WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:01.840 Welcome back to the Deep Dive, where we take 00:00:01.840 --> 00:00:03.980 your source material, articles, research papers, 00:00:04.240 --> 00:00:06.879 field notes, and, well, we cut right to the insights, 00:00:07.080 --> 00:00:09.199 making you the most informed person in the room 00:00:09.199 --> 00:00:13.140 and fast. And today we are really digging into 00:00:13.140 --> 00:00:16.379 a fascinating piece of machinery, the Grumman 00:00:16.379 --> 00:00:20.339 OV -1 Mohawk. A plane that is, I mean, it's part 00:00:20.339 --> 00:00:23.059 rugged observation tool, part revolutionary tech 00:00:23.059 --> 00:00:26.320 platform, and maybe most importantly, part deep 00:00:26.320 --> 00:00:28.570 -seated political irritant. inside the Pentagon. 00:00:28.789 --> 00:00:31.190 Oh, absolutely. It's a truly complex machine 00:00:31.190 --> 00:00:33.929 to study. The Mohawk was a twin turboprop aircraft 00:00:33.929 --> 00:00:37.729 designed back in the 1950s, and its success almost 00:00:37.729 --> 00:00:40.250 immediately forced this massive inter -service 00:00:40.250 --> 00:00:42.250 fight. A fight that actually changed the rules 00:00:42.250 --> 00:00:45.329 of engagement for U .S. Army aviation for decades. 00:00:45.490 --> 00:00:47.490 For decades. So our mission today is to uncover 00:00:47.490 --> 00:00:49.649 why this resilient plane, it was often called 00:00:49.649 --> 00:00:51.829 the secret eye of the Army, not only survived 00:00:51.829 --> 00:00:53.909 all that conflict and the political battles, 00:00:53.990 --> 00:00:55.990 but also pulled off a combat feat that the Army 00:00:55.990 --> 00:00:58.719 for years tried desperately to erase from history. 00:00:58.979 --> 00:01:01.299 Okay, let's unpack that. The Grumman OV -1 Mohawk, 00:01:01.380 --> 00:01:04.379 manufactured between 1959 and 1970, and they 00:01:04.379 --> 00:01:07.260 built about 380 of them in the end. Right. And 00:01:07.260 --> 00:01:09.359 officially, its category was an American Armed 00:01:09.359 --> 00:01:12.219 Military Observation and Attack Aircraft. And 00:01:12.219 --> 00:01:14.040 when you first look at the Mohawk, the configuration, 00:01:14.379 --> 00:01:17.099 it just jumps right out at you. You've got the 00:01:17.099 --> 00:01:19.319 twin turboprop engines, that very distinctive 00:01:19.319 --> 00:01:23.540 high wing, and then the cockpit. It's a robust... 00:01:23.739 --> 00:01:25.599 Side by side seating arrangement for the two 00:01:25.599 --> 00:01:28.439 crew members. The pilot and the observer or the 00:01:28.439 --> 00:01:30.879 sensor operator sitting shoulder to shoulder. 00:01:31.000 --> 00:01:33.099 Exactly. And that whole profile, you know, it 00:01:33.099 --> 00:01:36.370 was dictated by a single mandate. Rugged efficiency. 00:01:36.670 --> 00:01:39.590 This wasn't designed for, say, high altitude 00:01:39.590 --> 00:01:42.250 strategic reconnaissance like a U -2. Not at 00:01:42.250 --> 00:01:44.370 all. It was designed specifically for battlefield 00:01:44.370 --> 00:01:47.150 surveillance and, at least initially, for light 00:01:47.150 --> 00:01:50.150 strike capabilities. And crucially, that airframe, 00:01:50.269 --> 00:01:52.230 it needed the inherent strength in that wing 00:01:52.230 --> 00:01:55.310 design to operate from short, unimproved runways. 00:01:55.510 --> 00:01:57.700 So we're talking dirt strips. Hastily prepared 00:01:57.700 --> 00:01:59.879 clearings, that kind of thing. That's it. That 00:01:59.879 --> 00:02:02.900 battlefield agility, the ability to launch intelligence 00:02:02.900 --> 00:02:05.219 operations right alongside the troops it was 00:02:05.219 --> 00:02:08.000 supporting. That was the core requirement. And 00:02:08.000 --> 00:02:10.580 the context for this tells us exactly why the 00:02:10.580 --> 00:02:13.699 army needed such a huge jumping capability. They 00:02:13.699 --> 00:02:15.120 weren't just looking for something new. They 00:02:15.120 --> 00:02:18.280 were reacting directly to some very stark lessons 00:02:18.280 --> 00:02:20.860 from the Korean War. Absolutely. They were desperate 00:02:20.860 --> 00:02:23.080 to replace their main observation platform at 00:02:23.080 --> 00:02:26.379 the time, which was the the venerable Cessna 00:02:26.379 --> 00:02:29.300 L -19 bird dog. The bird dog was essential in 00:02:29.300 --> 00:02:32.020 Korea, but it was just so vulnerable. Oh, incredibly. 00:02:32.240 --> 00:02:35.539 It was slow, often fabric skin, completely unarmored. 00:02:35.539 --> 00:02:37.780 It was vulnerable to ground fire, even small 00:02:37.780 --> 00:02:40.099 arms fire. So in a world that's moving toward 00:02:40.099 --> 00:02:42.939 high speed jet powered warfare, that's just not 00:02:42.939 --> 00:02:44.960 going to cut it. Not at all. The army needed 00:02:44.960 --> 00:02:47.120 something that could survive, first of all, but 00:02:47.120 --> 00:02:49.460 also collect intelligence. and most importantly, 00:02:49.580 --> 00:02:52.560 deliver that intelligence rapidly. The Army's 00:02:52.560 --> 00:02:57.300 1956 type specification, TS -145, it was crystal 00:02:57.300 --> 00:02:59.759 clear on this. What did it ask for? A two -seat 00:02:59.759 --> 00:03:02.419 twin turboprop all -weather observation platform. 00:03:02.639 --> 00:03:05.259 And it had to be capable of handling small, rough 00:03:05.259 --> 00:03:07.539 fields. It had to be tough, fast, and protected. 00:03:07.900 --> 00:03:10.180 That is a significant upgrade. Yeah. I mean, 00:03:10.180 --> 00:03:12.500 you're going from what is basically a light civil 00:03:12.500 --> 00:03:16.240 aircraft to a military twin turboprop with armor 00:03:16.240 --> 00:03:18.960 and some serious power. It's a whole different 00:03:18.960 --> 00:03:22.379 league. But you know, this search for the ultimate 00:03:22.379 --> 00:03:25.479 battlefield observation tool, it almost immediately 00:03:25.479 --> 00:03:29.449 hit. Let's call it bureaucratic turbulence. And 00:03:29.449 --> 00:03:31.430 that turbulence started because this wasn't just 00:03:31.430 --> 00:03:34.210 an Army project, was it? No, not initially. It 00:03:34.210 --> 00:03:36.710 began as a joint program. It involved the Army 00:03:36.710 --> 00:03:38.289 and the Marine Corps, and the whole thing was 00:03:38.289 --> 00:03:40.889 managed through the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics 00:03:40.889 --> 00:03:43.550 or Bow Warrior. And any time you combine the 00:03:43.550 --> 00:03:45.550 requirements of two different fighting forces 00:03:45.550 --> 00:03:48.090 and then filter them through a third branch's 00:03:48.090 --> 00:03:50.530 procurement office. You are absolutely setting 00:03:50.530 --> 00:03:52.949 the stage for massive compromise and conflict. 