WEBVTT

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If I were to ask you to play a quick game of

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word association right now, and I threw out the

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word Edsel, what is the very first thing that

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fires in your synapses? For the vast majority

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of people, even those who weren't even born in

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the 20th century, let alone the 1950s, it isn't

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just an image of a vintage car with chrome bumpers.

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It's a punchline. It really is. It's a punchline.

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It is the cultural synonym for a catastrophic,

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humiliating commercial flop. It's right up there

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with the Titanic or New Coke. It is. It's one

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of those rare proper nouns that has. you know,

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transcended its original meaning to become a

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generic entry in the dictionary of business failures.

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Right. If you launch a product today, whether

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it's software, a beverage or a gadget, and it

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absolutely bombs, the business press will say

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you've pulled an Edsel. It has become shorthand

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for a disaster born of hubris. Exactly. It's

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the ultimate cautionary tale. But the mission

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for this deep dive is to move past the easy punchline,

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because when you actually peel back the layers

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and look at the numbers, the scale of this disaster

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is just, well, it's mind. It is. We aren't just

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talking about a car that didn't sell quite as

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well as they hoped. We are talking about a financial

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crater that nearly swallowed an empire. The numbers

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are truly staggering, even by modern standards.

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You really have to look at the investment here.

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Ford lost over $250 million on development, manufacturing,

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and marketing alone. Just on the setup. Just

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on the setup. And when you factor in the total

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operational losses by the time the dust settled,

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estimates climbed to roughly $350 million. $350

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million. Now, in the late 1950s, that was a fortune.

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That was an empire's ransom. If we adjust that

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for inflation to 2024 dollars, we're talking

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about a loss of roughly $2 .9 billion. $2 .9

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billion. Gone. Just evaporated into thin air.

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That is the GDP of a small nation just set on

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fire. It effectively was money set on fire in

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front of the entire world. And to put it in perspective

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of the product itself in terms of sales, they

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moved about 116 ,000 units total. Which sounds

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like a lot if you're a small company. Right.

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If you're a boutique manufacturer like Ferrari,

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that's a great run. But for a mass market giant

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like Ford, it was catastrophic. It was less than

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half of their breakeven point. They were losing

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massive amounts of money on every single unit

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that rolled off the line. So that sets the stakes

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for our deep dive today. Our mission isn't just

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to point and laugh at a funny looking car with

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a weird grill. It's to play detective. Yeah.

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How did a company as massive As experienced and

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as successful as the Ford Motor Company get this

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so profoundly wrong. Was it just an ugly car?

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Or was it a victim of something much more complex?

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Bad timing, corporate infighting, and a market

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that just shifted under its feet. That is the

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pivotal question. In my experience analyzing

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business history, it is rarely just about the

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product being ugly or bad. A bad product can

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sometimes sell if the marketing is genius, and

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a great product can fail if the timing is off.

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The Edsel story is really a story about corporate

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hubris, about misreading the tea leaves of history,

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and about the sunk cost fallacy. The incredible

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danger of assuming the future is going to look

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exactly like the past. Okay, let's unpack this.

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To understand the Edsel, We have to understand

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where Ford was as a corporate entity in the mid

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1950s. Yeah. Because they weren't just throwing

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darts at a board. They had a very specific strategic

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reason for doing this. They felt they had no

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choice. They did. You have to go back to a specific

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date. January 17th, 1956. This is a watershed

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moment in automotive history because that is

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when Ford Motor Company went public. Oh, I didn't

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realize it was that late. Yes. Before that, for

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over half a century, it was entirely owned by

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the Ford family. It was a kingdom run by Henry

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Ford and then his descendants. But once you go

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public, the rules of engagement changed completely.

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Right. Suddenly you have shareholders. You have

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shareholders. You have Wall Street analysts breathing

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down your neck. You need sustained, demonstrable

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growth every single quarter. So the pressure

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is on. And when this new management team looked

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at the automotive landscape, they saw a gaping

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hole in their lineup. compared to their rivals,

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right? Precisely. They looked across town at

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General Motors and they saw a perfect ladder

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of success. GM had brilliant market segmentation.

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The famous GM ladder? The ladder. If you were

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a young person or a working class buyer, you

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started with a Chevrolet. Then, as you got a

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promotion, maybe got married, you moved up to

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a Pontiac. Then, as you hit middle management,

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you bought an Oldsmobile. Then a Buick. And finally,

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when you had truly arrived as an executive, you

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bought a Cadillac. A car for every stage of life.

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They had a car for every tax bracket and every

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stage of the American dream. It was a cradle

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-to -grave strategy. GM kept you in the family

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for your entire life, but Ford didn't have that

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ladder. What did Ford have? No! Ford had Ford.

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the working man's car and then way up at the

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top of the mountain they had lincoln there was

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a massive barren wasteland in the middle just

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a huge price jump a huge jump and lincoln was

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trying to compete with oldsmobile and buick which

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was the wrong target lincoln should have been

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fighting Cadillac. They were aiming too low.

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Exactly. So Ford was hemorrhaging customers.

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They were tracking this data. They saw thousands

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of lineal Ford owners trading in their cars and

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walking across the street to buy an Oldsmobile

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or a Buick because Ford had nothing to offer

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them in that medium price bracket. So if I'm

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a Ford customer in 1955 and I'm doing well, I've

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got a little extra cash in my pocket and I want

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to upgrade from my basic Ford sedan, I literally

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have to leave the brand. You have to leave the

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brand. You are forced out. And in the 1950s,

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that medium price market was where the volume

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and the profit margins were. It was the juicy

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middle. Where all the money was. It was. So the

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strategy makes perfect sense on paper. You move

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Lincoln up market to fight Cadillac head to head.

