gets really interesting. 00:09:17.320 --> 00:09:20.220 Fast forward to November 21st, 2013. The button 00:09:20.220 --> 00:09:22.980 actually gets pushed. It does. Democratic Majority 00:09:22.980 --> 00:09:25.740 Leader Harry Reid invoked the nuclear option 00:09:25.740 --> 00:09:28.539 to reduce the cloture threshold to a simple majority 00:09:28.539 --> 00:09:31.799 for lower court and executive nominations. He 00:09:31.799 --> 00:09:33.960 raised the point of order. The chair overruled 00:09:33.960 --> 00:09:36.879 him. He appealed. And the Senate voted 48 to 00:09:36.879 --> 00:09:39.759 52 to overturn the chair's ruling. The precedent 00:09:39.759 --> 00:09:42.610 was set. The Supreme Court was left explicitly 00:09:42.610 --> 00:09:45.610 exempt from this new precedent, but the 60 -vote 00:09:45.610 --> 00:09:47.529 threshold for the lower courts and the executive 00:09:47.529 --> 00:09:50.470 branch was gone. So let's look at the data and 00:09:50.470 --> 00:09:52.850 the context our sources provide for that 2013 00:09:52.850 --> 00:09:56.049 decision, keeping our strictly neutral lens here. 00:09:56.490 --> 00:09:58.610 Why did they do it? Well, the Democrats cited 00:09:58.610 --> 00:10:01.250 a massive backlog as their primary motivation. 00:10:01.850 --> 00:10:04.789 At the time of the vote, 59 executive branch 00:10:04.789 --> 00:10:07.470 nominees and 17 judicial nominees were waiting 00:10:07.470 --> 00:10:10.429 for confirmation. That is a lot. It is. And they 00:10:10.429 --> 00:10:12.029 were particularly frustrated that Republicans 00:10:12.029 --> 00:10:14.210 had filibustered three nominations to the United 00:10:14.210 --> 00:10:16.350 States Court of Appeals for this or to Columbia 00:10:16.350 --> 00:10:18.769 Circuit. The D .C. Circuit. OK, so what was the 00:10:18.769 --> 00:10:20.830 Republican counter argument regarding those D 00:10:20.830 --> 00:10:23.830 .C. Circuit seats? Impartially, the Republican 00:10:23.830 --> 00:10:25.909 argument was that the D .C. Circuit Court was 00:10:25.909 --> 00:10:29.190 underworked. They argued the number of judges 00:10:29.190 --> 00:10:32.289 in that specific circuit should actually be downsized 00:10:32.289 --> 00:10:35.169 to save costs, making the nominations unnecessary. 00:10:35.450 --> 00:10:38.549 Got it. And if we look at the broader data provided 00:10:38.549 --> 00:10:42.190 in the text, prior to this 2013 vote, there had 00:10:42.190 --> 00:10:46.789 been 168 cloture motions filed on nominations 00:10:46.789 --> 00:10:50.370 in entire Senate history. Wow. Nearly half of 00:10:50.370 --> 00:10:53.129 them, 82, were during the Obama administration 00:10:53.129 --> 00:10:56.429 compared to 38 during the preceding eight years 00:10:56.429 --> 00:10:58.940 under George W. Bush. Though our sources also 00:10:58.940 --> 00:11:01.000 make a point to note that cloture motions are 00:11:01.000 --> 00:11:03.179 sometimes filed preemptively by the majority 00:11:03.179 --> 00:11:06.120 just to speed up the calendar, not strictly because 00:11:06.120 --> 00:11:08.299 of a hostile filibuster. That's a crucial distinction. 00:11:08.580 --> 00:11:10.899 The confirmation success rates present a highly 00:11:10.899 --> 00:11:13.539 nuanced picture, too. Up to that point, Obama 00:11:13.539 --> 00:11:16.460 had won confirmation for 71 percent of his federal 00:11:16.460 --> 00:11:18.940 appeals court nominations compared to Bush's 00:11:18.940 --> 00:11:22.399 67 percent. For district courts, Obama had 83 00:11:22.399 --> 00:11:25.299 percent confirmed, while Bush had 95 percent 00:11:25.299 --> 00:11:28.080 in his first term. And Republicans pointed out 00:11:28.080 --> 00:11:31.759 that while filibusters were used on 20 of Obama's 00:11:31.759 --> 00:11:34.539 district court picks, they had ultimately allowed 00:11:34.539 --> 00:11:37.960 19 of those 20 to be confirmed