WEBVTT

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Quote, Houston, we have a problem, unquote. It

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is, without a doubt, the most famous sentence

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ever spoken in space. Oh, absolutely. It's the

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ultimate catchphrase. Like, you burn the toast

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in the morning, you say, Houston, we have a problem.

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Your Wi -Fi goes down during a Zoom call. Exactly.

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It is this universal shorthand for, you know,

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something has gone terribly wrong and I need

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help right now. It's calm, it's cool, and instantly

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recognizable. It is incredibly iconic. It's totally

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universal. And if we are being strictly accurate

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about the history here, it is also a complete

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fabrication. See, I had a feeling you were going

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to say that. I set up this dramatic intro. I'm

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channeling my inner Tom Hanks over here. And

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you immediately come in with a red pen to mark

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up the script. I have to. I mean, this is one

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of those fascinating instances where our collective

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memory, the things that you and I and everyone

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listening think we know about history, it's been

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entirely overwritten by pop culture. Overwritten

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how? That phrase, exactly the way you just said

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it, it was actually never spoken during the Apollo

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13 mission. Not even once. Okay, let's unpack

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this. Because we are going on a deep dive today.

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And I can hear the voice in my head. I can literally

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see the movie scene. It is just so ingrained

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in our culture. What are you telling me? Is this

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some sort of Mandela effect situation? Or did

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Hollywood just pull a fast one on all of us?

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It's a little bit of both, but mostly it's Hollywood.

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The astronauts on board the Odyssey Command Module

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back in... April of 1970, they said something

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different. And the difference, while it might

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just seem like a minor grammar nitpick at first

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glance, it actually changes the entire psychological

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context of that specific moment in space. All

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right. I am fully ready for this. Let's do a

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forensic audit. One of the most famous moments

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in spaceflight history. Let's do it. We got the

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actual flight journals today. We have the movie

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script to look at. And perhaps most importantly,

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we have the actual technical specs of the ship

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itself. Yeah. Because I really want to understand

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not just what they actually said, but why they

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said it that particular way. Right. Well, to

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do that, we really have to set the scene for

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you. And the scene wasn't exactly what you might

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expect it to be. What do you mean? Well, if I

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asked you to describe the general mood on Apollo

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13 right before the accident happened, what would

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you say? Tension. High stakes. I mean, they are

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flying through the void of space to the moon.

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Actually, it was extreme boredom. Boredom. You're

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kidding. No, extreme boredom. You have to remember

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the context of the era. This was the third lunar

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landing attempt. Apollo 11 was the huge one.

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Right. Neil Armstrong. Giant leap for mankind.

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Exactly. And then Apollo 12 proved they could

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do it again, but with pinpoint precision. So

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by the time Apollo 13 came around in 1970, the

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American public had largely just lost interest.

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Wow. Yeah, the major television networks didn't

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even air the crew's primetime broadcasts. Ouch.

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That is, imagine broadcasting live from deep

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space and you get... Preempted by a rerun of

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I Love Lucy or something. That is basically what

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happened. Marilyn Lovell, who was the mission

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commander's wife, she was actually sitting in

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the VIP viewing room down at Mission Control,

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and they couldn't even find the live broadcast

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on the monitors in there. You're joking. I'm

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not. The vice president at the time, Spiro Agnew,

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had just left the room. The control room itself

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was running on a skeleton crew. For all intents

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and purposes, this was considered a totally routine

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flight. Which is usually exactly when things

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go horribly wrong in the movies. And in real

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life, as it turns out. So let's look at the timeline.

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We are exactly 55 hours into the mission. They

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are roughly 200 ,000 miles away from Earth. Okay.

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They've just finished that television broadcast

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that practically nobody watched. And mission

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control radios up and asks them to do a routine

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quote -unquote cruise. A cryo -ster. A cryo -ster,

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which honestly sounds like a fancy cocktail.

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I wish it was a cocktail. It's actually a vital

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maintenance procedure for the ship's cryogenics.