00:03:53.069 --> 00:03:55.129 Which is fascinating because it led to this. 00:03:55.659 --> 00:03:58.099 impossibly wide initial mission scope they were 00:03:58.099 --> 00:04:00.860 trying to satisfy everyone everyone it wasn't 00:04:00.860 --> 00:04:03.840 just observation the original list for the mohawk 00:04:03.840 --> 00:04:07.080 included okay get this observation forward artillery 00:04:07.080 --> 00:04:09.900 spotting air control for troop movements naval 00:04:09.900 --> 00:04:11.939 target spotting that's the navy's requirement 00:04:11.939 --> 00:04:16.019 of course right then liaison between units radiological 00:04:16.019 --> 00:04:18.620 monitoring and even emergency resupply drops 00:04:18.620 --> 00:04:21.620 they wanted one aircraft that could do basically 00:04:21.620 --> 00:04:24.160 everything short of heavy bombing and inside 00:04:24.160 --> 00:04:27.029 that enormous mission scope, we find what has 00:04:27.029 --> 00:04:31.069 to be the most bizarre, the most exotic. One 00:04:31.069 --> 00:04:34.269 that just screams Marine Corps expeditionary 00:04:34.269 --> 00:04:36.230 operations. Oh, I know what you're talking about. 00:04:36.350 --> 00:04:39.310 The water skis. The water skis, yes. This often 00:04:39.310 --> 00:04:41.490 gets glossed over as like a funny footnote, but 00:04:41.490 --> 00:04:43.370 it tells you everything about the design pressures. 00:04:43.730 --> 00:04:45.850 So what was the thinking there? The Marines were 00:04:45.850 --> 00:04:47.870 anticipating operations where you just wouldn't 00:04:47.870 --> 00:04:50.470 have airfields, specifically island landings. 00:04:50.629 --> 00:04:53.050 So they required the capability for the Mohawk 00:04:53.050 --> 00:04:55.949 to be fitted with skis. To land at sea. To land 00:04:55.949 --> 00:04:58.470 at sea or near a beach and then taxi directly 00:04:58.470 --> 00:05:00.629 onto the island. island. It speeds up to 20 knots, 00:05:00.709 --> 00:05:03.209 about 37 kilometers per hour. Wait, hold on. 00:05:03.250 --> 00:05:06.250 We are talking about a sophisticated twin turboprop 00:05:06.250 --> 00:05:08.790 intelligence platform, not a little float plane. 00:05:08.889 --> 00:05:10.930 Okay. And it was designed to land on the ocean 00:05:10.930 --> 00:05:13.029 and then drive itself up onto a potentially hostile 00:05:13.029 --> 00:05:16.449 beach. That's what they wanted. That level of 00:05:16.449 --> 00:05:19.230 ruggedness, that versatility is almost unbelievable. 00:05:19.750 --> 00:05:22.949 And it's what cemented Grumman's winning G134 00:05:22.949 --> 00:05:26.149 design in 1957. But that kind of ambition, trying 00:05:26.149 --> 00:05:29.509 to build this do -everything hybrid. That's where 00:05:29.509 --> 00:05:32.569 the friction starts, especially around armament. 00:05:32.709 --> 00:05:34.889 Which brings us to the first major political 00:05:34.889 --> 00:05:38.370 flashpoint. The Marines. By their doctrine, they're 00:05:38.370 --> 00:05:41.350 authorized to operate fixed wing aircraft in 00:05:41.350 --> 00:05:45.089 a close air support or CAS role. So, of course, 00:05:45.149 --> 00:05:47.209 when the Mohawk mockup was presented, it had 00:05:47.209 --> 00:05:49.970 underwing pylons. Exactly. And those pylons were 00:05:49.970 --> 00:05:52.709 there for rockets, for bombs, for all sorts of 00:05:52.709 --> 00:05:55.250 specialized stores. But the moment the Army had 00:05:55.250 --> 00:05:57.089 a platform that was capable of carrying weapons, 00:05:57.389 --> 00:05:59.709 even if that capability was initially driven 00:05:59.709 --> 00:06:02.310 by the Marines needs, well, the alarm bells went 00:06:02.310 --> 00:06:05.220 off. In one place that mattered most. The United 00:06:05.220 --> 00:06:06.959 States Air Force. The one place that mattered 00:06:06.959 --> 00:06:08.540 most. So this is where we really need to get 00:06:08.540 --> 00:06:10.720 into that political friction. The Air Force sees 00:06:10.720 --> 00:06:13.100 the Army fielding an armed, fixed -wing aircraft, 00:06:13.439 --> 00:06:16.379 and they immediately try to shut it down. Why? 00:06:16.560 --> 00:06:18.879 Why were they so against the Army operating anything 00:06:18.879 --> 00:06:21.420 that could be seen as a combat aircraft? Well, 00:06:21.439 --> 00:06:23.060 it goes all the way back to the foundational 00:06:23.060 --> 00:06:26.079 agreements that govern military roles after World 00:06:26.079 --> 00:06:29.480 War II, primarily the Key West Agreement of 1948. 00:06:29.699 --> 00:06:32.180 Which basically split up the sky. It did. It 00:06:32.180 --> 00:06:35.120 split the operational sphere. The Army handled 00:06:35.120 --> 00:06:38.120 land warfare, and they owned helicopters. The 00:06:38.120 --> 00:06:40.699 Air Force controlled nearly all strategic and 00:06:40.699 --> 00:06:44.139 tactical fixed -wing combat aviation. So the 00:06:44.139 --> 00:06:46.560 Mohawk, with its armor, its speed, and those 00:06:46.560 --> 00:06:49.199 underwing pylons, it looked suspiciously like 00:06:49.199 --> 00:06:51.199 a ground attack plane to the Air Force. And a 00:06:51.199 --> 00:06:53.220 threat to their fixed -wing monopoly. Well, direct 00:06:53.220 --> 00:06:55.560 threat. So the Air Force fought tooth and nail 00:06:55.560 --> 00:06:57.259 to get the armament stripped off the design. 00:06:57.579 --> 00:06:59.980 Meanwhile, you have the Marines, whose requirements 00:06:59.980 --> 00:07:01.959 started this whole thing. They start getting 00:07:01.959 --> 00:07:05.050 cold feet. Why? They decided they didn't really 00:07:05.050 --> 00:07:07.329 want to invest in such a sensor -heavy platform. 