Welcome to the Deep Dive, the show dedicated
to making you instantly fluent in the most critical
topics shaping our world. Today, we are focusing
on one man who has, well, to put it mildly, fundamentally
reshaped the trajectory of nearly a fifth of
the world's population, Xi Jinping. Indeed. And
you have to remember, when Xi Jinping took the
reins as general secretary back in 2012, China
was operating under a very different system.
A carefully balanced system. Right. The collective
leadership model. Exactly. That was Ding Xiaoping's
legacy. And it was designed very specifically
to prevent the, you know, the catastrophic cult
of personality we saw under Mao Zedong a decade
later. Oh, yeah. But that system has been completely
swept aside. Absolutely. The speed of it, the
scale. Yeah. It's just breathtaking. She has
centralized authority to a degree we haven't
witnessed since the mid 20th century. Culminating,
of course, in him securing that unprecedented
third term in 2022. And that is the core of our
mission today. We are diving deep into a comprehensive
stack of sources covering his entire career,
his guiding ideology, what we now know as Xi
Jinping thought, and of course, his key policies
and the profound systemic changes he's enacted.
Our deep dive today is really a forensic examination
of that journey. How did a man who was once an
exiled pariah, someone who was personally persecuted
during the Cultural Revolution, how did he manage
to ascend to become the ultimate paramount leader
of China's fifth generation of leadership? And
crucially, what does his signature political
project, the Chinese Dream, truly signify? Not
just for China's domestic political landscape,
but for the entire global order. I think to understand
any of that, we have to start at the beginning.
We have to understand the crucible that forged
this specific type of leader. OK, let's unpack
this journey. And that means starting with his
roots. Xi Jinping was born in 1953, which puts
him squarely within the princeling cohort. The
children of the revolutionary elite. Exactly.
His father, Xi Zongsun, was a highly decorated
communist party. But that guarantee just evaporated.
And it happened very early on, which I think
is key. It demonstrates the inherent volatility
of CCP politics. So he's just 10 years old. Barely
10. It's 1963. And his father is abruptly purged
from the party. He's removed from all his posts,
sent to work in a factory in Henan. And this
wasn't just a political demotion. This was the
start of a decade of intense personal trauma
for the entire family. That is the pivotal moment,
isn't it? Our sources describe this absolute
chaos that just engulfs the She family as the
Cultural Revolution gathers pace. I mean, you
have student militants ransacking their home.
The political persecution was so intense that
it led to an unimaginable tragedy. The suicide
of his half -sister. At her military academy,
yes. And she himself was only 15 when his father
was later imprisoned in 1968. That period. It
wasn't just political education. For him, it
was survival training. You can see how that would
hammer home a lesson that defines his entire
career. Absolutely. That political control is
fragile. That political loyalty is everything.
And that the party, if it's not disciplined,
can just devour its own children. So in 1969,
at age 15, she himself gets swept up in the down
-to -the -countryside movement. And he's exiled.
sent to the remote, impoverished Lingjihe village
in Shaanxi province. And he wasn't just visiting.
He lived there for seven full years. We often
hear this anecdote that he lived in a yaodong,
a traditional cave house. Right, but you have
to understand, this isn't some abstract hardship.
This is grinding physical poverty. It was brutal.
So brutal, in fact, that the sources reveal he
actually tried to desert at one point. He fled
back to Beijing. But he was caught. He was arrested
during a crackdown on deserters and sent to a
work camp to dig ditches before being forced
to go back to the village. The fact that he was
willing to risk arrest just to escape, I mean,
that speaks volumes about the sheer desperation
and the physical toll of those seven years. Which
makes his next move all the more remarkable.
He tries to join the very party that had persecuted
his family and exiled him. It's incredible. And
because of his father's continuing political
stain, he submitted, what was it, 10 unsuccessful
applications to the CCP. Ten. That's not a casual
rejection. No, it's reputed institutional denial.
It wasn't until 1974 that his application was
finally approved, and only because the local
village secretaries, who'd seen his capabilities
and determination firsthand, vouched for him.
They took a huge political risk to do that. It
just shows an unparalleled level of political
persistence. It really does. So he finally gets
in, and soon after, education follows. From 1975
to 1979, he studies chemical engineering at Tsinghua
University. But under that worker -peasant -soldier
-student system. Right. So he earned his spot
through political diligence and manual labor,
not just academic merit. His career then shifts
from the rural periphery back toward the political
center for a little while anyway. Yes, very briefly.
He served Zhen Biao, a Politburo member and minister
of defense in Beijing. But he soon made a really
strategic move to local government. And this
shift, starting his ascent through the local
ranks and moving along China's fast -developed
coast, was absolutely critical. It gave him deep
administrative and economic experience, far from
the factional infighting that was still plaguing
the capital. Let's look at those early posts.
Specifically, Zhengding County from 82 to 85.
There's a great anecdote here that really foreshadows
his future approach to governance. It's very
hands on. Right. The story of the excessive requisitions.
