WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:03.480 I want you to picture something for me. You are 00:00:03.480 --> 00:00:06.580 driving your car. It is a busy Tuesday. Maybe 00:00:06.580 --> 00:00:08.560 you're running a bit late and you come up to 00:00:08.560 --> 00:00:11.179 a massive four -way intersection. But as you 00:00:11.179 --> 00:00:13.949 get closer, you realize something is wrong. The 00:00:13.949 --> 00:00:16.289 traffic lights are completely dark. No red, no 00:00:16.289 --> 00:00:19.469 green. Nothing. No yellow. Just dead. And there 00:00:19.469 --> 00:00:21.589 is no police officer in the middle waving people 00:00:21.589 --> 00:00:24.030 through. It is just, well, it's anarchy. That 00:00:24.030 --> 00:00:25.750 is the definition of a high -stress situation 00:00:25.750 --> 00:00:27.969 right there. Right. You have cars creeping forward 00:00:27.969 --> 00:00:31.949 inch by inch. You are trying to make eye contact 00:00:31.949 --> 00:00:34.270 with the guy in the SUV across from you, wondering 00:00:34.270 --> 00:00:36.929 if he's going to stop or just gun it. You are 00:00:36.929 --> 00:00:39.210 relying entirely on the hope that everyone else 00:00:39.210 --> 00:00:41.170 is paying attention and following the unwritten 00:00:41.170 --> 00:00:44.659 rules. It is amazing how quickly our sense of 00:00:44.659 --> 00:00:47.740 safety just evaporates when you remove that external 00:00:47.740 --> 00:00:49.880 authority, you know, the traffic light. Suddenly 00:00:49.880 --> 00:00:52.159 you have to trust total strangers with your life. 00:00:52.520 --> 00:00:55.000 Exactly. And I think most of us assume that this 00:00:55.000 --> 00:00:57.840 kind of Wild West scenario only happens on the 00:00:57.840 --> 00:01:00.399 ground when the power goes out. But what if I 00:01:00.399 --> 00:01:02.439 told you that in the sky where the stakes are 00:01:02.439 --> 00:01:05.140 infinitely higher, this is standard operating 00:01:05.140 --> 00:01:07.620 procedure for thousands of airports every single 00:01:07.620 --> 00:01:09.950 day? It sounds terrifying when you put it that 00:01:09.950 --> 00:01:11.469 way, but you are absolutely right. We're talking 00:01:11.469 --> 00:01:14.069 about non -towered airports. Today, we are doing 00:01:14.069 --> 00:01:16.450 a deep dive into a specific event that shows 00:01:16.450 --> 00:01:18.609 exactly what happens when that trust between 00:01:18.609 --> 00:01:22.069 strangers breaks down. We are unpacking the tragedy 00:01:22.069 --> 00:01:25.650 of United Express Flight 5925. And this is not 00:01:25.650 --> 00:01:29.129 a story about an engine exploding or a wing falling 00:01:29.129 --> 00:01:31.349 off. No, not at all. This is a story about a 00:01:31.349 --> 00:01:34.170 few spoken words that went missing and the devastating 00:01:34.170 --> 00:01:36.430 consequences of assuming the coast is clear. 00:01:36.879 --> 00:01:38.959 This is a really heavy case. It happened back 00:01:38.959 --> 00:01:42.739 on November 19, 1996 at Quincy Municipal Airport 00:01:42.739 --> 00:01:45.439 in Illinois. And you hit the nail on the head 00:01:45.439 --> 00:01:47.560 earlier. This was not a mechanical failure in 00:01:47.560 --> 00:01:49.939 the traditional sense. It was a failure of communication, 00:01:50.379 --> 00:01:53.939 timing, and human psychology. So let's set the 00:01:53.939 --> 00:01:56.849 stage. When I think of commercial flying, I am 00:01:56.849 --> 00:02:00.989 picturing O 'Hare or JFK. Massive control towers, 00:02:01.329 --> 00:02:04.349 guys in headsets tracking blips on a radar screen 00:02:04.349 --> 00:02:07.329 telling pilots exactly what to do down to the 00:02:07.329 --> 00:02:10.840 second. But Quincy is not that, is it? Not even 00:02:10.840 --> 00:02:13.300 close. Quincy Municipal is what we call a non 00:02:13.300 --> 00:02:15.759 -towered field. And just to give you some context, 00:02:15.939 --> 00:02:18.240 the vast majority of