WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:02.520 You know, there's this concept in business school 00:00:02.520 --> 00:00:07.219 and honestly, just in life called survivorship 00:00:07.219 --> 00:00:10.359 bias. Right. We tend to focus exclusively on 00:00:10.359 --> 00:00:12.460 the winners. We look at the companies that made 00:00:12.460 --> 00:00:14.960 it to the Fortune 500 and, you know, stay there 00:00:14.960 --> 00:00:18.160 for 50 years. We study their habits, their CEOs, 00:00:18.440 --> 00:00:20.320 their morning routines. We build a whole mythology 00:00:20.320 --> 00:00:23.469 around them. Exactly. But if you really want 00:00:23.469 --> 00:00:26.050 to understand how the economy works, especially 00:00:26.050 --> 00:00:28.850 the brutal landscape of American retail, you 00:00:28.850 --> 00:00:30.489 shouldn't just be looking at the guy standing 00:00:30.489 --> 00:00:32.710 on the podium popping the champagne. You should 00:00:32.710 --> 00:00:34.109 be looking to the ones who got knocked down. 00:00:34.189 --> 00:00:36.890 That is where the real lessons are hidden. The 00:00:36.890 --> 00:00:39.530 failures, the near misses, the bankruptcies, 00:00:39.530 --> 00:00:42.929 and ones that just refuse to stay dead. It's 00:00:42.929 --> 00:00:45.170 the Darwinian underbelly of capitalism. And that 00:00:45.170 --> 00:00:47.450 is exactly what we're doing today. We are looking 00:00:47.450 --> 00:00:49.979 at a brand that... by all rational accounts, 00:00:50.200 --> 00:00:52.979 should be a fossil. It's a name that might trigger 00:00:52.979 --> 00:00:56.140 a very specific potpourri -scented memory for 00:00:56.140 --> 00:00:58.399 you if you grew up in the South or the Midwest. 00:00:58.840 --> 00:01:02.560 We are talking about Steinmart. Steinmart. It 00:01:02.560 --> 00:01:05.140 is a fascinating case study. I mean, if you were 00:01:05.140 --> 00:01:07.420 to look at a textbook life cycle of a retail 00:01:07.420 --> 00:01:10.920 brand, it usually goes birth, growth, maturity, 00:01:11.060 --> 00:01:14.230 decline, and finally, death. Right. The end. 00:01:14.329 --> 00:01:16.890 The end. Maybe you get a liquidation sale. Maybe 00:01:16.890 --> 00:01:19.049 you get a nostalgic T -shirt sold on eBay. But 00:01:19.049 --> 00:01:21.670 that's it. The entity ceases to exist. Steinbart, 00:01:21.769 --> 00:01:24.230 however, didn't get that memo. No, they definitely 00:01:24.230 --> 00:01:26.609 didn't. We are looking at a story that starts 00:01:26.609 --> 00:01:29.549 on a steamboat in Mississippi in the early 1900s, 00:01:29.569 --> 00:01:32.150 rides the wave of the American mall explosion, 00:01:32.510 --> 00:01:35.689 crashes and burns during a global pandemic, gets 00:01:35.689 --> 00:01:38.189 bought by what can only be described as... E 00:01:38.189 --> 00:01:40.750 -commerce vultures. Exactly. E -commerce vultures 00:01:40.750 --> 00:01:43.989 almost dies again. And now... Here we are. It's 00:01:43.989 --> 00:01:46.849 February 2026, and according to reports we have 00:01:46.849 --> 00:01:50.209 in front of us, Steinmark is back. Which is incredibly 00:01:50.209 --> 00:01:52.430 rare. We need to frame this correctly for you, 00:01:52.530 --> 00:01:54.849 the listener. This isn't just a story about a 00:01:54.849 --> 00:01:56.810 store selling discounted cardigans and crystal 00:01:56.810 --> 00:01:59.170 vases. This is a story about resilience. It's 00:01:59.170 --> 00:02:02.989 a 118 -year rollercoaster ride. 118 years. And 00:02:02.989 --> 00:02:05.409 it forces us to grapple with this really modern 00:02:05.409 --> 00:02:08.370 economic concept of zombie brands. What makes 00:02:08.370 --> 00:02:10.569 a brand valuable enough to bring back from the 00:02:10.569 --> 00:02:13.449 dead not once, but twice? That is the mission 00:02:13.449 --> 00:02:15.389 for this deep dive. We are going to unpack this 00:02:15.389 --> 00:02:18.030 entire saga. We have a stack of sources here. 00:02:18.210 --> 00:02:20.650 Corporate history, bankruptcy filings from the 00:02:20.650 --> 00:02:23.830 2020 crash, financial reports from the REV acquisition, 00:02:23.969 --> 00:02:26.810 and of course, the recent news about their 2026 00:02:26.810 --> 00:02:29.830 return. We're going to figure out how a Russian 00:02:29.830 --> 00:02:32.469 immigrant's general store became a symbol of 00:02:32.469 --> 00:02:35.780 upscale discount shopping. why the wheels fell 00:02:35.780 --> 00:02:38.300 off, and what this resurrection tells us about 00:02:38.300 --> 00:02:40.699 the future of how we shop. We have a lot of ground 00:02:40.699 --> 00:02:42.900 to cover. It's a big story. So let's map this 00:02:42.900 --> 00:02:44.379 out for everyone. We're going to start at the 00:02:44.379 --> 00:02:46.780 very beginning. Part one, the origins. We're 00:02:46.780 --> 00:02:49.039 going back to 1908 to understand the DNA of the 00:02:49.039 --> 00:02:52.520 company. You have to. Then part two, the expansion. 00:02:53.479 --> 00:02:56.199 How did they actually make money? We need to 00:02:56.199 --> 00:02:57.919 get into the weeds of their business model because 00:02:57.919 --> 00:02:59.900 it was actually quite clever. Very clever. Part 00:02:59.900 --> 00:03:03.090 three is... The experience, what it felt like 00:03:03.090 --> 00:03:06.069 to shop there, and why that mattered. Part four 00:03:06.069 --> 00:03:10.030 is the fall, the big one, the 2020 crash. And 00:03:10.030 --> 00:03:13.889 finally, part five, the afterlife, what is happening 00:03:13.889 --> 00:03:18.169 right now in 2026. It's a perfect arc, from the 00:03:18.169 --> 00:03:20.770 Mississippi Delta to the digital cloud. Let's 00:03:20.770 --> 00:03:24.159 jump into part one then, the origins. Because 00:03:24.159 --> 00:03:26.240 honestly, if you pitch this script to a movie 00:03:26.240 --> 00:03:27.960 studio, they might tell you it's a little too 00:03:27.960 --> 00:03:30.319 cliche. Oh, absolutely. It's the classic American 00:03:30.319 --> 00:03:32.639 immigrant story. It really is. It has a cinematic 00:03:32.639 --> 00:03:35.479 quality to it for sure. So set the scene for 00:03:35.479 --> 00:03:38.419 us. It's 1905. Our protagonist is Sam Stein. 00:03:38.620 --> 00:03:40.900 He's a Russian Jewish immigrant. He's in New 00:03:40.900 --> 00:03:42.819 York City, which is, you know, the standard entry 00:03:42.819 --> 00:03:44.919 point. The classic Ellis Island story. Right. 