WEBVTT

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Okay, I want you to picture a specific sign.

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You've probably seen it a hundred times. You're

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stopped at a red light, maybe at a busy intersection.

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You're just looking out the window and you see

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it. It's stapled to a telephone pole. It's usually

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like bright yellow, maybe white. And it has this

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almost handwritten looking font, or sometimes

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it's literally just a sharpie. And it says four

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words, we buy ugly houses. Or cash for homes.

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Any condition. Exactly. Those ones, too. And

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I think for the longest time, I just I glossed

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over them. You know, they were just part of the

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background noise of driving around town. Yeah,

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they just blend in. It's like street level advertising

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spam. Yeah. Right up there with lost dog flyers.

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Yes, totally. But recently I started really noticing

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them like they were everywhere. And then I go

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home. I turn on the TV. I'm flipping through

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channels late at night. And it's there, too.

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But on TV, it's not ugly at all. Oh, no. On TV,

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it's glamorous. It's so glamorous. It's, you

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know, sledgehammers crashing through drywall

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in slow motion. It's high fives in a brand new

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kitchen. It's these big flashy profit margins

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flashing up on the screen. It's really the two

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faces of the exact same coin, isn't it? The telephone

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pole is the acquisition, the gritty start and

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the TV show. Yeah. That's the disposition, the

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glossy end result. Right. But what they're both

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selling at the end of the day is the concept

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of flipping. And that is what we are really getting

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into today. We're going to unpack this whole

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phenomenon. But I want to be clear. We are not

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doing the HGTV version of this conversation.

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I don't really care about the backsplash tile

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or the staging furniture. I want to know about

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the machinery behind it. Because when you see

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those signs or you watch those shows, you are

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really just looking at the absolute tip of a

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massive economic iceberg. That's a good way to

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put it. We've got this whole stack of articles,

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data reports, economic analyses. and they paint

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this picture of flipping not just as a hobby

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or a side hustle, but as a massive financial

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engine. And I would add an ethical minefield.

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That too, a big one. And we're definitely going

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to get into the ethics of it, but we're also

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going to look at the hard numbers, the actual

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economics of buying, renovating, and reselling

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these assets. And we have to ask the big question

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here. Is this whole industry a vital service

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that is saving our housing stock? Or is it more

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of a predatory machine that's just chewing up

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neighborhoods and spitting out unaffordable assets?

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It's a huge question. And I think maybe before

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we get too deep in the weeds, we should probably

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clarify what we even mean by flipping in this

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specific context. Because, you know, if you talk

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to a day trader on Wall Street, flipping means

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something completely different. That's a great

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point. Yeah. In the broadest sense, flipping

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is just. It's buying any asset to sell it quickly

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for a profit. You can flip a vintage sneaker.

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Right. You can flip a stock, a comic book. A

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Taylor Swift ticket. Exactly. It's an arbitrage

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play. You believe an asset is undervalued or

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maybe you believe you can add value to it really

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quickly and then you sell it on. But for this

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deep dive we're focusing in, we are looking pretty

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much exclusively at real estate. Right. The whole

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process of acquiring a residential property.

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rehabbing it, or as we'll find out, at least

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claiming to rehab it and then reselling it for

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more. That's the one. And, you know, I think

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the common perception is that this is kind of

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a niche thing. Maybe it's your uncle who's a

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contractor and he does like one house a summer

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or a couple of small time investors here and

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there. Yeah. Cottage industry. Exactly. But the

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data you pulled, man, it really shattered that

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illusion for me. The scale of this is. Well,

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it's industrial. It is absolutely industrial.

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There's no other word for it. If we look at some

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of the peak numbers provided in the research,

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specifically going back to 2017, house flipping

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in the U .S. hit an 11 -year high. We're talking

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about 207 ,088 condos and single -family houses

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flipped in a single year. Okay, let's just pause

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on that number for a second. 207 ,000, that is...

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That's a lot of drywall. That is a lot of paint.

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It's a staggering amount of inventory being turned

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over. And to give you some context for that number,

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that 207 ,000 represented nearly 6 % of all single

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family property sales that year. Wait a minute,

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6%. You know, 6 % sounds like a small number

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if you just say six. But when you think about

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the millions and millions of real estate transactions

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that happen every year, that's wild. It means

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if I drive down a random street with, say, 20

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for sale signs? Statistically, at least one of

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them, probably more, is a flip. Wow. Yeah. And

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that's really why this matters so much. Because

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when you have an activity that accounts for that

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much of the total market, it stops being a side

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hustle. You know, it starts being a market mover.

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It's not just following the trends. It's making

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the trends. It is. It impacts prices for everyone.

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It impacts the availability of housing stock.

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It fundamentally impacts the character of community.

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And that's the tension, right? That's the central

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conflict we're going to keep coming back to in

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this entire deep dive. On one hand, you have

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this argument that these people are well. They're

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heroes. They are taking the houses that nobody

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wants, the ugly houses from the telephone pole

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sign, and they're turning them back into livable,

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beautiful homes. They are, in a sense, recycling

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the American housing stock. That's the rejuvenation

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argument. And to be fair, it has merit. We'll

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definitely get into that side of it. But then

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you have the complete other side, the side that

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says this is predatory, that it's just a way

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to artificially inflate prices, to create dangerous

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real estate bubbles, and ultimately to displace

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the people who have lived in these neighborhoods

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for decades. The exploitation argument. And honestly,

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the data we have here, it supports both sides.

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It really depends on how a flip is executed and

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why. It's not a binary, you know, good or bad.

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It's a whole spectrum. So let's start with the

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engine that drives all of this. Let's start with

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the money, the economics of the flip, because

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on the surface, the business model seems incredibly

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simple. Deceptively simple. Yeah. Buy low, fix

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it up, sell high. It's the classic buy low, sell

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high logic just applied to bricks and mortar.

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It sounds simple and it is in principle. But

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the real nuance, the secret sauce is in where.

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Where do you buy low and where can you sell high?

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Because real estate, as they say, is local. But

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capital. Capital is global. It's mobile. This

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was one of the most interesting threads in the

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reading for me. This idea that flipping, it follows

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a migration pattern. It's almost like watching

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a weather map or a virus spreading. It moves

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to wherever the conditions are most favorable

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for growth. Exactly. And to really understand

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the current state of flipping, where it's happening

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now, you have to look at the history. of where

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that capital has traveled over the last couple

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of decades. The sources all point to what they

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call the California effect in the 2000s as the

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perfect case study. Ah, the bubble years. The

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bubble years, yeah. Think back to, say, 2005,

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2006 in California. You had this intense economic

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pressure cooker. You had high -paying jobs, high

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wages, but just astronomically high real estate

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prices. It was becoming functionally impossible

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for a normal person to buy a home in the Bay

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Area or Los Angeles. So what do people do when

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they can't afford to live where they work? They

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move. They move. They migrate. And crucially,

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they take their equity with them. So you saw

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this massive exodus of Californians moving to

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cheaper states. The data points to Arizona, Nevada,

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Texas, Oregon, Washington as the main destinations.

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I remember this so clearly. I remember reading

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all those stories about people selling like a

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total teardown shack in San Jose for a million

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dollars and then going and buying a literal mansion

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in Phoenix. Right. But think about the second

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order effects of that. Think about the economics

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of that single transaction multiplied by thousands.

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You have this wave of new buyers arriving in,

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say, Phoenix with pockets absolutely full of

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California cash. What happens to the housing

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market in Phoenix? Demand goes through the roof.

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Supply is static. So prices have to spike. Prices

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spike dramatically. And who notices when prices

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start to spike? The flippers. Investors. Flippers.

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They see the heat map turning red in a new city

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and they swarm to it. So that migration of people

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directly caused this wave of gentrification in

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these new locations. The Las Vegas Valley, the

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suburbs of Phoenix, they became the new hotspots,

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the new ground zero. It's like a contagion then.

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The high price fever in California infected the

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neighboring states. Contingent is actually a

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very, very apt term for it. And it's important

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because it illustrates that flipping isn't just

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a local issue. You can't just look at your local

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city council and blame them for rising prices.

