WEBVTT

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Welcome back to the Deep Dive. Our mission here

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is to take stacks of complex source material,

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historical documents, regulatory filings, financial

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data, and really turn them into the deep insights

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you need to be truly well informed. And when

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we talk about, you know, financial stability

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and making sure your money is safe in the United

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States, one name always comes up. The FDIC. The

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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. They're

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the ones everyone knows. They back the big commercial

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banks. Exactly. And that familiarity, it's well

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-earned, but it kind of obscures a huge part

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of the picture. The U .S. financial system has

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this crucial parallel structure. The credit union

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movement. Right. And if you, the listener, are

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one of the, what is it, 124 million people in

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this country with an account at a credit union.

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That's a number. Then you are insured and regulated

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by a completely separate, equally vital, and

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frankly, a much less understood federal agency.

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And that's our entire focus today. We're zeroing

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in on this powerful regulator, the National Credit

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Union Administration, or as we'll call it, the

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NCUA. It's the sister agency to the FDIC, but

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it is built exclusively for a credit union. and

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their unique cooperative nonprofit structure.

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So let's define it right out of the gate. What

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is the NCUA fundamentally? Okay, so at its core,

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it's an independent U .S. federal agency. Congress

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created it, and it has this really expansive

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mandate. to regulate, to charter, to supervise.

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And this is the most critical part for most people.

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Yeah. To ensure the nation's credit unions. And

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that structure, it seems to suggest that credit

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unions are just different. They need their own

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special kind of oversight. They absolutely do.

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Yeah. The whole idea is that because they're

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cooperatively owned by their members and they're

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mission focused, not profit focused, they just

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don't fit the commercial banking regulatory model.

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And we are not talking about a small niche player

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here. The scale is. I mean, the sources we have

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paint this map. picture of financial responsibility.

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It's staggering, really. As of December 2020,

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you had the NCUA insuring the deposits of over

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124 million people. 124 million? Across nearly

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5 ,100 federally insured credit unions. And the

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total assets under their watch. It was over $1

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.84 trillion. A trillion with a T. Yeah, that

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puts the NCUA firmly in the big leagues of financial

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regulators. They are managing a huge pillar of

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American finance. Right. So our deep dives today,

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our mission is to give you a really comprehensive

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understanding of this agency. We're going to

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unpack its unique governance, trace its history

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all the way back to the New Deal. And look at

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how it handled some of your financial crises.

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All while, and this is key, maintaining a core...

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cooperative, non -taxpayer funded insurance system.

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Exactly. The goal is for you to walk away truly

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informed about the other major financial insurer

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in the U .S. Okay, let's unpack this, starting

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with the architecture, you know, the very structure

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that makes this agency pick. So the first thing

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that really jumps out at you about the NCUA is

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its governance. It's not led by a single person

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like a secretary or an administrator. Right.

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It's run by a three -member board. Why do they

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do it that way? It seems very deliberately designed

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for, I don't know, stability. That is the absolute

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key insight. The board model is all about checks

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and balances. It's about continuity. These three

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members, they're not just picked out of a hat.

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They're high -level federal appointees. Appointed

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by the president, confirmed by the Senate. Yes,

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which just underscores how serious their positions

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are. I mean, they're trustees of a nearly $2

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trillion financial system. The president then

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picks one of the three to be the chairman to,

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you know, set the agenda. And what's really fascinating

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to me is the political constraint that's baked

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right into the law. The bipartisan rule. Exactly.

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The law says no more than two of those three

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members can belong to the same political party.

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That's not an accident, is it? Not at all. It's

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a structural requirement designed to force bipartisanship.

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It's like an internal break on ideology. A huge

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policy change or response to a crisis can't just

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be pushed through on a narrow party line vote.

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So it forces them to talk to each other. It forces

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deliberation, negotiation, consensus. You know,

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if you compare that to an agency run by one person

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who can be swapped out the day a new president

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takes office, the NCUA's structure is built to

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prevent that kind of regulatory whiplash. And

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the terms they serve, that reinforces the goal,

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too. Six years. A long time. It's designed to

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span across presidential election cycles to provide

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that stability. And they can't just keep getting

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reappointed either. Right. The rules are pretty

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specific. You can't be reappointed to succeed

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yourself immediately unless, say, you were just

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filling out the last bit of someone else's term.