00:07:07.490 --> 00:07:10.029 They needed something more focused purely on 00:07:10.029 --> 00:07:12.569 combat utility. So the whole joint program just 00:07:12.569 --> 00:07:14.569 starts to collapse under its own weight. And 00:07:14.569 --> 00:07:16.569 the Marines officially drop out in September 00:07:16.569 --> 00:07:19.629 of 57. They do. And you just can't make up the 00:07:19.629 --> 00:07:22.829 reason why. The Navy decided to divert the budget 00:07:22.829 --> 00:07:25.110 that was allocated for the Mohawk, you know, 00:07:25.129 --> 00:07:28.209 the plane with the water skis, to fund the construction 00:07:28.209 --> 00:07:31.910 of a fleet oil tanker instead. A tanker won. 00:07:32.480 --> 00:07:35.720 A tanker won over a high -tech surveillance platform. 00:07:36.100 --> 00:07:39.000 That is a perfect example of how defense procurement 00:07:39.000 --> 00:07:42.079 works sometimes. Logistics over tactics. But 00:07:42.079 --> 00:07:44.519 the Army, they saw the essential need for this 00:07:44.519 --> 00:07:47.759 advanced observation capability. So they persisted, 00:07:47.759 --> 00:07:49.680 even after the Marines and the Navy were gone. 00:07:49.779 --> 00:07:51.620 And they kept the armed capability. They did. 00:07:51.779 --> 00:07:54.420 They even developed unique accessories like these 00:07:54.420 --> 00:07:57.399 specialized droppable cargo paws that could deliver 00:07:57.399 --> 00:08:00.319 emergency resupply to troops using those hardpoints. 00:08:00.680 --> 00:08:03.000 It was a clear sign they intended to use those 00:08:03.000 --> 00:08:05.379 stations one way or another. But this persistence 00:08:05.379 --> 00:08:08.699 came at a cost, right? financially a huge cost 00:08:08.699 --> 00:08:11.199 all those design compromises that were mandated 00:08:11.199 --> 00:08:13.759 by the joint program like having complex ejection 00:08:13.759 --> 00:08:16.300 seats features to satisfy navy carrier deck requirements 00:08:16.300 --> 00:08:19.279 they made the mohawk a really expensive aircraft 00:08:19.279 --> 00:08:21.660 which created constant resistance in army budgets 00:08:21.660 --> 00:08:24.110 down the line Exactly. It was kind of a victim 00:08:24.110 --> 00:08:26.930 of its own robust multi -service design. And 00:08:26.930 --> 00:08:29.790 this political friction, it finally just explodes 00:08:29.790 --> 00:08:31.949 into formal policy. We've talked about the turf 00:08:31.949 --> 00:08:34.330 war. Now we need to talk about the policy that 00:08:34.330 --> 00:08:36.690 tried to stop it, the Johnson -McConnell agreement. 00:08:36.809 --> 00:08:39.230 Right. This is the essential historical context 00:08:39.230 --> 00:08:42.250 you have to have to understand the next 30 years 00:08:42.250 --> 00:08:45.929 of Army aviation. The controversy over the Army 00:08:45.929 --> 00:08:48.809 wanting to operate armed fixed -wing planes like 00:08:48.809 --> 00:08:51.610 the Mohawk, it reached its peak around 1960. 00:08:52.309 --> 00:08:55.429 And this led directly to the 1966 Johnson -McConnell 00:08:55.429 --> 00:08:57.850 Agreement, named after the Secretary of Defense 00:08:57.850 --> 00:09:00.009 and the Air Force Chief of Staff. That's right. 00:09:00.190 --> 00:09:02.389 And what was the core commandment of that directive? 00:09:02.669 --> 00:09:06.350 It was a formal directive that... basically codified 00:09:06.350 --> 00:09:08.730 the Air Force's victory. It prohibited the Army 00:09:08.730 --> 00:09:11.110 from operating any armed fixed wing aircraft. 00:09:11.409 --> 00:09:13.789 So the idea was the Air Force handles all close 00:09:13.789 --> 00:09:15.850 air support and attack roles from the sky. And 00:09:15.850 --> 00:09:18.730 the Army focuses on ground operations and rotary 00:09:18.730 --> 00:09:21.649 wing helicopter aviation. That is a huge distinction 00:09:21.649 --> 00:09:24.409 because the Army had armed helicopters, but they 00:09:24.409 --> 00:09:27.360 were now strictly prohibited from. Fielding armed 00:09:27.360 --> 00:09:30.580 fixed wing platforms. Right. So the Mohawk was 00:09:30.580 --> 00:09:32.879 designed with a light strike role in mind, but 00:09:32.879 --> 00:09:35.259 its actual deployment was instantly crippled 00:09:35.259 --> 00:09:38.000 by a political pen stroke. The armament was now 00:09:38.000 --> 00:09:41.019 officially legally off limits. Correct. And yet 00:09:41.019 --> 00:09:43.419 the aircraft was already flying and its capabilities 00:09:43.419 --> 00:09:46.360 were just too important to discard. The prototype 00:09:46.360 --> 00:09:50.330 flew on April 14th, 1959. Production started 00:09:50.330 --> 00:09:54.570 fast. By mid -1961, the first Mohawks were already 00:09:54.570 --> 00:09:57.350 overseas. Delivered to the 7th Army in Germany 00:09:57.350 --> 00:10:00.149 at Sandhofen Airfield. They needed these eyes 00:10:00.149 --> 00:10:02.549 in the sky immediately. They did, and the initial 00:10:02.549 --> 00:10:04.309 impression was strong enough that it even got 00:10:04.309 --> 00:10:06.759 international interest. Germany and France were 00:10:06.759 --> 00:10:09.220 looking very closely at the design. Grumman even 00:10:09.220 --> 00:10:12.340 signed a licensing agreement with Brega Aviation 00:10:12.340 --> 00:10:14.559 in France. So the world recognized its quality. 00:10:14.840 --> 00:10:17.980 For sure. This U .S. Army design, meant for battlefield 00:10:17.980 --> 00:10:21.059 agility, was seen as a template for quick, robust, 00:10:21.220 --> 00:10:24.289 close -range recon all over Europe. It's amazing 00:10:24.289 --> 00:10:26.590 that this plane, which was constantly under threat 00:10:26.590 --> 00:10:28.889 from inside the Pentagon, was already out there 00:10:28.889 --> 00:10:31.769 redefining reconnaissance. It was. And that brings 00:10:31.769 --> 00:10:33.450 us to the tool that made it so indispensable, 00:10:33.870 --> 00:10:36.389 the technology that truly cemented the Mohawk's 00:10:36.389 --> 00:10:39.029 legacy. If the airframe was built for ruggedness, 00:10:39.110 --> 00:10:41.370 its brain was the cult. The side -looking airborne 00:10:41.370 --> 00:10:44.529 radar, or SLAR, this was the single greatest 00:10:44.529 --> 00:10:47.769 technological leap the Mohawk represented. It 00:10:47.769 --> 00:10:50.250 moved battlefield surveillance from, you know, 00:10:50.269 --> 00:10:53.230 just visual observation to all weather near real 00:10:53.230 --> 00:10:55.409 -time mapping. Okay, so for you listening, you 00:10:55.409 --> 00:10:57.509 might be familiar with traditional radar, but 00:10:57.509 --> 00:11:00.620 not cell RR. How does that side -looking concept 00:11:00.620 --> 00:11:04.200 actually differ from conventional radar? So traditional 00:11:04.200 --> 00:11:06.419 radar, like weather radar, it looks straight 00:11:06.419 --> 00:11:08.940 ahead and gives you range and bearing. CELAR 00:11:08.940 --> 00:11:10.919 is different. It's mounted under the wing in 00:11:10.919 --> 00:11:13.559 this long pod, and it beams microwave energy 00:11:13.559 --> 00:11:16.360 sideways perpendicular to the aircraft's flight 00:11:16.360 --> 00:11:18.539 path. Like a photocopier scanner moving across 00:11:18.539 --> 00:11:20.860 a page. That's a great analogy. As the aircraft 00:11:20.860 --> 00:11:23.779 flies, the radar creates this long swab of scanned 00:11:23.779 --> 00:11:27.019 terrain off to the side. And crucially, it uses 00:11:27.019 --> 00:11:29.779 the Doppler effect, that shift in frequency caused 00:11:29.779 --> 00:11:32.259 by motion, to process the return signal with 00:11:32.259 --> 00:11:34.580 incredible precision. So it's building a detailed 00:11:34.580 --> 00:11:36.720 image based on the time it takes for those radar 00:11:36.720 --> 00:11:39.679 echoes to return. Why was this so revolutionary 00:11:39.679 --> 00:11:41.679 for the environments the Army was fighting in, 00:11:41.740 --> 00:11:45.389 like, say, dense jungles? That's the key. Because 00:11:45.389 --> 00:11:47.549 radar energy operates in the microwave spectrum, 00:11:47.769 --> 00:11:50.509 it has this unique ability to penetrate foliage 00:11:50.509 --> 00:11:53.730 and even light cloud cover. Which means a commander 00:11:53.730 --> 00:11:57.009 could get a clear map of terrain, river crossings, 00:11:57.009 --> 00:12:00.789 roads, trails, all hidden under the thick canopy 00:12:00.789 --> 00:12:03.809 of Southeast Asia. A feat that was just impossible 00:12:03.809 --> 00:12:06.129 with standard photographic reconnaissance at 00:12:06.129 --> 00:12:08.289 the time. And the information retrieval was also 00:12:08.289 --> 00:12:10.889 incredibly fast, especially for the analog systems 00:12:10.889 --> 00:12:13.909 of the 1960s. Oh, absolutely. The system recorded 00:12:13.909 --> 00:12:16.529 the returning radar signals onto photographic 00:12:16.529 --> 00:12:20.029 film right inside the SLR pod. So the observer 00:12:20.029 --> 00:12:22.509 sitting right next to the pilot would receive 00:12:22.509 --> 00:12:25.090 the finished film image just minutes after the 00:12:25.090 --> 00:12:27.250 scanning was complete. It's like having a portable 00:12:27.250 --> 00:12:29.870 real -time war planner on board. Exactly. Ready 00:12:29.870 --> 00:12:32.230 to deliver fresh intelligence just moments after 00:12:32.230 --> 00:12:35.009 collection. And this rapid output was then refined 00:12:35.009 --> 00:12:37.330 even further by a crucial military function. 00:12:37.669 --> 00:12:42.240 The image was deliberately split. Yes. The SLR 00:12:42.240 --> 00:12:44.759 image was presented in two distinct parts. The 00:12:44.759 --> 00:12:46.500 first part showed the fixed terrain features, 00:12:46.720 --> 00:12:48.580 the mountains, the infrastructure, the rivers. 00:12:48.759 --> 00:12:51.159 That gave you the baseline map. But the second 00:12:51.159 --> 00:12:53.730 part... And this was invaluable for tactical 00:12:53.730 --> 00:12:57.230 commanders. It was filtered specifically to spot 00:12:57.230 --> 00:13:00.669 moving targets. So if an enemy truck convoy or 00:13:00.669 --> 00:13:02.690 a unit of troops was on the move. The system 00:13:02.690 --> 00:13:04.730 would immediately highlight that movement against 00:13:04.730 --> 00:13:07.350 the static geographical background. This ability 00:13:07.350 --> 00:13:10.110 to instantly differentiate between static geography 00:13:10.110 --> 00:13:13.730 and dynamic enemy movement. It made the SLR equipped 00:13:13.730 --> 00:13:16.509 Mohawk an unparalleled tactical intelligence 00:13:16.509 --> 00:13:19.590 platform. It's no wonder they were deployed immediately 00:13:19.590 --> 00:13:22.100 to high tension areas. For sure. Operational 00:13:22.100 --> 00:13:24.220 missions patrolling the Korean demilitarized 00:13:24.220 --> 00:13:27.779 zone began as early as 1963. Detecting small 00:13:27.779 --> 00:13:30.320 movements across that line was, you know, the 00:13:30.320 --> 00:13:32.720 difference between peace and conflict. And that 00:13:32.720 --> 00:13:35.320 versatility meant the Mohawk design had to adapt 00:13:35.320 --> 00:13:37.980 constantly, which gave rise to what you call 00:13:37.980 --> 00:13:40.759 the alphabet soup of observation across its different 00:13:40.759 --> 00:13:43.120 variants. A whole alphabet soup. Let's break 00:13:43.120 --> 00:13:45.340 down the primary ones, and not just the letter, 00:13:45.419 --> 00:13:48.360 but the tactical need each one fulfilled. Okay, 00:13:48.399 --> 00:13:51.580 we start with the baseline, the OV -1A. This 00:13:51.580 --> 00:13:53.860 was the original daylight observation and basic 00:13:53.860 --> 00:13:56.139 photo recon platform. It was the visual scout. 00:13:56.379 --> 00:13:59.039 And it had the shorter wingspan, optimized for 00:13:59.039 --> 00:14:02.879 agility. Then came the big upgrade, the OV -1B. 00:14:03.100 --> 00:14:05.659 That was the definitive side -looking radar variant. 00:14:05.740 --> 00:14:09.720 And to carry that heavy, long Stahlar pod. it 00:14:09.720 --> 00:14:13.080 needed a longer wingspan. It jumped from 42 feet 00:14:13.080 --> 00:14:15.399 to 48 feet. Which also helped its high altitude 00:14:15.399 --> 00:14:18.259 performance, I'd imagine. It did. Then the next 00:14:18.259 --> 00:14:21.279 iteration, the OV -1C, addressed a different 00:14:21.279 --> 00:14:23.759 tactical need. It moved from daylight and radar 00:14:23.759 --> 00:14:26.659 into thermal detection. Infrared. Precisely. 00:14:26.659 --> 00:14:29.960 The C model incorporated infrared, or IR, reconnaissance 00:14:29.960 --> 00:14:32.639 gear. This was crucial for night operations detecting 00:14:32.639 --> 00:14:35.600 campfires, engine heat signatures, recent ground 00:14:35.600 --> 00:14:37.259 disturbance, things like that. And it went back 00:14:37.259 --> 00:14:39.139 to the shorter wingspan. It did, yeah, because 00:14:39.139 --> 00:14:41.460 the IR gear was much lighter than the big cellar 00:14:41.460 --> 00:14:43.860 pod. But here's where it gets interesting, because 00:14:43.860 --> 00:14:46.379 the Army, still operating under that strict political 00:14:46.379 --> 00:14:48.120 constraint of the Johnson -McConnell Agreement, 00:14:48.419 --> 00:14:50.639 found a way to maintain an armed capability. 