WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:04.339 So I want you to picture a very specific kind 00:00:04.339 --> 00:00:06.900 of failure. Oh, this is going to be good. Right. 00:00:07.259 --> 00:00:09.220 Because usually when we talk about disasters 00:00:09.220 --> 00:00:12.199 on this deep dive, we imagine something physically 00:00:12.199 --> 00:00:15.380 breaking, like an engine exploding or a catastrophic 00:00:15.380 --> 00:00:18.739 mechanical flaw. A wing snapping off. Exactly. 00:00:19.940 --> 00:00:22.539 But today, we're looking at a disaster where 00:00:22.539 --> 00:00:25.859 almost every single piece of billion dollar technology 00:00:25.859 --> 00:00:29.280 was working perfectly. and it still resulted 00:00:29.280 --> 00:00:32.939 in this massive pile of scrap metal sitting at 00:00:32.939 --> 00:00:35.829 the bottom of a freezing fjord. It really is 00:00:35.829 --> 00:00:37.850 the ultimate paradox of the modern age. I mean, 00:00:37.850 --> 00:00:39.689 you have one of the most advanced warships in 00:00:39.689 --> 00:00:42.630 the world, right? A Fritjof Nansen -class frigate. 00:00:42.649 --> 00:00:45.630 Built to hunt submarines? Hunt subs, track supersonic 00:00:45.630 --> 00:00:48.609 missiles, survive high -intensity warfare, and 00:00:48.609 --> 00:00:51.170 yet it gets taken out by a slow -moving oil tanker 00:00:51.170 --> 00:00:53.829 on a totally calm, clear night. It sounds like 00:00:53.829 --> 00:00:56.670 a bad joke, or like a massive plot hole in a 00:00:56.670 --> 00:00:59.210 movie. But it's real. It is entirely real. This 00:00:59.210 --> 00:01:02.310 is the story of the H &O MS Helgingstad and the 00:01:02.310 --> 00:01:05.099 oil tanker Solitis. Welcome back to the deep 00:01:05.099 --> 00:01:07.040 dive. Glad to be. Today we're combing through 00:01:07.040 --> 00:01:09.900 the official accident investigation reports, 00:01:10.359 --> 00:01:12.379 the court transcripts from the Norwegian legal 00:01:12.379 --> 00:01:15.060 system, maritime logs all to figure out how this 00:01:15.060 --> 00:01:17.920 happened. And honestly, the how is terrifying 00:01:17.920 --> 00:01:20.599 because it's just so deeply human. Yeah, that's 00:01:20.599 --> 00:01:22.140 our mission today. We aren't just looking at 00:01:22.140 --> 00:01:24.819 a boat crash. We're unpacking this this perfect 00:01:24.819 --> 00:01:28.439 storm of. cognitive bias, invisible design flaws, 00:01:29.019 --> 00:01:31.280 and communication breakdowns. It turned a routine 00:01:31.280 --> 00:01:34.500 navigation exercise into a total loss for NATO. 00:01:34.939 --> 00:01:37.480 A total loss. So let's set the board. We have 00:01:37.480 --> 00:01:40.239 two massive players here. First up, the victim. 00:01:40.510 --> 00:01:43.469 if we can call it that. The Hel Ingstad. Right. 00:01:43.730 --> 00:01:46.030 The pride of the Royal Norwegian Navy. She's 00:01:46.030 --> 00:01:50.290 134 meters long, valued at nearly 5 billion Norwegian 00:01:50.290 --> 00:01:52.569 kroner, just unequipped. Which is astronomical. 00:01:52.769 --> 00:01:54.650 And much, much more once you add all the weapon 00:01:54.650 --> 00:01:57.329 systems. She had just finished this massive NATO 00:01:57.329 --> 00:01:59.769 exercise called Trident Juncture. So you've got 00:01:59.769 --> 00:02:02.329 a crew of 137 people, highly trained, coming 00:02:02.329 --> 00:02:04.510 off a really high -tempo operation. And she's 00:02:04.510 --> 00:02:07.680 fast. Very fast, capable of roughly 26 knots. 00:02:08.099 --> 00:02:11.199 She's designed to be sleek, agile, and stealthy. 