The central government was taking too much grain
and it was crushing the local farmers. And she
and another official, they didn't just complain
locally. No, they wrote a letter directly to
the central government and that intervention
worked. It convinced Beijing to reduce the annual
requisition amount by a massive 14 million kilograms
of grain. That's huge. The impact must have been
immediate. It was. Farmers' average intums in
that county shot up from 148 yuan to over 400
yuan in just one year. It shows you he prioritized
tangible results for the masses over just towing
the presidential line. And he wasn't just focused
on agriculture. He showed an early focus on tourism,
on using local resources. That's right. He was
instrumental in building the Ronguo Mansion,
which secured the filming base for the highly
influential television series Dream of the Red
Mansions. Which was a massive show at the time.
A cultural phenomenon. And that single project
generated over 17 million yuan in revenue that
year. So he learned early that cultural projects,
if you manage them properly, could be powerful
economic engines. Okay, so moving along the coast,
his next major stop is Fujian. He spends nearly
two decades there, from 1985 to 2002, eventually
becoming governor. And this was his deep dive
into modernization and market opening. Fujian
was geographically crucial, right across the
Taiwan Strait. So his key objective was attracting
investment. Taiwanese and foreign investment,
yes. Establishing major manufacturing firms.
But he also spearheaded these ambitious local
initiatives like the Digital Fujian Program to
modernize the region's IT infrastructure and
the Fuzhou 3820 Project Master Plan. A long -term
strategy. A very forward -looking strategy that
mapped out Fuzio's development goals over three,
eight, and 20 -year horizons. So he was consistently
focused on long -term strategic development and
often stepping in to stabilize areas that were
rocked by corruption scandals. Which brings us
to Zhejiang from 2002 to 2007. This is the tenure
that really put him on the map nationally, where
he rose to provincial party secretary. And he
didn't just oversee immense economic growth.
I think he was averaging 14 percent per year.
He was also developing his management philosophy.
The double eight strategy. Exactly. And this
wasn't just jargon. It was a comprehensive playbook.
It identified eight comparative advantages Zijian
had, like its location or its human resources,
and paired them with eight corresponding actions
the government had to take. Like further marketizing,
improving infrastructure. Protecting the environment,
all of it. It was this holistic, structured and
strategic approach that was exactly what the
central leadership in Beijing wanted to see.
And his simultaneous commitment to cleaning house
really cemented his reputation. He took a famously
tough and straightforward stance against corrupt
officials. Yes. So this reputation for capability,
discipline and uncompromising anti -corruption
while delivering massive growth, it set the stage.
In 2007, he was rapidly transferred to Shanghai.
filling the vacuum left by the colossal corruption
dismissal of Chen Lianju. It was a very short
tenure, though. Only seven months. It was primarily
designed to prove he was a safe, dependable pair
of hands ready for the highest level. And sources
point to the small but memorable detail from
that Shanghai stint that just speaks volumes
about his rigid adherence to protocol. He famously
refused to use a special train reserved for national
leaders that the Shanghai administrators had
arranged for him. He said it party regulation.
So he finished that. coastal trajectory, having
established a reputation as controversy -free,
disciplined, and very capable of managing complex
market -driven economies. So having proved himself
in the provinces, the next logical step was Beijing
and the center of power. At the 17th Party Congress
in October 2007, he joins the Politburo Standing
Committee, the ultimate decision -making body.
And the signal that came with his appointment
was fascinating. The signal was unmistakable.
He was ranked above Li Keqiang, who was also
entering the PSC, and that positioning explicitly
designated Xi as Hu Jintao's presumed successor.
Deng Xiaoping's model of orderly succession was
being followed, ensuring stability at the top.
So between 2008 and 2013, he quickly accumulates
this crucial experience, holding significant
national portfolios. Vice President, Vice Chairman
of the Central Military Commission, the CMC,
which gave him a crucial foothold in the military.
And he was leading these massive organizational
efforts, including the preparations for the 2008
Beijing Olympics. He was also tasked with chairing
that high -level committee known as the 6521
Project. Yes, which was established to ensure
stability during some very politically sensitive
anniversaries in 2009. These roles, they exposed
him to every aspect of national security. foreign
policy, and internal governance required of a
future leader. Now, despite this clear signaling,
his path wasn't entirely uncontested. We have
to talk about Bo Xilai, the dynamic party secretary
of Chongqing who was seen by many as a powerful
rival, a potential alternative. Bo Xilai was
a legitimate threat. He had both the princeling
pedigree and this charismatic political appeal.
He was running a very populist model in Chongqing
that resonated with some of the party's left
leaning fashions. And she even initially praised
his policy. He did during a 2010 visit, which
really shows you the political sensitivity of
the time. But the internal dynamics shifted and
shifted dramatically. They certainly did. Bo's
downfall. Triggered by the Wang Lijun incident,
where his police chief tried to defect to the
U .S. consulate, revealing a murder cover -up
involving Bo's wife, it was high drama. Absolutely.
