WEBVTT

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Welcome back to the Deep Dive. This is a place

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where we take on these just impossibly complex

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corporate giants, the regulatory mazes they navigate,

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and we try to turn it all into something clear,

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something that gives you a crucial insight you

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can actually use. And today we are definitely

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mapping some vast territory. We're looking at

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one of the single largest players in global health

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care, in managed insurance and in pharmacy benefits.

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We're talking about a company whose decisions

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really do affect millions of people, often at

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the most vulnerable and delicate moments of their

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lives. We are dedicating this deep dive to the

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Cigna Group. And when we say group, that's a

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really important word here. This is so much more

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than just a health insurance company you might

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know. Right. This is an American multinational

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for -profit behemoth. It covers managed health

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care, life, and accident insurance. This is the

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critical part, the incredibly powerful and, frankly,

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opaque world of pharmacy benefit management or

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PBMs. Okay. So that's our mission today. We are

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going to cut through all of that industry jargon,

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the mind -boggling financial scale, the complex

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corporate structures. We're going to trace its

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history, which goes back centuries, actually,

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through these huge high -stakes mergers and acquisitions.

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But most importantly, we have to investigate

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the specific, really high -profile controversies.

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including a documented system built for rapid,

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sometimes automated, claim denial. And that system

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really defines Cigna's modern public image. We're

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trying to find the mechanism, the engine that

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drives its massive financial success, and then

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explore what the implications of that mechanism

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are for patient care. You use the word behemoth,

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and that is not an exaggeration at all when you

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look at the number. Not at all. I mean, just

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for context, so you can grasp the scale we're

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talking about here. In 2023, Cigna was number

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15 on the Fortune 500 list. Number 15. Number

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15. That's ranked by total revenue. They also

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came in at 68th on the 2023 Forbes Global 2000

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list. So you're putting them right up there with

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major oil companies, massive tech giants, huge

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retailers. That is a staggering amount of financial

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power. all concentrated in the world of human

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health. The numbers just don't lie. For 2024,

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their key metrics show revenue hitting $247 .1

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billion, with a net income of $3 .434 billion.

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This is a machine that is absolutely built to

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maximize returns. And what's so critical for

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you, the listener, to grasp is the context of

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this scale. You have a single entity that is

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managing health insurance, administering life

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insurance and controlling how prescription drugs

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are distributed and paid for. That's the vertical

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integration you mentioned. That is the source

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of its immense power. It's their strategic advantage.

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And as we're going to explore, it is also the

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root of some of its most significant ethical

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and regulatory challenges. Because when one company

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controls your insurance coverage and it also

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dictates which drugs you can get and how much

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they can get. cost, it just creates this fundamental

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tension, doesn't it? It does. A decision to approve

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a treatment is both a medical decision and profit

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and loss calculation for the very same company.

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Exactly. And to understand how that tension got

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to where it is today, we have to go way back.

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We have to look at the foundations, trace the

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lineage of Cigna back 200 years. That's right.

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The company we know as Cigna today was officially

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formed in 1982, but it was a merger of two incredibly

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historic American corporations. The first of

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those was the INA Corporation. That was the parent

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company of the Insurance Company of North America.

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And if you want a sense of just how historic

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that is, INA was founded in 1792. It's amazing.

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I mean, George Washington was still president.

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And it wasn't just old. It was actually the first

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stock insurance company in America. And the other

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half of that merger was the Connecticut General

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Life Insurance Company, or just CG. It was established

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quite a bit later, in 1865, by a special act

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of the governor of Connecticut. So the name Cigna.

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is just, it's a blend. It's a very straightforward

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combination of the letters from the merging companies,

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CG and INA. Their corporate legacy is branded

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right into the name. And I think this is a really

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crucial starting point because if we want to

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get a snapshot of the, let's call it the moral

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contract that these original companies represented,

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you have to look at the Great Chicago Fire of

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1871. An absolutely epical event. It destroyed

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thousands of buildings, left 100 ,000 people

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homeless. It wasn't just a natural disaster.

