WEBVTT

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April 23, 1985. If you were around then, you

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probably remember exactly where you were. Oh,

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absolutely. And if you weren't, you've almost

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certainly heard the legend. It is a date that

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lives in what the Coca -Cola company itself now

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calls marketing infamy. It's a great phrase.

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And it really is the Kennedy assassination of

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the consumer packaged goods world. That's a great

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way to put it. Everyone remembers the shock.

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It was the day the Coca -Cola company... did

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the unthinkable. Right. They held this massive,

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glitzy press conference at Lincoln Center in

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New York City. All the lights, all the cameras,

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and announced they were scrapping the formula

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for the most popular soft drink in history. I

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still find this story hard to wrap my head around,

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even after going through all these stacks of

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files we have here. Do what? We were talking

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about Coca -Cola. It had been around for 99 years

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at that point. Century, almost. It wasn't just

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a soda. It was, I mean, it was an icon. It was

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Americana in a bottle. And they just... decided

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to change it. They didn't just change it. I think

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that's the key distinction we need to make right

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up front. They erased it. They stopped production

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on the original formula immediately. Immediately.

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This wasn't a line extension like Diet Coke,

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which was new, or Cherry Coke. This was a replacement.

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So the old stuff was just gone. Gone. The new

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stuff. That was it. And that is what we are unpacking

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today. We're looking at the launch of New Coke.

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Which, as you pointed out, was technically just

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called Coke on the can. Right. The new was just

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on the corner, but everyone called it New Coke.

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And we're looking at its absolutely spectacular

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historic failure. But the mission here isn't

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just to point and laugh at a big corporate blunder,

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is it? Maybe a little. I mean, don't get me wrong.

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It is fun to laugh at big corporations when they

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trip over their own shoelaces. Of course. But

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we want to get to the bottom of how this happened,

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because looking at the documents, this wasn't

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like a snap decision. Not at all. The mission

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is to understand how a company with essentially

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unlimited resources, the smartest marketing minds

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in the business, and mountains, I mean, literal

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mountains of data could make such a colossal

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mistake. Here's the twist we're going to get

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to by the end of this deep dive. Right. Why this

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failure might have actually been the single most

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important success in the company's history. I

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love a good counterintuitive twist. It's like

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a business thriller where the victim turns out

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to be the winner. Exactly. So we're digging into

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historical accounts. We've got the actual market

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research data from the early 80s. And we're looking

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at all the retrospectives on the Cola Wars. We

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are. And I think we need to frame this correctly

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from the start. This isn't just a business story.

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It feels bigger than that. It is. If you look

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at it closely. It's a story about psychology.

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It's about regional identity, specifically the

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deep -seated pride in the American South. And

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it's about the massive, often ignored gap between

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what people say they want in a survey. And what

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they actually want in real life. Precisely. So

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let's get into the why, because the assumption,

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I think, for most people looking back at the

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80s is that Coke was king. Right. That's what

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everyone thinks. I always picture the 80s as

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the era of Coke dominance. Like, wasn't Coke

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always on top? Why would you ever mess with perfection

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if you were winning? That is the nostalgia talking.

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It's the Mean Joe Green commercial effect. Oh,

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I loved that ad. We all did. We remember the

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ad, so we assumed the business was healthy. But

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the reality of the early 1980s was very, very

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different. Coke was a brand in crisis. A crisis?

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Really? Oh, yeah. If you look at the internal

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memos in the annual reports from 1983 and 1984,

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they paint a pretty grim picture for the executives

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down in Atlanta. Grim how? I'm looking at the

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chart here. And they still had the lead, didn't

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they? They had the lead, but look at the trend

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line. That's what terrifies a CEO. Let's look

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at the post -World War II era. In the late 40s

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and 50s, Coke had something like 60 % of the

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market share. I think it's 2%. They were the

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default. If you said soda, you meant Coke. But

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by 1983... What was it then? That number had

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plummeted to under 24%. Wow. Okay, I knew it

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had dropped. But from 60 to 24, that is a free

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fall. That's losing more than half your empire.

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It is a hemorrhage. Yeah. And the main culprit

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was Pepsi. The Pepsi Challenge. Pepsi had been

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hammering away at them for a decade with the

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Pepsi Challenge. In fact, by the early 80s...

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Pepsi was actually outselling Coke in supermarkets.

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Wait, hold on. Pepsi was outselling Coke in stores.

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I did not realize it had gotten that bad. I thought

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Coke always had the edge. It had the edge in

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overall volume, but you have to dissect where

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that volume comes from. Coke dominated vending

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machines and fountain sales. Specifically, their

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exclusive deals with fast food giants like McDonald's.

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Right. If you go to McDonald's, you drink Coke.

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You don't have a choice. That's what they call

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a forced choice market. And I'm not going to

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walk out of a McDonald's just because they don't

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have Pepsi. I'll just take the Coke. Exactly.

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But if you took away the restaurants and the

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vending machines and just looked at the free

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choice market. People in a grocery aisle. People

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standing in a grocery aisle looking at two bottles

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and deciding which one to put in their cart.

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Coke was losing. Coke was losing. They were losing

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the battle for the consumer's preference. So

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they were winning on distribution muscle, but

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losing the heart and I guess the palate of the

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drinker. Precisely. And the demographics were

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even more terrifying for them. How so? I was

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reading through the analyst reports from 83 and

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they were looking at the baby boomers. As the

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boomers aged, they were moving toward diet drinks

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or coffee or juices. So the full sugar cola market

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was shrinking. It was. So the future of that

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market. was the youth market and let me guess

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the kids were drinking pepsi the kids were drinking

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pepsi of course they were pepsi had successfully

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positioned itself as the drink of the new generation

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they had michael jackson lighting up the screen

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sometimes literally sometimes literally yes they

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had lionel richie they had energy and youth coke

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felt It felt like your parents' drink. Exactly.

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It felt like your parents' drink. It felt like

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Eisenhower era America in a neon 80s world. Yeah.

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So you have a declining market share, a competitor

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that's cooler than you, and a customer base that's

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aging out. Okay. So into this burning building

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walks Roberto Goizueta. The new CEO. Right. I

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was reading his bio, and he's such a fascinating

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figure in this story because he doesn't fit the

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mold of the good old boy Atlanta executive. Not

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at all. Roberto Goizueta became CEO in 1980.

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He was a Cuban exile who had fled Castro's regime.

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And he was not a sentimental man. No. He was

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a chemist by training, not a marketer. He came

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from a technical background where results matter

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more than tradition. He looked at a formula.

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as a chemical compound, not a holy relic. He

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had that famous line to his staff, right? About

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sacred cows? Yes. That's the key to his entire

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mindset. He gathered his top executives and told

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them there would be no sacred cows. Meaning?

