WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:01.620 I want to start today with something that's, 00:00:01.720 --> 00:00:05.980 honestly, it's a little uncomfortable. I'm going 00:00:05.980 --> 00:00:07.599 to read you a quote, and I don't want you to 00:00:07.599 --> 00:00:09.160 just hear it. I want you to really sit with it 00:00:09.160 --> 00:00:11.560 for a second, because when I first opened the 00:00:11.560 --> 00:00:15.060 file we're looking at today, this quote just 00:00:15.060 --> 00:00:17.140 stopped me cold. I have a feeling I know exactly 00:00:17.140 --> 00:00:18.719 which one you're looking at. It's right near 00:00:18.719 --> 00:00:20.899 the beginning. It is. It's from Jeremy Richman. 00:00:21.359 --> 00:00:24.300 He was the father of Eviel Richman, who was one 00:00:24.300 --> 00:00:27.190 of the first graders killed at Sandy Hook. He 00:00:27.190 --> 00:00:29.329 gave this testimony to the commission we're discussing 00:00:29.329 --> 00:00:32.130 today, and he was talking about the condolences 00:00:32.130 --> 00:00:35.189 he and his wife received. He said, we would often 00:00:35.189 --> 00:00:37.350 hear people say, I can't imagine what you're 00:00:37.350 --> 00:00:39.890 going through. I can't imagine how hard it must 00:00:39.890 --> 00:00:42.289 be. I can't imagine losing your child. Which 00:00:42.289 --> 00:00:44.670 is the default, right? It's what we all say when 00:00:44.670 --> 00:00:46.729 we don't know what to say. It's meant to be kind, 00:00:46.869 --> 00:00:49.810 to show support without being intrusive. Exactly. 00:00:49.929 --> 00:00:53.380 It's almost a polite shield. But then he pivots, 00:00:53.399 --> 00:00:55.320 and this is the part that, you know, it really 00:00:55.320 --> 00:00:57.420 hurts, he says. And while we appreciated the 00:00:57.420 --> 00:00:59.600 sentiment, the fact was that they were imagining 00:00:59.600 --> 00:01:01.840 it. They were putting themselves into our shoes 00:01:01.840 --> 00:01:05.079 for at least a second. And as hard and as horrible 00:01:05.079 --> 00:01:07.680 as it sounds, we need people to imagine what 00:01:07.680 --> 00:01:10.640 it is like. Without that imagination, we'll never 00:01:10.640 --> 00:01:13.859 change. That is just a profoundly difficult and 00:01:13.859 --> 00:01:16.859 profoundly necessary place to start. It's a demand, 00:01:16.920 --> 00:01:19.280 really. It demands that we move from sympathy, 00:01:19.579 --> 00:01:22.680 which is easy, and it's passive to real empathy, 00:01:22.939 --> 00:01:26.099 which is active work, and it's painful. It is 00:01:26.099 --> 00:01:28.000 work. He's challenging us to actually do that 00:01:28.000 --> 00:01:30.079 work, to look at the horror directly, not to 00:01:30.079 --> 00:01:32.000 wallow in it, but because if we don't truly imagine 00:01:32.000 --> 00:01:34.500 how the system failed, how every crack lined 00:01:34.500 --> 00:01:37.890 up on that one day. We can't possibly fix them. 00:01:37.969 --> 00:01:39.590 And that really is the entire mission of the 00:01:39.590 --> 00:01:41.530 document we're looking at today. It really is. 00:01:41.790 --> 00:01:44.590 And that brings us to our deep dive. We are looking 00:01:44.590 --> 00:01:46.510 at the final report of the Sandy Hook Advisory 00:01:46.510 --> 00:01:49.450 Commission. This is a huge document. It was presented 00:01:49.450 --> 00:01:51.329 to the governor of Connecticut, Daniel Malloy, 00:01:51.510 --> 00:01:55.109 back in March of 2015. So, you know, a couple 00:01:55.109 --> 00:01:57.930 of years after the event. And look, we all know 00:01:57.930 --> 00:02:00.189 the context. We know this report stems from the 00:02:00.189 --> 00:02:03.290 tragedy on December 14, 2012 at Sandy Hook Elementary 00:02:03.290 --> 00:02:07.760 School in Newtown, Connecticut. But I think there's 00:02:07.760 --> 00:02:09.639 a tendency to look at a big government report 00:02:09.639 --> 00:02:11.819 like this and just think it's, I don't know, 00:02:11.860 --> 00:02:14.599 paperwork, a doorstop, something that gets filed 00:02:14.599 --> 00:02:17.120 away. And that would be a massive mistake. This 00:02:17.120 --> 00:02:19.900 wasn't a standard bureaucratic exercise. The 00:02:19.900 --> 00:02:21.900 commission wasn't just tasked with a crime scene 00:02:21.900 --> 00:02:23.659 investigation. They weren't just asking what 00:02:23.659 --> 00:02:27.300 happened or who did it. We knew those answers, 00:02:27.479 --> 00:02:30.180 tragically, very quickly. Their mission was entirely 00:02:30.180 --> 00:02:32.080 forward -looking. Right. The mission statement 00:02:32.080 --> 00:02:33.740 was basically, how do we stop this from ever 00:02:33.740 --> 00:02:36.099 happening again? And the scope is just staggering. 00:02:36.280 --> 00:02:38.460 I went into this expecting a lot of talk about 00:02:38.460 --> 00:02:41.219 gun laws, and sure, that's in there. A lot. But 00:02:41.219 --> 00:02:42.939 it also covers safe school design, architecture, 00:02:43.280 --> 00:02:45.460 police response tactics, mental health insurance 00:02:45.460 --> 00:02:48.000 billing, landscaping. It's everything. And the 00:02:48.000 --> 00:02:50.780 commission actually uses a specific word to describe 00:02:50.780 --> 00:02:52.979 their recommendations. They call it a tapestry. 00:02:53.539 --> 00:02:56.979 I think that word choice is deliberate and really 00:02:56.979 --> 00:02:59.120 important for us to keep in mind throughout this 00:02:59.120 --> 00:03:02.219 whole discussion. Why tapestry? Why not just 00:03:02.219 --> 00:03:04.680 a plan? Or a checklist. Well, think about a checklist. 00:03:04.879 --> 00:03:07.039 A checklist implies that if you do three out 00:03:07.039 --> 00:03:08.960 of five things, you're, you know, 60 percent 00:03:08.960 --> 00:03:11.560 safe. You can pick and choose. A tapestry, on 00:03:11.560 --> 00:03:14.319 the other hand, implies that everything is interwoven. 00:03:14.599 --> 00:03:18.060 If you pull one thread, say, you focus entirely 00:03:18.060 --> 00:03:20.960 on hardening the school doors with steel, but 00:03:20.960 --> 00:03:23.340 you completely ignore the mental health system. 00:03:23.439 --> 00:03:25.419 The whole thing unravels. You haven't actually 00:03:25.419 --> 00:03:28.379 created safety. You've just moved the risk around. 00:03:28.500 --> 00:03:31.400 You need all these disparate elements. Law enforcement, 00:03:31.659 --> 00:03:33.620 school. design and mental health working together 00:03:33.620 --> 00:03:36.240 to create a net that can actually catch people. 00:03:36.400 --> 00:03:39.000 So let's start to unpack this tapestry. But before 00:03:39.000 --> 00:03:40.680 we get into the nitty gritty of the locks and 00:03:40.680 --> 00:03:43.439 the laws, there was this one concept right at 00:03:43.439 --> 00:03:45.080 the beginning of the report that really surprised 00:03:45.080 --> 00:03:47.939 me. It felt kind of counterintuitive. They call 00:03:47.939 --> 00:03:51.900 it the all hazards philosophy. Yes. This is absolutely 00:03:51.900 --> 00:03:54.159 foundational. If you don't understand the all 00:03:54.159 --> 00:03:56.699 hazards approach, none of the other recommendations 00:03:56.699 --> 00:03:59.280 really make sense in context. It's the philosophy 00:03:59.280 --> 00:04:01.800 of modern emergency management, really. OK, so 00:04:01.800 --> 00:04:04.039 walk me through it, because my first instinct 00:04:04.039 --> 00:04:06.080 and I think the instinct of any parent listening 00:04:06.080 --> 00:04:09.620 right now is to say, I don't care about all hazards. 00:04:09.699 --> 00:04:13.020 I care about the hazard, the shooter. If I'm 00:04:13.020 --> 00:04:15.430 a principal, why shouldn't I just. Turn the school 00:04:15.430 --> 00:04:18.290 into a fortress. Bolt the doors, bar the windows, 00:04:18.470 --> 00:04:21.149 build a concrete bunker. And that is the natural 00:04:21.149 --> 00:04:23.129 emotional response. It's completely understandable. 00:04:23.490 --> 00:04:25.730 But the commission realized early on that if 00:04:25.730 --> 00:04:28.149 you design a school specifically and only to 00:04:28.149 --> 00:04:30.209 stop an active shooter, you might accidentally 00:04:30.209 --> 00:04:32.589 create a death trap for other, much more common 00:04:32.589 --> 00:04:34.889 emergencies. Okay, give me an example. Think 00:04:34.889 --> 00:04:37.970 about a fire. A fire is statistically way more 00:04:37.970 --> 00:04:40.110 likely to happen in a school than a shooting. 00:04:40.290 --> 00:04:43.980 Or a chemical spill in a science lab. or a natural 00:04:43.980 --> 00:04:46.519 disaster like a tornado or an earthquake, depending 00:04:46.519 --> 00:04:49.199 on where you live. Now, if you've turned that 00:04:49.199 --> 00:04:51.980 school into a gated community or a prison where 00:04:51.980 --> 00:04:54.379 every exit is barred and chained to keep bad 00:04:54.379 --> 00:04:57.600 guys out. How do you get 500 children out during 00:04:57.600 --> 00:04:59.459 a fire? You can't. You've trapped them inside. 