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They had these massive tanks of liquid hydrogen

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and liquid oxygen on board. Right. And to keep

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the quantity readings accurate, they periodically

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had to turn on these internal fans inside the

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tanks to mix up the super cold slush. Otherwise,

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the liquid stratifies and the sensors give bad

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readings. Okay, so they're just stirring the

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oxygen tank. That sounds incredibly routine.

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It was completely supposed to be. So Jack Swigert,

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who is the command... module pilot he floats

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over and flips the switch for the fans in oxygen

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tank number two and moments later the bang a

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massive bang the entire ship violently shudders

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now before we get to what they actually said

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on the radio i really want to understand what

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happened physically in that moment because if

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you watch the 1995 movie it looks like a bomb

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went off inside the ship a bomb effectively did

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go off. And this is where the engineering history

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gets incredibly tragic. Yeah, it turns out this

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specific oxygen tank had been dropped slightly

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during its factory installation years prior.

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Just dropped. Dropped just a couple of inches,

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but it damaged a drain tube. So to fix a draining

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issue during a ground test just weeks before

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the actual launch, the ground crew had turned

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on the internal heaters in that tank for a really

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long period to just boil off the excess oxygen.

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Okay, that seems like a standard workaround.

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It would have been, except for one tiny fatal

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detail. The thermostat switches inside the tank.

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were rated for the command module's standard

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28 -volt DC power. Right. But during this specific

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ground test, they were plugged into the launch

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pad's 65 -volt power supply. Oh, no, I see exactly

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where this is going. An electrical overload.

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A massive overload. The switches essentially

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welded shut. They failed to click off when the

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heater got too hot, so the temperature inside

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the tank unknowingly spiked to over 1 ,000 degrees

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Fahrenheit. 1 ,000 degrees? Inside an oxygen

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tank? Yes. It literally melted the tank. Teflon

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insulation right off the electrical wires inside

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the tank. So for the entire flight up to that

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point, for 55 solid hours in space, they were

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flying around with bare exposed wires sitting

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inside a pressurized tank of pure liquid oxygen.

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Exactly. It was a literal bomb just waiting for

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a single spark. And when Swigert flipped that

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fan switch to do the routine stir at 55 hours

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in, the exposed wires shorted out and the spark

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jumped. And boom. Boom. The resulting overpressure

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blew the entire side. panel off the service module.

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It physically severed the plumbing lines to the

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other oxygen tank. It was a catastrophic structural

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failure. So there is utter chaos on the ship.

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Alarm lights are flashing everywhere. Master

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alarms are blaring. This is the moment. Who speaks

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first? Because in my head, it's Tom Hanks playing

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the commander looking totally steely eyed. In

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the movie, yes. Tom Hanks, playing Jim Lovell,

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keys the mic and delivers the famous line. But

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in the real timeline, if we look directly at

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the actual flight transcripts, Jim Lovell wasn't

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the first person to report the explosion. Wait,

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it wasn't the commander? No. It was the command

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module pilot. It was Jack Swigert, the guy who

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physically flipped the switch. Okay, so Jack

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Swigert gets on the comms. What is the exact

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timestamp in the flight journal? We are at 55

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hours, 55 minutes, and 19 seconds into the mission.

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Swigert keys his mic. And he says, quote, OK,

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Houston, we've had a problem here, unquote. Wait,

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say that again. We've had a problem. We've had,

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past tense, or if we are being technical linguists,

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present perfect tense. That feels really strange

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to hear. We have a problem feels immediate and

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terrifying. Yeah. We've had a problem. Sounds

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almost like, I don't know, hey, we had a little

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glitch a minute ago, but we're checking it out

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now. Precisely. And that grammatical nuance is

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huge. It implies an event that is already. occurred

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and concluded a singular past incident right

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saying we've had a problem suggests something

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happened a bang occurred and now we are dealing

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with the aftermath of it it does not necessarily

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scream ongoing, life -threatening emergency.