And that event, coupled with the corruption charges
that followed, essentially cleared the field
for Xi. His accession became virtually undisputed,
and it demonstrated to everyone that even the
most powerful local figures could be brought
down by the center. As vice president, Xi traveled
a lot, establishing his international profile.
He visited North Korea, the Middle East, Latin
America, Europe. His 2012 visit to the U .S.
was particularly notable. Right, with that sentimental
stop in Iowa to meet the family who hosted him
way back in 1985. Those moments offered a brief
glimpse of a softer side, but a more telling
indicator of his future style came earlier in
2009 during a visit to Mexico. He made a very
pointed statement about China's critics. The
bored foreigners comment. Yes, saying there are
some bored foreigners with full stomachs who
have nothing better to do than point fingers
at us. That's a strong phrase. It is. And he
added that China doesn't export revolution or
hunger or poverty or headaches. That comment,
delivered while he was still vice president,
was an early uncensored indicator of the assertive
nationalism and the don't meddle in our affairs
attitude that would come to define his time in
power. And that strong, unapologetic voice became
the foundation of his first major initiative
after officially being elected general secretary
in November 2012, the anti -corruption campaign.
He immediately stressed that fighting corruption
was absolutely critical for the CCP's very survival.
This wasn't just rhetoric for him, was it? No,
it was existential. His own history, seeing his
family destroyed by political instability, made
him viscerally afraid of the decay of the party.
He argued corruption was the toughest challenge
the party faced. And within weeks, in December
2012, he outlined the eight -point regulation.
Which were strict, practical rules. Very practical.
Curbing things like lavish banquets, excessive
motorcades, waste in official party business.
And the campaign became famously known for rooting
out tigers and flies. It's such an effective,
memorable metaphor. It's brilliant political
branding. Tigers were the high -ranking incumbent
and retired officials, the untouchables. Figures
like Zhu Yongkang, Zhu Kaihu. Exactly. Former
Pollitt Borough Standing Committee members, former
CMC vice chairman. And the flies were the ordinary
party functionaries. It ensured no level of government
was safe. The scale is just staggering, far beyond
any previous anti -corruption drive. I mean,
consider the numbers. Over 200 ,000 officials
received warnings, fines or demotions within
the first two years alone. By 2023, approximately
2 .3 million government officials had been formally
prosecuted or disciplined. This wasn't merely
a cleanup. This was a political purge wrapped
in a campaign of moral renewal. That does raise
an important question. We know the campaign neutralized
rivals like Zhu Yang came, but was it actually
good for governance? Did it improve things, or
did the paralysis and fear of action end up being
a worse outcome in the long run? That is the
essential analytical tension, isn't it? The sources
suggest that while public opinion, at least initially,
was strongly supportive, they loved the crackdown
on conspicuous consumption, the long -term effect
was twofold. Okay. On one hand, yes, genuine
graft was reduced in some areas. But on the other,
the pervasive fear of being targeted led to widespread
bureaucratic paralysis. So officials were afraid
to make any decisions. Exactly. Cadres became
reluctant to make bold moves, preferring to do
nothing rather than risk crossing some unwritten
line and being investigated by the CCDI. It prioritized
political loyalty and inaction over innovation
and bold governance. And this campaign became
the tool for institutionalizing his control.
Precisely. She used the campaign to reform and
dramatically empower the Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection, CCDI, making it this powerful,
independent control body that reported directly
to him. And then in 2018, that net was expanded.
Right. With the creation of the National Supervision
Commission. This effectively granted the CCDI
oversight not just over party members, but over
all state officials and public servants. It formalized
political control over the entire bureaucracy.
And this reach extended deep into the military,
which is absolutely critical for consolidating
ultimate power. Without absolute control of the
gun, the leader is vulnerable. Specific anti
-corruption efforts targeted high -ranking military
officials, including former Defense Ministers
Li Shengfu and Wei Fenghe. Sources suggest that
by 2025, at least 14 generals appointed under
Xi's direct leadership have been officially ousted.
This anti -corruption campaign was the essential
mechanism for ensuring absolute, unquestioning
loyalty across the entire political, bureaucratic,
and military apparatus. So the anti -corruption
drive wasn't really the goal in itself. It was
the means to the goal. The ultimate centralization
of power. Exactly. Political observers are unanimous
on this. Xi Jinping is the most powerful Chinese
leader since Mao Zedong. And this is where the
structural changes to the party itself really
take center stage. It's a definitive... break
from the Deng Xiaoping era. Deng's model insisted
on collective leadership to prevent another Maoist
disaster. Xi has systematically dismantled that.
He centralized institutional power and at the
same time he targeted rival factions. Which included
systematically eroding the power of the Tuan
Pai, the Communist Youth League faction. Exactly.
The Tuan Pai historically acted as a feeder system
for future leaders. But Xi famously criticized
their cadres. He said they were too bureaucratic,
too predictable, too stereotypical in their talk.
He was suggesting they lacked the real world
grit he developed during his youth. Pretty much.