00:04:59.699 --> 00:05:02.860 Exactly. You've traded one very specific, very 00:05:02.860 --> 00:05:05.699 rare risk for another much more probable risk. 00:05:05.899 --> 00:05:08.720 The all hazards approach means that every recommendation 00:05:08.720 --> 00:05:10.920 has to be weighed against the full spectrum of 00:05:10.920 --> 00:05:13.740 risk. The goal isn't to build a bunker that can 00:05:13.740 --> 00:05:15.959 withstand a siege but fails during a medical 00:05:15.959 --> 00:05:18.620 emergency. It's about building safer schools 00:05:18.620 --> 00:05:20.740 that remain welcoming, functional places for 00:05:20.740 --> 00:05:23.339 education while mitigating all types of threats. 00:05:23.560 --> 00:05:25.449 So it's a balancing act. You have to secure the 00:05:25.449 --> 00:05:27.589 facility, but you can't compromise the ability 00:05:27.589 --> 00:05:31.269 to evacuate. Or I guess for EMTs to get in if 00:05:31.269 --> 00:05:33.259 a kid has an asthma attack. Correct. And that 00:05:33.259 --> 00:05:35.540 brings up the core tension of this whole deep 00:05:35.540 --> 00:05:37.699 dive, really. It's the question the commission 00:05:37.699 --> 00:05:41.019 wrestled with on every page. How do you secure 00:05:41.019 --> 00:05:43.920 a school without turning it into a prison? Because 00:05:43.920 --> 00:05:45.920 the moment a school starts to feel like a prison, 00:05:46.000 --> 00:05:48.699 they argue, you are actually damaging the educational 00:05:48.699 --> 00:05:50.759 experience and the psychological development 00:05:50.759 --> 00:05:53.959 of the children inside, which in the long run 00:05:53.959 --> 00:05:57.019 creates its own set of problems. So to understand 00:05:57.019 --> 00:05:59.439 the solutions they came up with. the specific 00:05:59.439 --> 00:06:02.420 recommendations about locks and glass and police 00:06:02.420 --> 00:06:04.920 tactics. We have to look at the event itself. 00:06:05.100 --> 00:06:07.180 We have to understand the why behind the what. 00:06:07.259 --> 00:06:09.420 And I have to warn you, our listeners, we are 00:06:09.420 --> 00:06:11.439 going to talk about the timeline of that morning. 00:06:11.660 --> 00:06:15.300 It is heavy. It's uncomfortable. But... The report 00:06:15.300 --> 00:06:17.879 is very, very factual about this and for a very 00:06:17.879 --> 00:06:19.839 good reason. We have to look at the clock. The 00:06:19.839 --> 00:06:21.899 commission found that you cannot possibly fix 00:06:21.899 --> 00:06:23.639 the problem if you don't understand what they 00:06:23.639 --> 00:06:26.439 called the calculus of time. So let's walk through 00:06:26.439 --> 00:06:30.000 the morning of December 14, 2012. The report 00:06:30.000 --> 00:06:32.560 lays it out clinically, minute by minute. The 00:06:32.560 --> 00:06:34.439 shooter arrived at the school shortly before 00:06:34.439 --> 00:06:37.579 9 .30 a .m. And he didn't exactly sneak in, did 00:06:37.579 --> 00:06:40.319 he? No. And this is important. It dispels a common 00:06:40.319 --> 00:06:42.279 myth about how these things happen. He didn't 00:06:42.279 --> 00:06:44.319 pick a lock. He didn't find an open side door. 00:06:44.459 --> 00:06:47.040 He didn't trick a janitor. The front doors of 00:06:47.040 --> 00:06:48.819 Sandy Hook Elementary were locked. They were 00:06:48.819 --> 00:06:51.079 secure. The school was following its standard 00:06:51.079 --> 00:06:54.139 protocol. So the lock on the door did its job, 00:06:54.279 --> 00:06:56.410 mechanically speaking. The lock worked perfectly, 00:06:56.550 --> 00:06:59.529 but the shooter bypassed the lock entirely by 00:06:59.529 --> 00:07:02.689 attacking the building envelope itself. He used 00:07:02.689 --> 00:07:06.649 a Bushmaster Model XM -15 E2S rifle to shoot 00:07:06.649 --> 00:07:09.850 out a large plate glass window right next to 00:07:09.850 --> 00:07:11.910 the locked front doors. I want to pause on the 00:07:11.910 --> 00:07:13.709 weapon for just a second because the report is 00:07:13.709 --> 00:07:15.930 very specific about exactly what he had on him. 00:07:15.970 --> 00:07:19.110 He had that Bushmaster rifle. He had two handguns, 00:07:19.110 --> 00:07:22.339 a Sig Sauer and a Glock. And he had hundreds 00:07:22.339 --> 00:07:24.600 of rounds of ammunition on his person in multiple 00:07:24.600 --> 00:07:26.980 magazines. And a shotgun was left in the car. 00:07:27.100 --> 00:07:29.560 He came prepared for a prolonged engagement. 00:07:29.980 --> 00:07:32.600 Right. So he shoots out the window, and he literally 00:07:32.600 --> 00:07:34.620 just steps through the hole he made in the glass 00:07:34.620 --> 00:07:37.259 into the school's lobby. Yes. Now, start the 00:07:37.259 --> 00:07:40.319 clock. The first 911 call hits the Newtown Police 00:07:40.319 --> 00:07:43.920 Department at 9 .35 and 39 seconds in the morning. 00:07:44.079 --> 00:07:47.759 Okay, 9 .35, .39. The first Newtown police officers 00:07:47.759 --> 00:07:49.759 arrived in the school driveway less than four 00:07:49.759 --> 00:07:52.720 minutes later. They were on site, at the building, 00:07:52.879 --> 00:07:55.240 and under four minutes. They entered the building 00:07:55.240 --> 00:07:58.579 shortly after that. And by 9 .40 a .m., the shooter 00:07:58.579 --> 00:08:02.459 had taken his own life. Wait. Pause there. That 00:08:02.459 --> 00:08:05.860 is, that's incredibly fast. It's minutes. The 00:08:05.860 --> 00:08:08.560 entire event from the first 911 call to the final 00:08:08.560 --> 00:08:11.439 gunshot was less than five minutes. I think when 00:08:11.439 --> 00:08:13.759 we see these things on the news or we watch movies, 00:08:14.000 --> 00:08:17.629 we imagine a standoff. We imagine SWAT teams 00:08:17.629 --> 00:08:19.990 negotiating for hours, a perimeter being set 00:08:19.990 --> 00:08:22.209 up. This was over before most of the first responders 00:08:22.209 --> 00:08:24.509 even started their engines. From his entry into 00:08:24.509 --> 00:08:26.149 the building to the end of the event, it was 00:08:26.149 --> 00:08:28.910 less than 10 minutes. And that leads to the commission's 00:08:28.910 --> 00:08:31.829 most chilling but most practical insight. They 00:08:31.829 --> 00:08:34.509 stated explicitly in the report. Seconds and 00:08:34.509 --> 00:08:36.850 minutes equate to lives lost or saved. It's a 00:08:36.850 --> 00:08:39.929 math problem, a brutal math problem. It is. And 00:08:39.929 --> 00:08:42.149 every single recommendation you'll find in this 00:08:42.149 --> 00:08:44.870 report regarding hardware, glass, locks and police 00:08:44.870 --> 00:08:47.929 response is built around that specific timeline. 00:08:48.289 --> 00:08:50.830 The goal isn't necessarily to stop the shooter 00:08:50.830 --> 00:08:52.610 at the perimeter, though that would be ideal. 00:08:52.750 --> 00:08:56.779 The primary achievable goal is to buy time. If 00:08:56.779 --> 00:08:58.480 you know the police will take four minutes to 00:08:58.480 --> 00:09:00.379 arrive, the building has to survive for four 00:09:00.379 --> 00:09:02.500 minutes and one second. And the report notes 00:09:02.500 --> 00:09:05.100 the sheer volume of fire during those few minutes. 00:09:05.299 --> 00:09:07.500 Yeah. This part was hard to read. They found 00:09:07.500 --> 00:09:10.919 154 spent casings from the rifle alone inside 00:09:10.919 --> 00:09:14.679 that school. Correct. 154 rifle rounds in roughly 00:09:14.679 --> 00:09:16.960 four minutes of shooting. That is a staggering 00:09:16.960 --> 00:09:19.539 amount of lethality. It's almost hard to comprehend 00:09:19.539 --> 00:09:21.700 that rate of fire. How is that even mechanically 00:09:21.700 --> 00:09:23.399 possible? I mean, you have to reload, right? 00:09:23.679 --> 00:09:25.720 And this brings us to the lethality analysis. 00:09:25.740 --> 00:09:27.980 analysis the commission performed. It's a critical 00:09:27.980 --> 00:09:31.039 piece of the puzzle. The shooter used high capacity 00:09:31.039 --> 00:09:35.159 30 round magazines. But not just that. He had 00:09:35.159 --> 00:09:37.679 taped two of these magazines together side by 00:09:37.679 --> 00:09:40.320 side but inverted. Jungle style I think it's 00:09:40.320 --> 00:09:42.659 called. That's the term. It's a military technique. 00:09:42.879 --> 00:09:45.220 You fire 30 rounds. You hit the magazine release. 