00:03:45.370 --> 00:03:47.250 But he doesn't stay there. No, and that's a key 00:03:47.250 --> 00:03:49.129 part of the history of the American South that 00:03:49.129 --> 00:03:51.110 often gets overlooked. There was a significant 00:03:51.110 --> 00:03:53.610 movement of Jewish immigrants who left the crowded 00:03:53.610 --> 00:03:56.009 tenements of the Lower East Side to find opportunity 00:03:56.009 --> 00:03:59.289 in the wider country. New York was just, it was 00:03:59.289 --> 00:04:01.669 saturated. Too much competition. Way too much. 00:04:01.969 --> 00:04:03.930 If you wanted to build something of your own, 00:04:04.030 --> 00:04:06.750 you often had to look elsewhere. Sam Stein was 00:04:06.750 --> 00:04:09.909 one of them. He heads south. And he doesn't arrive 00:04:09.909 --> 00:04:12.909 in a car or a train. He arrives in Greenville, 00:04:12.990 --> 00:04:15.509 Mississippi on a steamboat. Just picture that 00:04:15.509 --> 00:04:18.910 for a second. 1905. A Russian immigrant stepping 00:04:18.910 --> 00:04:21.449 off a steamboat in the deep Mississippi Delta. 00:04:22.089 --> 00:04:24.490 That is a completely different world. Oh, a world 00:04:24.490 --> 00:04:27.189 away. Culturally, linguistically, climatically, 00:04:27.350 --> 00:04:31.230 it's hot, it's humid, and it's very, very far 00:04:31.230 --> 00:04:33.189 from Russia or New York. It would have been a 00:04:33.189 --> 00:04:35.350 massive shock, but you have to look at the economic 00:04:35.350 --> 00:04:39.490 context. The South in the early 1900s was agricultural. 00:04:39.730 --> 00:04:42.610 It was rebuilding. There was a specific niche 00:04:42.610 --> 00:04:45.470 for what we call the merchant class. You had 00:04:45.470 --> 00:04:47.629 these immigrants starting as peddlers, carrying 00:04:47.629 --> 00:04:50.050 goods on their backs, literally walking from 00:04:50.050 --> 00:04:52.040 farm to farm, and eventually... saving enough 00:04:52.040 --> 00:04:55.079 to open small general stores. They filled a gap 00:04:55.079 --> 00:04:57.240 in the local economy that the established plantation 00:04:57.240 --> 00:04:59.500 economy wasn't serving. They were the connectors. 00:04:59.800 --> 00:05:01.379 That's a perfect way to put it. They were the 00:05:01.379 --> 00:05:03.360 connectors. And that's what Sam Stein did. He 00:05:03.360 --> 00:05:05.540 didn't start a fashion empire. Yeah. He started 00:05:05.540 --> 00:05:09.040 a general store in 1908. Correct. This was Stein 00:05:09.040 --> 00:05:12.220 Mart in name, but not in the concept as we knew 00:05:12.220 --> 00:05:15.160 it later. It was a true general store. You have 00:05:15.160 --> 00:05:18.620 to imagine wooden floors, barrels of goods. Like 00:05:18.620 --> 00:05:20.740 in the movies. Exactly. You're selling tools, 00:05:21.079 --> 00:05:23.959 dry goods, maybe some fabric, seeds, perhaps 00:05:23.959 --> 00:05:26.620 some basic workwear. You are serving the local 00:05:26.620 --> 00:05:29.939 agricultural community. It's a volume business, 00:05:30.160 --> 00:05:33.279 low margin, high necessity. You are the lifeline 00:05:33.279 --> 00:05:35.600 for the local farmers. So for decades, it's just 00:05:35.600 --> 00:05:38.120 this local staple in Greenville, a family business. 00:05:38.259 --> 00:05:40.920 A successful one, successful enough to support 00:05:40.920 --> 00:05:43.600 a family build a life. But then we hit the first 00:05:43.600 --> 00:05:46.209 major pivot point. And this is a theme we're 00:05:46.209 --> 00:05:48.310 going to see a lot in this story. Generational 00:05:48.310 --> 00:05:50.569 shifts changing the business model. It's always 00:05:50.569 --> 00:05:52.709 the next generation that shakes things up. Always. 00:05:53.050 --> 00:05:56.389 So it's 1932. Sam Stein passes away. And his 00:05:56.389 --> 00:05:59.269 son, Jake Stein, takes the wheel. Now I'm looking 00:05:59.269 --> 00:06:02.199 at the date here. 1932. That is, historically 00:06:02.199 --> 00:06:04.639 speaking, a terrible time to take over a retail 00:06:04.639 --> 00:06:06.939 business. It's possibly the worst time in American 00:06:06.939 --> 00:06:09.339 history to take over a business. We are in the 00:06:09.339 --> 00:06:12.079 absolute depths of the Great Depression. Unemployment 00:06:12.079 --> 00:06:14.779 is skyrocketing. We're talking 25 percent unemployment 00:06:14.779 --> 00:06:17.879 in some areas. Banks are failing. Disposable 00:06:17.879 --> 00:06:21.079 income is practically nonexistent. But Jake Stein 00:06:21.079 --> 00:06:23.579 makes a move that defines the company for the 00:06:23.579 --> 00:06:26.879 next century. He pivots. He says, no more general 00:06:26.879 --> 00:06:30.360 merchandise. A huge risk. A huge risk. He shifts 00:06:30.360 --> 00:06:33.699 the focus entirely to discounted clothing. Why? 00:06:34.100 --> 00:06:36.779 Why double down on fashion when people can barely 00:06:36.779 --> 00:06:39.300 afford food? It sounds counterintuitive, but 00:06:39.300 --> 00:06:41.449 it was actually brilliant. In the Depression, 00:06:41.810 --> 00:06:44.209 value wasn't just a marketing buzzword. It was 00:06:44.209 --> 00:06:47.009 a survival mechanism. Use everything. Everything. 00:06:47.209 --> 00:06:49.889 People still needed clothes for work, for church, 00:06:50.009 --> 00:06:52.509 for dignity. But the idea of paying full price 00:06:52.509 --> 00:06:54.910 at a fancy department store was impossible. By 00:06:54.910 --> 00:06:57.509 pivoting to a discount model, Jake Stein aligned 00:06:57.509 --> 00:06:59.550 the business with the brutal economic reality 00:06:59.550 --> 00:07:01.910 of his customers. So he understood his customers' 00:07:02.050 --> 00:07:03.709 psychology. He understood that people didn't 00:07:03.709 --> 00:07:05.629 want to look poor just because the economy was 00:07:05.629 --> 00:07:08.050 poor. He wasn't trying to sell them luxury. He 00:07:08.050 --> 00:07:10.269 was selling them respectability at a price they 00:07:10.269 --> 00:07:13.069 could stomach. Exactly. And that created loyalty. 