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It's almost shockingly casual given that half

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their ship just blew up. It is so casual that

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Mission Control didn't even understand him the

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first time. Seriously. They missed it. They completely

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missed the urgency. Jack R. Luzma was the capsule

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communicator, the Capcom, down in Houston. You

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have to imagine his perspective. The telemetry

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data on his screens is suddenly going completely

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haywire, but the voice loop in his headset is

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totally calm. He hears Swigert say it, but it

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just doesn't register as a mayday call. Luzma

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actually replies this is Houston say again please

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again please the spacecraft is literally venting

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its vital oxygen into the vacuum of space and

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the guy on the ground is asking for a repeat

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that is baffling it took about 16 seconds of

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pure confusion on the ground Then, at timestamp

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055 -5535, Jim Lovell, the mission commander,

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finally jumps onto the radio loop to clarify

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for Houston. Okay, what does he say? And he repeats

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the exact same grammar. Lovell says, ah, Houston,

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we've had a problem. So they both use the past

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tense. We've had. They both did. And then Lovell

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follows up immediately with the dry technical

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readout. He says, we've had a main B -bus undervolt.

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Main B -bus undervolt. Okay, I've seen that specific

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phrase in the transcripts you shared, but I've

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never really grasped the actual gravity of it.

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It's dense engineering jargon. Yeah, because

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to the average listener, an undervolt just sounds

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like a flashlight battery running a bit low.

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Why is it the very first thing he reported to

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Houston? That is a great point, and it's critical

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to understanding why they were in so much immediate

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danger. The Apollo spacecraft didn't use standard

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batteries for its main power. It used fuel cells.

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Right, which work by mixing hydrogen and oxygen.

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Exactly. You mix liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen,

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and a chemical reaction gives you two things,

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electricity and water. The crew drinks the water,

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and the ship runs on the electricity. Now the

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main bus is essentially the primary spinal cord

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of the ship's electrical system. So when Commander

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Lovell looks at his gauges and sees a main B

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bus under volt. It means the heart of the ship

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is stopping. It means one of the primary power

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grids is completely dying. And because those

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fuel cells absolutely need oxygen to generate

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power and their main oxygen tank just violently

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exploded, they aren't just losing the cabin lights.

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They're losing everything. Everything. They are

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losing the ability to power the navigation computer,

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the thrusters, the life support systems. And

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because the fuel cells make the water, they are

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also rapidly losing their drinking water supply.

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So saying undervolt is actually just test pilot

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engineer speak for we are rapidly dying. Essentially,

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yes. But notice the incredible discipline in

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that moment. They didn't scream explosion or

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fire into the mic. They looked at the instrument

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panel, read the gauges, and reported the specific

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data. Main B bus undervolt. This brings me right

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back to the phrasing they used. We've had a problem.

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It feels like the ultimate example of ironic

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understatement. It truly is. And it stems from

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this very specific, deeply ingrained pilot culture.

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Most of these guys came from test pilot and military

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aviation backgrounds. Right. The right stuff.

00:11:03.759 --> 00:11:06.519
Exactly. There is a deeply held belief in that

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community that panic will kill you much faster

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than any mechanical failure ever could. If you

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scream, your heart rate instantly goes up, your

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breathing gets shallow, you consume more oxygen

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and you stop thinking clearly. So the language

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they choose to use actually becomes a tool for

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emotional control. 100%. By deliberately using

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the past tense, we've had a problem. And by sticking

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to dry technical terms like undervolt, they are

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psychologically containing the terrifying event.

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They are actively framing it in their own minds

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as a technical puzzle that needs to be solved

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rather than a fatal catastrophe to be feared.

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That makes so much sense. It really reminds me

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of that famous story about the British Airways

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flight that accidentally flew right into a cloud

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of volcanic ash. Oh, I know the one. Yeah. All

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four engines completely stopped mid -flight.