00:14:51.139 --> 00:14:52.919 You're talking about the JOV -1A conversions. 00:14:53.639 --> 00:14:55.940 This feels like the Army being defiant, right? 00:14:56.179 --> 00:14:59.220 It absolutely does. The J -OV -1A wasn't a new 00:14:59.220 --> 00:15:00.899 production model. It was a field conversion. 00:15:01.240 --> 00:15:04.980 They took 59 existing OV -1A and OV -1C models, 00:15:05.139 --> 00:15:07.500 and they specifically refitted them with the 00:15:07.500 --> 00:15:10.100 underwing pylons and the wiring to carry armament. 00:15:10.379 --> 00:15:12.620 And these were often for deployment in active 00:15:12.620 --> 00:15:15.600 combat zones like Vietnam? Right, where the need 00:15:15.600 --> 00:15:17.460 for self -defense or rapid ground suppression 00:15:17.460 --> 00:15:20.259 was acute. So on paper, they were just observation 00:15:20.259 --> 00:15:22.700 aircraft. But in the field, they were armed birds 00:15:22.700 --> 00:15:25.659 ready to fight back. It really shows how bureaucracy 00:15:25.659 --> 00:15:28.019 bends when it's confronted. with combat necessity. 00:15:28.440 --> 00:15:31.179 The adaptation didn't stop there either. Beyond 00:15:31.179 --> 00:15:34.480 photo, radar, and thermal, the Mohawk became 00:15:34.480 --> 00:15:37.620 a key platform for electronic intelligence, ELINT. 00:15:37.759 --> 00:15:40.000 Yeah, you see the development of this whole electronic 00:15:40.000 --> 00:15:43.379 reconnaissance family. The RV -1C, the RV -1D, 00:15:43.419 --> 00:15:46.679 famously nicknamed Quick Look 2, and the EV -1E, 00:15:46.740 --> 00:15:49.019 or Quick Look 3. These were basically flying 00:15:49.019 --> 00:15:51.659 listening posts. That's what they were. Intercepting 00:15:51.659 --> 00:15:54.519 enemy radio comms, tracking radar signals, and 00:15:54.519 --> 00:15:56.860 building this comprehensive picture of the opponent's 00:15:56.860 --> 00:15:59.559 electronic order of battle. That is an extraordinary 00:15:59.559 --> 00:16:03.039 range of roles for one single airframe. And all 00:16:03.039 --> 00:16:05.179 of this dedication to flexibility, it must have 00:16:05.179 --> 00:16:07.740 culminated in the final, ultimate version of 00:16:07.740 --> 00:16:11.019 the design. It did in the OV -1D. The D model 00:16:11.019 --> 00:16:13.519 was the pinnacle. It was the synthesis of the 00:16:13.519 --> 00:16:16.700 Mohawk's mission. It had upgraded, more powerful. 00:16:17.200 --> 00:16:20.240 like humming T -53L 701 engines and state -of 00:16:20.240 --> 00:16:22.460 -the -art avionics for the time. But the real 00:16:22.460 --> 00:16:24.740 genius was something called the mission pallet 00:16:24.740 --> 00:16:27.019 concept. This was revolutionary for logistics. 00:16:27.379 --> 00:16:29.620 Think of the Mohawk like a high -end professional 00:16:29.620 --> 00:16:32.379 camera. Before the D model, if you wanted to 00:16:32.379 --> 00:16:34.860 switch from SAR, your wide -angle mapping lens, 00:16:35.120 --> 00:16:38.299 to IR, your night photography lens, you basically 00:16:38.299 --> 00:16:40.759 needed a different camera body. And a whole new 00:16:40.759 --> 00:16:43.340 maintenance routine. Exactly. The mission pallet 00:16:43.340 --> 00:16:46.200 concept changed that. The primary mission equipment, 00:16:46.440 --> 00:16:49.279 the complex IR gear, or the bulky Cesslar pod, 00:16:49.580 --> 00:16:52.919 it was mounted on a standardized, quickly detachable 00:16:52.919 --> 00:16:55.269 pallet in the fuselage bay. Instead of having 00:16:55.269 --> 00:16:57.149 highly specialized aircraft that could only do 00:16:57.149 --> 00:16:59.909 one job, the Army could use one airframe and 00:16:59.909 --> 00:17:02.149 just swap the intelligence package based on the 00:17:02.149 --> 00:17:04.509 day's mission. That's it. Crews could change 00:17:04.509 --> 00:17:07.170 the aircraft from an infrared night recon configuration 00:17:07.170 --> 00:17:09.890 to a cellar mapping mission in about an hour 00:17:09.890 --> 00:17:12.410 with standard field maintenance equipment. Wow. 00:17:12.609 --> 00:17:16.660 An hour. That is a game changer. It was. This 00:17:16.660 --> 00:17:20.039 rapid retasking capability made the OV -1D incredibly 00:17:20.039 --> 00:17:23.359 valuable. It vastly reduced the number of specialized 00:17:23.359 --> 00:17:25.480 aircraft the Army needed to keep operational. 00:17:25.940 --> 00:17:30.240 37 new OV -1Ds were built and 82 earlier airframes 00:17:30.240 --> 00:17:32.740 were converted. It proved its worth. We have 00:17:32.740 --> 00:17:35.440 this exceptionally adaptable, sensor -heavy aircraft 00:17:35.440 --> 00:17:38.559 that the Army desperately needs for intelligence 00:17:38.559 --> 00:17:41.359 superiority. Yet its very existence is constantly 00:17:41.359 --> 00:17:43.680 under threat from the Air Force. That tension 00:17:43.680 --> 00:17:45.930 just has to boil over once this plane hits. its 00:17:45.930 --> 00:17:48.809 true combat operations. And it did. The Mohawk 00:17:48.809 --> 00:17:51.130 proved its true worth in the jungles of Southeast 00:17:51.130 --> 00:17:54.269 Asia. Its success in Vietnam were so undeniable 00:17:54.269 --> 00:17:56.250 that despite the strict limitations of the Johnson 00:17:56.250 --> 00:17:58.430 -McConnell Agreement, the Army placed additional 00:17:58.430 --> 00:18:01.329 orders in 1966. So they had a political directive 00:18:01.329 --> 00:18:03.430 telling them to back off, but the reality of 00:18:03.430 --> 00:18:06.009 combat was screaming for more Mohawks. That's 00:18:06.009 --> 00:18:09.119 it, exactly. The service began early. In September 00:18:09.119 --> 00:18:13.480 1962, the 23rd Special Warfare Aviation Depachment 00:18:13.480 --> 00:18:15.920 deployed to South Vietnam for initial surveillance 00:18:15.920 --> 00:18:18.519 and operational testing. And those missions were 00:18:18.519 --> 00:18:21.279 critical for generating intelligence that ground 00:18:21.279 --> 00:18:23.900 units just couldn't get otherwise. Not from slower 00:18:23.900 --> 00:18:26.359 helicopters or high -flying strategic assets. 