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It's meant to encourage a slow, steady rotation

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of fresh perspectives without gutting the institution

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of its experience. And there's this one little

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logistical detail, the holdover provision, that

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seems incredibly important for keeping things

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running. Oh, it's essential, especially in today's

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political world. It means that if a member's

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six -year term is up, they don't just pack their

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bags and leave. They stay on. They stay on. They

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continue to serve until their replacement is

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not just nominated, but actually confirmed by

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the Senate and sworn in. This prevents a power

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vacuum. It means a political fight can't just

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paralyze the agency. And we can see this in action.

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The source material gives us a snapshot, right?

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As of July 26, 2025. We can. In that example,

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the chairman is Kyle S. Hauptman, a Republican.

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But the other two seats, the vice chair and the

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member slot. are vacant, which happens a lot

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in government all the time. Yeah. But because

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of that holdover rule, the agency doesn't grind

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to a halt. It can still function. It does, however,

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show you the vulnerability. I mean, a board that's

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supposed to be three strong and bipartisan isn't

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at its best when it's operating with just one

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member for a long time. Right. Makes sense. OK,

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so from the leadership at the top, let's go to

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the boots on the ground. This is a national organization

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covering all 50 states, territories. How do they

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manage such a huge supervisory load? They break

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it down. The agency operates through three big

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regional offices. And that physical separation

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is crucial for effective regulation. Why is that?

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Well, think about it. You need examiners to be

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physically near the institutions they're regulating.

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especially with that mandatory 12 -month examination

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cycle we're going to talk about. It's all about

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having that close supervisory relationship. Okay,

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so let's lay out these three pillars for the

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listener. First up is the eastern region. It's

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headquartered in Alexandria, Virginia. And as

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you'd guess, it handles the really dense established

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credit union areas in the northeast and mid -Atlantic.

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So you're talking New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia,

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D .C. The older, more urban institutions. Exactly.

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Then you travel south and you get the southern

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region, based out of Austin, Texas. This one

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covers a huge swath of the country. Florida,

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Texas, Georgia. And its reach goes into the Caribbean,

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too, which is an important detail. They oversee

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credit unions in Puerto Rico and the U .S. Virgin

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Islands. And finally, the west. The vast western

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region, which has run out of Tempe, Arizona.

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Geographically, this one is just enormous. It

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covers everything from the Midwest, like Illinois,

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all the way west. So you've got huge financial

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centers like California and Washington, but also

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Alaska, Hawaii, and even the Pacific Territory

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of Guam. That division of labor seems so important.

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It lets them tailor their supervision to what's

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actually happening in the local economy, right?

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It's vital. The health of a credit union is often

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tied directly to local industries. Is it auto

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manufacturing in Michigan? Is it tech in California?

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Tourism in Florida? The regional offices make

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sure their examiners understand those specific

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economic headwinds when they walk in the door.

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Okay, so let's pivot to what powers all of this.

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The money. The sources make it really clear that

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the NCUA isn't just one big pot of insurance

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money. It's actually four separate funds. Yep.

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And this complexity is key. Most people only

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know about the first one. The insurer. The National

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Credit Union Share Insurance Fund, or NCUSAF.

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That's the one. It's the main guarantee. Insures

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your deposits up to $250 ,000. And it is explicitly

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backed by the full faith and credit of the U

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.S. government. It is the absolute bedrock of

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consumer confidence. Okay. Number two. The NCUA

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Operating Fund. This is what pays the agency's

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bills. It works with the NCUCIF to cover the

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day -to -day stuff salaries for all those examiners,

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IT, rent for the regional offices. It keeps the

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lights on and the regulatory machine running.

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The third one. Seems strategically crucial, especially

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in a crisis. The Central Liquidity Facility,

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or CLF. The CLF is fascinating. It's what really

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anchors the cooperative in attendance of the

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whole system. It's the lender of last resort,

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but just for credit unions. So if a credit union

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has a sudden cash crunch. a big unexpected wave

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of withdrawals maybe or the money markets freeze

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up, the CLF could step in and provide short term

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loans to tide them over. How is that different

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from, say, the Federal Reserve's discount window

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that banks use? It's the structure. The CLF is

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member owned. Credit unions actually buy stock

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in it to become members. So when one of them

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needs liquidity, the CLF is essentially tapping

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into this shared capital pool to stabilize that

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institution. It's a critical line of defense.

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It lets this system solve its own short -term

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problems internally. And that brings us to the

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fourth and final fund, the Community Development

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Revolving Loan Fund. This one really seems to

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speak to the mission of credit unions. It absolutely

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does. The CDRLLF, as it's called, exists purely

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for community investment. It provides loans and

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grants to credit unions that are specifically

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serving low income and underserved communities.