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And the captain got on the passenger intercom

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and just casually said, ladies and gentlemen,

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we have a small problem. All four engines have

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stopped. We are doing our damnedest to get them

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going again. I trust you are not in too much

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distress. I trust you are not in too much distress.

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It is the exact same energy. Right. It's polite,

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it's measured, it's calm. And it is incredibly

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effective at keeping everyone, including the

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pilot, totally focused on the solution instead

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of the danger. Okay, so that establishes the

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historical reality of the flight deck. Jack Swigert

00:12:26.289 --> 00:12:28.350
said it first, Jim Lovell confirmed it, they

00:12:28.350 --> 00:12:30.629
both definitely used the past tense, and they

00:12:30.629 --> 00:12:33.529
were cool as cucumbers. So who messed up the

00:12:33.529 --> 00:12:37.570
quote? Who exactly changed we've had to we have?

00:12:38.269 --> 00:12:41.049
Enter the Hollywood screenwriters William Broyles

00:12:41.049 --> 00:12:44.190
Jr. and Al Reinhart. They are the ones who wrote

00:12:44.190 --> 00:12:47.750
the screenplay for the 1995 film Apollo 13. And

00:12:47.750 --> 00:12:50.490
honestly, as writers, they had a major problem

00:12:50.490 --> 00:12:52.549
of their own to solve. Which was what? The fact

00:12:52.549 --> 00:12:54.990
that reality is often just really bad storytelling.

00:12:55.350 --> 00:12:58.049
Fair point. They looked at the actual NASA transcripts.

00:12:58.049 --> 00:13:00.009
They saw Jack Swigert saying, OK, Houston, we've

00:13:00.009 --> 00:13:02.529
had a problem here. And they realize it drags.

00:13:02.529 --> 00:13:05.529
It lacks punch. It is a bit clunky for a movie

00:13:05.529 --> 00:13:08.970
script, isn't it? It's very soft. It is. Broyles

00:13:08.970 --> 00:13:11.730
and a linguist named Naomi S. Barron actually

00:13:11.730 --> 00:13:14.970
analyzed this exact linguistic shift later on.

00:13:15.070 --> 00:13:18.149
They noted that the actual historical line simply

00:13:18.149 --> 00:13:20.450
wasn't considered dramatic enough for a high

00:13:20.450 --> 00:13:23.330
-stakes suspense movie. You really have to think

00:13:23.330 --> 00:13:25.129
about the audience sitting in that dark movie

00:13:25.129 --> 00:13:28.730
theater back in 1995. Well, the audience already

00:13:28.730 --> 00:13:31.370
knew the ending. Spoiler alert for anyone listening,

00:13:31.529 --> 00:13:34.450
they survive and make it home. Exactly. For the

00:13:34.450 --> 00:13:37.669
moviegoer, there is zero actual suspense about

00:13:37.669 --> 00:13:40.289
the ultimate outcome of the mission. So as a

00:13:40.289 --> 00:13:42.610
director or writer, how do you keep the audience

00:13:42.610 --> 00:13:44.350
on the edge of their seat when they know the

00:13:44.350 --> 00:13:46.690
ending? You have to maximize the tension of the

00:13:46.690 --> 00:13:49.029
immediate moment. So they changed the tense of

00:13:49.029 --> 00:13:51.889
the verb? They changed we've had to we have.

00:13:52.379 --> 00:13:55.299
Present tense. Houston, we have a problem. It

00:13:55.299 --> 00:13:57.259
just sounds so much more active and dangerous.

00:13:57.559 --> 00:14:01.740
It is highly active. It signals an ongoing, unresolved

00:14:01.740 --> 00:14:04.279
state of emergency. It basically tells the theater

00:14:04.279 --> 00:14:06.759
audience the danger is here, right now, in this

00:14:06.759 --> 00:14:09.080
second, and it is not resolved yet. It puts you

00:14:09.080 --> 00:14:10.840
right there in the cramped cockpit with them,

00:14:10.919 --> 00:14:13.179
facing a crisis that is currently unfolding.

