WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:02.700 Welcome back. I am I'm just so glad you could 00:00:02.700 --> 00:00:05.519 join us today for another custom tailored deep 00:00:05.519 --> 00:00:08.000 dive. It's great to be here. So if you turn on 00:00:08.000 --> 00:00:10.259 the news, especially during an election year 00:00:10.259 --> 00:00:12.839 or when a new administration is taking over the 00:00:12.839 --> 00:00:15.939 government, you are practically guaranteed to 00:00:15.939 --> 00:00:18.539 hear politicians and pundits tossing around the 00:00:18.539 --> 00:00:21.879 phrase advice and consent. Oh, constantly. Right. 00:00:22.000 --> 00:00:25.239 And it gets said with such immense gravity. Everyone 00:00:25.239 --> 00:00:27.839 sitting around the anchor desk nods as if the 00:00:27.839 --> 00:00:30.489 exact mechanics of that. are universally understood. 00:00:30.850 --> 00:00:33.409 But if you stop and really think about it, the 00:00:33.409 --> 00:00:35.509 phrase has sort of faded into the background 00:00:35.509 --> 00:00:37.950 noise of political commentary. How often does 00:00:37.950 --> 00:00:40.509 anyone actually explain the procedural machinery 00:00:40.509 --> 00:00:43.229 running beneath those words? Almost never. I 00:00:43.229 --> 00:00:45.969 mean, it is a perfect example of a phrase that 00:00:45.969 --> 00:00:48.850 has become invisible through repetition. We hear 00:00:48.850 --> 00:00:50.810 it so often that we just assume the process is 00:00:50.810 --> 00:00:52.869 static and straightforward, but the reality is 00:00:52.869 --> 00:00:55.829 far more complex. And dynamic. Exactly. Very 00:00:55.829 --> 00:00:58.570 dynamic. Which is exactly what we are going to 00:00:58.570 --> 00:01:01.469 explore today. We have put together a deep dive 00:01:01.469 --> 00:01:04.370 based on a really comprehensive Wikipedia article 00:01:04.370 --> 00:01:08.129 all about advice and consent. And our mission 00:01:08.129 --> 00:01:10.090 for you today, we'll call you the learner for 00:01:10.090 --> 00:01:13.090 this one, is to cut through all that parliamentary 00:01:13.090 --> 00:01:15.530 jargon and look at what this phrase actually 00:01:15.530 --> 00:01:18.519 means at its core. Because it's not just semantics. 00:01:18.659 --> 00:01:21.700 No, not at all. We are going to examine how it 00:01:21.700 --> 00:01:23.400 was originally designed to balance government 00:01:23.400 --> 00:01:27.219 power and how over the last decade or so it has 00:01:27.219 --> 00:01:30.159 morphed into this high stakes procedural battleground. 00:01:30.500 --> 00:01:33.280 OK, let's unpack this. When we strip away the 00:01:33.280 --> 00:01:36.260 specific country by country context, what is 00:01:36.260 --> 00:01:38.120 the baseline definition we are actually working 00:01:38.120 --> 00:01:40.760 with here? Right. So at its most basic structural 00:01:40.760 --> 00:01:43.299 level, advice and consent is a legal mechanism. 00:01:43.870 --> 00:01:46.090 It's designed to moderate the power of one branch 00:01:46.090 --> 00:01:48.950 of government by legally requiring the concurrence 00:01:48.950 --> 00:01:51.390 of another branch before a specific action can 00:01:51.390 --> 00:01:53.230 be finalized. Like a structural check and ballot. 00:01:53.469 --> 00:01:56.510 Precisely. Broadly speaking, the sources show 00:01:56.510 --> 00:01:59.409 this plays out in one of two very different constitutional 00:01:59.409 --> 00:02:03.250 scenarios. The first scenario features a weak 00:02:03.250 --> 00:02:05.629 executive branch that is essentially required 00:02:05.629 --> 00:02:07.709 to rubber stamp an action that has already been 00:02:07.709 --> 00:02:09.949 initiated and approved by a powerful legislative 00:02:09.949 --> 00:02:13.870 branch. And the second scenario flips that dynamic 00:02:13.870 --> 00:02:16.770 completely. You have a strong legislative branch 00:02:16.770 --> 00:02:19.509 that must concur and approve an action that was 00:02:19.509 --> 00:02:22.289 initiated by a strong executive. That makes sense. 00:02:22.349 --> 00:02:24.490 I was actually looking at the exact text used 00:02:24.490 --> 00:02:26.729 to pass laws in the United Kingdom, which seems 00:02:26.729 --> 00:02:29.110 to perfectly illustrate that first scenario you 00:02:29.110 --> 00:02:31.270 mentioned, the weak executive. Yes, the UK is 00:02:31.270 --> 00:02:33.610 the classic example. Because the enacting formula 00:02:33.610 --> 00:02:36.770 for British bills sounds incredibly formal. It 00:02:36.770 --> 00:02:39.030 explicitly states that the law is enacted by 00:02:39.030 --> 00:02:41.530 the king, by and with the advice and consent 00:02:41.530 --> 00:02:45.050 of the lords and commons in parliament. But looking 00:02:45.050 --> 00:02:47.590 at modern British politics, how much power does 00:02:47.590 --> 00:02:49.669 the monarch actually exercise in that equation? 