WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:01.300 You know, I was standing in the security line 00:00:01.300 --> 00:00:03.399 at the airport the other day, shoes in one hand, 00:00:03.459 --> 00:00:05.459 laptop in the other, shuffling forward in my 00:00:05.459 --> 00:00:08.779 socks on that gray industrial carpet. And I looked 00:00:08.779 --> 00:00:10.439 around at the fluorescent lights, the plastic 00:00:10.439 --> 00:00:13.560 bins, the tired faces, and I just thought, this 00:00:13.560 --> 00:00:16.320 is a bus station. It is. It's effectively a logistics 00:00:16.320 --> 00:00:19.000 processing center. That is what modern air travel 00:00:19.000 --> 00:00:21.500 has become. It's all about efficiency, volume, 00:00:21.859 --> 00:00:25.000 throughput, and safety. It is completely utilitarian. 00:00:25.199 --> 00:00:27.760 Exactly. It's just a means to an end. But the 00:00:27.760 --> 00:00:30.350 reason we're here today... And the reason I pulled 00:00:30.350 --> 00:00:32.750 this massive stack of history books, financial 00:00:32.750 --> 00:00:35.329 reports, and old flight manifests is because 00:00:35.329 --> 00:00:37.170 it wasn't always like that. There's a specific 00:00:37.170 --> 00:00:40.969 window in the 20th century where an airline wasn't 00:00:40.969 --> 00:00:43.509 just a company. It was a vibe. It was a cultural 00:00:43.509 --> 00:00:46.890 icon. And at the absolute center of that universe 00:00:46.890 --> 00:00:50.530 was TWA, Trans World Airlines. The Airline of 00:00:50.530 --> 00:00:53.189 the Stars. The Airline of the Stars. And that 00:00:53.189 --> 00:00:55.250 is not just some marketing fluff. We're talking 00:00:55.250 --> 00:00:57.579 about an airline that was... owned by Howard 00:00:57.579 --> 00:01:01.420 Hughes, arguably the most eccentric, famous billionaire 00:01:01.420 --> 00:01:03.659 in American history. We're talking about terminals 00:01:03.659 --> 00:01:06.099 that look like sculptures from the future. We're 00:01:06.099 --> 00:01:08.400 talking about a brand that effectively taught 00:01:08.400 --> 00:01:12.120 America how to be global citizens. It was for 00:01:12.120 --> 00:01:14.260 a very long time the gold standard. For a large 00:01:14.260 --> 00:01:17.500 part of the mid -20th century, TWA was effectively 00:01:17.500 --> 00:01:19.900 the second unofficial flag carrier of the United 00:01:19.900 --> 00:01:22.879 States, right there alongside Pan Am. If you 00:01:22.879 --> 00:01:25.599 were flying internationally in the 1950s or 60s, 00:01:25.599 --> 00:01:28.540 you were likely on a TWA Constellation or a 707. 00:01:28.879 --> 00:01:31.519 It really did represent the projection of American 00:01:31.519 --> 00:01:34.700 soft power abroad. And yet, and this is the hook, 00:01:34.700 --> 00:01:36.700 this is the real tragedy we have to unpack today. 00:01:37.019 --> 00:01:39.859 This company, which was founded by aviation pioneers 00:01:39.859 --> 00:01:42.319 and owned by the richest man in the world, ends 00:01:42.319 --> 00:01:44.760 up being sold for parts. He goes from the Lindbergh 00:01:44.760 --> 00:01:47.099 line to a financial carcass picked clean by corporate 00:01:47.099 --> 00:01:49.879 raiders in the 1980s and 90s. How does that happen? 00:01:50.170 --> 00:01:52.930 It's a dramatic, almost Shakespearean rise and 00:01:52.930 --> 00:01:55.010 fall. And what we're going to do in this deep 00:01:55.010 --> 00:01:58.859 dive is trace that entire arc. Because TWA isn't 00:01:58.859 --> 00:02:01.159 just a story about planes. It's a case study 00:02:01.159 --> 00:02:03.819 in the tension between radical engineering innovation, 00:02:04.219 --> 00:02:07.640 massive celebrity power, and eventually just 00:02:07.640 --> 00:02:10.419 brutal, brutal corporate finance. We have a massive 00:02:10.419 --> 00:02:12.360 stack of source material here to get through. 00:02:12.460 --> 00:02:14.800 We've got the corporate histories, the fleet 00:02:14.800 --> 00:02:17.699 manifests, the NTSB accident reports, and the 00:02:17.699 --> 00:02:19.360 bankruptcy filings. We're going to go through 00:02:19.360 --> 00:02:21.180 it all. We're going to cover the glory days, 00:02:21.419 --> 00:02:23.960 the engineering breakthroughs that honestly changed 00:02:23.960 --> 00:02:26.740 physics, the fatal mistakes in the border. room, 00:02:26.840 --> 00:02:29.620 and of course, the tragic final chapters. So 00:02:29.620 --> 00:02:33.039 let's rewind all the way back. Because TWA didn't 00:02:33.039 --> 00:02:35.199 start as TWA. It wasn't one guy with a dream 00:02:35.199 --> 00:02:37.099 in a garage. It was more like a shotgun wedding, 00:02:37.180 --> 00:02:39.479 wasn't it? It absolutely was. A forced marriage. 00:02:39.860 --> 00:02:42.819 To understand the birth of TWA, we have to look 00:02:42.819 --> 00:02:45.860 at the year 1930. And honestly, to understand 00:02:45.860 --> 00:02:48.539 early TWA, you have to understand the male. The 00:02:48.539 --> 00:02:52.229 male. Like letters. The U .S. mail. In 1930, 00:02:52.530 --> 00:02:54.509 the airline industry wasn't really about passengers. 00:02:54.830 --> 00:02:56.629 Passengers were heavy. They complained. They 00:02:56.629 --> 00:02:58.870 got air sick. They needed bathrooms. Mail sacks 00:02:58.870 --> 00:03:01.870 did not. The lifeblood of early aviation, the 00:03:01.870 --> 00:03:03.729 only thing that made it profitable was government 00:03:03.729 --> 00:03:06.710 airmail contracts. And the man holding the purse 00:03:06.710 --> 00:03:09.349 strings was the postmaster general, a guy named 00:03:09.349 --> 00:03:12.449 Walter Folger Brown. OK. Walter Folger Brown. 00:03:12.569 --> 00:03:14.509 So he's the puppet master here. He's the puppet 00:03:14.509 --> 00:03:17.430 master. Brown had a vision. He looked at the 00:03:17.430 --> 00:03:20.080 map of the United States. And he saw this patchwork 00:03:20.080 --> 00:03:23.520 of tiny, struggling airlines flying open cockpit 00:03:23.520 --> 00:03:26.560 biplanes. It was chaotic. It was unreliable. 00:03:26.680 --> 00:03:29.479 He didn't want chaos. He wanted stability. He 00:03:29.479 --> 00:03:32.099 wanted three main transcontinental routes, a 00:03:32.099 --> 00:03:33.919 northern one, a central one, and a southern one. 00:03:34.000 --> 00:03:36.520 And he wanted big, robust corporations running 00:03:36.520 --> 00:03:38.419 them. So he didn't just ask nicely for them to 00:03:38.419 --> 00:03:40.979 consolidate. Now, he leveraged something called 00:03:40.979 --> 00:03:44.259 the Air Mail Act of 1930, also known as the McNary 00:03:44.259 --> 00:03:47.560 Watchers Act. He effectively forced a merger. 00:03:47.719 --> 00:03:50.099 He took a company called Transcontinental Air 00:03:50.099 --> 00:03:53.120 Transport, or TAP, merged it with Western Air 00:03:53.120 --> 00:03:56.639 Express, WAE, and then threw in a few smaller 00:03:56.639 --> 00:03:59.379 outfits like Maddox Airlines. He basically called 00:03:59.379 --> 00:04:01.340 them all into a meeting, which later got called 00:04:01.340 --> 00:04:03.840 the Spoils Conference, and said, if you want 00:04:03.840 --> 00:04:06.759 the lucrative central air mail contract, you 00:04:06.759 --> 00:04:09.620 are now one company. You are now Transcontinental 00:04:09.620 --> 00:04:12.699 and Western Air, TWA. Exactly. And while it was 00:04:12.699 --> 00:04:14.520 a forced marriage, you have to look at the DNA 00:04:14.520 --> 00:04:16.939 of the parents. It was spectacular. Let's look 00:04:16.939 --> 00:04:19.180 at TAT. They were already marketing themselves 00:04:19.180 --> 00:04:22.379 as the Lindbergh line. Charles Lindbergh, as 00:04:22.379 --> 00:04:25.579 in the Charles Lindbergh, the spirit of St. Louis. 00:04:25.699 --> 00:04:28.139 The one and only. Lindbergh was a technical advisor 00:04:28.139 --> 00:04:30.279 for TAT. He had actually surveyed the routes 00:04:30.279 --> 00:04:32.720 himself, having his name attached to your airline 00:04:32.720 --> 00:04:35.639 in 1930. It's hard to overstate. It would be 00:04:35.639 --> 00:04:37.720 like having, I don't know, the most famous tech 00:04:37.720 --> 00:04:39.740 visionary and the most famous pop star launch 00:04:39.740 --> 00:04:41.879 a company together today. It was instant credibility. 00:04:42.220 --> 00:04:44.480 So you have the celebrity aviator on one side. 00:04:44.560 --> 00:04:46.639 Who is coming from the Western Air Express side 00:04:46.639 --> 00:04:49.420 of the family? That brought in Jack Fry. And 00:04:49.420 --> 00:04:52.279 Fry is a crucial, crucial character in this story. 