airports in the United States 00:02:18.240 --> 00:02:21.340 do not have a control tower. It is just not economically 00:02:21.340 --> 00:02:24.199 feasible to staff every small airstrip with air 00:02:24.199 --> 00:02:26.930 traffic controllers 24 -7. So if there is no 00:02:26.930 --> 00:02:29.150 controller who is directing traffic, I mean, 00:02:29.169 --> 00:02:31.849 if I'm a pilot flying a plane full of passengers 00:02:31.849 --> 00:02:33.849 into Quincy who gives me permission to land. 00:02:33.990 --> 00:02:35.849 Nobody gives you permission. You give yourself 00:02:35.849 --> 00:02:38.110 permission. Really? Yeah. It is a system called 00:02:38.110 --> 00:02:40.530 see and avoid. Essentially, the pilots are completely 00:02:40.530 --> 00:02:42.409 responsible for coordinating with each other. 00:02:42.469 --> 00:02:44.229 They use a common traffic advisory frequency 00:02:44.229 --> 00:02:48.069 or CTAF. CTAF. OK, so is that like a like a conference 00:02:48.069 --> 00:02:50.490 call? Think of it more like a chaotic group chat 00:02:50.490 --> 00:02:53.509 or maybe a CB radio channel for everyone within 00:02:53.509 --> 00:02:56.620 a 10 mile radius of the airport. You hop on the 00:02:56.620 --> 00:02:58.560 frequency and you announce your intentions. You 00:02:58.560 --> 00:03:01.680 say, I am 10 miles out or I am turning left. 00:03:01.780 --> 00:03:04.599 I am landing. You are constantly broadcasting 00:03:04.599 --> 00:03:08.020 your position so that every other pilot builds 00:03:08.020 --> 00:03:10.560 a mental map of where you are. That seems like 00:03:10.560 --> 00:03:12.840 it requires a massive amount of trust. You are 00:03:12.840 --> 00:03:15.060 trusting that everyone else is on the right frequency, 00:03:15.300 --> 00:03:17.699 that they are speaking clearly and that they 00:03:17.699 --> 00:03:20.400 are actually looking out the window. It absolutely 00:03:20.400 --> 00:03:23.879 does. And the thing is, 99 .9 % of the time it 00:03:23.879 --> 00:03:27.099 works perfectly. Pilots are professionals. But 00:03:27.099 --> 00:03:28.939 the system has a single point of failure. It 00:03:28.939 --> 00:03:31.340 relies entirely on active listening and accurate 00:03:31.340 --> 00:03:33.879 perception. Right. If you miss a radio call or 00:03:33.879 --> 00:03:36.620 if you misinterpret silence. The safety net completely 00:03:36.620 --> 00:03:39.400 disappears. Which brings us to that cold November 00:03:39.400 --> 00:03:43.039 afternoon in 1996. Who are the players on the 00:03:43.039 --> 00:03:44.659 board here? Because it was not just one plane 00:03:44.659 --> 00:03:46.620 involved. Right, we have a cast of three aircraft. 00:03:47.219 --> 00:03:50.699 The main character, so to speak, is United Express 00:03:50.699 --> 00:03:55.319 Flight 5925. This is a Beechcraft 1900C. It is 00:03:55.319 --> 00:03:58.199 a twin -engine turboprop airliner. Just a solid, 00:03:58.259 --> 00:04:00.400 reliable workhorse for regional flights. And 00:04:00.400 --> 00:04:03.300 who is flying it? In the cockpit, we have Captain 00:04:03.300 --> 00:04:05.719 Kate Gatchy and First Officer Darren McCombs. 00:04:05.979 --> 00:04:08.259 They are coming from Burlington, Iowa, bringing 00:04:08.259 --> 00:04:10.960 10 passengers into Quincy. They are the ones 00:04:10.960 --> 00:04:13.080 in the air, approaching the airport to land. 00:04:13.300 --> 00:04:15.639 Okay, so they are coming down. Who is on the 00:04:15.639 --> 00:04:18.079 ground waiting? This is where the geometry of 00:04:18.079 --> 00:04:20.339 the situation gets really critical. On the ground 00:04:20.339 --> 00:04:22.300 preparing to take off, we have two smaller private 00:04:22.300 --> 00:04:25.319 planes. The first one is a Beechcraft King Air. 00:04:25.500 --> 00:04:28.199 It is a high -performance private aircraft flown 00:04:28.199 --> 00:04:30.740 by a 63 -year -old pilot named Neil Reinwald. 