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Nothing was off the table. If it wasn't making

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money or if it could be improved, he was willing

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to change it. He basically said, we are not a

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museum, we are a business. And you have to understand

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his history, too. He'd run the Coca -Cola subsidiary

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in the Bahamas before this. Right. What happened

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in the Bahamas? That seems like a pretty good

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gig if you can get it. It was a good gig, but

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he used it as a laboratory. He improved sales

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there significantly by tweaking the flavor of

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the drink to match local tastes. Really? He changed

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the formula there? He did. He added a little

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more sugar. Change the carbonation levels. Yeah.

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He had seen firsthand that if you adjust the

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formula to match what the people currently want,

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you can boost profits. So he didn't have this

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reverence for the secret formula that the public

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assumed the CEO of Coca -Cola would have? None.

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He saw it as a variable, not a constant. That

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makes so much sense. So he's looking at the data,

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seeing the global decline and thinking, I fixed

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this before by changing the recipe. Why not do

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it again on a global scale? He was willing to

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break the glass. He was willing to blow up the

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building if it meant saving the company. He believed

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that the product itself, the liquid in the bottle,

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was the problem. Not the marketing, not the brand

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image, the actual taste. The taste. He thought

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people prefer the taste of Pepsi. Therefore,

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we must make our product taste more like Pepsi.

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It's a very logical chemist's brain deduction.

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So this kicks off the secret mission. Project

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Kansas. I love the code names from the 80s. Project

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Kansas. It was named after a famous photo of

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a journalist, William Allen White, drinking a

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Coke. A little piece of trivia for you. I like

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that. This was a top secret initiative led by

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marketing VP Sergio Zayman and Brian Dyson. Their

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mandate was simple, but terrifying. Yeah. Create

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a flavor that beats Pepsi. And this is the part

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that I think gets lost in the Coke was stupid

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narrative. They didn't just guess, right? Oh,

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God, no. They didn't just mix a bucket of syrup

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in a back room and say, yeah, that's good. They

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tested the living daylights out of this. Oh,

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they tested it more than almost any product in

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history up to that point. This is where the tragedy

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of the data comes in. OK. They ran blind taste

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tests. With nearly 200 ,000 consumers. 200 ,000.

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200 ,000. Just think about the logistics of that

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in 1984. No internet, no digital surveys. This

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is clipboard and paperwork in malls across America.

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That is a sample size that would make a medical

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researcher jealous. You usually launch a drug

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with way less data than that. Exactly. And the

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results were overwhelmingly positive. The new

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formula, which was sweeter and smoother. It had

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less of that bite or burn that the original Coke

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had. It was designed to be more like Pepsi. It

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was. And it beat everything. It beat the original

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Coke by a solid margin. It beat Pepsi. Even in

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the South. Because I know we're going to talk

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about the backlash, but surely the South held

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the line during the testing. That's the thing.

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They didn't. That's what was so convincing to

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the executives. Even in the Southeast, even in

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Atlanta, Coke's hometown, people preferred the

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new flavor in blind tests. The data said. Unequivocally,

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this tastes better. So if I'm Goizueta and I'm

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looking at this spreadsheet with 200 ,000 data

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points. You feeling pretty good? I'm thinking,

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checkmate. We found a product that beats our

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competitor and our own old product. It seems

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like a no -brainer. It does. It looks like the

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perfect business decision. But, and there is

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always a but in these stories. There always is.

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There were warning signs in the qualitative data

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that they chose to ignore. What do you mean by

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qualitative? I mean the feelings, the emotions.

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They were so focused on the quantitative, the

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numbers, the percentages, that they missed the

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emotional cues. What specifically did they miss?

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Because I saw a mention of focus groups going

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wrong. Well, most of the tests were blind, right?

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Here is cup A, here is cup B. Which do you like?

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Simple. But they also did focus groups where

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they would reveal to the testers what they were

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drinking. They'd say, okay, this new one you

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like, that's going to be the new Coca -Cola,

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and we are taking the old one away. That's a

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bold move to tell them you're taking the old

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one away. Usually companies just add to the line.

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Right. And for most people, surprisingly, the

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preference actually went up. It did. Yeah. They

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liked the idea of a new and improved Coke. They

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bought into the marketing hype before it even

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launched. But there was this small group. About

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10 to 12 percent of the participants. The angry

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minority. The angry minority. Yeah. These people

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didn't just dislike the idea. They felt alienated.

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They were furious. What were they saying? Things

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like, I might stop drinking Coke altogether.

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They talked about it like a betrayal. But looking

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at it from a boardroom perspective, 10 percent

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isn't a majority. Right. In a democracy, if you

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win 90 percent of the vote, that's a landslide.

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You pop the champagne. That is exactly how the

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executives saw it. They looked at the raw numbers.

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They thought, OK, we lose 10 % of the diehards,

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but we gain the Pepsi generation. Net positive.

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But they missed something. They missed the social

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dynamic. In these focus groups, the angry 10

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% were so vocal, so passionate, that they started

00:12:03.559 --> 00:12:06.220
to sway the other people in the room. It's the

00:12:06.220 --> 00:12:08.659
loudest voice in the room syndrome. It is. They

00:12:08.659 --> 00:12:11.480
exerted this peer pressure effect. The negativity

00:12:11.480 --> 00:12:14.159
was contagious. A person who five minutes ago

00:12:14.159 --> 00:12:16.940
said, yeah, this new stuff is pretty good. We'd

00:12:16.940 --> 00:12:19.139
hear the angry guy ranting about tradition and

00:12:19.139 --> 00:12:21.120
the good old days. And suddenly they'd change

00:12:21.120 --> 00:12:23.259
their mind. Suddenly they'd say, you know what?

00:12:24.000 --> 00:12:26.139
He's right. This is terrible. Why are you doing

00:12:26.139 --> 00:12:28.539
this? That's fascinating. So the spreadsheet

00:12:28.539 --> 00:12:32.019
says 90 % approval, but the room vibe says riot.

00:12:32.279 --> 00:12:34.580
Exactly. And the executives weren't in the room.

00:12:34.620 --> 00:12:36.179
They were just looking at the report summaries.

00:12:36.620 --> 00:12:39.419
Correct. And the company actively downplayed

00:12:39.419 --> 00:12:41.919
that psychological reaction. They focused on

00:12:41.919 --> 00:12:43.840
the sip tests, the raw preference. They thought

00:12:43.840 --> 00:12:46.820
once people get used to it, the anger will fade.