00:02:50.219 --> 00:02:52.240 What's fascinating here is that this specific 00:02:52.240 --> 00:02:55.259 legal language is essentially a polite fiction. 00:02:55.439 --> 00:02:58.180 A polite fiction. I like that. It really is. 00:02:58.240 --> 00:03:00.719 If you read the text literally, it paints a picture 00:03:00.719 --> 00:03:04.240 of a king who is single -handedly creating the 00:03:04.240 --> 00:03:07.439 law and just, you know, merely checking in with 00:03:07.439 --> 00:03:08.939 the House of Lords and the House of Commons to 00:03:08.939 --> 00:03:10.639 get their thoughts. Like, hey guys, what do you 00:03:10.639 --> 00:03:13.659 think of this law I just made? Exactly. But legally 00:03:13.659 --> 00:03:15.860 and practically, the dynamic operates in reverse. 00:03:16.690 --> 00:03:19.310 That enacting formula, what they call the king 00:03:19.310 --> 00:03:22.669 in parliament, emphasizes that while the bill 00:03:22.669 --> 00:03:24.949 is legally finalized by the British monarchy 00:03:24.949 --> 00:03:27.849 with the royal assent, the actual initiative 00:03:27.849 --> 00:03:30.990 and the real power to draft, debate and pass 00:03:30.990 --> 00:03:33.810 that legislation lies entirely with parliament. 00:03:34.009 --> 00:03:36.349 So the thing is just rubber stamping it. The 00:03:36.349 --> 00:03:39.189 monarch has virtually no practical discretionary 00:03:39.189 --> 00:03:42.319 power to halt it at all. The indispensable part 00:03:42.319 --> 00:03:44.240 of the equation is the legislature's adoption 00:03:44.240 --> 00:03:46.800 of the bill. So the language maintains the historical 00:03:46.800 --> 00:03:49.300 prestige of the crown, while the actual gears 00:03:49.300 --> 00:03:51.659 of government turn within parliament. It is such 00:03:51.659 --> 00:03:54.580 a fascinating legal quirk. But the sources note 00:03:54.580 --> 00:03:57.539 that in Singapore, this concept of advice takes 00:03:57.539 --> 00:03:59.819 on a much more rigid definition. Oh, absolutely. 00:03:59.979 --> 00:04:01.860 Because Singapore is a parliamentary republic, 00:04:02.080 --> 00:04:04.419 right? With a president serving as the head of 00:04:04.419 --> 00:04:07.819 state. How does their framework handle the concept 00:04:07.819 --> 00:04:11.830 of a cabinet giving the president... Well, it 00:04:11.830 --> 00:04:14.969 completely redefines the word. I mean, in standard 00:04:14.969 --> 00:04:17.670 conversation, if someone gives you advice, the 00:04:17.670 --> 00:04:19.870 inherent assumption is that you have the agency 00:04:19.870 --> 00:04:21.889 to ignore it. Right. I can take it or leave it. 00:04:22.009 --> 00:04:24.350 But in the constitutional framework of Singapore, 00:04:24.629 --> 00:04:27.990 advice of the cabinet carries an entirely different 00:04:27.990 --> 00:04:31.009 legal weight. When the Constitution stipulates 00:04:31.009 --> 00:04:33.949 that the president exercises certain powers on 00:04:33.949 --> 00:04:36.459 the advice of the cabinet. It means the president 00:04:36.459 --> 00:04:38.779 is legally bound to act in full accordance with 00:04:38.779 --> 00:04:41.199 that advice. So the president cannot exercise 00:04:41.199 --> 00:04:43.560 independent judgment in those specific instances. 00:04:43.779 --> 00:04:46.699 Not at all. There is zero discretionary power 00:04:46.699 --> 00:04:48.759 available to the head of state in those moments. 00:04:48.879 --> 00:04:52.100 Wow. Yeah. In that specific legal context, the 00:04:52.100 --> 00:04:54.579 word advice functions as an absolute mandate. 00:04:55.019 --> 00:04:57.439 The cabinet makes the decision and the president 00:04:57.439 --> 00:04:59.860 is constitutionally obligated to execute it. 00:05:00.120 --> 00:05:03.439 It is incredible that in Singapore, advice literally 00:05:03.439 --> 00:05:06.939 translates to a legally binding mandate. But 00:05:06.939 --> 00:05:09.379 if we cross the ocean to the United States Constitution, 00:05:09.800 --> 00:05:13.379 that exact same phrase becomes the center of 00:05:13.379 --> 00:05:16.339 a 200 -year tug of war. A very messy tug of war. 00:05:16.860 --> 00:05:19.459 The U .S. operates under that second scenario 00:05:19.459 --> 00:05:22.079 you mentioned earlier, advice and consent applying 00:05:22.079 --> 00:05:25.259 to a strong executive. Here, the power is held 00:05:25.259 --> 00:05:27.560 by the United States Senate, which must approve 00:05:27.560 --> 00:05:29.660 treaties and major presidential appointments. 