before the nuclear 00:11:37.960 --> 00:11:40.899 option was invoked. So both sides clearly had 00:11:40.899 --> 00:11:43.980 their data. Both sides had their arguments. But 00:11:43.980 --> 00:11:45.940 the result was the same. The rules were fundamentally 00:11:45.940 --> 00:11:48.799 altered. Yes. And the nature of Senate precedent 00:11:48.799 --> 00:11:51.700 means that when you break a rule to gain an advantage, 00:11:51.960 --> 00:11:54.960 you leave that broken rule behind for your political 00:11:54.960 --> 00:11:57.399 opponents to use when the balance of power shifts. 00:11:57.679 --> 00:11:59.519 Which is exactly what happened. Right. Which 00:11:59.519 --> 00:12:02.379 brings us to the inevitable 2017 retaliation. 00:12:02.379 --> 00:12:05.779 On April 6th, 2017, Republicans were now in the 00:12:05.779 --> 00:12:08.460 majority. Senate Democrats were filibustering 00:12:08.460 --> 00:12:10.480 the nomination of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme 00:12:10.480 --> 00:12:13.820 Court. So Republican Majority Leader Mitch McConnell 00:12:13.820 --> 00:12:16.279 invoked to the nuclear option using the exact 00:12:16.279 --> 00:12:18.919 same procedural maneuver Harry Reid used four 00:12:18.919 --> 00:12:22.299 years prior. The vote was 48 to 52 to overturn 00:12:22.299 --> 00:12:25.059 the chair. The Supreme Court exception created 00:12:25.059 --> 00:12:28.259 in 2013 was eliminated and Neil Gorsuch was confirmed 00:12:28.259 --> 00:12:31.179 by a simple majority. And the arms race just 00:12:31.179 --> 00:12:34.529 continued to escalate from there. In 2019, the 00:12:34.529 --> 00:12:36.769 Republican majority Senate used the maneuver 00:12:36.769 --> 00:12:39.789 to drastically reduce the time allowed for postclosure 00:12:39.789 --> 00:12:42.590 debate. Right. For lower level nominations, they 00:12:42.590 --> 00:12:45.990 slashed the debate time from 30 hours down to 00:12:45.990 --> 00:12:48.750 just two hours, arguing the minority party was 00:12:48.750 --> 00:12:51.429 using that debate time simply to stall President 00:12:51.429 --> 00:12:54.309 Trump's nominees. And our sources bring us right 00:12:54.309 --> 00:12:57.330 up to 2025, detailing further tweaks under a 00:12:57.330 --> 00:13:00.279 Republican majority led by John Thune. Senate 00:13:00.279 --> 00:13:02.320 Democrats accused the Republicans of exercising 00:13:02.320 --> 00:13:05.200 the nuclear option three separate times for procedural 00:13:05.200 --> 00:13:07.220 maneuvers. What kind of maneuvers? Things like 00:13:07.220 --> 00:13:09.179 allowing consideration of joint resolutions under 00:13:09.179 --> 00:13:11.440 the Congressional Review Act, changing the budget 00:13:11.440 --> 00:13:13.620 baseline scoring for a piece of legislation called 00:13:13.620 --> 00:13:16.019 the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, and allowing 00:13:16.019 --> 00:13:18.000 the majority leader to group multiple nominations 00:13:18.000 --> 00:13:20.840 together in an en bloc consideration. Though 00:13:20.840 --> 00:13:23.080 the Republicans disputed that the nuclear label 00:13:23.080 --> 00:13:25.340 even applied to those specific parliamentary 00:13:25.340 --> 00:13:29.100 maneuvers, they argued they were procedural adjustments 00:13:29.100 --> 00:13:32.100 rather than foundational rule breaks. Right. 00:13:32.240 --> 00:13:35.080 But the debate itself shows how hyper -vigilant 00:13:35.080 --> 00:13:38.340 the institution has become regarding any majority 00:13:38.340 --> 00:13:41.200 -driven rule changes. It highlights a continuous 00:13:41.200 --> 00:13:44.000 erosion of minority power in the chamber. The 00:13:44.000 --> 00:13:47.179 boundaries of what requires consensus are constantly 00:13:47.179 --> 00:13:50.830 shrinking. Yes. So what does this all mean? We've 00:13:50.830 --> 00:13:53.429 seen the 60 vote threshold evaporate for executive 00:13:53.429 --> 00:13:56.250 branch nominees. We've seen it vanish for lower 00:13:56.250 --> 00:13:58.610 federal courts. We've seen it disappear for the 00:13:58.610 --> 00:14:01.529 Supreme Court. There is only one final frontier 00:14:01.529 --> 00:14:04.269 left. The legislative filibuster. The legislative 00:14:04.269 --> 00:14:07.509 filibuster. The rule governing actual laws. That 00:14:07.509 --> 00:14:09.470 is the looming threat over the Senate today. 