I want you to close your eyes for a second. We
are going to do a little sensory time travel.
Okay, I'm with you. It's a Saturday afternoon
in, say, 1994. You're seven years old. You've
just walked through a set of automatic sliding
doors that rattled a little on the tracks. I
can hear them. That specific, slightly rickety
sound. The air conditioning hits you first. It's
freezing cold. And then the smell hits you. It
is a very specific industrial cocktail. Oh, yeah.
That smell. Off -gassing vinyl from inflatable
pool toys, a little bit of floor wax, maybe some
stale popcorn, and cardboard. Lots of cardboard.
It is a core memory for, I think, at least three
generations of consumers. That smell is practically
part of the American DNA at this point. It really
is. It was the smell of sheer unadulterated possibility.
Exactly. It was the smell of, I might leave here
with a super soaker. But we aren't here today
just to wax poetic about Jeffrey the giraffe
or getting your first Game Boy. Or the anxiety
of the little ticket booth for video games. Oh,
the ticket system. We are here because as of
today, Valentine's Day, February 14th, 2026,
we are looking at perhaps the strangest business
case study on the 21st century. It really is
unique. We are looking at a company that didn't
just go bankrupt. It didn't just restructure.
Yeah. It was liquidated. It was dead. Its pulse
was zero. In 2018, the U .S. operations ceased
to exist. And yet. Here we are. If you drive
past the Chicago premium outlets in Aurora, Illinois
right now, or the Camarillo premium outlets in
California, or walk through the Dallas -Fort
Worth airport. What do you see? You see the backwards
R. You see Jeffrey. You see glistening brand
new stores. It is the retail equivalent of a
zombie movie. But unlike a zombie, which usually
looks a bit ragged, this brand is actually looking
quite healthy. That's a great way to put it.
It's arguably the most complex, chaotic, and
fascinating resurrection story in modern business
history. That is the tension we need to unpack
today. How does a brand die so completely? I
mean, we're talking 33 ,000 people fired, 735
stores gutted, lawsuits, anger, and then claws
its way back to being a global brick and mortar
player just eight years later. And to understand
that, we have to look past the nostalgia. It's
so easy to get caught up in the, you know, I
don't want to grow up jingle. Right. This isn't
a story about toys. It's a story about private
equity engineering, a catastrophic misunderstanding
of the Internet, and a brand that somehow became
more valuable as a ghost than it was as a living
company. So our mission for this deep dive is
to really dissect the anatomy of this resurrection.
We're going to look at the air, land and sea
strategy that's unfolding right now in 2026.
It's a big piece of it. We also need to talk
about the collapse of the Australian arm just
last year in 2025, which is a massive red flag
that I feel like a lot of people in the business
press are ignoring. Oh, that Australian piece
is critical. It's the counter narrative to the
glowing success story we're seeing in the U .S.
Exactly. But to get there, we have to go back
to the start. And I was surprised to learn during
the research for this that the category killer
of toys, it didn't actually start with toys.
Not at all. It started with furniture. Right.
We have to go back to 1948, post -war Washington,
D .C. A man named Charles Lazarus opens a store.
But he didn't call it Toys R Us. He calls it
children's supermark. Children's supermark. It
sounds very Soviet, very utilitarian. It was.
Lazarus is a young guy, just 25 years old. He'd
been a cryptographer during the war. Wow. He
comes back and he sees all his friends getting
married, having babies. Yeah. The baby boom is
just kicking off. He figured logically these
people need furniture, cribs, high chairs, changing
tables. That's smart. I mean, follow the demographics,
simple business plan. Exactly. But he was also
very observant. he noticed a fundamental flaw
in the furniture business model almost immediately.
Which was what? It's a low -frequency transaction.
You buy a crib for your first kid, maybe you
reuse it for the second, you don't come back
next week to buy another crib. Right. It's a
one -and -done purchase. Unless you're running
an orphanage, you aren't buying cribs in bulk.
Exactly. But the parents kept coming in asking
for, you know, rattles and small toys to keep
the kids occupied while they looked at the furniture.
Ah, okay. The add -on sale. And Lazarus realized...
That unlike a solid oak crib, toys are ephemeral.
They break. Kids outgrow them. Or the kid just
gets bored. The replacement cycle. The replacement
cycle for a toy is weeks or months, not years.
That is where the recurring revenue was. So he
pivots. And it wasn't an overnight thing, right?
It took a while. No, it took about a decade.