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So the NCUA is using its power to actively foster

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economic growth, tying regulation directly back

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to the whole reason credit unions were created

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in the first place. To really get the NCUA today,

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you have to go back, way back. Like so many of

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our big financial institutions, its story starts

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in the Great Depression. That's right. The year

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is 1934. President Franklin D. Roosevelt signs

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the Federal Credit Union Act into law. And you

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have to remember the context. Trust in banks

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was completely shattered. Millions were out of

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work. And the goal of the act was what exactly?

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It was profoundly progressive for its time. It

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was designed to promote. thrift, you know, saving

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and to create a stable national system of financial

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institutions that were based on this cooperative

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nonprofit model. This idea that the owners are

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the members. Exactly. Any profits go back to

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the members through lower loan rates or higher

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savings rates. It was a direct contrast to the

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shareholder owned. profit driven banks that had

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just failed so spectacularly. So in the beginning,

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this new regulatory body was pretty small. Tiny.

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It started out as the Bureau of Federal Credit

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Unions, the BFCU. And for the first few decades,

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it just it sort of wandered through the government

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bureaucracy. The sources show this crazy migration.

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It's a real shuffle. It started at the Farm Credit

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Administration. Then kind of ironically, it got

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moved to the FDIC for a while. The very agency

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it would later parallel. Right. Then it went

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to the Federal Security Agency. And finally,

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it landed for a time inside. the Department of

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Health, Education, and Welfare, HEW. So you can

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really think of this period as the agency just

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trying to find its footing, right? It's always

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part of something bigger. Completely. But while

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the regulator was getting shuffled around, the

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credit union movement itself was just exploding.

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By 1960, the scale was becoming undeniable. You

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had over 6 million members in more than 10 ,000

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federal credit unions. The Bureau was just outgrowing

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its small corner in the government. And that

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growth, that demanded a change. It demanded independence.

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It demanded focus. And that really sets the stage

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for the big turning point in the 1970s. This

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is when the BFCU gets a complete overhaul and

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becomes the modern independent NCUA we know today.

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1970 is the year. And just as importantly, 1970

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is when the National Credit Union Share Insurance

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Fund, the NCUCIF, was formally created. Having

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federal deposit insurance specifically for credit

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unions was a huge step. OK, and let's focus on

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the aha moment here, because this one detail

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seems to define the entire philosophy of the

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agency, the funding. This is the fundamental

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distinction. The NCU site was capitalized solely

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by credit unions. No tax dollars. Not a single

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cent of taxpayer money was used to start it.

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And that self -funded model isn't just a fun

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fact. It creates this perfect alignment of interests.

00:12:19.129 --> 00:12:22.169
The entire credit union system has a direct financial

00:12:22.169 --> 00:12:25.470
stake in making sure the insurance fund is stable

00:12:25.470 --> 00:12:27.870
and well -regulated because they are the ones

00:12:27.870 --> 00:12:30.799
who paid for it. So in the 70s went on, the credit

00:12:30.799 --> 00:12:32.519
unions themselves were getting more sophisticated.

00:12:32.919 --> 00:12:36.379
Much more. By 1977, they weren't just simple

00:12:36.379 --> 00:12:38.399
savings and loan operations anymore. They were

00:12:38.399 --> 00:12:40.600
offering things like share certificates, doing

00:12:40.600 --> 00:12:42.840
mortgage lending. They were becoming the full

00:12:42.840 --> 00:12:45.740
service institutions we see today. And that complexity

00:12:45.740 --> 00:12:48.960
demanded a more robust leadership. It did. And

00:12:48.960 --> 00:12:51.919
the response came in 1979 when that three -member

00:12:51.919 --> 00:12:54.720
board structure we talked about officially replaced

00:12:54.720 --> 00:12:56.500
the single administrator. It was about building

00:12:56.500 --> 00:12:59.659
in that stability at the top. And 1979 was also

00:12:59.659 --> 00:13:01.639
the year they formalized the Central Liquidity

00:13:01.639 --> 00:13:05.809
Facility, the CLF. Yes. Adding the CLF, that

00:13:05.809 --> 00:13:08.730
lender of last resort, was Congress recognizing

00:13:08.730 --> 00:13:11.929
that as these institutions grew, they needed

00:13:11.929 --> 00:13:14.389
their own dedicated source of liquidity to manage

00:13:14.389 --> 00:13:17.149
risk. So by the end of the 70s, the picture is

00:13:17.149 --> 00:13:19.129
complete. You have separate dedicated bodies

00:13:19.129 --> 00:13:22.110
for regulation, insurance and liquidity. And

00:13:22.110 --> 00:13:24.710
the growth during that decade was just off the

00:13:24.710 --> 00:13:27.169
charts. Unbelievable. Membership doubled and

00:13:27.169 --> 00:13:31.370
assets tripled to over $65 billion. The 1970s

00:13:31.370 --> 00:13:33.529
was really the decade the NCUA came into its

00:13:33.529 --> 00:13:36.110
own. So the NCUA gets its modern independent

00:13:36.110 --> 00:13:39.769
form just in time to face, what, a massive economic