00:12:47.200 --> 00:12:49.820
It's just the shock of the new. I have to ask

00:12:49.820 --> 00:12:52.440
the obvious question here, though. Did they ever

00:12:52.440 --> 00:12:56.120
consider just selling both? They did. Like keep

00:12:56.120 --> 00:12:59.379
old Coke and launch new Coke as Coke Supreme

00:12:59.379 --> 00:13:02.299
or something? Why did it have to be a Highlander

00:13:02.299 --> 00:13:05.230
situation where there can be only one? It's a

00:13:05.230 --> 00:13:07.809
great question, and they did consider it. It

00:13:07.809 --> 00:13:10.210
wasn't completely off the radar, but management

00:13:10.210 --> 00:13:12.909
rejected it for a few very specific tactical

00:13:12.909 --> 00:13:15.929
reasons. Okay, like what? First, their bottlers

00:13:15.929 --> 00:13:18.470
were already furious with them. Why are the bottlers

00:13:18.470 --> 00:13:21.129
mad? Complexity. Coke had just launched Diet

00:13:21.129 --> 00:13:24.730
Coke in 1982, which was a huge hit, but a logistical

00:13:24.730 --> 00:13:27.850
nightmare. A new product, new cans, new everything.

00:13:28.230 --> 00:13:29.830
And they were launching Cherry Coke around the

00:13:29.830 --> 00:13:32.570
same time in 1985. The bottlers, the guys who

00:13:32.570 --> 00:13:34.230
own the trucks and the factories, were screaming,

00:13:34.330 --> 00:13:35.789
we don't have enough shelf space. We don't have

00:13:35.789 --> 00:13:38.169
enough trucks. They didn't want another SKU to

00:13:38.169 --> 00:13:40.409
manage. Right. The bottlers are the ones who

00:13:40.409 --> 00:13:43.149
actually have to put the liquid in the jars and

00:13:43.149 --> 00:13:45.529
drive the trucks to the Piggly Wiggly. They are

00:13:45.529 --> 00:13:47.440
the boots on the ground. Right. And there was

00:13:47.440 --> 00:13:50.120
a lot of legal tension, too. Bottlers were suing

00:13:50.120 --> 00:13:52.980
Coca -Cola over syrup pricing contracts. It was

00:13:52.980 --> 00:13:55.639
a messy time. So adding another product would

00:13:55.639 --> 00:13:58.259
have just made things worse. Much worse. Plus,

00:13:58.340 --> 00:14:02.039
the marketing team feared cannibalization. Cannibalization.

00:14:02.120 --> 00:14:04.559
It's when your new product eats the sales of

00:14:04.559 --> 00:14:06.679
your old product. They worry that if you have

00:14:06.679 --> 00:14:09.519
two Cokes, you split your own market share, you

00:14:09.519 --> 00:14:12.000
dilute the brand, and suddenly... Pepsi looks

00:14:12.000 --> 00:14:14.299
even bigger by comparison because your sales

00:14:14.299 --> 00:14:16.299
are split between two buckets. So Goizueta makes

00:14:16.299 --> 00:14:19.220
the call. He pushes all the chips to the center

00:14:19.220 --> 00:14:21.899
of the table. He makes the decree. New Coke or

00:14:21.899 --> 00:14:25.299
no Coke. It had to be a total replacement. He

00:14:25.299 --> 00:14:27.379
wanted to show confidence. He insisted on the

00:14:27.379 --> 00:14:30.539
new label. He genuinely believed this was the

00:14:30.539 --> 00:14:32.779
future and that keeping the old stuff was just

00:14:32.779 --> 00:14:36.360
clinging to a dying past. So April 23, 1985.

00:14:36.919 --> 00:14:40.179
The big day. Lincoln Center. The invites go out.

00:14:40.440 --> 00:14:43.340
It was a spectacle. But Pepsi, you have to hand

00:14:43.340 --> 00:14:45.500
it to Pepsi. They played this beautifully. How

00:14:45.500 --> 00:14:48.519
so? They knew it was coming. Oh, they knew. The

00:14:48.519 --> 00:14:51.379
beverage industry is leaky. They had spies or

00:14:51.379 --> 00:14:53.980
just good industry intel from suppliers. They

00:14:53.980 --> 00:14:56.860
knew Coke was changing the formula, so they poisoned

00:14:56.860 --> 00:14:59.820
the well. That sounds ominous. How do you poison

00:14:59.820 --> 00:15:02.000
the well for a soda launch? They started shaping

00:15:02.000 --> 00:15:05.340
the narrative before Coke even said a word. They

00:15:05.340 --> 00:15:07.929
declared victory. Before the launch. The day

00:15:07.929 --> 00:15:10.409
of the launch. Before the press conference. They

00:15:10.409 --> 00:15:12.509
gave their employees the day off. They ran full

00:15:12.509 --> 00:15:15.450
-page ads saying Pepsi won the Cola Wars. They

00:15:15.450 --> 00:15:18.909
framed Coke's change not as an improvement, but

00:15:18.909 --> 00:15:21.610
as a desperate admission of defeat. That is 4

00:15:21.610 --> 00:15:24.289
-D chess right there. So by the time Goizueta

00:15:24.289 --> 00:15:26.710
walks on stage, the reporters are already primed

00:15:26.710 --> 00:15:28.990
to be cynical. Exactly. And they fed reporters

00:15:28.990 --> 00:15:31.659
questions to ask. So when Goizueta stands up

00:15:31.659 --> 00:15:33.600
there trying to describe the flavor as bolder,

00:15:33.600 --> 00:15:36.399
rounder, more harmonious. More harmonious. That

00:15:36.399 --> 00:15:38.019
sounds like he's describing a symphony and not

00:15:38.019 --> 00:15:42.220
a soda. Laughs. He was trying to elevate it.

00:15:42.259 --> 00:15:44.539
He was a sophisticated man. But the reporters

00:15:44.539 --> 00:15:47.179
were skeptical. They asked point blank. Is this

00:15:47.179 --> 00:15:49.360
an admission that the old Coke was bad? And what

00:15:49.360 --> 00:15:52.519
did he say? Goizueta got defensive. He refused

00:15:52.519 --> 00:15:55.279
to say the word taste test. He refused to admit

00:15:55.279 --> 00:15:58.059
that Pepsi forced their hand. So he didn't give

00:15:58.059 --> 00:16:00.519
a straight answer. No. He said the secret formula

00:16:00.519 --> 00:16:03.220
wasn't sacrosanct. He pointed out that they had

00:16:03.220 --> 00:16:06.139
changed the formula back in 1935 to make it kosher.

00:16:06.379 --> 00:16:08.519
I didn't know that. They changed it for religious

00:16:08.519 --> 00:16:11.899
reasons. Yes. They made tweaks for kosher certification

00:16:11.899 --> 00:16:15.320
removing tallow and glycerin derived from beef

00:16:15.320 --> 00:16:18.240
and later for halal and vegetarian compliance.

00:16:18.279 --> 00:16:20.620
So his argument was, we've done this before.

00:16:20.860 --> 00:16:23.580
His argument was, we tweak things all the time.

00:16:23.580 --> 00:16:26.289
This is just another tweak. But he refused to

00:16:26.289 --> 00:16:28.610
admit that consumer preference drove the decision.