00:05:30.000 --> 00:05:32.360 Cabinet secretaries, federal judges, military 00:05:32.360 --> 00:05:35.089 officers, things like that. Right. And that requirement 00:05:35.089 --> 00:05:38.050 is hardwired into Article 2, Section 2, Clause 00:05:38.050 --> 00:05:40.970 2 of the U .S. Constitution. It explicitly grants 00:05:40.970 --> 00:05:43.250 the president the power to make treaties, provided 00:05:43.250 --> 00:05:46.209 two thirds of the senators present concur. And 00:05:46.209 --> 00:05:48.470 then in the very next breath, it lays out the 00:05:48.470 --> 00:05:50.870 nomination and confirmation process for the federal 00:05:50.870 --> 00:05:53.050 appointees you just mentioned, which traditionally 00:05:53.050 --> 00:05:56.350 requires a simple majority. Yes, the basic framework 00:05:56.350 --> 00:05:58.230 is all right there. Here's where it gets really 00:05:58.230 --> 00:06:01.550 interesting. That specific wording, advice and 00:06:01.550 --> 00:06:03.920 consent wasn't just some casual care. carryover 00:06:03.920 --> 00:06:06.779 from British law. Looking at the history of the 00:06:06.779 --> 00:06:09.439 Constitutional Convention, this was the product 00:06:09.439 --> 00:06:12.360 of a massive standoff between the framers. It 00:06:12.360 --> 00:06:14.379 was one of the biggest debates they had. Because 00:06:14.379 --> 00:06:16.899 you had delegates trying to build a new government 00:06:16.899 --> 00:06:20.490 from scratch. One faction wanted a highly empowered 00:06:20.490 --> 00:06:23.689 executive who could act decisively without being 00:06:23.689 --> 00:06:26.449 micromanaged by a committee. But the opposing 00:06:26.449 --> 00:06:28.810 faction had just fought a war against a monarch 00:06:28.810 --> 00:06:31.550 and was terrified of consolidating that much 00:06:31.550 --> 00:06:34.550 power in one person. They wanted the legislator 00:06:34.550 --> 00:06:37.089 to hold the reins. And the phrase was the ultimate 00:06:37.089 --> 00:06:40.000 delicate compromise. It achieved the goals of 00:06:40.000 --> 00:06:42.839 both factions. It allowed the president the unilateral 00:06:42.839 --> 00:06:45.399 power to initiate treaties and select nominees, 00:06:45.680 --> 00:06:48.379 preserving that executive decisiveness. But it 00:06:48.379 --> 00:06:51.339 handed the Senate a hard veto. Exactly. The theory 00:06:51.339 --> 00:06:53.199 was that this structural hurdle would prevent 00:06:53.199 --> 00:06:55.720 authoritarian control and cronyism. It would 00:06:55.720 --> 00:06:57.639 force the president to select highly qualified 00:06:57.639 --> 00:07:00.399 individuals who could actually survive the scrutiny 00:07:00.399 --> 00:07:03.029 of an independent body. But the sources point 00:07:03.029 --> 00:07:05.649 out a major ambiguity that the framers just left 00:07:05.649 --> 00:07:08.670 unresolved. They agreed on the phrase, but they 00:07:08.670 --> 00:07:12.110 completely disagreed on the timeline. When exactly 00:07:12.110 --> 00:07:14.790 is this advice supposed to take place in the 00:07:14.790 --> 00:07:17.759 life cycle of a nomination? The historical debate 00:07:17.759 --> 00:07:20.459 over the mechanics of that timeline is incredibly 00:07:20.459 --> 00:07:23.319 revealing. You had the primary architects of 00:07:23.319 --> 00:07:25.540 the government holding diametrically opposed 00:07:25.540 --> 00:07:28.379 views on how the process should actually function. 00:07:28.519 --> 00:07:31.420 Thomas Jefferson and James Madison argued that 00:07:31.420 --> 00:07:34.279 the Senate's role was strictly reactive. They 00:07:34.279 --> 00:07:36.379 believe the Senate should only advise the president 00:07:36.379 --> 00:07:39.839 after a nomination had been formally made. In 00:07:39.839 --> 00:07:42.079 their view, the president needed the autonomy 00:07:42.079 --> 00:07:44.699 to make the initial selection based purely on 00:07:44.699 --> 00:07:47.170 executive judgment. without any interference 00:07:47.170 --> 00:07:49.750 from lawmakers. But other framers, like Roger 00:07:49.750 --> 00:07:52.709 Sherman, argued the exact opposite. He believed 00:07:52.709 --> 00:07:54.769 that the Senate providing advice before a nomination 00:07:54.769 --> 00:07:57.009 was ever formalized would be deeply beneficial 00:07:57.009 --> 00:07:59.430 to the president, essentially vetting candidates 00:07:59.430 --> 00:08:02.170 collaboratively. And the tiebreaker fell to George 00:08:02.170 --> 00:08:05.009 Washington. As the first president, his actions 00:08:05.009 --> 00:08:07.670 established the unwritten precedence the subsequent 00:08:07.670 --> 00:08:11.009 administrations would follow. Washington took 00:08:11.009 --> 00:08:13.350 a pragmatic, middle -of -the -road approach. 