00:13:39.769 --> 00:13:42.669
test in the 1980s? An immediate test. The early

00:13:42.669 --> 00:13:44.889
80s were brutal. You had sky -high interest rates,

00:13:44.990 --> 00:13:47.809
a deep recession, soaring unemployment, and all

00:13:47.809 --> 00:13:49.750
of that economic stress flowed directly to the

00:13:49.750 --> 00:13:51.789
credit union system. And it started causing losses.

00:13:52.230 --> 00:13:55.009
Significant insurance losses. The NCUCEF, that

00:13:55.009 --> 00:13:56.970
fund that was so proudly built by the credit

00:13:56.970 --> 00:13:59.470
unions, started to feel the strain from all the

00:13:59.470 --> 00:14:01.230
failures and the payouts. And they had to fix

00:14:01.230 --> 00:14:03.110
it, but without going to the taxpayers first.

00:14:03.149 --> 00:14:06.990
bailout. Right. The solution came in 1985, and

00:14:06.990 --> 00:14:10.250
it was a crucial recapitalization. The federally

00:14:10.250 --> 00:14:13.289
insured credit unions all deposited 1 % of their

00:14:13.289 --> 00:14:16.970
total shares directly into the NCUSEF. So it

00:14:16.970 --> 00:14:18.730
wasn't a fee, it was more like an equity injection.

00:14:19.110 --> 00:14:21.610
Exactly. It was an equity deposit that instantly

00:14:21.610 --> 00:14:24.169
shored up the fund and gave it the cushion it

00:14:24.169 --> 00:14:26.610
needed to absorb more losses. And this action,

00:14:26.649 --> 00:14:28.970
it basically created the fail -safe mechanism

00:14:28.970 --> 00:14:32.320
that protects the fund to this day. It did. It's

00:14:32.320 --> 00:14:34.879
a highly sophisticated system designed to trigger

00:14:34.879 --> 00:14:37.720
automatically if the fund's capital level drops

00:14:37.720 --> 00:14:40.539
too low. What's the magic number? Well, the goal

00:14:40.539 --> 00:14:43.059
is to keep the fund's equity ratio at or above

00:14:43.059 --> 00:14:45.960
1 .3 % of all insured shares. The trigger point,

00:14:46.120 --> 00:14:48.980
the line in the sand, was set at 1 .23%. So if

00:14:48.980 --> 00:14:52.440
it dips below 1 .23%, alarms go off. Pretty much.

00:14:52.559 --> 00:14:55.000
The board is then required by law to immediately

00:14:55.000 --> 00:14:57.460
charge all the credit unions a premium to bring

00:14:57.460 --> 00:14:59.580
that level back up. And we saw it happen. In

00:14:59.580 --> 00:15:01.879
1991, the ratio dipped and boom, the board charged

00:15:01.879 --> 00:15:04.200
the premium. It forces the industry to bear the

00:15:04.200 --> 00:15:07.080
cost of its own risks in real time. At the same

00:15:07.080 --> 00:15:10.200
time, all this is happening. The agency is dealing

00:15:10.200 --> 00:15:13.200
with big changes inside the credit union world

00:15:13.200 --> 00:15:16.639
itself, especially around this idea of the field

00:15:16.639 --> 00:15:19.799
of membership. Oh, yeah. For decades, the rule

00:15:19.799 --> 00:15:22.279
was incredibly strict. You could only join a

00:15:22.279 --> 00:15:25.120
credit union if you had a very specific common

00:15:25.120 --> 00:15:27.539
bond, like you all worked for the same company

00:15:27.539 --> 00:15:30.139
or lived in the same small town. That started

00:15:30.139 --> 00:15:32.940
to loosen up in the 80s. It did. But the real

00:15:32.940 --> 00:15:36.279
earthquake came in 1998 with a law called the

00:15:36.279 --> 00:15:39.820
Credit Union Membership Access Act. H .R. 1151.