00:04:30.980 --> 00:04:33.480 He has a flight instructor on board, Laura Winkleman 00:04:33.480 --> 00:04:35.600 Brooks, but she is just a passenger for this 00:04:35.600 --> 00:04:37.500 particular leg of the trip. And then there is 00:04:37.500 --> 00:04:40.680 a third plane, right? A smaller one. Yes, a Piper 00:04:40.680 --> 00:04:43.899 Cherokee. It is a small, single -engine, private 00:04:43.899 --> 00:04:47.220 plane. It is taxiing out behind the King Air. 00:04:47.799 --> 00:04:50.500 Now, usually three planes at an airport is no 00:04:50.500 --> 00:04:53.519 big deal at all. But Quincy has a specific layout 00:04:53.519 --> 00:04:56.379 that turns this into a puzzle. The runways intersect. 00:04:56.720 --> 00:04:59.319 Like a literal X on the ground. Exactly like 00:04:59.319 --> 00:05:01.680 an X. Imagine it in your head. The United Express 00:05:01.680 --> 00:05:04.540 flight is coming in to land on runway 13. Meanwhile, 00:05:04.860 --> 00:05:07.379 the King Air and the Piper Cherokee are taxiing 00:05:07.379 --> 00:05:10.339 out to take off on runway 4. Those two runways 00:05:10.339 --> 00:05:12.439 cross each other. Right in the middle. I see 00:05:12.439 --> 00:05:14.399 the problem. If the United plane lands at the 00:05:14.399 --> 00:05:16.519 exact same time the King Air takes off, they're 00:05:16.519 --> 00:05:18.279 going to meet right in the middle of that X. 00:05:18.879 --> 00:05:21.939 Precisely. And in aviation, two objects cannot 00:05:21.939 --> 00:05:24.540 occupy the same space at the same time without 00:05:24.540 --> 00:05:27.000 catastrophic results. The rules of the road say 00:05:27.000 --> 00:05:28.860 that landing traffic generally has the right 00:05:28.860 --> 00:05:31.139 of way, but the ultimate rule is to never enter 00:05:31.139 --> 00:05:33.600 a runway unless you are absolutely sure it is 00:05:33.600 --> 00:05:36.100 clear. So put us in the cockpit of the United 00:05:36.100 --> 00:05:38.870 Express. Captain Gatchi is coming in. She knows 00:05:38.870 --> 00:05:41.069 this is a non -towered airport. She knows there 00:05:41.069 --> 00:05:42.990 are planes on the ground. She's probably on high 00:05:42.990 --> 00:05:45.670 alert, right? She is. She is doing everything 00:05:45.670 --> 00:05:49.029 completely by the book. As they get closer to 00:05:49.029 --> 00:05:51.509 landing, she is on that common traffic advisory 00:05:51.509 --> 00:05:54.129 frequency. She sees the planes on the ground 00:05:54.129 --> 00:05:55.930 or at least knows they're in the vicinity and 00:05:55.930 --> 00:05:58.829 she wants to confirm their intentions. She specifically 00:05:58.829 --> 00:06:01.269 asks about the King Air. Because the King Air 00:06:01.269 --> 00:06:02.930 is the one at the front of the line to take off. 00:06:03.209 --> 00:06:06.850 Right. She keys her mic and asks. Effectively, 00:06:06.870 --> 00:06:09.670 King Air, are you holding short or are you taking 00:06:09.670 --> 00:06:12.490 off? She needs to know if they're going to wait 00:06:12.490 --> 00:06:14.550 for her to land and pass the intersection. And 00:06:14.550 --> 00:06:16.589 what does she hear back? The first time she asks, 00:06:16.730 --> 00:06:19.730 it is just silence. No response. That is unnerving. 00:06:19.910 --> 00:06:22.689 Silence is not a yes and it is not a no. It is 00:06:22.689 --> 00:06:25.910 just a giant question mark. Exactly. And when 00:06:25.910 --> 00:06:28.569 you are hurtling toward the ground at 130 knots, 00:06:28.949 --> 00:06:32.730 a question mark is incredibly dangerous. So she 00:06:32.730 --> 00:06:35.379 asks again. She is diligent. She gets on the 00:06:35.379 --> 00:06:37.660 radio a second time and asks the King Air to 00:06:37.660 --> 00:06:39.519 confirm they are holding short of the runway. 00:06:39.680 --> 00:06:41.120 And this is the moment, right? This is where 00:06:41.120 --> 00:06:43.180 everything pivots. This is the fatal second. 