00:08:13.870 --> 00:08:16.410 He concluded that receiving advice from the Senate 00:08:16.410 --> 00:08:19.310 prior to a nomination was permissible and often 00:08:19.310 --> 00:08:22.769 politically wise, but it was absolutely not a 00:08:22.769 --> 00:08:25.310 constitutional requirement. So he kept the power 00:08:25.310 --> 00:08:27.709 in the executive branch. He firmly maintained 00:08:27.709 --> 00:08:30.569 that the executive alone was responsible for 00:08:30.569 --> 00:08:33.570 the final selection of the nominee. And Washington's 00:08:33.570 --> 00:08:36.350 precedent really shaped the modern process. Today, 00:08:36.509 --> 00:08:38.990 the notion that pre -nomination advice is optional 00:08:38.990 --> 00:08:41.509 has effectively fused the two words together. 00:08:41.809 --> 00:08:44.389 The advice portion and the consent portion are 00:08:44.389 --> 00:08:47.350 now executed as a single unified action by the 00:08:47.350 --> 00:08:49.700 Senate. Though presidents certainly still consult 00:08:49.700 --> 00:08:52.580 informally with key senators behind closed doors 00:08:52.580 --> 00:08:55.120 to gauge whether a nominee can survive a floor 00:08:55.120 --> 00:08:57.559 vote. Oh, of course. But the formal parliamentary 00:08:57.559 --> 00:09:00.519 procedure is a single motion. Now, speaking of 00:09:00.519 --> 00:09:02.940 the Senate's power, there's a really quick, memorable 00:09:02.940 --> 00:09:05.279 trivia fact I want to toss in here from the sources. 00:09:05.539 --> 00:09:08.419 For almost every major federal appointment, the 00:09:08.419 --> 00:09:11.740 Senate acts completely alone. But there is a 00:09:11.740 --> 00:09:14.740 specific exception outlined in the 25th Amendment 00:09:14.740 --> 00:09:17.470 for replacing a vice president. It's not just 00:09:17.470 --> 00:09:20.190 the Senate. The 25th Amendment requires a majority 00:09:20.190 --> 00:09:23.669 vote in both houses of Congress, the Senate, 00:09:23.789 --> 00:09:26.389 and the House of Representatives. That's a vital 00:09:26.389 --> 00:09:28.789 distinction. It's the rare instance where the 00:09:28.789 --> 00:09:31.409 entire legislative branch is required to consent 00:09:31.409 --> 00:09:34.149 to an executive appointment, reflecting the immense 00:09:34.149 --> 00:09:36.669 gravity of placing someone directly next in line 00:09:36.669 --> 00:09:39.190 for the presidency. Exactly. It highlights just 00:09:39.190 --> 00:09:41.370 how intentionally the framers distributed power. 00:09:42.830 --> 00:09:44.809 Moving into the modern era, looking at the last 00:09:44.809 --> 00:09:48.129 decade, this process has become intensely weaponized. 00:09:48.350 --> 00:09:50.409 Now, before we dive into recent U .S. history, 00:09:50.549 --> 00:09:53.110 I want to explicitly pause and address you, the 00:09:53.110 --> 00:09:54.860 listener, for a second. This is important. Yes. 00:09:55.159 --> 00:09:58.139 The sources we are utilizing today contain some 00:09:58.139 --> 00:10:00.659 highly politically charged actions from both 00:10:00.659 --> 00:10:03.539 left wing and right wing figures. I want to make 00:10:03.539 --> 00:10:05.659 it absolutely clear that we are not taking sides 00:10:05.659 --> 00:10:08.500 or endorsing any political viewpoints here. We 00:10:08.500 --> 00:10:10.620 are simply impartially reporting the historical 00:10:10.620 --> 00:10:13.940 facts and rule changes exactly as they are documented 00:10:13.940 --> 00:10:16.179 in the source material. Just dig into the procedural 00:10:16.179 --> 00:10:19.460 mechanics. Exactly. So setting aside the politics 00:10:19.460 --> 00:10:22.440 to focus strictly on those mechanics, how did 00:10:22.440 --> 00:10:24.580 the standard confirmation process process actually 00:10:24.580 --> 00:10:27.740 operate before the modern installations began? 00:10:28.080 --> 00:10:30.080 Well, for a long time, the confirmation process 00:10:30.080 --> 00:10:32.799 relied heavily on informal norms rather than 00:10:32.799 --> 00:10:35.759 strictly codified rules. The baseline procedure 00:10:35.759 --> 00:10:38.500 involves a congressional hearing where the appointee 00:10:38.500 --> 00:10:40.299 is questioned by the relevant Senate committee. 