00:09:45.539 --> 00:09:47.419 The empty one falls out. You just flip the whole 00:09:47.419 --> 00:09:50.519 thing over and you slam the fresh 30 round magazine 00:09:50.519 --> 00:09:53.700 in. You're reloading in under a second. So there's 00:09:53.700 --> 00:09:56.539 almost no pause. Almost zero pause. The commission 00:09:56.539 --> 00:09:59.039 argues that this specific mechanical advantage, 00:09:59.519 --> 00:10:02.879 the ability to maintain a continuous high volume 00:10:02.879 --> 00:10:06.360 stream of fire without pausing, directly correlated 00:10:06.360 --> 00:10:08.799 to the number of lives lost. Because every time 00:10:08.799 --> 00:10:11.000 a shooter has to stop and reload a standard magazine, 00:10:11.279 --> 00:10:14.360 that's a pause. That's a second where a teacher 00:10:14.360 --> 00:10:17.059 can lock a door or a child can run for cover 00:10:17.059 --> 00:10:19.580 or a police officer can advance down the hall. 00:10:19.909 --> 00:10:22.570 Exactly. It's friction. It's an interruption 00:10:22.570 --> 00:10:25.090 in the violence. If you force the shooter to 00:10:25.090 --> 00:10:27.490 stop and fumble with a new magazine from a pouch 00:10:27.490 --> 00:10:30.210 every 10 rounds, you've created multiple distinct 00:10:30.210 --> 00:10:32.789 pauses. Those are opportunities for survival. 00:10:33.009 --> 00:10:35.509 The taped, high -capacity magazines effectively 00:10:35.509 --> 00:10:37.789 eliminated those opportunities for the victims. 00:10:38.110 --> 00:10:40.909 So keeping that seconds count mantra in our minds, 00:10:41.090 --> 00:10:44.990 let's pivot to Section 2 of the report. Safe 00:10:44.990 --> 00:10:48.870 school design and operation, or SSDO as they 00:10:48.870 --> 00:10:50.610 call it. This is where the report gets really 00:10:50.610 --> 00:10:52.990 architectural. And again, they're wrestling with 00:10:52.990 --> 00:10:56.289 that central tension. We want safety, but we 00:10:56.289 --> 00:10:58.129 don't want to raise our children in a bunker. 00:10:58.590 --> 00:11:01.529 And they explicitly reject the idea of gated 00:11:01.529 --> 00:11:04.409 communities or prison -like environments for 00:11:04.409 --> 00:11:07.029 schools. They argue that if a school looks and 00:11:07.029 --> 00:11:09.350 feels like a prison, it fosters a culture of 00:11:09.350 --> 00:11:12.409 fear. And a culture of fear is actually counterproductive 00:11:12.409 --> 00:11:14.730 to learning and healthy development. So they 00:11:14.730 --> 00:11:17.590 use this term invisible security. Which sounds 00:11:17.590 --> 00:11:19.370 a bit like a spy movie, but it's actually a really 00:11:19.370 --> 00:11:22.250 practical and I think elegant concept. It's about 00:11:22.250 --> 00:11:24.169 designing safety features that you don't necessarily 00:11:24.169 --> 00:11:26.809 notice as security. It's baked into the environment 00:11:26.809 --> 00:11:28.889 and it starts at the very edge of the property 00:11:28.889 --> 00:11:31.629 line. The report leans heavily on a concept called 00:11:31.629 --> 00:11:34.809 CPTED. CPTED. OK, that's an acronym. Let's unpack 00:11:34.809 --> 00:11:37.250 that. It stands for Crime Prevention Through 00:11:37.250 --> 00:11:39.889 Environmental Design. It's a whole field of study. 00:11:40.909 --> 00:11:43.009 The basic idea is that the physical environment 00:11:43.009 --> 00:11:45.809 can be designed to influence human behavior in 00:11:45.809 --> 00:11:48.850 a way that deters crime. Okay, so if I drive 00:11:48.850 --> 00:11:52.009 past a school that was designed using CPT principles, 00:11:52.490 --> 00:11:55.690 what am I seeing? Or maybe, what am I not seeing? 00:11:55.929 --> 00:11:58.730 Well, you're not seeing a 12 -foot chain -link 00:11:58.730 --> 00:12:02.049 fence with razor wire on top. What you are seeing 00:12:02.049 --> 00:12:04.789 is thoughtful landscaping. You're seeing what's 00:12:04.789 --> 00:12:07.009 called natural surveillance. Natural surveillance. 00:12:07.250 --> 00:12:09.590 What is that? It's the idea that you design... 00:12:09.769 --> 00:12:12.330 the parking lots, the walkways, the main entrance, 00:12:12.549 --> 00:12:14.490 and the playgrounds, so that they are naturally 00:12:14.490 --> 00:12:16.590 observable by the people inside the building. 00:12:16.789 --> 00:12:19.450 You want clear, unobstructed sight lines. So 00:12:19.450 --> 00:12:21.610 no big, dense bushes right up against the windows 00:12:21.610 --> 00:12:23.889 where someone could hide. Exactly. And you don't 00:12:23.889 --> 00:12:26.389 put a playground behind a solid brick wall where 00:12:26.389 --> 00:12:28.429 nobody in the main office can see if a stranger 00:12:28.429 --> 00:12:30.669 walks up to the kids. You put that playground 00:12:30.669 --> 00:12:32.409 in a place that's visible from the administrative 00:12:32.409 --> 00:12:35.110 windows, from the library, from classrooms. You 00:12:35.110 --> 00:12:37.269 create a situation where you have dozens of pairs 00:12:37.269 --> 00:12:39.490 of eyes on it just by happenstance. stands throughout 00:12:39.490 --> 00:12:41.710 the day. So instead of a concrete wall, maybe 00:12:41.710 --> 00:12:43.669 you have a lower decorative fence you can see 00:12:43.669 --> 00:12:45.669 through. Right. Or you trim the tree canopy up 00:12:45.669 --> 00:12:47.490 high so you can see clearly under the branches. 00:12:48.049 --> 00:12:51.250 Precisely. To a parent, it just looks like nice 00:12:51.250 --> 00:12:54.289 gardening and a well -maintained property. To 00:12:54.289 --> 00:12:57.049 a security expert, it's a strategic design choice. 00:12:57.929 --> 00:13:00.809 The report also gets very specific about distance. 00:13:01.330 --> 00:13:04.129 For example, they recommend that playgrounds 00:13:04.129 --> 00:13:06.450 should be located at least 50 feet back from 00:13:06.450 --> 00:13:09.190 public access points or parking areas if at all 00:13:09.190 --> 00:13:12.059 possible. Just to create a buffer zone. A reaction 00:13:12.059 --> 00:13:14.179 gap. Right. And they talk about using things 00:13:14.179 --> 00:13:17.279 like bullards or large heavy planters to prevent 00:13:17.279 --> 00:13:19.379 vehicles from being able to drive right up to 00:13:19.379 --> 00:13:21.620 the front door at high speed. I've seen those. 00:13:21.740 --> 00:13:24.419 The big concrete flower pots or spheres outside 00:13:24.419 --> 00:13:26.980 of government buildings. To a visitor, it just 00:13:26.980 --> 00:13:29.000 looks like a nice landscaped entrance with some 00:13:29.000 --> 00:13:32.159 flowers. To a security expert, it's a vehicle 00:13:32.159 --> 00:13:34.679 barrier that prevents a car from being used as 00:13:34.679 --> 00:13:37.340 a battering ram or, in a worst case scenario, 00:13:37.700 --> 00:13:41.039 delivering a bomb. That is the essence of invisible 00:13:41.039 --> 00:13:43.919 security. But then we get to the building itself, 00:13:44.259 --> 00:13:46.820 the building envelope, as they call it. And this 00:13:46.820 --> 00:13:48.899 goes right back to what happened at Sandy Hook. 00:13:49.379 --> 00:13:52.059 Because as we established, the lock on the front 00:13:52.059 --> 00:13:55.129 door didn't fail. The glass failed. This is a 00:13:55.129 --> 00:13:58.490 major, major focus of the report. Most schools 00:13:58.490 --> 00:14:02.090 historically use standard tempered glass. You 00:14:02.090 --> 00:14:04.289 know, think of a sliding patio door in your house. 00:14:04.429 --> 00:14:06.730 If you shoot it or hit it hard enough with a 00:14:06.730 --> 00:14:09.049 hammer, what happens? It shatters into a million 00:14:09.049 --> 00:14:11.889 little cubes and falls out. Instantly. It just 00:14:11.889 --> 00:14:14.789 disintegrates. It offers zero resistance to entry. 00:14:14.830 --> 00:14:17.129 It's gone. So the commission recommends that 00:14:17.129 --> 00:14:20.149 all schools upgrade to forced entry -resistant 00:14:20.149 --> 00:14:22.350 glazing. Is that the same thing as bulletproof 00:14:22.350 --> 00:14:25.399 glass? Not necessarily, and that's a key distinction. 00:14:25.799 --> 00:14:28.779 True bullet -resistant glass is incredibly heavy, 00:14:28.899 --> 00:14:31.179 incredibly thick, and prohibitively expensive 00:14:31.179 --> 00:14:34.039 for most school districts. The goal here, again, 00:14:34.139 --> 00:14:36.080 isn't to make the school invincible. It's to 00:14:36.080 --> 00:14:38.879 buy time. Right. Back to the clock. Exactly. 00:14:38.940 --> 00:14:41.360 They talk about things like laminated glass. 00:14:41.460 --> 00:14:43.919 Think of your car's windshield. Okay, so if a 00:14:43.919 --> 00:14:47.659 rock hits my windshield on the highway, it cracks. 