00:02:12.180 --> 00:02:14.280 Yes. Stealthy is a key word here because it plays 00:02:14.280 --> 00:02:17.039 a huge role in the setup. They weren't just sailing 00:02:17.039 --> 00:02:19.979 normally. No, they were navigating the Hiltiff 00:02:19.979 --> 00:02:23.199 Jordan, which is a super busy shipping lane north 00:02:23.199 --> 00:02:25.620 of Bergen. And they were doing it in what's called 00:02:25.620 --> 00:02:28.560 passive mode. Meaning they had their AIs switched 00:02:28.560 --> 00:02:31.520 off. AIS being the Automatic Identification System. 00:02:31.819 --> 00:02:34.759 Right. Think of AIS as like a digital name tag. 00:02:35.050 --> 00:02:38.830 Every commercial ship broadcasts its name, speed, 00:02:39.310 --> 00:02:42.169 heading, position to everyone else. It pops up 00:02:42.169 --> 00:02:44.789 on digital charts. But the hell Jinxtad turned 00:02:44.789 --> 00:02:47.229 that transmit function off? For training purposes. 00:02:47.629 --> 00:02:49.930 They wanted to practice navigating without giving 00:02:49.930 --> 00:02:51.849 away their position, just like they would in 00:02:51.849 --> 00:02:53.930 an actual war zone. So they can see everyone 00:02:53.930 --> 00:02:56.110 else on their screens, but to the digital systems 00:02:56.110 --> 00:02:58.530 of the other ships, the frigate is effectively 00:02:58.530 --> 00:03:01.169 a ghost. To the digital systems, yes. Right. 00:03:01.289 --> 00:03:03.310 I mean, they still show up as a blip on raw radar, 00:03:03.530 --> 00:03:06.289 but there's no data attached, no name, just this 00:03:06.289 --> 00:03:08.569 anonymous echo moving through the dark. OK, so 00:03:08.569 --> 00:03:11.050 we have a ghost ship doing 17 knots through a 00:03:11.050 --> 00:03:13.830 busy fjord. Who is in the other corner? The heavyweight 00:03:13.830 --> 00:03:19.110 champion. A Maltese -flagged oil tanker. And 00:03:19.110 --> 00:03:23.629 this thing is a Leviathan. 250 meters long, almost 00:03:23.629 --> 00:03:26.250 twice the length of the frigate. And fully loaded 00:03:26.250 --> 00:03:30.729 with 625 ,000 barrels of crude oil. That is just 00:03:30.729 --> 00:03:33.069 a massive amount of massive momentum. It's basically 00:03:33.069 --> 00:03:36.009 a freight train on water. And it's being escorted 00:03:36.009 --> 00:03:39.240 by a tugboat. the 10X, they had just pulled away 00:03:39.240 --> 00:03:41.560 from the store terminal. Now usually when a tanker 00:03:41.560 --> 00:03:44.860 leaves a terminal, it's this slow, loud, very 00:03:44.860 --> 00:03:46.960 obvious affair you'd think would be impossible 00:03:46.960 --> 00:03:49.319 to miss. And yet we're here discussing a collision. 00:03:49.620 --> 00:03:51.520 Exactly. This is where we need to get into the 00:03:51.520 --> 00:03:54.800 head of the bridge crew on the frigate. The investigation 00:03:54.800 --> 00:03:57.960 talks a lot about an optical illusion. How do 00:03:57.960 --> 00:04:01.280 you get an optical illusion with a giant lit 00:04:01.280 --> 00:04:03.979 up tanker? This is the psychological pivot point 00:04:03.979 --> 00:04:06.759 of the whole disaster. The Sola TS had left the 00:04:06.759 --> 00:04:09.960 dock, right? But the crew hadn't turned off their 00:04:09.960 --> 00:04:12.539 deck floodlights yet. These are incredibly bright 00:04:12.539 --> 00:04:14.919 industrial halogen lights used to illuminate 00:04:14.919 --> 00:04:16.699 the work deck so the crew can see what they're 00:04:16.699 --> 00:04:19.379 doing while leaving port. OK, but it's super 00:04:19.379 --> 00:04:21.439 bright. Shouldn't that make it easier to see? 00:04:21.680 --> 00:04:24.680 You would think so. But from the angle the halogen 00:04:24.680 --> 00:04:27.970 stod was approaching, those bright deck lights 00:04:27.970 --> 00:04:30.850 totally drowned out the tanker's navigation light. 00:04:30.990 --> 00:04:32.689 The red and green ones. Right, the lights that 00:04:32.689 --> 00:04:34.550 actually tell you which way a ship is moving. 