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It's often driven by these huge macroeconomic

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forces happening thousands of miles away. OK,

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here's where the plot twists a bit, because if

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you asked me today or, you know, in the last

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couple of years where the hot flipping markets

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are, I'd probably still guess the Sunbelt. You

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know, I guess Austin or Miami, maybe Phoenix

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is still hot. That would be the intuitive guess

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for sure. But the data we have from 2020 and

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onward shows this, this massive shift. The capital,

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it seems, got bored of the Sunbelt or maybe it

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just got priced out of the Sunbelt and it moved

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to the Midwest, the Rust Belt. The Great Lakes

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region specifically. This was the most fascinating

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pivot in all the data. We're talking about greater

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Cleveland, Akron, Pittsburgh, and even South

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Bend, Indiana. Akron, Ohio, the new real estate

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frontier. It sounds so counterintuitive. It does

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sound counterintuitive until you pull up the

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spreadsheet. And then it makes perfect, cold,

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hard sense. It is purely a margin play. Okay,

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walk me through the math. Why Akron? What's the

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play? Let's look at the 2019 numbers that were

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provided in our source stack. In these Midwest

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markets, the median flip home was purchased for

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roughly $60 ,000. $60 ,000. I mean, let's just

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sit with that for a second. In San Francisco,

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you can't buy a parking spot for $60 ,000. In

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parts of Cleveland, that gets you a whole house.

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It gets you a whole house. Now, it might need

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a lot of work. It's not going to be pretty. It

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might be in a neighborhood that has seen much,

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much better days. But the entry price, your initial

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capital outlay, is incredibly low. Okay, so that's

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the buy low part. What about the sell high? Right.

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So now look at the exit price. They were selling

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those same renovated homes for a median price

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of $124 ,000. Okay, let me do the quick back

00:10:15.919 --> 00:10:18.360
of the knack in math here. You buy for $60 ,000.

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You sell for $124 ,000. That is a $64 ,000 growth

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spread. That's more than 100 % markup on your

00:10:25.399 --> 00:10:28.269
initial purchase price. Exactly. Now, obviously,

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you've got your renovation costs in there. You

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have holding costs, taxes, realtor fees. But

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let's say you spend a generous $30 ,000 on the

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rehab. You are still clearing a massive profit

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relative to your initial investment. The ROI

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is huge. And compared to a market like L .A.

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Oh, it's a completely different world. In L .A.,

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you might have to spend $800 ,000 just to buy

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a teardown. And maybe you spend another $200

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,000 fixing it and sell it for $1 .1 million.

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The raw dollar amount of profit is higher, maybe,

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but the risk you took on is astronomical. Your

00:11:01.980 --> 00:11:04.080
capital is tied up, and the percentage return

00:11:04.080 --> 00:11:06.220
is often much, much thinner. Plus, the competition

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must be insane in those markets. Fierce. Everyone

00:11:09.220 --> 00:11:11.679
is looking for a deal. But in the Midwest in

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2019, 2020, the market inefficiencies were still

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there. There was still gold in those hills, so

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to speak. So you literally have investment advisors,

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people in suits, in high -rise offices in Century

00:11:22.120 --> 00:11:24.379
City telling their California -based investors,

00:11:24.519 --> 00:11:26.940
don't buy a rental in your backyard. Send your

00:11:26.940 --> 00:11:29.779
money to Northeastern Ohio. That's exactly what

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was happening. It's the financialization of the

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Rust Belt. These cities that were hit so hard

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by deindustrialization that had this huge surplus

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of cheap, aging housing stock suddenly became

00:11:40.480 --> 00:11:43.259
these unlikely gold mines for remote capital.

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It's just wild to think about. You have a guy

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in Santa Monica sitting by his pool owning a

00:11:47.879 --> 00:11:51.240
portfolio of three or four homes in Akron that

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he's probably never even stepped foot in. And

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this isn't just a U .S. phenomenon either. The

00:11:55.379 --> 00:11:57.759
sources touched on this briefly, but it's important

00:11:57.759 --> 00:12:00.750
to... note that this buy, rehab, resell model

00:12:00.750 --> 00:12:04.149
is growing rapidly in Europe, too. You have large

00:12:04.149 --> 00:12:06.850
real estate firms and private equity buying up

00:12:06.850 --> 00:12:09.289
properties in places like Berlin and Lisbon doing

00:12:09.289 --> 00:12:11.429
the exact same thing. So it's a global shift

00:12:11.429 --> 00:12:13.850
in how we view housing. It's moving away from

00:12:13.850 --> 00:12:16.870
just shelter and more towards just an asset class

00:12:16.870 --> 00:12:19.970
to be optimized, like a stock or a bond. That's

00:12:19.970 --> 00:12:21.690
the perfect way to describe it. Which brings

00:12:21.690 --> 00:12:24.470
us right back to the impact on the ground. Because

00:12:24.470 --> 00:12:27.179
look. If I'm living in Akron and my neighborhood

00:12:27.179 --> 00:12:30.480
has a bunch of boarded up, derelict houses, and

00:12:30.480 --> 00:12:32.779
suddenly all this capital flows in from California

00:12:32.779 --> 00:12:36.200
and fixes them up, isn't that a good thing? Let's

00:12:36.200 --> 00:12:37.879
play devil's advocate for a minute here. Let's

00:12:37.879 --> 00:12:41.740
talk about the good. This is the strongest, most

00:12:41.740 --> 00:12:44.259
compelling argument for the flipping industry.

00:12:44.559 --> 00:12:48.009
The idea of gentrification as restoration. Right.

00:12:48.090 --> 00:12:50.009
Because nobody wants to live next to a zombie

00:12:50.009 --> 00:12:52.230
house, a place with broken windows and weeds

00:12:52.230 --> 00:12:54.049
up to your waist. Of course not. And there's

00:12:54.049 --> 00:12:56.389
a very specific sociological theory that comes

00:12:56.389 --> 00:12:58.149
up in the literature here that explains why.

00:12:58.370 --> 00:13:00.490
It's called the broken windows theory. Right.

00:13:00.610 --> 00:13:03.629
I've heard this used in policing contexts, you

00:13:03.629 --> 00:13:06.169
know, crack down on the small stuff like turnstile

00:13:06.169 --> 00:13:08.309
jumpers to prevent bigger crimes from happening.

00:13:08.409 --> 00:13:11.830
But how does it apply to real estate? The underlying

00:13:11.830 --> 00:13:14.690
logic is identical. The theory, which dates back

00:13:14.690 --> 00:13:17.029
to social scientists Wilson and Kelling in the

00:13:17.029 --> 00:13:19.710
80s, suggests that visible signs of disorder

00:13:19.710 --> 00:13:22.450
and neglect act as a powerful signal to the community.

00:13:22.730 --> 00:13:25.330
What kind of signal? A broken window that goes

00:13:25.330 --> 00:13:28.830
unfixed. Or in this context, a house with peeling

00:13:28.830 --> 00:13:32.230
paint, knee -high grass, and a collapsing front

00:13:32.230 --> 00:13:36.190
porch that signals to everyone, both law -abiding

00:13:36.190 --> 00:13:39.429
citizens and criminal elements, that... No one

00:13:39.429 --> 00:13:41.470
cares about this place. It signals a lack of

00:13:41.470 --> 00:13:44.070
surveillance, a lack of ownership, a power vacuum.

00:13:44.350 --> 00:13:47.049
Exactly. It sends a message that says the social

00:13:47.049 --> 00:13:49.350
contract is broken here. The rules don't apply.