00:14:09.789 --> 00:14:12.509 The legislative filibuster is the last major 00:14:12.509 --> 00:14:14.950 supermajority requirement standing. And looking 00:14:14.950 --> 00:14:17.490 neutrally at the recent history, both sides have 00:14:17.490 --> 00:14:19.769 faced intense internal pressure to push that 00:14:19.769 --> 00:14:22.110 final button. Oh, absolutely. During his presidency, 00:14:22.389 --> 00:14:24.929 Donald Trump repeatedly demanded that the Senate 00:14:24.929 --> 00:14:27.809 abolish the legislative filibuster so he could 00:14:27.809 --> 00:14:30.710 secure funding for his border wall. But the Republicans 00:14:30.710 --> 00:14:33.529 held the line on that one. Then Majority Leader 00:14:33.529 --> 00:14:36.110 Mitch McConnell refused to do it. And in April 00:14:36.110 --> 00:14:40.289 2017, a bipartisan coalition of 61 senators signed 00:14:40.289 --> 00:14:42.269 a letter explicitly stating their opposition 00:14:42.269 --> 00:14:44.870 to abolishing the legislative filibuster. And 00:14:44.870 --> 00:14:47.269 the Democrats faced similar internal pressure. 00:14:47.659 --> 00:14:51.340 In January 2022, Democratic Majority Leader Chuck 00:14:51.340 --> 00:14:54.159 Schumer attempted to use the nuclear option to 00:14:54.159 --> 00:14:56.620 create a carve out in the legislative filibuster 00:14:56.620 --> 00:14:59.720 to pass election reform and voting rights bills. 00:14:59.860 --> 00:15:02.159 Right. He raised a point of order to allow a 00:15:02.159 --> 00:15:04.659 talking filibuster on the legislation with a 00:15:04.659 --> 00:15:06.820 simple majority vote. But that attempt failed. 00:15:07.450 --> 00:15:10.110 Two Democratic senators, Joe Manchin and Kyrsten 00:15:10.110 --> 00:15:12.710 Sinema, voted with all the Republicans to sustain 00:15:12.710 --> 00:15:14.970 the ruling of the chair upholding the 60 vote 00:15:14.970 --> 00:15:17.690 rule. And yet the conversation continues to surface. 00:15:17.809 --> 00:15:20.970 In 2024, Kamala Harris proposed ending the filibuster 00:15:20.970 --> 00:15:23.370 specifically to pass abortion rights legislation. 00:15:24.110 --> 00:15:27.210 Whenever there is a massive, deeply held policy 00:15:27.210 --> 00:15:30.149 priority blocked by the minority, the temptation 00:15:30.149 --> 00:15:33.330 to use the procedural loophole flares back up. 00:15:33.450 --> 00:15:35.750 It's always right there. If we connect this to 00:15:35.750 --> 00:15:37.889 the bigger picture, this is why you listening 00:15:37.889 --> 00:15:40.309 right now should care deeply about this. It is 00:15:40.309 --> 00:15:42.750 incredibly easy to tune out parliamentary procedure. 00:15:43.009 --> 00:15:44.610 I mean, it sounds like inside baseball nonsense. 00:15:44.889 --> 00:15:48.779 It does. But this specific arcane loophole is 00:15:48.779 --> 00:15:51.720 the single bottleneck deciding how and if major 00:15:51.720 --> 00:15:54.320 laws get passed in the United States. It determines 00:15:54.320 --> 00:15:56.299 the fate of health care, voting rights, environmental 00:15:56.299 --> 00:15:59.399 regulations and taxes. The history of the nuclear 00:15:59.399 --> 00:16:02.220 option exposes a raw truth about our government. 