By 1957, he opens the first store dedicated exclusively
to toys in Rockville, Maryland. And this is where
the branding genius kicks in. He renames it Toys
R Us. Let's talk about that branding for a second.
The backwards R. It drives grammar teachers crazy,
but it was intentional. Oh, it was genius. Pure
genius. Lazarus designed it himself. He wanted
it to look like a semi -literate child had written
the sign. It was a psychological signal. Totally.
It told parents, this is a place for your kids.
And it told kids, this is a place where you are
in charge. It stripped away the stuffiness of
the department store. You know, you weren't allowed
to touch anything. This was your domain. And
this leads us to the concept of the category
killer. We hear this term thrown around in business
school or on CNBC. But what does it actually
mean in this context? Because Toys R Us was really
the prototype for this. Right. A category killer
is a retailer that specializes in one specific
segment. Toys, electronics, pet supplies and
stocks. Such a massive depth of inventory that
generalist stores can't compete. So before Toys
R Us, where would you even buy a toy? You'd go
to a local mom and pop shop or maybe the hardware
store. They had maybe three options for a doll.
Toys R Us have 300 options. They had entire aisles
of just dolls. They killed the competition by
sheer volume and selection. They suck the oxygen
out of the room. From the 1960s through the 1990s,
they were the predator. They rolled up the industry.
They bought competitors like interstate department
stores in 66. They drove small shops out of business.
And they just rode these massive culture. ways.
Oh, yeah. They grew alongside the rise of action
figures. I mean, Star Wars, G .I. Joe, and then
the massive video game boom of the 80s with Nintendo
and Sega. They were perfectly positioned for
all of it. I think that's important to remember.
We view them as the victim now because of what
happened later. But for 40 years, they were the
bully. Absolutely. They dictated terms to Mattel
and Hasbro. If Toys R Us didn't carry your toy,
your toy didn't exist. They were the gatekeepers
of childhood fun. And they tried to keep evolving,
right? I saw something about Concept 2000 store.
Yeah, that was in 1996. They tried to modernize
with these Concept 2000 stores. The first one
was in Raritan, New Jersey. Oh, I remember seeing
pictures of these, the blue facades. Yes, blue
facades, yellow lined windows. They were trying
to look modern, trying to get away from that
warehouse feel. But even as they were doing that,
the ground was shifting beneath them. And that
brings us to the beginning of the end, the 2000s.
And this seems to be where the cracks don't just
appear, they shatter the foundation. That's a
good way to put it. We have a new CEO, John Eiler,
who comes over from FAO Schwartz in 2000. But
the landscape is changing. Walmart and Target
are starting to chew away at their market share.
The 2000s are defined by two things that destroyed
the category killer model. the rise of the loss
leader strategy from big box retailers, and of
course, the rise of the internet. Okay, let's
start with Walmart and this idea of the loss
leader. How does that work? Break that down for
us. A loss leader is when a store sells a product
at a price lower than what they paid for it.
They literally lose money on the sale just to
get a customer into the store. So they're taking
a hit. On purpose. On purpose. Walmart knew that
if they sold the hot new Barbie for $10, even
if it cost them $12 to buy it from Mattel, mom
would come in, buy the doll, and then spend $200
on groceries, clothes, and detergent. They made
their profit on the total basket, not on the
individual toy. Exactly. And Toys R Us couldn't
do that. No, because toys were the only thing
in their basket. Right. If Toys R Us sold the
Barbie at a loss, they just lost money, period.
They couldn't make it up on bananas or motor
oil. They couldn't compete on price anymore.
Their margins were being compressed to death.
Okay, so the physical retail war is going badly.
Then comes the internet, and this is the part
of the story that always, always frustrates me.
The deal with the devil. It is painful to look
back on. It's 1999. E -commerce is exploding.
Toys R Us tries to launch a website, ToysRUs
.com, but their logistics, they just implode
during the Christmas rush. I remember the headlines,
gifts don't arrive, it's a PR nightmare, parents
are furious. Beyond furious. So instead of fixing
it, what do they do? They outsource it. They
panicked. In 2000, they signed a 10 -year exclusive
deal with Amazon. A 10 -year deal? 10 years.
The pitch was, Amazon handles the tech, the website,
and the shipping. Toys R Us handles the inventory
and buying. On taper, that sounds? Yeah. Okay.
You play to your strengths. You're a toy merchant.