00:15:40.100 --> 00:15:42.559
And that law. Yeah. It just changed everything.

00:15:42.799 --> 00:15:45.179
It blew the doors open. Instead of being restricted

00:15:45.179 --> 00:15:48.000
to those tiny, narrow groups, credit unions could

00:15:48.000 --> 00:15:50.700
now serve much larger community -based or geographic

00:15:50.700 --> 00:15:53.159
areas. It was a massive expansion of their potential

00:15:53.159 --> 00:15:55.019
market. Which they needed to compete with the

00:15:55.019 --> 00:15:57.679
big banks. Absolutely. It was critical for letting

00:15:57.679 --> 00:15:59.659
them grow and achieve the scale they needed to

00:15:59.659 --> 00:16:01.519
survive. It was the moment the movement really

00:16:01.519 --> 00:16:04.059
became a nationwide competitor. So that expansion

00:16:04.059 --> 00:16:06.720
helps them through the 90s and early 2000s. But

00:16:06.720 --> 00:16:09.039
then comes the big one. The global financial

00:16:09.039 --> 00:16:12.320
crisis of 2008. Right. And it strained the entire

00:16:12.320 --> 00:16:15.200
system. The NCUCIF had to charge premiums again

00:16:15.200 --> 00:16:18.759
in 2009 and 2010. But the unique problem for

00:16:18.759 --> 00:16:21.750
credit unions, the real weak spot. wasn't the

00:16:21.750 --> 00:16:25.029
small consumer -facing CUs. It was the ones that

00:16:25.029 --> 00:16:27.669
served them, the corporate credit unions. Exactly.

00:16:27.669 --> 00:16:30.629
These were the giant wholesale institutions that

00:16:30.629 --> 00:16:33.669
provided banking services for the thousands of

00:16:33.669 --> 00:16:36.490
smaller credit unions. And five of the biggest

00:16:36.490 --> 00:16:38.570
ones in the country basically failed. Here's

00:16:38.570 --> 00:16:40.309
where it gets really interesting for the listener.

00:16:40.830 --> 00:16:43.649
Why did they fail? The same reason as so many

00:16:43.649 --> 00:16:46.649
big banks. They invested billions and billions

00:16:46.649 --> 00:16:49.269
of dollars in those toxic, high risk mortgage

00:16:49.269 --> 00:16:52.210
backed securities that became worthless when

00:16:52.210 --> 00:16:54.350
the housing market collapsed. So the failure

00:16:54.350 --> 00:16:56.909
of these huge central institutions threatened

00:16:56.909 --> 00:16:58.789
to take the whole system down with them. It was

00:16:58.789 --> 00:17:01.779
an existential threat. And the NCUA had to act

00:17:01.779 --> 00:17:04.500
immediately to wall off the consumer system from

00:17:04.500 --> 00:17:07.299
these massive corporate losses, all while sticking

00:17:07.299 --> 00:17:10.019
to that core principle of no taxpayer bailouts.

00:17:10.140 --> 00:17:12.019
And their response was, I mean, it was multi

00:17:12.019 --> 00:17:14.079
-primed. It was complex. It was a master class

00:17:14.079 --> 00:17:16.059
in crisis management. The first thing they did

00:17:16.059 --> 00:17:18.519
was work with the Treasury and Congress to create

00:17:18.519 --> 00:17:21.119
the Temporary Corporate Credit Union Stabilization

00:17:21.119 --> 00:17:23.799
Fund. OK, a stabilization fund. What was that

00:17:23.799 --> 00:17:26.539
for? Is that taxpayer money? No. And that is

00:17:26.539 --> 00:17:29.130
the crucial point. It was designed to absorb

00:17:29.130 --> 00:17:32.410
the billions in losses from the failed corporates

00:17:32.410 --> 00:17:37.329
to protect the main NCUCF insurance fund. But

00:17:37.329 --> 00:17:39.589
it was structured so that the credit unions themselves,

00:17:39.930 --> 00:17:43.349
not you, the taxpayer, would pay the costs back

00:17:43.349 --> 00:17:46.230
over time through special assessments. So they

00:17:46.230 --> 00:17:49.390
contain the fire within their own house. Precisely.