00:13:49.570 --> 00:13:52.289
And that environment is a magnet for vandalism,

00:13:52.309 --> 00:13:55.409
for squatting, for drug use. It creates this

00:13:55.409 --> 00:13:58.799
vicious spiral of decline. So the flipper in

00:13:58.799 --> 00:14:01.019
this narrative comes in as the interrupter of

00:14:01.019 --> 00:14:03.259
that spiral, the circuit breaker. In theory,

00:14:03.299 --> 00:14:05.620
yes. That's the idea. They come in, they fix

00:14:05.620 --> 00:14:07.879
the broken window, they paint the siding, they

00:14:07.879 --> 00:14:10.039
hire a landscaper to cut the grass, they install

00:14:10.039 --> 00:14:12.279
a motion sensor light on the porch. Suddenly

00:14:12.279 --> 00:14:14.240
the signal changes completely. The signal now

00:14:14.240 --> 00:14:16.820
says someone is watching. Someone has invested

00:14:16.820 --> 00:14:19.460
here. This property has value. Precisely. And

00:14:19.460 --> 00:14:21.879
that can create a virtuous cycle. Well, the criminal

00:14:21.879 --> 00:14:24.450
element might move on. Because the environment

00:14:24.450 --> 00:14:26.789
is no longer permissive. The neighbors across

00:14:26.789 --> 00:14:28.690
the street see the improvement and they feel

00:14:28.690 --> 00:14:31.210
a renewed sense of pride. Or maybe it's just

00:14:31.210 --> 00:14:33.350
peer pressure and they finally decide to paint

00:14:33.350 --> 00:14:35.629
their own fences. The whole block gets a lift.

00:14:35.909 --> 00:14:38.769
And then there's the money side of it for the

00:14:38.769 --> 00:14:41.049
city itself. I have to imagine the local government

00:14:41.049 --> 00:14:43.250
is basically rolling out the red carpet for these

00:14:43.250 --> 00:14:46.490
investors. For the most part, yes. Absolutely.

00:14:46.490 --> 00:14:49.389
Because cities, especially struggling ones, run

00:14:49.389 --> 00:14:51.970
on property taxes. A house that's assessed at

00:14:51.970 --> 00:14:56.110
$60 ,000 pays very little in tax revenue. That

00:14:56.110 --> 00:14:59.830
same house, after a flip, now assessed at $124

00:14:59.830 --> 00:15:02.809
,000, pays more than double. That's more money

00:15:02.809 --> 00:15:05.490
for schools, for roads, for the fire department.

00:15:05.830 --> 00:15:08.269
Exactly. And don't forget the sales tax bump

00:15:08.269 --> 00:15:10.379
during the renovation itself. I mean, if you're

00:15:10.379 --> 00:15:12.919
doing a full gut rehab on a house, you're buying

00:15:12.919 --> 00:15:15.559
thousands of dollars of lumber, drywall, copper

00:15:15.559 --> 00:15:19.200
pipes, new appliances. You're hiring local electricians

00:15:19.200 --> 00:15:21.559
and plumbers and roofers. It's a mini stimulus

00:15:21.559 --> 00:15:24.220
package for the local economy. It absolutely

00:15:24.220 --> 00:15:27.240
is. There is no denying that. When a flip is

00:15:27.240 --> 00:15:29.659
done right, and that's the key qualifier, when

00:15:29.659 --> 00:15:32.789
it's done right, meaning they actually. fix the

00:15:32.789 --> 00:15:34.850
structural issues and restore the home to the

00:15:34.850 --> 00:15:37.690
market in a responsible way, it can be a massive

00:15:37.690 --> 00:15:40.649
net positive for a dying neighborhood. It brings

00:15:40.649 --> 00:15:43.190
housing stock back online that might otherwise

00:15:43.190 --> 00:15:45.950
be condemned and demolished. When it's done right.

00:15:46.659 --> 00:15:48.419
That feels like the key phrase in this whole

00:15:48.419 --> 00:15:50.340
conversation, doesn't it? It is. Because that

00:15:50.340 --> 00:15:52.759
brings us directly to the dark side. The bad.

00:15:52.960 --> 00:15:55.120
The bad. Because we can talk about the neighbor

00:15:55.120 --> 00:15:57.440
effect. You know, my house value goes up because

00:15:57.440 --> 00:15:59.419
your newly renovated house value went up. That

00:15:59.419 --> 00:16:02.320
sounds great. But there is a cost to that. If

00:16:02.320 --> 00:16:05.019
values on my street keep going up and up and

00:16:05.019 --> 00:16:07.940
up, eventually they go up too much for some people.

00:16:08.139 --> 00:16:10.659
This is where we collide head on with the issue

00:16:10.659 --> 00:16:13.659
of displacement. It's the unavoidable flip side

00:16:13.659 --> 00:16:17.159
of gentrification. Right. So let's say I've lived

00:16:17.159 --> 00:16:19.039
in my house for 30 years. I bought it for nothing

00:16:19.039 --> 00:16:21.360
back in the 80s. Maybe I'm on a fixed income

00:16:21.360 --> 00:16:23.419
now. I'm retired. I'm not planning on selling

00:16:23.419 --> 00:16:27.360
my house ever. But suddenly three flippers come

00:16:27.360 --> 00:16:31.559
onto my block and the property values just skyrocket.

00:16:31.659 --> 00:16:34.480
Your property tax assessment skyrockets right

00:16:34.480 --> 00:16:36.820
along with them. Your tax bill could double or

00:16:36.820 --> 00:16:38.940
triple in just a few years. And if you're on

00:16:38.940 --> 00:16:41.860
a fixed income and you can't afford that new

00:16:41.860 --> 00:16:45.720
massive tax bill. Yeah. You are forced to sell.

00:16:45.820 --> 00:16:47.720
You're taxed out of your own home. You are forced

00:16:47.720 --> 00:16:50.059
to leave the community you may have helped build

00:16:50.059 --> 00:16:52.600
and lived in your entire life. And if you're

00:16:52.600 --> 00:16:55.019
a renter, it's even faster and more brutal. Oh,

00:16:55.039 --> 00:16:57.159
yeah. The landlord sees the property values going

00:16:57.159 --> 00:16:59.620
up all around, sees what the flicked houses are

00:16:59.620 --> 00:17:01.799
renting for and says, why on earth am I charging

00:17:01.799 --> 00:17:04.339
$800 a month when the new market comps say I

00:17:04.339 --> 00:17:07.059
can get $1 ,500? And your lease is up and you

00:17:07.059 --> 00:17:09.400
get a notice. Your rent is doubling. Pay up or

00:17:09.400 --> 00:17:12.440
get out. Exactly. So while the neighborhood objectively

00:17:12.440 --> 00:17:15.299
looks nicer. You know, better paint jobs, new

00:17:15.299 --> 00:17:17.859
windows, manicured lawns. The community that

00:17:17.859 --> 00:17:20.420
actually lived there, the social fabric, is completely

00:17:20.420 --> 00:17:24.460
erased. The flipping activity accelerates gentrification

00:17:24.460 --> 00:17:27.519
to a speed that existing residents simply cannot

00:17:27.519 --> 00:17:30.220
adapt to. And then there's the quality issue,

00:17:30.380 --> 00:17:32.440
the quality of the work itself. We absolutely

00:17:32.440 --> 00:17:34.460
have to talk about the lipstick flip. Oh, the

00:17:34.460 --> 00:17:36.539
lipstick flip. It's such a wonderfully evocative

00:17:36.539 --> 00:17:39.519
term. It really is. It paints the perfect picture,

00:17:39.660 --> 00:17:42.869
doesn't it? A lipstick flip. is in essence putting

00:17:42.869 --> 00:17:45.490
lipstick on a pig. It's a renovation that is

00:17:45.490 --> 00:17:48.849
purely cosmetic, designed to dazzle the buyer's

00:17:48.849 --> 00:17:51.970
eye while ignoring, or in some cases actively

00:17:51.970 --> 00:17:55.250
hiding, the serious, expensive structural rot

00:17:55.250 --> 00:17:57.029
underneath. This is what I was alluding to earlier

00:17:57.029 --> 00:17:59.809
with the millennial gray laminate floors and

00:17:59.809 --> 00:18:01.829
the generic fixtures. You walk into one of these

00:18:01.829 --> 00:18:03.730
places and everything smells like fresh paint.