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You keep Mercury as a step up from Ford. Ford,

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and then you create a brand new fourth brand,

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an intermediate division, to fight in that rich

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territory against Pontiac, Oldsmobile, and DeSoto.

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The logic is sound. It really is. So development

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begins in 1955. They give it the codename e -car,

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which just stood for experimental car. Right.

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And this brings us to the first major psychological

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element of this failure. Hubris. Reading through

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the internal memos and the press releases from

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this time, Ford wasn't just hopeful. They were

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arrogant about this. It was supreme confidence

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bordering on delusion. You have to remember,

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the mid -50s were the golden age of American

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corporate confidence. The war was over, the economy

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was booming, and American industry felt invincible.

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We can do anything. Anything. And Ford assured

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investors and the Detroit automotive press that

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the e -car wasn't a gamble. They claimed the

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styling and specifications were the result of

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sophisticated market analysis. I love that phrase.

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It sounds so official. It does. But they essentially

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told the world that they could guarantee broad

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public acceptance before a single member of the

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public had even seen a sketch. Guaranteed acceptance.

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That is a dangerous phrase in any business. It

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implies you've solved the equation of human desire.

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It does. And as we'll see, humans are notoriously

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bad at fitting into equations. They believe that

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with enough data, enough focus groups, and enough

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charts, they could scientifically engineer a

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hit. They thought they could dictate what the

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public wanted rather than discovering it. So

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they have the car. They have the strategy. Now

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they need a name. And this. This is honestly

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one of my favorite parts of the story because

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it is a case study in indecision and corporate

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absurdity. It really is. It really illustrates

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how disjointed the decision making process was.

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It was absolute chaos. Initially, there was a

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very natural proposal to name the car after Edsel

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Ford. Now, for context, Edsel was Henry Ford's

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son. He was the father of the current CEO at

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the time, Henry Ford II. Right. Edsel Ford had

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been the company president. He was a sensitive,

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artistic soul who actually. had great taste,

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but he died relatively young. So naming it after

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him would be a nice tribute. But the family wasn't

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on board with that. I hated the idea, passionately.

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Henry Ford II specifically said he did not want

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his father's good name spinning around on thousands

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of hubcaps. Wow, that's a great quote. Isn't

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it? He felt it was disrespectful. They wanted

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to keep the family legacy separate from the commercial

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grinder of a mid -market sedan. So no Edsel.

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They do what any confused corporation does. They

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hire consultants. Right. They hired the advertising

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firm Foot Cone and Belding. And the directive

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was simple. Find us a name that conveys excitement,

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modernity, and status. The agency went to work

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and came back with a list. A list. It was a fun

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book. They produced 6 ,000 possibilities. 6 ,000

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names. You can just imagine the executive meeting.

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Ernest Bruch, who was the chairman of the board

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and a top Ford executive, famously looked at

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this mountain of paperwork and said, we hired

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you to find one name. Not 6 ,000. That's a fair

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point. It was analysis paralysis at its finest.

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And amidst this chaos, the marketing manager,

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again named David Wallace, gets desperate. He

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decides to try something completely different.

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He starts a correspondence with the famous modernist

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poet Marianne Moore. Of all people. Right. He

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asks her for creative input and what she sent

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back. I mean, you cannot make this stuff up.

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The Marianne Moore letters are legendary in the

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advertising world. They are completely unorthodox.

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She was clearly approaching this from a linguistic

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and artistic perspective, completely detached

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from the reality of selling steel and rubber

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to a suburban dad. Oh, completely. I have to

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read some of these. Because I want you, the listener,

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to imagine walking into a dealership in 1957,

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looking at a shiny new car and seeing the badge

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on the back. Imagine driving a utopian turtletop.

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It paints a picture, doesn't it? Though probably

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not the aerodynamic one they were hoping for.

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I mean, what even is that? Or how about the pastelogram?

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Which sounds like a geometry equation drawn in

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chalk. Or something you get from the post office.

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It does. Or the resilient bullet. Resilient bullet

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sounds terrifying. Like a projectile that bounces

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back and hits you. Not a great image for a car.

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My personal favorite might be the Mongoose Civic.

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It sounds like a French sports car designed for

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small mammals. It's poetic, but it doesn't scream

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American muscle. And Andante Con Moto, which

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is a musical tempo. She also suggested Turco

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Tinga. Which sounds like a tropical disease you

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catch in the jungle. It's just incredible. So

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they have 6 ,000 corporate names, they have utopian

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turtletop, and they are running out of time.

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Production is looming. How did they land back

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on the one name the family strictly forbade?

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It was the ultimate anticlimax. Ernest Breach

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was chairing a board meeting. Henry Ford II was

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actually away at the time, conveniently out of

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the room. Of course he was. Breach looked at

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all the options, didn't like any of them, and

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just decided to call it Edsel. in honor of Edsel

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Ford. After all that time, money, and 6 ,000

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suggestions, they went with the placeholder that

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the CEO had specifically rejected. It feels like

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a gnomon. Yeah. They couldn't even agree on what

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to call it, so they just forced a decision that

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the boss hated. It certainly speaks to the internal

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friction and lack of unified vision that would

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plague the whole project. You have a car named

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by committee, but the wrong committee. So we

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have a name. The Edsel. Now let's talk about

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the car itself, the physical object. Because

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even if they called it the Thunder Cougar Falcon

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Bird, it wouldn't matter if the car was ugly.