00:06:43.300 --> 00:06:45.680 She asks the question. And this time she gets 00:06:45.680 --> 00:06:48.560 an answer. But it is not from the person she 00:06:48.560 --> 00:06:50.980 thinks it is. It's the third pilot. The guy in 00:06:50.980 --> 00:06:53.139 the little Piper Cherokee. The pilot of the Piper 00:06:53.139 --> 00:06:55.100 Cherokee is sitting behind the King Air on the 00:06:55.100 --> 00:06:58.139 taxiway. He hears the United crew asking if traffic 00:06:58.139 --> 00:07:01.519 is holding. He decides to be helpful. He keys 00:07:01.519 --> 00:07:04.079 his mic to confirm that he is holding. He is 00:07:04.079 --> 00:07:06.060 basically saying, don't worry about me, I'm stopping. 00:07:06.199 --> 00:07:08.899 He says, Cherokee holding short. It is a completely 00:07:08.899 --> 00:07:12.060 standard call. But here is where technology and 00:07:12.060 --> 00:07:15.680 bad luck collide in the worst possible way. At 00:07:15.680 --> 00:07:17.860 the exact millisecond the Cherokee pilot starts 00:07:17.860 --> 00:07:20.500 speaking, a safety system in the United Express 00:07:20.500 --> 00:07:23.759 cockpit activates. A safety system? Yes, the 00:07:23.759 --> 00:07:27.399 Ground Proximity Warning System, or GPWS. Because 00:07:27.399 --> 00:07:29.079 the United plane is getting close to the ground 00:07:29.079 --> 00:07:31.399 for landing, the computer triggers an automatic 00:07:31.399 --> 00:07:34.500 altitude alert. It is a loud electronic tone 00:07:34.500 --> 00:07:37.500 or a voice call out inside their cockpit. So 00:07:37.500 --> 00:07:39.639 you have a voice on the radio and a loud beep 00:07:39.639 --> 00:07:41.740 in the cockpit happening at the exact same time. 00:07:41.860 --> 00:07:45.040 We call it stepping on a transmission. The loud 00:07:45.040 --> 00:07:47.819 electronic alert in the cockpit drowned out the 00:07:47.819 --> 00:07:51.180 first word of the radio call. The Cherokee pilot 00:07:51.180 --> 00:07:54.879 said, Cherokee holding short. But the United 00:07:54.879 --> 00:07:58.160 pilots. Did not hear the word Cherokee. They 00:07:58.160 --> 00:08:00.300 just heard the tail end of the sentence. They 00:08:00.300 --> 00:08:03.779 just heard holding short. Exactly. Oh, wow. I 00:08:03.779 --> 00:08:06.120 see where this is going. They just asked the 00:08:06.120 --> 00:08:09.259 King Air a direct question. Yes. They asked the 00:08:09.259 --> 00:08:11.459 King Air, are you holding? They heard a voice 00:08:11.459 --> 00:08:13.639 say, holding short. Their brains filled in the 00:08:13.639 --> 00:08:16.000 gap. This is a textbook example of confirmation 00:08:16.000 --> 00:08:18.379 bias. Yeah. They expected the King Air to answer, 00:08:18.480 --> 00:08:20.220 so when they heard a partial confirmation, they 00:08:20.220 --> 00:08:21.939 assumed it was the King Air. They hear what they 00:08:21.939 --> 00:08:24.439 want to hear. The King Air is stopping. The runway 00:08:24.439 --> 00:08:26.959 is mine. That is the exact conclusion they drew. 00:08:27.079 --> 00:08:29.259 They believe the intersection was perfectly clear. 00:08:29.579 --> 00:08:32.600 But in reality, the King Air, the plane that 00:08:32.600 --> 00:08:34.779 was actually the threat, had never said a single 00:08:34.779 --> 00:08:37.860 word. Why not? Why was the King Air totally silent? 00:08:38.139 --> 00:08:40.659 The investigation suggests the King Air pilot 00:08:40.659 --> 00:08:43.720 simply was not paying attention. He may not have 00:08:43.720 --> 00:08:45.620 heard the query, or he might have been distracted 00:08:45.620 --> 00:08:48.139 by something in the cockpit. He never announced 00:08:48.139 --> 00:08:50.639 his takeoff clearly on the radio, and he never 00:08:50.639 --> 00:08:53.669 responded to the United crew. So he thinks the 00:08:53.669 --> 00:08:56.690 coast is clear too. He pushes the throttle forward. 