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It was a financial cataclysm. The insurance industry

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was just decimated. I mean, hundreds of companies

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went bankrupt practically overnight. couldn't

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pay the claims. But INA didn't fold. No, they

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paid out $650 ,000 in claims, which was a staggering

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amount of money for the time. And here's the

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really incredible part. Out of 202 insurance

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companies operating in Chicago then, INA was

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one of only 51 that paid its claims in full.

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Wow. So that moment just cemented this reputation

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for responsibility, for integrity, for financial

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strength. And it's an anchor point that stands

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in such... Almost shocking contrast to the modern

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controversies we're about to get into. That historical

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DNA of responsibility, it's been strained over

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and over again by corporate evolution. I mean,

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ever since that 1982 merger, the company has

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been constantly reshaping itself. Right, to maximize

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efficiency. Exactly. A big early shift happened

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in 1997. Cigna sold off the majority of its traditional

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life insurance business to Lincoln National Corporation.

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So that was a very deliberate move away from

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being... just a broad traditional insurer. Yes,

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a pivot. They were moving towards specializing

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in managed care and group benefits. And then

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about a decade or so ago, we see this really

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sharp turn towards government sponsored health

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care programs, which. you know, have become an

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incredibly lucrative part of the market. That's

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in October 2011. Cigna makes this huge strategic

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acquisition. They buy HealthSpring Inc. for $3

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.8 billion. And this wasn't a random purchase.

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It was a very specific move. Oh, absolutely.

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It was purely strategic, designed to rapidly,

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massively scale up their presence in Medicare

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Advantage. The goal was to jumpstart their position

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in this growing government -backed sector. And

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it worked. It did, instantly. That one acquisition

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took their Medicare Advantage membership from

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a pretty modest 46 ,000 people to nearly 400

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,000. So this shows that Cigna saw the huge potential

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in Medicare and these other government programs

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really early on. They were positioning for aggressive

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growth long before the era of these mega -mergers

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really kicked into high gear. And that sets the

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stage perfectly for where we need to go next.

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This is the period of the $67 billion bet and

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these massive corporate identity shifts. This

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is really where the modern vertically integrated

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signal was forged, right? Through these huge

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high risk corporate battles. Some failed spectacularly.

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And others just fundamentally remade the entire

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company. The first major chapter here is the

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attempted mega merger with Anthem Inc. This whole

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corporate drama played out over five years from

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2015. all the way to 2020. So in June 2015, Anthem

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announces they want to buy Cigna for $47 billion,

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a figure that I think was later revised even

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higher to $48 billion. Yeah. And the ambition

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here was enormous. If this had gone through,

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the combined company would have been, at that

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time, the largest health insurer in the United

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States, just a massive consolidation of market

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share. And it's exactly that size, that level

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of market concentration that immediately got

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the attention of federal regulators. Of course.

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In July 2016, the U .S. Department of Justice

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files a major antitrust lawsuit specifically

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to block the merger. And their argument was pretty

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straightforward. Very. The DOJ argued that if

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you combine two of the largest national insurers,

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you would massively reduce competition, especially

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in the market for big companies, for large employer

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groups. And that would lead to higher prices.

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And fewer choices for everybody. The legal fight

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was intense. It all came to a head in February

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2017 with the district court ruling. And that

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court sided with the Justice Department. They

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successfully blocked the merger on anti -competitive

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grounds. But this is where the story gets really

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dramatic. It goes from a regulatory dispute to

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basically an internal corporate war. Right. Because

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Cigna officially calls off the agreement, but

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the fight just... It changes arenas. It pivots

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immediately into Delaware's Court of Chancery.

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And this was not a friendly breakup. It just

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devolved into this long, incredibly hostile legal

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saga where Anthem sued Cigna and Cigna countersued

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Anthem. And they were suing each other for billions

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in damages and termination fees over the deal's

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failure. Billions. It was extraordinary, especially

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when you consider the allegations that came out

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later, investor lawsuits, which we will get to.