00:10:40.500 --> 00:10:42.500 And if they pass the committee? If the committee 00:10:42.500 --> 00:10:44.899 advances the nominee, it moved to the full Senate 00:10:44.899 --> 00:10:47.720 floor. The formal parliamentary action is a motion 00:10:47.720 --> 00:10:50.919 to advise and consent. Passing that motion usually 00:10:50.919 --> 00:10:53.100 just takes a simple majority of senators present. 00:10:53.470 --> 00:10:55.929 However, the Senate historically operated on 00:10:55.929 --> 00:10:57.950 a principle of unlimited debate. Which brings 00:10:57.950 --> 00:11:01.250 us to the filibuster. Precisely. Under the old 00:11:01.250 --> 00:11:04.250 norms, any senator could infinitely debate a 00:11:04.250 --> 00:11:07.149 nomination, effectively preventing the actual 00:11:07.149 --> 00:11:09.710 confirmation vote from ever taking place. The 00:11:09.710 --> 00:11:12.490 only way to force an end to that debate, a procedural 00:11:12.490 --> 00:11:15.529 move called cloture, required a supermajority 00:11:15.529 --> 00:11:17.850 of three -fifths of the Senate. So, 60 votes. 00:11:18.190 --> 00:11:21.100 Yes. So while the final confirmation only required 00:11:21.100 --> 00:11:23.740 a simple majority, simply getting to that vote 00:11:23.740 --> 00:11:26.779 often required 60 senators. This meant the minority 00:11:26.779 --> 00:11:30.019 party held massive procedural leverage. And if 00:11:30.019 --> 00:11:32.139 we look at the timeline in our sources, the history 00:11:32.139 --> 00:11:34.200 of the last decade is essentially the history 00:11:34.200 --> 00:11:36.539 of that minority leverage being systematically 00:11:36.539 --> 00:11:40.000 dismantled. The breakdown of those informal norms 00:11:40.000 --> 00:11:43.039 really began escalating in November 2013, right? 00:11:43.179 --> 00:11:45.519 Yes. If we connect this to the bigger picture, 00:11:45.659 --> 00:11:48.549 you can see how the rules began to unravel. In 00:11:48.549 --> 00:11:51.610 November 2013, the Democratic Party, led by then 00:11:51.610 --> 00:11:54.230 -majority leader Harry Reid, was facing widespread 00:11:54.230 --> 00:11:57.590 filibusters of their nominees. In response, Reid 00:11:57.590 --> 00:12:00.009 utilized a parliamentary maneuver, commonly known 00:12:00.009 --> 00:12:02.289 as the nuclear option. Changing the rules without 00:12:02.289 --> 00:12:05.190 actually passing a new rule. Exactly. They raised 00:12:05.190 --> 00:12:07.909 a point of order claiming that only a simple 00:12:07.909 --> 00:12:10.269 majority was needed to end debate on certain 00:12:10.269 --> 00:12:13.149 nominees. The presiding officer ruled against 00:12:13.149 --> 00:12:16.429 them, citing the existing rules. But the majority 00:12:16.429 --> 00:12:18.570 then voted to overrule the presiding officer. 00:12:18.830 --> 00:12:21.970 By doing that with a simple majority, they established 00:12:21.970 --> 00:12:24.190 a binding new precedent. And that permanently 00:12:24.190 --> 00:12:26.850 altered how the Senate operates. The immediate 00:12:26.850 --> 00:12:29.399 effect was that... Judicial nominees for lower 00:12:29.399 --> 00:12:31.779 federal courts, along with executive branch nominations, 00:12:32.159 --> 00:12:35.519 could completely bypass that three -fifths cloture 00:12:35.519 --> 00:12:38.360 requirement. But importantly, Harry Reid intentionally 00:12:38.360 --> 00:12:41.159 left the filibuster intact for the Supreme Court. 00:12:41.259 --> 00:12:43.700 Right. Which sets the stage for the next major 00:12:43.700 --> 00:12:46.960 escalation in February 2016. Following the death 00:12:46.960 --> 00:12:49.700 of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, a vacancy 00:12:49.700 --> 00:12:52.399 opened during a presidential election year. The 00:12:52.399 --> 00:12:54.639 Republican Senate majority leader, Mitch McConnell, 00:12:54.840 --> 00:12:56.899 declared that the Senate would not hold hearings 00:12:56.899 --> 00:12:59.159 or vote on any replacement nominated by President 00:12:59.159 --> 00:13:01.980 Obama until after the next election. And the 00:13:01.980 --> 00:13:05.080 source material characterizes this as a historic 00:13:05.080 --> 00:13:08.759 rebuke of executive authority. It was a stark 00:13:08.759 --> 00:13:11.440 departure from the longstanding procedural norm 00:13:11.440 --> 00:13:14.799 of considering. each high court nominee on their 00:13:14.799 --> 00:13:17.919 individual merits. The sources really emphasize 00:13:17.919 --> 00:13:21.139 how unprecedented that maneuver was. A sitting 00:13:21.139 --> 00:13:23.799 president had never been forced to forfeit a 00:13:23.799 --> 00:13:26.759 high court appointment simply because the legislative 00:13:26.759 --> 00:13:29.620 branch refused to engage in the advice and consent 00:13:29.620 --> 00:13:32.340 process at all. It was a massive shift. And that 00:13:32.340 --> 00:13:35.440 strategy held the seat open, shifting the confirmation 00:13:35.440 --> 00:13:37.700 battle to the following year, which triggered 00:13:37.700 --> 00:13:40.759 another massive procedural change in April 2017. 