00:08:57.029 --> 00:09:00.370 He begins his takeoff roll on runway 4. At the 00:09:00.370 --> 00:09:02.990 same moment, the United Express touches down 00:09:02.990 --> 00:09:05.759 on runway 13. It is like a horror movie where 00:09:05.759 --> 00:09:07.759 you were screaming at the screen, you have two 00:09:07.759 --> 00:09:10.740 planes rushing toward the same point, and neither 00:09:10.740 --> 00:09:13.259 pilot realizes the other is there until it is 00:09:13.259 --> 00:09:15.419 too late. The United pilots spot the King Air 00:09:15.419 --> 00:09:17.899 at the very last second. We know this because 00:09:17.899 --> 00:09:20.139 investigators found heavy skid marks on the runway. 00:09:20.299 --> 00:09:22.500 They slammed on the brakes. They tried to steer 00:09:22.500 --> 00:09:26.100 the plane away. But you cannot stop a 16 ,000 00:09:26.100 --> 00:09:29.500 -pound aircraft instantly. Physics is just unforgiving. 00:09:29.679 --> 00:09:31.679 They collide right at the intersection. They 00:09:31.679 --> 00:09:34.429 do. The wings impact, the engines smash together, 00:09:34.669 --> 00:09:37.190 the King Air is effectively destroyed by the 00:09:37.190 --> 00:09:40.230 sheer force. The United Express plane skids off 00:09:40.230 --> 00:09:42.429 the runway, slides across the grass for about 00:09:42.429 --> 00:09:45.820 110 feet, and finally comes to a stop. Now, this 00:09:45.820 --> 00:09:47.779 is the part of the story that I found the most 00:09:47.779 --> 00:09:50.000 haunting when I was reading the reports. Because 00:09:50.000 --> 00:09:52.759 usually when we talk about plane crashes, the 00:09:52.759 --> 00:09:55.000 impact is the end of the story. But that was 00:09:55.000 --> 00:09:57.259 not the case here at all. No. And this is the 00:09:57.259 --> 00:09:59.559 detail that keeps safety investigators up at 00:09:59.559 --> 00:10:03.059 night. The collision was violent, yes. But according 00:10:03.059 --> 00:10:06.340 to the NTSB, the impact itself was survivable 00:10:06.340 --> 00:10:08.480 for everyone on board the United Express flight. 00:10:08.700 --> 00:10:10.899 Wait, everyone on the commercial plane survived 00:10:10.899 --> 00:10:14.210 the initial crash? All 12 people. Two pilots 00:10:14.210 --> 00:10:16.870 and the 10 passengers. The fuselage remained 00:10:16.870 --> 00:10:19.690 largely intact. They were shaken up. They were 00:10:19.690 --> 00:10:22.190 terrified. But they were alive. They were conscious. 00:10:22.409 --> 00:10:24.830 So why did we lose them? Because they could not 00:10:24.830 --> 00:10:27.149 get out. Yeah. The collision warped the frame 00:10:27.149 --> 00:10:30.389 of the aircraft. The United Express plane, the 00:10:30.389 --> 00:10:33.870 Beechcraft 1900, has a main cabin door that doubles 00:10:33.870 --> 00:10:36.850 as stairs. It is called an air stair door. And 00:10:36.850 --> 00:10:38.809 it operates with a cable system. I have seen 00:10:38.809 --> 00:10:40.590 those. They kind of fold down and out. Right. 00:10:41.019 --> 00:10:43.759 The impact bent the fuselage just enough that 00:10:43.759 --> 00:10:45.799 the door jammed completely shut. They were trapped 00:10:45.799 --> 00:10:49.779 inside a metal tube. Trapped. And tragically, 00:10:49.820 --> 00:10:52.440 the collision had ruptured the fuel tanks. A 00:10:52.440 --> 00:10:54.860 fire broke out almost immediately on the outside 00:10:54.860 --> 00:10:57.220 of the plane. I cannot even imagine the panic. 00:10:57.299 --> 00:10:59.539 You survive the crash. You can look out the window 00:10:59.539 --> 00:11:02.039 and see the grass, see the sky. But the door 00:11:02.039 --> 00:11:04.259 will not budge. And people were trying to help. 00:11:04.399 --> 00:11:07.840 This is the truly heartbreaking part. The pilot 00:11:07.840 --> 00:11:10.470 of the Piper Cherokee. The guy who made that 00:11:10.470 --> 00:11:12.970 stepped -on radio call, he saw the whole thing 00:11:12.970 --> 00:11:15.649 happen right in front of him. He and other pilots 00:11:15.649 --> 00:11:17.970 at the airport rushed over to the wreckage. They 00:11:17.970 --> 00:11:19.870 were outside, pulling on that