00:07:13.829 --> 00:07:16.269 Incredible, deep loyalty. It didn't just survive 00:07:16.269 --> 00:07:19.149 the Depression. It thrived because of it. It 00:07:19.149 --> 00:07:21.589 embedded the brand into the community. So by 00:07:21.589 --> 00:07:24.569 the time we get to the 70s. By the late 1970s, 00:07:24.569 --> 00:07:26.990 Stein Mart is basically the place to shop for 00:07:26.990 --> 00:07:29.829 families in the Mississippi Delta. If you needed 00:07:29.829 --> 00:07:32.350 a suit for Sunday service or a dress for a wedding, 00:07:32.490 --> 00:07:35.329 you went to Stein Mart. So that brings us to 00:07:35.329 --> 00:07:39.019 the incubation period. For roughly 70 years, 00:07:39.079 --> 00:07:42.639 from 1908 to the late 70s, it's a regional success 00:07:42.639 --> 00:07:45.939 story. It established the DNA. But it wasn't 00:07:45.939 --> 00:07:48.060 a national giant yet. No, it was a well -kept 00:07:48.060 --> 00:07:50.579 secret in Mississippi. Which brings us to the 00:07:50.579 --> 00:07:52.720 third generation. Here we go again. Enter Jay 00:07:52.720 --> 00:07:54.540 Stein. This is where the numbers start to get 00:07:54.540 --> 00:07:55.899 a little crazy. I'm looking at the expansion 00:07:55.899 --> 00:07:59.480 data here. In 1977, when Jay Stein really takes 00:07:59.480 --> 00:08:02.180 the reins, they have three stores. Three. Three. 00:08:02.379 --> 00:08:04.639 That's a nice, successful family business. You 00:08:04.639 --> 00:08:06.819 can manage three stores by driving between them 00:08:06.819 --> 00:08:09.180 in a single afternoon. Respectable, manageable. 00:08:09.459 --> 00:08:13.079 You know every employee's name. But then, 1990. 00:08:14.159 --> 00:08:17.279 13 years later, they have 40 stores. A huge jump. 00:08:17.500 --> 00:08:23.399 And by 1996, just six years after that, 123 stores. 00:08:23.519 --> 00:08:25.779 That is a rocket ship. That is the definition 00:08:25.779 --> 00:08:28.480 of exponential growth. And it's incredibly dangerous 00:08:28.480 --> 00:08:30.720 if you don't do it right. How so? Going from 00:08:30.720 --> 00:08:33.600 three stores to over 100 implies a massive logistical 00:08:33.600 --> 00:08:36.820 overhaul. You can't run 123 stores the way you 00:08:36.820 --> 00:08:38.899 run three. You need distribution centers. You 00:08:38.899 --> 00:08:40.960 need HR departments. You need standardized training, 00:08:41.120 --> 00:08:43.679 a whole corporate infrastructure. So how do they 00:08:43.679 --> 00:08:45.840 manage that? How do you go from a Mississippi 00:08:45.840 --> 00:08:48.919 secret to a Sunbelt powerhouse? Yeah. Without 00:08:48.919 --> 00:08:59.720 the wheels falling off. Really? He realized that 00:08:59.720 --> 00:09:02.600 the general store vibe wouldn't fly in Dallas 00:09:02.600 --> 00:09:04.899 or Jacksonville. He moved the headquarters to 00:09:04.899 --> 00:09:07.240 Jacksonville, Florida, which was a huge strategic 00:09:07.240 --> 00:09:09.460 move. Why Jacksonville? Logistics and access. 00:09:10.340 --> 00:09:12.659 Jacksonville is a port city. It's a gateway to 00:09:12.659 --> 00:09:15.220 the rest of the southeast. It put them in a position 00:09:15.220 --> 00:09:17.600 to push into Florida, which was booming, and 00:09:17.600 --> 00:09:19.580 then move westward into Texas and eventually 00:09:19.580 --> 00:09:22.340 California. They went where the sun was shining 00:09:22.340 --> 00:09:24.620 and the suburbs were growing. Okay, that makes 00:09:24.620 --> 00:09:27.340 sense. But they didn't just open stores anywhere. 00:09:27.789 --> 00:09:30.049 And this is where we need to get into part two, 00:09:30.129 --> 00:09:33.629 the business strategy, because Steinmart had 00:09:33.629 --> 00:09:36.409 a very specific science of upscale discount. 00:09:36.990 --> 00:09:39.710 It's a dangerous middle ground. In retail, usually 00:09:39.710 --> 00:09:41.629 you want to be the cheapest think Walmart or 00:09:41.629 --> 00:09:44.049 the best think Nordstrom or Neiman Marcus. The 00:09:44.049 --> 00:09:46.429 middle is the death zone. It's the dead zone, 00:09:46.570 --> 00:09:48.669 absolutely. Being in the middle is usually where 00:09:48.669 --> 00:09:51.690 you get crushed. But Steinmart carved out a niche 00:09:51.690 --> 00:09:53.990 right there in the center. The sources mentioned 00:09:53.990 --> 00:09:56.470 their location strategy. They targeted cities 00:09:56.470 --> 00:10:00.289 with populations of 125 ,000 or more. That seems 00:10:00.289 --> 00:10:03.799 like a very specific number. Why 125 ,000? That 00:10:03.799 --> 00:10:06.340 number is the Goldilocks zone. Think about it. 00:10:06.360 --> 00:10:08.919 If you go to a massive metropolis, say downtown 00:10:08.919 --> 00:10:12.460 Chicago or Manhattan, the real estate costs are 00:10:12.460 --> 00:10:14.500 astronomical. Oh, forget about it. You're paying 00:10:14.500 --> 00:10:16.639 hundreds of dollars per square foot in rent. 00:10:17.240 --> 00:10:20.320 Plus, you are competing directly with the flagship 00:10:20.320 --> 00:10:23.960 luxury stores that have unlimited budgets. You 00:10:23.960 --> 00:10:26.059 can't win there. OK, so stay away from Fifth 00:10:26.059 --> 00:10:28.860 Avenue. Right. But if you go to small rural towns 00:10:28.860 --> 00:10:31.700 with 10 ,000 people, you don't have enough density 00:10:31.700 --> 00:10:34.259 of affluent customers to support the upscale 00:10:34.259 --> 00:10:36.679 part of the business. You can't sell designer 00:10:36.679 --> 00:10:38.840 dresses in a town where the median income is 00:10:38.840 --> 00:10:42.200 too low. So 125 ,000 is a sweet spot. It's big 00:10:42.200 --> 00:10:45.759 enough, but not too big. Exactly. 125 ,000 gives 00:10:45.759 --> 00:10:48.340 you a regional hub. It's big enough to have a 00:10:48.340 --> 00:10:50.779 country club, big enough to have a hospital system 00:10:50.779 --> 00:10:54.279 and a university, which means. Doctors and professors 00:10:54.279 --> 00:10:57.059 and professionals. People with disposable income. 00:10:57.200 --> 00:10:59.220 People with disposable income and a reason to 00:10:59.220 --> 00:11:01.879 dress up. It's big enough to have a refined customer 00:11:01.879 --> 00:11:04.320 base, but affordable enough to operate a large 00:11:04.320 --> 00:11:06.340 footprint store without the rent killing you. 00:11:06.500 --> 00:11:08.740 They relied heavily on demographic research, 00:11:08.799 --> 00:11:12.299 too. Income, education, occupation. They were 00:11:12.299 --> 00:11:14.519 hunting for a specific person. Oh, absolutely. 