He essentially shut down that alternative path
to leadership, ensuring that the only way up
was through loyalty to the center. And the ultimate
expression of this centralization, the structural
change that sent shockwaves around the world,
came in 2018. The constitutional shift. The National
People's Congress passed constitutional amendments
that formally removed term limits for the president
and vice president. This wasn't just symbolic.
Not at all. It was the institutional removal
of the guardrails that Ding had put in place.
It legally paved the way for Xi to secure his
third term in March 2023. And conceptually, it
removed any formal restriction on him remaining
in power indefinitely. And alongside this legal
change came the accumulation of all these titles,
this reverent language designed to elevate him
above his peers. This is classical cult of personality
engineering. You're building a political scaffolding
around the man. In 2016, he officially received
the title of leadership core from the CCP. A
term used by Deng Xiaoping, but it's relatively
bureaucratic. It is. What's fascinating is the
political upgrade that followed. The introduction
of the term links you. Yes, links you. It's a
reverent term for a leader that carries immense
historical weight. It was previously reserved
only for Mao Zedong and briefly for his immediate
successor, Hua Guofeng. By introducing this term
and later naming him the people's leader in 2019,
he was deliberately signaling a status beyond
just first among equals. He's now viewed as the
pilot at the helm, placing him outside the normal
bureaucratic competition. And this entire ideological
project culminated in 2021 with the adoption
of the third major historical resolution in party
history. Only Mao in 1945 and Deng in 1981 had
adopted previous ones. So this was a huge deal.
What did it do? The historical resolution. adopted
at the Sixth Plenum, fundamentally secured Xi's
place in the pantheon of Chinese history. It
elevated his status to be similar to Mao and
Deng, and it justified the end of the collective
leadership era. It promoted the crucial slogans
of the two establishes and the two upholds. The
two establishes being establishing Xi's core
status and his thought as the guiding principle.
Right. And the two upholds being upholding Xi's
core status and the party central's authority.
These terms mandated that the entire party must
now unite around and protect his central position.
It made dissent ideologically, not just politically,
unacceptable. OK, let's talk about the philosophical
engine behind all this. Xi Jinping thought it's
everywhere now, incorporated into both the party
and state constitutions. What is the deep meaning
of this dense doctrine beyond the very long official
title? The official title is Xi Jinping Thought
on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for
a New Era. strategically is positioned as the
21st century evolution of Marxism. Party academics
actually describe it as 21st century Marxism.
So it's the ideological capstone that connects
the original dogma of Marx and Lenin to the current
realities of modern China. Exactly. And it surpasses
Deng's focus on just economic pragmatism. And
the political purpose isn't just theoretical.
It's about internal discipline. Oh, absolutely.
Xi uses these chemical analogies to explain its
operational function. He has famously stated
that communism is the calcium in a party member's
spine. Right. And he argues that without this
ideological strength, members would suffer the
osteoporosis of political decay, the very kind
of decay he saw internally that led to the chaos
of his youth and the ultimate collapse of the
Soviet Union. Which brings us to the practical
implementation. This is... force compliance,
often through technology. Yes. The Wuxi Qianguo
app, which translates to study to make China
strong, is promoted and in many cases mandatory
for cadres to immerse themselves in the doctrine
daily. And it tracks them. It uses gamification,
quizzes and tracking to ensure ideological conformity
permeates the entire bureaucracy. Loyalty is
now a measurable KPI for your career progression.
His signature political slogan, the Chinese dream,
is perhaps the most marketable piece of his ideology.
If we are deep diving here, what's the complex
definition of that slogan? The Chinese dream
is deliberately broad and highly potent. It's
fundamentally linked to the great rejuvenation
of the Chinese nation. It's not about the individual
pursuit of happiness like in the American context.
It's a collective national aspiration. So what's
it about? The sources define it as being about
Chinese prosperity, collective effort, socialism,
and most importantly... achieving national glory,
a China that is once again recognized as the
dominant great power on the global stage. It
is about returning China to its rightful historical
status. And in terms of governance, what defines
his personal style? It sounds like a blend of
extreme secrecy and relentless control. That
tension is key. He maintains a preference for
secrecy. He rarely gives press conferences. And
his major speeches are often released months
or even years after he delivers them. Which allows
the party to control the narrative completely.
But you contrast that. with his approach to management,
which is micromanagement. Sources report he personally
reviews every single draft of major policy documents
and often returns all submitted reports with
his instructions the very next morning. This
is intense personal control over the entire policy
apparatus. It prevents any local improvisation
or delay. And that personal intense control extends
to an unprecedented level of censorship and surveillance
across civil life. Correct. Since he came to
power, censorship has become stricter across
the board. Xi's message to the media is uncompromising.
Media must hold the family name of the party.
Meaning it must embody the party's will and safeguard
its authority, not operate as some independent
entity seeking truth. Exactly. Digitally, this
is formalized in the concept of Internet sovereignty.