door handle with 00:11:19.870 --> 00:11:21.730 everything they had. But they could not force 00:11:21.730 --> 00:11:25.610 it open. No. The damage was too severe. And Quincy 00:11:25.610 --> 00:11:27.970 Municipal Airport, like many small airports, 00:11:28.210 --> 00:11:31.370 did not have a dedicated fire rescue team sitting 00:11:31.370 --> 00:11:32.950 in a truck with the engine running right next 00:11:32.950 --> 00:11:35.029 to the runway. But by the time the local volunteer 00:11:35.029 --> 00:11:37.409 fire department arrived, the fire had spread 00:11:37.409 --> 00:11:40.179 completely. So the smoke got them. That is right. 00:11:40.440 --> 00:11:43.220 The cause of death for all 12 people on the United 00:11:43.220 --> 00:11:45.740 Express and the two pilots in the King Air who 00:11:45.740 --> 00:11:49.330 died in the collision was smoke inhalation. It 00:11:49.330 --> 00:11:51.669 was a survivable crash that turned into a fatal 00:11:51.669 --> 00:11:54.590 tragedy because of a jammed door and a lack of 00:11:54.590 --> 00:12:07.070 immediate rescue equipment. It is what we call 00:12:07.070 --> 00:12:09.570 the Swiss cheese model of accident causation. 00:12:09.669 --> 00:12:12.409 You have these layers of defense pilot vigilance, 00:12:12.429 --> 00:12:15.250 radio procedures, aircraft design, emergency 00:12:15.250 --> 00:12:17.830 response. Usually if one layer has a hole in 00:12:17.830 --> 00:12:19.929 it, then... next layer stops the accident. But 00:12:19.929 --> 00:12:22.250 in Quincy, the holes in every single layer lined 00:12:22.250 --> 00:12:25.230 up perfectly. So when the NTSB, the National 00:12:25.230 --> 00:12:27.210 Transportation Safety Board, finished their investigation, 00:12:27.590 --> 00:12:29.529 who did they blame? Did they blame the Cherokee 00:12:29.529 --> 00:12:32.250 pilot for speaking at the wrong time? The fatal 00:12:32.250 --> 00:12:34.750 transmission that stepped on radio call was listed 00:12:34.750 --> 00:12:37.629 as a major contributing factor. It explains why 00:12:37.629 --> 00:12:40.789 the United crew is confused. But the NTSB placed 00:12:40.789 --> 00:12:43.330 the primary blame squarely on the shoulders of 00:12:43.330 --> 00:12:46.610 the King Air pilot. Neil Reinwald, the one who 00:12:46.610 --> 00:12:49.610 never answered. Correct. The official cause was 00:12:49.610 --> 00:12:52.529 a failure to monitor the common frequency and 00:12:52.529 --> 00:12:55.190 a failure to scan for traffic. Scan for traffic? 00:12:55.269 --> 00:12:58.250 That sounds so basic. It is basically look both 00:12:58.250 --> 00:13:00.789 ways before you cross the street. It is basic, 00:13:00.830 --> 00:13:03.889 and that is exactly why it is so damning. Even 00:13:03.889 --> 00:13:05.830 with the radio confusion, even with the technological 00:13:05.830 --> 00:13:08.610 glitch, even with the Cherokee pilot chiming 00:13:08.610 --> 00:13:11.269 in, all the King Air pilot had to do was turn 00:13:11.269 --> 00:13:13.870 his head to the left. The United plane was not 00:13:13.870 --> 00:13:16.230 invisible. It was right there. It was a clear 00:13:16.230 --> 00:13:19.110 day. Visibility was perfect. If the King Air 00:13:19.110 --> 00:13:21.409 pilot had just looked down Runway 13 before you 00:13:21.409 --> 00:13:23.509 crossed the hold line, he would have seen a large 00:13:23.509 --> 00:13:26.169 twin turboprop airliner bearing down on him. 00:13:26.309 --> 00:13:28.549 So he was flying blind. He was relying entirely 00:13:28.549 --> 00:13:30.950 on what? Why would he not look? Complacency. 