00:16:28.769 --> 00:16:31.669
He famously called it one of the easiest decisions

00:16:31.669 --> 00:16:34.809
we've ever made. Oof. That is a quote that aged

00:16:34.809 --> 00:16:37.129
like milk. One of the easiest decisions. And

00:16:37.129 --> 00:16:40.210
here's the supreme irony of the launch. For years,

00:16:40.490 --> 00:16:42.710
Coke had been using Bill Cosby as their spokesman.

00:16:42.730 --> 00:16:45.370
Right. And Cosby's whole pitch, his entire shtick

00:16:45.370 --> 00:16:47.870
in the commercials, was that Coke was less sweet

00:16:47.870 --> 00:16:50.860
than Pepsi. He used to say it wasn't cloying.

00:16:50.860 --> 00:16:52.879
He called it the real thing because it had that

00:16:52.879 --> 00:16:54.960
bite. So now they're launching a sweeter drink.

00:16:55.120 --> 00:16:58.279
Now, suddenly, Coke is launching a drink that

00:16:58.279 --> 00:17:00.679
is specifically sweeter to compete with Pepsi.

00:17:00.860 --> 00:17:03.139
They completely undermined their own marketing

00:17:03.139 --> 00:17:05.819
history. They basically said, hey, remember how

00:17:05.819 --> 00:17:08.279
we told you for 10 years that sweet is bad? Just

00:17:08.279 --> 00:17:11.599
kidding. Sweet is good now. They did. But, and

00:17:11.599 --> 00:17:13.359
here's where it gets really interesting and where

00:17:13.359 --> 00:17:17.119
the data gets confusing again. Despite the awkward

00:17:17.119 --> 00:17:19.859
press conference, The launch was initially a

00:17:19.859 --> 00:17:22.859
success. Really? Because the legend says it was

00:17:22.859 --> 00:17:25.319
a disaster from day one? Yeah. I picture people

00:17:25.319 --> 00:17:27.960
throwing cans at the screen immediately. No,

00:17:28.019 --> 00:17:29.920
that's the myth that has built up over time.

00:17:30.160 --> 00:17:32.500
In the first few days, the Coca -Cola stock price

00:17:32.500 --> 00:17:34.779
actually went up. Wall Street liked it. Wall

00:17:34.779 --> 00:17:37.799
Street liked the move. Market research showed...

00:17:37.950 --> 00:17:40.609
80 % of the public knew about the change within

00:17:40.609 --> 00:17:43.150
48 hours, which is insane market penetration

00:17:43.150 --> 00:17:45.809
for pre -Internet days. That's huge. And sales

00:17:45.809 --> 00:17:48.309
in cities like New York, Miami, and Detroit went

00:17:48.309 --> 00:17:50.650
up by 8%. So people were buying it. They were

00:17:50.650 --> 00:17:52.990
curious. They were buying it. They were drinking

00:17:52.990 --> 00:17:56.670
it. 75 % of respondents in early surveys said

00:17:56.670 --> 00:17:59.450
they'd buy it again. They were giving it away

00:17:59.450 --> 00:18:01.390
at the Statue of Liberty renovation celebration.

00:18:01.410 --> 00:18:03.990
It was at McDonald's. If you looked at the spreadsheets

00:18:03.990 --> 00:18:07.839
in May, 1985, a month after launch. It looked

00:18:07.839 --> 00:18:10.180
like the gamble worked. So where did the rebellion

00:18:10.180 --> 00:18:12.819
start? Because we know it ends with burning effigies

00:18:12.819 --> 00:18:14.940
in the streets. At some point, the mood shifted.

00:18:15.160 --> 00:18:17.220
They started where Coke began, the American South.

00:18:17.380 --> 00:18:20.000
Of course. Talk to me about the Southern reaction.

00:18:20.140 --> 00:18:21.819
Why was it so different there? I mean, soda is

00:18:21.819 --> 00:18:24.660
soda, right? Not in the South. You have to understand

00:18:24.660 --> 00:18:27.059
that in the South, Coca -Cola isn't just a carbonated

00:18:27.059 --> 00:18:29.690
beverage. What is it? It's Coca -Cola. It's a

00:18:29.690 --> 00:18:31.670
food group. It's part of the cultural fabric.

00:18:31.750 --> 00:18:34.490
It was invented in Atlanta. It's a point of regional

00:18:34.490 --> 00:18:37.549
pride. For many Southerners, seeing a New York

00:18:37.549 --> 00:18:40.769
-based competitor like Pepsi force Coke to change,

00:18:41.069 --> 00:18:43.690
it was viewed through a very specific historical

00:18:43.690 --> 00:18:46.529
prism. Are you going to say the Civil War? I

00:18:46.529 --> 00:18:49.529
am absolutely saying the Civil War. I know it

00:18:49.529 --> 00:18:51.930
sounds hyperbolic to us now, but some people

00:18:51.930 --> 00:18:54.930
genuinely viewed it as a cultural surrender to

00:18:54.930 --> 00:18:57.609
the Yankees. Wow. Pepsi is based in Purchase,

00:18:57.609 --> 00:19:01.240
New York. Coke is Atlanta. To change the formula

00:19:01.240 --> 00:19:03.440
to taste like Pepsi felt like a betrayal of Southern

00:19:03.440 --> 00:19:06.160
heritage. It felt like Atlanta was surrendering

00:19:06.160 --> 00:19:09.420
to New York values. That is heavy for a drink

00:19:09.420 --> 00:19:12.200
that costs 50 cents. But identity is powerful

00:19:12.200 --> 00:19:14.579
stuff. It is the most powerful stuff. And once

00:19:14.579 --> 00:19:16.279
the South started screaming, the rest of the

00:19:16.279 --> 00:19:18.460
country started listening. And the anecdotes

00:19:18.460 --> 00:19:21.559
of rage are just. They are colorful. Okay, give

00:19:21.559 --> 00:19:24.299
me one. Goizueta received a letter addressed

00:19:24.299 --> 00:19:27.359
to... Chief Dodo, the Coca -Cola company. Chief

00:19:27.359 --> 00:19:30.339
Dodo. Simple, effective, insulting. I like it.

00:19:30.640 --> 00:19:33.200
Another customer wrote in asking for Goizueta's

00:19:33.200 --> 00:19:35.640
autograph. Because they were a fan. Maybe they

00:19:35.640 --> 00:19:37.859
liked the new taste. No. They explained that

00:19:37.859 --> 00:19:40.019
the signature of one of the dumbest executives

00:19:40.019 --> 00:19:42.240
in American business history would be valuable

00:19:42.240 --> 00:19:44.880
to collectors someday. That is cold. That is

00:19:44.880 --> 00:19:48.240
deeply premeditated insult. I respect that. The

00:19:48.240 --> 00:19:52.599
company Hotline 1800, Get Coke, went into meltdown.

00:19:53.000 --> 00:19:55.619
Before the change, they got maybe 400 calls a

00:19:55.619 --> 00:19:57.740
day. Just normal customer service stuff. Right.