Which is the state's absolute right to control
Internet usage. within its borders. Which has
led to the continued blocking of major foreign
platforms like Google, Facebook, Wikipedia. His
administration has enforced a strict Internet
real name system and deployed these massive cleanup
campaigns like cleaning the Web and Operation
King Lang, constantly purging anything deemed
politically questionable or disruptive to social
harmony. And how is this control applied at the
most granular level of Chinese society? It's
supported by a significant expansion of the national
security legal framework, the counterespionage
law, the cybersecurity law, the data security
law, and the dramatic growth of the mass surveillance
network. Crucially, we see the rise and prominence
of the grid -style social management system.
What's that? It involves subdividing China's
counties and cities into small, manageable zones
grids, with personnel in each zone regularly
reporting all activity and identifying risks
to the local government. It's an institutionalized
system of ubiquitous neighborhood -level security
and control. This centralization wasn't just
ideological. It demanded a complete structural
overhaul of the state itself to ensure the party
was truly in command of every single lever of
power. Right. Xi's tenure has seen these massive
institutional reforms, particularly in 2018 and
2023, all aimed at integrating the CCP and state
bodies more closely than ever before. This is
vital, isn't it? The strategic move was to assert
ultimate party control by bypassing existing
institutions. Yes. Traditionally, the state council,
led by the premier, handled much of the day -to
-day governance and economic policy. She achieved
this by creating these powerful super ministerial
steering committees, initially called central
leading groups. Like the leading group for cybersecurity
and informatization. And the one for financial
economic affairs. And because she chaired these
leading groups, he was essentially making policy
above and outside the traditional government
mechanism. So they were upgraded to powerful
commissions in 2018. Right, which reinforced
the CCP's direct policy making control and simultaneously
diminished the traditional power base of the
premier. who was now seen as merely executing
the central party's decisions. It fundamentally
shifted the power dynamic away from the state
council and toward the general secretary's office.
And the most recent reforms in 2023 just doubled
down on this consolidation, targeting key strategic
sectors like finance and technology. The 2023
reforms were all about total control over money
and data. They established two CCP bodies for
finance, the Central Financial Commission, CFC,
which oversees all financial regulation, and
the revival of the Central Financial Work Commission,
which handles party discipline within this sector.
They also created the Central Science and Technology
Commission to broadly oversee and coordinate
the technology sector, making sure that industrial
policy directly serves party goals. They even
went so far as to amend the foundational legal
structure of the government. They did. In 2024,
The organic law of the state council was amended
to add a clause explicitly requiring the cabinet
to follow CCP ideology and policies. This isn't
just a political directive. It's a legal subordination
of the state government to the party's will.
Let's turn to the military, the People's Liberation
Army, the PLA. Control of the PLA is clearly
paramount to Xi, and he's constantly referencing
the fate of the Soviet Union. That analogy is
his constant motivation. He argues the Soviet
collapse happened because its military was separated
from the party and disarmed. And when the crisis
came, nobody was man enough to stand up and resist.
That fear of internal political decay and disloyalty
is foundational to his military restructuring.
Absolutely. In 2014, he held the new Gushing
Conference to reemphasize Mao's principle of
the party has absolute control over the army.
And that political reassertion was immediately
followed by the most extensive structural reforms
in decades. What was the mechanism of these reforms?
The overarching goal was to shift the PLA from
a geographically based structure, which could
foster local military fiefdoms, to a joint operational
structure reporting directly to the CMC, which,
of course, she chairs. So he abolished the four
autonomous general departments. General staff,
general political, general logistics, and general
armaments. All gone. Replaced them with 15 smaller
agencies reporting directly to the CMC. He also
reduced the number of large regional theater
commands from seven down to five. So this streamlined
command chain meant less power for regional military
leaders and more direct authority for him as
chairman of the CMC. Precisely. And concurrently,
he dramatically modernized the PLA to focus on
modern warfighting. He established the Joint
Logistics Support Force and upgraded the old
2nd Artillery Corps, which handled nuclear and
conventional missiles, to the PLA Rocket Force.
And the modernization didn't stop there. The
2024 reforms added more branches focused on cutting
-edge warfare. The 2024 overhaul established
three critical new forces. the Aerospace Force,
the Cyberspace Force, and the Information Support
Force. The dissolution of the previous Strategic
Support Force and the creation of these new entities
signals a clear prioritization of integrating
space, cyber, and information warfare capabilities
directly under centralized party control. And
all this modernization is underpinned by a massive
expansion of the military budget. The official
military budget has more than doubled under Xi.
It's projected to reach $246 billion in 2025.
This has driven rapid expansion. and particularly
for power projection. It's been growing faster
than any major global naval power. They're commissioning
new aircraft carriers like the Shandong and the
Fujian. And this maritime reach culminated in
2017 with the establishment of China's first
overseas naval base in Djibouti, giving them
a critical logistical foothold in the Horn of
Africa. Before we move on, let's quickly touch
on his simultaneous drive for legal reform, which
he calls Chinese socialistic rule of law. This
is another one of those deliberate paradoxes.