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So after all that, after years of fighting and

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millions in legal fees, what was the final outcome?

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It was, well, almost anticlimactic. It was a

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corporate draw. In August of 2020, a decision

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came down that essentially denied both companies'

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claims for compensation from the other. So they

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spent five years fighting just to end up right

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back where they started. Pretty much. having

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spent a fortune preventing the creation of the

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country's largest health insurer. The whole thing

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is just this powerful example of the kind of

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regulatory scrutiny and limits on consolidation

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in this space. That failed merger was just a

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monumental waste of resources. But Cigna didn't

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even blink. They immediately pivoted and made

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an even bigger bet. And this one did succeed

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and it cemented their new identity. They pivoted

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directly into the drug supply chain. In 2018,

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Cigna acquires the pharmacy benefit manager,

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Express Scripts, in a deal valued at a massive

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$67 billion. 67 billion. That number. It's just

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enormous. And when a company is willing to spend

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that much on a PBM, it tells you something. It

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tells you that controlling the drug supply chain

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must generate savings and revenue that just dwarf

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that acquisition cost. Oh, absolutely. For the

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listener who might have heard the term PBM but

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isn't sure exactly... What it is. What did buying

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Express Scripts actually give Cigna control over?

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It gave them end to end vertical control. They

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now manage every major step in the process of

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how you get your drugs. A PBM like Express Scripts

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does three critical money saving things. OK.

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First, they negotiate rebates from drug makers

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in exchange for putting their drugs on the insurer's

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list of covered medications, the formulary. Second,

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they decide what's on that formulary. often steering

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patients to cheaper drugs. And third, they manage

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the distribution, like mail order pharmacies.

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So by buying that whole function, Cigna could

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now control the cost of prescription drugs for

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its own members, but also generate huge revenue

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by selling that service to other clients. Exactly.

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The company that covers your hospital stay is

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now the company that dictates which medications

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you take and what they're going to cost. And

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this new identity became so central to Cigna's

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business that it forced them to do a whole corporate

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restructuring and rebranding not long after.

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It was essential. In September 2020, Cigna took

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its health services portfolio, which was now

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the huge Express Scripts, specialty pharmacy

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Acredo, a company called Evicor, and they put

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them all under a new umbrella brand called Evernorth.

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And this dual identity as both an insurer and

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this powerful services provider needed even more

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clarification, which led to another restructuring

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in 2023. That segmentation was crucial. It gives

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them regulatory flexibility and a bigger market

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reach. The main holding company became the Cigna

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Group. The traditional insurance arm became Cigna

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Healthcare. And critically, the PBM and services

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unit became Evernorth Health Services. And that

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segmentation allows Evernorth to act almost like

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an independent company, right? Precisely. It

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can contract with other health plans, even direct

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competitors of Cigna Healthcare, so they can

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expand their PBM market share way beyond just

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Cigna's own patient base. That is such a key

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insight. Evernorth isn't just serving Cigna.

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It's a separate revenue engine serving the whole

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industry. And that complexity probably makes

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it easier to sell off parts of the business,

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too, which brings us to their very recent moves.

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And the cyclical nature of these brand strategies.

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In January 2024, Cigna announces a huge divestment.

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They agreed to sell off a big chunk of their

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government -sponsored programs. Which ones? Specifically,

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their Medicare Advantage, Supplemental Benefits,

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Part D, and their Care Outlier businesses. They

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sold them to the health care service corporation,

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HCSC, for $3 .7 billion. Wow. So that's a massive

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strategic shift away from the very government

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programs they previously spent billions to get

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into. It seems to signal a renewed focus on their

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core commercial insurance business and, of course,

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the massive Evernorth PBM platform. And this

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is where that fascinating corporate recycling

00:12:38.509 --> 00:12:41.230
comes in. HCSC, the company that bought these

00:12:41.230 --> 00:12:44.769
assets. They announced in July 2025 that the

00:12:44.769 --> 00:12:47.830
newly acquired Medicare Advantage products, the

00:12:47.830 --> 00:12:51.230
very ones Cigna had grown through that 2011 HealthSpring

00:12:51.230 --> 00:12:54.629
acquisition, would be renamed HealthSpring. They

00:12:54.629 --> 00:12:57.110
just revived the old brand name. They literally

00:12:57.110 --> 00:12:59.429
revived the brand that Cigna had let go dormant.