00:17:49.609 --> 00:17:51.829
Second, they got their hands dirty and dealt

00:17:51.829 --> 00:17:55.099
with the toxic assets themselves. Ow! They seized

00:17:55.099 --> 00:17:56.819
the failed corporates, and then they took all

00:17:56.819 --> 00:17:58.420
those worthless mortgage -backed securities,

00:17:58.720 --> 00:18:01.079
repackaged them, and sold them off with a new

00:18:01.079 --> 00:18:03.700
government -backed guarantee. That move alone

00:18:03.700 --> 00:18:06.400
raised almost $30 billion and helped stabilize

00:18:06.400 --> 00:18:08.259
the market. And they had to keep the system running

00:18:08.259 --> 00:18:11.099
day to day. Yes. So they set up these temporary

00:18:11.099 --> 00:18:13.819
bridge corporate credit unions. These were placeholder

00:18:13.819 --> 00:18:16.940
institutions run by the NCUA to make sure that

00:18:16.940 --> 00:18:19.880
consumer CUs could still clear payments and get

00:18:19.880 --> 00:18:22.279
liquidity while the old corporates were being

00:18:22.279 --> 00:18:25.509
dismantled. It prevented any disruption for those

00:18:25.509 --> 00:18:28.970
124 million members. And beyond the corporate

00:18:28.970 --> 00:18:31.809
mess, they also had to deal with regular consumer

00:18:31.809 --> 00:18:34.710
-owned credit unions failing because of foreclosures

00:18:34.710 --> 00:18:36.750
and unemployment. Right. And their response there

00:18:36.750 --> 00:18:39.190
was to get much tougher on supervision. They

00:18:39.190 --> 00:18:41.289
implemented a mandatory 12 -month examination

00:18:41.289 --> 00:18:44.269
cycle for every single federally insured credit

00:18:44.269 --> 00:18:46.509
union. To catch problems faster. Much faster.

00:18:46.670 --> 00:18:49.150
Before they could fester and lead to insolvency.

00:18:49.269 --> 00:18:52.609
And you know what? It worked. The data is incredible.

00:18:52.750 --> 00:18:55.049
By the end of 2009, in the middle of the worst

00:18:55.049 --> 00:18:57.710
financial crisis since the Depression, over 96

00:18:57.710 --> 00:18:59.750
% of all credit unions were still considered

00:18:59.750 --> 00:19:02.549
well -capitalized. It was a remarkable success

00:19:02.549 --> 00:19:05.309
story of self -funded crisis containment. So

00:19:05.309 --> 00:19:07.470
coming out of the 2008 crisis, the next decade

00:19:07.470 --> 00:19:09.650
seems to be about making things permanent, really

00:19:09.650 --> 00:19:12.119
cementing the lessons they learned. Absolutely.

00:19:12.279 --> 00:19:14.759
The first big step was the Dodd -Frank Act in

00:19:14.759 --> 00:19:17.539
2010. That's the huge legislative response to

00:19:17.539 --> 00:19:21.119
the crisis. And it made the NCUA's $250 ,000

00:19:21.119 --> 00:19:24.150
insurance limit permanent. That had been a temporary

00:19:24.150 --> 00:19:26.490
increase during the crisis, right? It had. Making

00:19:26.490 --> 00:19:29.049
it permanent was a huge deal for consumer confidence

00:19:29.049 --> 00:19:31.450
and stability. That's the guarantee you see on

00:19:31.450 --> 00:19:33.630
the little NCUA sign at every credit union. And

00:19:33.630 --> 00:19:35.990
that legal battle we mentioned earlier over who

00:19:35.990 --> 00:19:38.029
credit unions could serve their field of membership,

00:19:38.329 --> 00:19:41.349
that fight continued to rage through this period.

00:19:41.589 --> 00:19:44.450
It was a decade -long war, really. The NCUA issued

00:19:44.450 --> 00:19:48.190
new, broader rules in 2016 to modernize the system,

00:19:48.309 --> 00:19:50.529
and they were immediately sued by banking trade

00:19:50.529 --> 00:19:52.480
groups who said they were straying too far. from

00:19:52.480 --> 00:19:55.480
the original mission. But in the end, the NCUA

00:19:55.480 --> 00:19:59.559
won. A huge regulatory victory. In 2019, the

00:19:59.559 --> 00:20:01.980
D .C. Circuit Court upheld most of their new

00:20:01.980 --> 00:20:04.940
rules. And then in 2020, the Supreme Court refused

00:20:04.940 --> 00:20:07.240
to hear an appeal from the banks. That was the

00:20:07.240 --> 00:20:09.240
final word. It cemented the broader membership

00:20:09.240 --> 00:20:12.019
criteria and really secured the future competitiveness

00:20:12.019 --> 00:20:14.119
of the credit union system. And it's kind of

00:20:14.119 --> 00:20:16.460
amazing, just as they finally get that long -sought

00:20:16.460 --> 00:20:19.059
permanence, they get hit with a totally different

00:20:19.059 --> 00:20:22.369
kind of global crisis. COVID -19. It's almost

00:20:22.369 --> 00:20:25.609
ironic. The agency celebrated its 50th anniversary

00:20:25.609 --> 00:20:29.230
as an independent regulator on March 10th, 2020.