00:11:14.620 --> 00:11:16.980 They were hunting for the aspirational shopper 00:11:16.980 --> 00:11:20.799 or perhaps the pragmatic affluent shopper. Define 00:11:20.799 --> 00:11:25.059 that for me. pragmatic, affluent. This is someone 00:11:25.059 --> 00:11:27.759 who knows what a Ralph Lauren or a Calvin Klein 00:11:27.759 --> 00:11:30.559 label is. They appreciate the quality of the 00:11:30.559 --> 00:11:33.679 fabric, the cut, the stitching. They aren't looking 00:11:33.679 --> 00:11:36.600 for generic polyester. They know quality. They 00:11:36.600 --> 00:11:38.980 know quality. And they could probably afford 00:11:38.980 --> 00:11:42.620 to shop at Macy's or Dillard's or even Nordstrom. 00:11:43.100 --> 00:11:45.919 But they choose not to pay full price. because 00:11:45.919 --> 00:11:49.019 they are smart with their money, they view overpaying 00:11:49.019 --> 00:11:52.080 as a personal failure. The smart shopper, you 00:11:52.080 --> 00:11:53.600 know, the person who buys a shirt and immediately 00:11:53.600 --> 00:11:55.700 tells you, guess how much I paid for this? It 00:11:55.700 --> 00:11:58.899 was marked down from $80 to $30. Precisely. That 00:11:58.899 --> 00:12:01.200 is a Steinmark customer. The dopamine hit isn't 00:12:01.200 --> 00:12:03.559 just the shirt, it's the savings. They offer 00:12:03.559 --> 00:12:06.919 25 to 60 % off department store prices. That 00:12:06.919 --> 00:12:09.120 is a compelling hook. It gamifies the shopping 00:12:09.120 --> 00:12:11.779 experience. But here's the tricky part. To make 00:12:11.779 --> 00:12:14.240 that customer, the one who knows quality comfortable, 00:12:15.279 --> 00:12:17.519 You can't have the store feel like a dump. I 00:12:17.519 --> 00:12:19.279 remember walking into some discount stores in 00:12:19.279 --> 00:12:21.720 the 90s, and it looked like a bomb had gone off 00:12:21.720 --> 00:12:23.879 in a pile of laundry. Right. The treasure hunt 00:12:23.879 --> 00:12:26.080 can easily turn into dumpster diving if you aren't 00:12:26.080 --> 00:12:28.919 careful. And that alienates the affluent shopper. 00:12:28.980 --> 00:12:31.580 They want the deal, but they don't want the grime. 00:12:31.659 --> 00:12:33.399 And that's where the upscale part of Upspoil 00:12:33.399 --> 00:12:36.179 Discount comes in. It had to. Steinmart went 00:12:36.179 --> 00:12:37.940 the other way. They tried to make it feel like 00:12:37.940 --> 00:12:40.779 a boutique. They explicitly used terms like the 00:12:40.779 --> 00:12:42.580 boutique for their special occasion clothing. 00:12:43.969 --> 00:12:46.389 attitudes for everyday women's wear. Those names 00:12:46.389 --> 00:12:48.909 matter. They do. And look at the physical environment. 00:12:49.519 --> 00:12:51.539 They had carpeting. That sounds like a small 00:12:51.539 --> 00:12:54.220 detail, but it changes the acoustics of the store. 00:12:54.340 --> 00:12:58.460 It makes it quieter, calmer, softer. They had 00:12:58.460 --> 00:13:01.100 better lighting warmer tones, not those harsh 00:13:01.100 --> 00:13:03.419 industrial fluorescent lights you see in warehouse 00:13:03.419 --> 00:13:06.440 stores that make everyone look green. They expanded 00:13:06.440 --> 00:13:09.679 into home decor in 2010 with housewares that 00:13:09.679 --> 00:13:11.720 were actually arranged nicely, not just piled 00:13:11.720 --> 00:13:13.700 on shelves. It removes the shame, didn't it? 00:13:13.799 --> 00:13:15.990 That's a great way to put it. In the 80s and 00:13:15.990 --> 00:13:18.129 90s, there was still a bit of stigma attached 00:13:18.129 --> 00:13:21.070 to discount shopping. It implied you couldn't 00:13:21.070 --> 00:13:23.929 afford better by elevating the atmosphere, making 00:13:23.929 --> 00:13:25.950 it feel like a smaller, friendlier department 00:13:25.950 --> 00:13:28.649 store. They gave their customers permission to 00:13:28.649 --> 00:13:30.669 hunt for bargains without feeling like they were 00:13:30.669 --> 00:13:33.049 downgrading their experience. You could run into 00:13:33.049 --> 00:13:35.129 your neighbor at Stein Mart and not feel embarrassed. 00:13:35.570 --> 00:13:38.230 Now, I want to touch on a specific detail about 00:13:38.230 --> 00:13:40.090 their business model that I found fascinating, 00:13:40.289 --> 00:13:42.090 and I think a lot of people didn't realize this. 00:13:42.230 --> 00:13:44.840 Okay. Stein Mart didn't actually run everything 00:13:44.840 --> 00:13:49.019 in the store. Ah, yes. The leasing model. This 00:13:49.019 --> 00:13:51.419 is a master class in capital efficiency. So you 00:13:51.419 --> 00:13:53.799 walk into Stein Mart. You buy a pair of shoes. 00:13:53.980 --> 00:13:55.539 You think you're buying them from Steinmart. 00:13:55.759 --> 00:13:58.539 You pay at the Steinmart register. But you're 00:13:58.539 --> 00:14:00.580 not really buying them from Steinmart. Correct. 00:14:00.700 --> 00:14:03.559 For decades, the shoe department was leased out 00:14:03.559 --> 00:14:07.399 to other retailers, most notably DSW Shoe Warehouse. 00:14:07.879 --> 00:14:10.960 And then later, in 2010, they started partnering 00:14:10.960 --> 00:14:13.700 with Perfumania for fragrances. Why do that? 00:14:13.759 --> 00:14:16.460 Why give away the sales? If I'm a retailer, don't 00:14:16.460 --> 00:14:18.340 I want to capture every dollar that walks through 00:14:18.340 --> 00:14:20.519 the door? Not if capturing that dollar costs 00:14:20.519 --> 00:14:24.389 you $2 in headaches. Think about shoes. Shoes 00:14:24.389 --> 00:14:26.649 are a nightmare to manage inventory for. Because 00:14:26.649 --> 00:14:29.389 of all the sizes. The SKU density is out of control. 