00:04:35.329 --> 00:04:38.230 Even worse, the tanker was still physically very 00:04:38.230 --> 00:04:40.910 close to the terminal it just left. Ah, I see 00:04:40.910 --> 00:04:43.389 where this is going. The terminal has lights 00:04:43.389 --> 00:04:46.199 too. The stir terminal is lit up like a Christmas 00:04:46.199 --> 00:04:48.519 tree. So when the crew on the frigate looked 00:04:48.519 --> 00:04:51.079 out the window, they didn't see a ship moving 00:04:51.079 --> 00:04:53.720 toward them. They saw a cluster of bright lights 00:04:53.720 --> 00:04:55.959 that blended perfectly with the background lights 00:04:55.959 --> 00:04:58.379 of the terminal. Object constancy. Their brains 00:04:58.379 --> 00:05:01.680 just decided that is a stationary object. Precisely. 00:05:01.839 --> 00:05:03.959 They identified the tanker as part of the dock. 00:05:04.160 --> 00:05:06.300 They thought they were looking at a stationary 00:05:06.300 --> 00:05:09.360 extension of the land. And once that mental model 00:05:09.360 --> 00:05:12.019 locks in, it becomes incredibly hard to break. 00:05:12.259 --> 00:05:13.939 But wait, there are other safeguards. What about 00:05:13.939 --> 00:05:17.980 the traffic control center? The FedGVTS? They're 00:05:17.980 --> 00:05:20.300 watching the screens, right? Like the air traffic 00:05:20.300 --> 00:05:22.699 controllers of the sea. They are. But remember 00:05:22.699 --> 00:05:26.240 that AIS issue? The passive mode? Right. The 00:05:26.240 --> 00:05:29.060 traffic controller sees a blip on his radar moving 00:05:29.060 --> 00:05:31.949 south. But because the frigate isn't broadcasting 00:05:31.949 --> 00:05:35.170 its ID, he has no idea it's a warship. He doesn't 00:05:35.170 --> 00:05:37.470 know it's the Helgingstad. So the frigate thinks 00:05:37.470 --> 00:05:40.769 the tanker is a dock. The tanker sees a blip 00:05:40.769 --> 00:05:42.910 but doesn't know what it is, and traffic control 00:05:42.910 --> 00:05:45.709 is looking at an anonymous echo. Everyone is 00:05:45.709 --> 00:05:48.050 operating in this fog of partial information. 00:05:48.279 --> 00:05:50.699 And the clock is ticking. We can actually trace 00:05:50.699 --> 00:05:54.120 the radio logs, the VHF recordings, and it is 00:05:54.120 --> 00:05:56.819 just agonizing to listen to. What happens? About 00:05:56.819 --> 00:05:59.160 three minutes before impact, the Sola TS pilot 00:05:59.160 --> 00:06:02.720 calls up traffic control. He sees this fast moving 00:06:02.720 --> 00:06:05.660 echo on his radar coming straight at him. He 00:06:05.660 --> 00:06:08.899 asks, who is this ship coming towards me? A totally 00:06:08.899 --> 00:06:11.199 reasonable question. What does FEDGY say? The 00:06:11.199 --> 00:06:13.569 traffic controller says, I don't know. Wow. He 00:06:13.569 --> 00:06:15.550 literally couldn't identify the target initially. 00:06:15.670 --> 00:06:17.430 That has to be chilling for the tanker pilot. 00:06:17.509 --> 00:06:19.889 You have a collision course target, and the authorities 00:06:19.889 --> 00:06:22.490 don't even know who it is. So the tanker tries 00:06:22.490 --> 00:06:25.370 to signal physically. They use an Aldus lamp, 00:06:25.529 --> 00:06:28.029 which is a powerful Morse signal lamp, and they 00:06:28.029 --> 00:06:30.449 flash it directly at the bridge of the oncoming 00:06:30.449 --> 00:06:32.689 frigate. Like flashing your high beams on the 00:06:32.689 --> 00:06:35.250 highway to say, hey, wake up. Exactly. But think 00:06:35.250 --> 00:06:37.389 about the confirmation bias we just talked about. 