00:20:30.190 --> 00:20:33.049
And then days later, the world just shut down.

00:20:33.170 --> 00:20:35.170
And the response had to be immediate. It was.

00:20:35.250 --> 00:20:37.750
They shifted gears instantly to focus on giving

00:20:37.750 --> 00:20:40.329
credit unions maximum flexibility to deal with

00:20:40.329 --> 00:20:42.250
the lockdowns, the loan distress, everything.

00:20:42.450 --> 00:20:44.490
And that central liquidity facility, the CLF,

00:20:44.509 --> 00:20:46.750
became a key tool again. Oh, it was the focal

00:20:46.750 --> 00:20:49.470
point. They took the lessons from 2008 and supercharged

00:20:49.470 --> 00:20:52.420
it. The CARES Act and the NCUA board made changes

00:20:52.420 --> 00:20:54.759
that dramatically increased the CLF's borrowing

00:20:54.759 --> 00:20:57.380
capacity and made it easier for more credit unions

00:20:57.380 --> 00:20:59.859
to join. They were preparing for a worst -case

00:20:59.859 --> 00:21:02.420
scenario, making sure a liquidity crunch wouldn't

00:21:02.420 --> 00:21:04.660
cause a system failure. And they also used their

00:21:04.660 --> 00:21:07.019
community development fund to target help where

00:21:07.019 --> 00:21:10.069
it was needed most. They did. They recognized

00:21:10.069 --> 00:21:12.150
that the pandemic was hitting low -income and

00:21:12.150 --> 00:21:14.470
underserved communities the hardest, so they

00:21:14.470 --> 00:21:16.730
dedicated the majority of the 2020 community

00:21:16.730 --> 00:21:19.910
development revolving loan fund to COVID -19

00:21:19.910 --> 00:21:22.890
assistance. It was a very mission -driven response.

00:21:23.309 --> 00:21:25.930
Which brings us to today and where the NCUA is

00:21:25.930 --> 00:21:28.509
headed. The sources show the agency expanding

00:21:28.509 --> 00:21:31.390
its vision way beyond just insuring deposits.

00:21:31.990 --> 00:21:34.660
It's a profound shift. They're looking at major

00:21:34.660 --> 00:21:37.740
macroeconomic and societal challenges and seeing

00:21:37.740 --> 00:21:40.299
how they connect to financial stability. A big

00:21:40.299 --> 00:21:42.299
one is advancing economic equity and justice.

00:21:42.660 --> 00:21:45.200
What does that mean in practice? It means using

00:21:45.200 --> 00:21:47.339
their regulatory power to help close the wealth

00:21:47.339 --> 00:21:50.049
gap. It means stricter compliance with fair lending

00:21:50.049 --> 00:21:53.029
laws and focusing examinations on whether institutions

00:21:53.029 --> 00:21:55.109
are actually serving their entire communities.

00:21:55.349 --> 00:21:57.910
And they're also specifically supporting minority

00:21:57.910 --> 00:22:01.009
depository institutions, MDIs. Right. They see

00:22:01.009 --> 00:22:03.289
that these MDIs are often the only gateway to

00:22:03.289 --> 00:22:05.670
financial services in some communities. So they're

00:22:05.670 --> 00:22:08.230
making their stability and growth strategic priority.

00:22:08.509 --> 00:22:11.200
It's all part of that broader equity goal. But

00:22:11.200 --> 00:22:14.140
the most surprising, I think, and maybe the most

00:22:14.140 --> 00:22:16.779
forward -looking expansion of their mandate is

00:22:16.779 --> 00:22:18.940
thinking about climate change. What's fascinating

00:22:18.940 --> 00:22:21.539
here is you have a regulator that was born in

00:22:21.539 --> 00:22:24.880
1934 to promote basic thrift, and now it's making

00:22:24.880 --> 00:22:27.799
strategic plans for rising sea levels and wildfires.