00:14:13.559 --> 00:14:16.440
It's honestly amazing that just cutting two letters,

00:14:16.620 --> 00:14:19.879
getting rid of the D in had, can totally shift

00:14:19.879 --> 00:14:21.789
the entire weight of a scene. It shifted the

00:14:21.789 --> 00:14:23.669
weight of the scene and ultimately it shifted

00:14:23.669 --> 00:14:27.029
our entire culture. That misquote became so unbelievably

00:14:27.029 --> 00:14:30.669
powerful that in 2005, the American Film Institute,

00:14:30.909 --> 00:14:33.470
the AFI, officially ranked it. I saw this in

00:14:33.470 --> 00:14:36.889
the notes. Number 50 on the list of the 100 greatest

00:14:36.889 --> 00:14:39.330
movie quotes of all time. Right. But think about

00:14:39.330 --> 00:14:41.350
the deep implication of that for a second. It

00:14:41.350 --> 00:14:44.570
is a quote unquote movie quote list. But because

00:14:44.570 --> 00:14:48.340
Apollo 13 is a historical biopic. Because it's

00:14:48.340 --> 00:14:51.779
heavily marketed as a quote unquote true story.

00:14:52.220 --> 00:14:55.259
The general public completely conflated the movie

00:14:55.259 --> 00:14:57.639
script with the historical flight transcript.

00:14:57.940 --> 00:15:00.700
The movie version basically cannibalized reality.

00:15:01.139 --> 00:15:03.460
Exactly. The fiction replaced the fact. It's

00:15:03.460 --> 00:15:05.340
like the movie became the official historical

00:15:05.340 --> 00:15:08.120
record. I guarantee if you ask a random person

00:15:08.120 --> 00:15:10.580
on the street today, they will bet their house

00:15:10.580 --> 00:15:13.679
that Tom Hanks exact line is what was really

00:15:13.679 --> 00:15:15.860
said in space. And honestly, can you really blame

00:15:15.860 --> 00:15:18.549
them? The movie. perfectly portrays the emotional

00:15:18.549 --> 00:15:21.750
truth of the situation, even if it slightly fudges

00:15:21.750 --> 00:15:23.370
the factual truth. That's a good way to look

00:15:23.370 --> 00:15:25.570
at it. The true emotion in that tiny capsule

00:15:25.570 --> 00:15:28.769
was, we have a problem. The historical fact was,

00:15:28.929 --> 00:15:31.830
we've had a problem. That is a really interesting

00:15:31.830 --> 00:15:34.570
distinction to make. The screenwriters explicitly

00:15:34.570 --> 00:15:37.590
prioritized the visceral feeling of the danger

00:15:37.590 --> 00:15:41.110
over the dry accuracy of the radio log. They

00:15:41.110 --> 00:15:43.590
did. And on top of changing the grammar, they

00:15:43.590 --> 00:15:46.850
gave the famous line to the commander, Tom Hanks

00:15:46.850 --> 00:15:49.370
playing Jim Lovell, instead of the pilot, Jack

00:15:49.370 --> 00:15:51.509
Swigert. Why do you think they did that? Was

00:15:51.509 --> 00:15:53.669
it just Hollywood politics because Tom Hanks

00:15:53.669 --> 00:15:57.090
was the big A -list star? Partly, yes. You give

00:15:57.090 --> 00:16:00.159
the best lines to your leading man. But also,

00:16:00.299 --> 00:16:03.360
narratively speaking, the commander is the definitive

00:16:03.360 --> 00:16:06.279
father figure of the mission. It feels much heavier

00:16:06.279 --> 00:16:09.320
and more authoritative coming from him. But because

00:16:09.320 --> 00:16:12.320
of that, poor Jack Swigert really gets the short

00:16:12.320 --> 00:16:14.019
end of the stick in popular history. He really

00:16:14.019 --> 00:16:16.259
does. He's the one who actually sat in the seat,

00:16:16.419 --> 00:16:19.039
physically saw the master warning light illuminate,