00:13:31.350 --> 00:13:33.690 Distraction. We will never know exactly what 00:13:33.690 --> 00:13:36.289 was happening in that cockpit. But he violated 00:13:36.289 --> 00:13:38.809 the golden rule of non -towered airports. Trust 00:13:38.809 --> 00:13:41.500 no one. Verify everything. He likely assumed 00:13:41.500 --> 00:13:43.120 that because he did not hear anyone screaming 00:13:43.120 --> 00:13:45.980 at him on the radio, the runway was empty. And 00:13:45.980 --> 00:13:48.460 on the flip side, the United crew assumed that 00:13:48.460 --> 00:13:50.820 because they heard a word that sounded like holding, 00:13:51.059 --> 00:13:54.120 the runway was safe. That is the psychological 00:13:54.120 --> 00:13:57.539 trap. We call it expectation bias. When you are 00:13:57.539 --> 00:14:00.639 under a high workload like landing a plane, your 00:14:00.639 --> 00:14:04.559 brain craves simplicity. You want the answer 00:14:04.559 --> 00:14:07.440 to be yes. You are actively looking for information 00:14:07.440 --> 00:14:10.240 that confirms your plan. They needed the king 00:14:10.240 --> 00:14:13.200 air to be holding short. They heard holding short. 00:14:13.639 --> 00:14:16.179 Their brains filtered out the ambiguity because 00:14:16.179 --> 00:14:18.679 the partial data matched their desire. It is 00:14:18.679 --> 00:14:20.279 chilling because we do that in everyday life 00:14:20.279 --> 00:14:22.200 all the time. We hear what we want to hear. You 00:14:22.200 --> 00:14:24.120 read a text message and interpret the tone based 00:14:24.120 --> 00:14:26.580 on what you are feeling, not what is actually 00:14:26.580 --> 00:14:29.720 there. Absolutely. In a boardroom or a relationship, 00:14:29.940 --> 00:14:32.000 that might lead to an argument or a lost deal. 00:14:32.159 --> 00:14:34.559 In aviation, it leads to two planes colliding 00:14:34.559 --> 00:14:36.559 on a runway. That is why the training for these 00:14:36.559 --> 00:14:38.639 airports changed so drastically after Quincy. 00:14:38.740 --> 00:14:40.279 What changed? Did they start building towers 00:14:40.279 --> 00:14:42.379 everywhere? No, that is still too expensive. 00:14:42.840 --> 00:14:44.600 But they changed the way pilots are trained to 00:14:44.600 --> 00:14:47.019 communicate. Now, there is a massive emphasis 00:14:47.019 --> 00:14:50.179 on specificity. You never, ever just say holding 00:14:50.179 --> 00:14:52.340 short. You have to say who you are. You have 00:14:52.340 --> 00:14:55.820 to say, Cherokee 5 Hotel Papa is holding short 00:14:55.820 --> 00:14:59.360 runway 4. And if you are the landing pilot and 00:14:59.360 --> 00:15:02.059 you hear a garbled message or a beep steps on 00:15:02.059 --> 00:15:05.320 the call sign, you do not assume. You ask again. 00:15:05.539 --> 00:15:07.820 You say, aircraft holding short, say call sign. 00:15:08.039 --> 00:15:11.360 You treat ambiguity as a threat. Ambiguity is 00:15:11.360 --> 00:15:14.220 the enemy. If there is even a 1 % doubt about 00:15:14.220 --> 00:15:16.899 who is talking, you assume the runway is blocked 00:15:16.899 --> 00:15:19.600 until proven otherwise. That is the lesson written 00:15:19.600 --> 00:15:21.080 in blood here. What about the door? Did they 00:15:21.080 --> 00:15:22.779 fix the plane so that does not happen again? 00:15:23.840 --> 00:15:26.299 There were recommendations regarding door maintenance 00:15:26.299 --> 00:15:28.960 and emergency exit training. The industry also 00:15:28.960 --> 00:15:31.139 took a hard look at rescue capabilities at small 00:15:31.139 --> 00:15:34.059 airports. But, you know, you can engineer a stronger 00:15:34.059 --> 00:15:36.740 door and you can upgrade the radios. But the 00:15:36.740 --> 00:15:39.080 core lesson keeps coming back to human performance. 00:15:39.279 --> 00:15:41.259 The human element. Exactly. You cannot engineer 00:15:41.259 --> 00:15:43.620 a solution for a pilot who simply decides not 00:15:43.620 --> 00:15:45.639 to look out the window. That is a behavioral 00:15:45.639 --> 00:15:48.659 issue, not a mechanical one. It is really a story 00:15:48.659 --> 00:15:50.620 about the intersection of high tech and low tech, 00:15:50.679 --> 00:15:52.840 isn't it? You have these advanced turboprops. 