The stated aim was genuinely positive, reforming
a judicial system that was plagued by corruption
and local government interference. He wanted
to improve fairness and commercial certainty.
He championed a greater role for the Constitution
and called for judicial integrity. But there's
a huge caveat. The caveat is crucial. This legal
system must absolutely uphold the absolute leadership
of the party. It is rule by law, not rule of
law. So the law is a tool to serve the party's
stability. And its policy goals. It's not an
independent check on party power. The most telling
metric is in the legislation itself. The share
of laws passed that explicitly affirm the leadership
of the CCP has skyrocketed. They did establish
some useful specialized courts, like the Hangzhou
Internet Court, but the system's foundational
principle is political submission. Okay, moving
to the economy. Xi's approach signals a profound
ideological redirection. For decades, China operated
on this GDP heroism model growth at all costs.
Xi abandoned that. He abandoned it in favor of
high -quality development. And this is a major
structural shift. So what does that mean in practice?
It means prioritizing the correction of longstanding
structural imbalances, tackling social issues
like inequality, emphasizing environmental protection,
and focusing on sustainable high -tech growth
over just sheer volume. It's a necessary move,
really. The old model was leading to ecological
disaster and massive public resentment over wealth
caps. A major, very visible achievement of this
redirection was the massive push against poverty.
The battle against poverty, which he launched
in 2015, was arguably one of the greatest feats
of centralized state coordination in modern history.
By 2021, declared a complete victory over extreme
poverty, citing that nearly 100 million people
had been lifted out of it during his tenure.
Though it's worth noting that was using China's
own lower poverty threshold. That's right, not
the World Bank standard. But still, the mobilization
of state resources to achieve that goal was undeniable
and highly successful in boosting the party's
domestic legitimacy. The most dramatic state
intervention, though, was in the property sector,
the longtime engine of China's economy. This
is where Xi's ideology clashed directly with
unchecked market forces. He coined the defining
phrase, houses are for living, not for speculation.
His administration sought to reduce the economy's
reliance on the massive debt -fueled real estate
sector, which represented almost a quarter of
all economic activity. And this was operationalized
through the Three Red Lines policy. How did that
mechanism work and what was the impact? The Three
Red Lines policy was introduced in 2020 and placed
strict caps on property developers' ability to
borrow based on three financial metrics. Their
debt -to -asset ratio, their net debt -to -equity
ratio, and their cash -to -short -term debt ratio.
So if a developer failed one line, they were
penalized. And if they failed all three, they
were essentially cut off from new borrowing.
On the surface, that sounds like responsible
financial policy, but it triggered a crisis.
It did because the entire property sector was
so deeply leveraged. The sudden enforcement of
these rules was just too much for highly indebted
players like Evergrande and Country Garden. The
policy successfully reduced financial risk exposure
for state banks, but it starved developers of
cash, leading directly to mass defaults, stalled
construction, and the current massive property
crisis. It really highlights the party's willingness
to tolerate severe short -term economic pain
for long -term ideological goals. It does. And
parallel to this deleveraging, we see an intense
focus on technology and self -reliance. especially
after the trade war with the U .S., put China's
dependence on foreign semiconductors into such
sharp relief. The mandate now is existential,
isn't it? Reduce reliance on foreign technology
and achieve technological supremacy. Exactly.
And this is being driven by massive state -directed
industrial policy, most notably the Made in China
2025 plan. This plan aims for self -reliance
in 10 key strategic technologies, from robotics
to new energy vehicles. Consequently, R &D spending
in China has just soared. It now surpasses the
entire European Union combined. And the ultimate
message to the private sector was sent pretty
dramatically in 2020. That was the high -profile
halt of Ant Group's highly anticipated IPO. After
the founder, Jack Ma, publicly criticized government
finance regulation, she personally intervened
to halt what would have been the world's largest
IPO. That served as a clear warning to all private
entrepreneurs. The warning was. There is a ceiling
on your economic power, and the party, not the
market, holds ultimate regulatory authority.
That brings us to the defining economic slogan
of the post -2021 era, common prosperity. Common
prosperity is defined as affluence for all, described
as an essential requirement of socialism. Ideologically,
this is Xi's direct break from Deng's philosophy
of let some get rich first. It's the ideological
justification for large -scale state intervention
and redistribution. And it was used to justify
wide -ranging crackdowns. Precisely. It justified
massive fines on tech giants accused of monopolistic
practices, the elimination of the entire private
tutoring industry through the double reduction
policy. Which was to reduce educational inequality
and cost burden. Right. And widespread restrictions
on wealth flaunting, including pressure on high
salaries and bonuses in the financial sector.
The goal is affluence, but without the perceived
decay, inequality and social instability of Western
capitalism. Shifting to foreign policy, we move
from economic self -reliance to global assertiveness,
something Xi champions as major country diplomacy.