00:18:03.789 --> 00:18:05.910
It looks like an Instagram post. But what is

00:18:05.910 --> 00:18:08.220
going on behind the drywall? That's the million

00:18:08.220 --> 00:18:11.259
-dollar question. And the problem is, the flipper's

00:18:11.259 --> 00:18:14.319
primary motivation is speed. Every single day

00:18:14.319 --> 00:18:16.440
they hold that property, they're losing money

00:18:16.440 --> 00:18:19.380
on interest payments, insurance, taxes, utilities.

00:18:19.539 --> 00:18:21.980
They want to get in and get out as fast as possible.

00:18:22.160 --> 00:18:25.799
And fixing a cracked foundation is slow and expensive.

00:18:26.220 --> 00:18:30.599
And, most importantly, invisible. No buyer walks

00:18:30.599 --> 00:18:33.000
into an open house and says, ooh, honey, look

00:18:33.000 --> 00:18:35.859
at that sexy new foundation repair. Right. No,

00:18:35.920 --> 00:18:38.180
they say, look at that beautiful subway tile

00:18:38.180 --> 00:18:41.359
backsplash. Or, wow, an open concept. Exactly.

00:18:41.380 --> 00:18:43.039
So the flipper spends all their money on the

00:18:43.039 --> 00:18:45.220
tile, the paint, the new stainless steel appliances,

00:18:45.380 --> 00:18:47.819
the fixtures, the lipstick, and they just ignore

00:18:47.819 --> 00:18:50.319
the cast iron plumbing from 1950 that's about

00:18:50.319 --> 00:18:52.880
to burst. Or the old knob and tube wiring that's

00:18:52.880 --> 00:18:55.150
a genuine fire hazard. The sources we looked

00:18:55.150 --> 00:18:56.930
at mentioned critics saying that flippers often

00:18:56.930 --> 00:19:00.049
use these very specific, expensive looking, minimalist

00:19:00.049 --> 00:19:03.130
designs precisely to distract from the lack of

00:19:03.130 --> 00:19:05.269
structural integrity. It's basically architectural

00:19:05.269 --> 00:19:08.210
sleight of hand. It is. They create a wow factor

00:19:08.210 --> 00:19:10.990
with surface level stuff to keep you from looking

00:19:10.990 --> 00:19:12.809
too closely at the things that actually matter.

00:19:13.259 --> 00:19:15.400
for the health and safety of the home. And in

00:19:15.400 --> 00:19:18.119
Europe, the sources point to an even more specific

00:19:18.119 --> 00:19:21.160
and maybe more insidious type of structural degradation.

00:19:21.539 --> 00:19:24.500
It's not just about bad repairs. It's about fundamentally

00:19:24.500 --> 00:19:27.660
changing the layout of homes for the worse. This

00:19:27.660 --> 00:19:30.720
is the chopping up of apartments. Yes. In many

00:19:30.720 --> 00:19:33.440
older European cities, you have these beautiful,

00:19:33.519 --> 00:19:35.980
large, historic apartments. They're perfect for

00:19:35.980 --> 00:19:38.940
a family. But a flipper or an investor looks

00:19:38.940 --> 00:19:41.440
at that space, and they don't see a family home.

00:19:41.619 --> 00:19:44.599
They see inefficiency. They see unmonetized square

00:19:44.599 --> 00:19:46.859
footage. So what do they do? They buy the large

00:19:46.859 --> 00:19:48.880
family apartment, and they throw up a bunch of

00:19:48.880 --> 00:19:51.240
new walls and chop it into three tiny micro apartments.

00:19:51.519 --> 00:19:53.839
Because three tiny rents add up to more than

00:19:53.839 --> 00:19:56.180
one big rent. It's just a math problem for them.

00:19:56.400 --> 00:19:59.460
Correct. But the long -term cost to the city

00:19:59.460 --> 00:20:02.420
is that you systematically destroy the family

00:20:02.420 --> 00:20:05.319
-sized housing stock. You turn a neighborhood

00:20:05.319 --> 00:20:08.099
that was once full of families into a neighborhood

00:20:08.099 --> 00:20:11.019
of transients, students and short term renters.

00:20:11.259 --> 00:20:13.579
You change the demographic fabric of a place

00:20:13.579 --> 00:20:16.099
permanently just to squeeze out a few more percentage

00:20:16.099 --> 00:20:18.940
points of annual yield. It's incredibly cynical.

00:20:18.960 --> 00:20:20.920
But, you know, I also want to be fair to the

00:20:20.920 --> 00:20:22.500
flippers for a second, or at least the honest

00:20:22.500 --> 00:20:24.839
ones who are trying to do good work, because

00:20:24.839 --> 00:20:27.750
the sources made it very, very clear. This is

00:20:27.750 --> 00:20:30.390
not easy money. We see the big profit numbers

00:20:30.390 --> 00:20:32.509
on TV, but we don't always see the spectacular

00:20:32.509 --> 00:20:35.490
losses. No, absolutely not. It's a high risk,

00:20:35.569 --> 00:20:38.009
high stress game. The failure rate is significant.

00:20:38.450 --> 00:20:41.549
The sources we read listed a top 10 risk factors

00:20:41.549 --> 00:20:43.829
list, and it's basically a catalog of nightmares

00:20:43.829 --> 00:20:45.809
for any property owner. What was the one that

00:20:45.809 --> 00:20:47.809
stood out to you on that list? For me, it was

00:20:47.809 --> 00:20:50.150
the concept of the demo discovery. That sounds

00:20:50.150 --> 00:20:52.369
like the title of a horror movie. For the investor,

00:20:52.529 --> 00:20:55.170
it feels like one. It's that moment when you

00:20:55.170 --> 00:20:57.910
start demolition. You take that sledgehammer

00:20:57.910 --> 00:20:59.329
to the kitchen wall because you want to create

00:20:59.329 --> 00:21:01.809
that open concept we talked about, and you find

00:21:01.809 --> 00:21:03.950
something you absolutely did not budget for.

00:21:04.329 --> 00:21:08.029
Like what? Termites. Termites. Black mold hiding

00:21:08.029 --> 00:21:11.509
behind the drywall. A load -bearing wall that

00:21:11.509 --> 00:21:13.930
your plan said you could remove, but it turns

00:21:13.930 --> 00:21:15.730
out it's the only thing holding up the second

00:21:15.730 --> 00:21:18.450
floor. Or maybe you find out the previous owner

00:21:18.450 --> 00:21:20.630
did a bunch of unpermitted electrical work, and

00:21:20.630 --> 00:21:23.250
it's a complete rat's nest of fire hazards. And

00:21:23.250 --> 00:21:25.990
just like that, your $30 ,000 renovation budget

00:21:25.990 --> 00:21:29.269
is now $60 ,000 or more. And your three -month

00:21:29.269 --> 00:21:32.069
timeline just doubled. And while you're scrambling

00:21:32.069 --> 00:21:33.670
to deal with that, you're also dealing with the

00:21:33.670 --> 00:21:37.569
other huge risk factor, the human element, specifically

00:21:37.569 --> 00:21:41.230
finding dependable contractors. Oh, man. Anyone

00:21:41.230 --> 00:21:43.450
who has ever just tried to do a simple kitchen

00:21:43.450 --> 00:21:46.250
remodel knows this pain intimately. Now imagine

00:21:46.250 --> 00:21:49.509
doing it remotely. Imagine you're that investor

00:21:49.509 --> 00:21:51.410
we talked about sitting in California trying

00:21:51.410 --> 00:21:54.990
to manage a contractor in Akron, Ohio. The contractor

00:21:54.990 --> 00:21:57.569
knows you aren't there to check on the progress.

00:21:57.869 --> 00:21:59.910
Maybe he doesn't show up for a week. Maybe he's

00:21:59.910 --> 00:22:02.569
juggling three other jobs. Maybe a bunch of expensive

00:22:02.569 --> 00:22:04.910
copper piping just walks off the job site. So

00:22:04.910 --> 00:22:06.829
you're just bleeding money every single day.