00:04:52.540 --> 00:04:55.680 He wasn't just a suit. He was a pilot's pilot, 00:04:55.899 --> 00:04:59.459 a barnstormer, an absolute operations genius. 00:04:59.759 --> 00:05:02.930 So right out of the gate. In 1930, you have the 00:05:02.930 --> 00:05:05.410 Lindbergh brand and the Jack Fry operational 00:05:05.410 --> 00:05:07.769 grit. It was a potent combination. That's immediate 00:05:07.769 --> 00:05:10.430 street cred in the aviation world. So they merged, 00:05:10.569 --> 00:05:12.509 they have the contracts. What was the product 00:05:12.509 --> 00:05:14.689 actually like for a passenger? They wasted no 00:05:14.689 --> 00:05:18.250 time. On October 25, 1930, they launched one 00:05:18.250 --> 00:05:20.670 of the first all -plane coast -to -coast passenger 00:05:20.670 --> 00:05:23.089 schedules. Now, I have to pause you there. When 00:05:23.089 --> 00:05:25.540 we say coast -to -coast in 1930... We aren't 00:05:25.540 --> 00:05:27.680 talking about a five -hour flight with Wi -Fi 00:05:27.680 --> 00:05:29.620 and a movie. Oh, no. We are talking about a 36 00:05:29.620 --> 00:05:32.920 -hour ordeal. 36 hours. 36 hours. And that was 00:05:32.920 --> 00:05:35.019 considered blazing speed. You have to remember 00:05:35.019 --> 00:05:36.959 the alternative was a train that took three to 00:05:36.959 --> 00:05:38.879 four days. Right. But here's the real kicker. 00:05:39.079 --> 00:05:41.660 They didn't fly at night. Why not? The technology 00:05:41.660 --> 00:05:44.339 just wasn't there. No reliable navigation aids, 00:05:44.560 --> 00:05:46.379 no lighted runways in the middle of nowhere. 00:05:46.459 --> 00:05:49.930 It was just too dangerous. So you would fly all 00:05:49.930 --> 00:05:52.170 day from the East Coast, land in Kansas City, 00:05:52.329 --> 00:05:54.290 get off the plane. They take you to a hotel. 00:05:54.350 --> 00:05:56.689 You'd stay overnight, get back on the plane the 00:05:56.689 --> 00:05:58.410 next morning and fly the rest of the way to Los 00:05:58.410 --> 00:06:01.449 Angeles. That sounds absolutely exhausting. But 00:06:01.449 --> 00:06:03.449 I guess compared to the train, it must have felt 00:06:03.449 --> 00:06:06.350 like time travel. It was a revolution. But just 00:06:06.350 --> 00:06:08.389 as they're getting started, tragedy strikes. 00:06:08.649 --> 00:06:10.610 And this is one of those moments in history that 00:06:10.610 --> 00:06:13.329 pivots an entire industry. If this crash doesn't 00:06:13.329 --> 00:06:16.350 happen, modern aviation looks very, very different. 00:06:16.649 --> 00:06:18.629 You're talking about the Newt Rockne crash? Yes. 00:06:18.750 --> 00:06:23.970 March 31st, 1931. TWA Flight 599. It was a Fokker 00:06:23.970 --> 00:06:26.689 F -10 trimotor. It crashes in a field near Matfield 00:06:26.689 --> 00:06:29.509 Green, Kansas. It kills all eight people on board. 00:06:29.649 --> 00:06:31.709 Eight people. Yeah. In today's numbers, that 00:06:31.709 --> 00:06:33.649 sounds like a small private plane accident. Yeah. 00:06:34.040 --> 00:06:37.040 But one of those people was very, very famous. 00:06:37.300 --> 00:06:40.560 Newt Rockne, the legendary, iconic football coach 00:06:40.560 --> 00:06:44.699 of Notre Dame. In 1931 America, he was a titan. 00:06:45.500 --> 00:06:47.720 This would be like, I mean, imagine if a major 00:06:47.720 --> 00:06:50.220 NFL coach or a massive celebrity today died in 00:06:50.220 --> 00:06:52.699 a commercial plane crash. The media storm was 00:06:52.699 --> 00:06:55.279 intense. The public demanded answers. And what 00:06:55.279 --> 00:06:56.759 were the answers? What brought the plane down? 00:06:57.019 --> 00:06:59.540 The investigation revealed something terrifying. 00:07:00.459 --> 00:07:03.139 The Fokker F -10, like many planes of its era, 00:07:03.279 --> 00:07:06.240 had wooden wings. It was a wood structure covered 00:07:06.240 --> 00:07:08.839 in fabric and plywood. What had happened was 00:07:08.839 --> 00:07:10.939 that over time, moisture had seeped into the 00:07:10.939 --> 00:07:13.560 interior of the wing. The glue that held the 00:07:13.560 --> 00:07:16.019 wooden spars together had dissolved. It lost 00:07:16.019 --> 00:07:18.680 its integrity. So the wing was literally rotting 00:07:18.680 --> 00:07:21.040 from the inside out. Exactly. And during turbulence, 00:07:21.259 --> 00:07:23.060 the wing essentially just snapped off in flight. 00:07:23.220 --> 00:07:25.699 Wooden wings. It sounds insane to us now, sitting 00:07:25.699 --> 00:07:28.060 here in the 21st century, but that was the standard, 00:07:28.160 --> 00:07:31.019 wasn't it? It was. But the Rockne crash ended 00:07:31.019 --> 00:07:33.439 the era of wood and fabric for major passenger 00:07:33.439 --> 00:07:35.980 transport practically overnight. The public lost 00:07:35.980 --> 00:07:39.120 faith. TWA grounded their entire Fokker fleet. 00:07:39.279 --> 00:07:41.600 They were in a serious crisis. They needed a 00:07:41.600 --> 00:07:44.120 new plane. They needed metal. So logic suggests 00:07:44.120 --> 00:07:46.879 they go to Boeing, right? Boeing is the big manufacturer. 00:07:46.879 --> 00:07:48.959 They did go to Boeing. And Boeing had just developed 00:07:48.959 --> 00:07:51.920 the Model 247. It was the first truly modern 00:07:51.920 --> 00:07:55.180 airliner, all metal, retractable, landing gear, 00:07:55.259 --> 00:07:58.730 sleek. It's the future. But there was a catch. 00:07:58.970 --> 00:08:00.829 There's always a catch. Boeing was part of a 00:08:00.829 --> 00:08:03.550 giant conglomerate called United Aircraft and 00:08:03.550 --> 00:08:06.189 Transport Corporation. Guess who else was in 00:08:06.189 --> 00:08:08.449 that conglomerate? United Airlines. Correct. 00:08:08.870 --> 00:08:11.829 So when Jack Fry and TWA knocked on the door 00:08:11.829 --> 00:08:14.290 and asked for the 247, Boeing basically said, 00:08:14.310 --> 00:08:17.069 sure, you can have some after we deliver the 00:08:17.069 --> 00:08:19.149 first 60 of them to our sister company, United. 00:08:19.649 --> 00:08:22.759 Ouch. That is anti -competitive behavior 101. 00:08:23.240 --> 00:08:25.899 So TWA is grounded. Their reputation is taking 00:08:25.899 --> 00:08:28.259 a massive hit because of the Rockne crash, and 00:08:28.259 --> 00:08:31.000 their main competitor has an exclusive lock on 00:08:31.000 --> 00:08:34.360 the only modern plane in existence. Right. Backed 00:08:34.360 --> 00:08:36.879 into a corner, TWA did something bold, something 00:08:36.879 --> 00:08:39.840 that would define the company for decades. Jack 00:08:39.840 --> 00:08:42.039 Fry and his team wrote up a spec sheet and sent 00:08:42.039 --> 00:08:44.639 it to several smaller manufacturers. They sent 00:08:44.639 --> 00:08:47.019 it to a company called the Douglas Aircraft Company. 00:08:47.399 --> 00:08:49.980 At the time, Douglas wasn't a huge player in 00:08:49.980 --> 00:08:53.279 civil aviation, and TWA gave them a list of demands 00:08:53.279 --> 00:08:55.860 that was incredibly ambitious. They basically 00:08:55.860 --> 00:08:58.679 said, we need a metal plane that is faster than 00:08:58.679 --> 00:09:01.879 the Boeing, carries more people, and most importantly, 00:09:02.059 --> 00:09:04.779 can take off on one engine from any airport in 00:09:04.779 --> 00:09:07.399 our system. Why the one engine rule? That seems 00:09:07.399 --> 00:09:10.700 specific. Safety redundancy, born directly from 00:09:10.700 --> 00:09:12.840 the trauma of the Rockne crash. They were flying 00:09:12.840 --> 00:09:14.539 over the Rocky Mountains in the high desert. 