00:06:37.949 --> 00:06:39.829 The frigate crew thinks they're looking at the 00:06:39.829 --> 00:06:42.779 terminal. Right. If you see a flashing light 00:06:42.779 --> 00:06:46.680 on a quote unquote stationary terminal, what 00:06:46.680 --> 00:06:48.339 do you think it is? I don't know. Someone working 00:06:48.339 --> 00:06:51.519 on the dock. A flickering floodlight. Exactly. 00:06:51.980 --> 00:06:53.939 They didn't interpret it as a warning signal. 00:06:54.240 --> 00:06:56.360 They interpreted it as background noise that 00:06:56.360 --> 00:06:59.199 just fit their existing theory. This is the danger 00:06:59.199 --> 00:07:01.800 of a strong mental model. It just filters out 00:07:01.800 --> 00:07:05.120 everything that contradicts it. So at some point, 00:07:05.500 --> 00:07:07.269 they must have gotten on the radio. They did, 00:07:07.290 --> 00:07:10.730 but it was too late and way too confused. The 00:07:10.730 --> 00:07:13.310 traffic center finally deduced it might be the 00:07:13.310 --> 00:07:15.990 Helgingstead. So the pilot on the tanker gets 00:07:15.990 --> 00:07:18.870 on the radio. He is very clear. He says, turn 00:07:18.870 --> 00:07:21.029 starboard immediately. Varon Wright, get out 00:07:21.029 --> 00:07:23.730 of the way. Standard evasion. And the officer 00:07:23.730 --> 00:07:26.769 of the watch on the Helgingstead replies, no. 00:07:27.110 --> 00:07:29.870 He refuses. He refuses. He says, if I turn starboard, 00:07:30.029 --> 00:07:32.069 I'll get too close to the blocks. The block. 00:07:32.230 --> 00:07:35.110 He means the shore. Remember, in his head, the 00:07:35.110 --> 00:07:37.980 tanker is the shore. He thinks the pilot is telling 00:07:37.980 --> 00:07:40.819 him to drive his ship onto the rocks. Oh, man. 00:07:41.199 --> 00:07:44.199 That is tragic irony. The move that would save 00:07:44.199 --> 00:07:47.220 them is the one move he thinks will destroy them. 00:07:47.500 --> 00:07:50.000 He actually says they will wait to turn until 00:07:50.000 --> 00:07:52.740 they have passed the object. He thinks he can 00:07:52.740 --> 00:07:55.100 squeeze between the object and his port side. 00:07:55.540 --> 00:07:57.579 He doesn't realize the object is moving toward 00:07:57.579 --> 00:08:01.139 him at seven knots, and he's closing at 17 knots. 00:08:01.300 --> 00:08:03.819 That's a closing speed of almost 25 knots. And 00:08:03.819 --> 00:08:07.819 then impact. 401 AM. And it wasn't a head -on 00:08:07.819 --> 00:08:10.439 crash. It was a side swipe, which in maritime 00:08:10.439 --> 00:08:13.040 terms is often way worse. Why is a side swipe 00:08:13.040 --> 00:08:16.259 worse? Because the tanker has these massive steel 00:08:16.259 --> 00:08:18.399 protrusions on the bow called anchor cleats. 00:08:18.699 --> 00:08:21.000 They're basically giant steel horns. And against 00:08:21.000 --> 00:08:23.540 the sleek steel of a frigate. It acted like a 00:08:23.540 --> 00:08:25.740 giant can opener. It caught the starboard side 00:08:25.740 --> 00:08:29.259 of the Helging stud and tore a 45 -meter long 00:08:29.259 --> 00:08:32.100 gash right along the hull. 45 meters? It shredded 00:08:32.100 --> 00:08:34.080 the side of the ship, opening up the crew quarters, 00:08:34.259 --> 00:08:36.519 the canteen, and critically, the generator room. 00:08:36.799 --> 00:08:38.879 What about the tanker? Barely scratched. Just 00:08:38.879 --> 00:08:41.740 kidding. Some paint scraping, minor bow damage. 00:08:41.980 --> 00:08:44.340 It's a double -hulled supertanker. It barely 00:08:44.340 --> 00:08:47.220 felt it, but the frigate spun out of control. 00:08:47.320 --> 00:08:50.080 They lost steering, lost engine power. OK, but 00:08:50.080 --> 00:08:53.200 here's where I get confused. This is a warship. 