00:14:47.860 --> 00:14:50.980 It spiderwebs all over. But it doesn't fall into 00:14:50.980 --> 00:14:53.679 my lap. It stays in the frame. Exactly. Because 00:14:53.679 --> 00:14:56.940 there is a layer of plastic, a polymer, sandwiched 00:14:56.940 --> 00:14:58.980 between the layers of glass, it holds it all 00:14:58.980 --> 00:15:01.659 together. The commission suggests a standard 00:15:01.659 --> 00:15:04.279 where the glass in critical areas, like around 00:15:04.279 --> 00:15:07.360 doorways, should be able to withstand a determined 00:15:07.360 --> 00:15:10.519 forced entry for a specific amount of time. They 00:15:10.519 --> 00:15:13.419 suggest a five -minute forced entry standard 00:15:13.419 --> 00:15:15.600 as a goal. Okay, let's do the math on that right 00:15:15.600 --> 00:15:17.799 now. If the glass takes five minutes to beat 00:15:17.799 --> 00:15:19.990 through, And we know the police can arrive in 00:15:19.990 --> 00:15:21.850 four minutes. You've bridged the gap. You've 00:15:21.850 --> 00:15:24.230 won the race. Precisely. If the shooter shoots 00:15:24.230 --> 00:15:26.870 the window, it cracks and turns opaque, but it 00:15:26.870 --> 00:15:29.529 stays in the frame. Now he has to physically 00:15:29.529 --> 00:15:32.250 beat it out. He has to use the butt of the rifle 00:15:32.250 --> 00:15:35.149 or a hammer or kick it repeatedly. That takes 00:15:35.149 --> 00:15:37.009 energy. It makes a lot of noise, which alerts 00:15:37.009 --> 00:15:39.450 people inside. And most importantly, it burns 00:15:39.450 --> 00:15:42.179 the clock. Every second he spends fighting the 00:15:42.179 --> 00:15:44.559 window is a second a teacher can lock a door. 00:15:44.679 --> 00:15:46.960 That's fascinating. It's not about stopping the 00:15:46.960 --> 00:15:48.879 bullet. It's about frustrating the shooter and 00:15:48.879 --> 00:15:51.879 slowing him down. Correct. They also recommend, 00:15:52.120 --> 00:15:54.779 as part of that building envelope, a vestibule 00:15:54.779 --> 00:15:58.120 system, a double door, or what some people call 00:15:58.120 --> 00:16:00.480 an airlock entry. I've seen these in newer schools. 00:16:00.840 --> 00:16:02.860 You walk in the first set of doors from the outside, 00:16:03.080 --> 00:16:06.409 and you're trapped in a little glass lobby. You 00:16:06.409 --> 00:16:08.570 can't get into the main school hallway until 00:16:08.570 --> 00:16:10.590 someone in the office sees you and buzzes you 00:16:10.590 --> 00:16:13.370 through the second set of doors. Right. It forces 00:16:13.370 --> 00:16:15.610 every visitor to pass through a screening area. 00:16:15.769 --> 00:16:19.129 It prevents someone from just tailgating a student 00:16:19.129 --> 00:16:21.350 who's walking into the main hallway. It's a simple 00:16:21.350 --> 00:16:24.289 but very effective physical choke point. Okay, 00:16:24.350 --> 00:16:25.950 so we've hardened the outside and the entrance. 00:16:26.149 --> 00:16:28.509 Now let's move inside the building, into the 00:16:28.509 --> 00:16:31.289 classroom. And this, to me, this was the most 00:16:31.289 --> 00:16:34.009 striking and, frankly, hopeful finding in the 00:16:34.009 --> 00:16:36.720 whole design section. The door lock rule. It 00:16:36.720 --> 00:16:39.419 is the single most critical, low -tech, and life 00:16:39.419 --> 00:16:41.279 -saving finding in the report. The commission 00:16:41.279 --> 00:16:44.000 stated it very clearly. There has never been 00:16:44.000 --> 00:16:46.240 an event up to the time of the report's publication 00:16:46.240 --> 00:16:49.639 where an active shooter breached a locked and 00:16:49.639 --> 00:16:53.240 occupied classroom door. Never. Not once. Essentially 00:16:53.240 --> 00:16:56.480 never. In all the data they reviewed, active 00:16:56.480 --> 00:16:59.059 shooters do not spend time picking locks or trying 00:16:59.059 --> 00:17:01.820 to kick down solid wood or metal doors. They 00:17:01.820 --> 00:17:04.019 are racing the clock. They are looking for easy 00:17:04.019 --> 00:17:06.220 targets. They try the handle. If it's locked, 00:17:06.359 --> 00:17:08.519 they move on to the next one. They are hunting 00:17:08.519 --> 00:17:11.079 for targets of opportunity, not trying to solve 00:17:11.079 --> 00:17:14.099 an engineering problem. That is. Wow. I mean, 00:17:14.099 --> 00:17:16.380 that simplifies things so much, doesn't it? The 00:17:16.380 --> 00:17:19.079 answer is just lock the door. It sounds so simple, 00:17:19.099 --> 00:17:21.400 but the logistics of how you lock the door matter 00:17:21.400 --> 00:17:24.160 immensely. And this detail, when I read it, it 00:17:24.160 --> 00:17:27.019 honestly made me angry. I want you to think about 00:17:27.019 --> 00:17:29.559 the classrooms you grew up in. If the teacher 00:17:29.559 --> 00:17:31.559 heard a commotion and needed to lock the door, 00:17:31.720 --> 00:17:34.819 what did they have to do? Oh, man. They had to 00:17:34.819 --> 00:17:38.839 find the key. which is usually on a big jangly 00:17:38.839 --> 00:17:41.559 key chain, go to the door, open the door, step 00:17:41.559 --> 00:17:43.259 out into the hallway, put the key in the outside 00:17:43.259 --> 00:17:45.779 lock, turn it, take the key out, and then quickly 00:17:45.779 --> 00:17:47.779 get back inside and pull the door shut. Exactly. 00:17:47.779 --> 00:17:49.599 So in the middle of an active shooter event, 00:17:49.740 --> 00:17:51.819 the standard procedure in most older schools 00:17:51.819 --> 00:17:54.099 requires the teacher to open the door and step 00:17:54.099 --> 00:17:56.480 into the line of fire to secure the room. That's 00:17:56.480 --> 00:17:58.880 absolute insanity. The commission thought so 00:17:58.880 --> 00:18:02.460 too. Their recommendation is absolute and unequivocal. 00:18:03.019 --> 00:18:05.519 All classroom doors must be lockable from the 00:18:05.519 --> 00:18:09.200 inside without a key. A teacher should never, 00:18:09.240 --> 00:18:11.839 ever have to breach the safety of the room to 00:18:11.839 --> 00:18:14.259 engage the lock. It should be a simple thumb 00:18:14.259 --> 00:18:18.000 turn or a button. One action from the safe side 00:18:18.000 --> 00:18:20.019 of the door. It seems like such a small hardware 00:18:20.019 --> 00:18:22.079 change, but it's literally the difference between 00:18:22.079 --> 00:18:24.710 life and death. It is. They also mentioned a 00:18:24.710 --> 00:18:27.269 design feature for new schools called tailgating 00:18:27.269 --> 00:18:29.750 prevention between classrooms. What does that 00:18:29.750 --> 00:18:32.250 mean in this context? So many modern schools 00:18:32.250 --> 00:18:34.730 have doors that connect classrooms directly to 00:18:34.730 --> 00:18:37.990 each other. Room 101 connects to room 102 internally 00:18:37.990 --> 00:18:40.950 without going into the main hall. The report 00:18:40.950 --> 00:18:43.450 encourages this. It allows for internal movement 00:18:43.450 --> 00:18:46.089 and evacuation. If a shooter is in the hallway, 00:18:46.410 --> 00:18:48.430 a teacher in one room can move their students 00:18:48.430 --> 00:18:50.089 through the connecting door into the next room 00:18:50.089 --> 00:18:52.430 and so on, moving them further away from the 00:18:52.430 --> 00:18:54.950 threat without ever entering the dangerous corridor. 00:18:55.289 --> 00:18:58.119 It creates a maze for the shooter. But an escape 00:18:58.119 --> 00:19:00.619 route for the staff and students. There was one 00:19:00.619 --> 00:19:02.960 other detail in this design section that just 00:19:02.960 --> 00:19:06.859 seemed so small but so incredibly smart. The 00:19:06.859 --> 00:19:10.700 numbering system. Yes. This is all about situational 00:19:10.700 --> 00:19:13.480 awareness for first responders. The recommendation 00:19:13.480 --> 00:19:16.619 is to number all exterior windows and doors. 00:19:17.240 --> 00:19:19.900 Large reflective numbers. Maybe in the upper 00:19:19.900 --> 00:19:22.259 right corner of every single window. Explain 00:19:22.259 --> 00:19:25.339 why that's so critical. Okay. Imagine you are 00:19:25.339 --> 00:19:27.779 a police officer. You're the first one to arrive 00:19:27.779 --> 00:19:31.160 at this massive, sprawling brick school building. 00:19:31.599 --> 00:19:33.480 We've never been inside it before in your life. 00:19:33.680 --> 00:19:36.039 The dispatcher gets on the radio and says, a 00:19:36.039 --> 00:19:38.500 teacher is on the phone. She says the intruder 00:19:38.500 --> 00:19:41.099 is in Mrs. Smith's third grade classroom. You 00:19:41.099 --> 00:19:43.119 have absolutely no idea where that is. It could 00:19:43.119 --> 00:19:45.440 be anywhere. Zero idea. Is it on the first floor? 00:19:45.640 --> 00:19:48.779 The second, the north wing. But imagine the dispatcher 00:19:48.779 --> 00:19:50.740 says the teacher is hiding under her desk and 00:19:50.740 --> 00:19:53.769 she can see the number 12 on the window. And 00:19:53.769 --> 00:19:55.829 you, the officer outside, you just look up at 00:19:55.829 --> 00:19:57.769 the building and you see the big reflective number 00:19:57.769 --> 00:19:59.789 12 on a window on the second floor. You know 00:19:59.789 --> 00:20:02.009 exactly where the threat is. You know exactly 00:20:02.009 --> 00:20:04.269 where to go. It allows the people hiding inside 00:20:04.269 --> 00:20:06.269 to coordinate with the tactical teams outside. 00:20:06.769 --> 00:20:10.049 It cuts through the fog of war and saves precious, 00:20:10.349 --> 00:20:13.910 precious time. Now, implementing all this, you 00:20:13.910 --> 00:20:16.369 can't just hand a blueprint to a principal and 00:20:16.369 --> 00:20:19.309 walk away. This stuff needs maintenance. The 00:20:19.309 --> 00:20:21.470 report talks about creating local champions. 