00:12:59.549 --> 00:13:01.950
It's a perfect little microcosm of how corporate

00:13:01.950 --> 00:13:04.269
assets and identities are treated in this industry,

00:13:04.370 --> 00:13:07.269
isn't it? A brand, even one you paid almost $4

00:13:07.269 --> 00:13:10.710
billion for, can just be shelved and then resurrected

00:13:10.710 --> 00:13:12.990
by someone else a decade later. It really shows

00:13:12.990 --> 00:13:15.789
how the financial mechanism often just supersedes

00:13:15.789 --> 00:13:18.789
any sense of brand loyalty or history. Okay,

00:13:18.850 --> 00:13:21.169
so we've established the history and the huge

00:13:21.169 --> 00:13:23.379
scale they achieved. Now let's talk about the

00:13:23.379 --> 00:13:25.899
current tangible scope of their operations. How

00:13:25.899 --> 00:13:28.659
wide is Cigna's net really cast? Well, as of

00:13:28.659 --> 00:13:31.720
2024, they're a massive employer. They list 73

00:13:31.720 --> 00:13:34.860
,500 employees around the world. And their core

00:13:34.860 --> 00:13:37.279
products cover everything. Medical, dental, disability,

00:13:37.500 --> 00:13:39.539
life, and accident insurance. And most of that

00:13:39.539 --> 00:13:41.799
is sold through employers, right? Exactly. It's

00:13:41.799 --> 00:13:43.679
a business model built on group distribution

00:13:43.679 --> 00:13:47.059
through employers, large associations, unions.

00:13:47.759 --> 00:13:50.120
But their domestic business is really only half

00:13:50.120 --> 00:13:53.830
the story. global reach is managed by a separate

00:13:53.830 --> 00:13:56.549
dedicated unit. Cigna Global Health Benefits

00:13:56.549 --> 00:14:00.049
or CGHB. Right. And CGHB was founded way back

00:14:00.049 --> 00:14:03.970
in 1977, long before the Cigna merger. It operates

00:14:03.970 --> 00:14:06.470
in this very specific, very high value niche.

00:14:06.809 --> 00:14:10.009
Covering expatriates. Yes, employees of multinational

00:14:10.009 --> 00:14:11.629
companies who are working outside their home

00:14:11.629 --> 00:14:15.309
country. This is complex, expensive, highly specialized

00:14:15.309 --> 00:14:17.990
insurance. And that kind of specialization demands

00:14:17.990 --> 00:14:20.389
a global operation that's built to handle these

00:14:20.389 --> 00:14:23.190
incredibly complex, multi -jurisdictional claims.

00:14:23.490 --> 00:14:25.590
Their headquarters for that unit is in Wilmington,

00:14:25.649 --> 00:14:28.070
Delaware, but they have major operational hubs

00:14:28.070 --> 00:14:31.470
all over the globe. Visalia, California, Greenock

00:14:31.470 --> 00:14:35.009
in Scotland, Shanghai, China, and Antwerp, Belgium.

00:14:35.269 --> 00:14:37.389
So this structure lets them offer coverage that

00:14:37.389 --> 00:14:40.110
just transcends national borders, providing seamless

00:14:40.110 --> 00:14:42.129
care for people who are highly mobile. What does

00:14:42.129 --> 00:14:43.850
that actually look like in terms of their provider

00:14:43.850 --> 00:14:46.990
network? It is huge. In the U .S. alone, they

00:14:46.990 --> 00:14:50.450
have a network of 550 ,000 physicians and hospitals.