00:14:29.629 --> 00:14:33.629 Think about a dress. You might have small, medium, 00:14:33.730 --> 00:14:38.789 large, XL, four SKUs per style. Now think about 00:14:38.789 --> 00:14:42.320 a shoe. You have sizes 5 through 11. You have 00:14:42.320 --> 00:14:45.259 half sizes. You have narrow, regular, and wide 00:14:45.259 --> 00:14:47.580 widths. For one style of pump, you might have 00:14:47.580 --> 00:14:50.440 30 or 40 different boxes. Wow. So the amount 00:14:50.440 --> 00:14:52.399 of capital you need to tie up an inventory is 00:14:52.399 --> 00:14:54.940 enormous. And if you don't have the size 8 .5 00:14:54.940 --> 00:14:57.720 wide, you lose the sale. And if you buy too many 00:14:57.720 --> 00:15:00.860 size 6s? you are stuck with dead stock that takes 00:15:00.860 --> 00:15:03.259 up huge amounts of space in the back room. Which 00:15:03.259 --> 00:15:05.899 costs you money. It is incredibly capital intensive 00:15:05.899 --> 00:15:08.159 to stock a shoe department properly. You need 00:15:08.159 --> 00:15:10.539 millions of dollars just sitting in boxes. So 00:15:10.539 --> 00:15:13.019 Steinmar basically said, hey, DSW, you guys are 00:15:13.019 --> 00:15:15.299 the experts at shoes. You take the floor space, 00:15:15.539 --> 00:15:17.320 you take the inventory risk, and we'll just take 00:15:17.320 --> 00:15:19.559 a cut of the sales or the rent. Pretty much. 00:15:19.639 --> 00:15:21.720 It allowed Steinmar to offer a full department 00:15:21.720 --> 00:15:23.820 store experience. Look, we have shoes, we have 00:15:23.820 --> 00:15:26.899 perfume. Without tying up their own cash in that 00:15:26.899 --> 00:15:29.379 risky inventory. It kept them agile. It allowed 00:15:29.379 --> 00:15:31.659 them to focus their money on apparel, which was 00:15:31.659 --> 00:15:33.799 their bread and butter. That is fascinating. 00:15:34.000 --> 00:15:36.059 It's like a store within a store. A brilliant 00:15:36.059 --> 00:15:38.399 strategy. It creates a seamless illusion for 00:15:38.399 --> 00:15:41.679 the customer. But on the back end, it's a strategic 00:15:41.679 --> 00:15:44.539 partnership that reduces risk. And it worked 00:15:44.539 --> 00:15:48.419 beautifully for a very long time. Until the market 00:15:48.419 --> 00:15:50.460 started to shift. Which leads us to part three. 00:15:50.799 --> 00:15:53.610 The marketing. and the connection because they 00:15:53.610 --> 00:15:55.789 had the locations, they had the boutique vibe, 00:15:55.990 --> 00:15:58.610 they had the smart leasing, but they also needed 00:15:58.610 --> 00:16:01.960 to speak to the customer. And in 2003, They did 00:16:01.960 --> 00:16:03.639 something that I think was actually kind of ahead 00:16:03.639 --> 00:16:05.759 of its time. The Real Shopper campaign. Yeah. 00:16:05.919 --> 00:16:08.200 This was with the Fryham and Bar Agency. Instead 00:16:08.200 --> 00:16:10.779 of hiring 19 -year -old models who looked like 00:16:10.779 --> 00:16:13.240 they had never eaten a carb in their lives, they 00:16:13.240 --> 00:16:16.480 held casting calls, nationwide casting calls. 00:16:16.580 --> 00:16:18.320 They were looking for their actual customers. 00:16:18.519 --> 00:16:20.620 They wanted authenticity. They picked six to 00:16:20.620 --> 00:16:23.100 eight women per season, real women, teachers, 00:16:23.399 --> 00:16:26.769 real estate agents, grandmothers. And they put 00:16:26.769 --> 00:16:28.389 them in the ads. They put them in a sisterhood 00:16:28.389 --> 00:16:30.909 book online. In 2003, this was novel. Today, 00:16:31.049 --> 00:16:33.549 we talk about authenticity and user -generated 00:16:33.549 --> 00:16:36.350 content and influencers all the time. That's 00:16:36.350 --> 00:16:39.149 everywhere now. We are used to seeing real people 00:16:39.149 --> 00:16:42.149 on TikTok or Instagram wearing the clothes. But 00:16:42.149 --> 00:16:44.669 back then, fashion marketing was very much about 00:16:44.669 --> 00:16:48.190 an unattainable ideal. It was the era of the 00:16:48.190 --> 00:16:52.480 supermodel. Airbrush perfection. Exactly. Steinmart 00:16:52.480 --> 00:16:54.539 looked at their demographic, which, let's be 00:16:54.539 --> 00:16:57.399 honest, skewed a bit older, 40s, 50s, 60s, and 00:16:57.399 --> 00:16:59.820 said, why don't we show women who actually look 00:16:59.820 --> 00:17:02.120 like our customers? That seems so obvious in 00:17:02.120 --> 00:17:04.400 retrospect. It does. But it was revolutionary 00:17:04.400 --> 00:17:06.859 then. They realized that their customer didn't 00:17:06.859 --> 00:17:09.079 want to look like a teenager. She wanted to look 00:17:09.079 --> 00:17:11.460 like a stylish, confident version of herself. 00:17:11.720 --> 00:17:13.960 It solidified that connection. It wasn't about 00:17:13.960 --> 00:17:16.059 this is who you could be if you starved yourself. 00:17:16.240 --> 00:17:18.440 It was this is who you are and you look great. 00:17:18.559 --> 00:17:21.420 It built loyalty. And loyalty was the currency 00:17:21.420 --> 00:17:23.779 Steinmark traded on. They didn't have the massive 00:17:23.779 --> 00:17:26.740 ad budgets of Macy's. They couldn't blanket the 00:17:26.740 --> 00:17:28.799 airwaves during the Super Bowl. They needed that, 00:17:28.859 --> 00:17:31.940 I love my Steinmark feeling. They created a community 00:17:31.940 --> 00:17:35.220 where women felt seen. But while they were nailing 00:17:35.220 --> 00:17:38.259 the real shopper vibe, there was another storm 00:17:38.259 --> 00:17:41.299 brewing on the horizon. The digital storm. The 00:17:41.299 --> 00:17:44.380 internet. The great disruptor. The notes say 00:17:44.380 --> 00:17:46.799 they began offering ship from store in October 00:17:46.799 --> 00:17:51.930 2010 due to popular demand. 2010? That feels... 00:17:51.930 --> 00:17:54.309 I don't know, is that late? It's acceptable, 00:17:54.430 --> 00:17:56.910 but perhaps a bit reactive rather than proactive. 00:17:57.269 --> 00:18:00.190 By 2010, Amazon is already a juggernaut. Right. 00:18:00.349 --> 00:18:02.170 Zappos has already revolutionized how people 00:18:02.170 --> 00:18:04.230 buy shoes online with free shipping and returns. 00:18:04.650 --> 00:18:07.069 Ship from store is a good move logistically. 00:18:07.349 --> 00:18:09.849 It means using your physical stores as warehouses 00:18:09.849 --> 00:18:12.529 to fulfill online orders. But it shows they were 00:18:12.529 --> 00:18:14.089 trying to bridge a gap. They were playing catch 00:18:14.089 --> 00:18:15.910 up. They were a brick and mortar culture trying 00:18:15.910 --> 00:18:18.730 to adapt to a digital world. And that's a very 00:18:18.730 --> 00:18:20.950 hard transition to make. And this brings us to 00:18:20.950 --> 00:18:24.299 part four, the fall. Because for a long time, 00:18:24.319 --> 00:18:26.460 it seemed like Steinmart was defying gravity. 00:18:27.019 --> 00:18:29.440 Even as malls started to decline in the late 00:18:29.440 --> 00:18:32.319 2000s, Steinmart held on. They were resilient. 