00:20:21.730 --> 00:20:24.130 This is all about the human element of security. 00:20:24.529 --> 00:20:27.829 Security isn't a one -time purchase. It's a constant 00:20:27.829 --> 00:20:31.390 process. Locks break. Glazing gets cracked by 00:20:31.390 --> 00:20:34.089 a stray baseball. New staff forget procedures. 00:20:34.490 --> 00:20:36.950 The report recommends a standing school security 00:20:36.950 --> 00:20:39.190 and safety committee in every single district. 00:20:39.450 --> 00:20:42.250 And interestingly, they get very specific about 00:20:42.250 --> 00:20:44.720 who should be on it. Of course, you have the 00:20:44.720 --> 00:20:46.599 police chief, the fire chief, the principal, 00:20:46.799 --> 00:20:49.539 and the custodians. I loved that detail. Why 00:20:49.539 --> 00:20:51.720 the custodians? Think about it. Who knows the 00:20:51.720 --> 00:20:53.720 physical building better than anyone else? Who 00:20:53.720 --> 00:20:55.819 knows which side door jams when it gets humid? 00:20:55.980 --> 00:20:58.000 Who knows that the latch on the boiler room window 00:20:58.000 --> 00:21:00.119 has been loose for six months? The guy with the 00:21:00.119 --> 00:21:03.460 keys. The head custodian. They are the eyes and 00:21:03.460 --> 00:21:06.039 ears of the fiscal plant. The commission recognized 00:21:06.039 --> 00:21:08.440 that leaving them out of security planning is 00:21:08.440 --> 00:21:11.480 a massive critical oversight. You can have the 00:21:11.480 --> 00:21:14.000 best policies in the world, but if the side door 00:21:14.000 --> 00:21:16.519 doesn't actually latch properly because the frame 00:21:16.519 --> 00:21:19.700 is rusted, you have no security. The custodian 00:21:19.700 --> 00:21:22.180 knows about the rust. They have to be at the 00:21:22.180 --> 00:21:25.259 table. That makes perfect sense. Okay, let's 00:21:25.259 --> 00:21:27.359 shift gears. This is a big one. We built the 00:21:27.359 --> 00:21:29.500 safer school building. Now we have to talk about 00:21:29.500 --> 00:21:34.039 the weapons themselves. Section 3. Law enforcement, 00:21:34.279 --> 00:21:37.680 weapons, and public safety. This is where the 00:21:37.680 --> 00:21:40.140 report navigates some very, very tricky political 00:21:40.140 --> 00:21:42.720 and constitutional waters. It absolutely does. 00:21:42.940 --> 00:21:45.319 And the report is very upfront about the legal 00:21:45.319 --> 00:21:48.039 landscape. They begin the section by citing District 00:21:48.039 --> 00:21:50.240 of Columbia v. Heller, which is the landmark 00:21:50.240 --> 00:21:52.779 Supreme Court case. They acknowledge that the 00:21:52.779 --> 00:21:54.799 Second Amendment protects an individual's right 00:21:54.799 --> 00:21:56.859 to bear arms for purposes like self -defense. 00:21:57.119 --> 00:21:59.140 So they aren't coming into this saying confiscate 00:21:59.140 --> 00:22:01.579 all guns. That's not the starting point. Not 00:22:01.579 --> 00:22:04.140 at all. They acknowledge there are some 300 million 00:22:04.140 --> 00:22:07.359 firearms in civilian hands in the U .S. Their 00:22:07.359 --> 00:22:10.700 focus isn't on a total ban, but on two very specific 00:22:10.700 --> 00:22:15.160 concepts, lethality and suitability. We touched 00:22:15.160 --> 00:22:17.839 on lethality with the taped magazines. But let's 00:22:17.839 --> 00:22:20.180 go deeper into the recommendations. The commission 00:22:20.180 --> 00:22:23.259 recommended a total ban on the sale and possession 00:22:23.259 --> 00:22:25.960 of any ammunition magazine capable of holding 00:22:25.960 --> 00:22:28.039 more than 10 rounds. Right. And the argument 00:22:28.039 --> 00:22:30.940 here is purely about the mechanics of mass casualty 00:22:30.940 --> 00:22:33.839 events. It's a time and math problem again. If 00:22:33.839 --> 00:22:36.119 you limit the magazine to 10 rounds, you force 00:22:36.119 --> 00:22:38.660 a reload every 10 shots. As we already discussed, 00:22:38.819 --> 00:22:41.720 that creates pauses. It reduces the volume of 00:22:41.720 --> 00:22:44.059 fire a single individual can produce in a short 00:22:44.059 --> 00:22:45.920 amount of time. Now, the immediate counterargument 00:22:45.920 --> 00:22:48.140 you always hear is, about sport. I need this 00:22:48.140 --> 00:22:50.559 for the range or I use this for competition shooting. 00:22:50.759 --> 00:22:52.579 The commission addressed that argument head on. 00:22:52.880 --> 00:22:55.599 They essentially argued that sportsmanship does 00:22:55.599 --> 00:22:58.480 not require military -grade magazines. If you 00:22:58.480 --> 00:23:01.039 are target shooting or hunting, the necessity 00:23:01.039 --> 00:23:03.680 for a 30 -round magazine simply doesn't outweigh 00:23:03.680 --> 00:23:05.920 the immense public safety risk they pose when 00:23:05.920 --> 00:23:08.359 used in a crime. They essentially drew a line 00:23:08.359 --> 00:23:10.839 and said, the convenience of the hobbyist in 00:23:10.839 --> 00:23:13.400 this specific case does not override the safety 00:23:13.400 --> 00:23:15.160 of the public. There was also a recommendation 00:23:15.160 --> 00:23:18.339 in this section that felt very CSI. or almost 00:23:18.339 --> 00:23:22.019 futuristic, the idea of laser etching. Yes, this 00:23:22.019 --> 00:23:24.279 is a very interesting technological recommendation. 00:23:24.980 --> 00:23:28.200 They suggested a law that would require every 00:23:28.200 --> 00:23:30.799 single shell casing sold in the state of Connecticut 00:23:30.799 --> 00:23:34.079 to have a unique serial number laser etched onto 00:23:34.079 --> 00:23:36.640 it. Every single bullet casing. Every single 00:23:36.640 --> 00:23:39.470 one. The reasoning is twofold. First, and most 00:23:39.470 --> 00:23:42.710 obviously, it aids in solving crimes. If you 00:23:42.710 --> 00:23:45.569 find spent casing at a crime scene, you can trace 00:23:45.569 --> 00:23:47.890 that casing back to the exact box of ammunition 00:23:47.890 --> 00:23:50.470 it came from and thus to the exact person who 00:23:50.470 --> 00:23:52.250 bought it. It's like a tiny license plate for 00:23:52.250 --> 00:23:54.549 every bullet. That's a great way to put it. But 00:23:54.549 --> 00:23:57.269 the second and maybe more important reason is 00:23:57.269 --> 00:24:00.890 to prevent straw purchases of ammunition. That's 00:24:00.890 --> 00:24:04.569 when I, a legal buyer, go and buy ammo for someone 00:24:04.569 --> 00:24:06.410 else who isn't legally allowed to have it, right? 00:24:06.730 --> 00:24:09.890 Correct. Now think about your behavior if you 00:24:09.890 --> 00:24:12.210 know that every single bullet you buy is registered 00:24:12.210 --> 00:24:15.390 to your name with a unique code. Are you going 00:24:15.390 --> 00:24:17.309 to buy a box of ammo and just hand it to your 00:24:17.309 --> 00:24:19.869 cousin who has a felony record? Probably not, 00:24:20.049 --> 00:24:23.140 because if he uses it in a crime... The police 00:24:23.140 --> 00:24:25.400 are going to come knocking on my door. Exactly. 00:24:25.700 --> 00:24:28.180 It creates a chain of accountability. It makes 00:24:28.180 --> 00:24:30.900 the original legal purchaser responsible for 00:24:30.900 --> 00:24:32.960 the projectile. It's designed to make people 00:24:32.960 --> 00:24:35.220 think twice about illegally trafficking ammunition. 00:24:35.599 --> 00:24:37.960 That brings us to the second big concept from 00:24:37.960 --> 00:24:41.119 this section, suitability. It's a word they use 00:24:41.119 --> 00:24:42.880 a lot. It sounds like a background check, but 00:24:42.880 --> 00:24:45.279 the report says it's much more than that. A standard 00:24:45.279 --> 00:24:48.440 background check, the NICS system, is essentially 00:24:48.440 --> 00:24:51.210 a negative search. It's a computer checking a 00:24:51.210 --> 00:24:54.549 database for disqualifiers. Do you have a felony 00:24:54.549 --> 00:24:57.349 conviction? Have you been involuntarily committed 00:24:57.349 --> 00:24:59.910 to a mental institution? Do you have a final 00:24:59.910 --> 00:25:02.410 restraining order against you? If the answer 00:25:02.410 --> 00:25:04.809 to all of those is no, you pass. It's a very 00:25:04.809 --> 00:25:08.269 rigid binary checklist. So if I'm a generally 00:25:08.269 --> 00:25:11.049 angry, threatening person who makes violent posts 00:25:11.049 --> 00:25:13.390 online, but I've never actually been convicted 00:25:13.390 --> 00:25:15.710 of a felony, I pass the check. Correct. And that 00:25:15.710 --> 00:25:18.200 is the gap the commission wants to close. Suitability 00:25:18.200 --> 00:25:20.900 is a much broader, more holistic standard. They 00:25:20.900 --> 00:25:23.259 recommend a screening process for anyone