00:19:58.380 --> 00:20:01.240
Where can I buy this? Yeah. Or my can was dented.

00:20:01.960 --> 00:20:04.559
Suddenly, they were getting 1 ,500 calls a day.

00:20:04.700 --> 00:20:06.940
And these weren't just complaints. What were

00:20:06.940 --> 00:20:10.259
they? They hired a psychiatrist. to listen in

00:20:10.259 --> 00:20:12.299
on the hotline calls to analyze the consumer

00:20:12.299 --> 00:20:15.539
sentiment. Seriously? Yes. And the psychiatrists

00:20:15.539 --> 00:20:17.400
reported that people sounded like they were discussing

00:20:17.400 --> 00:20:19.940
the death of a family member. They were grieving.

00:20:20.200 --> 00:20:22.619
They felt a genuine sense of loss. They weren't

00:20:22.619 --> 00:20:25.279
angry about a flavor. They were sad that a piece

00:20:25.279 --> 00:20:27.559
of their childhood was gone. It goes back to

00:20:27.559 --> 00:20:30.480
that emotional attachment the data missed. You

00:20:30.480 --> 00:20:33.380
can't quantify childhood memory in a blind taste

00:20:33.380 --> 00:20:35.740
test. You can't. And it wasn't just average citizens.

00:20:36.339 --> 00:20:39.559
Fidel Castro, the Cuban leader, Goizueta's nemesis,

00:20:39.559 --> 00:20:42.099
essentially came out and bashed New Coke. He

00:20:42.099 --> 00:20:44.960
called it a sign of American capitalist decadence.

00:20:45.000 --> 00:20:46.799
That's amazing. He said the Americans had lost

00:20:46.799 --> 00:20:48.619
their way so badly they couldn't even keep their

00:20:48.619 --> 00:20:50.779
sodas straight. Wait, Goizueta's father was a

00:20:50.779 --> 00:20:52.579
Cuban exile, right? He must have hated that.

00:20:52.819 --> 00:20:55.579
Yes. And Goizueta later said that was the only

00:20:55.579 --> 00:20:58.220
time his father ever agreed with Fidel Castro.

00:20:58.929 --> 00:21:01.630
What? They both hated New Coke. You know you've

00:21:01.630 --> 00:21:03.910
messed up when you're uniting the Goizueta family

00:21:03.910 --> 00:21:06.410
and Fidel Castro on a policy issue. It was the

00:21:06.410 --> 00:21:08.769
great unifier. And then you have Gay Mullins.

00:21:09.549 --> 00:21:11.849
Cannot tell this story without Gay Mullins. The

00:21:11.849 --> 00:21:14.390
Seattle retiree, I was reading about him. He

00:21:14.390 --> 00:21:16.509
seems like a character written for a movie. He

00:21:16.509 --> 00:21:19.150
really does. He was a retiree looking to start

00:21:19.150 --> 00:21:22.650
a PR firm. And he saw this as his moment. He

00:21:22.650 --> 00:21:25.779
founded the... Old cola drinkers of America.

00:21:26.019 --> 00:21:28.680
And he sued them. He launched a class action

00:21:28.680 --> 00:21:31.619
lawsuit to force the company to bring back the

00:21:31.619 --> 00:21:34.880
old formula. He was on TV dumping new coke into

00:21:34.880 --> 00:21:37.400
the sewers of Seattle. He became the face of

00:21:37.400 --> 00:21:39.480
the resistance. But there's a funny footnote

00:21:39.480 --> 00:21:41.400
about him in the research, right? A little bit

00:21:41.400 --> 00:21:44.339
of irony. A huge irony alert. Mullins participated

00:21:44.339 --> 00:21:47.339
in a blind taste test later on, challenged by

00:21:47.339 --> 00:21:50.720
a TV station. And he failed. He failed. He either

00:21:50.720 --> 00:21:53.220
couldn't tell the difference, or in some takes,

00:21:53.630 --> 00:21:56.630
He actually preferred New Coke. Blast. No way.

00:21:56.789 --> 00:21:58.970
So the leader of the revolution didn't even know

00:21:58.970 --> 00:22:00.690
what he was fighting for. He was fighting for

00:22:00.690 --> 00:22:03.769
the idea of old Coke. Ah. He wasn't fighting

00:22:03.769 --> 00:22:06.309
for the liquid. That is the crucial distinction

00:22:06.309 --> 00:22:09.390
that goes way to mist. The liquid didn't matter.

00:22:09.450 --> 00:22:13.250
The idea mattered. So consumer rage is exploding.

00:22:13.349 --> 00:22:17.329
The media is piling on. But Coke is a big ship

00:22:17.329 --> 00:22:19.829
to turn around. What finally made them pivot?

00:22:19.990 --> 00:22:23.329
Was it the letters? Was it Gay Mullins? It wasn't

00:22:23.329 --> 00:22:25.650
just the consumers. I think the real pivot point

00:22:25.650 --> 00:22:27.869
was the bottlers. The bottlers again. We mentioned

00:22:27.869 --> 00:22:29.970
them earlier. These are the local business people

00:22:29.970 --> 00:22:32.109
who live in these communities. They were getting

00:22:32.109 --> 00:22:34.910
hammered. They were being socially ostracized.

00:22:35.150 --> 00:22:38.269
Like at the country club or at church. Everywhere.

00:22:38.789 --> 00:22:41.730
Friends, family. Bottlers reported that people

00:22:41.730 --> 00:22:44.089
were angry at them personally. At the bottlers.

00:22:44.190 --> 00:22:46.250
Yes. There's a story about a bottler in Georgia

00:22:46.250 --> 00:22:48.490
who said a woman came up to him at a church picnic

00:22:48.490 --> 00:22:51.190
and accused him of ruining her bridge club. She

00:22:51.190 --> 00:22:53.710
wouldn't speak to him. You do not mess with the

00:22:53.710 --> 00:22:57.009
bridge club. That is a sacred institation. Laughs.

00:22:57.230 --> 00:23:00.150
It sounds funny, but it was affecting their livelihood.

00:23:00.390 --> 00:23:02.269
Drivers were getting yelled at while delivering

00:23:02.269 --> 00:23:04.250
to supermarkets. So they were getting it from

00:23:04.250 --> 00:23:07.569
all sides. On June 23rd, there was a meeting

00:23:07.569 --> 00:23:10.029
where bottlers confronted the executives in Atlanta.

00:23:10.430 --> 00:23:13.109
They basically said, you are killing us out here.