00:18:26.680 --> 00:18:29.700 The key was persistence and the ability to operate 00:18:29.700 --> 00:18:32.539 quickly from those forward bases. And by 1968, 00:18:32.920 --> 00:18:35.859 usage had ramped up significantly. You have five 00:18:35.859 --> 00:18:38.079 full surveillance companies operating them. Mohawk 00:18:38.079 --> 00:18:41.160 across Southeast Asia. But that came at a very 00:18:41.160 --> 00:18:44.099 steep price. A very steep price. 65 Mohawks were 00:18:44.099 --> 00:18:46.960 lost during the Vietnam War. 65? Yeah. And that 00:18:46.960 --> 00:18:49.500 loss rate, it reflects the inherent danger of 00:18:49.500 --> 00:18:51.640 their mission profile. They had to fly relatively 00:18:51.640 --> 00:18:54.180 low, under 10 ,000 feet, and often slowly enough 00:18:54.180 --> 00:18:56.099 for the sensors to get good data. Which made 00:18:56.099 --> 00:18:58.660 them prime targets for heavy ground fire. Prime 00:18:58.660 --> 00:19:01.680 targets. Many were shot down. It really highlights 00:19:01.680 --> 00:19:03.839 the risk those crews took to get that crucial 00:19:03.839 --> 00:19:07.759 intelligence. That number? 65 losses is sobering. 00:19:07.779 --> 00:19:10.000 It really illustrates the vulnerability the Air 00:19:10.000 --> 00:19:13.299 Force warned about. But despite that, one single 00:19:13.299 --> 00:19:16.619 incident completely defied all logic. And it 00:19:16.619 --> 00:19:18.440 proved the Army's insistence on keeping an arm 00:19:18.440 --> 00:19:21.500 capability, even unofficially, was justified. 00:19:21.779 --> 00:19:24.400 This is the centerpiece of the Mohawk's legend. 00:19:24.619 --> 00:19:27.259 The story of the Army's only recorded MIG kills 00:19:27.259 --> 00:19:30.279 since World War II. It's an anecdote that perfectly 00:19:30.279 --> 00:19:32.599 encapsulates the entire struggle the aircraft 00:19:32.599 --> 00:19:35.380 faced. Walk us through this. A turbotrop observation 00:19:35.380 --> 00:19:38.119 plane engaging a dedicated fighter jet. The incident 00:19:38.119 --> 00:19:41.259 happened in early 1968. U .S. Army Captain Ken 00:19:41.259 --> 00:19:44.779 Lee was flying an OV -1 over South Vietnam. His 00:19:44.779 --> 00:19:46.660 mission was surveillance, but he found himself 00:19:46.660 --> 00:19:49.779 intercepted by a North Vietnamese MiG -17 Fresco 00:19:49.779 --> 00:19:53.559 fighter jet. A MiG -17. An agile, jet -powered 00:19:53.559 --> 00:19:56.420 dogfighter. Way faster than the Mohawk. Significantly 00:19:56.420 --> 00:19:58.339 faster. That must have been terrifying. I mean, 00:19:58.359 --> 00:20:00.119 what chance did he possibly have? What was his 00:20:00.119 --> 00:20:02.660 Mohawk even carrying, weapon -wise, given all 00:20:02.660 --> 00:20:04.440 the political constraints? Well, Lee's Mohawk 00:20:04.440 --> 00:20:06.420 was one of those JOV -1A conversions, so it was 00:20:06.420 --> 00:20:08.460 armed. He was carrying two types of ordnance. 00:20:08.579 --> 00:20:12.880 First, two XM14 .50 caliber gun pods. Okay, heavy 00:20:12.880 --> 00:20:15.700 machine guns. Right, 12 .7 millimeter. And second, 00:20:15.980 --> 00:20:20.599 two M159 unguided rocket pods. And it was a combination 00:20:20.599 --> 00:20:23.559 of these that let him win. Accounts suggest Lee 00:20:23.559 --> 00:20:26.059 used the Mohawk's superior low -speed handling 00:20:26.059 --> 00:20:28.480 and its ruggedness to outmaneuver the faster 00:20:28.480 --> 00:20:30.759 MiG -17. So he used the jet speed against it. 00:20:30.859 --> 00:20:33.960 He did, capitalizing on the jet's tendency to 00:20:33.960 --> 00:20:36.720 overshoot in close combat. When the MiG made 00:20:36.720 --> 00:20:39.539 a pass, Lee opened fire with everything he had 00:20:39.539 --> 00:20:41.680 in the combination of the heavy machine gun rounds 00:20:41.680 --> 00:20:44.940 and the unguided rockets. It destroyed the MiG. 00:20:45.200 --> 00:20:48.460 An astonishing victory for a plane never, ever 00:20:48.460 --> 00:20:51.450 meant for air -to -air combat. But the fallout 00:20:51.450 --> 00:20:53.190 from this, it didn't bring medals. It brought 00:20:53.190 --> 00:20:55.750 silence. Why did the Army want to keep this a 00:20:55.750 --> 00:20:58.009 secret for so long? This is where that political 00:20:58.009 --> 00:21:00.170 context becomes absolutely paramount. The Army 00:21:00.170 --> 00:21:02.250 was terrified, and I mean genuinely terrified, 00:21:02.309 --> 00:21:04.990 that formally recognizing an Army aviator achieving 00:21:04.990 --> 00:21:07.009 an air -to -air kill with a fixed -wing aircraft 00:21:07.009 --> 00:21:09.809 would be seen by the Air Force as indisputable 00:21:09.809 --> 00:21:11.650 proof. That the Army was violating the Key West 00:21:11.650 --> 00:21:13.329 Agreement and the Johnson -McConnell Agreement. 00:21:13.710 --> 00:21:16.450 Exactly. The fear was that the Air Force would 00:21:16.450 --> 00:21:19.950 use the MIG kill as leverage to demand the transfer 00:21:19.950 --> 00:21:22.549 of the entire Mohawk fleet, all the sensor packages, 00:21:22.769 --> 00:21:26.130 all the advanced radar systems out of Army inventory 00:21:26.130 --> 00:21:29.430 and into USAF control. So they saw this single 00:21:29.430 --> 00:21:32.849 successful combat engagement as potentially gutting 00:21:32.849 --> 00:21:35.940 their entire aerial recon capability. Which, 00:21:36.019 --> 00:21:38.920 by the late 60s, was heavily reliant on the Mohawk's 00:21:38.920 --> 00:21:41.759 specialized sensors. The intelligence gained 00:21:41.759 --> 00:21:43.940 by the Mohawk was worth more to the Army than 00:21:43.940 --> 00:21:46.700 the pride of claiming a MiG kill. So they buried 00:21:46.700 --> 00:21:48.740 the paperwork. They kept quiet. That is just 00:21:48.740 --> 00:21:51.789 a profound cost of bureaucratic warfare. an incredible 00:21:51.789 --> 00:21:54.569 combat achievement silenced for nearly 40 years 00:21:54.569 --> 00:21:57.269 just to protect institutional turf. It really 00:21:57.269 --> 00:21:59.269 speaks volumes about the constant threat the 00:21:59.269 --> 00:22:01.890 Mohawk operated under. Lee's kill was finally 00:22:01.890 --> 00:22:05.390 formally recognized by the Army in 2007, long 00:22:05.390 --> 00:22:07.690 after the aircraft was retired and the operational 00:22:07.690 --> 00:22:09.710 stakes had passed. But it proves the Mohawk was 00:22:09.710 --> 00:22:11.869 an effective armed platform, even if the Army 00:22:11.869 --> 00:22:14.170 was legally prohibited from saying so. It does. 00:22:14.390 --> 00:22:16.970 And moving beyond Vietnam, the Mohawk's operational 00:22:16.970 --> 00:22:20.049 footprint was vast, and its relevance endured 00:22:20.049 --> 00:22:22.789 well past the end of the Cold War. Where else 00:22:22.789 --> 00:22:24.490 was it providing that essential surveillance? 