00:09:14.940 --> 00:09:17.419 They specifically mentioned the route from Winslow, 00:09:17.620 --> 00:09:20.279 Arizona to Albuquerque, which had some very high 00:09:20.279 --> 00:09:22.860 elevations. They needed to know that if an engine 00:09:22.860 --> 00:09:24.799 failed over the mountains, the plane wouldn't 00:09:24.799 --> 00:09:27.299 just drop out of the sky. So they forced Douglas 00:09:27.299 --> 00:09:30.240 to over -engineer it for safety. Exactly. And 00:09:30.240 --> 00:09:32.580 Douglas delivered. They built the DC -1 for Douglas 00:09:32.580 --> 00:09:35.120 Commercial 1. It was a prototype. Then they refined 00:09:35.120 --> 00:09:38.899 it into the DC -2. And eventually they widened 00:09:38.899 --> 00:09:42.379 it into the legendary, the iconic, the world 00:09:42.379 --> 00:09:44.759 -changing DC -3. And the DC -3, I mean, that's 00:09:44.759 --> 00:09:47.100 not just a plane. That's an institution. That's 00:09:47.100 --> 00:09:49.000 the plane that changed the world. It changed 00:09:49.000 --> 00:09:51.220 the physics of the business. Before the DC -3, 00:09:51.440 --> 00:09:53.919 airlines effectively lost money on passengers 00:09:53.919 --> 00:09:56.059 and made their profit on mail. The DC -3 was 00:09:56.059 --> 00:09:58.580 efficient enough and carried enough people, 21 00:09:58.580 --> 00:10:01.399 passengers, that for the first time an airline 00:10:01.399 --> 00:10:04.039 could turn a profit just hauling humans. That 00:10:04.039 --> 00:10:06.460 is a massive shift. That's the moment it stops 00:10:06.460 --> 00:10:08.320 being a government subsidized service and starts 00:10:08.320 --> 00:10:10.860 being a real viable business. And the speed. 00:10:11.450 --> 00:10:14.429 In February 1934, Jack Fry, remember him, the 00:10:14.429 --> 00:10:16.850 pilot executive, and Eddie Rickenbacker, another 00:10:16.850 --> 00:10:18.970 World War I ace who was then with Eastern Airlines, 00:10:19.169 --> 00:10:22.149 they flew the DC -1 across the country. They 00:10:22.149 --> 00:10:25.129 flew from Burbank to Newark in just over 13 hours. 00:10:25.289 --> 00:10:27.269 Wait, hold on. Let me get this straight. In 1930, 00:10:27.450 --> 00:10:30.570 it was 36 hours with an overnight stop. By 1934, 00:10:30.789 --> 00:10:33.980 it's 13 hours nonstop. That is the pace of innovation 00:10:33.980 --> 00:10:36.639 we are dealing with. In four years, they cut 00:10:36.639 --> 00:10:39.320 the travel time by almost two -thirds. TWA became 00:10:39.320 --> 00:10:41.539 the leader in technology and speed because they 00:10:41.539 --> 00:10:43.759 were forced to be. Tragedy driving innovation. 00:10:44.120 --> 00:10:46.700 It's a recurring theme in this story. So TWA 00:10:46.700 --> 00:10:48.220 is recovering. They have these shiny new metal 00:10:48.220 --> 00:10:50.799 planes. They are the Lindbergh line. Things are 00:10:50.799 --> 00:10:54.799 looking up. But then we hit 1939, and a new character 00:10:54.799 --> 00:10:58.000 enters the chat. Very big one. Perhaps the biggest 00:10:58.000 --> 00:11:00.519 character in 20th century aviation history. And 00:11:00.519 --> 00:11:02.379 again, it starts with Jack Fry wanting a new 00:11:02.379 --> 00:11:06.019 plane. He wanted to buy the new Boeing 307 straddle 00:11:06.019 --> 00:11:08.159 liners. What was special about the straddle liner? 00:11:08.279 --> 00:11:11.600 One word, pressurization. That is the key. Before 00:11:11.600 --> 00:11:14.100 pressurization, you had to fly low, usually below 00:11:14.100 --> 00:11:16.720 10 ,000 feet. That meant if there was a storm, 00:11:16.779 --> 00:11:18.399 you flew right to the middle of the storm. You 00:11:18.399 --> 00:11:20.940 bounced around. People got sick. The air sickness 00:11:20.940 --> 00:11:22.980 bag was a standard piece of equipment, not a 00:11:22.980 --> 00:11:26.200 precaution. Exactly. Pressurization meant you 00:11:26.200 --> 00:11:28.419 could seal the cabin, pump it full of air, and 00:11:28.419 --> 00:11:31.399 fly over the weather at 20 ,000 feet. It was 00:11:31.399 --> 00:11:33.840 smoother, it was faster, it was infinitely more 00:11:33.840 --> 00:11:36.240 comfortable. Fry knew this was the next great 00:11:36.240 --> 00:11:39.860 leap forward. But the TWA board was conservative. 00:11:40.379 --> 00:11:42.799 They looked at the huge price tag and said no. 00:11:43.019 --> 00:11:45.419 They didn't want to spend the cash. Right. So 00:11:45.419 --> 00:11:48.539 Fry, incredibly frustrated with his own board 00:11:48.539 --> 00:11:51.100 of directors, goes to a friend, a fellow aviation 00:11:51.100 --> 00:11:54.740 nut with very, very, very deep pockets, Howard 00:11:54.740 --> 00:11:57.779 Hughes. The Howard Hughes, the tool company fortune, 00:11:57.980 --> 00:12:00.659 the movie producer, the reclusive, eccentric. 00:12:01.279 --> 00:12:03.620 Genius. Hughes listens to Fry and he doesn't 00:12:03.620 --> 00:12:05.480 just cut a check for the planes. He goes out 00:12:05.480 --> 00:12:08.580 and starts secretly buying up TWA stock. He buys 00:12:08.580 --> 00:12:10.460 a controlling interest in the entire airline 00:12:10.460 --> 00:12:12.620 through the Hughes Tool Company. He effectively 00:12:12.620 --> 00:12:15.240 buys the airline so his friend Jack Fry can buy 00:12:15.240 --> 00:12:17.379 the planes he wants. That is, that's a power 00:12:17.379 --> 00:12:19.679 move. My boss won't let me buy this cool new 00:12:19.679 --> 00:12:21.580 toy, so my billionaire friend bought the company. 00:12:21.799 --> 00:12:25.259 And suddenly, TWA isn't just a corporation. It's 00:12:25.259 --> 00:12:28.200 Howard Hughes' personal laboratory. And this 00:12:28.200 --> 00:12:30.200 leads directly to the development of the most 00:12:30.200 --> 00:12:33.220 iconic, most beautiful propeller plane ever built, 00:12:33.379 --> 00:12:36.399 the Connie. The Lockheed Constellation. And this 00:12:36.399 --> 00:12:38.820 is a great story of corporate secrecy. Hughes 00:12:38.820 --> 00:12:41.720 didn't just order this plane off a catalog. He 00:12:41.720 --> 00:12:44.419 and Jack Fry went to Lockheed and secretly co 00:12:44.419 --> 00:12:47.360 -developed it. Hughes demanded performance specs 00:12:47.360 --> 00:12:49.620 that everyone thought were impossible. He wanted 00:12:49.620 --> 00:12:51.980 a plane that could outrun a Japanese zero fighter, 00:12:52.240 --> 00:12:55.419 outclimb a bomber, and carry 40 passengers and 00:12:55.419 --> 00:12:58.360 transcontinental luxury. Why all the secrecy? 00:12:58.460 --> 00:13:00.860 He didn't want Pan Am or United to know what 00:13:00.860 --> 00:13:02.720 he was building until it was too late for them 00:13:02.720 --> 00:13:04.940 to catch up. They worked under code names. It 00:13:04.940 --> 00:13:07.340 was a complete black project. And when they finally 00:13:07.340 --> 00:13:09.539 unveiled it, well, there's a famous flight in 00:13:09.539 --> 00:13:12.679 April 1944. This is during the war. The plane 00:13:12.679 --> 00:13:15.039 is not for commercial use yet. Correct. Technically, 00:13:15.120 --> 00:13:17.620 the first Connie's were designated C -69 and 00:13:17.620 --> 00:13:20.019 went to the military. But Hughes wanted to show 00:13:20.019 --> 00:13:23.019 off what his baby could do. He and Fry got in 00:13:23.019 --> 00:13:25.139 the cockpit of a Constellation painted in full 00:13:25.139 --> 00:13:28.159 TWA livery, and they flew it from Burbank, California 00:13:28.159 --> 00:13:30.980 to Washington, D .C. And how fast did they do 00:13:30.980 --> 00:13:34.799 it? Under seven hours. Six hours and 57 minutes, 00:13:34.980 --> 00:13:37.120 to be precise. Seven hours. So it went from 36 00:13:37.120 --> 00:13:40.080 to 13 to now under seven. We're getting close 00:13:40.080 --> 00:13:42.419 to modern jet speeds here, and this is in a propeller 00:13:42.419 --> 00:13:45.649 plane. It averaged about 330 miles per hour. 00:13:45.769 --> 00:13:48.110 It shattered the existing transcontinental record. 00:13:48.429 --> 00:13:51.070 But more importantly, it was a publicity stunt 00:13:51.070 --> 00:13:53.909 that signaled TWA was no longer just hauling 00:13:53.909 --> 00:13:56.570 mail. They were now the undisputed luxury leader. 00:13:56.750 --> 00:13:59.370 The Constellation had these sleek lines, a triple 00:13:59.370 --> 00:14:01.649 tail. It looked like a dolphin or a shark. It 00:14:01.649 --> 00:14:03.509 was a sexy airplane. And that really sets the 00:14:03.509 --> 00:14:06.070 stage for the next era. World War II ends, the 00:14:06.070 --> 00:14:08.789 economy booms, and TWA enters its golden age. 00:14:08.889 --> 00:14:11.840 This is the real madman era of flight. The late 00:14:11.840 --> 00:14:14.580 1940s and the 1950s. This is when the airline 00:14:14.580 --> 00:14:16.740 of the stars moniker really becomes true, not 00:14:16.740 --> 00:14:19.419 just marketing. Tell me about the star of California 00:14:19.419 --> 00:14:21.320 flight. That sounds like the perfect example. 00:14:21.580 --> 00:14:25.240 It is. February 1946. TWA launches its commercial 00:14:25.240 --> 00:14:28.139 constellation service, the inaugural flight from 00:14:28.139 --> 00:14:30.440 Los Angeles to New York. The passenger manifest 00:14:30.440 --> 00:14:32.960 reads like the credits of a blockbuster movie. 