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And the design of the Edsel is, well, controversial

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is putting it mildly. It is putting it very mildly.

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The controversy centered almost entirely on the

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front grill. The infamous horse collar. Yes,

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the vertical center grill. Now what's fascinating

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here is that the original design by Roy Brown,

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the lead stylist, was actually quite different.

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delicate vertical opening. It was supposed to

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be elegant, reminiscent of high -end European

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cars or the classic LaSalles of the 1930s. Okay,

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so a thin, classy grille. What happened? How

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did we get from elegant to the monster that was

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released? Engineering happened. The engineers

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looked at the slender opening and said, this

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won't let in enough air. The engine will overheat.

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Ah, a practical problem. A very practical problem.

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So they demanded it be made wider and taller.

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Then, Ernest Breach, the same guy who picked

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the name, demanded it be even taller to look

00:12:12.200 --> 00:12:14.899
more imposing on the road. So what started as

00:12:14.899 --> 00:12:17.500
a delicate accent became a gaping maw. And the

00:12:17.500 --> 00:12:19.779
public reaction was brutal. It was visceral.

00:12:19.799 --> 00:12:21.580
People called it a horse collar. They called

00:12:21.580 --> 00:12:23.860
it a toilet seat. But the most famous insult,

00:12:24.019 --> 00:12:25.960
which appeared in the press and became the defining

00:12:25.960 --> 00:12:28.840
joke, was that it resembled an Oldsmobile sucking

00:12:28.840 --> 00:12:32.059
a lemon. Oof. That is hard to come back from.

00:12:32.139 --> 00:12:34.860
It really is. It signaled that the car was sour,

00:12:35.039 --> 00:12:38.399
pinched. Weird. And it wasn't just the front.

00:12:38.519 --> 00:12:41.759
The 1958 station wagons had a serious design

00:12:41.759 --> 00:12:45.320
flaw in the back. They used these boomerang -shaped

00:12:45.320 --> 00:12:47.799
taillights. Okay, picturing a boomerang. Now

00:12:47.799 --> 00:12:50.379
imagine two of them. But because of the shape,

00:12:50.559 --> 00:12:52.700
at a distance, the left taillight looked like

00:12:52.700 --> 00:12:54.980
an arrow pointing to the right, and the right

00:12:54.980 --> 00:12:56.759
one looked like an arrow pointing to the left.

00:12:56.879 --> 00:12:59.980
Oh no. So if a driver signaled a left turn, the

00:12:59.980 --> 00:13:02.139
shape of the light was literally pointing the

00:13:02.139 --> 00:13:04.960
traffic behind them to the right. That is genuinely

00:13:04.960 --> 00:13:07.740
dangerous. It was confusing, and management refused

00:13:07.740 --> 00:13:10.279
to pay for sheet metal changes to fix it because

00:13:10.279 --> 00:13:12.519
the tooling was already done, so they were stuck

00:13:12.519 --> 00:13:15.039
with it. Just one bad design choice after another.

00:13:15.610 --> 00:13:17.830
But the Edsel wasn't just about looking weird.

00:13:17.909 --> 00:13:19.529
It was supposed to be the car of the future.

00:13:19.990 --> 00:13:22.929
It was packed with gadgets. And some of these

00:13:22.929 --> 00:13:26.570
features sound. Well, let's talk about the teletouch

00:13:26.570 --> 00:13:28.830
drive, because this sounds like science fiction

00:13:28.830 --> 00:13:32.669
gone wrong. Ugh, the teletouch. This was a classic

00:13:32.669 --> 00:13:36.029
case of technology for technology's sake. It

00:13:36.029 --> 00:13:38.490
was a push -button transmission system, which

00:13:38.490 --> 00:13:40.490
was trendy at the time. Chrysler had buttons

00:13:40.490 --> 00:13:43.000
on the dash. Right, I've seen those. But Ford,

00:13:43.179 --> 00:13:45.580
wanting to be different, put the buttons right

00:13:45.580 --> 00:13:48.100
in the center of the steering wheel hub. Wait.

00:13:48.539 --> 00:13:50.259
The center of the steering wheel. Isn't that

00:13:50.259 --> 00:13:53.340
where the horn goes? Exactly. That is the universal

00:13:53.340 --> 00:13:56.700
instinctive location for the horn. So you had

00:13:56.700 --> 00:14:00.080
drivers in traffic, in a panic, slapping the

00:14:00.080 --> 00:14:02.899
center of the wheel to honk at someone, and instead

00:14:02.899 --> 00:14:05.299
they were downshifting or throwing the car into

00:14:05.299 --> 00:14:07.580
neutral. That's a disaster waiting to happen.

00:14:07.659 --> 00:14:09.799
I could just picture it. It gets worse. The buttons

00:14:09.799 --> 00:14:12.340
were arranged in a circle. Street racers found

00:14:12.340 --> 00:14:14.480
a way to make fun of it. They joked that the

00:14:14.480 --> 00:14:17.279
buttons stood for D for drag, L for leap, and

00:14:17.279 --> 00:14:20.220
R for race. But the real problem was reliability.