They're a tech company. In the short term, sure,
it stopped the bleeding. But in the long term,
it was suicide. By partnering with Amazon, Toys
R Us stopped learning. What do you mean by that?
They didn't build their own data centers. They
didn't develop the algorithms to predict demand.
They didn't learn how to ship individual packages
to doorsteps efficiently. They just they handed
all their customer data and their entire digital
future to the company that would eventually eat
their lunch. And then Amazon cheated on them.
Well, Amazon did what Amazon does. They realized
they could make more money allowing third party
sellers to sell toys on the platform, too. They
breached the exclusivity clause. So Toys R Us
sued. They sued in 2006. And they actually won.
They got $51 million in damages in 2009. But
$51 million is nothing. It's pocket change compared
to losing a decade of digital innovation. Precisely.
By the time they got their website back, the
game was over. They were analog players trying
to sprint in a digital world. They had lost the
muscle memory of innovation. But we still haven't
talked about the actual cause of death. Because
plenty of companies struggle with Amazon and
survive. Best Buy is still here. Target is still
here. Why did Toys R Us actually liquidate? We
need to talk about the LBO. This is the smoking
gun. If you take one thing away from this deep
dive, let it be this. Toys R Us didn't die because
nobody wanted to buy toys. It died because of
financial engineering. In 2005. In 2005, the
company was taken private in a leveraged buyout
in LBO. Okay, we need to break this down. What
happened? Who were the players? A group of private
equity firms, Bain Capital, Kohlberg, Kravis
Roberts, so KKR, and Varnida Realty Trust. They
bought the company for $6 .6 billion. Walk us
through the mechanics of an LBO, because it sounds
like the investors buy the company like I'd buy
a car. But that's not really what happens, is
it? Not with their own money, no. I mean, not
all of it. Imagine you want to buy a house that
costs a million dollars. You put down maybe $20
,000 of your own cash and you borrow the other
$980 ,000. But here's the trick. You don't take
out the loan in your name. You take it out in
the house's name. The house itself now has to
pay the mortgage. So Toys R Us, the company,
was suddenly saddled with the debt used to purchase
itself. Yes. Overnight, they were loaded with
over $5 billion in debt. $5 billion. With a B.
And the service costs, the interest payments
alone, were roughly $400 million a year. Wait,
wait. $400 million a year just to pay the interest.
Just to pay the interest. Right. Before they
paid a single employee, before they bought a
single toy from Hasbro, before they paid the
electric bill or the rent on their stores, they
had to find $400 million. And this explains so
much. This explains why the stores started to
look like dumps in the 2010s. Exactly. You mentioned
the smell earlier. By 2015, that smell included
dirty carpets and flickering fluorescent lights.
Right. They couldn't invest in the customer experience.
They couldn't renovate. They couldn't build a
better... website to fight Amazon. Every spare
dollar, every cent to profit went to the lenders.
So when people say the retail apocalypse killed
toys are us, that's lazy analysis. It is. I mean,
it's not wrong, but it's incomplete. Amazon was
the storm. The changing retail habits were the
wind. But the debt was the reason the house collapsed.
It was the pre -existing condition. Perfectly
put. If they hadn't had that debt, they might
have had the agility to pivot. They could have
invested in prices or smaller, more experiential
stores. But their hands were tied behind their
backs. Which brings us to the inevitable crash.
Section 3 of our outline, the bankruptcy and
liquidation. It's September 2017. They filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Now, Chapter
11 is usually about reorganization. Right. It's
not supposed to be a death sentence. Exactly.
The goal wasn't to close. It was to restructure
that mountain of debt so they could breathe again.
But the timing was horrific. Why? They filed
right before the holiday season. The absolute
worst time for a toy store to look unstable.
And consumer confidence tanked. It wasn't just
consumers, it was the suppliers. Companies like
Mattel, Lego, Hasbro, they got nervous. They
thought, if I ship a million dollars worth of
Barbies to Toys R Us, will they be able to pay
me in January? So they tightened their terms.
They demanded cash up front or, you know, much
stricter payment terms. Toys R Us didn't have
the cash. The whole point of the bankruptcy was
that they were out of cash. So the shelves were
empty, or at least thinner than usual, during
the most important shopping season of the year.
And the holiday sales were a disaster, a complete
disaster. They missed their targets by a mile.