00:14:33.159 --> 00:14:35.700 You add Cary Grant, Myrna Loy, Tyrone Power, 00:14:36.080 --> 00:14:39.299 Edward G. Robinson, William Powell. Wow. Imagine 00:14:39.299 --> 00:14:42.419 being on that flight. The cigarette smoke, the 00:14:42.419 --> 00:14:45.179 clinking of martini glasses, the leg room. It 00:14:45.179 --> 00:14:47.720 was an event, not just transportation. It absolutely 00:14:47.720 --> 00:14:49.679 cemented the brand. If you were a movie star, 00:14:49.820 --> 00:14:52.019 you flew TWA. If you were a business tycoon, 00:14:52.120 --> 00:14:55.120 you flew TWA. And Hughes, now in full control, 00:14:55.299 --> 00:14:57.299 pushed for international expansion aggressively. 00:14:57.620 --> 00:14:59.759 He wanted to encircle the globe. They launched 00:14:59.759 --> 00:15:02.779 service to Paris, Rome, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Bombay. 00:15:03.120 --> 00:15:05.740 TWA became the way America traveled to the world. 00:15:05.960 --> 00:15:08.200 But, and there's always a but with Howard Hughes. 00:15:09.320 --> 00:15:12.190 All was not well in the boardroom. No. This is 00:15:12.190 --> 00:15:14.429 where the eccentric part of the billionaire genius 00:15:14.429 --> 00:15:17.629 becomes a massive liability. Hughes was chaotic. 00:15:17.950 --> 00:15:19.970 He would disappear for weeks, sometimes months 00:15:19.970 --> 00:15:22.610 at a time. He would meddle in the tiniest details 00:15:22.610 --> 00:15:25.269 like the shape of the silverware or the fabric 00:15:25.269 --> 00:15:27.570 on the seats while ignoring massive critical 00:15:27.570 --> 00:15:30.610 financial decisions. And Jack Fry, who was trying 00:15:30.610 --> 00:15:33.029 to run a functional airline, started clashing 00:15:33.029 --> 00:15:35.549 with him constantly. So Fry wanted efficiency 00:15:35.549 --> 00:15:38.830 and a plan. Hughes wanted perfection or control 00:15:38.830 --> 00:15:41.100 or something else entirely. Fry was concerned 00:15:41.100 --> 00:15:43.100 about the bottom line, about schedules, about 00:15:43.100 --> 00:15:45.259 logistics. Hughes was concerned about, well, 00:15:45.419 --> 00:15:48.159 about being Howard Hughes. In 1947, they had 00:15:48.159 --> 00:15:50.740 a massive falling out. The airline was struggling 00:15:50.740 --> 00:15:52.679 financially after the war. There were strikes, 00:15:52.860 --> 00:15:55.980 operational issues. TWA stock had tanked from 00:15:55.980 --> 00:16:00.279 a high of $71 down to just $9 a share. That is 00:16:00.279 --> 00:16:02.820 a collapse. What caused such a dramatic drop? 00:16:03.100 --> 00:16:05.559 A combination of post -war adjustment, a pilot 00:16:05.559 --> 00:16:08.600 strike, and just the sheer chaos of Hughes' management 00:16:08.600 --> 00:16:11.860 style. The airline was losing $20 million a year. 00:16:12.159 --> 00:16:14.299 Hughes put more of his own money in to save it, 00:16:14.360 --> 00:16:16.740 but he used that leverage to force Jackfy out 00:16:16.740 --> 00:16:19.200 of the company he helped build. That feels like 00:16:19.200 --> 00:16:22.340 a major, major turning point. It is a pivotal 00:16:22.340 --> 00:16:24.580 moment. The source material calls it the end 00:16:24.580 --> 00:16:28.019 of the airline run by flyers. Jack Fry was the 00:16:28.019 --> 00:16:30.360 soul of the airline. He was the guy who flew 00:16:30.360 --> 00:16:32.600 the planes, who understood the mechanics. When 00:16:32.600 --> 00:16:35.539 he left, TWA stopped being an airline run by 00:16:35.539 --> 00:16:38.320 pilots and started being an airline run by, well, 00:16:38.480 --> 00:16:40.860 by an absentee billionaire and his accountants 00:16:40.860 --> 00:16:43.259 from the tool company. And that change in management, 00:16:43.419 --> 00:16:46.240 Hughes' complete control, led directly to the 00:16:46.240 --> 00:16:48.960 biggest strategic stumble of all. The coming 00:16:48.960 --> 00:16:51.220 of the jet age. We all know the jet age was coming. 00:16:51.399 --> 00:16:53.840 The British had the de Havilland comet. Boeing 00:16:53.840 --> 00:16:56.659 was secretly building the 707. Everyone in the 00:16:56.659 --> 00:16:58.399 industry knew propellers were on their way out. 00:16:58.500 --> 00:17:00.580 Speed was the new currency. The game was about 00:17:00.580 --> 00:17:03.519 to change again. Everyone knew this except, apparently, 00:17:03.740 --> 00:17:07.019 Howard Hughes' checkbook. He hesitated. He dithered. 00:17:07.279 --> 00:17:09.900 Pan Am, their arch rival led by Juan Triped, 00:17:10.059 --> 00:17:12.339 jumped in with both feet. They placed a huge 00:17:12.339 --> 00:17:15.720 order for Boeing 707s and Douglas DC -8s. Pan 00:17:15.720 --> 00:17:18.359 Am launched jet service in 1958 and completely 00:17:18.359 --> 00:17:21.140 captured the market. Hughes just waited. Why 00:17:21.140 --> 00:17:23.400 did he wait? Was he losing his touch? Was it 00:17:23.400 --> 00:17:26.539 the money? It's complex. Part of it was his obsession 00:17:26.539 --> 00:17:28.920 with the details. He kept trying to redesign 00:17:28.920 --> 00:17:31.700 the jets on paper. He also had a preference for 00:17:31.700 --> 00:17:34.259 the Convair 880, which was faster but smaller. 00:17:34.539 --> 00:17:37.519 He was also becoming more reclusive, more paranoid. 00:17:37.700 --> 00:17:39.759 He was trying to play the manufacturers off each 00:17:39.759 --> 00:17:42.960 other, but all he did was lose time. By the time 00:17:42.960 --> 00:17:46.079 he finally placed a massive order in 1956 for 00:17:46.079 --> 00:17:50.500 33 jets, a mix of 707s and the 880s, it was late. 00:17:51.000 --> 00:17:53.380 And it was incredibly expensive. How expensive 00:17:53.380 --> 00:17:56.519 are we talking? The total order cost was $497 00:17:56.519 --> 00:18:00.200 million. Half a billion dollars in 1956 money? 00:18:00.559 --> 00:18:03.000 That's an astronomical sum. It was. And the Hughes 00:18:03.000 --> 00:18:05.099 Tool Company didn't have that kind of cash on 00:18:05.099 --> 00:18:07.700 hand. To fund the purchase, he had to go to a 00:18:07.700 --> 00:18:09.559 consortium of Wall Street banks and insurance 00:18:09.559 --> 00:18:11.940 companies. And the lenders had a condition, a 00:18:11.940 --> 00:18:13.920 very big one. They said, we will lend you this 00:18:13.920 --> 00:18:15.960 money, but you, Howard, have to step back. You 00:18:15.960 --> 00:18:18.000 are too erratic. You are a risk we can't manage. 00:18:18.200 --> 00:18:20.440 They put him in a timeout? They sidelined the 00:18:20.440 --> 00:18:23.740 owner. Effectively. In the early 1960s, Hughes 00:18:23.740 --> 00:18:26.519 was forced to put his TWA stock into a voting 00:18:26.519 --> 00:18:29.200 trust, giving up control of the airline. He fought 00:18:29.200 --> 00:18:31.420 it in court for years, but eventually lost and 00:18:31.420 --> 00:18:34.259 sold his shares in 1966 for a massive profit. 00:18:34.720 --> 00:18:37.380 But the damage was done. So the man who built 00:18:37.380 --> 00:18:40.039 it into a global icon ultimately choked off its 00:18:40.039 --> 00:18:42.920 future by waiting too long to modernize. Exactly. 00:18:43.119 --> 00:18:46.059 It's the theme that haunts them. TWA had great 00:18:46.059 --> 00:18:48.579 engineering, great pilots, an incredible brand. 00:18:48.819 --> 00:18:50.940 But the financial management at the very top 00:18:50.940 --> 00:18:53.660 was erratic and unreliable. And that pattern, 00:18:53.819 --> 00:18:56.579 great product, shaky finance, haunts them for 00:18:56.579 --> 00:18:58.990 the rest of their existence. So Hughes is out. 00:18:59.029 --> 00:19:01.549 We enter the 1960s. The madman era continues. 00:19:01.730 --> 00:19:04.130 The jets are finally flying. But now we have 00:19:04.130 --> 00:19:06.569 a corporate guy in charge, a lawyer named Charles 00:19:06.569 --> 00:19:09.269 Tillinghast Jr. Yes. And Tillinghast represents 00:19:09.269 --> 00:19:11.450 the shift to the corporate conglomerate style 00:19:11.450 --> 00:19:13.809 of the 60s. He wasn't an airline guy. He was 00:19:13.809 --> 00:19:15.589 a lawyer and a businessman. He looked at the 00:19:15.589 --> 00:19:17.269 airline industry and saw that it was brutally 00:19:17.269 --> 00:19:19.630 cyclical. Boom and bust. When the economy is 00:19:19.630 --> 00:19:21.750 good, people fly and you make money. When there's 00:19:21.750 --> 00:19:23.589 a recession, the planes are empty and you lose 00:19:23.589 --> 00:19:26.410 your shirt. So he wanted to hedge his bets, smooth 00:19:26.410 --> 00:19:29.250 out the earnings. Precisely. He thought, let's 00:19:29.250 --> 00:19:32.130 diversify. Let's create a holding company, Transworld 00:19:32.130 --> 00:19:35.170 Corporation, and buy businesses in other industries. 