00:08:53.620 --> 00:08:57.759 It's designed to take a missile hit. It has watertight 00:08:57.759 --> 00:09:00.220 compartments, bulkheads. It's like an ice cube 00:09:00.220 --> 00:09:02.720 tray, right? If you puncture one cube, the others 00:09:02.720 --> 00:09:06.100 stay dry. Why did a single gash sink the whole 00:09:06.100 --> 00:09:08.779 ship? This is where the story shifts from human 00:09:08.779 --> 00:09:12.100 error to an incredible engineering failure. And 00:09:12.100 --> 00:09:14.379 this is the part that triggered massive lawsuits 00:09:14.379 --> 00:09:17.179 later on. Theoretically, the Helging Stard was 00:09:17.179 --> 00:09:19.860 designed to survive flooding in any two watertight 00:09:19.860 --> 00:09:22.000 compartments. OK. The collision opened up two 00:09:22.000 --> 00:09:23.480 or three. It really should have floated. But 00:09:23.480 --> 00:09:25.860 it didn't. No. And the reason was hidden deep 00:09:25.860 --> 00:09:28.259 inside the mechanics of the ship, the propeller 00:09:28.259 --> 00:09:30.940 shafts, the long tubes connecting the engines 00:09:30.940 --> 00:09:33.559 to the propellers at the back. On this specific 00:09:33.559 --> 00:09:36.360 class of ship, those shafts were hollow. Hollow. 00:09:36.379 --> 00:09:39.360 Why does that matter? Well, the collision flooded 00:09:39.360 --> 00:09:42.259 the generator room. The propeller shafts ran 00:09:42.259 --> 00:09:45.210 right through that room. The water filled the 00:09:45.210 --> 00:09:47.990 room, found its way into those hollow shafts 00:09:47.990 --> 00:09:50.539 and used them like a secret tunnel. Wait, you 00:09:50.539 --> 00:09:53.519 mean the water traveled inside the spinning shafts? 00:09:53.600 --> 00:09:56.159 Inside the shafts. It bypassed the watertight 00:09:56.159 --> 00:09:58.600 bulkheads completely and just poured out into 00:09:58.600 --> 00:10:00.879 the gear room and the engine rooms further back 00:10:00.879 --> 00:10:03.120 in the ship. So the bulkheads were doing their 00:10:03.120 --> 00:10:05.759 job holding the water back, but the water just 00:10:05.759 --> 00:10:07.519 went straight through the pipes running through 00:10:07.519 --> 00:10:10.679 the bulkheads. Exactly. It completely defeated 00:10:10.679 --> 00:10:14.299 the entire compartmentalization strategy. Suddenly, 00:10:14.679 --> 00:10:17.830 the crew wasn't fighting a localized flood. Water 00:10:17.830 --> 00:10:19.730 was appearing in rooms that hadn't even been 00:10:19.730 --> 00:10:21.950 touched by the collision. That sounds like a 00:10:21.950 --> 00:10:24.450 catastrophic design oversight. The investigation 00:10:24.450 --> 00:10:26.830 board certainly thought so. They called it a 00:10:26.830 --> 00:10:28.950 critical safety issue not just for the ship but 00:10:28.950 --> 00:10:31.929 for the entire class of frigates. But we can't 00:10:31.929 --> 00:10:34.450 lay it all on the design either. There is total 00:10:34.450 --> 00:10:37.309 chaos on board. The human element again. Right. 00:10:37.610 --> 00:10:40.190 As the ship was flooding, the crew evacuated. 00:10:40.440 --> 00:10:43.259 And in the panic, and keep in mind, it was pitch 00:10:43.259 --> 00:10:47.100 black, freezing water, screaming metal everywhere. 00:10:47.460 --> 00:10:49.279 They didn't close all the watertight doors and 00:10:49.279 --> 00:10:51.019 hatches behind them. They left the doors open. 00:10:51.220 --> 00:10:53.620 Several of them. The investigation found that 00:10:53.620 --> 00:10:55.740 progressive flooding occurred through hatches 00:10:55.740 --> 00:10:59.039 left open during the evacuation. So you had water 00:10:59.039 --> 00:11:01.759 tunneling through the shafts from below and water 00:11:01.759 --> 00:11:04.470 spreading through open doors from above. The 00:11:04.470 --> 00:11:06.750 ship just didn't stand a chance. But the captain 00:11:06.750 --> 00:11:08.750 did try to save it, though. I remember seeing 00:11:08.750 --> 00:11:11.190 photos of