seeking 00:25:23.259 --> 00:25:25.279 a firearm license that assesses whether this 00:25:25.279 --> 00:25:28.519 person is, well, suitable to be trusted with 00:25:28.519 --> 00:25:30.799 that level of responsibility. This is where it 00:25:30.799 --> 00:25:32.940 gets very nuanced, right? Because they're very 00:25:32.940 --> 00:25:35.259 careful not to say, if you have any mental health 00:25:35.259 --> 00:25:38.170 diagnosis, you're banned. Crucially, no. And 00:25:38.170 --> 00:25:39.910 we will get to the mental health section in more 00:25:39.910 --> 00:25:42.829 detail shortly. But the report emphasizes again 00:25:42.829 --> 00:25:45.710 and again that a diagnosis alone shouldn't disqualify 00:25:45.710 --> 00:25:48.250 someone. The vast majority of people with depression 00:25:48.250 --> 00:25:51.690 or anxiety are not violent. Suitability is about 00:25:51.690 --> 00:25:54.589 looking at behavior. Have there been documented 00:25:54.589 --> 00:25:57.049 threats of violence? Is there a history of violent 00:25:57.049 --> 00:25:59.950 outbursts that maybe didn't result in a conviction 00:25:59.950 --> 00:26:02.650 but are documented in police reports? So it would 00:26:02.650 --> 00:26:04.650 give the local police chief or the licensing 00:26:04.650 --> 00:26:07.369 board more discretion. They could look at a file 00:26:07.369 --> 00:26:10.069 and say, look, this guy has had the police call 00:26:10.069 --> 00:26:12.329 to his house 10 times in the last year for domestic 00:26:12.329 --> 00:26:14.950 disturbances. He's never been arrested, but he's 00:26:14.950 --> 00:26:17.210 clearly not a suitable person to own a firearm 00:26:17.210 --> 00:26:19.849 right now. Exactly. It moves the process from 00:26:19.849 --> 00:26:22.509 a rigid computerized checklist to a human led 00:26:22.509 --> 00:26:26.019 risk. Speaking of police the report also had 00:26:26.019 --> 00:26:28.539 some very specific operational changes for law 00:26:28.539 --> 00:26:30.400 enforcement that came directly from the lessons 00:26:30.400 --> 00:26:33.359 of that day. One was about jurisdiction. Yes, 00:26:33.420 --> 00:26:36.380 this is a direct lesson from the chaos of a massive 00:26:36.380 --> 00:26:39.759 multi -agency response. In a mass casualty event, 00:26:39.980 --> 00:26:42.359 officers from neighboring towns rush to help. 00:26:42.480 --> 00:26:44.559 You have state troopers, you have local cops 00:26:44.559 --> 00:26:46.599 from the next town over, maybe even off -duty 00:26:46.599 --> 00:26:49.240 federal agents who live nearby. But legally, 00:26:49.460 --> 00:26:52.059 a local police officer's authority to make arrests 00:26:52.059 --> 00:26:54.960 and use force often stops right at their town 00:26:54.960 --> 00:26:57.680 line. So a cop from the next town over shows 00:26:57.680 --> 00:27:00.519 up at Sandy Hook, and technically, they can't 00:27:00.519 --> 00:27:03.579 arrest anyone. or give lawful orders. It creates 00:27:03.579 --> 00:27:06.400 a legal and command ambiguity right in the middle 00:27:06.400 --> 00:27:09.180 of a crisis. Can they detain a suspect? Can they 00:27:09.180 --> 00:27:11.000 take command of a scene if they are the highest 00:27:11.000 --> 00:27:13.299 ranking officer there? The report recommends 00:27:13.299 --> 00:27:16.220 giving all sworn police officers statewide jurisdiction 00:27:16.220 --> 00:27:18.920 during a declared emergency. It just cuts all 00:27:18.920 --> 00:27:20.940 the red tape so they can focus on stopping the 00:27:20.940 --> 00:27:23.119 threat. But then they also warn against something 00:27:23.119 --> 00:27:25.380 called self -dispatching, which sounds like the 00:27:25.380 --> 00:27:27.900 exact opposite problem. It is the opposite problem, 00:27:28.039 --> 00:27:31.470 but it's equally dangerous. Imagine... You are 00:27:31.470 --> 00:27:34.450 a police officer in a town 20 minutes away from 00:27:34.450 --> 00:27:38.009 Newtown. You hear active shooter at an elementary 00:27:38.009 --> 00:27:40.849 school come over the statewide radio. What is 00:27:40.849 --> 00:27:42.990 your first instinct? Get in your car and drive 00:27:42.990 --> 00:27:45.529 as fast as you possibly can to help. It's a heroic 00:27:45.529 --> 00:27:48.109 instinct. It's understandable. But if every single 00:27:48.109 --> 00:27:50.490 officer in the county does that at the same time, 00:27:50.609 --> 00:27:52.509 what happens to the roads and highways leading 00:27:52.509 --> 00:27:54.970 to the school? A complete gridlock. Total gridlock. 00:27:55.029 --> 00:27:58.130 You end up with. hundreds of patrol cars clogging 00:27:58.130 --> 00:28:00.450 the streets. Now the ambulances can't get in 00:28:00.450 --> 00:28:02.589 to treat the wounded. The fire trucks can't get 00:28:02.589 --> 00:28:05.109 in. The specialized SWAT teams can't get to the 00:28:05.109 --> 00:28:08.130 scene. The report calls for a strict, unified 00:28:08.130 --> 00:28:10.750 command structure. You need one person running 00:28:10.750 --> 00:28:12.809 the show and officers go where they are told. 00:28:13.029 --> 00:28:15.069 If you aren't called to the scene, you don't 00:28:15.069 --> 00:28:18.299 go. Because helping by creating a traffic jam 00:28:18.299 --> 00:28:20.680 isn't helping at all. It's about suppressing 00:28:20.680 --> 00:28:23.799 that individual hero instinct for the sake of 00:28:23.799 --> 00:28:26.319 the overall system. Order over chaos. That's 00:28:26.319 --> 00:28:28.299 the goal. OK, so we have the building design. 00:28:28.359 --> 00:28:29.839 We have the weapons and the police response. 00:28:30.140 --> 00:28:33.460 Now we have to touch the third rail, the most 00:28:33.460 --> 00:28:36.359 difficult part of this tapestry. Section four, 00:28:36.519 --> 00:28:40.220 mental and behavioral health. This is perhaps 00:28:40.220 --> 00:28:42.880 the most complex and in some ways the most heartbreaking 00:28:42.880 --> 00:28:45.500 section of the report. The commission describes 00:28:45.500 --> 00:28:48.480 the mental health system in America not as a 00:28:48.480 --> 00:28:51.619 system at all, but as fundamentally fragmented. 00:28:51.900 --> 00:28:54.160 Fragmented how? What does that mean in practice? 00:28:54.460 --> 00:28:56.720 It means it operates in silos that don't talk 00:28:56.720 --> 00:28:59.380 to each other. The school system sees one piece 00:28:59.380 --> 00:29:02.019 of a child's life. Their pediatrician sees another 00:29:02.019 --> 00:29:04.680 piece. The parents see another piece. And the 00:29:04.680 --> 00:29:07.019 insurance companies sit on top of it all, often 00:29:07.019 --> 00:29:09.240 dictating the type and duration of care based 00:29:09.240 --> 00:29:12.259 on financial rules, not on clinical needs. The 00:29:12.259 --> 00:29:14.220 commission talks a lot about the need for parity. 00:29:14.420 --> 00:29:16.920 Parity. That means equality, right? Treating 00:29:16.920 --> 00:29:18.900 mental health checks the same way we treat physical 00:29:18.900 --> 00:29:21.240 health checks. Right. And think about how different 00:29:21.240 --> 00:29:23.500 they are now. If your child breaks their leg 00:29:23.500 --> 00:29:25.700 on the playground, what happens? You go to the 00:29:25.700 --> 00:29:27.920 ER, you get an x -ray, they set the bone, you 00:29:27.920 --> 00:29:30.500 get a cast, maybe some physical therapy later. 00:29:30.660 --> 00:29:33.299 The insurance company covers it. No one questions 00:29:33.299 --> 00:29:36.670 it. Exactly. Now, imagine your child starts showing 00:29:36.670 --> 00:29:39.789 signs of severe anxiety or oppositional defiant 00:29:39.789 --> 00:29:42.630 disorder. You might get approved for six therapy 00:29:42.630 --> 00:29:45.730 sessions. After that, the insurance company might 00:29:45.730 --> 00:29:48.049 say the treatment is no longer medically necessary 00:29:48.049 --> 00:29:50.130 or you have to pay thousands of dollars out of 00:29:50.130 --> 00:29:52.930 pocket. The report argues that until we treat 00:29:52.930 --> 00:29:55.130 behavioral health with the same urgency, the 00:29:55.130 --> 00:29:57.630 same level of coverage, and the same lack of 00:29:57.630 --> 00:30:00.250 bureaucracy as physical health, we will continue 00:30:00.250 --> 00:30:02.490 to miss the kids who need help the most. And 00:30:02.490 --> 00:30:04.670 then there's the stigma. The governor's original 00:30:04.670 --> 00:30:06.869 charge to the commission had this quote that 00:30:06.869 --> 00:30:08.789 really stuck with me. He said that our society 00:30:08.789 --> 00:30:11.690 has destigmatized violence while refusing to 00:30:11.690 --> 00:30:14.470 destigmatize mental treatment. It's a powerful 00:30:14.470 --> 00:30:17.250 and disturbing paradox, isn't it? We see violence 00:30:17.250 --> 00:30:19.730 everywhere in our movies, our video games, on 00:30:19.730 --> 00:30:23.109 the nightly news. It's normalized. But admitting 00:30:23.109 --> 00:30:25.910 