00:16:19.080 --> 00:16:21.860
understood the failing electrical systems, and

00:16:21.860 --> 00:16:25.220
made the brave call to Houston. But Jim Lovell

00:16:25.220 --> 00:16:27.429
gets all the glory in the movie. It is tough

00:16:27.429 --> 00:16:29.649
being the command module pilot. You're basically

00:16:29.649 --> 00:16:31.929
the designated bus driver while everyone else

00:16:31.929 --> 00:16:34.009
gets to go walk on the moon. And in this specific

00:16:34.009 --> 00:16:36.470
case, you're the guy who bravely reported the

00:16:36.470 --> 00:16:39.070
deadly explosion, but the other guy gets the

00:16:39.070 --> 00:16:41.570
famous T -shirt slogan. You know, digging into

00:16:41.570 --> 00:16:45.350
this technical side, the fuel cells, the welded

00:16:45.350 --> 00:16:48.990
heater switches, the melting Teflon. It makes

00:16:48.990 --> 00:16:51.649
the absolute calmness of the real transcript,

00:16:51.830 --> 00:16:54.309
quote, even more impressive to me. It really

00:16:54.309 --> 00:16:56.690
is staggering. I mean, Swigert and Lovell must

00:16:56.690 --> 00:16:59.330
have known deep down. looking at those primary

00:16:59.330 --> 00:17:02.490
voltage readings rapidly dropping to zero, that

00:17:02.490 --> 00:17:04.970
this wasn't just some sensor glitch. They definitely

00:17:04.970 --> 00:17:07.470
suspected it was catastrophic very early on.

00:17:08.009 --> 00:17:10.609
Lovell actually later wrote in a book, Apollo

00:17:10.609 --> 00:17:12.690
Expeditions to the Moon, that when he finally

00:17:12.690 --> 00:17:15.450
looked out the small window and physically saw

00:17:15.450 --> 00:17:18.609
the vital oxygen gas visibly venting out into

00:17:18.609 --> 00:17:21.130
space. Which happened, what, about 15 minutes

00:17:21.130 --> 00:17:22.910
after the bang? Yeah, about 15 minutes later,

00:17:23.049 --> 00:17:25.470
Lovell wrote that seeing that gas venting is

00:17:25.470 --> 00:17:28.250
when the, quote, not in a stomach. really tightened.

00:17:28.390 --> 00:17:30.630
That is the exact moment he knew for sure the

00:17:30.630 --> 00:17:33.309
problem wasn't an instrument glitch. It was a

00:17:33.309 --> 00:17:35.569
fatal catastrophe. But by the time he looked

00:17:35.569 --> 00:17:37.829
out the window, the famous radio call had already

00:17:37.829 --> 00:17:40.829
been made. Right. And that is exactly what makes

00:17:40.829 --> 00:17:43.730
the real transcript so uniquely fascinating to

00:17:43.730 --> 00:17:47.130
read. It captures that very specific, terrifying

00:17:47.130 --> 00:17:51.450
limbo period. Those few confusing minutes between

00:17:51.450 --> 00:17:54.150
the initial bang and the undeniable realization

00:17:54.150 --> 00:17:57.569
of their doom, we've had a problem, perfectly

00:17:57.569 --> 00:18:00.349
reflects that initial uncertainty. They were

00:18:00.349 --> 00:18:02.869
actively troubleshooting. They were working the

00:18:02.869 --> 00:18:05.390
problem step by step. It's a master class in

00:18:05.390 --> 00:18:07.630
crisis management, really. Assess the panel,

00:18:07.710 --> 00:18:10.390
report the data, verify the issue. Don't panic

00:18:10.390 --> 00:18:12.190
until you actually know what you're panicking

00:18:12.190 --> 00:18:14.069
about. And even then, as we discussed, don't

00:18:14.069 --> 00:18:16.609
panic because panic uses up your oxygen and you

00:18:16.609 --> 00:18:19.089
suddenly don't have any left. That is a terrifyingly