00:22:24.869 --> 00:22:27.210 Its role in Cold War Europe, where the first 00:22:27.210 --> 00:22:30.410 ones deployed in 61, that was crucial for border 00:22:30.410 --> 00:22:32.529 surveillance, detecting potential Soviet movements. 00:22:32.890 --> 00:22:35.430 And likewise, it continued its mission patrolling 00:22:35.430 --> 00:22:38.609 the Korean DMZ, using that SLARC and nobility 00:22:38.609 --> 00:22:41.269 for continuous all -weather monitoring. And it 00:22:41.269 --> 00:22:43.680 saw domestic service as well, right? to the Army 00:22:43.680 --> 00:22:47.160 National Guard? It did, starting in 1972. The 00:22:47.160 --> 00:22:50.559 ARNG gave the fleet a long life, operating the 00:22:50.559 --> 00:22:53.039 B, C, and D models with units in Georgia and 00:22:53.039 --> 00:22:55.680 Oregon. This kept the airframes active and the 00:22:55.680 --> 00:22:58.579 expertise alive. And, amazingly, demonstrating 00:22:58.579 --> 00:23:01.799 its longevity... It was deployed for combat recon 00:23:01.799 --> 00:23:04.279 late in its life during Operation Desert Storm 00:23:04.279 --> 00:23:07.019 in 1991. That's right. By 1991, surveillance 00:23:07.019 --> 00:23:09.319 tech had advanced dramatically. You had satellites, 00:23:09.599 --> 00:23:12.319 sophisticated jets everywhere. What specific 00:23:12.319 --> 00:23:14.980 niche was the Mohawk still filling in Desert 00:23:14.980 --> 00:23:17.059 Storm? Well, despite that high -tech environment, 00:23:17.480 --> 00:23:19.599 the Mohawk's unique ability to operate from short 00:23:19.599 --> 00:23:22.619 forward airfields and provide rapid ground -level 00:23:22.619 --> 00:23:25.700 SLAR and ELINT coverage was still vital. So it 00:23:25.700 --> 00:23:27.880 filled the gap between strategic satellite imagery. 00:23:28.359 --> 00:23:31.180 which might be too slow or too broad. And the 00:23:31.180 --> 00:23:33.319 tactical intelligence needed by units on the 00:23:33.319 --> 00:23:35.980 move. Its low -flying ELINT capabilities were 00:23:35.980 --> 00:23:38.599 particularly useful for gathering signals intelligence 00:23:38.599 --> 00:23:40.859 in a high -tempo conflict like that one. But 00:23:40.859 --> 00:23:42.940 even the most durable aircraft eventually reached 00:23:42.940 --> 00:23:45.440 the end of their service lives. What prompted 00:23:45.440 --> 00:23:47.579 the final retirement of the Mohawk in the mid 00:23:47.579 --> 00:23:51.329 -1990s? It was a gradual retirement, really driven 00:23:51.329 --> 00:23:54.329 by two main factors, the increasing digitalization 00:23:54.329 --> 00:23:56.529 and networking of intelligence, and the full 00:23:56.529 --> 00:23:58.710 establishment of a new inter -service surveillance 00:23:58.710 --> 00:24:01.089 doctrine. When did they finally stand down? It 00:24:01.089 --> 00:24:03.750 was retired from Europe in 1992, from South Korea 00:24:03.750 --> 00:24:06.569 in September 1996, and the final U .S. retirement 00:24:06.569 --> 00:24:09.089 was in 1996. And what replaced its immediate 00:24:09.089 --> 00:24:11.740 role? Initially, its direct replacement was the 00:24:11.740 --> 00:24:14.440 EO -5C. This was a militarized version of the 00:24:14.440 --> 00:24:17.880 de Havilland Canada Dash 7, a four -engine turboprop 00:24:17.880 --> 00:24:20.380 airliner. So a larger, safer, higher -flying 00:24:20.380 --> 00:24:23.170 platform. Essentially, yeah, equipped with the 00:24:23.170 --> 00:24:26.109 next generation of SLR. But the ultimate replacement, 00:24:26.349 --> 00:24:30.309 the evolution of that massive battlefield radar 00:24:30.309 --> 00:24:33.009 surveillance role the Mohawk pioneered, was the 00:24:33.009 --> 00:24:35.970 U .S. Air Force's Northrop Grumman E -8 Joint 00:24:35.970 --> 00:24:38.670 STARS. Right, Joint STARS, the Joint Surveillance 00:24:38.670 --> 00:24:41.930 Target Attack Radar System. That took the Mohawk's 00:24:41.930 --> 00:24:44.690 moving target indicator concept and put it on 00:24:44.690 --> 00:24:47.190 a strategic jet platform, networking the entire 00:24:47.190 --> 00:24:50.390 battlefield. Exactly. It moved the mission from... 00:24:50.460 --> 00:24:52.319 tactical coverage a few miles off the ground 00:24:52.319 --> 00:24:55.160 to this massive high altitude strategic overview. 00:24:55.400 --> 00:24:58.920 And that shift required fewer, albeit much larger 00:24:58.920 --> 00:25:01.579 and more expensive aircraft. The digital revolution 00:25:01.579 --> 00:25:03.900 made the Mohawks film based processing obsolete. 00:25:04.430 --> 00:25:06.369 even if the airframe itself was still perfectly 00:25:06.369 --> 00:25:08.289 capable. That's a perfect way to put it. But 00:25:08.289 --> 00:25:10.569 the aircraft itself found new homes internationally. 00:25:11.130 --> 00:25:13.549 It did. The Argentine Army Aviation received 00:25:13.549 --> 00:25:16.869 23 OV -1s in the 1990s. They flew them until 00:25:16.869 --> 00:25:19.609 2015. And it was also famously operated by the 00:25:19.609 --> 00:25:22.029 Israeli Air Force. They nicknamed it the Atalef. 00:25:22.210 --> 00:25:24.690 Which is Hebrew for bat. A fitting name for a 00:25:24.690 --> 00:25:26.650 surveillance aircraft that often flew at night. 00:25:26.809 --> 00:25:29.289 Before we discuss its final legacy, let's just 00:25:29.289 --> 00:25:31.829 revisit the nuts and bolts, the specs of the 00:25:31.829 --> 00:25:35.259 OV -1D. Because that sh - toughness, the performance 00:25:35.259 --> 00:25:37.640 metrics, they're key to understanding why it 00:25:37.640 --> 00:25:39.700 was so successful in those austere environments. 00:25:39.960 --> 00:25:42.180 Looking at the physical machine really confirms 00:25:42.180 --> 00:25:44.599 the Army's original requirements for ruggedness. 