00:22:28.019 --> 00:22:31.460
That's a huge leap. It is. But the NCUA now recognizes

00:22:31.460 --> 00:22:33.980
that climate change is a direct threat to the

00:22:33.980 --> 00:22:36.480
solvency of regional credit unions. If you're

00:22:36.480 --> 00:22:39.019
a credit union in Florida or California, your

00:22:39.019 --> 00:22:41.319
entire loan portfolio could be exposed to hurricanes,

00:22:41.559 --> 00:22:43.980
floods, or fires. So they're saying climate risk

00:22:43.980 --> 00:22:47.380
is financial risk. Unquestionably. A major wildfire

00:22:47.380 --> 00:22:49.759
doesn't just destroy homes. It destabilizes the

00:22:49.759 --> 00:22:52.200
regional economy. It causes loan defaults. It

00:22:52.200 --> 00:22:54.779
devalues assets. All of that ultimately threatens

00:22:54.779 --> 00:22:56.579
the insurance fund they're sworn to protect.

00:22:56.839 --> 00:22:59.160
So they are moving into this next frontier of

00:22:59.160 --> 00:23:01.140
risk management, trying to figure out how to

00:23:01.140 --> 00:23:03.019
regulate for threats that are completely new.

00:23:03.640 --> 00:23:06.079
Hashtag Taktag Outright, Trey. So we've covered

00:23:06.079 --> 00:23:08.240
a lot of ground here, from a small New Deal bureau

00:23:08.240 --> 00:23:12.279
to a $2 trillion regulator. The NCOA really stands

00:23:12.279 --> 00:23:14.819
as this essential but often overlooked pillar

00:23:14.819 --> 00:23:17.579
of U .S. financial stability. I think the key

00:23:17.579 --> 00:23:20.500
takeaways are these. The NCOA protects the money

00:23:20.500 --> 00:23:23.440
of 124 million people. It's separate from the

00:23:23.440 --> 00:23:26.519
FDIC. Its leadership structure is built for bipartisan

00:23:26.519 --> 00:23:29.660
stability. And most importantly, its insurance

00:23:29.660 --> 00:23:31.880
fund is paid for by the credit unions themselves.

00:23:31.980 --> 00:23:34.359
Which allowed it to absorb the catastrophic losses

00:23:34.359 --> 00:23:37.579
of 2008 without a taxpayer bailout. A critical

00:23:37.579 --> 00:23:40.519
point. So what does this all mean? It means a

00:23:40.519 --> 00:23:42.599
huge part of our financial system is overseen

00:23:42.599 --> 00:23:45.380
by an agency that's not just an insurer. It's

00:23:45.380 --> 00:23:47.799
an agency that's deeply rooted in a cooperative,

00:23:48.039 --> 00:23:50.500
community -focused mission. And that mission

00:23:50.500 --> 00:23:53.660
is now expanding to include promoting economic

00:23:53.660 --> 00:23:56.319
equity. and even planning for the financial risks

00:23:56.319 --> 00:23:59.460
of climate change. It's a powerful, highly adaptive

00:23:59.460 --> 00:24:02.339
regulator. We saw how the 2008 crisis came from

00:24:02.339 --> 00:24:04.700
risks in complex financial products, mortgage

00:24:04.700 --> 00:24:06.960
-backed securities. It was a threat they learned

00:24:06.960 --> 00:24:09.680
to manage. So here is a final provocative thought

00:24:09.680 --> 00:24:12.819
for you to explore on your own. With the NCUA

00:24:12.819 --> 00:24:15.279
now officially considering the risks from rising

00:24:15.279 --> 00:24:17.900
temperatures and devastating wildfires, what

00:24:17.900 --> 00:24:20.539
new unprecedented threats will these physical

00:24:20.539 --> 00:24:23.339
environmental changes create? Think about the

00:24:23.339 --> 00:24:25.779
loan portfolios in coastal Florida or agricultural

00:24:25.779 --> 00:24:28.799
California. Will that kind of concentrated climate

00:24:28.799 --> 00:24:31.539
risk force the NCUA to evolve the fail -safe

00:24:31.539 --> 00:24:33.660
features of its insurance fund into something

00:24:33.660 --> 00:24:36.180
we've never seen before, something beyond what

00:24:36.180 --> 00:24:38.380
they needed for the crises of the 80s or 2008?

00:24:39.230 --> 00:24:41.589
How do you price the risk of a flood or a fire

00:24:41.589 --> 00:24:44.329
into the stability of a cooperative system? Thanks

00:24:44.329 --> 00:24:46.009
for joining us for the Deep Dive. We'll catch

00:24:46.009 --> 00:24:46.430
you next time.