00:18:19.089 --> 00:18:21.930
practical point. Just chilling. So looking at

00:18:21.930 --> 00:18:25.069
all of this, do you think the movie ruined the

00:18:25.069 --> 00:18:28.759
true history or did it somehow save it? That

00:18:28.759 --> 00:18:30.720
is the big philosophical question of this whole

00:18:30.720 --> 00:18:32.880
deep dive, isn't it? I mean, on one hand, I am

00:18:32.880 --> 00:18:35.680
a total stickler for historical accuracy. It

00:18:35.680 --> 00:18:37.859
genuinely annoys me that we as a society are

00:18:37.859 --> 00:18:39.680
quoting a Hollywood screenwriter instead of an

00:18:39.680 --> 00:18:42.319
American astronaut. But on the other hand. If

00:18:42.319 --> 00:18:44.420
Tom Hanks had looked at the camera and said,

00:18:44.559 --> 00:18:47.420
OK, Houston, we've had a problem here and delivered

00:18:47.420 --> 00:18:50.319
it with that super dry test pilot casualness.

00:18:50.339 --> 00:18:53.059
It definitely wouldn't be on the AFI top 100

00:18:53.059 --> 00:18:55.799
list. It wouldn't be a worldwide meme. It wouldn't

00:18:55.799 --> 00:18:58.539
be printed on a million coffee mugs and T -shirts.

00:18:58.579 --> 00:19:01.200
So you could strongly argue that by sexing up

00:19:01.200 --> 00:19:04.680
the quote, by making it punchier and more dramatic.

00:19:05.259 --> 00:19:07.859
The screenwriters actually ensured that the Apollo

00:19:07.859 --> 00:19:10.640
13 mission itself stayed relevant to the public

00:19:10.640 --> 00:19:14.319
consciousness for decades. Exactly. It is a classic

00:19:14.319 --> 00:19:17.140
example of the Luke, I am your father effect.

00:19:17.480 --> 00:19:20.220
Oh, right. Which is actually, no, I am your father.

00:19:20.420 --> 00:19:22.619
See, we do this all the time with pop culture.

00:19:22.759 --> 00:19:25.259
We collectively polish up history to make it

00:19:25.259 --> 00:19:27.720
fit a better narrative arc. We naturally crave

00:19:27.720 --> 00:19:30.480
those clear, dramatic beats. The real world is

00:19:30.480 --> 00:19:33.079
often messy, it's filled with radio static, and

00:19:33.079 --> 00:19:34.789
it's frequently grammatically passive. we've

00:19:34.789 --> 00:19:37.890
had, but stories. Stories are active. We have.

00:19:38.130 --> 00:19:41.789
And humans always prefer the better story. It's

00:19:41.789 --> 00:19:44.109
endlessly fascinating to me that we feel the

00:19:44.109 --> 00:19:46.730
need to artificially heighten reality to make

00:19:46.730 --> 00:19:49.869
it feel real to an audience. The actual literal

00:19:49.869 --> 00:19:52.930
explosion of a spacecraft halfway to the moon

00:19:52.930 --> 00:19:55.910
wasn't quite dramatic enough on its own. We needed

00:19:55.910 --> 00:19:57.930
to fix the verb tense to make people sitting

00:19:57.930 --> 00:20:00.569
in a theater truly feel it. It speaks volumes

00:20:00.569 --> 00:20:03.970
about how we process historical trauma and memory.

00:20:04.329 --> 00:20:07.130
We need our heroes to sound exactly like heroes.

00:20:07.329 --> 00:20:09.930
We need them to speak in bold, declarative sentences.

00:20:10.369 --> 00:20:13.630
We don't want our brave astronauts saying, Houston

00:20:13.630 --> 00:20:16.170
looks like a minor voltage drop on the B bus.