00:14:20.639 --> 00:14:23.539
It didn't work. The control wires for these buttons

00:14:23.539 --> 00:14:26.399
ran down the steering column, but they were routed

00:14:26.399 --> 00:14:28.899
too close to the exhaust manifold and the engine

00:14:28.899 --> 00:14:31.679
bay. Heat and delicate electronics usually don't

00:14:31.679 --> 00:14:34.539
mix well. They do not. The heat would melt the

00:14:34.539 --> 00:14:36.799
insulation or damage the servo motor, so you'd

00:14:36.799 --> 00:14:38.740
have people pressing drive and the car doing

00:14:38.740 --> 00:14:40.879
absolutely nothing because the transmission motor

00:14:40.879 --> 00:14:43.720
failed. It was infuriating for owners. It sounds

00:14:43.720 --> 00:14:46.299
incredibly frustrating. But to be fair to the

00:14:46.299 --> 00:14:48.200
engineers, there were some innovations that actually

00:14:48.200 --> 00:14:50.840
stuck, right? It wasn't all bad ideas. That's

00:14:50.840 --> 00:14:53.480
an important corrective to the history. Underneath

00:14:53.480 --> 00:14:56.259
the bad styling, the Edsel actually introduced

00:14:56.259 --> 00:14:58.720
a lot of things we take for granted today. Like

00:14:58.720 --> 00:15:01.690
what? It had warning lights for low oil and the

00:15:01.690 --> 00:15:04.690
parking brake, inspired by aircraft design. It

00:15:04.690 --> 00:15:07.529
had a speed warning system, which was a precursor

00:15:07.529 --> 00:15:10.990
to cruise control. It introduced self -adjusting

00:15:10.990 --> 00:15:13.250
brakes, which is a first for the industry, and

00:15:13.250 --> 00:15:15.309
a huge maintenance saver. That's a big deal.

00:15:15.429 --> 00:15:18.809
And childproof rear door locks. Oh, really? I

00:15:18.809 --> 00:15:20.690
didn't know the Edsel introduced child locks.

00:15:20.870 --> 00:15:23.330
Yes. So underneath the lemon -sucking grille

00:15:23.330 --> 00:15:25.590
and the faulty transmission buttons, there was

00:15:25.590 --> 00:15:27.509
actually some very forward -thinking engineering.

00:15:28.159 --> 00:15:30.299
The tragedy is that the failures were so loud

00:15:30.299 --> 00:15:33.039
they drowned out the successes. So let's go to

00:15:33.039 --> 00:15:37.139
E -Day. September 4th, 1957. The launch. The

00:15:37.139 --> 00:15:39.320
marketing leading up to this was intense, wasn't

00:15:39.320 --> 00:15:41.659
it? The hype leading up to this was unprecedented.

00:15:42.200 --> 00:15:44.519
They treated it like a state secret or a new

00:15:44.519 --> 00:15:47.399
weapons system. They had a top -rated TV special

00:15:47.399 --> 00:15:50.600
called The Edsel Show. featuring stars like Bing

00:15:50.600 --> 00:15:53.779
Crosby and Frank Sinatra. Wow, big names. Huge

00:15:53.779 --> 00:15:56.480
names. And in the marketing, they were incredibly

00:15:56.480 --> 00:15:58.980
secretive. They would show the car under tarps

00:15:58.980 --> 00:16:01.879
or viewed through a blurred lens in print ads.

00:16:02.059 --> 00:16:05.480
The tagline was, The Car of the Future. They

00:16:05.480 --> 00:16:07.600
built up this mystery that what was under the

00:16:07.600 --> 00:16:09.279
tarp was going to change your life. And then

00:16:09.279 --> 00:16:12.769
the tarp comes off. And people saw. A car. A

00:16:12.769 --> 00:16:14.649
car that looked a lot like a Ford, but with a

00:16:14.649 --> 00:16:17.549
weird grille. The bloom popped. Instantly. The

00:16:17.549 --> 00:16:19.870
letdown was palpable. Consumers were confused.

00:16:19.970 --> 00:16:21.970
They didn't understand what it was. It was described

00:16:21.970 --> 00:16:25.909
by some as a reborn LaSalle. Firsthand, the similarities

00:16:25.909 --> 00:16:28.149
to the existing Ford and Mercury bodies were

00:16:28.149 --> 00:16:30.429
obvious because it shared the same chassis. It

00:16:30.429 --> 00:16:31.909
didn't look like a spaceship. It looked like

00:16:31.909 --> 00:16:34.269
a Ford that was trying too hard. So the launch

00:16:34.269 --> 00:16:36.409
is a thud, but now we have to get into the why.

00:16:36.909 --> 00:16:39.870
Why did it fail so hard? Because usually, even

00:16:39.870 --> 00:16:42.769
a weird car sells a few units. The outline suggests

00:16:42.769 --> 00:16:44.850
there are three main theories here. Let's start

00:16:44.850 --> 00:16:47.659
with Theory A. The market moved. This is the

00:16:47.659 --> 00:16:50.500
aim was right. The target moved theory. And there

00:16:50.500 --> 00:16:52.159
is a lot of economic truth to this. Remember,

00:16:52.320 --> 00:16:54.980
planning started in the early 50s. Right. Boom

00:16:54.980 --> 00:16:57.519
times. The medium price market was exploding.

00:16:58.080 --> 00:17:00.720
Pontiac, Buick and Dodge were selling millions

00:17:00.720 --> 00:17:03.620
of cars. So aiming for that market made sense

00:17:03.620 --> 00:17:06.240
then. Yes. But cars take years to develop. They

00:17:06.240 --> 00:17:08.579
do. And by the time the Edsel launched in late

00:17:08.579 --> 00:17:11.960
1957, the U .S. economy had hit a sharp recession.