Xi explicitly broke away from Deng's famous advice
to hide your strength and bide your time. He
advocates for China to take its rightful place
as a big power. He champions baseline thinking,
these explicit red lines that other nations must
not cross, to ensure China's resolve is never
misjudged. And this shift gave rise to the style
of Chinese diplomacy known globally as wolf warrior
diplomacy. That is the aggressive, hawkish posture
adopted by Chinese diplomats, asserting nationalistic
interests often through combative and confrontational
language, particularly on social media. Ideologically,
this is underpinned by Xi's belief that the East
is rising and the West is declining, which was
fueled by perceived Western dysfunction, especially
during the global pandemic response. The most
visible example of this global reach has to be
the Belt and Road Initiative. The BRI is enormous,
a massive global infrastructure and economic
development project spanning Africa, Asia and
Eurasia. It's often cited as the largest infrastructure
investment by a single great power since the
U .S. Marshall Plan. But the BRI is just the
economic foundation. She has also unveiled a
suite of new initiatives designed to shape global
governance. Right. We need to differentiate these.
We have the GDI. The GSI and the GCI. Okay, break
them down. The Global Development Initiative,
GDI, focuses on accelerating the UN 2030 agenda,
prioritizing infrastructure and poverty reduction.
The Global Security Initiative, GSI, is more
provocative. It promotes a new path to security
that is often seen as a direct challenge to the
Western -led NATO and alliance security architecture.
The Global Civilization Initiative focuses on
promoting common values of mankind, which are
often interpreted as a pushback against Western
concepts of universal human rights and democracy.
They are all designed to increase China's global
influence and offer alternatives to the U .S.-led
order. On specific relationships, the relationship
with the U .S. changed dramatically under Xi.
Xi initially called for a new type of great power
relations, hoping for a formalized recognition
of China's new status. But the ties soured dramatically
after 2017. Driven by the escalating trade war
under President Trump. That. followed by geopolitical
tension over technology and human rights, and
it further deteriorated during the mutual blame
surrounding the COVID -19 pandemic. The relationship
is now characterized by fierce competition across
all domains. What about Russia? She has actively
cultivated this relationship, especially after
the 2014 Ukraine crisis. They share a common
ideological antipathy towards Western liberalism.
During the ongoing Russo -Ukrainian war, Xi provided
diplomatic cover, expressing opposition to sanctions
against Russia and asserting support for Russia
on security issues, while officially maintaining
China's stance of respecting territorial integrity.
They're increasingly presenting a united, powerful
front for the Global South to blunt the effect
of international pressure. And in China's own
backyard, in Asia, the assertiveness is perhaps
most destabilizing. Regionally, the PLA Navy's
rapid building and militarization of artificial
islands in the South China Sea, creating forward
operating bases, is perhaps the clearest signal
of territorial ambition. And relations with India
have seriously deteriorated due to recurring,
sometimes deadly, border standoffs. In places
like Depsang, Doklam, and that lethal clash in
2020. Exactly. The overarching theme across Asia
is assertive regional dominance backed by overwhelming
military power. This intense national security
focus and the resulting baseline thinking leads
us directly into the massive internal challenges
and the highly scrutinized human rights record
that defines this era. particularly in Xinjiang.
Following terrorist attacks in 2013 and 2014,
one happening just after Xi's visit to the region,
he launched the Strike Hard campaign against
violent terrorism. And this campaign unleashed
systematic mass repression. The mechanism involved
the mass detention and surveillance of ethnic
minorities, leading to reports of up to 1 .8
million people, predominantly Uyghurs and other
ethnic and religious minorities, being held in
internment camps by 2020. And this was coupled
with severe Yes, campaigns targeting the Uyghur
population aimed at changing the demographic
composition of the region. And crucially, we
have internal documentation that speaks to Xi's
personal philosophy driving this crackdown. Yes.
Leaked documents reveal that Xi personally ordered
officials to show absolutely no mercy and to
utilize all the weapons of the people's democratic
dictatorship against those deemed infected with
the virus of extremism. He used some shilling
language. He likened extremism to a drug that
required painful interventionary treatment. However,
in a complex display of pragmatism, he also reportedly
warned against outright ethnic discrimination
and rejected proposals to eliminate Islam completely.
Suggesting a policy of forced assimilation rather
than total eradication. That distinction assimilation
over eradication is key to understanding his
broader policy toward ethnic minorities. So his
administration has systematically scrapped guarantees
for native language education. And heavily emphasized
the teaching of the national language, Mandarin.
The goal is to promote a singular sense of identity
for the Chinese nation. He further emphasized
this by appointing Han Chinese officials to lead
the National Ethnic Affairs Commission, signaling
a deep institutional commitment to cultural homogenization
and integration. We see a similar tightening
of control in Hong Kong, starting with the goal
of greater political and economic integration,
like the Greater Bay Area Project. But Beijing
signaled its true intentions back in 2014. That's
when the State Council published a white paper
asserting Beijing's comprehensive jurisdiction
over Hong Kong. It effectively declared the previously
respected Sino -British Joint Declaration legally
subordinate to China's sovereign rule. The restrictions
mounted quickly after that. Yes, including the
National People's Congress Standing Committee
restricting voting reforms in 2014, which led
directly to massive pro -democracy protests.