00:20:16.390 --> 00:20:18.289
We want them looking death in the eye and saying,

00:20:18.369 --> 00:20:20.650
we have a problem. It really is the difference

00:20:20.650 --> 00:20:23.349
between a technician. and a warrior that is a

00:20:23.349 --> 00:20:25.369
beautiful way to summarize it the raw flight

00:20:25.369 --> 00:20:27.970
transcript shows us brilliant technicians the

00:20:27.970 --> 00:20:30.269
hollywood movie shows us mythic warriors both

00:20:30.269 --> 00:20:32.029
versions are true just in their different ways

00:20:32.029 --> 00:20:34.069
so if you're listening to this we've taken a

00:20:34.069 --> 00:20:35.970
close look at the sheer boredom right before

00:20:35.970 --> 00:20:39.009
the bang the horrifying mechanics of a faulty

00:20:39.009 --> 00:20:41.609
heater switch turning an oxygen tank into a bomb

00:20:41.609 --> 00:20:44.349
and the subtle linguistic shift that went on

00:20:44.349 --> 00:20:47.369
to define an entire generation's memory It is

00:20:47.369 --> 00:20:49.349
a whole lot more than just a simple misquote.

00:20:49.470 --> 00:20:51.930
It really is. It's an incredible glimpse into

00:20:51.930 --> 00:20:54.829
just how fragile these complex machines actually

00:20:54.829 --> 00:20:58.170
are and how remarkably resilient the human beings

00:20:58.170 --> 00:21:00.670
inside them have to be to survive. And also just

00:21:00.670 --> 00:21:03.609
how incredibly powerful a good screenwriter can

00:21:03.609 --> 00:21:06.329
be. Never underestimate a writer armed with a

00:21:06.329 --> 00:21:08.710
red pen. Well, before we sign off today, I want

00:21:08.710 --> 00:21:10.549
to leave everyone listening with a final thought

00:21:10.549 --> 00:21:13.539
to mull over on your own time. We have firmly

00:21:13.539 --> 00:21:16.279
established that the movie version is the quote

00:21:16.279 --> 00:21:20.200
everyone knows and loves. It is undeniably better

00:21:20.200 --> 00:21:22.440
storytelling. But here is the question for you

00:21:22.440 --> 00:21:25.299
to think about. If Broyles and Reinhardt hadn't

00:21:25.299 --> 00:21:27.619
changed those two little letters, if they had

00:21:27.619 --> 00:21:30.440
stayed 100 % faithful to the dry passive transcript,

00:21:30.779 --> 00:21:33.960
would Apollo 13 be so widely remembered today

00:21:33.960 --> 00:21:38.049
as NASA's great successful failure? Or would

00:21:38.049 --> 00:21:40.390
it have slowly faded away into the dense history

00:21:40.390 --> 00:21:43.869
books, just like Apollo 12 or 14? Does our lasting

00:21:43.869 --> 00:21:46.269
memory of history depend on the actual monumental

00:21:46.269 --> 00:21:49.710
event? Or does it entirely depend on how catchy

00:21:49.710 --> 00:21:52.109
the catchphrase is? That is the ultimate question.

00:21:52.589 --> 00:21:55.690
Are we really remembering the quiet bravery of

00:21:55.690 --> 00:21:58.089
Jack Swigert, or are we just remembering the

00:21:58.089 --> 00:22:00.950
screen charisma of Tom Hanks? Something to think

00:22:00.950 --> 00:22:02.750
deeply about the next time you burn your morning

00:22:02.750 --> 00:22:05.720
toast and find yourself calling Houston. Thanks

00:22:05.720 --> 00:22:07.640
for joining me on this deep dive. It was an absolute

00:22:07.640 --> 00:22:10.099
blast. Poor choice of words given the topic,

00:22:10.160 --> 00:22:11.759
but you know what I mean. A pleasure as always.

00:22:11.960 --> 00:22:13.839
We will catch you all on the next deep dive.

00:22:13.920 --> 00:22:14.420
Stay curious.