00:17:12.220 --> 00:17:16.039
The Eisenhower slide of 1957. Bad timing. The

00:17:16.039 --> 00:17:18.779
worst possible timing. People panicked. They

00:17:18.779 --> 00:17:21.500
stopped buying big, gas -guzzling, medium -priced

00:17:21.500 --> 00:17:24.680
cars. And the Edsel was a gas -duzzler. It required

00:17:24.680 --> 00:17:27.119
premium fuel and had terrible mileage. And this

00:17:27.119 --> 00:17:29.559
is right when the compact car revolution starts,

00:17:29.640 --> 00:17:32.380
isn't it? Exactly. This is the moment the Volkswagen

00:17:32.380 --> 00:17:35.000
Beetle starts taking off in America. They were

00:17:35.000 --> 00:17:38.019
selling 50 ,000 Beetles a year. People were buying

00:17:38.019 --> 00:17:41.039
Ramblers from American Motors. The American consumer

00:17:41.039 --> 00:17:44.019
suddenly wanted efficiency and economy. And Ford

00:17:44.019 --> 00:17:46.960
just launched a giant... Giant, expensive, chrome

00:17:46.960 --> 00:17:49.740
-covered barge. And it wasn't just Edsel suffering,

00:17:49.859 --> 00:17:52.000
right? The competition collapsed, too. That's

00:17:52.000 --> 00:17:54.140
the proof that the market had shifted. It wasn't

00:17:54.140 --> 00:17:56.339
just that people hated the Edsel. Nobody was

00:17:56.339 --> 00:17:59.299
buying anything in this class. DeSoto sales dropped

00:17:59.299 --> 00:18:02.490
50%. Packard, one of the most famous American

00:18:02.490 --> 00:18:05.349
luxury brands, essentially died during this period.

00:18:05.410 --> 00:18:07.930
They became the awful Packard Bakers. Right.

00:18:08.109 --> 00:18:10.569
American Motors killed off Nash and Hudson to

00:18:10.569 --> 00:18:13.289
focus entirely on the compact Rambler. The entire

00:18:13.289 --> 00:18:15.869
medium price segment evaporated just as Edsel

00:18:15.869 --> 00:18:17.809
walked through the door. So that's Theory A.

00:18:18.009 --> 00:18:20.369
The recession killed it. It's very compelling.

00:18:20.529 --> 00:18:22.309
But then there's Theory B. Ford shot themselves

00:18:22.309 --> 00:18:24.769
in the foot with pricing and internal confusion.

00:18:25.089 --> 00:18:26.970
This is where the strategy falls apart in practice.

00:18:27.250 --> 00:18:30.029
Remember, Edsel was supposed to slot neatly between

00:18:30.029 --> 00:18:33.930
Ford and Mercury. Right. The latter. Ford -Edsel,

00:18:34.029 --> 00:18:37.670
Mercury -Mercury -Lincoln. Clear steps. But they

00:18:37.670 --> 00:18:39.930
messed up the pricing. The cheapest Edsel, the

00:18:39.930 --> 00:18:42.609
Ranger, was priced almost exactly the same as

00:18:42.609 --> 00:18:45.470
the most expensive Ford, the Fairlane 500. So

00:18:45.470 --> 00:18:47.329
they were competing with themselves. Directly.

00:18:47.349 --> 00:18:49.809
If you walked into a dealership, you had to choose.

00:18:49.849 --> 00:18:52.470
Do I want a top -of -the -line, fully -loaded

00:18:52.470 --> 00:18:55.539
Ford with leather seats and power windows? or

00:18:55.539 --> 00:18:58.839
a base model stripped down Edsel, most people

00:18:58.839 --> 00:19:01.200
chose the loaded Ford. That makes sense. And

00:19:01.200 --> 00:19:03.420
then on the other end? On the high end, the middle

00:19:03.420 --> 00:19:06.339
Edsels, the Pacer and Corsair, were actually

00:19:06.339 --> 00:19:09.579
more expensive than comparable Mercurys. Wait,

00:19:09.619 --> 00:19:11.359
I thought Mercury was supposed to be the higher

00:19:11.359 --> 00:19:14.140
brand. Exactly. It completely broke the hierarchy.

00:19:14.539 --> 00:19:16.700
Buyers couldn't figure it out. Is the Edsel better

00:19:16.700 --> 00:19:18.640
than a Mercury? Is it worse? Why does it cost

00:19:18.640 --> 00:19:21.440
more? It was a muddy, confusing mess for the

00:19:21.440 --> 00:19:23.559
consumer. And they launched with how many models?

00:19:24.009 --> 00:19:28.569
18. 18 models for a brand new car. That's insane.

00:19:29.289 --> 00:19:32.130
Sedans, hardtops, convertibles, wagons like the

00:19:32.130 --> 00:19:35.210
Bermuda, Roundup, Villager. They flooded the

00:19:35.210 --> 00:19:36.890
market with variations before they even knew

00:19:36.890 --> 00:19:39.349
if people wanted the basic car. It created confusion

00:19:39.349 --> 00:19:41.809
for dealers and buyers alike. And this leads

00:19:41.809 --> 00:19:44.630
to Theory C, which might be the nail in the coffin.

00:19:45.500 --> 00:19:48.440
quality control. Because even if you sorted through

00:19:48.440 --> 00:19:51.039
the pricing mess and bought one, it often didn't

00:19:51.039 --> 00:19:53.700
work. This is the production nightmare. Ford,

00:19:53.880 --> 00:19:56.779
in a cost -saving move, didn't build a dedicated

00:19:56.779 --> 00:19:59.299
factory for the Edsel. They just shoved them

00:19:59.299 --> 00:20:01.759
onto existing Ford and Mercury assembly lines.