00:18:32.519 --> 00:18:34.680 In 2013, they were still a profitable company. 00:18:34.859 --> 00:18:38.059 They reported a profit of $25 .6 million. They 00:18:38.059 --> 00:18:41.680 had 260 stores in 29 states. That is a healthy, 00:18:41.700 --> 00:18:44.579 functioning company. On paper, yes. But profit 00:18:44.579 --> 00:18:47.119 is a lagging indicator sometimes. The retail 00:18:47.119 --> 00:18:48.920 landscape was shifting under their feet faster 00:18:48.920 --> 00:18:50.960 than they could pivot. The retail apocalypse, 00:18:51.359 --> 00:18:53.299 as the media dubbed it, was gaining momentum 00:18:53.299 --> 00:18:56.359 and the department store model itself was under 00:18:56.359 --> 00:18:59.009 attack. From all sides. All sides. You had the 00:18:59.009 --> 00:19:01.769 rise of fast fashion like H &M and Zara eating 00:19:01.769 --> 00:19:04.230 up the younger demographic with incredibly cheap, 00:19:04.329 --> 00:19:07.430 trendy clothes. You had the rise of off -price 00:19:07.430 --> 00:19:10.069 giants like TJ Maxx and Marshalls growing aggressively 00:19:10.069 --> 00:19:13.349 and, frankly, executing the treasure hunt model 00:19:13.349 --> 00:19:15.509 very well. And then the big one. And then you 00:19:15.509 --> 00:19:17.829 had Amazon eating everything else. Steinmart 00:19:17.829 --> 00:19:20.289 was getting squeezed from all sides. And we start 00:19:20.289 --> 00:19:23.170 to see the cracks in 2017. The stock price is 00:19:23.170 --> 00:19:26.049 trending down. And what do they do? They start 00:19:26.049 --> 00:19:27.829 cutting. This is the part of the story that always 00:19:27.829 --> 00:19:30.950 hurts to read. It's the classic painful playbook 00:19:30.950 --> 00:19:33.049 of a distressed retailer. Walk us through it. 00:19:33.069 --> 00:19:36.049 What were the cuts? October 2017, they cut 10 00:19:36.049 --> 00:19:38.289 % of the corporate staff. They trim inventory 00:19:38.289 --> 00:19:42.369 by 15%. They slash capital expenses by $22 million. 00:19:43.009 --> 00:19:46.349 They suspend stock dividends. Okay, help me understand 00:19:46.349 --> 00:19:48.970 this from a business perspective. If you're losing 00:19:48.970 --> 00:19:52.250 money, shouldn't you cut costs? Isn't that the 00:19:52.250 --> 00:19:54.210 responsible thing to do? You should cut waste, 00:19:54.289 --> 00:19:57.180 absolutely. But if you cut capacity, you enter 00:19:57.180 --> 00:19:59.400 a death spiral. Think about the service profit 00:19:59.400 --> 00:20:01.660 chain. If you cut corporate staff, there are 00:20:01.660 --> 00:20:04.099 fewer people to manage strategy, buying, and 00:20:04.099 --> 00:20:06.440 marketing. You lose the brains of the operation. 00:20:06.839 --> 00:20:09.519 So you lose your vision. And if you trim inventory... 00:20:09.519 --> 00:20:13.339 If you trim inventory by 15%, that real shopper 00:20:13.339 --> 00:20:15.799 walks in and looks at the racks. Maybe she used 00:20:15.799 --> 00:20:18.180 to find 10 things she liked. Now she finds two. 00:20:18.339 --> 00:20:21.700 Maybe she can't find her size. The store feels 00:20:21.700 --> 00:20:24.759 sparse. It feels less abundant. The treasure 00:20:24.759 --> 00:20:27.319 hunt isn't as exciting. It's not. So she leaves 00:20:27.319 --> 00:20:30.589 empty -handed. And she might not come back. And 00:20:30.589 --> 00:20:33.069 if you slash capital expenses, the stores stop 00:20:33.069 --> 00:20:35.630 getting updated. The carpet gets worn. The lighting 00:20:35.630 --> 00:20:37.789 gets dim. The bathrooms don't get renovated. 00:20:37.829 --> 00:20:39.789 The store starts to look tired. It smells like 00:20:39.789 --> 00:20:42.130 decline. That's it, exactly. It smells like decline. 00:20:42.349 --> 00:20:44.710 So the customer experience degrades, which leads 00:20:44.710 --> 00:20:47.029 to lower sales, which forces you to cut more. 00:20:47.190 --> 00:20:49.900 It's a self -fulfilling prophecy. You are cutting 00:20:49.900 --> 00:20:52.339 the muscle along with the fat. You are saving 00:20:52.339 --> 00:20:54.500 money in the short term by destroying the long 00:20:54.500 --> 00:20:57.039 -term viability of the brand. And by January 00:20:57.039 --> 00:21:00.240 2018, they make the announcement that no employee 00:21:00.240 --> 00:21:03.240 wants to hear. They are exploring strategic alternatives. 00:21:03.740 --> 00:21:07.029 Which is corporate speak for... We are drowning. 00:21:07.150 --> 00:21:10.710 Please, someone buy us. Help us. They were looking 00:21:10.710 --> 00:21:12.650 for a buyer because they realized they couldn't 00:21:12.650 --> 00:21:14.789 survive as a standalone public company anymore. 00:21:15.009 --> 00:21:16.750 The public markets are ruthless. They demand 00:21:16.750 --> 00:21:19.589 growth every quarter. Steinmart needed time to 00:21:19.589 --> 00:21:21.630 restructure. And you don't get time on the stock 00:21:21.630 --> 00:21:24.309 market. And they almost found a lifeline in February 00:21:24.309 --> 00:21:27.910 2020. The timing here is just heartbreaking. 00:21:28.150 --> 00:21:30.710 It is the definition of bad luck. If you believe 00:21:30.710 --> 00:21:33.650 in fate, this is a cruel twist. February 2020. 00:21:33.970 --> 00:21:36.960 They enter a deal to go private. A private equity 00:21:36.960 --> 00:21:38.599 group is going to buy them out, take them off 00:21:38.599 --> 00:21:40.880 the stock market. This looks like the path to 00:21:40.880 --> 00:21:43.859 survival, a way to fix the issues away from the 00:21:43.859 --> 00:21:46.059 glare of quarterly earnings calls. It was a valid 00:21:46.059 --> 00:21:48.599 strategy. Go private, restructure, slim down, 00:21:48.859 --> 00:21:50.839 fix the inventory and eventually relaunch. It 00:21:50.839 --> 00:21:54.279 could have worked. And then March 2020, the world 00:21:54.279 --> 00:21:56.880 stops. The black swan event to end all black 00:21:56.880 --> 00:21:59.740 swan events. COVID -19. The deal to go private. 00:21:59.900 --> 00:22:03.640 Dead. The buyers walked away. The stores. forced 00:22:03.640 --> 00:22:06.720 to close temporarily due to lockdowns. And for 00:22:06.720 --> 00:22:09.099 a retailer that was already on the edge, struggling 00:22:09.099 --> 00:22:11.299 with liquidity. It was the final blow. It was 00:22:11.299 --> 00:22:14.059 a final blow. In retail, cash flow is oxygen. 