00:13:41.200 --> 00:13:44.179 Right. By April 2017, control of the executive 00:13:44.179 --> 00:13:46.620 branch had changed, and McConnell and the Republicans 00:13:46.620 --> 00:13:48.960 were seeking to confirm Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme 00:13:48.960 --> 00:13:51.539 Court. Facing a promised filibuster from the 00:13:51.539 --> 00:13:53.779 Democratic minority, they utilized their own 00:13:53.779 --> 00:13:55.860 nuclear option using the exact same mechanics 00:13:55.860 --> 00:13:58.700 established in 2013. They overruled the presiding 00:13:58.700 --> 00:14:01.519 officer with a simple majority. Yes, establishing 00:14:01.519 --> 00:14:03.799 a new precedent that eliminated the supermajority 00:14:03.799 --> 00:14:06.240 requirement for Supreme Court nominees. The filibuster 00:14:06.240 --> 00:14:08.519 for all executive and judicial appointments was 00:14:08.519 --> 00:14:11.250 officially dead. The speed at which these centuries 00:14:11.250 --> 00:14:13.370 -old procedural norms were dismantled is just 00:14:13.370 --> 00:14:16.149 staggering. But the sources reveal that the breakdown 00:14:16.149 --> 00:14:18.590 of advice and consent isn't limited to party 00:14:18.590 --> 00:14:21.769 leadership clashing over the courts. Individual 00:14:21.769 --> 00:14:24.690 senators possess a staggering amount of unilateral 00:14:24.690 --> 00:14:27.070 leverage through a mechanism known as a hold. 00:14:27.519 --> 00:14:30.159 which is incredibly powerful. Especially regarding 00:14:30.159 --> 00:14:32.879 military nominations. Just to frame the sheer 00:14:32.879 --> 00:14:35.759 volume we are talking about, the Senate is tasked 00:14:35.759 --> 00:14:38.720 with confirming roughly 50 ,000 military appointments 00:14:38.720 --> 00:14:41.600 every single year. And that volume is exactly 00:14:41.600 --> 00:14:44.799 why the hold is so potent. The Senate floor simply 00:14:44.799 --> 00:14:47.179 does not have the time to debate and vote on 00:14:47.179 --> 00:14:49.899 50 ,000 individual military promotions. It would 00:14:49.899 --> 00:14:52.519 take forever. So to manage the workflow, they 00:14:52.519 --> 00:14:55.669 rely on unanimous consent. They group hundreds 00:14:55.669 --> 00:14:58.009 or thousands of routine military promotions into 00:14:58.009 --> 00:15:00.509 a single batch and ask if any senator objects 00:15:00.509 --> 00:15:03.350 to confirming them all at once. If no one objects, 00:15:03.629 --> 00:15:06.529 they pass instantly. But if just one single senator 00:15:06.529 --> 00:15:09.169 objects? If one objects, placing a hold on the 00:15:09.169 --> 00:15:11.490 batch, the Senate is forced to revert to standard 00:15:11.490 --> 00:15:14.070 procedure. Meaning they would have to file cloture, 00:15:14.250 --> 00:15:17.129 wait the required time, and hold individual roll 00:15:17.129 --> 00:15:19.809 call votes for every single officer. Which would 00:15:19.809 --> 00:15:23.090 consume months, if not years, of floor time, 00:15:23.309 --> 00:15:26.169 bringing all other legislative business to a 00:15:26.169 --> 00:15:29.490 dead halt. Therefore, a single senator can essentially 00:15:29.490 --> 00:15:32.909 freeze the military promotion system to extract 00:15:32.909 --> 00:15:35.799 concessions. And we have two very recent examples 00:15:35.799 --> 00:15:38.179 from the sources that demonstrate this. In July 00:15:38.179 --> 00:15:41.299 2020, Democratic Senator Tammy Duckworth placed 00:15:41.299 --> 00:15:43.899 a hold on military officers at the rank of colonel 00:15:43.899 --> 00:15:46.340 and above. Her objective was highly specific. 