WEBVTT

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Welcome to the debate. So today we're dissecting

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a phenomenon that I think you could argue defines

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the modern economic experience more than any

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other. It's personal. It is definitely painful.

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And it is playing out on this massive synchronized

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global scale. We are talking about the global

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housing crisis. It is a heavy topic. And frankly,

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calling it a crisis, it almost feels like an

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understatement at this point. When we look at

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the source material, we're not just seeing a

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series of local inconveniences or separate market

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bubbles. We are looking at what the literature

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calls a complex web of problems and dysfunctions.

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Exactly. And whether you're in Amsterdam or Auckland

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or San Francisco, the story is remarkably similar.

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Housing costs are consistently rising faster

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than household income. But the core disagreement

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and what we're here to discuss is why. Is this

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crisis primarily a failure of government regulation,

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a kind of self -inflicted wound caused by planning

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systems that just refuse to let cities grow?

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Or is it a systemic failure of financial markets,

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of labor dynamics, and deep -seated income inequality?

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I'd argue that simply chanting, build more, ignores

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the macroeconomic reality that housing is a financial

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asset. It's subject to these boom and bust cycles.

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And that the market, you know, when left to its

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own devices, consistently fails the most vulnerable.

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And I see why you think that. But let me offer

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a different perspective. I believe the evidence

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points almost overwhelmingly to a supply -side

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crisis driven by these artificial constraints.

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The solution isn't more complexity. It is simply

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deregulation and physical construction, as we've

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seen in places like Japan and New Zealand. Well,

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I come at it from a different angle. But let's

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get into the details. Why don't you lay out your

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case for the supply side argument? Gladly. If

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we look at the foundational economic research

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on this, specifically the work of Hilber and

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Shoney from 2022, they identify the primary strand

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of this whole debate as being about supply constraints.

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The logic is stark and really inescapable. Land

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use restrictions prevent the market from meeting

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a growing demand. When you stop people from building,

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costs go up. It's that simple. I don't deny that

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supply is tight, but to say it's the primary

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driver, that feels reductive to me. But consider

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the magnitude of the distortion here. Studies

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have found that restrictive zoning can make homes,

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I mean, we're talking more than 50 % more expensive

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than the actual cost to build them. That is not

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a market failure. That's a regulatory tax. We

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see this clear divergence between planning systems.

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Anglophone countries, the UK, the US, Australia.

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They have planning systems that basically enable

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obstruction, empowering local governments and

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NIMBYs, you know, not -in -my -backyard activists,

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to block new projects. And the result is shortage.

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Contrast that with Japan, where zoning is controlled

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more at the national level, which reduces local

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obstruction. Japanese cities have maintained

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abundant and affordable housing relative to their

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size precisely because they allow supply to meet

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demand. There's a compelling argument, I'll give

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you that. But have you considered the definition

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of the crisis itself? The source material describes

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it as a web of problems. You're pulling on one

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thread, zoning, and claiming it unravels the

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whole knot. I would argue that poor earnings

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are a major contributor that you're just overlooking.

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People simply do not make enough money relative

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to the cost of living. Income is a factor, certainly,

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but... It's more than just a factor. It's central.

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If you look at the findings from Moody's Analytics,

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they point out that the main causes of the crisis

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include shortages of labor and materials, issues

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that were significantly made worse by the COVID

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-19 pandemic. You can rezone a city all you want,

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but if you don't have the bricks, the timber,

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or the workers to lay them, you're not getting

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new houses. The crisis is also about financing

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conditions and just poor forecasting. It's a

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structural mismatch between the economy people

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live in and the housing market that operates

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way above their heads. I'm not entirely convinced

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by that because it treats labor and material

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shortages as these permanent, immutable barriers

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rather than market signals that would resolve

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if we just legalized the density that makes construction

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efficient. Let's look at a concrete example where

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deregulation actually worked. We have what you

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could call a gold standard of evidence in the

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source material. New Zealand. New Zealand is

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an interesting case, I grant you. It is more

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than interesting. It is proof of concept. Auckland

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specifically. In 2013, they started reforming

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their housing laws to loosen construction constraints.

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They didn't just talk about webs of problems.