the ship up against the rocks. Yeah, 00:11:11.190 --> 00:11:13.769 he made a split second decision to run the ship 00:11:13.769 --> 00:11:16.649 aground. He pushed it onto the rocky shore to 00:11:16.649 --> 00:11:18.950 literally stop it from sinking into the deep 00:11:18.950 --> 00:11:22.090 water of the fjord. And for a few days it just 00:11:22.090 --> 00:11:24.690 sat there leaning precariously. It became this 00:11:24.690 --> 00:11:27.269 massive public spectacle. And this leads us to 00:11:27.269 --> 00:11:29.870 the salvage operation, which, from the reports, 00:11:30.230 --> 00:11:31.950 sounds like it was a disaster in its own right. 00:11:32.090 --> 00:11:35.389 It was a slow -motion car crash. You have a multi 00:11:35.389 --> 00:11:38.029 -billion kroner asset teetering on the rocks. 00:11:38.649 --> 00:11:41.529 The Navy and salvage crews rushed in. They tried 00:11:41.529 --> 00:11:43.690 to secure the frigate to the shore using heavy 00:11:43.690 --> 00:11:46.090 steel cables to pin it in place. Secure it so 00:11:46.090 --> 00:11:47.629 it wouldn't slide down the underwater slope. 00:11:47.889 --> 00:11:50.909 Exactly. But this operation was heavily criticized. 00:11:51.350 --> 00:11:53.690 The Green Warriors of Norway, which is an environmental 00:11:53.690 --> 00:11:56.539 group, were watching closely. They publicly called 00:11:56.539 --> 00:11:59.960 the cables sewing thread. Sewing thread. That 00:11:59.960 --> 00:12:01.960 is not what you want to hear about the gear holding 00:12:01.960 --> 00:12:04.980 up a billion dollar warship. Were they right? 00:12:05.299 --> 00:12:08.019 Tragically, yes. On the morning of November 13th, 00:12:08.019 --> 00:12:10.519 so a few days after the crash, the cable started 00:12:10.519 --> 00:12:13.379 to smoke. Smoke from the tension. Friction and 00:12:13.379 --> 00:12:17.039 tension. And then snap. One by one, the cables 00:12:17.039 --> 00:12:19.600 burst. The ship slid down the embankment and 00:12:19.600 --> 00:12:22.059 sank almost completely underwater. Only the very 00:12:22.059 --> 00:12:24.039 top of the radar tower was left sticking out 00:12:24.039 --> 00:12:26.620 of the fjord. That image is seared into my brain. 00:12:27.080 --> 00:12:30.080 A top tier NATO asset totally submerged in freezing 00:12:30.080 --> 00:12:32.299 water. They did eventually raise it, though. 00:12:32.519 --> 00:12:34.720 They brought in these massive crane ships, the 00:12:34.720 --> 00:12:38.120 Gulliver and the Rambiz. They lifted it out and 00:12:38.120 --> 00:12:41.600 barged it to a naval base. But, you know, saltwater 00:12:41.600 --> 00:12:44.820 is the ultimate enemy of electronics. After sitting 00:12:44.820 --> 00:12:47.710 underwater for months, the ship was toast. So 00:12:47.710 --> 00:12:50.590 let's talk numbers. What is the final bill for 00:12:50.590 --> 00:12:53.470 a mistake like this? Astronomical. When they 00:12:53.470 --> 00:12:55.850 finally assessed the damage, the repair estimate 00:12:55.850 --> 00:13:00.210 came in between 12 and 14 billion Norwegian kroner. 00:13:00.389 --> 00:13:02.730 And what's the cost of a new ship? About 11 to 00:13:02.730 --> 00:13:05.129 13 billion. So it is literally cheaper to buy 00:13:05.129 --> 00:13:07.490 a brand new destroyer than to fix the wet one. 00:13:07.870 --> 00:13:09.710 Correct. The Ministry of Defense declared it 00:13:09.710 --> 00:13:12.090 a total loss. They stripped it for spare parts 00:13:12.090 --> 00:13:14.690 and sold the metal for scrap. I'm almost afraid 00:13:14.690 --> 00:13:17.970 to ask, what's the scrap value of a 5 billion 00:13:17.970 --> 00:13:21.350 kroner frigate? About 15 to 18 million kroner, 00:13:21.549 --> 00:13:24.629 it's pennies on the dollar, a 99 % loss of value. 