00:15:46.759 --> 00:15:49.039 She demanded confirmation from the Defense Department 00:15:49.039 --> 00:15:51.740 that Alexander Vindman was receiving proper consideration 00:15:51.740 --> 00:15:54.440 for promotion following his congressional testimony 00:15:54.440 --> 00:15:57.120 against President Trump. But that hold was incredibly 00:15:57.120 --> 00:15:59.899 narrow in its timeline. Senator Duckworth lifted 00:15:59.899 --> 00:16:01.820 it after two weeks, the moment the Secretary 00:16:01.820 --> 00:16:04.220 of Defense explicitly confirmed the promotion 00:16:04.220 --> 00:16:06.440 had been approved. Even though Vindman ultimately 00:16:06.440 --> 00:16:09.799 chose to retire. Right. It was a targeted use 00:16:09.799 --> 00:16:12.399 of procedural leverage for a specific personnel 00:16:12.399 --> 00:16:15.580 inquiry. But the sources contrast that with a 00:16:15.580 --> 00:16:18.340 structurally identical, yet vastly broader maneuver 00:16:18.340 --> 00:16:21.159 a few years later. From February to December 00:16:21.159 --> 00:16:24.379 of 2023, Republican Senator Tommy Tuberville 00:16:24.379 --> 00:16:27.340 instituted a massive blanket hold on all general 00:16:27.340 --> 00:16:29.860 and admiral appointments. And this hold was utilized 00:16:29.860 --> 00:16:32.480 for a broad policy objective rather than a personnel 00:16:32.480 --> 00:16:35.740 inquiry. Senator Tuberville was protesting a 00:16:35.740 --> 00:16:38.500 new military policy that covered travel expenses 00:16:38.500 --> 00:16:41.039 for service members seeking out -of -state abortions. 00:16:41.139 --> 00:16:44.139 And he held it up for 10 months. Yes. Because 00:16:44.139 --> 00:16:46.519 he maintained the hold for so long, the backlog 00:16:46.519 --> 00:16:49.919 grew to encompass 451 senior military officers. 00:16:50.259 --> 00:16:52.559 The sources detail the resulting chaos within 00:16:52.559 --> 00:16:54.659 the military's chain of command. By freezing 00:16:54.659 --> 00:16:57.720 those 451 leadership positions, the Defense Department 00:16:57.720 --> 00:17:00.019 had to scramble. They were forced to utilize 00:17:00.019 --> 00:17:02.539 acting commanders, meaning officers were performing 00:17:02.539 --> 00:17:04.960 the duties of higher ranks without the corresponding 00:17:04.960 --> 00:17:07.380 authority or pay. And it forced the military 00:17:07.380 --> 00:17:09.460 to delay the retirements of outgoing generals 00:17:09.460 --> 00:17:11.960 just to keep critical commands functioning. The 00:17:11.960 --> 00:17:14.400 procedural standoff eventually concluded in December 00:17:14.400 --> 00:17:18.599 2023. Tuberville released the hold without actually 00:17:18.599 --> 00:17:20.779 securing the floor vote on the abortion travel 00:17:20.779 --> 00:17:23.400 policy he had originally demanded. But the real 00:17:23.400 --> 00:17:26.460 world impact was that the 10 month freeze. created 00:17:26.460 --> 00:17:29.299 such a massive bottleneck that roughly a year 00:17:29.299 --> 00:17:31.779 later, the Senate resorted to passing a single 00:17:31.779 --> 00:17:35.400 unanimous consent motion that confirmed 6 ,000 00:17:35.400 --> 00:17:38.079 military officers simultaneously. Just to flush 00:17:38.079 --> 00:17:40.839 the backlog out of the system. It perfectly illustrates 00:17:40.839 --> 00:17:43.539 how a constitutional mechanism designed to prevent 00:17:43.539 --> 00:17:46.559 authoritarianism can be repurposed by one individual 00:17:46.559 --> 00:17:49.119 to paralyze the leadership structure of the armed 00:17:49.119 --> 00:17:51.980 forces. And the procedural arms race has only 00:17:51.980 --> 00:17:54.650 continued to accelerate. The timeline in our 00:17:54.650 --> 00:17:56.549 sources brings us right up to the present day 00:17:56.549 --> 00:18:00.410 to a major structural shift in 2025. So what 00:18:00.410 --> 00:18:02.910 does this all mean? Well, the 2025 evolution 00:18:02.910 --> 00:18:05.329 represents the logical extreme of the trend we 00:18:05.329 --> 00:18:07.309 have been tracking. In 2025, Senate Republicans 00:18:07.309 --> 00:18:09.269 changed the rules to allow an unlimited number 00:18:09.269 --> 00:18:11.670 of executive branch nominees to be grouped together 00:18:11.670 --> 00:18:14.109 and confirmed via a single vote. So unlimited 00:18:14.109 --> 00:18:17.970 bulk confirmations. Yes. The only carve out in 00:18:17.970 --> 00:18:20.970 this rule was for cabinet level secretaries who 00:18:20.970 --> 00:18:23.740 still required individual consideration. Every 00:18:23.740 --> 00:18:26.880 other subcabinet official, agency head, and executive 00:18:26.880 --> 00:18:30.380 appointee could be confirmed in one massive batch. 