00:25:44.779 --> 00:25:50.039 The OV -1D was powered by two Lycoming T53L701 00:25:50.039 --> 00:25:53.160 turboprops, each delivering about 1 ,400 shaft 00:25:53.160 --> 00:25:56.059 horsepower. Which gave it a top speed of 305 00:25:56.059 --> 00:25:59.099 mile per hour and a service ceiling of 25 ,000 00:25:59.099 --> 00:26:01.220 feet. But those numbers don't tell the whole 00:26:01.220 --> 00:26:04.180 story. The crucial specs are all about its stay 00:26:04.180 --> 00:26:06.819 -sole capability. Short, takeoff and landing. 00:26:06.960 --> 00:26:09.240 That's right. Explain those SESTLL metrics in 00:26:09.240 --> 00:26:11.059 context. What does that mean for a commander 00:26:11.059 --> 00:26:13.220 on the battlefield? Well, the ability to operate 00:26:13.220 --> 00:26:15.740 from unapproved fields was non -negotiable. And 00:26:15.740 --> 00:26:17.900 if you look at the numbers, to take off and clear 00:26:17.900 --> 00:26:21.259 a 50 -foot obstacle, it needed only 1 ,175 feet 00:26:21.259 --> 00:26:23.200 of runway. That's not much at all. And to land 00:26:23.200 --> 00:26:25.599 from a 50 -foot obstacle, it needed just 1 ,060 00:26:25.599 --> 00:26:27.640 feet. In real world terms, those figures mean 00:26:27.640 --> 00:26:29.339 the Mohawk could operate from any relatively 00:26:29.339 --> 00:26:32.440 flat stretch of road, a field, or a hastily prepared 00:26:32.440 --> 00:26:34.740 dirt strip right behind the front lines. Which 00:26:34.740 --> 00:26:37.440 allowed for rapid mission turnaround and ensured 00:26:37.440 --> 00:26:39.880 the intelligence from the SLR was delivered directly 00:26:39.880 --> 00:26:41.940 to the ground commanders who needed it immediately. 00:26:42.259 --> 00:26:44.279 That's what made it a true battlefield asset. 00:26:44.559 --> 00:26:47.000 It's so interesting that even years after it 00:26:47.000 --> 00:26:49.819 was retired, the idea of the Mohawk as a useful 00:26:49.819 --> 00:26:53.700 combat tool just didn't die. In 2011, there was 00:26:53.700 --> 00:26:56.650 a series venture to bring a modernized armed 00:26:56.650 --> 00:27:00.109 version of the OV -1D back into service. Specifically 00:27:00.109 --> 00:27:04.190 for a counterinsurgency or Koyine role. This 00:27:04.190 --> 00:27:06.329 was a really compelling demonstration. Alliant 00:27:06.329 --> 00:27:08.650 Tech Systems partnered with a few groups to show 00:27:08.650 --> 00:27:11.230 that the Mohawk's robust airframe and short field 00:27:11.230 --> 00:27:14.670 capability, its low cost and persistence still 00:27:14.670 --> 00:27:17.210 made it perfect for Koyine operations. And this 00:27:17.210 --> 00:27:19.130 demonstrator was fitted with modern sensors, 00:27:19.349 --> 00:27:22.750 a FLIR turret and critically eventual trainable 00:27:22.750 --> 00:27:25.440 M230 chaingun. So the cycle just repeats itself. 00:27:25.700 --> 00:27:27.559 40 years later, the same political argument, 00:27:27.720 --> 00:27:29.740 should the Army field a heavily armed, fixed 00:27:29.740 --> 00:27:32.359 -wing surveillance platform, it just reemerged, 00:27:32.380 --> 00:27:34.400 but this time dressed up for the war on terror. 00:27:34.579 --> 00:27:36.420 It proves the enduring utility of the fundamental 00:27:36.420 --> 00:27:39.500 concept. It absolutely confirms that when mission 00:27:39.500 --> 00:27:42.579 requirements demand persistent, rugged, affordable 00:27:42.579 --> 00:27:45.640 surveillance close to the ground, the Mohawk 00:27:45.640 --> 00:27:48.799 design still holds up. And today, its legacy 00:27:48.799 --> 00:27:51.589 is secure. The number of surviving Mohawks is 00:27:51.589 --> 00:27:54.109 remarkable. They're in museums and on bases all 00:27:54.109 --> 00:27:56.410 over the country. And several are still airworthy, 00:27:56.549 --> 00:27:58.990 operated by private companies like Mohawk Technologies. 00:27:59.529 --> 00:28:02.490 It's a huge testament to Grumman's initial very 00:28:02.490 --> 00:28:05.519 robust engineering. So we've covered the ground. 00:28:05.740 --> 00:28:08.599 The Mohawk was born from a disastrous joint program, 00:28:08.819 --> 00:28:11.559 introduced revolutionary SLR technology that 00:28:11.559 --> 00:28:14.299 could pierce the jungle canopy, constantly defied 00:28:14.299 --> 00:28:16.480 political limits to carry armament, and... And 00:28:16.480 --> 00:28:19.019 against all odds, achieved the only Army MiG 00:28:19.019 --> 00:28:21.500 kill since World War II, an achievement that 00:28:21.500 --> 00:28:23.720 had to be suppressed just to save the program 00:28:23.720 --> 00:28:26.640 itself. It was a robust hybrid that just refused 00:28:26.640 --> 00:28:29.180 to be pigeonholed. It kept finding ways to be 00:28:29.180 --> 00:28:31.839 essential, even when institutional politics tried 00:28:31.839 --> 00:28:34.549 to transfer or prohibit its mission. The Mohawk's 00:28:34.549 --> 00:28:37.029 story is a perfect encapsulation of how technological 00:28:37.029 --> 00:28:39.829 necessity, that urgent need for better battlefield 00:28:39.829 --> 00:28:42.509 vision, it forces military structures to adapt, 00:28:42.750 --> 00:28:44.789 often against their own established doctrine. 00:28:45.029 --> 00:28:47.509 And that brings us to our final provocative thought 00:28:47.509 --> 00:28:50.150 for you to chew on. The Mohawk was born from 00:28:50.150 --> 00:28:52.450 the need to put sophisticated human -operated 00:28:52.450 --> 00:28:55.650 sensors right above the battlefield. This immediately 00:28:55.650 --> 00:28:58.130 led to intense political battles over whether 00:28:58.130 --> 00:29:00.650 the Army should operate what the Air Force considered 00:29:00.650 --> 00:29:03.819 to be fixed -wing combat aircraft. Now, given 00:29:03.819 --> 00:29:06.240 that the Army today uses unmanned aerial systems 00:29:06.240 --> 00:29:09.039 drones, for many of the exact same reconnaissance, 00:29:09.140 --> 00:29:11.000 surveillance, and even light strike roles the 00:29:11.000 --> 00:29:13.839 Mohawk pioneered, does the story of the OV -1 00:29:13.839 --> 00:29:15.519 prove that the very nature of an intelligence 00:29:15.519 --> 00:29:17.940 gathering always pushes the limits of institutional 00:29:17.940 --> 00:29:20.339 boundaries, whether the vehicle carrying the 00:29:20.339 --> 00:29:22.980 sensor package is crewed or uncrewed? Is the 00:29:22.980 --> 00:29:25.380 technology the driver, and is the political fight 00:29:25.380 --> 00:29:27.180 simply the inevitable cost of innovation?