00:16:02.460 --> 00:16:04.960 The rules are really only as strong as the majority's 00:16:04.960 --> 00:16:07.340 willingness to abide by them. It is a profound 00:16:07.340 --> 00:16:10.100 realization about the fragility of institutional 00:16:10.100 --> 00:16:13.480 norms. To summarize the journey we've taken through 00:16:13.480 --> 00:16:15.889 these sources, we started with a Senate. that 00:16:15.889 --> 00:16:18.690 originally had no mechanism to end debate. They 00:16:18.690 --> 00:16:21.129 eventually created a supermajority rule, which 00:16:21.129 --> 00:16:23.370 morphed into the painless, silent filibuster 00:16:23.370 --> 00:16:25.690 of the two -track system. That gridlock frustrated 00:16:25.690 --> 00:16:28.549 both parties so deeply that they began using 00:16:28.549 --> 00:16:30.970 an obscure appeal process, almost called the 00:16:30.970 --> 00:16:34.029 hulk option, to dismantle the supermajority requirements 00:16:34.029 --> 00:16:37.450 piece by piece, first for the lower courts, then 00:16:37.450 --> 00:16:40.669 the Supreme Court. And now the legislative filibuster 00:16:40.669 --> 00:16:44.149 stands as the final barrier to a purely majoritarian 00:16:44.149 --> 00:16:46.610 Senate. It's been a relentless escalation over 00:16:46.610 --> 00:16:48.990 the decades. It really has. And as we wrap up, 00:16:49.029 --> 00:16:50.590 I want to leave you with one final fascinating 00:16:50.590 --> 00:16:52.850 historical twist from our source material that 00:16:52.850 --> 00:16:54.610 we haven't even touched on yet. Oh, lay it on 00:16:54.610 --> 00:16:56.950 us. The concept of the nuclear option, this idea 00:16:56.950 --> 00:16:59.610 of a political maneuver so extreme it alters 00:16:59.610 --> 00:17:02.529 the very fabric of an institution, is so resonant 00:17:02.529 --> 00:17:04.390 that it has actually been applied retrospectively 00:17:04.390 --> 00:17:08.569 to history. Really? How so? In a 2005 legal ruling, 00:17:08.789 --> 00:17:11.890 the UK House of Lords used the term nuclear option. 00:17:12.250 --> 00:17:14.490 to describe an event that happened in Great Britain 00:17:14.490 --> 00:17:18.390 back in 1832. 1832. Yes. The British government 00:17:18.390 --> 00:17:20.369 at the time was trying to pass the Reform Act, 00:17:20.529 --> 00:17:23.329 but the House of Lords was blocking it. So the 00:17:23.329 --> 00:17:25.450 government threatened to simply create hundreds 00:17:25.450 --> 00:17:28.509 of new peers, essentially packing House of Lords 00:17:28.509 --> 00:17:30.789 with their political allies to force the vote 00:17:30.789 --> 00:17:32.390 through. And they called it the nuclear option 00:17:32.390 --> 00:17:34.690 for an event that happened in 1832. They did. 00:17:34.829 --> 00:17:37.529 Over a century before actual nuclear weapons 00:17:37.529 --> 00:17:40.339 were even theorized. This raises an incredible 00:17:40.339 --> 00:17:42.539 question for you to ponder long after this deep 00:17:42.539 --> 00:17:45.480 dive ends. Isn't it fascinating that the political 00:17:45.480 --> 00:17:47.759 impulse to find a devastating, rule -breaking 00:17:47.759 --> 00:17:50.859 loophole to crush gridlock isn't just a modern 00:17:50.859 --> 00:17:53.559 American phenomenon? No kidding. It is an instinct 00:17:53.559 --> 00:17:57.160 regarding power that is so universal it transcends 00:17:57.160 --> 00:17:59.740 continents and predates the atomic age by more 00:17:59.740 --> 00:18:02.450 than 100 years. That is a phenomenal piece of 00:18:02.450 --> 00:18:04.849 perspective. The urge to fundamentally alter 00:18:04.849 --> 00:18:07.190 the system when you can't advance your goals 00:18:07.190 --> 00:18:09.549 within it seems to be just a permanent fixture 00:18:09.549 --> 00:18:12.329 of human politics. Thank you so much for joining 00:18:12.329 --> 00:18:13.990 us for this deep dive. Keep questioning, keep 00:18:13.990 --> 00:18:16.490 learning, and keep exploring the history of the 00:18:16.490 --> 00:18:18.529 rules that govern us. We'll see you next time.