00:19:35.430 --> 00:19:38.130 And this is where the list of companies TWA bought 00:19:38.130 --> 00:19:40.750 gets, well, it gets weird. It gets very weird. 00:19:40.829 --> 00:19:42.549 I was reading the list in the source material, 00:19:42.609 --> 00:19:44.130 and I had to double check I was looking at an 00:19:44.130 --> 00:19:46.710 airline history. Right. So the holding company 00:19:46.710 --> 00:19:49.230 bought Hilton International. Okay, that makes 00:19:49.230 --> 00:19:51.430 sense. Hotels and airlines, there's a synergy 00:19:51.430 --> 00:19:53.529 there. But then they bought Canteen Corporation, 00:19:53.910 --> 00:19:56.349 a vending machine company, and then they bought... 00:19:56.569 --> 00:19:59.089 Hardee's. Hardee's, the fast food burger place. 00:19:59.190 --> 00:20:01.730 The burger place. And then the strangest of all, 00:20:01.829 --> 00:20:04.589 they bought Century 21 Realty. So in theory, 00:20:04.609 --> 00:20:07.269 you could fly TWA to a conference in Europe, 00:20:07.390 --> 00:20:10.710 stay in a TWA -owned Hilton, get a snack from 00:20:10.710 --> 00:20:13.930 a TWA vending machine, come home, buy a house 00:20:13.930 --> 00:20:17.349 through TWA Century 21, and grab a burger to 00:20:17.349 --> 00:20:20.319 celebrate at TWA's Hardee's. That was the corporate 00:20:20.319 --> 00:20:23.180 dream of the 70s. It was all about smoothing 00:20:23.180 --> 00:20:25.539 out those revenue streams. If the airline is 00:20:25.539 --> 00:20:27.359 losing money, maybe the burgers are selling. 00:20:27.660 --> 00:20:30.319 But what it also meant was that management focus 00:20:30.319 --> 00:20:32.519 was diluted. They weren't just running an airline 00:20:32.519 --> 00:20:35.259 anymore. They were running a sprawling, disconnected 00:20:35.259 --> 00:20:37.759 conglomerate. But even with all this corporate 00:20:37.759 --> 00:20:40.559 distraction, the airline brand was still innovating 00:20:40.559 --> 00:20:43.319 on the customer face inside. I read they were 00:20:43.319 --> 00:20:45.519 the first airline to introduce in -flight movies 00:20:45.519 --> 00:20:49.150 all the way back in 1961. They were. And they 00:20:49.150 --> 00:20:52.529 invested heavily in design and image. This brings 00:20:52.529 --> 00:20:55.230 us to perhaps the most visible, beautiful legacy 00:20:55.230 --> 00:20:58.970 of TWA that still exists today. The TWA Flight 00:20:58.970 --> 00:21:01.890 Center at JFTA Airport in New York. Oh, the Aero 00:21:01.890 --> 00:21:03.930 Surinam Terminal. It's iconic. It doesn't even 00:21:03.930 --> 00:21:06.430 look like a building. Opened in 1962, it's that 00:21:06.430 --> 00:21:09.529 swooping, concrete, bird -like structure. It 00:21:09.529 --> 00:21:11.529 looked like the future had landed. It was pure 00:21:11.529 --> 00:21:14.170 optimism in concrete form, designed to capture 00:21:14.170 --> 00:21:16.289 the glamour and excitement of the jet age. I've 00:21:16.289 --> 00:21:17.730 walked through it since it became the hotel. 00:21:18.349 --> 00:21:21.309 There are almost no right angles. It feels organic 00:21:21.309 --> 00:21:23.509 like a sculpture. Saarinen wanted to capture 00:21:23.509 --> 00:21:25.490 the sensation of flight before you even got on 00:21:25.490 --> 00:21:28.410 the plane. But, and here's the design tragedy 00:21:28.410 --> 00:21:30.650 of TWA. While they were building architectural 00:21:30.650 --> 00:21:32.670 masterpieces in New York, they were making a 00:21:32.670 --> 00:21:35.450 massive, massive infrastructure mistake in the 00:21:35.450 --> 00:21:37.950 Midwest. Let's talk about the Kansas City Hub. 00:21:38.150 --> 00:21:40.789 This is a fascinating case study in a brilliant 00:21:40.789 --> 00:21:45.289 design idea meeting a brutal new reality. TWA's 00:21:45.289 --> 00:21:47.369 main base was in Kansas City for a long time. 00:21:47.430 --> 00:21:49.710 They helped design the new Kansas City International 00:21:49.710 --> 00:21:54.230 Airport, KCI. And the design philosophy was revolutionary. 00:21:55.309 --> 00:21:58.150 Drive to the gate. What does that mean exactly? 00:21:58.430 --> 00:22:00.690 The idea was ultimate convenience. You would 00:22:00.690 --> 00:22:02.710 drive your car, park right outside your gate, 00:22:02.789 --> 00:22:04.450 walk maybe 100 feet, and you were on the jet 00:22:04.450 --> 00:22:07.269 bridge. No long terminals, no trams, no miles 00:22:07.269 --> 00:22:09.269 of walking, just curb to plane. That actually 00:22:09.269 --> 00:22:10.730 sounds amazing. Why don't we have that everywhere? 00:22:10.990 --> 00:22:13.430 It sounds amazing for 1965 when it was designed, 00:22:13.569 --> 00:22:16.809 but the airport didn't open until 1972. And what 00:22:16.809 --> 00:22:19.410 happened in the late 60s and early 70s? Hijackings. 00:22:19.849 --> 00:22:22.470 Hijackings. The hijacking epidemic, mostly to 00:22:22.470 --> 00:22:25.160 Cuba, changed everything in aviation. Suddenly, 00:22:25.240 --> 00:22:27.480 you needed centralized security checkpoints, 00:22:27.660 --> 00:22:30.900 metal detectors, X -ray machines for bags. You 00:22:30.900 --> 00:22:33.619 can't put a full TSA style security checkpoint 00:22:33.619 --> 00:22:36.920 at every single gate door along a horseshoe shaped 00:22:36.920 --> 00:22:39.740 terminal. Exactly. The drive to the gate design 00:22:39.740 --> 00:22:42.460 made centralized security physically impossible. 00:22:43.039 --> 00:22:46.839 They had to retrofit these awkward, ugly glass 00:22:46.839 --> 00:22:50.140 walls and tiny checkpoints into the skinny terminal 00:22:50.140 --> 00:22:53.519 corridors. It was an operational disaster. The 00:22:53.519 --> 00:22:55.980 terminals were too narrow for the crowds. Connecting 00:22:55.980 --> 00:22:58.539 flights were a nightmare. The design was obsolete. 00:22:58.799 --> 00:23:01.220 the day it opened. So TWA has this brand new 00:23:01.220 --> 00:23:03.900 hub that is fundamentally broken. Correct. And 00:23:03.900 --> 00:23:06.099 because of that massive inefficiency, they were 00:23:06.099 --> 00:23:07.880 eventually forced to move their main domestic 00:23:07.880 --> 00:23:11.440 hub to St. Louis in the early 80s. They abandoned 00:23:11.440 --> 00:23:13.500 their dream in Kansas City because the world 00:23:13.500 --> 00:23:15.640 had changed around their design. So we move into 00:23:15.640 --> 00:23:18.059 the 1970s, and the 70s were tough for everyone 00:23:18.059 --> 00:23:20.079 in America, but especially for the legacy airlines. 00:23:20.670 --> 00:23:22.589 It was the perfect storm. First, you had the 00:23:22.589 --> 00:23:26.490 introduction of the Boeing 747 jumbo jet. TWA 00:23:26.490 --> 00:23:28.289 bought a lot of them because Pan Am did. They 00:23:28.289 --> 00:23:29.769 didn't want to be left behind again. But the 00:23:29.769 --> 00:23:33.250 747 is a huge, huge plane to fill. Nearly 400 00:23:33.250 --> 00:23:37.349 seats. Then the 1973 oil embargo hits. Fuel prices 00:23:37.349 --> 00:23:39.690 skyrocket. So now you have these massive planes 00:23:39.690 --> 00:23:42.029 that guzzle fuel flying half empty because the 00:23:42.029 --> 00:23:44.069 economy is in a recession. It was a recipe for 00:23:44.069 --> 00:23:49.250 losing money. And then the knockout punch. 1978. 00:23:49.250 --> 00:23:52.250 The Airline Deregulation Act. The game changer. 00:23:52.349 --> 00:23:53.930 We have to explain this briefly because it's 00:23:53.930 --> 00:23:56.670 so important. Before 1978, the government, an 00:23:56.670 --> 00:23:59.089 agency called the Civil Aeronautics Board, or 00:23:59.089 --> 00:24:01.980 CAB, set the routes and the prices. Airlines 00:24:01.980 --> 00:24:04.140 competed on service. The quality of the steak, 00:24:04.319 --> 00:24:06.660 the freeness of the champagne, the legroom. It 00:24:06.660 --> 00:24:09.180 was a protected, regulated utility. It was cozy 00:24:09.180 --> 00:24:12.059 for the big players. Very cozy. After 1978, the 00:24:12.059 --> 00:24:14.019 gloves came off. Anyone could start an airline, 00:24:14.200 --> 00:24:15.759 fly anywhere they wanted, and charge whatever 00:24:15.759 --> 00:24:18.240 the market would bear. New low -cost carriers 00:24:18.240 --> 00:24:20.619 like People Express and Southwest popped up. 00:24:20.740 --> 00:24:24.470 Vicious price wars began. And TWA. With its high 00:24:24.470 --> 00:24:27.109 cost, its powerful unions, and its older gas 00:24:27.109 --> 00:24:30.109 -guzzling fleet, they were incredibly vulnerable. 