00:22:06.990 --> 00:22:09.309
You're bleeding money. Running out of funds is

00:22:09.309 --> 00:22:13.480
a huge, huge risk. If you run out of cash halfway

00:22:13.480 --> 00:22:16.220
through a flip, you are dead in the water. You

00:22:16.220 --> 00:22:18.059
can't sell a half gutted house for a profit.

00:22:18.140 --> 00:22:20.799
You're stuck. You might lose everything. So it's

00:22:20.799 --> 00:22:23.660
high risk, high reward. That's the game. But

00:22:23.660 --> 00:22:25.240
that's the legal version of the game. That's

00:22:25.240 --> 00:22:27.519
the, you know, I tried my best, but the market

00:22:27.519 --> 00:22:29.940
turned against me version. Now we need to move

00:22:29.940 --> 00:22:32.299
to the next segment. The part that I have to

00:22:32.299 --> 00:22:34.359
say really made my blood boil when I was reading

00:22:34.359 --> 00:22:37.359
the notes. We need to talk about the ugly. This

00:22:37.359 --> 00:22:40.200
is where we leave the world of legitimate. if

00:22:40.200 --> 00:22:43.720
risky, investment strategies. And we enter the

00:22:43.720 --> 00:22:46.259
world of actual crime. Because there are people

00:22:46.259 --> 00:22:48.720
out there who aren't just bad at flipping or

00:22:48.720 --> 00:22:52.079
cutting corners to save a buck. They are actively

00:22:52.079 --> 00:22:55.200
and systematically preying on people. Predatory

00:22:55.200 --> 00:22:57.880
behavior. And it often starts with the acquisition.

00:22:58.180 --> 00:23:00.460
We talked about those yellow signs, we buy ugly

00:23:00.460 --> 00:23:03.619
houses. But the tactics used to actually get

00:23:03.619 --> 00:23:06.480
the owners of those houses to sell can be incredibly

00:23:06.480 --> 00:23:08.440
manipulative. Let's talk about this concept of

00:23:08.440 --> 00:23:11.690
posing. What is that? Posing is a tactic where

00:23:11.690 --> 00:23:14.490
a corporate entity, a big real estate firm or

00:23:14.490 --> 00:23:17.069
a professional investment group disguises itself

00:23:17.069 --> 00:23:20.289
as a sympathetic everyday individual. So like

00:23:20.289 --> 00:23:22.269
you get a letter in the mail and it looks handwritten.

00:23:22.309 --> 00:23:24.710
Maybe it's on, you know, cute stationery. And

00:23:24.710 --> 00:23:27.069
it says something like, hi, I'm Jen. My husband

00:23:27.069 --> 00:23:28.750
and I are looking for our first home to raise

00:23:28.750 --> 00:23:31.009
our baby in. We just love your street. Please

00:23:31.009 --> 00:23:33.130
call us if you're thinking of selling. Right.

00:23:33.309 --> 00:23:35.849
And you, the homeowner, you think, oh, how sweet.

00:23:35.970 --> 00:23:38.410
Jen needs a house for her baby. Yeah. But Jen

00:23:38.410 --> 00:23:42.250
is a persona. Jen isn't real. Jen is a call center

00:23:42.250 --> 00:23:45.410
in another state. Jen is a shell company owned

00:23:45.410 --> 00:23:49.049
by a private equity firm. That is so dark. It's

00:23:49.049 --> 00:23:51.650
a psychological tactic. It's designed to lower

00:23:51.650 --> 00:23:54.349
your defenses. If you know you're negotiating

00:23:54.349 --> 00:23:57.450
with a sharp -suited professional shark, you

00:23:57.450 --> 00:24:00.349
keep your guard up. You hire a lawyer. You get

00:24:00.349 --> 00:24:02.609
your own appraisal. If you think you're helping

00:24:02.609 --> 00:24:05.390
a nice young couple start their family, You might

00:24:05.390 --> 00:24:08.089
accept a lower price out of kindness. You might

00:24:08.089 --> 00:24:10.519
be more flexible on the terms. And who are they

00:24:10.519 --> 00:24:12.359
targeting with these letters? They're not just

00:24:12.359 --> 00:24:14.539
sending them out randomly, are they? No, the

00:24:14.539 --> 00:24:17.339
targeting is very precise. The sources are very

00:24:17.339 --> 00:24:19.720
specific about this. They target the vulnerable.

00:24:20.140 --> 00:24:23.359
They pull public records to find the elderly

00:24:23.359 --> 00:24:25.619
who have owned their homes for a long time who

00:24:25.619 --> 00:24:27.920
might be looking to downsize and have no idea

00:24:27.920 --> 00:24:30.599
what the current market value is. OK. They target

00:24:30.599 --> 00:24:33.000
people who are in foreclosure or deep in debt.

00:24:33.299 --> 00:24:35.640
They target owners of properties with what the

00:24:35.640 --> 00:24:38.240
industry calls stigmas. Stigmas. What does that

00:24:38.240 --> 00:24:40.740
mean? It could be anything that makes a property

00:24:40.740 --> 00:24:43.960
hard to sell on the open market. A serious bug

00:24:43.960 --> 00:24:47.720
infestation, a hoarding situation, a house where

00:24:47.720 --> 00:24:50.140
a violent crime occurred, or even just a house

00:24:50.140 --> 00:24:52.819
with notoriously bad neighbors. They find owners

00:24:52.819 --> 00:24:55.900
who are embarrassed or desperate or just completely

00:24:55.900 --> 00:24:58.859
overwhelmed, and they offer them what seems like

00:24:58.859 --> 00:25:01.180
an easy way out. We'll pay cash, we can close

00:25:01.180 --> 00:25:04.059
in seven days, no inspections, no hassle. And

00:25:04.059 --> 00:25:06.420
for someone who is drowning in debt or shame,

00:25:06.660 --> 00:25:09.430
that sounds like a lifeline. But it's not. It's

00:25:09.430 --> 00:25:11.890
an anchor. Because the offer they make is almost

00:25:11.890 --> 00:25:14.190
always pennies on the dollar. They are stripping

00:25:14.190 --> 00:25:16.049
the equity from the people who need it the most

00:25:16.049 --> 00:25:19.069
under the guise of helping them. But even that,

00:25:19.230 --> 00:25:21.369
it's still technically legal, right? I mean,

00:25:21.369 --> 00:25:25.069
it's unethical, it's slimy, but buying low isn't

00:25:25.069 --> 00:25:27.670
a crime in itself? Correct. It exists in a moral

00:25:27.670 --> 00:25:30.890
gray area. But illegal property flipping is a

00:25:30.890 --> 00:25:34.240
crime. And the sources we reviewed and law enforcement

00:25:34.240 --> 00:25:36.720
distinguish this very, very clearly from just

00:25:36.720 --> 00:25:39.119
being a shrewd negotiator. OK, so this is the

00:25:39.119 --> 00:25:41.119
real criminal stuff. What makes a flip illegal?

00:25:41.500 --> 00:25:45.099
In a word, fraud. The mechanism here is completely

00:25:45.099 --> 00:25:47.880
different. In a legal flip, you buy a property,

00:25:48.039 --> 00:25:50.480
you add value through improvements or you wait

00:25:50.480 --> 00:25:53.140
for the market to rise and then you sell. In

00:25:53.140 --> 00:25:55.980
an illegal flip, the improvement is a lie. and

00:25:55.980 --> 00:25:58.519
the value is a complete fabrication. Okay, so

00:25:58.519 --> 00:26:00.599
walk us through the scheme. How do you pull something

00:26:00.599 --> 00:26:03.279
like this off? All right, step one, the criminal

00:26:03.279 --> 00:26:06.740
entity buys a property, usually a very distressed

00:26:06.740 --> 00:26:08.660
one, a real wreck. Let's say they buy it for

00:26:08.660 --> 00:26:12.660
$100 ,000. Okay. Step two, they make zero, and

00:26:12.660 --> 00:26:15.039
I mean zero, meaningful improvements. They might

00:26:15.039 --> 00:26:17.299
sweep the floor. They might put up a new house

00:26:17.299 --> 00:26:18.920
number to make it look like something happened,

00:26:19.019 --> 00:26:21.279
but they do nothing of actual value. Got it.