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They cut the red tape with something called the

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Unitary Plan. And the result? Rent in Auckland

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grew more slowly than in other parts of the country

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and crucially, more slowly than incomes. Slowing

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the growth is not the same as solving the crisis,

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though. But look at the counterfactual. Ryan

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Greenway McGrivey estimated in July 2024 that

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rents in Auckland were 28 percent lower than

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they would have been without those reforms. That

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is a massive difference for a renter. It was

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so successful that in October 2021, the national

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government passed bipartisan upzoning for the

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country's largest cities, allowing three units

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and three stories on residential parcels. They

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legalized the missing middle. This proves that

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when you remove the obstruction, the market responds

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and prices stabilize. I see the data point you're

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using, but I think you're declaring victory a

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bit too early. Legislative targets and zoning

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changes. they don't automatically create homes.

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Let's look at the Netherlands. They're well aware

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of their crisis. The government set a target

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of constructing 100 ,000 new homes annually.

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A target is different from deregulation, though.

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But the intent was there, and yet in 2024, only

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about 82 ,000 were added. The shortage is actually

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increasing. It was around 396 ,000 homes in mid

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-2025, and experts forecast it to swell to 453

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,000 by 2027. This is happening in a sophisticated

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economy. Why? Because the web is tangling them

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up. The source material notes that despite the

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demand, social housing is lagging way behind.

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Between 2020 and 2023, only 51 of 342 municipalities

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met their social housing goals. But wait, why

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are they missing those goals? The Netherlands

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example actually supports my skepticism of regulation,

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not your faith in it. How so? Well, look at the

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policy response. The Netherlands introduced the

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Affordable Rent Act in 2024 and the Good Landlordship

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Act in 2023. They're capping rents from mid -price

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dwellings and limiting annual hikes. And critics

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explicitly argue that these measures hinder the

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housing association's ability to invest in new

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construction. You have a rent freeze that reduces

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the rental income needed to build the next generation

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of social housing. It's a perfect example of

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how trying to control the market paradoxically

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kills investment. I'm sorry, but I just don't

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buy that. Let me tell you why. You're blaming

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tenant protections for a lack of supply, but

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that ignores the vulnerability of the people

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actually living in these homes. If you let the

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market run wild without those protections, you

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might get investment, but you also get displacement.

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But without the investment, you get shortage,

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which drives prices up for everyone. Look at

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Germany. It's often cited as a model of a strong

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rental market, but homeownership is incredibly

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low. Only what? 46 .7 % in 2022. And what's happening

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there? As subsidies for homeownership were reduced

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in the 2000s, overcrowding has steeply risen.

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The regulated approach is leading to people living

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on top of each other. That actually brings me

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to a crucial point about financialization. We

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cannot talk about housing without talking about

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it as an asset class. It's not just shelter.

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It's a financial vehicle. The source material

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discusses asset cycles. When you treat housing

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primarily as an investment to be deregulated

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and maximized, you invite volatility. Volatility

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is part of any market. But in housing, volatility

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ruins lives. Goran and McQuaid. and their 2020

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research describe these price default spirals.

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So when an economic shock hits, like a drop in

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employment, it induces foreclosures. In a hyper

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-financialized market, those foreclosures amplify

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asset price declines, which then leads to a credit

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crunch for the wider economy. We saw this in

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the subprime crisis of 2007, 2008. If you purely

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deregulate, you are inflating bubbles that inevitably

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burst. and the people at the bottom get crushed.

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But the bust is often caused by the distortion

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of the boom. If supply could adjust smoothly

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to demand, if we didn't have zoning creating

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this artificial scarcity, we wouldn't see such

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violent bubbles. I think that's wishful thinking.

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A purely market -based approach fails the poor

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because there is simply no profit in housing

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them. Look at India. The numbers are just staggering.

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In 2012, The shortage was estimated at 18 .78

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million units. But here's the kicker. 10 .55

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million of those were needed by the economically

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weaker section, households making under 300 ,000

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rupees. Another 7 .41 million were for the lower

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income group. That is a tragedy. Absolutely.

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It's not just a tragedy. It's a market reality.

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The middle income group and above only faced

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a shortfall of like... 0 .82 million units. The

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market builds for the rich. It builds for the

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middle. It does not build for the 18 million

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poor people in India without massive intervention.