00:18:30.759 --> 00:18:33.880 Moving from individual scrutiny to unlimited 00:18:33.880 --> 00:18:36.900 bulk confirmations is a monumental departure 00:18:36.900 --> 00:18:39.519 from historical precedent. What was the context 00:18:39.519 --> 00:18:42.359 driving that specific rule change? It's really 00:18:42.359 --> 00:18:45.119 the culmination of two opposing procedural tactics 00:18:45.119 --> 00:18:48.460 colliding. On one side, Senate Democrats have 00:18:48.460 --> 00:18:50.420 been maximizing the remaining procedural rules 00:18:50.420 --> 00:18:53.319 to force lengthy, time -consuming floor debates 00:18:53.319 --> 00:18:55.980 for nearly every executive nominee put forward 00:18:55.980 --> 00:18:58.380 by President Trump. Effectively utilizing the 00:18:58.380 --> 00:19:00.819 clock to stall the administration's ability to 00:19:00.819 --> 00:19:02.779 staff the government. Exactly. And on the other 00:19:02.779 --> 00:19:04.880 side, President Trump was floating the idea of 00:19:04.880 --> 00:19:07.259 bypassing the Senate entirely. He was threatening 00:19:07.259 --> 00:19:09.779 to ask Congress to formally recess so he could 00:19:09.779 --> 00:19:12.579 install officials via recess appointments, which 00:19:12.579 --> 00:19:15.119 requires zero Senate confirmation entirely. So 00:19:15.119 --> 00:19:16.980 the bulk confirmation rule was essentially a 00:19:16.980 --> 00:19:19.900 pressure release valve. Yes. The majority implemented 00:19:19.900 --> 00:19:22.759 it to circumvent the minority's stalling tactics 00:19:22.759 --> 00:19:25.900 and rapidly staffed the executive branch, avoiding 00:19:25.900 --> 00:19:28.759 the constitutional crisis that widespread weaponized 00:19:28.759 --> 00:19:31.099 recess appointments would have triggered. But 00:19:31.099 --> 00:19:32.400 if you connect us back to the listener and what 00:19:32.400 --> 00:19:34.299 we discussed at the beginning. The framers sitting 00:19:34.299 --> 00:19:37.240 in a room fiercely debating how to balance an 00:19:37.240 --> 00:19:40.059 effective executive against a monarch. Right. 00:19:40.220 --> 00:19:43.240 They built the Advice and Consent Clause as a 00:19:43.240 --> 00:19:45.599 delicate compromise, a deliberate structural 00:19:45.599 --> 00:19:48.660 filter. But when you look at the modern mechanics, 00:19:48.839 --> 00:19:51.859 the 2013 and 2017 nuclear options stripping away 00:19:51.859 --> 00:19:54.619 the supermajority, the weaponization of unanimous 00:19:54.619 --> 00:19:57.720 consent to freeze the military, and now the 2025 00:19:57.720 --> 00:20:01.420 pivot to bulk confirmations, the process has 00:20:01.420 --> 00:20:03.539 fundamentally transformed. It is no longer a 00:20:03.539 --> 00:20:05.720 measured evaluation of qualifications. No, it 00:20:05.720 --> 00:20:08.599 has become a procedural arms race where the fundamental 00:20:08.599 --> 00:20:10.779 rules of consent are constantly rewritten on 00:20:10.779 --> 00:20:12.859 the fly by whichever party holds a simple majority. 00:20:13.099 --> 00:20:15.400 It is genuinely dizzying to look at the full 00:20:15.400 --> 00:20:17.450 timeline. Which is why this raises an important 00:20:17.450 --> 00:20:19.509 question, something for everyone listening to 00:20:19.509 --> 00:20:22.190 chew on. Building on the history we just discussed, 00:20:22.410 --> 00:20:24.950 if the Senate can continually rewrite the rules 00:20:24.950 --> 00:20:27.950 of advice and consent via simple majority creating 00:20:27.950 --> 00:20:31.210 nuclear options and bulk confirmations, is the 00:20:31.210 --> 00:20:33.789 Senate's consent still functioning as a meaningful, 00:20:33.869 --> 00:20:37.130 independent check on executive power as the framers 00:20:37.130 --> 00:20:39.349 intended? Or has it just become something else 00:20:39.349 --> 00:20:41.609 entirely? Right. In an era of intense polarization, 00:20:42.089 --> 00:20:44.009 when a president's party controls the chamber, 00:20:44.269 --> 00:20:47.069 has the entire concept of advice and consent 00:20:47.069 --> 00:20:49.869 merely devolved into a procedural rubber stamp 00:20:49.869 --> 00:20:52.710 for whichever party is in charge? That structural 00:20:52.710 --> 00:20:55.329 reality is exactly why we do these deep dives. 00:20:55.369 --> 00:20:57.170 It takes a phrase you hear casually mentioned 00:20:57.170 --> 00:20:59.490 on a Sunday morning talk show and forces you 00:20:59.490 --> 00:21:01.970 to really examine the structural integrity of 00:21:01.970 --> 00:21:04.910 the entire government framework. Thank you so 00:21:04.910 --> 00:21:06.609 much for joining us on this deep dive today. 00:21:07.210 --> 00:21:09.230 hope this exploration provided the shortcut to 00:21:09.230 --> 00:21:11.190 being well informed that you were looking for. 00:21:11.490 --> 00:21:14.289 Keep questioning the fine print of history, because 00:21:14.289 --> 00:21:16.930 as we have seen today, the rules are always subject 00:21:16.930 --> 00:21:18.990 to change. We will see you next time.