00:26:21.339 --> 00:26:23.779
Step three is the crime itself. They immediately

00:26:23.779 --> 00:26:26.259
put it back on the market, sometimes within days

00:26:26.259 --> 00:26:29.720
or even hours, and resell it for, say, $200 ,000.

00:26:30.000 --> 00:26:33.019
But wait, who would buy a $100 ,000 house for

00:26:33.019 --> 00:26:35.140
$200 ,000? Wouldn't the buyer, you know, see

00:26:35.140 --> 00:26:37.579
that it's a total dump? They would, unless the

00:26:37.579 --> 00:26:40.410
buyer is in on the scheme. Or, more commonly,

00:26:40.529 --> 00:26:42.470
the real victim isn't the buyer, it's the bank.

00:26:42.690 --> 00:26:45.210
The scheme requires collusion. You can't do it

00:26:45.210 --> 00:26:47.890
alone. You need a corrupt appraiser. Ah, the

00:26:47.890 --> 00:26:50.049
appraiser is the gatekeeper. The appraiser is

00:26:50.049 --> 00:26:52.890
the linchpin. The bank relies on the professional

00:26:52.890 --> 00:26:56.089
appraiser to tell them, yes, this house is indeed

00:26:56.089 --> 00:26:59.490
worth $200 ,000 and is adequate collateral for

00:26:59.490 --> 00:27:02.549
the loan. So the corrupt appraiser falsifies

00:27:02.549 --> 00:27:05.559
the report. They might use comparable sales from

00:27:05.559 --> 00:27:07.400
a totally different, much nicer neighborhood.

00:27:07.740 --> 00:27:09.880
They might lie about the square footage or the

00:27:09.880 --> 00:27:12.019
condition of the property. So the bank's underwriting

00:27:12.019 --> 00:27:14.859
department gets the paperwork. It all looks legitimate,

00:27:14.980 --> 00:27:17.440
they say, looks good. And they approve the loan

00:27:17.440 --> 00:27:20.460
and wire the $200 ,000. Exactly. The flipper

00:27:20.460 --> 00:27:23.720
gets the $200 ,000, pays off the corrupt appraiser,

00:27:23.779 --> 00:27:26.140
and walks away with a huge fraudulent profit.

00:27:27.450 --> 00:27:30.130
The buyer, who is often a straw buyer, who has

00:27:30.130 --> 00:27:32.109
paid a small fee to let the criminals use their

00:27:32.109 --> 00:27:34.569
good credit score, never intends to make a single

00:27:34.569 --> 00:27:37.289
mortgage payment. The mortgage immediately goes

00:27:37.289 --> 00:27:40.109
into default. The bank has to foreclose. And

00:27:40.109 --> 00:27:41.750
when the bank finally takes possession of the

00:27:41.750 --> 00:27:43.490
house and goes to sell it to recoup their money,

00:27:43.630 --> 00:27:45.829
they realize, wait a minute, this is a pile of

00:27:45.829 --> 00:27:48.789
rubble that's only worth $100 ,000. The bank

00:27:48.789 --> 00:27:51.279
is forced to take the massive loss. It's literally

00:27:51.279 --> 00:27:53.599
bank robbery with paperwork instead of a gun.

00:27:53.740 --> 00:27:55.900
That's a perfect way to put it. And when you

00:27:55.900 --> 00:27:58.799
multiply this by thousands and thousands of transactions

00:27:58.799 --> 00:28:01.339
across the country, you get systemic risk. You

00:28:01.339 --> 00:28:03.339
get bubbles. And this brings us to the big one,

00:28:03.440 --> 00:28:07.019
the 2008 connection. Because I think people remember

00:28:07.019 --> 00:28:10.079
the big short. They remember the term subprime.

00:28:10.299 --> 00:28:12.859
But I don't think everyone fully realizes how

00:28:12.859 --> 00:28:16.359
central this kind of flipping was to the entire

00:28:16.359 --> 00:28:20.089
crash. It was the gasoline on the fire. An accelerant.

00:28:20.089 --> 00:28:22.750
How so? What was the mechanism? Well, think about

00:28:22.750 --> 00:28:24.930
the incentives at the time. In the years leading

00:28:24.930 --> 00:28:28.450
up to 2008, lending standards were, well, they

00:28:28.450 --> 00:28:30.369
were basically non -existent. You had the infamous

00:28:30.369 --> 00:28:33.990
no income, no job, no assets loans, the NINJ

00:28:33.990 --> 00:28:36.250
loans. You could get a mortgage with practically

00:28:36.250 --> 00:28:39.079
zero money down. So you didn't need to be a millionaire

00:28:39.079 --> 00:28:41.339
real estate tycoon to be a speculator anymore.

00:28:41.500 --> 00:28:43.640
You just needed a pulse and a decent credit score.

00:28:43.799 --> 00:28:46.160
Exactly. So you had taxi drivers, strippers,

00:28:46.420 --> 00:28:48.980
school teachers, people with absolutely no background

00:28:48.980 --> 00:28:51.160
in real estate, buying three, four, five houses

00:28:51.160 --> 00:28:53.359
at a time, not to live in, not even to rent out,

00:28:53.420 --> 00:28:55.400
just to flip. They were betting on the market.

00:28:55.539 --> 00:28:57.059
They assumed prices would just go up forever.

00:28:57.299 --> 00:29:00.960
It was pure, unadulterated speculation. They

00:29:00.960 --> 00:29:03.480
were buying with the sole intent of reselling

00:29:03.480 --> 00:29:06.630
in a month or two for profit. And this created

00:29:06.630 --> 00:29:09.829
this massive artificial demand for housing, demand

00:29:09.829 --> 00:29:12.470
radically outstripped supply. And what happens

00:29:12.470 --> 00:29:17.089
then? Prices skyrocketed. Which in turn drew

00:29:17.089 --> 00:29:19.589
in even more flippers who saw the easy money

00:29:19.589 --> 00:29:22.569
being made. It was a feedback loop, an inflationary

00:29:22.569 --> 00:29:25.589
spiral. But it was a house to cards because the

00:29:25.589 --> 00:29:27.630
underlying value just wasn't theirs, all built

00:29:27.630 --> 00:29:29.930
on cheap debt. And the moment the prices stopped

00:29:29.930 --> 00:29:32.519
rising, the moment the music stopped. Everyone

00:29:32.519 --> 00:29:34.500
tried to sell at once. And there were no buyers

00:29:34.500 --> 00:29:37.640
left, just sellers. And prices collapsed. But

00:29:37.640 --> 00:29:39.660
the debt, the mortgages, remained. And because

00:29:39.660 --> 00:29:41.859
the banks had lent 100 % of the inflated value,

00:29:42.039 --> 00:29:45.000
or in some cases even more, they were left holding

00:29:45.000 --> 00:29:47.839
trillions of dollars in toxic assets. The flipping

00:29:47.839 --> 00:29:51.240
frenzy was a major, major component. of what

00:29:51.240 --> 00:29:53.559
became the global financial crisis. It's actually

00:29:53.559 --> 00:29:55.859
terrifying to think that a bunch of people slapping

00:29:55.859 --> 00:29:58.079
gray paint on houses in Florida and Nevada helped

00:29:58.079 --> 00:29:59.940
take down an institution like Lehman Brothers.