By March 2018, the lenders, who effectively owned
the company, pulled the plug. They gave up on
the reorganization. They decided the company
was worth more dead than alive. Sell off the
inventory, sell off the real estate, and try
to recoup some of their losses. I remember the
photos from that time. The signs that said, everything
let go. And that heartbreaking picture of Jeffrey
the giraffe waving goodbye with a suitcase. It
was genuinely sad. It was brutal. By June 29,
2018, all 735 U .S. stores were closed. And 33
,000 people lost their jobs. And without severance
pay, right, that was a huge controversy. Right.
The private equity owners paid themselves millions
in executive bonuses. But the rank and file employees
got nothing. We can't gloss over that. It was
a tragedy for the workforce. These were people
who had worked there for 20, 30 years. There
was that brief moment where Party City tried
to fill the gap with Toy City pop -ups. But yeah,
it felt like the brand was dead. Except, not
everywhere. And this is a key plot point for
where we are today. The Canadian arm survived.
Yes. This is a fascinating nuance. The Canadian
division was financially healthier. It wasn't
dragged down by the exact same debt structure
in the same way. It was profitable. So while
the U .S. was liquidating, Canada was OK. More
than OK. In April 2018, a company called Fairfax
Financial bought the Canadian division for about
$234 million. So if you were in Toronto or Vancouver,
Toys R Us never left. It just kept chugging along.
Correct. And that's crucial because it kept the
brand heartbeat alive in North America. It proved
the store concept itself wasn't broken. The U
.S. financial structure was. OK, so the U .S.
operations are dead. We enter what I call the
zombie years. This is Section 4, 2018 to 2021.
The lenders decide not to sell the brand name,
the intellectual property, but to try and revive
it themselves. It was a very clumsy, very experimental
period. They realized the brand name and Jeffrey
still had immense value, so they held on to it.
And their first move was something called Jeffrey's
Toy Box. Right. In late 2018. But this wasn't
a store. No, it was a wholesale concept. You'd
walk into a Kroger supermarket and there would
be a cardboard display of... Toys R Us branded
toys. It felt desperate, honestly, like seeing
a washed up celebrity doing low budget car insurance
commercials. It was a way to keep the trademark
active. In trademark law, you have to use it
or you lose it. That makes sense. Then in January
2019, the company emerged from bankruptcy as
a new entity called True Kids. True Kids. OK.
And they tried a few things. They relaunched
the website. But get this. They partnered with
Target for fulfillment. So you go to ToysRUs
.com. buy a toy, and a box with red bullseyes
would show up at your house. Exactly. It was
so weird. And then in 2020, they switched that
partnership to Amazon. Back to the X. Oh, my
God. It was purely a licensing play. But they
did try to open physical stores, two of them.
Right. They opened two small concept stores in
late 2019, one in New Jersey at the Westfield
Garden State Plaza and one in Houston at the
Galleria. And these weren't the old giant warehouses.
No, they were small. 10 ,000 square feet, a fraction
of the size of the old big boxes. There were
experiential play areas, little theaters, things
to do. They were trying to be more interactive.
And very, very unlucky. The worst timing imaginable.
They opened in late 2019, three months later.
COVID -19 sweeps the globe. Malls shut down.
Retail freezes. Those two concept stores didn't
stand a chance. They both closed in January 2021.
So for the second time, Toys R Us is dead in
the U .S. No physical stores. Just a website
fulfilled by Amazon. It feels like the end of
the road. But then the plot twists again. Another
twist. A new player enters the game. WHP Global.
In March 2021, this brand management firm acquired
a controlling interest in True Kids. And this
is where the strategy shifts from flailing zombie
to... strategic resurrection. Who are these guys?
What's their background? WHP Global is backed
by Oak Tree Capital Management. They're brand
managers. They own brands like Anne Klein and
Joseph Abood. Their philosophy is generally asset
light. What does that mean in this context? It
means they realized that the value of Toys R
Us wasn't in signing expensive long -term real
estate leases and managing thousands of employees.
The value was in the name, in Jeffrey. In the
nostalgia. So their first big move wasn't building
stores. It was the Macy's deal. This was the
game changer. Absolutely brilliant. In August
2021, they announced a partnership to put a Toys
R Us shop inside every Macy's in America. And
they moved fast. I remember seeing them pop up.
By October 2022, they were in over 400 Macy's
locations. It was a genius move. It solved the
real estate problem instantly. They didn't have
to sign 400 leases. They didn't have to pay for
400 electric bills. They used Macy's existing
foot traffic. And for Macy's, it brought in families
who maybe hadn't shopped at a department store
in years. It was a perfect symbiotic relationship.