And the final nail in the coffin for the one
country, two systems model came after the massive
protests of 2019. Following those widespread
and disruptive protests, Xi presided over the
passage of the 2020 National... Security Law,
NSL. This law dramatically clamped down on political
opposition, freedom of assembly, and freedom
of the press in the city. It established the
Office for Safeguarding National Security outside
Hong Kong's jurisdiction, allowing mainland agents
to operate there. This was the rapid and decisive
culmination of Xi's long -term project to ensure
Hong Kong's full political alignment with the
mainland, prioritizing security over promised
autonomy. Moving across the strait to Taiwan,
she initially used softer rhetoric aimed at economic
integration. He coined that unifying slogan in
2013. Both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one
family. This culminated in the historic 2015
meeting with then Taiwanese President Ma Ying
-jeou, the first such meeting between the leaders
since 1949. The message was clear. Reunification
through peaceful economic means was preferred.
But once the independence -leaning Democratic
Progressive Party, the DPP, won the presidency
under Tsai Ing -wen in 2016, relations quickly
deteriorated. The rhetoric hardened significantly.
Xi adopted a much more coercive stance. In a
pivotal 2019 speech, he reiterated the goal of
unification under the one country, two systems
formula, but issued a clear public threat. Though
we make no promise to renounce the use of force
line. Exactly. He said, we make no promise to
renounce the use of force and reserve the option
of taking all necessary means. And he emphasized
this force would be used against external interference
or separatist activities. Since 2018, the PLA
has used increasingly frequent and complex military
drills around Taiwan as a constant form of political
and military pressure. Finally, we have to discuss
his most controversial domestic policy of the
last few years. The COVID -19 response. He initially
presided over a dynamic zero COVID policy. Launched
in January 2020, this policy was an extreme example
of the party's ability to mobilize and control
the population. It involved stringent prolonged
lockdowns, mass testing campaigns and mandatory
centralized quarantine for anyone testing positive.
And Xi personally defended it as necessary to
protect life safety and to demonstrate to the
superiority of the Chinese system. But the cost
of this policy, particularly the brutal 2022
Shanghai lockdown, was immense. It caused massive
economic disruption and social frustration. The
policy faced mounting internal criticism. I mean,
when you have a megacity like Shanghai, the engine
of the Chinese. economy paralyzed for two months.
The economic and social toll becomes unbearable.
And this discontent tragically spilled over dramatically
in November 2022. Widespread protests broke out
across major cities. Triggered by a fatal apartment
fire in Urumqi, where lockdown rules were blamed
for hindering rescue efforts. Does the speed
and scale of that reversal show political weakness
when faced with popular revolt? Or does it show
political agility in the face of an impossible
policy? That is the ultimate question about Xi's
governance, isn't it? The government responded
with a swift and dramatic reversal. By December
2022, they had effectively ended the zero -COVID
policy, allowing home quarantine for mild cases
and reducing mass testing. It demonstrated that
even a highly personalized policy, once it breaches
the tolerance level of the populace and threatens
economic stability, can be abandoned with astonishing
speed. The priority is party survival, even over
the signature policy itself. Hashtag no in outro.
What a profound and rapid transformation China
has undergone in the last decade. I mean, looking
back across our deep dive, the scope of change
during Xi Jinping's tenure is just monumental.
It's a definitive shift from cautious collective
leadership to hyper centralized personal power,
all driven by this ideological imperative for
absolute control. We've witnessed the institutionalization
of his guiding philosophy, Xi Jinping thought,
which requires absolute ideological conformity
enforced by technology and by legal mandate.
And this consolidation has enabled a profound
redirection of the state, fundamental military
reform to ensure absolute loyalty, a sharp pivot
toward economic self -reliance and common prosperity,
and an unwavering tightening of security and
surveillance over every single aspect of Chinese
society, from finance to farming. He has truly
and fundamentally altered the nation's political
landscape, ensuring that the CCP leads government,
the military, society and schools, north, south,
east and west. The core takeaway, I think, is
that Xi Jinping's political identity was forged
by the chaos and persecution he experienced firsthand
during the Cultural Revolution. He saw the party
almost lose control, and he compares China's
resilience today against the fall of the depoliticized
Soviet military. Having successfully centralized
power and eliminated his rivals, he views his
primary mandate as absolute control to guarantee
the survival of the CCP. So this leaves us with
our final provocative thought for you. Given
Xi's traumatic youth and the resulting commitment
to maximum centralized control, is this relentless
focus on absolute party loyalty the greatest
source of China's future strength, providing
the necessary stability and coordination to face
Western competition, or is it, ironically, its
greatest constraint, stifling the dynamism, the
flexibility, and the innovative voices required
for long -term growth and global stability? Something
to mull over until our next deep dive.