00:22:14.400 --> 00:22:19.039 You have rent due on 280 stores. You have vendors 00:22:19.039 --> 00:22:21.119 who need to be paid for the spring inventory 00:22:21.119 --> 00:22:23.599 that is currently sitting in dark stores gathering 00:22:23.599 --> 00:22:26.660 dust. If you have zero revenue coming in, you 00:22:26.660 --> 00:22:28.799 suffocate very quickly. They didn't have the 00:22:28.799 --> 00:22:31.079 cash reserves to weather a multi -month shutdown. 00:22:31.460 --> 00:22:34.680 So in August 2020, They file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 00:22:35.460 --> 00:22:38.019 But it wasn't a we're going to restructure bankruptcy 00:22:38.019 --> 00:22:41.059 like airlines do. It was a liquidation. That's 00:22:41.059 --> 00:22:42.619 the key difference. They announced the closing 00:22:42.619 --> 00:22:47.460 of LL279 stores. Imagine that. 112 years of history 00:22:47.460 --> 00:22:50.259 gone. From a steamboat in 1905 to everything 00:22:50.259 --> 00:22:53.420 must go signs in 2020. And 11 ,000 employees 00:22:53.420 --> 00:22:56.319 out of work. Just. Gone. It was a massive shock 00:22:56.319 --> 00:22:57.759 to the industry and the consumers. I remember 00:22:57.759 --> 00:22:59.900 driving past one of the locations and seeing 00:22:59.900 --> 00:23:02.400 the signs. It felt like the end of an era. The 00:23:02.400 --> 00:23:04.880 specific niche they filled, that upscale discount 00:23:04.880 --> 00:23:07.380 experience, just evaporated. There was nowhere 00:23:07.380 --> 00:23:11.160 else quite like it to go. But, as we teased at 00:23:11.160 --> 00:23:13.259 the beginning, in the world of modern business, 00:23:13.579 --> 00:23:17.079 dead is a relative term. Welcome to part five. 00:23:17.400 --> 00:23:20.660 Welcome to the era of the zombie brand. So, late 00:23:20.660 --> 00:23:24.200 2020. The carcass of Steinmart is being picked 00:23:24.200 --> 00:23:26.420 over in bankruptcy court. Yeah. And a company 00:23:26.420 --> 00:23:29.579 called Rivey Retail E -Commerce Ventures swoops 00:23:29.579 --> 00:23:32.480 in. Who are these guys? RV is an interesting 00:23:32.480 --> 00:23:35.140 player in the modern retail landscape. Their 00:23:35.140 --> 00:23:38.079 business model is essentially find a bankrupt 00:23:38.079 --> 00:23:41.140 brand with high name recognition, Radio Shack, 00:23:41.140 --> 00:23:44.319 Pier 1 models, and buy the intellectual property. 00:23:44.500 --> 00:23:47.660 The IP, not the stores, not the inventory. Right. 00:23:48.029 --> 00:23:50.210 They buy the logo, the customer email list, the 00:23:50.210 --> 00:23:52.069 domain name, the trademark. They buy the soul 00:23:52.069 --> 00:23:54.309 of the brand, but not the body. So they don't 00:23:54.309 --> 00:23:55.970 buy the stores. They don't hire the employees. 00:23:56.130 --> 00:23:58.150 They don't take on the leases. No, none of the 00:23:58.150 --> 00:24:00.750 expensive, messy, real world stuff. They launch 00:24:00.750 --> 00:24:02.529 it as an online only store. It's like a ghost 00:24:02.529 --> 00:24:05.190 kitchen, but for retail. A ghost kitchen for 00:24:05.190 --> 00:24:07.630 retail. That's a perfect analogy. You go to Steinmart 00:24:07.630 --> 00:24:10.630 .com and it looks like Steinmart. The logo is 00:24:10.630 --> 00:24:13.400 there. The colors are there. But there are no 00:24:13.400 --> 00:24:16.839 stores. It's just a website shipping goods from 00:24:16.839 --> 00:24:19.359 a warehouse somewhere or even drop shipping them 00:24:19.359 --> 00:24:21.259 directly from manufacturers. They're banking 00:24:21.259 --> 00:24:23.720 on the nostalgia. They hope you click because 00:24:23.720 --> 00:24:26.640 you trust the name Stein Mart, even if the company 00:24:26.640 --> 00:24:29.160 behind it is totally different. Exactly. They 00:24:29.160 --> 00:24:32.039 are harvesting the brand equity that Sam and 00:24:32.039 --> 00:24:35.480 Jake and Jay Stein built over a century. They 00:24:35.480 --> 00:24:38.680 are betting that the name still has value. But 00:24:38.680 --> 00:24:41.250 even the zombies have trouble walking. Because 00:24:41.250 --> 00:24:44.190 simply slapping a famous logo on a website isn't 00:24:44.190 --> 00:24:46.150 a guaranteed money printer. It turns out the 00:24:46.150 --> 00:24:48.589 Steinmart experience was about more than just 00:24:48.589 --> 00:24:51.309 the logo. It was about the store, the treasure 00:24:51.309 --> 00:24:53.789 hunt, trying things on, touching the fabric, 00:24:53.950 --> 00:24:55.829 walking through the boutique. All the stuff that 00:24:55.829 --> 00:24:58.150 doesn't translate online. Right. When you take 00:24:58.150 --> 00:25:00.109 that away and just make it a website, you are 00:25:00.109 --> 00:25:02.569 competing with Amazon and Shin and everyone else. 00:25:02.630 --> 00:25:04.009 And you don't have the competitive advantage 00:25:04.009 --> 00:25:06.670 of the physical location anymore. And apparently 00:25:06.670 --> 00:25:10.589 it didn't work out so well. March 2, 2023. RV 00:25:10.589 --> 00:25:13.769 itself announces it is mulling bankruptcy. The 00:25:13.769 --> 00:25:16.710 Savior Company was drowning. They hired restructuring 00:25:16.710 --> 00:25:18.849 lawyers. It seemed like the Steinmart name was 00:25:18.849 --> 00:25:21.410 cursed. It was going to die a second death. Unbelievable. 00:25:21.769 --> 00:25:24.069 The attempt to digitize the nostalgia had failed. 00:25:24.269 --> 00:25:25.849 But here's where it gets really interesting. 00:25:26.049 --> 00:25:28.609 And this is the breaking news part of our deep 00:25:28.609 --> 00:25:31.150 dive. The Resurrection, part two. Our source 00:25:31.150 --> 00:25:34.029 text has a very simple but startling sentence. 00:25:34.840 --> 00:25:38.059 Stein Mart returned in 2026. We are recording 00:25:38.059 --> 00:25:41.720 this in February 2026. And yes, the brand is 00:25:41.720 --> 00:25:44.839 back. Now, the sources sparse on the exact details 00:25:44.839 --> 00:25:47.180 of the corporate structure of this 2026 return, 00:25:47.440 --> 00:25:49.799 whether it's RV restructuring or a new owner 00:25:49.799 --> 00:25:52.740 entirely. But the fact remains, the brand is 00:25:52.740 --> 00:25:55.660 active. It survived the 2020 liquidation. It 00:25:55.660 --> 00:25:59.099 survived the 2023 REV collapse. And it is here. 00:25:59.450 --> 00:26:02.049 This is what fascinates me. Why? Why won't this 00:26:02.049 --> 00:26:04.069 brand stay dead? There are plenty of department 00:26:04.069 --> 00:26:06.170 stores that went bust and stayed bust. Bonton, 00:26:06.470 --> 00:26:09.589 Mervin's, Gottschalk's. Why Steinmart? It has 00:26:09.589 --> 00:26:11.670 to be the customers, right? Those real shoppers. 