00:24:30.589 --> 00:24:32.910 Extremely vulnerable. They had a high -cost structure 00:24:32.910 --> 00:24:34.809 from the regulated era. They couldn't compete 00:24:34.809 --> 00:24:37.970 on price with the new non -union startups. The 00:24:37.970 --> 00:24:39.829 source material mentions a really telling detail 00:24:39.829 --> 00:24:42.130 about their desperation in the mid-'70s, even 00:24:42.130 --> 00:24:45.650 before deregulation. In 1975, they were so poor, 00:24:45.750 --> 00:24:48.730 so desperate for cash, they sold six of their 00:24:48.730 --> 00:24:52.390 prized 747s to the Imperial Iranian Air Force. 00:24:53.289 --> 00:24:55.670 Air Force. Yes. This was pre -revolution Iran 00:24:55.670 --> 00:24:57.690 under the Shah. They sold them for a fraction 00:24:57.690 --> 00:24:59.990 of their value. It was a fire sale. They were 00:24:59.990 --> 00:25:01.970 selling the crown jewels just to make payroll 00:25:01.970 --> 00:25:05.029 that month. It was a sign of deep, deep trouble. 00:25:05.289 --> 00:25:08.509 That brings us to the 1980s. And this is where 00:25:08.509 --> 00:25:10.369 the story shifts completely from engineering 00:25:10.369 --> 00:25:13.529 and glamour to pure Wall Street bloodsport. The 00:25:13.529 --> 00:25:16.480 corporate raider era. In 1983, the holding company, 00:25:16.599 --> 00:25:18.400 the one that owned Hardee's and Hilton, decides 00:25:18.400 --> 00:25:20.960 the airline is a drag on its profits. So they 00:25:20.960 --> 00:25:22.480 spin it off. They basically say to the airline, 00:25:22.619 --> 00:25:25.220 you're on your own. Good luck. TWA was now an 00:25:25.220 --> 00:25:27.380 independent company again for the first time 00:25:27.380 --> 00:25:30.319 since Hughes bought it. But it was starved for 00:25:30.319 --> 00:25:33.000 capital, loaded with debt and flying an aging 00:25:33.000 --> 00:25:36.099 fleet. And in the shark tank of the 1980s, a 00:25:36.099 --> 00:25:39.359 weak company is blood in the water. And two of 00:25:39.359 --> 00:25:41.039 the biggest sharks in the water start circling. 00:25:41.289 --> 00:25:43.990 Frank Lorenzo and Carl Eichen. And this is a 00:25:43.990 --> 00:25:47.150 fascinating and ultimately tragic bit of labor 00:25:47.150 --> 00:25:48.950 history. It really is. First, you have Frank 00:25:48.950 --> 00:25:51.390 Lorenzo. He was the head of Texas Air and Continental, 00:25:51.509 --> 00:25:54.690 and he was known as a fierce, ruthless cost cutter. 00:25:54.910 --> 00:25:57.609 The unions absolutely despised him. They called 00:25:57.609 --> 00:25:59.950 him the ultimate union buster. He had a history 00:25:59.950 --> 00:26:02.369 of using bankruptcy laws specifically to avoid 00:26:02.369 --> 00:26:04.650 union contracts and slash wages and benefits. 00:26:04.970 --> 00:26:07.529 So the TWA employees see Lorenzo making a bid 00:26:07.529 --> 00:26:09.410 for the company and they panic. Complete panic. 00:26:09.670 --> 00:26:12.759 And then. The other bidder emerges, Carl Icahn. 00:26:12.859 --> 00:26:15.019 Carl Icahn was a different kind of animal. He 00:26:15.019 --> 00:26:17.400 was a financier, a corporate raider. He didn't 00:26:17.400 --> 00:26:18.759 know how to run an airline, but he knew how to 00:26:18.759 --> 00:26:21.680 buy undervalued stock and extract value. So the 00:26:21.680 --> 00:26:24.799 TWA unions, particularly the Pilots Union, ALPA, 00:26:25.000 --> 00:26:28.160 and the Machinists Union, IAM, were faced with 00:26:28.160 --> 00:26:31.759 an impossible choice. Lorenzo or Icahn? A choice 00:26:31.759 --> 00:26:34.599 between the executioner you know and the complete 00:26:34.599 --> 00:26:38.099 unknown. It was a true Sophie's choice. They 00:26:38.099 --> 00:26:40.400 looked at Lorenzo and saw a certain doom for 00:26:40.400 --> 00:26:42.299 their contracts and their careers. They looked 00:26:42.299 --> 00:26:44.380 at Econ and thought, maybe we can work with him. 00:26:44.440 --> 00:26:46.859 He's just a finance guy. He wants to make money. 00:26:46.980 --> 00:26:49.160 He doesn't have this personal vendetta against 00:26:49.160 --> 00:26:52.700 unions like Lorenzo does. So in an incredible 00:26:52.700 --> 00:26:55.599 move, the unions actually supported Econ's takeover. 00:26:55.779 --> 00:26:58.019 They went to him and offered massive concessions, 00:26:58.019 --> 00:27:00.660 deep pay cuts to help him finance his bid to 00:27:00.660 --> 00:27:03.500 buy the airline and fend off Lorenzo. They invited 00:27:03.500 --> 00:27:05.119 the vampire into the house because they were 00:27:05.119 --> 00:27:07.380 afraid of the wolf at the door. That is a very, 00:27:07.420 --> 00:27:10.700 very apt analogy. Atkin takes control in 1985. 00:27:10.960 --> 00:27:13.680 And for a brief moment, there was hope. But then 00:27:13.680 --> 00:27:16.380 in 1988, he makes his move. He takes the company 00:27:16.380 --> 00:27:18.740 private. Let's unpack taking it private. What 00:27:18.740 --> 00:27:20.880 did that actually mean for TWA's bank account? 00:27:21.039 --> 00:27:23.960 Because this is the moment. This is the critical 00:27:23.960 --> 00:27:26.180 moment. This is where the airline is financially 00:27:26.180 --> 00:27:29.069 murdered. even if the body keeps flying for another 00:27:29.069 --> 00:27:32.730 12 years. When Eichen took TWA private, it was 00:27:32.730 --> 00:27:35.849 through a leveraged buyout, an LBO. Essentially, 00:27:35.990 --> 00:27:38.250 he used the airline's own credit and assets as 00:27:38.250 --> 00:27:41.009 collateral to borrow the money to buy the airline 00:27:41.009 --> 00:27:43.130 from the public shareholders. So the airline 00:27:43.130 --> 00:27:46.390 itself pays for its own purchase. Correct. TWA, 00:27:46.529 --> 00:27:48.950 the company, took on all the debt. According 00:27:48.950 --> 00:27:51.089 to the source, the deal was structured so that 00:27:51.089 --> 00:27:54.690 Aiken personally made $469 million in cash profit 00:27:54.690 --> 00:27:57.109 from the transaction. Almost half a billion dollars 00:27:57.109 --> 00:27:59.950 in profit for him personally. And TWA, the airline. 00:28:00.250 --> 00:28:04.349 TWA was saddled with $540 million in new, crippling 00:28:04.349 --> 00:28:06.569 debt. So he walks away with the cash and the 00:28:06.569 --> 00:28:08.670 airline is left holding a massive mortgage it 00:28:08.670 --> 00:28:11.069 can't possibly afford. A mortgage with enormous 00:28:11.069 --> 00:28:14.170 interest payments. The airline was now drowning 00:28:14.170 --> 00:28:17.569 in debt service. To raise cash to pay that debt, 00:28:17.730 --> 00:28:20.069 Icahn started doing what raiders do. He started 00:28:20.069 --> 00:28:22.769 selling assets. Asset stripping. And in 1990, 00:28:22.990 --> 00:28:25.829 he sold the single most valuable thing TWA owned, 00:28:25.970 --> 00:28:28.809 the routes to London Heathrow. To American Airlines. 00:28:29.130 --> 00:28:32.750 To American Airlines. Selling the Heathrow routes 00:28:32.750 --> 00:28:34.910 was like a Michelin -starred restaurant selling 00:28:34.910 --> 00:28:38.200 its kitchen. Those were the profitable, prestigious, 00:28:38.460 --> 00:28:41.779 high -yield routes. Those were the business travelers. 00:28:42.319 --> 00:28:45.299 TWA has been 40 years building that market dominance. 00:28:45.779 --> 00:28:48.660 Once those were gone, TWA was effectively a domestic 00:28:48.660 --> 00:28:50.539 airline with a few flights to other European 00:28:50.539 --> 00:28:53.400 cities. The trans -world part of the name started 00:28:53.400 --> 00:28:55.859 to mean less and less. It's just heartbreaking. 00:28:56.160 --> 00:28:58.440 They are selling the family furniture just to 00:28:58.440 --> 00:29:00.559 pay the interest on the rent. And it gets worse. 00:29:01.039 --> 00:29:03.200 After he's loaded the company with debt and sold 00:29:03.200 --> 00:29:05.400 its best assets, he puts it into bankruptcy. 