00:13:24.950 --> 00:13:26.769 That brings us to the accountability side of 00:13:26.769 --> 00:13:29.370 things. Because in the military, usually if you 00:13:29.370 --> 00:13:32.470 lose a ship, heads roll. Who took the fall for 00:13:32.470 --> 00:13:34.679 this? This is where it gets legally very messy. 00:13:35.019 --> 00:13:37.960 The Accident Investigation Board, the AIBN, was 00:13:37.960 --> 00:13:40.679 very careful. They concluded that this wasn't 00:13:40.679 --> 00:13:43.919 the fault of one single person. It was systemic. 00:13:44.139 --> 00:13:47.179 How so? They blamed training deficiencies. They 00:13:47.179 --> 00:13:49.899 blamed the confusion caused by the tanker's lights. 00:13:50.120 --> 00:13:52.759 And they heavily blame the passivity of the traffic 00:13:52.759 --> 00:13:55.000 control center. So nobody went to jail? Will 00:13:55.000 --> 00:13:57.820 the state fine the Ministry of Defense 10 million 00:13:57.820 --> 00:14:00.759 kroner for corporate negligence? Wait, the Ministry 00:14:00.759 --> 00:14:03.220 of Defense is the state? So the government basically 00:14:03.220 --> 00:14:06.100 fined itself? Essentially, yes. It's a way of 00:14:06.100 --> 00:14:08.220 formally acknowledging institutional failure. 00:14:08.779 --> 00:14:11.980 But they did go after one person, the officer 00:14:11.980 --> 00:14:14.220 of the watch. the young officer in charge of 00:14:14.220 --> 00:14:16.200 the bridge that night. A guy who said no to the 00:14:16.200 --> 00:14:18.899 turn command. Him. He faced criminal prosecution. 00:14:19.539 --> 00:14:21.919 The argument was that despite the confusing lights, 00:14:22.139 --> 00:14:24.860 despite the systemic issues, he had working radar. 00:14:25.100 --> 00:14:27.860 He had instruments. He failed to use them and 00:14:27.860 --> 00:14:30.759 relied solely on his eyes. Navigating by sight 00:14:30.759 --> 00:14:32.559 when you have millions of dollars of sensors 00:14:32.559 --> 00:14:35.200 available right in front of you. Exactly. The 00:14:35.200 --> 00:14:37.759 court ruled his actions were clearly unjustifiable. 00:14:38.440 --> 00:14:41.360 He was sentenced to 60 days of suspended imprisonment. 00:14:41.559 --> 00:14:45.740 He appealed, but as of late 2023, that sentence 00:14:45.740 --> 00:14:48.740 was upheld. It just feels like a very heavy birdie 00:14:48.740 --> 00:14:52.220 for one guy to carry. When the VTS failed, the 00:14:52.220 --> 00:14:54.539 tanker lights were blinding and the ship had 00:14:54.539 --> 00:14:58.100 a hidden design flaw. Speaking of which, what 00:14:58.100 --> 00:15:00.440 happened with that hollow shaft issue? Did the 00:15:00.440 --> 00:15:03.019 Navy just eat that cost? Oh, absolutely not. 00:15:03.419 --> 00:15:05.259 The Norwegian government turned around and sued 00:15:05.259 --> 00:15:08.009 the shipbuilder, Navantia. A Spanish company. 00:15:08.230 --> 00:15:11.769 This is a massive lawsuit. 13 .3 billion Croner. 00:15:11.850 --> 00:15:14.070 They want the full replacement costs. Yeah. They 00:15:14.070 --> 00:15:15.929 argue that the ship shouldn't have sunk. They 00:15:15.929 --> 00:15:17.809 say if the shafts weren't hollow or if the seals 00:15:17.809 --> 00:15:19.529 had worked properly, the ship would have just 00:15:19.529 --> 00:15:21.870 been damaged, not lost. And what does Devante 00:15:21.870 --> 00:15:23.950 say? You crashed it. You bought it. Pretty much. 00:15:24.200 --> 00:15:27.159 Navantia fights back hard. They argue that the 00:15:27.159 --> 00:15:29.159 hollow shaft design is standard for that class 00:15:29.159 --> 00:15:31.120 of ship and complied with all the regulations 00:15:31.120 --> 00:15:33.799 at the time. They also point out that the Norwegian 00:15:33.799 --> 00:15:36.740 Navy was operating with unaddressed deviations. 