00:30:00.160 --> 00:30:02.180
It just shows how interconnected and fragile

00:30:02.180 --> 00:30:04.799
the whole system can be. So surely we learned

00:30:04.799 --> 00:30:07.640
our lesson from that, right? This brings us to

00:30:07.640 --> 00:30:11.559
segment five, regulation. What did the government

00:30:11.559 --> 00:30:14.240
do to stop this from ever happening again? Well,

00:30:14.299 --> 00:30:16.960
they tried. The FHA, the Federal Housing Administration,

00:30:17.240 --> 00:30:19.740
has always been wary of this stuff. They insure

00:30:19.740 --> 00:30:22.079
mortgages against default. So they are the ones

00:30:22.079 --> 00:30:24.400
on the hook financially when these fraud schemes

00:30:24.400 --> 00:30:26.740
go south. So they have skin in the game. A lot

00:30:26.740 --> 00:30:30.160
of skin in the game. So back in 2003, they already

00:30:30.160 --> 00:30:33.319
had rules about this. But in 2006, right as the

00:30:33.319 --> 00:30:35.640
bubble was really peaking, they introduced a

00:30:35.640 --> 00:30:38.400
very specific rule designed to stop predatory

00:30:38.400 --> 00:30:40.890
flipping in its tracks. It was called the 90

00:30:40.890 --> 00:30:43.170
-day rule. Okay, the 90 -day rule. How did that

00:30:43.170 --> 00:30:45.250
work? It was very simple and very effective.

00:30:45.450 --> 00:30:47.910
If you bought a house, you were prohibited from

00:30:47.910 --> 00:30:50.589
reselling it to a buyer using an FHA -insured

00:30:50.589 --> 00:30:53.990
mortgage for at least 90 days. Why 90 days? What's

00:30:53.990 --> 00:30:56.829
magical about three months? It stops the churn.

00:30:57.349 --> 00:30:59.630
The illegal fraud schemes we just talked about,

00:30:59.890 --> 00:31:03.269
the buy at noon, sell at 1 p .m. scams, those

00:31:03.269 --> 00:31:06.450
rely on incredible speed. By forcing the investor

00:31:06.450 --> 00:31:09.269
to actually hold the property for 90 days, you

00:31:09.269 --> 00:31:12.230
force them to incur real costs. Holding costs.

00:31:12.589 --> 00:31:15.210
Exactly. Mortgage payments, insurance, taxes,

00:31:15.529 --> 00:31:18.029
maintenance, market risk. It makes the quick

00:31:18.029 --> 00:31:20.930
and dirty scam unprofitable and much riskier.

00:31:21.049 --> 00:31:23.289
So it's basically a speed bump for the market.

00:31:23.529 --> 00:31:27.230
It's a fantastic speed bump. And it worked until...

00:31:28.149 --> 00:31:30.089
Ironically, it became a problem. Wait, how did

00:31:30.089 --> 00:31:32.529
a rule that stopped fraud become a problem? Because

00:31:32.529 --> 00:31:34.950
of the crash it was meant to prevent. By 2010,

00:31:35.170 --> 00:31:37.670
the housing market was a corpse. Foreclosures

00:31:37.670 --> 00:31:39.549
were everywhere. Banks were drowning in this

00:31:39.549 --> 00:31:41.890
bad inventory they couldn't get rid of. The government

00:31:41.890 --> 00:31:45.099
needed someone. anyone to come in and start buying

00:31:45.099 --> 00:31:47.440
up these foreclosed homes to stabilize the market.

00:31:47.539 --> 00:31:49.400
They needed the flippers. They needed the flippers.

00:31:49.480 --> 00:31:51.539
But the flippers, the legitimate ones, were saying,

00:31:51.700 --> 00:31:53.799
hey, we can't buy these thousands of foreclosures

00:31:53.799 --> 00:31:56.220
because the 90 -day rule ties up our capital

00:31:56.220 --> 00:31:58.680
for too long. We need to be able to move fast

00:31:58.680 --> 00:32:01.839
to make the business model work. Wow. So the

00:32:01.839 --> 00:32:03.759
government was stuck between a rock and a hard

00:32:03.759 --> 00:32:06.920
place. Do you keep the rule that stops fraud

00:32:06.920 --> 00:32:09.740
or do you get rid of it to save the entire market

00:32:09.740 --> 00:32:12.440
from collapsing further? And they chose the market.

00:32:12.799 --> 00:32:16.000
In 2010, the FHA issued a waiver that greatly

00:32:16.000 --> 00:32:19.220
relaxed and for a period of time essentially

00:32:19.220 --> 00:32:21.660
eliminated the 90 -day requirement. They took

00:32:21.660 --> 00:32:23.920
down the speed bump to get traffic moving again,

00:32:24.000 --> 00:32:26.079
even if some of that traffic was dangerous. That's

00:32:26.079 --> 00:32:28.240
the perfect analogy. It was a calculated risk.

00:32:28.400 --> 00:32:31.259
They hoped that other newer oversight mechanisms

00:32:31.259 --> 00:32:33.700
like stricter appraisal standards and smarter

00:32:33.700 --> 00:32:36.420
bank algorithms would catch the fraud this time.

00:32:36.890 --> 00:32:39.190
And to be fair, we do have things now like U

00:32:39.190 --> 00:32:40.869
.S. PAPE, which are the professional appraisal

00:32:40.869 --> 00:32:43.349
standards. And Fannie Mae has these collateral

00:32:43.349 --> 00:32:45.809
underwriter programs that automatically flag

00:32:45.809 --> 00:32:49.369
suspicious rapid flips. But the fundamental tension

00:32:49.369 --> 00:32:52.869
remains. Regulation slows down market. Deregulation

00:32:52.869 --> 00:32:55.130
invites fraud. It's a pendulum that just keeps

00:32:55.130 --> 00:32:57.609
swinging back and forth. Now, I want to pivot

00:32:57.609 --> 00:32:59.529
from government regulation to something that

00:32:59.529 --> 00:33:01.710
I think is in some ways just as powerful and

00:33:01.710 --> 00:33:04.170
shaping this industry. And that's the culture,

00:33:04.369 --> 00:33:07.410
the media. Oh, this is huge. You can't understand

00:33:07.410 --> 00:33:09.890
modern flipping without talking about TV. Right,

00:33:10.029 --> 00:33:12.769
because as we said, after the 2008 crash, flipping

00:33:12.769 --> 00:33:15.450
was a dirty word. If you called someone a flipper,

00:33:15.529 --> 00:33:17.130
it was an insult. You were basically calling

00:33:17.130 --> 00:33:20.069
them a shark, a scammer, a person who helped

00:33:20.069 --> 00:33:22.210
cause the recession. It was a derogatory term.

00:33:22.250 --> 00:33:24.190
It was associated with financial ruin and greed.

00:33:24.690 --> 00:33:28.490
But then... Yeah. Something shifted. The reputation

00:33:28.490 --> 00:33:31.690
got laundered. And I think we can trace it back

00:33:31.690 --> 00:33:34.369
to a specific network and a specific genre of

00:33:34.369 --> 00:33:38.920
television. Reality TV, HGTV, A &amp;E. Bravo. And

00:33:38.920 --> 00:33:40.740
the sources mentioned a really specific moment

00:33:40.740 --> 00:33:45.259
in July 2012. CNBC, which is a serious business

00:33:45.259 --> 00:33:48.599
news network, greenlit multiple new pilots, all

00:33:48.599 --> 00:33:50.440
focused on house flipping. That was the signal.

00:33:50.500 --> 00:33:52.279
That was the moment the industry came out of

00:33:52.279 --> 00:33:54.759
the penalty box. When a network like CNBC says

00:33:54.759 --> 00:33:57.240
this is legitimate business content, they are

00:33:57.240 --> 00:33:59.420
re -legitimizing the entire practice for the

00:33:59.420 --> 00:34:01.420
public. They are saying this is a valid business

00:34:01.420 --> 00:34:03.420
again. And then the flood gets just opened. Flip

00:34:03.420 --> 00:34:05.680
or flop. Flip this house. Property ladder masters

00:34:05.680 --> 00:34:08.369
a flip. Then the crazier ones like Zombie House

00:34:08.369 --> 00:34:11.050
Flipping, Flipping Vegas, Flipping Boston. It's

00:34:11.050 --> 00:34:13.329
an endless list. But think about what these shows

00:34:13.329 --> 00:34:17.030
actually do psychologically. They gamify housing.

00:34:17.230 --> 00:34:19.789
They absolutely do. Every single episode has

00:34:19.789 --> 00:34:22.869
the exact same formulaic structure. The brave,

00:34:22.869 --> 00:34:25.469
telegenic hero buys the ugliest house on the

00:34:25.469 --> 00:34:28.230
block. They encounter a scary, unexpected prop.