00:29:06.220 --> 00:29:08.539 But he's not done. We have to talk about the 00:29:08.539 --> 00:29:10.920 Caribou deal. This sounded like a confusing legal 00:29:10.920 --> 00:29:12.619 mess in the notes, but when you look at the numbers, 00:29:12.700 --> 00:29:14.799 it's just shocking. Break it down for us. So 00:29:14.799 --> 00:29:18.220 TWA goes bankrupt in 1992. It's the inevitable 00:29:18.220 --> 00:29:21.400 result of that massive debt load. Econ is eventually 00:29:21.400 --> 00:29:24.460 ousted in 1993. The employees and creditors take 00:29:24.460 --> 00:29:27.380 over. But as he's leaving, Econ negotiates a 00:29:27.380 --> 00:29:30.180 parting gift for himself, a poison pill. He's 00:29:30.180 --> 00:29:32.920 leaving, but he's not done taking from the company. 00:29:33.279 --> 00:29:35.839 Not even close. See, he had loaned TWA about 00:29:35.839 --> 00:29:38.900 $190 million during the bankruptcy to keep it 00:29:38.900 --> 00:29:42.099 afloat. TWA couldn't pay him back in cash. So 00:29:42.099 --> 00:29:44.059 they agreed to a deal with a new travel company 00:29:44.059 --> 00:29:46.579 ICON set up called Caraboo. What were the terms 00:29:46.579 --> 00:29:48.740 of this deal? The deal gave Caraboo the right 00:29:48.740 --> 00:29:52.240 to buy any TWA ticket on any TWA flight, except 00:29:52.240 --> 00:29:55.140 for code shares at a 45 % discount from the published 00:29:55.140 --> 00:29:59.819 fare. 45 % off anything? Yes, for 10 years. But 00:29:59.819 --> 00:30:02.400 here is the real kicker. Caribou could buy an 00:30:02.400 --> 00:30:04.980 unlimited number of these tickets and then resell 00:30:04.980 --> 00:30:07.579 them to the public. They set up a website, LoisFair 00:30:07.579 --> 00:30:11.000 .com, to do exactly that. So wait, Icon's company 00:30:11.000 --> 00:30:13.779 could buy a ticket from TWA for $55, turn around 00:30:13.779 --> 00:30:16.539 and sell it to me for $80, keep the $25 profit 00:30:16.539 --> 00:30:20.240 while undercutting TWA's own price of $100. Worse 00:30:20.240 --> 00:30:22.819 than that, it meant TWA lost control of its own 00:30:22.819 --> 00:30:25.380 inventory and its own pricing. This is crucial 00:30:25.380 --> 00:30:27.960 in airline economics. Airlines make their money 00:30:27.960 --> 00:30:30.339 on something called yield management. They sell 00:30:30.339 --> 00:30:32.359 cheap. Keep seats early to fill the plane. Then 00:30:32.359 --> 00:30:34.279 they make their profit by raising the price for 00:30:34.279 --> 00:30:36.140 the last minute business traveler who has to 00:30:36.140 --> 00:30:38.160 fly. Right. The guy flying tomorrow for a meeting 00:30:38.160 --> 00:30:40.680 pays top dollar. But with the caribou deal, if 00:30:40.680 --> 00:30:43.440 TWA tried to raise the price on a popular route, 00:30:43.519 --> 00:30:45.859 say St. Louis to New York caribou, would just 00:30:45.859 --> 00:30:47.920 buy up all the seats at the 45 percent discount 00:30:47.920 --> 00:30:51.099 and sell them keeper. TWA couldn't raise prices. 00:30:51.160 --> 00:30:52.799 They couldn't make money on the busiest flights 00:30:52.799 --> 00:30:55.200 because Carl Eichelon was essentially skimming 00:30:55.200 --> 00:30:57.519 all the high yield revenue off the top. The source 00:30:57.519 --> 00:31:00.099 material says this cost them how much a year? 00:31:00.430 --> 00:31:03.269 The estimates are around $150 million in lost 00:31:03.269 --> 00:31:05.529 revenue per year. That is a bleeding wound you 00:31:05.529 --> 00:31:08.170 cannot possibly stitch up. It was a ticking time 00:31:08.170 --> 00:31:11.130 bomb that Eichen left in the fuselage. The airline 00:31:11.130 --> 00:31:13.589 was trying to recover, trying to modernize, but 00:31:13.589 --> 00:31:15.710 they had this anchor dragging them straight to 00:31:15.710 --> 00:31:17.869 the bottom. They were essentially subsidizing 00:31:17.869 --> 00:31:19.970 their former owner's new competing business. 00:31:20.410 --> 00:31:23.089 And speaking of tragedy, we are in the mid -90s 00:31:23.089 --> 00:31:25.630 now. The airline is financially crippled. Morale 00:31:25.630 --> 00:31:29.430 is at rock bottom. And then comes July 17, 1996. 00:31:30.400 --> 00:31:34.220 Flight 800. A dark, dark day in aviation. TWA 00:31:34.220 --> 00:31:37.720 Flight 800, a Boeing 747, takes off from JFK, 00:31:37.779 --> 00:31:40.400 bound for Paris on a warm summer evening. Minutes 00:31:40.400 --> 00:31:42.380 after takeoff, it explodes over the Atlantic 00:31:42.380 --> 00:31:45.319 off the coast of Long Island. All 230 people 00:31:45.319 --> 00:31:47.640 on board were killed. I remember the news coverage 00:31:47.640 --> 00:31:50.920 of this vividly. It was on 2047. There were so 00:31:50.920 --> 00:31:54.259 many theories. A missile, a bomb, a terrorist 00:31:54.259 --> 00:31:57.569 attack. The investigation took years. The FBI 00:31:57.569 --> 00:32:00.470 was involved. The CIA was involved. It was one 00:32:00.470 --> 00:32:03.210 of the most complex in history. But the NTSB 00:32:03.210 --> 00:32:05.650 eventually concluded it was a mechanical failure. 00:32:05.890 --> 00:32:09.569 A center wing fuel tank exploded, most likely 00:32:09.569 --> 00:32:12.650 caused by a spark from faulty wiring. But while 00:32:12.650 --> 00:32:15.109 the investigation was happening, the narrative 00:32:15.109 --> 00:32:17.289 that formed in the media was absolutely devastating 00:32:17.289 --> 00:32:20.230 for TWA's reputation. It was because even before 00:32:20.230 --> 00:32:22.509 they knew the cause, the media focused heavily 00:32:22.509 --> 00:32:26.750 on one fact. This specific 747 was 25 years old. 00:32:27.069 --> 00:32:29.130 It reinforced the public perception that TWA 00:32:29.130 --> 00:32:32.210 was a broke airline flying old, unsafe, clapped 00:32:32.210 --> 00:32:33.829 out equipment. The airline that can't afford 00:32:33.829 --> 00:32:36.410 new planes. Exactly. Even though the age of the 00:32:36.410 --> 00:32:38.730 plane wasn't the direct cause, maintenance and 00:32:38.730 --> 00:32:40.549 design protocols were changed for the entire 00:32:40.549 --> 00:32:43.470 global 747 fleet after that regarding fuel tank 00:32:43.470 --> 00:32:46.029 and earning the brand damage was done. It was 00:32:46.029 --> 00:32:48.950 seen as the old airline, the unsafe airline. 00:32:49.250 --> 00:32:50.589 He tried to fight back, though, didn't they? 00:32:50.630 --> 00:32:52.970 I read in the late 90s they made one last big 00:32:52.970 --> 00:32:55.369 push. They ordered a bunch of new planes. They 00:32:55.369 --> 00:32:58.559 did. In 1998, under new management, they placed 00:32:58.559 --> 00:33:02.519 a massive order for 125 new aircraft. Boeing 00:33:02.519 --> 00:33:06.460 757s, 767s, MD -80s. They were trying to refresh 00:33:06.460 --> 00:33:08.960 the fleet and the image. They even bought the 00:33:08.960 --> 00:33:11.119 naming rights to the football stadium in St. 00:33:11.180 --> 00:33:13.579 Louis. It became the Transworld Dome. The home 00:33:13.579 --> 00:33:16.180 of the greatest show on turf, the St. Louis Rams. 00:33:16.460 --> 00:33:18.279 I remember that. They were trying to look like 00:33:18.279 --> 00:33:20.779 a winner again. They were trying to project vitality. 00:33:20.779 --> 00:33:23.359 We are back. We are new. They had a clever promotion. 00:33:23.720 --> 00:33:26.039 Pay in coach, fly in first. for flights to the 00:33:26.039 --> 00:33:27.839 St. Louis hub to try and fill up those premium 00:33:27.839 --> 00:33:30.519 seats. They were scrambling, trying everything 00:33:30.519 --> 00:33:32.740 to win back customers. But with the Caribou deal 00:33:32.740 --> 00:33:35.619 still draining cash every single day and the 00:33:35.619 --> 00:33:37.779 mountain of debt from the Eichen years. It was 00:33:37.779 --> 00:33:40.000 too little, too late. The math just didn't work. 00:33:40.059 --> 00:33:42.359 You cannot outrun that kind of fundamental financial 00:33:42.359 --> 00:33:45.789 handicap. So we arrive at the end. The 2000s. 00:33:45.789 --> 00:33:48.529 January 2001. The third bankruptcy. Third time 00:33:48.529 --> 00:33:51.690 is not the charm. No. This time, it was the end 00:33:51.690 --> 00:33:53.809 of the line. American Airlines swoops in. They 00:33:53.809 --> 00:33:56.970 agree to acquire TWA's assets. They didn't really 00:33:56.970 --> 00:33:58.970 merge in the traditional sense, did they? It 00:33:58.970 --> 00:34:00.690 was an acquisition of the parts, not the whole 00:34:00.690 --> 00:34:03.970 company. Correct. A new entity called TWA Airlines 00:34:03.970 --> 00:34:07.230 LLC was formed just to facilitate the transfer 00:34:07.230 --> 00:34:11.389 of assets. The deal included a $745 million payment, 00:34:11.590 --> 00:34:14.309 but mostly it was about American taking the planes, 00:34:14.489 --> 00:34:16.690 the airport gates, and the routes. They didn't 00:34:16.690 --> 00:34:19.010 want the company. They wanted the stuff. December 00:34:19.010 --> 00:34:23.989 1st, 2001. The last day. The last day. Flight 00:34:23.989 --> 00:34:27.989 220 from Kansas City to St. Louis. It was a ceremonial 00:34:27.989 --> 00:34:30.670 final flight. The CEO at the time, Captain William 00:34:30.670 --> 00:34:33.210 Compton, was at the controls. It was a very emotional 00:34:33.210 --> 00:34:35.170 flight for the employees and everyone on board. 