00:15:52.899 --> 00:15:56.340 You have GPWS computers shouting warnings. But 00:15:56.340 --> 00:15:58.860 the failure point was the human eye and the human 00:15:58.860 --> 00:16:03.409 ear. We love our technology. We rely on it completely. 00:16:03.750 --> 00:16:06.250 The United Pilots relied on the radio, a piece 00:16:06.250 --> 00:16:08.570 of technology, to tell them it was safe. But 00:16:08.570 --> 00:16:11.090 the NTSB report was scathing about the fact that 00:16:11.090 --> 00:16:13.649 the Mark 1 eyeball, just looking outside, would 00:16:13.649 --> 00:16:15.889 have saved everyone. That is a profound takeaway 00:16:15.889 --> 00:16:18.470 for all of us, honestly. We are not piloting 00:16:18.470 --> 00:16:22.250 planes into rural Illinois, but we navigate these 00:16:22.250 --> 00:16:24.090 intersections all the time in our own lives. 00:16:24.250 --> 00:16:27.440 We do. Think about managing a project. If you 00:16:27.440 --> 00:16:29.120 assume you know what your team is doing because 00:16:29.120 --> 00:16:31.100 you sent an email but you never actually verified 00:16:31.100 --> 00:16:33.440 it, or if you assume a client is happy because 00:16:33.440 --> 00:16:35.299 they have not complained but you have not actually 00:16:35.299 --> 00:16:37.679 asked them, you are creating that exact same 00:16:37.679 --> 00:16:40.139 danger zone. Cherokee holding short versus holding 00:16:40.139 --> 00:16:42.139 short. The difference between life and death 00:16:42.139 --> 00:16:45.220 was literally one word lost in a beep. It forces 00:16:45.220 --> 00:16:47.379 you to ask yourself, are we verifying reality 00:16:47.379 --> 00:16:49.740 or are we just seeing what we expect to see? 00:16:50.080 --> 00:16:52.659 This has been an incredible deep dive. We have 00:16:52.659 --> 00:16:55.080 covered the mechanics, the psychology, and the 00:16:55.080 --> 00:16:57.940 tragedy of the aftermath. It is a story that 00:16:57.940 --> 00:17:00.039 really sticks with you long after you hear it. 00:17:00.120 --> 00:17:02.360 It certainly does. It is a case study that is 00:17:02.360 --> 00:17:04.539 taught to almost every single pilot during their 00:17:04.539 --> 00:17:06.940 training, but the principles apply to everyone. 00:17:07.160 --> 00:17:09.920 Before we wrap up, I want to leave you, the listener, 00:17:10.119 --> 00:17:13.160 with a final thought to chew on. We live in a 00:17:13.160 --> 00:17:15.480 world that is noisier than ever. Our phones are 00:17:15.480 --> 00:17:18.339 beeping, Slack is pinging, the news is shouting 00:17:18.339 --> 00:17:21.000 at us from every screen. We are constantly being 00:17:21.000 --> 00:17:24.430 stepped on by digital noise. Exactly. The pilots 00:17:24.430 --> 00:17:27.809 of flight 5925 were betrayed by a digital alert 00:17:27.809 --> 00:17:31.049 that drowned out a human warning. But the ultimate 00:17:31.049 --> 00:17:33.150 failsafe was right there, a window. All they 00:17:33.150 --> 00:17:35.369 had to do was look up. Just look up. In an age 00:17:35.369 --> 00:17:37.710 of endless notifications and digital distractions, 00:17:38.150 --> 00:17:40.670 are we forgetting to just look up and see what 00:17:40.670 --> 00:17:42.869 is actually right in front of us? Are we assuming 00:17:42.869 --> 00:17:44.829 the coast is clear just because our phone did 00:17:44.829 --> 00:17:47.089 not tell us otherwise? That is the big question. 00:17:47.569 --> 00:17:50.150 Sometimes the most advanced safety tool you have 00:17:50.150 --> 00:17:52.829 is your own attention. A heavy but absolutely 00:17:52.829 --> 00:17:56.569 necessary lesson from United Express Flight 5925. 00:17:56.930 --> 00:17:58.809 Thanks for guiding us through the wreckage and 00:17:58.809 --> 00:18:00.849 the report today. My pleasure. Stay safe out 00:18:00.849 --> 00:18:02.930 there. And to you listening, thanks for diving 00:18:02.930 --> 00:18:05.869 deep with us. Stay skeptical, verify your sources, 00:18:05.930 --> 00:18:08.250 and for heaven's sake, look both ways. We will 00:18:08.250 --> 00:18:09.269 see you on the next one.