00:20:02.000 --> 00:20:04.279
How did the workers react to that? They hated

00:20:04.279 --> 00:20:06.220
it. Imagine you are an assembly line worker.

00:20:06.440 --> 00:20:09.299
You have a rhythm building Fords. Suddenly, an

00:20:09.299 --> 00:20:11.279
Edsel comes down the line. You have to stop,

00:20:11.359 --> 00:20:13.859
change your tools, grab different parts, install

00:20:13.859 --> 00:20:16.519
them, then... switch back for the next four.

00:20:16.700 --> 00:20:18.559
It breaks the whole flow. It messed up their

00:20:18.559 --> 00:20:20.880
quotas. It was a hassle. And there are reports

00:20:20.880 --> 00:20:23.140
of resentment leading to sabotage, or at least

00:20:23.140 --> 00:20:26.319
gross neglect. Sabotage. Yes. Many Edsels left

00:20:26.319 --> 00:20:28.779
a line unfinished. There are famous stories of

00:20:28.779 --> 00:20:30.819
dealers receiving cars where the uninstalled

00:20:30.819 --> 00:20:32.480
parts were just thrown in the trunk with a note

00:20:32.480 --> 00:20:35.180
saying, you finish it. No way. Here's the door

00:20:35.180 --> 00:20:37.700
handle. Good luck. Essentially. Or bolts not

00:20:37.700 --> 00:20:40.559
tightened. Consumer reports and popular mechanics

00:20:40.559 --> 00:20:42.859
got their hands on these cars, and the data was

00:20:42.859 --> 00:20:47.069
just awful. 16 % of owners reported poor workmanship.

00:20:47.250 --> 00:20:49.950
We're talking faulty welding, power steering

00:20:49.950 --> 00:20:52.930
failures, trunks that leaked when it rained.

00:20:53.150 --> 00:20:55.069
Leaking trunks is a pretty basic failure. You

00:20:55.069 --> 00:20:57.309
have to get that right. It is. And odometers

00:20:57.309 --> 00:20:59.950
that read the wrong mileage. It reinforced this

00:20:59.950 --> 00:21:02.569
public perception that this was a lemon. So you

00:21:02.569 --> 00:21:05.750
have a recession, confusing pricing, and a car

00:21:05.750 --> 00:21:07.829
that leaks. It's the perfect storm of failure.

00:21:08.089 --> 00:21:09.970
And standing in the middle of this storm is a

00:21:09.970 --> 00:21:12.890
man named Robert McNamara. We have to talk about

00:21:12.890 --> 00:21:15.109
him because his role in killing the Edsel is

00:21:15.109 --> 00:21:18.269
fascinating. Robert McNamara is a huge figure

00:21:18.269 --> 00:21:20.809
in 20th century history. He was one of the whiz

00:21:20.809 --> 00:21:23.490
kids, a group of 10 officers from World War II

00:21:23.490 --> 00:21:25.829
who were hired to save Ford using statistics

00:21:25.829 --> 00:21:28.690
and logic. McNamara was all about efficiency,

00:21:28.990 --> 00:21:31.210
data, and cost cutting. And he didn't like the

00:21:31.210 --> 00:21:33.349
Edsel project from the start. He despised the

00:21:33.349 --> 00:21:35.809
strategy. He hated the idea of fragmented divisions.

00:21:36.190 --> 00:21:38.210
He thought having separate divisions for Edsel,

00:21:38.309 --> 00:21:40.470
Mercury, and Lincoln was inefficient and bloated.

00:21:40.490 --> 00:21:42.609
He wanted consolidation. So when the Edsel started

00:21:42.609 --> 00:21:45.680
to wobble, He didn't try to save it. No, he became

00:21:45.680 --> 00:21:49.240
the executioner. Almost immediately, in January

00:21:49.240 --> 00:21:52.640
1958, just a few months after launch, he merged

00:21:52.640 --> 00:21:55.980
Edsel into a conglomerate division called M .E

00:21:55.980 --> 00:22:00.079
.L., Mercury Edsel Lincoln. He stripped Edsel

00:22:00.079 --> 00:22:02.200
of its independence. Pulled its funding and support.

00:22:02.400 --> 00:22:06.359
And the budget. Slashed. He cut the advertising

00:22:06.359 --> 00:22:09.460
budget for 1959 and virtually eliminated it for

00:22:09.460 --> 00:22:12.769
1960. He pushed for the Edsel to stop using its

00:22:12.769 --> 00:22:15.549
own unique platforms and just use Ford bodies

00:22:15.549 --> 00:22:18.109
to save money, which further diluted the brand.

00:22:18.349 --> 00:22:20.309
He was already moving on to the next big thing.

00:22:20.450 --> 00:22:23.230
Yes, the Ford Falcon. McNamara saw the data we

00:22:23.230 --> 00:22:26.049
talked about, the shift to compact cars. He wanted

00:22:26.049 --> 00:22:28.670
to focus all of Ford's energy and resources on

00:22:28.670 --> 00:22:31.269
the Falcon. And ironically, the factory capacity

00:22:31.269 --> 00:22:33.109
that was built up for the Edsel ended up being

00:22:33.109 --> 00:22:35.109
used to build the Falcon. Which was a massive

00:22:35.109 --> 00:22:37.630
success. A monster success, selling 400 ,000

00:22:37.630 --> 00:22:40.519
in its first year. So in a cold, calculated business