00:23:13.190 --> 00:23:15.289
You need to fix this. And then there's the story

00:23:15.289 --> 00:23:17.710
about Donald Keough, the president of Coke. This

00:23:17.710 --> 00:23:20.009
feels like the cinematic turning point. This

00:23:20.009 --> 00:23:24.839
is the aha moment. kiaf is in monaco of all places

00:23:24.839 --> 00:23:28.420
visiting a small restaurant monaco fancy right

00:23:28.420 --> 00:23:30.720
and the owner comes up to him beaming with pride

00:23:30.720 --> 00:23:34.059
and serves of a chilled 6 .5 ounce glass bottle

00:23:34.059 --> 00:23:36.960
of coca -cola and the owner says i serve the

00:23:36.960 --> 00:23:40.680
real thing a real coke and kiaf realizes he realizes

00:23:40.680 --> 00:23:43.259
the brand is bigger than the company he realizes

00:23:43.259 --> 00:23:45.440
they aren't selling a flavor they are selling

00:23:45.440 --> 00:23:48.230
a memory They're selling consistency. And if

00:23:48.230 --> 00:23:49.950
they don't fix this, they are going to lose that

00:23:49.950 --> 00:23:52.410
magic forever. The owner in Monaco didn't care

00:23:52.410 --> 00:23:54.990
about market share or sweetness. He cared about

00:23:54.990 --> 00:23:57.890
the real thing. So the timeline here is shockingly

00:23:57.890 --> 00:24:01.569
short. Launch in April. By July, they are reversing

00:24:01.569 --> 00:24:06.210
course. 79 days. That is all it lasted. Less

00:24:06.210 --> 00:24:10.190
than three months. Wow. On July 11th, 1985, they

00:24:10.190 --> 00:24:12.309
hold another press conference. And this was big

00:24:12.309 --> 00:24:15.029
news. This wasn't just a business page footnote.

00:24:15.190 --> 00:24:18.690
Huge. Peter Jennings interrupted General Hospital

00:24:18.690 --> 00:24:22.089
on ABC with a special bulletin. You know it's

00:24:22.089 --> 00:24:23.970
a crisis when you interrupt the soaps in the

00:24:23.970 --> 00:24:27.369
80s. That is peak viewing time. A national emergency.

00:24:28.559 --> 00:24:30.660
Senator David Pryor went to the floor of the

00:24:30.660 --> 00:24:33.000
U .S. Senate and called it a meaningful moment

00:24:33.000 --> 00:24:35.740
in U .S. history. For a soda coming back, that

00:24:35.740 --> 00:24:39.200
is wild. For a soda. The hotline received 31

00:24:39.200 --> 00:24:42.440
,600 calls in two days after the announcement.

00:24:42.619 --> 00:24:45.819
31 ,000. But this time, they weren't angry. They

00:24:45.819 --> 00:24:47.960
were joyful. Executives said it was like they

00:24:47.960 --> 00:24:50.420
had cured cancer. People were weeping with relief.

00:24:50.720 --> 00:24:52.980
So they bring back the original formula, but

00:24:52.980 --> 00:24:54.599
they don't call it Coca -Cola anymore, right?

00:24:55.130 --> 00:24:57.049
This is the branding pivot. They bring it back

00:24:57.049 --> 00:25:00.009
as Coca -Cola Classic. And they keep New Coke

00:25:00.009 --> 00:25:02.430
on the shelves, just labeled as Coke. Later,

00:25:02.430 --> 00:25:05.329
it will be renamed Coke, too. And there is that

00:25:05.329 --> 00:25:07.369
famous quote from Keehoff when people started

00:25:07.369 --> 00:25:10.730
asking if this was all a giant conspiracy. Because

00:25:10.730 --> 00:25:12.970
naturally, people thought, did they do this on

00:25:12.970 --> 00:25:15.150
purpose? Of course. It's the first place your

00:25:15.150 --> 00:25:17.650
mind goes. And Keehoff gave the perfect answer.

00:25:18.490 --> 00:25:21.359
We're not that dumb. And we're not that smart.

00:25:21.539 --> 00:25:23.799
Which is probably the most honest corporate statement

00:25:23.799 --> 00:25:26.079
ever made. It really is. It sums up the whole

00:25:26.079 --> 00:25:29.759
debacle perfectly. It was a blunder, not a scheme.

00:25:30.079 --> 00:25:32.220
So I want to go back to the why for a second.

00:25:32.680 --> 00:25:35.400
We talked about the focus groups, but there is

00:25:35.400 --> 00:25:38.119
some deeper psychology here. I was reading Malcolm

00:25:38.119 --> 00:25:40.619
Gladwell's book Blink as part of the prep for

00:25:40.619 --> 00:25:42.880
this, and he devotes a whole chapter to this.

00:25:43.059 --> 00:25:46.220
Yes. Gladwell argues that the central flaw wasn't

00:25:46.220 --> 00:25:49.059
the data itself, but the methodology of the taste

00:25:49.059 --> 00:25:51.420
test. The sip test. I found this fascinating

00:25:51.420 --> 00:25:54.099
because it relates to biology. Exactly. Explain

00:25:54.099 --> 00:25:56.339
what happens in a sip test. So when you take

00:25:56.339 --> 00:25:58.980
a sip of something, just a tiny bit in a Dixie

00:25:58.980 --> 00:26:01.480
cup, your brain naturally prefers the sweeter

00:26:01.480 --> 00:26:04.240
option. It's a biological reaction to a sugar

00:26:04.240 --> 00:26:06.599
rush. It triggers the reward center immediately.

00:26:07.299 --> 00:26:10.319
Pepsi is sweeter. New Coke was formulated to

00:26:10.319 --> 00:26:13.640
be sweeter. So in a sip test, they win. Right.

00:26:13.720 --> 00:26:16.680
But, and this is the key, we don't drink soda

00:26:16.680 --> 00:26:20.599
by the sip. We drink a whole can or a whole bottle.

00:26:20.759 --> 00:26:23.039
And that's called a home use test. And the biology

00:26:23.039 --> 00:26:25.680
changes. When you drink a whole can of something

00:26:25.680 --> 00:26:28.220
that sweet, it can become cloying. It becomes

00:26:28.220 --> 00:26:30.700
too much. The sip test is a sprint. Drinking

00:26:30.700 --> 00:26:34.000
a Coke is a marathon. Coke was designed for the

00:26:34.000 --> 00:26:36.980
marathon. It has more acid, more bite, less sugar

00:26:36.980 --> 00:26:39.700
impact. But they tested it for a sprint. Yes.

00:26:39.920 --> 00:26:42.440
They optimized the product for the wrong environment.

00:26:42.720 --> 00:26:45.299
They optimized it for the test, not for the living

00:26:45.299 --> 00:26:47.099
room. That makes so much sense. And then there's

00:26:47.099 --> 00:26:49.400
a packaging. You sent me that note about sensation

00:26:49.400 --> 00:26:52.119
transference. Yes. This is a concept by Louis

00:26:52.119 --> 00:26:55.559
Cheskin, a famous marketing psychologist. He

00:26:55.559 --> 00:26:57.960
argued that people don't separate the product

00:26:57.960 --> 00:26:59.819
from the packaging in their minds. They merge

00:26:59.819 --> 00:27:02.619
them. Exactly. They transfer their feelings about

00:27:02.619 --> 00:27:05.680
the box or the can onto the taste itself. Can

00:27:05.680 --> 00:27:07.380
you give an example of how that works? Sure.