that you see a therapist or that your child needs 00:30:25.910 --> 00:30:28.509 medication for their brain chemistry, for many 00:30:28.509 --> 00:30:31.170 families, that is still hidden. That is still 00:30:31.170 --> 00:30:33.549 seen as a source of shame. And that shame leads 00:30:33.549 --> 00:30:36.069 to silence. And silence is so dangerous here. 00:30:36.490 --> 00:30:39.009 Stigma prevents people from seeking help early 00:30:39.009 --> 00:30:41.529 when it is most effective. If you wait until 00:30:41.529 --> 00:30:43.690 someone is 20 years old and already in a deep 00:30:43.690 --> 00:30:46.549 crisis, it is so much harder to help them than 00:30:46.549 --> 00:30:48.509 if you had caught the warning signs at age 10 00:30:48.509 --> 00:30:50.690 and gotten them support. Here's where it gets 00:30:50.690 --> 00:30:52.849 really interesting and maybe controversial for 00:30:52.849 --> 00:30:55.509 some, though. The report tackles the idea of 00:30:55.509 --> 00:30:57.970 identifying these kids before they act. I think 00:30:57.970 --> 00:31:01.269 we all secretly want a test. We want a minority 00:31:01.269 --> 00:31:04.589 report style system where we can say this specific 00:31:04.589 --> 00:31:07.410 kid is going to be a shooter. And the commission 00:31:07.410 --> 00:31:10.309 is very, very clear on this point. That test 00:31:10.309 --> 00:31:13.250 does not exist. You cannot predict violence. 00:31:13.670 --> 00:31:17.150 It is statistically too rare an event and human 00:31:17.150 --> 00:31:20.430 behavior is too complex. However. And this is 00:31:20.430 --> 00:31:22.690 a critical distinction. They distinguish between 00:31:22.690 --> 00:31:25.410 prediction and risk assessment. OK, break that 00:31:25.410 --> 00:31:27.089 down for me. What's the real world difference? 00:31:27.390 --> 00:31:29.890 Prediction is a crystal ball. It's saying this 00:31:29.890 --> 00:31:32.269 will happen. That's impossible. Risk assessment 00:31:32.269 --> 00:31:34.690 is like putting together a puzzle. The commission 00:31:34.690 --> 00:31:37.829 strongly advocates for the creation of multidisciplinary 00:31:37.829 --> 00:31:40.470 threat assessment teams in every school district. 00:31:40.670 --> 00:31:42.750 I like the puzzle analogy. Walk me through how 00:31:42.750 --> 00:31:44.750 that would work. OK, imagine a high school student. 00:31:44.849 --> 00:31:47.150 Let's call him Student X, who is really struggling. 00:31:47.680 --> 00:31:50.220 The math teacher knows that student X has gone 00:31:50.220 --> 00:31:53.039 from a B student to failing, and he puts his 00:31:53.039 --> 00:31:55.779 head down on the desk every single day. That's 00:31:55.779 --> 00:31:58.859 one puzzle piece. The bus driver knows that student 00:31:58.859 --> 00:32:01.440 X sits alone every day and mutters angrily to 00:32:01.440 --> 00:32:04.299 himself. That's another piece. The gym coach 00:32:04.299 --> 00:32:06.519 knows that Student X got into a shoving match 00:32:06.519 --> 00:32:08.880 in the locker room and seemed unusually aggressive 00:32:08.880 --> 00:32:12.039 and angry. Another piece. And the parents know 00:32:12.039 --> 00:32:14.259 that Student X has stopped sleeping and is spending 00:32:14.259 --> 00:32:16.759 all night on websites that glorify violence. 00:32:17.079 --> 00:32:19.140 So everyone has a piece of the puzzle. A little 00:32:19.140 --> 00:32:21.579 data point. Right. But in most school systems 00:32:21.579 --> 00:32:24.140 today, the math teacher doesn't talk to the bus 00:32:24.140 --> 00:32:26.480 driver. The bus driver doesn't talk to the coach. 00:32:26.619 --> 00:32:28.619 And nobody talks to the parents because they 00:32:28.619 --> 00:32:30.920 are terrified of violating privacy laws like 00:32:30.920 --> 00:32:33.740 FERPA or HIPAA. Everyone is scared of getting 00:32:33.740 --> 00:32:37.140 sued. So everyone holds their one piece, but 00:32:37.140 --> 00:32:39.140 nobody ever sees the whole picture. Exactly. 00:32:39.460 --> 00:32:41.539 Separately, none of those behaviors are giant 00:32:41.539 --> 00:32:44.440 flashing red lights. Kids fail math. Kids get 00:32:44.440 --> 00:32:46.980 in fights. But if you get those people in a room 00:32:46.980 --> 00:32:48.779 and put all those puzzle pieces on the table 00:32:48.779 --> 00:32:51.700 together. You see a kid who is in a deep, deep 00:32:51.700 --> 00:32:54.799 crisis. You see the full pattern. You see the 00:32:54.799 --> 00:32:57.420 pattern. The goal of these threat assessment 00:32:57.420 --> 00:33:00.900 teams is to create a legal and safe space where 00:33:00.900 --> 00:33:03.920 those people can share that information, to assemble 00:33:03.920 --> 00:33:07.000 the puzzle before the violence occurs. But I 00:33:07.000 --> 00:33:09.960 have to ask the question, isn't that just profiling? 00:33:10.119 --> 00:33:12.099 I mean, if I was a weird kid in high school, 00:33:12.220 --> 00:33:15.460 and I definitely was, I wouldn't want to be on 00:33:15.460 --> 00:33:18.799 some government list just because I wore black 00:33:18.799 --> 00:33:21.279 and didn't talk much. And that is the valid fear. 00:33:21.380 --> 00:33:23.640 That's the pushback. But the commission is very 00:33:23.640 --> 00:33:26.500 careful here. The goal of the team isn't to arrest 00:33:26.500 --> 00:33:28.660 the kid. It's not a get them squad. It's a help 00:33:28.660 --> 00:33:30.460 them squad. The primary question they're supposed 00:33:30.460 --> 00:33:33.099 to ask isn't how do we punish or expel the student? 00:33:33.180 --> 00:33:35.339 The question is, does the student need help? 00:33:35.400 --> 00:33:37.759 And how do we mobilize the resources of the school 00:33:37.759 --> 00:33:39.960 and the community to get it to him? So it's about 00:33:39.960 --> 00:33:42.700 intervention and support, not punishment. Ideally, 00:33:42.839 --> 00:33:45.480 yes. And it's about catching what experts call 00:33:45.480 --> 00:33:48.740 leakage. Leakage. That's the term they use. In 00:33:48.740 --> 00:33:50.619 the aftermath of almost every mass shooting, 00:33:50.720 --> 00:33:53.140 we find out the perpetrator leaked their intent 00:33:53.140 --> 00:33:56.559 beforehand. They told a friend. They posted a 00:33:56.559 --> 00:33:59.380 manifesto on a forum. They wrote a disturbing 00:33:59.380 --> 00:34:02.680 essay for English class. They leaked the violence 00:34:02.680 --> 00:34:05.140 that was building up inside them. The threat 00:34:05.140 --> 00:34:06.980 assessment team is designed to be the bucket 00:34:06.980 --> 00:34:09.679 that catches those leaks before the pipe bursts. 00:34:10.099 --> 00:34:12.730 But that requires people. in the school to be 00:34:12.730 --> 00:34:15.070 connected enough to even hear the leak in the 00:34:15.070 --> 00:34:17.829 first place which brings us to another key risk 00:34:17.829 --> 00:34:21.969 factor social isolation huge the report identifies 00:34:21.969 --> 00:34:25.130 social isolation as a massive and often overlooked 00:34:25.130 --> 00:34:27.889 risk factor you can't assess a kid you don't 00:34:27.889 --> 00:34:30.030 know you can't help a kid who is invisible to 00:34:30.030 --> 00:34:32.409 the adults in the building They proposed this 00:34:32.409 --> 00:34:34.929 trusted adult rule, which I thought was so simple 00:34:34.929 --> 00:34:38.130 but so powerful. Yes. The recommendation is that 00:34:38.130 --> 00:34:40.449 every single student in a school building should 00:34:40.449 --> 00:34:42.710 have a meaningful, positive connection with at 00:34:42.710 --> 00:34:45.230 least one adult in that building. Just one. Just 00:34:45.230 --> 00:34:48.210 one can be enough to anchor a child who is adrift. 00:34:48.389 --> 00:34:50.469 And it doesn't have to be their favorite teacher. 00:34:50.889 --> 00:34:52.869 It could be the basketball coach, the librarian, 00:34:53.269 --> 00:34:55.949 the school nurse, the cafeteria worker, or the 00:34:55.949 --> 00:34:58.230 custodian we talked about earlier. But there 00:34:58.230 --> 00:35:00.349 has to be someone the student feels they can 00:35:00.349 --> 00:35:02.769 talk to, because disconnected, isolated people 00:35:02.769 --> 00:35:05.110 are at a much higher risk of radicalization, 00:35:05.309 --> 00:35:08.469 desperation, and ultimately violence. It's really 00:35:08.469 --> 00:35:10.610 amazing how it all loops back to human connection. 00:35:10.829 --> 00:35:13.489 The locks buy you seconds, the glass buys you 00:35:13.489 --> 00:35:16.429 minutes, but the connection, in theory, can prevent 00:35:16.429 --> 00:35:18.639 the need for the locks in the first place. That 00:35:18.639 --> 00:35:21.039 is the absolute essence of the tapestry metaphor. 