00:22:40.519 --> 00:22:43.339
sense, McNamara was right. But there is a really

00:22:43.339 --> 00:22:46.200
dark, ironic historical footnote here regarding

00:22:46.200 --> 00:22:48.680
McNamara. Right, the Vietnam connection. McNamara

00:22:48.680 --> 00:22:51.519
later became the Secretary of Defense under JFK

00:22:51.519 --> 00:22:54.619
and LBJ, overseeing the escalation of the Vietnam

00:22:54.619 --> 00:22:58.400
War. There is a museum in Hanoi, the Ho Chi Minh

00:22:58.400 --> 00:23:01.240
Museum, that features an Edsel crashing through

00:23:01.240 --> 00:23:04.319
a wall. Wow, seriously. It is used to symbolize

00:23:04.319 --> 00:23:06.859
American military failure. The idea being that

00:23:06.859 --> 00:23:08.859
the same man who couldn't sell the Edsel also

00:23:08.859 --> 00:23:11.700
couldn't win the war. It's of a brutal, lasting

00:23:11.700 --> 00:23:14.619
legacy. That is heavy. So McNamara pulls the

00:23:14.619 --> 00:23:16.500
plug. Let's talk about the slow death of the

00:23:16.500 --> 00:23:19.220
car. Because it didn't disappear overnight. There

00:23:19.220 --> 00:23:23.279
was a 1959 model and even a 1960 model. The 1959

00:23:23.279 --> 00:23:25.980
model was an attempt to fix things. They toned

00:23:25.980 --> 00:23:27.960
down the styling. The grille was integrated into

00:23:27.960 --> 00:23:29.799
the headlights, much less lemon -sucking. It

00:23:29.799 --> 00:23:31.140
looked more conventional. And they got rid of

00:23:31.140 --> 00:23:33.579
the gadgets. They dropped the fancy, unreliable

00:23:33.579 --> 00:23:35.539
gadgets like the Teletouch and the Rolling Dome

00:23:35.539 --> 00:23:37.819
speedometer, but it was too little, too late.

00:23:37.920 --> 00:23:40.180
The name was already poisoned. Sales dropped

00:23:40.180 --> 00:23:42.980
to about 44 ,000. It was in a death spiral. And

00:23:42.980 --> 00:23:46.079
then the 1960 model, the Ghost Edsel. This is

00:23:46.079 --> 00:23:48.079
a collector's dream today because they are so

00:23:48.079 --> 00:23:51.420
incredibly rare. The 1960 model was only produced

00:23:51.420 --> 00:23:54.140
for about a month from October to November 1959.

00:23:54.740 --> 00:23:57.180
Just one month of production. That's it. Only

00:23:57.180 --> 00:24:00.619
2 ,846 were built. And it didn't even look like

00:24:00.619 --> 00:24:02.460
an Edsel anymore. Not at all. They abandoned

00:24:02.460 --> 00:24:04.460
the vertical grill entirely. It looked like a

00:24:04.460 --> 00:24:06.400
Pontiac split grill. It was basically a Ford

00:24:06.400 --> 00:24:08.380
with some different trim. It was an Edsel in

00:24:08.380 --> 00:24:11.039
name only. Yeah. A ghost, like you said. And

00:24:11.039 --> 00:24:13.759
then on November 19th, 1959, the announcement

00:24:13.759 --> 00:24:17.269
comes. It's over. discontinued and the reaction

00:24:17.269 --> 00:24:20.160
in the used car market was instant. The value

00:24:20.160 --> 00:24:23.019
of a used Edsel plummeted by $400 overnight.

00:24:23.299 --> 00:24:25.940
That's a huge chunk of value loss for people

00:24:25.940 --> 00:24:27.759
who had just bought one. And Ford actually had

00:24:27.759 --> 00:24:30.579
to issue coupons to apologize. They did. If you

00:24:30.579 --> 00:24:33.700
had bought a 1960 model right before the announcement,

00:24:33.740 --> 00:24:36.779
they gave you a coupon worth $300 to $400 toward

00:24:36.779 --> 00:24:39.259
a new Ford product to make up for the loss in

00:24:39.259 --> 00:24:41.759
resale value. It was a final public humiliation.

00:24:42.039 --> 00:24:45.559
So $350 million lost, the brand destroyed. Here's

00:24:45.559 --> 00:24:47.619
where it gets really interesting. It wasn't all

00:24:47.619 --> 00:24:50.140
for nothing. The Edsel actually had a strange

00:24:50.140 --> 00:24:53.779
afterlife. It did. The DNA of the Edsel survived.

00:24:54.460 --> 00:24:56.960
Which is the great irony. We mentioned the compact

00:24:56.960 --> 00:24:59.519
car revolution. Well, the Edsel division was

00:24:59.519 --> 00:25:01.619
actually developing a compact car before they

00:25:01.619 --> 00:25:04.119
were shut down. And that car became? The Comet.