00:27:07.680 --> 00:27:10.480
Jeskin did research on 7 -Up in the 40s. They

00:27:10.480 --> 00:27:13.539
found that if they put the exact same 7 -Up liquid

00:27:13.539 --> 00:27:16.500
in a bottle with a slightly more yellow label,

00:27:17.230 --> 00:27:20.630
People swore it tasted more lemony. No way. If

00:27:20.630 --> 00:27:23.109
the label was green, they tasted more lime. The

00:27:23.109 --> 00:27:24.950
brain is so easily tricked, we taste with our

00:27:24.950 --> 00:27:27.589
eyes. We do. So apply that to Coke. The consumers

00:27:27.589 --> 00:27:30.569
believed the product was the red can, the Spencerian

00:27:30.569 --> 00:27:33.630
script logo, the history, the shape of the bottle.

00:27:33.730 --> 00:27:35.670
There's a whole package of sensations. Right.

00:27:35.710 --> 00:27:37.670
When you change the definition of the product,

00:27:37.730 --> 00:27:39.609
when you said, this isn't that thing you love

00:27:39.609 --> 00:27:42.619
anymore, it's something new. You broke the sensation

00:27:42.619 --> 00:27:45.440
transference. You severed the leaf. So it actually

00:27:45.440 --> 00:27:47.119
tasted worse to them because the psychological

00:27:47.119 --> 00:27:49.980
seasoning was gone. Wow. There was also a theory

00:27:49.980 --> 00:27:52.559
I read about called the just noticeable difference.

00:27:52.980 --> 00:27:55.079
It suggests they could have just changed the

00:27:55.079 --> 00:27:58.099
flavor slowly, right? Like boiling a frog. The

00:27:58.099 --> 00:28:01.539
flavor balance hypothesis. Yes. Later studies

00:28:01.539 --> 00:28:03.640
showed that if Coke had just gradually tweaked

00:28:03.640 --> 00:28:06.339
the formula over five years, added a little more

00:28:06.339 --> 00:28:09.579
sugar in 1980, changed the acid balance in 1982,

00:28:09.799 --> 00:28:11.299
no one would have noticed. And they would have

00:28:11.299 --> 00:28:13.119
gotten to the same place. They could have arrived

00:28:13.119 --> 00:28:15.799
at the new Coke flavor without the new Coke launch.

00:28:16.099 --> 00:28:18.160
But they didn't want to do that. No. Goizueta

00:28:18.160 --> 00:28:20.339
wanted a big splash. He wanted the headlines.

00:28:20.599 --> 00:28:24.200
He wanted the new label to attract the youth.

00:28:24.559 --> 00:28:26.980
That was hubris. He wanted the credit for the

00:28:26.980 --> 00:28:28.880
change, and that's what killed it. Now, we have

00:28:28.880 --> 00:28:31.519
to talk conspiracy theories. We do. Because even

00:28:31.519 --> 00:28:34.900
today, if you mention New Coke at a party, someone,

00:28:35.200 --> 00:28:37.059
usually the uncle who thinks he knows everything,

00:28:37.299 --> 00:28:39.819
will say, oh, they did it on purpose to switch

00:28:39.819 --> 00:28:42.400
to corn syrup? The high fructose corn syrup theory.

00:28:42.740 --> 00:28:45.599
It is the most persistent myth in business history.

00:28:45.900 --> 00:28:48.500
So break it down. What's the theory? The theory

00:28:48.500 --> 00:28:51.740
is that sugar was expensive, corn syrup was cheap.

00:28:52.039 --> 00:28:54.480
So they used New Coke as a distraction to switch

00:28:54.480 --> 00:28:57.240
the original formula from cane sugar to corn

00:28:57.240 --> 00:29:00.039
syrup while no one was looking. Is there any

00:29:00.039 --> 00:29:03.220
truth to it? Because logically, it sounds plausible.

00:29:03.500 --> 00:29:05.960
It sounds plausible, but the timeline just, it

00:29:05.960 --> 00:29:07.960
destroys it. The switch had already happened.

00:29:08.019 --> 00:29:11.559
Before New Coke. Way before. Coke started allowing

00:29:11.559 --> 00:29:15.359
bottlers to use corn syrup in 1980, five years

00:29:15.359 --> 00:29:19.289
before New Coke. By 1985, Almost all bottlers

00:29:19.289 --> 00:29:22.890
in the U .S. were already using 100 % HFCS in

00:29:22.890 --> 00:29:25.289
the old Coke. So when people were hoarding old

00:29:25.289 --> 00:29:28.730
Coke in 1985, filling their basements with cases

00:29:28.730 --> 00:29:31.799
of... The good stuff. They were already hoarding

00:29:31.799 --> 00:29:34.279
corn syrup Coke. For the most part, yes. Unless

00:29:34.279 --> 00:29:36.519
they were importing it from Mexico, they were

00:29:36.519 --> 00:29:38.559
fighting for a formula that had already changed

00:29:38.559 --> 00:29:40.400
regarding the sweetener. They were fighting for

00:29:40.400 --> 00:29:43.099
the brand, not the sugar. Exactly. What about

00:29:43.099 --> 00:29:45.480
the classic spike theory that they broke it on

00:29:45.480 --> 00:29:47.759
purpose just so they could bring back the original

00:29:47.759 --> 00:29:50.039
and get a sales bump? Like a new and improved

00:29:50.039 --> 00:29:52.500
strategy, but in reverse. People love to believe

00:29:52.500 --> 00:29:55.160
corporations are playing 4D chess, plotting these

00:29:55.160 --> 00:29:57.619
master strokes. That's more fun that way. It

00:29:57.619 --> 00:29:59.480
is. But look at the chaos we just described.

00:30:00.059 --> 00:30:02.619
Bottlers were revolting. Stock prices eventually

00:30:02.619 --> 00:30:06.039
wobbled. The executives were being publicly humiliated.

00:30:06.279 --> 00:30:09.740
Kiev's quote stands. We're not that smart. No

00:30:09.740 --> 00:30:11.920
company risks their entire existence on a bank

00:30:11.920 --> 00:30:13.880
shot strategy like that. It's too dangerous.