For Toys R Us, it put the brand back in front
of millions of people instantly with very low
risk. But they didn't stop at the store within
a store model. They wanted the big flagship experience
back. And they went big. December 2021, the American
Dream Mall in New Jersey. The American Dream
Mall, yeah. 20 ,000 square feet. Two stories.
They had a slide going between the floors. An
ice cream parlor. This was a statement piece.
Absolutely. They were saying, we aren't just
a section in Macy's. We are still a destination.
And then fast forward to November 2023, they
open another massive flagship at the Mall of
America in Minnesota. Which brings us to the
modern era. We are talking late 2023 through
today, February 2026. This is where the strategy
goes from recovery to what looks like world domination.
I think that's fair. They call it the air, land
and sea strategy. It sounds like a military operation,
doesn't it? But it effectively categorizes their
expansion. Let's break it down. Air. Air. refers
to airport stores. They opened the first airport
store in Dallas -Fort Worth back in November
2023. It's a smart play. Why? You have a captive
audience. Parents traveling with bored kids or
business travelers realizing at the last minute
they forgot to buy a gift for their child back
home. High prices, high margins. I walked past
that one in Terminal A. It's surprisingly well
stocked for an airport shop. Okay, C. C is cruise
ships. They started putting branded stores on
cruise lines. Again, a captive audience. People
are in a vacation spending mindset. You're already
spending money. What's another $40 for a Lego
set? Makes sense. But land is the big gamble.
Because after saying they were going asset light
late last year, late 2025, they went heavy again.
They started building massive standalone flagship
stores. This is the flagship explosion of 2025.
This is where the story gets really interesting
right now. It started slow, but then in September
2025, they hit the gas pedal. What were the first
ones? September 20, 2025. They opened in Aurora,
Illinois at the Chicago Premium Outlets. October
25, Camarillo, California. November 1. West Des
Moines, Iowa. Wait, West Des Moines? That's interesting.
They're not just sticking to the coasts. No,
they're targeting the heartland. These aren't
just corners of a department store. These are
standalone locations. They are betting that the
experience of the toy store is back in demand.
And the openings kept coming. Oh, yeah. Through
the holiday season of 2025, they opened in Maryland,
Nebraska, Colorado, New York, Kansas. I mean,
they were cutting ribbons almost every week.
And we can't ignore the international push either.
I feel like we only focus on the U .S., but they
have been aggressive in Latin America. Very aggressive.
They opened in Mexico in late 2023 via partnership
with Liverpool, the department store chain there.
But the real push was late 2025 in South America.
Where would they go? They opened the first store
in Chile in November 2025 in Santiago and then
Peru just a couple of weeks later in Lima. So
if you look at the map right now in 2026, Toys
R Us is growing on three continents. It's in
airports. It's on boats. It's in Macy's. It's
opening standalone stores. It looks like a massive,
undeniable success story. It certainly looks
that way. The press releases are glowing. The
pictures are great. But. I hear a but coming.
A big one. We have to talk about Australia. The
warning sign. The canary in the coal mine. We
cannot ignore what happened in Australia. While
the U .S. was popping champagne and cutting ribbons
in late 2025, the Australian arm of Toys R Us
collapsed again. Talk us through that timeline.
This is recent history. So the Australian arm
had also been revived after the initial bankruptcy.
It was even listed on the ASX, the Australian
Stock Exchange. It seemed like it was stabilizing.
But it wasn't. But on June 5, 2025, less than
a year ago. It went into voluntary administration.
It's their version of bankruptcy. Why? What went
wrong there that's supposedly going right here?
The same old demons. Tight margins. Inflation
affecting consumer spending. High supply chain
costs. He was just losing money hand over fist.
By July 2025, it was taken over by a company
called Directed Electronics Australia and delisted
from the stock exchange. So literally seven years
after the initial bankruptcy, it failed again
in a major Western market. It serves as a potent
reminder. The brand name Toys R Us is not a magic
shield. It doesn't protect you from fundamental
economics. That's a huge point. The retail market
is still brutal. Inflation is still real. So
while we celebrate the U .S. expansion, the Australian
failure sits there as a reminder that back doesn't
necessarily mean safe. That is a sobering thought.
Just because you have a gleaming new flagship
in Des Moines doesn't mean you're printing money.
Exactly. Rent is expensive. Staffing is expensive.