00:34:28.369 --> 00:34:31.280
Oh no, the budget. Which usually happens right

00:34:31.280 --> 00:34:33.679
before a commercial break. Of course. They heroically

00:34:33.679 --> 00:34:36.420
solve it. They stage the house with beautiful

00:34:36.420 --> 00:34:41.539
furniture. And then the payoff. The big reveal.

00:34:41.800 --> 00:34:43.940
And the graphic on the screen. Purchase price,

00:34:44.059 --> 00:34:47.599
$6. Renovation cost, 36 city. Total profit, $50

00:34:47.599 --> 00:34:50.860
,000. And then everyone high fives and the credits

00:34:50.860 --> 00:34:53.349
roll. It trains us as viewers to view the house

00:34:53.349 --> 00:34:56.110
solely as a profit center. It trains us to root

00:34:56.110 --> 00:34:58.590
for the highest possible sale price. Exactly.

00:34:58.750 --> 00:35:00.349
You're sitting there on your couch and you are

00:35:00.349 --> 00:35:02.389
actively cheering for the house to sell for the

00:35:02.389 --> 00:35:04.170
highest number imaginable. You were cheering

00:35:04.170 --> 00:35:06.349
for housing inflation in your city. You never

00:35:06.349 --> 00:35:07.949
stopped to ask, wait, who can actually afford

00:35:07.949 --> 00:35:10.389
that house now? Or what does this do to the property

00:35:10.389 --> 00:35:12.849
taxes of the neighbors? You're just happy that

00:35:12.849 --> 00:35:15.119
the nice couple on TV made their money. And it

00:35:15.119 --> 00:35:17.800
completely, totally glosses over the lipstick

00:35:17.800 --> 00:35:20.619
issue we talked about. We are trained by these

00:35:20.619 --> 00:35:23.860
shows to applaud the gray floors and the subway

00:35:23.860 --> 00:35:27.360
tile and the barn doors. That specific visual

00:35:27.360 --> 00:35:31.199
language, the HGTV aesthetic, becomes the new

00:35:31.199 --> 00:35:33.960
standard for what value looks like. And we don't

00:35:33.960 --> 00:35:36.400
ask if they properly replaced the 80 -year -old

00:35:36.400 --> 00:35:39.280
wiring. We just ask if they successfully opened

00:35:39.280 --> 00:35:41.420
up the floor plan. It creates a whole generation

00:35:41.420 --> 00:35:45.159
of buyers who value aesthetics over mechanics.

00:35:45.780 --> 00:35:48.300
And maybe even more dangerously, it creates a

00:35:48.300 --> 00:35:50.960
generation of amateur flippers who watch these

00:35:50.960 --> 00:35:52.960
shows and think, hey, I can do that. It looks

00:35:52.960 --> 00:35:54.719
so easy. And then they go out, they get a hard

00:35:54.719 --> 00:35:56.539
money loan, they buy a house in Akron, and they

00:35:56.539 --> 00:35:59.019
get absolutely crushed by that demo discovery.

00:35:59.340 --> 00:36:01.760
Right. The media narrative just fuels the cycle.

00:36:01.840 --> 00:36:04.239
It keeps the fresh, naive capital flowing into

00:36:04.239 --> 00:36:06.559
the system, which helps keep the prices up, which

00:36:06.559 --> 00:36:08.860
keeps the pros in business. It's a self -perpetuating

00:36:08.860 --> 00:36:12.900
machine. So after all of this, where does this

00:36:12.900 --> 00:36:15.360
leave us? We've looked at the economics, the

00:36:15.360 --> 00:36:17.300
incredible 100 percent margins in the Midwest.

00:36:17.820 --> 00:36:20.380
We've looked at the good, the real value of fixing

00:36:20.380 --> 00:36:22.860
broken windows and saving homes. We've looked

00:36:22.860 --> 00:36:25.659
at the bad and the ugly, the fraud, the displacement

00:36:25.659 --> 00:36:28.820
and the systemic risk to our economy. I think

00:36:28.820 --> 00:36:30.750
we're left with a spectrum. That really is the

00:36:30.750 --> 00:36:32.409
most important takeaway for anyone listening.

00:36:32.909 --> 00:36:35.750
Flipping isn't inherently evil and it isn't inherently

00:36:35.750 --> 00:36:38.769
good. It is a tool. It is a mechanism for capital

00:36:38.769 --> 00:36:40.829
allocation in the housing market. In the hands

00:36:40.829 --> 00:36:43.329
of a responsible local contractor in Cleveland

00:36:43.329 --> 00:36:45.750
who really cares about the neighborhood, who

00:36:45.750 --> 00:36:48.530
buys a rot infested shell of a house and genuinely

00:36:48.530 --> 00:36:51.030
turns it back into a safe, beautiful family home.

00:36:51.389 --> 00:36:53.929
That's a win for everyone. That is rejuvenation.

00:36:53.929 --> 00:36:57.090
That is saving a dying asset and adding value

00:36:57.090 --> 00:36:59.130
to a community. But in the hands of a remote

00:36:59.130 --> 00:37:01.110
speculator who has never set foot in the state

00:37:01.110 --> 00:37:03.590
or a criminal fraudster or a lipstick artist

00:37:03.590 --> 00:37:05.670
just looking for a quick buck. It is a predatory

00:37:05.670 --> 00:37:07.909
practice. It extracts wealth from the community.

00:37:08.050 --> 00:37:10.250
It degrades the long term quality of the housing

00:37:10.250 --> 00:37:12.869
stock and it fuels instability for everyone.

00:37:13.090 --> 00:37:15.329
It creates wealth for investors. There's no doubt.

00:37:15.449 --> 00:37:17.329
It creates tax revenue for struggling cities.

00:37:17.670 --> 00:37:20.050
But it so often comes at the direct expense of

00:37:20.050 --> 00:37:22.489
long term residents and overall affordability.

00:37:22.610 --> 00:37:25.179
And that tension isn't going away. I mean, as

00:37:25.179 --> 00:37:27.679
long as housing in our society is viewed as an

00:37:27.679 --> 00:37:30.280
investment vehicle, as one of the primary ways

00:37:30.280 --> 00:37:32.880
to build wealth, rather than just as a place

00:37:32.880 --> 00:37:36.039
to sleep flipping, is going to be a central and

00:37:36.039 --> 00:37:38.539
controversial part of the American economy. So

00:37:38.539 --> 00:37:40.320
here's the question I really want to leave you

00:37:40.320 --> 00:37:43.500
with today. We all love a good before and after

00:37:43.500 --> 00:37:46.019
picture. It's satisfying. It triggers something

00:37:46.019 --> 00:37:49.159
in our brains that loves order from chaos. But

00:37:49.159 --> 00:37:52.059
when does a smart investment cross that invisible

00:37:52.059 --> 00:37:55.079
line and become predatory behavior? And I would

00:37:55.079 --> 00:37:57.539
add this final thought to that. The next time

00:37:57.539 --> 00:37:59.739
you see that for sale sign on a newly renovated

00:37:59.739 --> 00:38:01.780
home, the one with the perfect fresh sod and

00:38:01.780 --> 00:38:04.199
the trendy modern fawn, ask yourself about the

00:38:04.199 --> 00:38:06.480
invisible costs. Who lived in that house before?

00:38:06.639 --> 00:38:08.800
Why did they have to leave? And who is really

00:38:08.800 --> 00:38:10.920
truly paying for that profit margin you see on

00:38:10.920 --> 00:38:14.360
TV? Is it the new buyer? Is it the bank? Or is

00:38:14.360 --> 00:38:16.210
it the neighborhood itself? Something to think

00:38:16.210 --> 00:38:18.130
about the next time you drive past one of those

00:38:18.130 --> 00:38:21.590
little yellow we buy ugly houses signs. Thanks

00:38:21.590 --> 00:38:23.849
for diving deep with us. We'll see you next time.