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Deregulation doesn't solve that. It just makes

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it easier to build luxury condos. That's an interesting

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point, though I would frame it a little differently.

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When you build luxury condos or any market rate

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housing, you prevent high income earners from

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buying up the older housing stock, which suppresses

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prices down the chain. But let's look at how

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we even define need, because I think that's where

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the government planning models really fail. Take

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the United Kingdom. Right. The UK has its own

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unique set of issues. It does. The UK National

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Planning Policy Framework uses a standard formula

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to assess need based on household growth projections.

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And what does this formula reveal? A massive

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regional imbalance. You have undersupply and

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high demand in the south and relative abundance

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in the economically depressed north. This proves

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that the housing crisis is location specific.

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It is about the inability to build where the

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jobs are. Or it proves that the formula is flawed.

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How so? The parliament has a target of 300 ,000

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new homes a year. That's a clear metric for success.

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If they hit that, they alleviate the pressure.

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But critics of that standard formula say it ignores

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the backlog. It looks at future household growth,

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but it doesn't account for the millions of people

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currently living in poorly maintained or overcrowded

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accommodation. A 2019 report estimated 4 .75

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million households in Great Britain are in need

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of adequate affordable housing. 4 .75 million?

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Yes. And simply building 300 ,000 units somewhere

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doesn't necessarily help them if those units

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are the wrong type or in the wrong place. And

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this connects to the social unrest mentioned

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in the material. Political notes that the housing

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crisis has hurt millennials and Gen Z specifically,

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making them skeptical of democracy itself. I

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agree that the social cost is high. That is exactly

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why I'm so passionate about removing the barriers.

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If young people can't buy into the system, they

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will turn against it. But the missing middle

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housing, you know, duplexes, townhouses, is exactly

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what is illegal to build in so many Anglosphere

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cities. If we legalize that, the labor constraints

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you mentioned earlier would be less of an issue

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because those buildings are cheaper and easier

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to construct than high -rise towers. But you're

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still ignoring the labor shortage. The Moody's

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analytics finding wasn't a suggestion, it was

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a diagnosis. You can legalize a duplex, but you

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cannot build it without a carpenter. And right

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now, the labor market is broken. Relying on the

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private sector to magically summon a workforce

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when wages are stagnating? It's a fantasy. It's

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not magic. It's supply and demand. If the demand

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for construction is there, wages rise and workers

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enter the field. But they won't enter the field

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if the projects are blocked by city councils

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for five years before ground is even broken.

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I think we're circling the same drain here. You

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see the blockages as the starting line? I see

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the blockage as a symptom of a larger dysfunction.

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Okay, let's try to pull this together. We've

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looked at the global data from Auckland to Amsterdam.

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For me, the takeaway is clear. While the web

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is complex, we have empirical data, specifically

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from Ryan Greenaway -McGriffey in Auckland, showing

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that removing barriers works. It lowers the rent

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burden. Zoning restrictions are an artificial

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constraint that drives up prices by over 50%.

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We're taxing ourselves into poverty. And the

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solution is to stop doing that. And I remain

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skeptical that the solution is that linear. Housing

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is tied to labor markets, material availability,

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financial stability. If we don't address income

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inequality, the poor earnings cited in the literature,

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and if we don't protect tenants from the volatility

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of asset cycles, deregulation is only a partial

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solution. It might lower rents for some, but

00:13:48.960 --> 00:13:50.940
as we see in India and even the Netherlands,

00:13:51.159 --> 00:13:54.240
it can leave millions behind or create new vulnerabilities.

00:13:55.080 --> 00:13:58.440
It is a global phenomenon with significant variation.

00:13:58.879 --> 00:14:02.539
The Anglo -Saire, Europe, and Asia are all tackling

00:14:02.539 --> 00:14:05.399
this differently. Exactly. And the trade -offs

00:14:05.399 --> 00:14:07.720
between rent control, investment, and social

00:14:07.720 --> 00:14:10.659
stability are real. There is no silver bullet.

00:14:10.860 --> 00:14:13.320
We encourage you to look deeper into the material,

00:14:13.500 --> 00:14:16.139
specifically the trade -offs between those planning

00:14:16.139 --> 00:14:18.860
systems. And consider the human cost behind the

00:14:18.860 --> 00:14:20.940
numbers. Thank you for listening. Goodbye.