00:15:37.179 --> 00:15:39.639 Meaning the Navy knew about certain maintenance 00:15:39.639 --> 00:15:42.039 or safety issues and just ignored them. Or that 00:15:42.039 --> 00:15:43.700 the crew wasn't trained well enough to close 00:15:43.700 --> 00:15:46.919 the watertight doors. Navantia's stance is essentially, 00:15:47.519 --> 00:15:49.759 you drove it into a tanker, you left the doors 00:15:49.759 --> 00:15:52.679 open, and now you want us to pay for it. That 00:15:52.679 --> 00:15:56.940 trial is looming for late 2025. So even years 00:15:56.940 --> 00:16:00.019 later, the ripples of this crash are still hitting 00:16:00.019 --> 00:16:03.299 the courts. It's fascinating because it starts 00:16:03.299 --> 00:16:05.860 with such a simple thing, a light that was too 00:16:05.860 --> 00:16:08.539 bright, and it ends with international litigation. 00:16:08.840 --> 00:16:11.559 It really exposes the fragility of these high 00:16:11.559 --> 00:16:13.659 -tech systems we rely on. We surround ourselves 00:16:13.659 --> 00:16:16.299 with radar, AIS, collision warnings, automated 00:16:16.299 --> 00:16:19.259 barriers. But in the end, the safety of that 00:16:19.259 --> 00:16:21.539 billion -dollar vessel came down to a 20 -something 00:16:21.539 --> 00:16:23.299 -year -old looking out a window and seeing what 00:16:23.299 --> 00:16:25.740 he expected to see rather than what was actually 00:16:25.740 --> 00:16:28.299 there. Confirmation bias. It's the bug in the 00:16:28.299 --> 00:16:30.419 human operating system that no amount of technology 00:16:30.419 --> 00:16:32.700 seems to fix. And that actually brings us to 00:16:32.700 --> 00:16:35.320 the scariest statistic from the report. They 00:16:35.320 --> 00:16:38.240 found that out of 88 identified safety barriers 00:16:38.240 --> 00:16:41.000 that should have prevented this accident, 53 00:16:41.000 --> 00:16:45.039 were violated or failed. 53 out of 88. Yeah. 00:16:45.379 --> 00:16:48.259 That is a staggering failure rate. It's not even 00:16:48.259 --> 00:16:50.340 a Swiss cheese model anymore. It's just a giant 00:16:50.340 --> 00:16:53.600 hole. It is. And it leaves us with a provocative 00:16:53.600 --> 00:16:55.919 thought for everyone listening to mull over. 00:16:56.440 --> 00:16:59.320 We live in a world where our cars break for us, 00:16:59.460 --> 00:17:02.379 our planes practically fly themselves, and our 00:17:02.379 --> 00:17:05.880 ships have digital eyes. But does that safety 00:17:05.880 --> 00:17:08.940 net actually make us less safe? Because we stop 00:17:08.940 --> 00:17:12.000 looking. Because we outsource our survival instinct 00:17:12.000 --> 00:17:14.700 to the machine. The crew of the Helgeinstadt 00:17:14.700 --> 00:17:17.240 assumed the system would catch them. They assumed 00:17:17.240 --> 00:17:19.259 if there was a real threat, the radar would scream 00:17:19.259 --> 00:17:22.319 or the VTS would call. They stopped actively 00:17:22.319 --> 00:17:24.650 interrogating reality. That is a thought that 00:17:24.650 --> 00:17:26.410 will keep me up at night. Are we asleep at the 00:17:26.410 --> 00:17:28.309 wheel because we think the car is driving itself? 00:17:29.309 --> 00:17:31.430 A huge thank you to our expert for walking us 00:17:31.430 --> 00:17:34.390 through this incredible, expensive, and really 00:17:34.390 --> 00:17:36.490 tragic story today. Thank you. It's a lesson 00:17:36.490 --> 00:17:38.309 definitely worth learning. And thank you to everyone 00:17:38.309 --> 00:17:40.349 for listening to this deep dive into the Helding 00:17:40.349 --> 00:17:43.369 -Stodd collision. Stay curious, stay skeptical, 00:17:43.670 --> 00:17:45.269 and always double check what you see out the 00:17:45.269 --> 00:17:47.529 window. We'll see you on the next deep dive.