If the economy takes a dip or if another hot
trend emerges online, those standalone stores
are very vulnerable. Let's pivot to something
a little lighter before we wrap up. Let's talk
about the culture, because you can't talk about
Toys R Us without Jeffrey. The spokes animal.
He's an icon. You know, he started as Dr. G.
Raff in the 1950s. Dr. G. Raff? That sounds like
a bootleg serial mascot. Or a very questionable
pediatrician. I know, right? He evolved. He became
the Jeffrey we know in the 70s. But do you remember
April the Giraffe? Oh, the viral livestream.
2017. The whole world was watching this pregnant
giraffe give birth at a zoo in New York. The
whole world. And Toys R Us sponsored it. It was
this massive viral marketing win for them right
before the bankruptcy. It was a high point. It
showed that the brand still had immense cultural
relevance. People loved the connection. And speaking
of comebacks, it's not just the toy store. Babies
R Us is pulling a Lazarus, too. Yes. They opened
a flagship at the American Dream Mall in July
of 2023. But the big news was the Kohl's deal.
Right. Announced in May 2024. They opened 200
Baby Czar shops inside Kohl's stores. It's a
Macy's playbook all over again. Exactly. Partner
with an existing department store, reduce overhead,
leverage the brand. It's a smart way to capture
the baby market without the risk of owning massive
expensive real estate. And I have to mention
the movies. This is one of my favorite. Weird
facts from the research. Did you know the movie
Spirit Halloween from 2022 was filmed inside
an abandoned Toys R Us? That is the most meta
thing I've ever heard. A movie about a pop -up
store that takes over abandoned retail spaces
filmed in the abandoned carcass of the very store
that Spirit Halloween usually takes over. It's
retail inception. It's the circle of life. Or
the circle of retail death. It's perfect. And
we've got a new movie coming, right? An actual
Toys R Us movie announced back in April 2025.
Yes, produced by a company called Story Kitchen
and Toys R Us Studios. They have a studio now.
Apparently. They were trying to turn the IP into
a media franchise. Barbie did it. Lego did it.
They look at those billions of dollars and think,
why not Jeffrey? I'd watch a Jeffrey the Giraffe
origin story. Maybe a gritty reboot where Dr.
G. Raff loses his medical license and turns to
selling toys to pay off his student loans. Let's
not give them any ideas. But it speaks to the
strategy. They aren't just selling plastic. They
are selling a character, an experience. If kids
love the character, maybe the price of the toy
matters less. Okay, let's bring it all home.
Let's synthesize this. We've gone from the furniture
store in 1948 to the category killer, to the
debt -ridden giant, to the grave, and now to
this massive multi -platform resurrection in
2026. It's a story of financial engineering gone
wrong, and then perhaps financial engineering
gone right. The LBO in 2005 saddled them with
debt that made them unable to compete. The liquidation
wiped that debt slate clean. A hard reset. A
very hard reset. And the new ownership, WHP Global,
has been very clever about asset -light expansion
partnerships with Macy's, Kohl's, cruise ships.
They aren't trying to rebuild the empire of 1990
exactly as it was. They are building a modern,
more diversified version of it. But the question
remains. We are standing here in early 2026.
There are gleaming new stores in Iowa and California.
Is it sustainable? That is the billion dollar
question. We are seeing a swing back to physical
retail. I think people miss the experience during
the pandemic. They miss the smell of the story
you talked about at the top. I think so, too.
E -Congress is great for efficiency, but it's
terrible for discovery and wonder. Toys R Us
is betting that the wonder is worth the rent.
But with the Australia collapse in the rearview
mirror, we know the ice is thin. The debt is
gone, but the competition isn't. Amazon is still
Amazon. Walmart is still Walmart. Target is still
Target. Toys R Us has to offer an experience
that is worth the trip, worth the higher prices.
If they become just a warehouse with shelves
again, they will fail again. They need the magic.
So here is my final provocative thought for you
listening today. Next time you are in Macy's
or you see one of these new standalone Toys R
Us stores, walk in. Don't just look at the toys.
Look at the business. Look at the foot traffic.
Look at the prices on the shelves. Are they successfully
selling a product or are they successfully selling
a memory? And ask yourself, is the memory worth
the markup? because that is what they are banking
on. That nostalgia has a price tag. Ooh, that's
cynical, but accurate. That's it for this deep
dive into the resurrection of Toys R Us. We'll
catch you on the next one. Stay curious, watch
your margins, and maybe go buy a Lego set for
yourself. You've earned it. Goodbye, everyone.