00:25:04.180 --> 00:25:06.440
The Mercury Comet. It was originally designed

00:25:06.440 --> 00:25:08.920
as an Edsel. It even had Edsel -style keys and

00:25:08.920 --> 00:25:11.259
those elliptical taillights. But when Edsel died,

00:25:11.559 --> 00:25:14.099
they just slapped a Mercury badge on it. And

00:25:14.099 --> 00:25:16.799
the Comet was a massive hit. Oh, massive. It

00:25:16.799 --> 00:25:19.680
sold more in one year than all the Edsels combined

00:25:19.680 --> 00:25:22.140
over its three -year run. That has to hurt if

00:25:22.140 --> 00:25:24.470
you were an Edsel designer. Hey, they love my

00:25:24.470 --> 00:25:26.930
car. They just hate the name. It proves that

00:25:26.930 --> 00:25:29.150
the engineering wasn't the total problem. It

00:25:29.150 --> 00:25:31.309
was the branding and the packaging. There was

00:25:31.309 --> 00:25:34.849
also the Meteor, which was a Mercury model that

00:25:34.849 --> 00:25:38.930
started life as the 1961 Edsel Ranger. The good

00:25:38.930 --> 00:25:41.529
ideas survived under different names. And what

00:25:41.529 --> 00:25:43.349
about the design legacy? We talked about how

00:25:43.349 --> 00:25:45.670
ugly the grille was, but vertical grilles came

00:25:45.670 --> 00:25:47.869
back. They absolutely did. I mean, look at Pontiac

00:25:47.869 --> 00:25:51.099
for decades. Look at Jaguar. Alfa Romeo, and

00:25:51.099 --> 00:25:53.859
look at the modern BMW 4 Series with those massive

00:25:53.859 --> 00:25:55.839
vertical kidney grilles. They got a lot of hate

00:25:55.839 --> 00:25:57.900
for those, too, initially. They did, but they

00:25:57.900 --> 00:26:00.440
sold. The vertical grille wasn't inherently a

00:26:00.440 --> 00:26:03.019
bad design. It was just executed poorly on the

00:26:03.019 --> 00:26:05.279
Edsel and launched at a time when people wanted

00:26:05.279 --> 00:26:08.740
wide, horizontal cars. And the features, self

00:26:08.740 --> 00:26:12.000
-adjusting brakes, child locks, those are standard

00:26:12.000 --> 00:26:15.079
on every car today. So the Edsel was... In a

00:26:15.079 --> 00:26:17.779
weird way, ahead of its time in engineering,

00:26:17.980 --> 00:26:20.960
but behind its time in market trends. And trapped

00:26:20.960 --> 00:26:22.819
in a corporate structure that didn't know how

00:26:22.819 --> 00:26:25.319
to sell it. It was just the wrong car at the

00:26:25.319 --> 00:26:27.579
wrong time with the wrong name. It's the ultimate

00:26:27.579 --> 00:26:30.400
case study in what not to do. It is, but I think

00:26:30.400 --> 00:26:32.579
it's also a redemption story for Ford eventually.

00:26:32.859 --> 00:26:35.799
Years later, Ford launched the Sierra in Europe.

00:26:36.019 --> 00:26:38.400
It had radical styling that people initially

00:26:38.400 --> 00:26:41.180
hated. They called it the jelly mold. But Ford

00:26:41.180 --> 00:26:43.440
stuck with it, and it became a massive hit. They

00:26:43.440 --> 00:26:45.480
learned that... If you are going to be radical,

00:26:45.619 --> 00:26:47.440
you have to be patient and you have to get the

00:26:47.440 --> 00:26:49.480
engineering right. So what does this all mean

00:26:49.480 --> 00:26:51.700
for us? Why are we still talking about the Edsel

00:26:51.700 --> 00:26:54.500
almost 70 years later? Because it's the perfect

00:26:54.500 --> 00:26:56.920
storm. It's what happens when you have a recession,

00:26:57.180 --> 00:27:01.180
confusing pricing, bad quality control and internal

00:27:01.180 --> 00:27:04.359
sabotage all hitting at once. It wasn't just

00:27:04.359 --> 00:27:07.099
a funny grill. It was a systemic failure from

00:27:07.099 --> 00:27:09.640
top to bottom. And it challenges that idea of

00:27:09.640 --> 00:27:12.869
guaranteed success. Ford had the smartest guys

00:27:12.869 --> 00:27:15.529
in the room, the whiz kids, the biggest budget,

00:27:15.670 --> 00:27:18.410
and the most sophisticated market analysis of

00:27:18.410 --> 00:27:20.569
the era. And they still missed the mark completely

00:27:20.569 --> 00:27:22.589
because the world changed while they were building

00:27:22.589 --> 00:27:25.170
the car. That's the lesson. The world is dynamic.

00:27:25.329 --> 00:27:28.069
You can't just rely on past data to predict the

00:27:28.069 --> 00:27:30.109
future, no matter how good that data is. And

00:27:30.109 --> 00:27:31.950
that raises a really provocative question for

00:27:31.950 --> 00:27:34.450
everyone listening. We live in an age of algorithms.

00:27:34.990 --> 00:27:36.950
We have big data that predicts our every move,

00:27:37.069 --> 00:27:39.589
what we want to buy, what we want to watch. Companies

00:27:39.589 --> 00:27:41.750
today are even more confident than Ford was in

00:27:41.750 --> 00:27:44.170
1957. They are. They think they know us better

00:27:44.170 --> 00:27:46.450
than we know ourselves. So could a modern company

00:27:46.450 --> 00:27:50.230
make an Edsel -sized mistake today? Or are we

00:27:50.230 --> 00:27:52.349
just as vulnerable to assuming the future will

00:27:52.349 --> 00:27:54.990
look exactly like the past? Are we building utopian

00:27:54.990 --> 00:27:56.990
turtle tops right now and just don't know it

00:27:56.990 --> 00:27:59.250
yet? I think as long as humans are involved,

00:27:59.569 --> 00:28:02.950
the potential for a $2 .9 billion mistake is

00:28:02.950 --> 00:28:05.200
always there. On that note, thanks for diving

00:28:05.200 --> 00:28:07.460
deep with us. We'll see you next time. Thrive

00:28:07.460 --> 00:28:07.680
safe.