00:34:35.349 --> 00:34:37.750 There is a detail in the source material about 00:34:37.750 --> 00:34:39.670 that night that really sticks with me. It's so 00:34:39.670 --> 00:34:43.730 final. The sign removal. Yeah. At 10 .00 p .m. 00:34:43.730 --> 00:34:45.889 Central Time, employees at airports across the 00:34:45.889 --> 00:34:49.030 country started taking down the TWA signs, the 00:34:49.030 --> 00:34:51.480 red and white logos. By midnight, everything 00:34:51.480 --> 00:34:53.139 on the departure boards, all the gate signs, 00:34:53.360 --> 00:34:55.719 were changed to American Airlines. It's a ghost 00:34:55.719 --> 00:34:58.280 town effect. One minute and 71 -year -old American 00:34:58.280 --> 00:35:00.699 icon exists. The next minute, it's just paint 00:35:00.699 --> 00:35:03.199 and plastic being thrown in a dumpster. It happened 00:35:03.199 --> 00:35:06.599 officially overnight. And for the thousands of 00:35:06.599 --> 00:35:09.099 employees. It was brutal. American Airlines absorbed 00:35:09.099 --> 00:35:11.440 the airline, but then 9 -11 happened just a few 00:35:11.440 --> 00:35:13.670 months later. The entire industry contracted 00:35:13.670 --> 00:35:17.010 violently. American laid off thousands of employees. 00:35:17.230 --> 00:35:20.269 And the former TWA employees, having the least 00:35:20.269 --> 00:35:22.349 seniority at the newly combined company, were 00:35:22.349 --> 00:35:25.300 often the first to go. The St. Louis hub, which 00:35:25.300 --> 00:35:27.900 was supposed to be a key asset in the deal, American 00:35:27.900 --> 00:35:30.619 eventually downsized it and closed it as a main 00:35:30.619 --> 00:35:33.900 hub in 2009. The massive Kansas City maintenance 00:35:33.900 --> 00:35:37.239 space closed in 2010. So not only did the brand 00:35:37.239 --> 00:35:39.760 die, but the infrastructure and the jobs it supported 00:35:39.760 --> 00:35:42.239 were largely dismantled over the next decade. 00:35:42.360 --> 00:35:44.599 It was a total erasure. If you go to St. Louis 00:35:44.599 --> 00:35:46.800 Lambert Airport today, you can still feel the 00:35:46.800 --> 00:35:49.920 phantom limb of TWA, but the massive operation 00:35:49.920 --> 00:35:52.199 that was once there is gone. Right. It's not 00:35:52.199 --> 00:35:53.840 completely gone. And this brings us to the outro. 00:35:54.039 --> 00:35:56.840 The legacy. You can't kill a brand that strong 00:35:56.840 --> 00:35:59.260 completely. It lives on in memory and nostalgia. 00:35:59.280 --> 00:36:02.099 And in architecture. In a really beautiful way. 00:36:02.219 --> 00:36:05.760 The TWA Hotel. Yes. The Aero Serena Terminal 00:36:05.760 --> 00:36:08.159 at JFK, which sat empty and crumbling for nearly 00:36:08.159 --> 00:36:11.300 two decades, was meticulously restored. It reopened 00:36:11.300 --> 00:36:14.280 in 2019 as the TWA Hotel. Have you seen photos 00:36:14.280 --> 00:36:16.659 of it? It's incredible. They have the old split 00:36:16.659 --> 00:36:18.760 flap departure boards that go clack, clack, clack. 00:36:18.760 --> 00:36:20.619 They have the sunken lounge with the chili pepper 00:36:20.619 --> 00:36:23.619 red carpet. They even took an old Lockheed Constellation, 00:36:23.739 --> 00:36:25.980 one of the original Connie's, and turned it into 00:36:25.980 --> 00:36:29.659 a cocktail bar on the tarmac. It's pure distilled 00:36:29.659 --> 00:36:32.460 nostalgia. It celebrates the golden age we talked 00:36:32.460 --> 00:36:36.519 about in part two. It freezes TWA in time, back 00:36:36.519 --> 00:36:38.340 when it was glamorous and exciting, before the 00:36:38.340 --> 00:36:40.800 corporate raiders and the bankruptcies. It's 00:36:40.800 --> 00:36:43.730 TWA as we all want to remember it. Not as it 00:36:43.730 --> 00:36:46.250 actually ended. And American Airlines, to their 00:36:46.250 --> 00:36:48.349 credit, has painted a few of their modern jets 00:36:48.349 --> 00:36:51.070 in the TWA heritage livery over the years. A 00:36:51.070 --> 00:36:53.489 nod to the history. It's nice to see the Twin 00:36:53.489 --> 00:36:56.170 Globes logo on a fuselage again, even if it's 00:36:56.170 --> 00:36:58.929 just a coat of paint. So as we wrap this up, 00:36:59.050 --> 00:37:01.610 what does this all mean? We started by asking 00:37:01.610 --> 00:37:05.449 how the airline of the stars ends up being sold 00:37:05.449 --> 00:37:08.190 for parts. What's the final takeaway? I think 00:37:08.190 --> 00:37:10.429 the answer is that TWA was an airline defined 00:37:10.429 --> 00:37:13.289 by romance and engineering. It was built by pilots 00:37:13.289 --> 00:37:15.789 like Lindbergh and Fry and eccentric visionaries 00:37:15.789 --> 00:37:18.289 like Hughes. They cared about speed, altitude 00:37:18.289 --> 00:37:20.829 and style. They pushed the envelope of what was 00:37:20.829 --> 00:37:23.170 physically possible with an airplane. But they 00:37:23.170 --> 00:37:25.449 lost the war on finance. They were ultimately 00:37:25.449 --> 00:37:27.989 dismantled by financial engineering. Hughes's 00:37:27.989 --> 00:37:30.570 critical delay on jets cost them their market 00:37:30.570 --> 00:37:33.409 lead. The 70s diversification distracted them. 00:37:33.530 --> 00:37:36.769 And then the leveraged buyout in the 80s hollowed 00:37:36.769 --> 00:37:39.389 the company. out from the inside. The caribou 00:37:39.389 --> 00:37:41.769 deal was just the final parasite that drained 00:37:41.769 --> 00:37:44.889 the last drop of blood. It was a death by a thousand 00:37:44.889 --> 00:37:47.710 financial cuts. It really raises a big question 00:37:47.710 --> 00:37:50.090 about these legacy businesses. Can you survive 00:37:50.090 --> 00:37:52.530 just on a great name and a great history? No, 00:37:52.570 --> 00:37:54.610 not in an industry this brutal. The airline industry 00:37:54.610 --> 00:37:57.170 is unforgiving. It operates on razor -thin margins. 00:37:57.690 --> 00:37:59.869 If you don't constantly reinvent your business 00:37:59.869 --> 00:38:01.750 model, not just your planes, but your balance 00:38:01.750 --> 00:38:05.219 sheet, your cost structure, you die. TWA stopped 00:38:05.219 --> 00:38:07.360 reinventing the business and started just trying 00:38:07.360 --> 00:38:09.659 to survive the debt. Here's a provocative thought 00:38:09.659 --> 00:38:12.000 to leave you with. What would the airline industry 00:38:12.000 --> 00:38:14.380 look like today if Howard Hughes had bought those 00:38:14.380 --> 00:38:18.400 jets five years earlier? Or what if the employees 00:38:18.400 --> 00:38:22.360 in 1985 hadn't picked Daikon? If they had accepted 00:38:22.360 --> 00:38:24.980 their fate with Lorenzo. Yeah. It would have 00:38:24.980 --> 00:38:27.659 been brutal, but would TWA in some form still 00:38:27.659 --> 00:38:30.880 be flying today? Or was it just destined to become 00:38:30.880 --> 00:38:33.159 a beautiful relic of a more glamorous bygone 00:38:33.159 --> 00:38:36.510 time? That is the billion dollar what if. Maybe 00:38:36.510 --> 00:38:38.449 there just isn't room for that kind of glamour 00:38:38.449 --> 00:38:41.210 anymore in a world of budget carriers and basic 00:38:41.210 --> 00:38:43.849 economy. Next time you're at an aviation museum 00:38:43.849 --> 00:38:45.989 or maybe just walking through JFK on your way 00:38:45.989 --> 00:38:48.389 to that bus station in the sky, look for the 00:38:48.389 --> 00:38:51.369 Twin Globes logo. It really stands for a time 00:38:51.369 --> 00:38:54.150 when flying was something special. Thanks for 00:38:54.150 --> 00:38:56.210 listening to this deep dive. Safe travels.