00:26:11.769 --> 00:26:15.109 It absolutely is. There is a stickiness to the 00:26:15.109 --> 00:26:18.289 Steinmart brand that is incredibly rare. Think 00:26:18.289 --> 00:26:20.589 about the demographic. These are shoppers who 00:26:20.589 --> 00:26:24.569 perhaps aren't as fickle as the Gen Z trend chasers. 00:26:24.650 --> 00:26:26.660 They're loyal. They found a home at Steinmart. 00:26:26.779 --> 00:26:29.359 They trusted the curation. Even after the stores 00:26:29.359 --> 00:26:32.240 closed, that search volume people typing Steinmart 00:26:32.240 --> 00:26:34.619 into Google must have remained high enough to 00:26:34.619 --> 00:26:36.500 convince investors that there was still gold 00:26:36.500 --> 00:26:38.799 in that mine. It's the resilience of the name. 00:26:38.920 --> 00:26:42.579 It's 118 years of brand equity. You can't build 00:26:42.579 --> 00:26:44.660 that overnight. You can build a cool Shopify 00:26:44.660 --> 00:26:47.299 store, but you can't build 100 years of trust. 00:26:47.559 --> 00:26:50.420 And that is the lesson here. In a digital world, 00:26:50.599 --> 00:26:53.759 trust is the scarcest resource. If you have a 00:26:53.759 --> 00:26:55.819 name that people trust, even if you went bankrupt, 00:26:55.980 --> 00:26:57.799 that name is an asset. It's still worth something. 00:26:58.000 --> 00:27:00.819 It's why we see Toys R Us popping up inside Macy's. 00:27:00.960 --> 00:27:04.299 It's why Steinmart is back online in 2026. The 00:27:04.299 --> 00:27:08.319 idea of Steinmart curated discount upscale was 00:27:08.319 --> 00:27:10.299 strong enough to survive the failure of the execution. 00:27:10.619 --> 00:27:12.539 That's a powerful distinction. The execution 00:27:12.539 --> 00:27:15.619 failed. The stores were too expensive. The inventory 00:27:15.619 --> 00:27:18.619 was mismanaged. But the idea didn't fail. The 00:27:18.619 --> 00:27:20.960 customer still wants that product. Precisely. 00:27:21.000 --> 00:27:23.460 The demand didn't disappear. The supply chain 00:27:23.460 --> 00:27:26.519 did. Now the supply chain is trying to reconnect. 00:27:26.859 --> 00:27:29.000 So what does this all mean? If we zoom out, if 00:27:29.000 --> 00:27:30.900 I'm listening to this and I'm not a retail analyst, 00:27:31.099 --> 00:27:33.420 why should I care about Steinmark? Because Steinmark 00:27:33.420 --> 00:27:35.740 is a microcosm of American history. Look at the 00:27:35.740 --> 00:27:37.880 timeline. It tells the story of the 20th and 00:27:37.880 --> 00:27:40.500 21st centuries. Walk us through that. Step one, 00:27:40.740 --> 00:27:45.640 immigrant roots, the American dream. 1908, a 00:27:45.640 --> 00:27:47.640 man gets off a boat and builds something from 00:27:47.640 --> 00:27:50.609 nothing. Check. Step two. The suburban explosion. 00:27:50.890 --> 00:27:54.289 The mall era. 1980s and 90s. The democratization 00:27:54.289 --> 00:27:56.549 of luxury. Everyone gets to look rich. Okay. 00:27:56.750 --> 00:27:59.089 Step three. The private equity corporate struggle. 00:27:59.349 --> 00:28:02.529 The death spiral of the 2010s. The financialization 00:28:02.529 --> 00:28:05.470 of everything. Step four. The online shift in 00:28:05.470 --> 00:28:08.529 zombie phase. 2020s. The disruption of the internet. 00:28:08.750 --> 00:28:12.150 And step five. The resurrection. The realization 00:28:12.150 --> 00:28:14.690 that legacy matters. It really tracks perfectly 00:28:14.690 --> 00:28:16.730 with the economic life of the country. It does. 00:28:16.930 --> 00:28:19.740 And it proves that adaptation is messy. It's 00:28:19.740 --> 00:28:22.619 not a straight line. Steinmart failed to adapt 00:28:22.619 --> 00:28:24.720 to the internet quickly enough, and they paid 00:28:24.720 --> 00:28:27.079 the ultimate price liquidation. But they are 00:28:27.079 --> 00:28:28.799 getting a second chance because the foundation 00:28:28.799 --> 00:28:31.640 was strong. So as we wrap up this deep dive, 00:28:31.779 --> 00:28:33.680 I'm left with a question for you, the listener, 00:28:33.819 --> 00:28:36.220 and it's something to think about the next time 00:28:36.220 --> 00:28:38.220 you're shopping online. It's the question of 00:28:38.220 --> 00:28:42.359 authenticity. Steinmart returned in 2026, but 00:28:42.359 --> 00:28:44.839 the company that owned it was on the ropes in 00:28:44.839 --> 00:28:48.700 2023. So when you see these dead brands popping 00:28:48.700 --> 00:28:51.180 up on your Instagram feed or in your search results, 00:28:51.279 --> 00:28:53.480 whether it's Steinmart or Radio Shack or whoever, 00:28:53.700 --> 00:28:56.519 ask yourself, what are you actually buying? Are 00:28:56.519 --> 00:28:59.039 you buying the heritage? Are you buying the curation 00:28:59.039 --> 00:29:01.539 and the soul that Sam and Jake and Jay Stein 00:29:01.539 --> 00:29:04.279 built? Or are you just buying a logo that's been 00:29:04.279 --> 00:29:06.480 pasted onto a generic e -commerce experience? 00:29:06.779 --> 00:29:09.420 Is it a resurrection? Or is it just a ghost wearing 00:29:09.420 --> 00:29:11.440 the old uniform? That is the question for the 00:29:11.440 --> 00:29:14.160 modern consumer. Can a digital brand have a soul? 00:29:14.680 --> 00:29:17.259 Stein Mart is trying to prove that it can. They 00:29:17.259 --> 00:29:19.500 are trying to prove that the real shopper is 00:29:19.500 --> 00:29:22.059 still there. Stein Mart won't stay down. And 00:29:22.059 --> 00:29:25.279 honestly, part of me is rooting for them. 118 00:29:25.279 --> 00:29:28.299 years is a long time to just disappear. It certainly 00:29:28.299 --> 00:29:30.920 is. It's a testament to the power of a good idea. 00:29:31.759 --> 00:29:34.400 Thanks for diving deep with us today. It's been 00:29:34.400 --> 00:29:36.940 a wild ride from the Mississippi Delta to the 00:29:36.940 --> 00:29:39.519 digital age. Always a pleasure. We'll catch you 00:29:39.519 --> 00:29:41.440 on the next one. Keep looking beneath the surface.