00:30:14.119 --> 00:30:16.200
So it was an accidental victory, not a planned

00:30:16.200 --> 00:30:19.759
one. Exactly. Roger Enrico, the CEO of Pepsi,

00:30:19.920 --> 00:30:23.519
called it the Edsel of the 80s. He said if they

00:30:23.519 --> 00:30:25.880
had fired people over it. It would have destroyed

00:30:25.880 --> 00:30:28.099
the culture of risk -taking at Coke. But they

00:30:28.099 --> 00:30:30.539
didn't fire anyone, did they? No one. Here's

00:30:30.539 --> 00:30:33.559
the amazing part. They didn't fire anyone. Goizueta

00:30:33.559 --> 00:30:36.720
kept his job. Zyman kept his job. And in the

00:30:36.720 --> 00:30:39.180
end, it worked out for them. In a weird way,

00:30:39.279 --> 00:30:43.079
yes. Sales of Coca -Cola classics skyrocketed.

00:30:43.119 --> 00:30:46.640
By the end of 1985, Coke was blowing Pepsi out

00:30:46.640 --> 00:30:49.140
of the water. It re -established Coke as the

00:30:49.140 --> 00:30:51.319
dominant cola. It reminded people why they loved

00:30:51.319 --> 00:30:54.069
it. As Sergio Zayman later said, New Coke was

00:30:54.069 --> 00:30:56.390
a success because it revitalized the brand and

00:30:56.390 --> 00:30:59.009
reattached the public to Coke. Talk about spinning

00:30:59.009 --> 00:31:01.450
a failure. That is world -class spin. It is a

00:31:01.450 --> 00:31:03.410
good spin, but he's not wrong. Before New Coke,

00:31:03.509 --> 00:31:05.609
Coke was just a soda. After New Coke, it was

00:31:05.609 --> 00:31:07.230
an American treasure that you had to fight to

00:31:07.230 --> 00:31:09.650
protect. Before we wrap up, we have to mention

00:31:09.650 --> 00:31:12.210
the pop culture legacy. Yes. Because New Coke

00:31:12.210 --> 00:31:14.710
didn't just disappear. It had a weird afterlife.

00:31:15.210 --> 00:31:17.309
Tax headroom. The computer -generated guy. I

00:31:17.309 --> 00:31:19.529
barely remember him, but he's so 80s. Played

00:31:19.529 --> 00:31:21.289
by Matt Frewer in prosthetics, actually, not

00:31:21.289 --> 00:31:23.950
computer -generated. Oh, really? Wow. Yeah. And

00:31:23.950 --> 00:31:26.769
Coke used him to market Coke, too, or the New

00:31:26.769 --> 00:31:30.250
Coke, to the youth market. The slogan was Catch

00:31:30.250 --> 00:31:33.089
the Wave. And surprisingly, that campaign was

00:31:33.089 --> 00:31:37.029
huge. See? Catch the Wave. Even I know that tagline.

00:31:37.529 --> 00:31:40.869
It had 76 % awareness among teenagers. It was

00:31:40.869 --> 00:31:43.210
actually a very successful ad campaign for a

00:31:43.210 --> 00:31:46.230
very unsuccessful product. It kept New Coke on

00:31:46.230 --> 00:31:49.410
life support for years. And then weirdly, Stranger

00:31:49.410 --> 00:31:52.589
Things brought it back recently. In 2019, season

00:31:52.589 --> 00:31:55.289
three was set in the summer of 1985. So naturally,

00:31:55.529 --> 00:31:58.130
the kids are arguing about New Coke. Right. Lucas

00:31:58.130 --> 00:32:00.430
loves it. Mike hates it. It was a perfect period

00:32:00.430 --> 00:32:02.799
detail. And Coke actually partnered with Netflix

00:32:02.799 --> 00:32:05.079
and did a limited production run of the new Coke

00:32:05.079 --> 00:32:07.720
formula. Did people like it this time or did

00:32:07.720 --> 00:32:09.480
they hate it again? That is the funniest part.

00:32:10.019 --> 00:32:12.220
Reviews were surprisingly friendly. Our palates

00:32:12.220 --> 00:32:14.559
have changed. How so? We're used to sweeter drinks

00:32:14.559 --> 00:32:16.420
now because of the explosion of energy drinks

00:32:16.420 --> 00:32:19.119
and frappuccinos. One reporter said, tastes like

00:32:19.119 --> 00:32:21.579
what's normal now. So Guzueta wasn't wrong. He

00:32:21.579 --> 00:32:25.519
was just 34 years too early. He was a visionary,

00:32:25.720 --> 00:32:29.539
just. A visionary with bad timing and terrible

00:32:29.539 --> 00:32:32.059
execution. So let's unpack the final takeaway

00:32:32.059 --> 00:32:34.259
here. We had this massive company, perfect data,

00:32:34.359 --> 00:32:37.779
unlimited money, and a disaster. Well, New Coke

00:32:37.779 --> 00:32:40.380
failed as a product. As a liquid in a can. Right.

00:32:40.539 --> 00:32:44.779
But it succeeded as a marketing event. It inadvertently

00:32:44.779 --> 00:32:47.500
proved that a brand is not a set of physical

00:32:47.500 --> 00:32:50.559
attributes. A brand is a relationship. It's an

00:32:50.559 --> 00:32:52.700
emotion. You can't put nostalgia on a spreadsheet.

00:32:52.940 --> 00:32:55.079
No, you can't. And that brings me to the big

00:32:55.079 --> 00:32:57.059
question I think listeners should show on. Okay.

00:32:57.440 --> 00:32:59.539
We live in a world today that is obsessed with

00:32:59.539 --> 00:33:03.559
data. Big data. AI algorithms. A .B. testing

00:33:03.559 --> 00:33:05.519
everything to death. Absolutely. Everything is

00:33:05.519 --> 00:33:08.079
optimized. Koch had the perfect data. The blind

00:33:08.079 --> 00:33:09.980
taste test didn't lie. People like the taste

00:33:09.980 --> 00:33:13.059
better. But the data missed the context. It missed

00:33:13.059 --> 00:33:16.240
the humanity. So my question is, what other perfect

00:33:16.240 --> 00:33:19.019
data are companies following today that is completely

00:33:19.019 --> 00:33:21.880
missing the human element? What are we optimizing

00:33:21.880 --> 00:33:24.980
for? Efficiency, sweetness, clicks that is actually

00:33:24.980 --> 00:33:26.900
stripping away the soul of the things we love.

00:33:27.099 --> 00:33:29.700
That is a terrifying thought. Are we optimizing

00:33:29.700 --> 00:33:32.839
the flavor but losing the feeling? Exactly. Sometimes

00:33:32.839 --> 00:33:35.779
the worst product is the one people actually

00:33:35.779 --> 00:33:38.279
want. Because of what it represents. Well, on

00:33:38.279 --> 00:33:39.940
that note, I think I'm going to go grab a Coke.

00:33:40.420 --> 00:33:43.039
A classic one. Make it a glass bottle. It tastes

00:33:43.039 --> 00:33:46.180
better. Always. Thanks for diving in with us.

00:33:46.319 --> 00:33:48.259
A pleasure. And thank you for listening. See

00:33:48.259 --> 00:33:48.740
you in the next one.