00:35:21.320 --> 00:35:23.820 The hardware is the last line of defense. The 00:35:23.820 --> 00:35:26.559 software, the human relationships, is the first 00:35:26.559 --> 00:35:29.159 and most important line. So let's move to the 00:35:29.159 --> 00:35:31.820 final section of the report, Section 5, Response, 00:35:32.199 --> 00:35:35.099 Recovery, and Resilience. Because the report 00:35:35.099 --> 00:35:37.360 acknowledges that the tragedy doesn't end when 00:35:37.360 --> 00:35:39.619 the shooter is down and the yellow police tape 00:35:39.619 --> 00:35:42.300 comes down. No, that is just the beginning of 00:35:42.300 --> 00:35:45.519 the next and in some ways longest phase. The 00:35:45.519 --> 00:35:48.239 trauma extends far beyond the immediate families 00:35:48.239 --> 00:35:51.119 of the victims. It radiates out. It hits the 00:35:51.119 --> 00:35:53.059 first responders, the surviving children, the 00:35:53.059 --> 00:35:54.619 teachers who were there, the neighbors who heard 00:35:54.619 --> 00:35:57.639 the sirens. The report criticizes the standard 00:35:57.639 --> 00:36:00.519 American approach of just cleaning up and reopening 00:36:00.519 --> 00:36:02.980 as quickly as possible. They talk about needing 00:36:02.980 --> 00:36:06.380 a preplanned resilience strategy. Right. Standard 00:36:06.380 --> 00:36:08.539 disaster response usually focuses on physical 00:36:08.539 --> 00:36:11.519 reconstruction, rebuilding the walls, fixing 00:36:11.519 --> 00:36:14.920 the broken glass. This report calls for psychological 00:36:14.920 --> 00:36:18.260 reconstruction planning. How do you support the 00:36:18.260 --> 00:36:20.119 long -term mental health of an entire community 00:36:20.119 --> 00:36:23.039 for 5, 10, 20 years after an event like this? 00:36:23.239 --> 00:36:25.840 Because that level of trauma literally rewires 00:36:25.840 --> 00:36:28.340 a community. It absolutely does. In communities 00:36:28.340 --> 00:36:30.480 that have experienced mass violence, we see higher 00:36:30.480 --> 00:36:32.679 rates of substance abuse, divorce, depression 00:36:32.679 --> 00:36:35.360 and anxiety disorders for years, even decades 00:36:35.360 --> 00:36:38.300 after the event. The commission argues you need 00:36:38.300 --> 00:36:40.420 to have a plan for that before it happens. You 00:36:40.420 --> 00:36:42.159 need to have the infrastructure for long term 00:36:42.159 --> 00:36:44.260 mental health support ready to be deployed. And 00:36:44.260 --> 00:36:46.320 that requires the community to buy in. We're 00:36:46.320 --> 00:36:48.500 right back to that local champion concept again. 00:36:48.639 --> 00:36:51.440 Exactly. You cannot mandate a feeling of safety 00:36:51.440 --> 00:36:53.739 from the state capitol. The governor can sign 00:36:53.739 --> 00:36:56.360 a law that says schools must be safe, but you 00:36:56.360 --> 00:36:58.519 can't legislate. the feeling of safety and trust. 00:36:58.900 --> 00:37:01.780 That has to be built block by block locally. 00:37:02.440 --> 00:37:05.219 The report emphasizes that if you pull one thread, 00:37:05.420 --> 00:37:07.760 if you ignore the mental health needs during 00:37:07.760 --> 00:37:10.300 the recovery, or if you ignore the design flaws 00:37:10.300 --> 00:37:12.820 in the buildings, the whole safety net fails. 00:37:13.119 --> 00:37:16.219 It must be a combined, sustained effort of design, 00:37:16.480 --> 00:37:19.699 law enforcement, and health. So we've been through 00:37:19.699 --> 00:37:22.119 the timeline, the building design, the weapons, 00:37:22.219 --> 00:37:24.179 the mental health system, and the recovery. It 00:37:24.179 --> 00:37:27.039 is a massive And very heavy document. It is. 00:37:27.059 --> 00:37:28.900 It's a difficult read. So what does this all 00:37:28.900 --> 00:37:30.460 mean? If you're a listener, maybe you're a parent, 00:37:30.519 --> 00:37:32.460 maybe you're a teacher, what's the big takeaway 00:37:32.460 --> 00:37:34.619 from this deep dive? I think the biggest takeaway 00:37:34.619 --> 00:37:37.300 is that there is no silver bullet. There is no 00:37:37.300 --> 00:37:40.760 single law or single lock or single program that 00:37:40.760 --> 00:37:43.460 fixes this problem. It is a holistic approach 00:37:43.460 --> 00:37:46.440 or it is nothing. The report explicitly addresses 00:37:46.440 --> 00:37:49.309 the cost of all this, too. Because doing all 00:37:49.309 --> 00:37:51.690 of this, retrofitting hundreds of schools with 00:37:51.690 --> 00:37:54.769 laminated glass, hiring and training threat assessment 00:37:54.769 --> 00:37:57.949 teams, implementing a laser etching system for 00:37:57.949 --> 00:38:01.199 bullets. It costs a lot of money. It does. It 00:38:01.199 --> 00:38:03.159 is very expensive. But the commission took a 00:38:03.159 --> 00:38:05.639 very firm and admirable stance on this. They 00:38:05.639 --> 00:38:07.539 did not censor their recommendations based on 00:38:07.539 --> 00:38:10.619 cost. Their job was to determine what works, 00:38:10.760 --> 00:38:13.219 what would be effective. The question of how 00:38:13.219 --> 00:38:15.219 to pay for it is a separate political question. 00:38:15.440 --> 00:38:17.360 And the argument they make is that safety is 00:38:17.360 --> 00:38:20.440 an investment, not just an expense. Precisely. 00:38:20.710 --> 00:38:23.550 Safe, high -quality schools attract families. 00:38:23.769 --> 00:38:26.070 They attract businesses. If a school district 00:38:26.070 --> 00:38:28.110 gets a reputation for being safe and supportive, 00:38:28.429 --> 00:38:30.789 property values go up. The community thrives. 00:38:30.869 --> 00:38:32.929 But more importantly, what is the cost of the 00:38:32.929 --> 00:38:35.130 alternative? You can't put a price on the lives 00:38:35.130 --> 00:38:38.010 that were lost. But you can also look at the 00:38:38.010 --> 00:38:40.690 direct cost of the tragedy itself. The lawsuits, 00:38:40.969 --> 00:38:43.230 the medical bills, the lost productivity from 00:38:43.230 --> 00:38:45.769 traumatized workers, the sheer human misery. 00:38:46.119 --> 00:38:48.880 It's incalculable. Exactly. The cost of prevention 00:38:48.880 --> 00:38:51.079 is high, but the cost of failure is infinite. 00:38:51.280 --> 00:38:53.019 I want to end with a thought that really comes 00:38:53.019 --> 00:38:55.639 from the report's discussion on situational awareness. 00:38:56.320 --> 00:38:58.780 You know, we hear that phrase, if you see something, 00:38:58.840 --> 00:39:01.320 say something, all the time. And it usually makes 00:39:01.320 --> 00:39:03.239 me think of an unattended bag at the airport. 00:39:03.380 --> 00:39:05.519 It feels a little paranoid. Right. It implies 00:39:05.519 --> 00:39:08.199 suspicion. Watch your neighbor because they might 00:39:08.199 --> 00:39:11.699 be a threat. But the report sort of reclaims 00:39:11.699 --> 00:39:14.650 that phrase. It implies connection. not suspicion. 00:39:14.889 --> 00:39:18.309 How so? Well, you can only see something if you 00:39:18.309 --> 00:39:20.809 are actually looking. And you can only understand 00:39:20.809 --> 00:39:23.309 what you see if you are connected to the people 00:39:23.309 --> 00:39:26.050 and the community around you. If you don't know 00:39:26.050 --> 00:39:28.150 your students, you won't see the subtle change 00:39:28.150 --> 00:39:31.329 in their behavior that signals a crisis. If you 00:39:31.329 --> 00:39:33.530 don't know your neighbors, you won't see their 00:39:33.530 --> 00:39:36.869 deepening isolation. Seeing requires paying attention. 00:39:37.550 --> 00:39:39.309 That's the challenge at the heart of it all, 00:39:39.349 --> 00:39:41.969 isn't it? Are we as a society actually looking 00:39:41.969 --> 00:39:44.230 at each other? Or are we just staring at the 00:39:44.230 --> 00:39:46.739 locks on the doors, hoping they hold? That is 00:39:46.739 --> 00:39:49.400 the fundamental question. The locks are necessary. 00:39:49.760 --> 00:39:52.780 We need the better glass. We need the smart police 00:39:52.780 --> 00:39:56.480 tactics. But the looking, the empathy, the connection, 00:39:56.659 --> 00:39:59.079 the difficult work of imagination that Jeremy 00:39:59.079 --> 00:40:01.880 Richmond called for at the very beginning, that 00:40:01.880 --> 00:40:04.179 is what ultimately keeps us safe. We're going 00:40:04.179 --> 00:40:06.780 to close today with the dedication from the report 00:40:06.780 --> 00:40:09.360 itself. It seems like the only appropriate way 00:40:09.360 --> 00:40:11.670 to end this conversation. The Sandy Hook Advisory 00:40:11.670 --> 00:40:14.929 Commission dedicates this report to the 26 victims 00:40:14.929 --> 00:40:17.110 who were killed at Sandy Hook Elementary School, 00:40:17.289 --> 00:40:20.150 to their families, the Newtown community, and 00:40:20.150 --> 00:40:22.250 to all those that have come face to face with 00:40:22.250 --> 00:40:24.949 the devastating effects of violence. Thanks for 00:40:24.949 --> 00:40:27.170 listening to this deep dive. It was a tough one, 00:40:27.190 --> 00:40:29.469 but a really important one. Take care of each 00:40:29.469 --> 00:40:29.710 other.