00:14:50.730 --> 00:14:53.789
But to serve those expat clients, they also maintain

00:14:53.789 --> 00:14:57.289
a curated network of over 141 ,000 providers

00:14:57.289 --> 00:15:00.110
outside the U .S. And crucially, that's all managed

00:15:00.110 --> 00:15:02.529
through their own in -house international claims

00:15:02.529 --> 00:15:05.269
platform. This isn't just them outsourcing foreign

00:15:05.269 --> 00:15:08.230
coverage. It shows a really significant long

00:15:08.230 --> 00:15:10.950
-term investment in a truly multinational operational

00:15:10.950 --> 00:15:13.740
capacity. And this reliance on massive scale,

00:15:13.779 --> 00:15:16.100
on vertical integration with Evernorth and this

00:15:16.100 --> 00:15:19.220
global reach with CGHB, that's what makes Cigna

00:15:19.220 --> 00:15:22.659
a financial powerhouse. But it is exactly this

00:15:22.659 --> 00:15:25.600
pursuit of optimization and scale that is inseparable

00:15:25.600 --> 00:15:27.559
from the controversies that have come to dominate

00:15:27.559 --> 00:15:29.580
the public perception of the company. Which brings

00:15:29.580 --> 00:15:31.600
us right to the heart of the matter, the systemic

00:15:31.600 --> 00:15:34.759
issue, the mechanism of denial. We really need

00:15:34.759 --> 00:15:36.580
to preface this by saying that Cigna has been

00:15:36.580 --> 00:15:38.820
operating under intense public and regulatory

00:15:38.820 --> 00:15:41.879
scrutiny for years. And a lot of that situation

00:15:41.879 --> 00:15:44.200
has been exacerbated by their own political and

00:15:44.200 --> 00:15:47.320
PR strategies. For sure. Between 2005 and 2009,

00:15:47.559 --> 00:15:50.980
Cigna spent over $4 .4 million on lobbying. And

00:15:50.980 --> 00:15:53.379
that spending was obviously aimed at influencing

00:15:53.379 --> 00:15:55.600
the legislative and regulatory environment they

00:15:55.600 --> 00:15:58.740
operate in. And during that critical time, Cigna

00:15:58.740 --> 00:16:01.100
produced one of the most high -profile whistleblowers

00:16:01.100 --> 00:16:03.600
in the industry's history. That was Wendell Potter.

00:16:03.799 --> 00:16:06.100
He was Cigna's head of public relations and he

00:16:06.100 --> 00:16:09.179
resigned in 2008. But he didn't just quietly

00:16:09.179 --> 00:16:12.279
retire. No, he became a powerful advocate for

00:16:12.279 --> 00:16:15.000
reform. He gave this damning testimony before

00:16:15.000 --> 00:16:18.139
the U .S. Senate in 2009, explicitly calling

00:16:18.139 --> 00:16:20.840
for comprehensive reform of the health care industry,

00:16:21.460 --> 00:16:23.620
citing his own experience watching the corporate

00:16:23.620 --> 00:16:26.820
machinery prioritize profits over patients. And

00:16:26.820 --> 00:16:28.980
Potter also exposed some of their specific communication

00:16:28.980 --> 00:16:32.059
strategies. The U .K. newspaper The Guardian.

00:16:32.509 --> 00:16:35.429
documented Cigna's alleged use of astroturfing.

00:16:35.470 --> 00:16:37.850
Which is, let's be clear, the practice of creating

00:16:37.850 --> 00:16:40.769
fake blogs or fake grassroots efforts to push

00:16:40.769 --> 00:16:43.529
a certain narrative. Exactly. To push narratives

00:16:43.529 --> 00:16:45.409
that were profitable for the company, particularly

00:16:45.409 --> 00:16:47.450
narratives that dismiss the need for universal

00:16:47.450 --> 00:16:50.549
health care systems. It shows a really proactive,

00:16:50.750 --> 00:16:53.490
aggressive effort to shape public opinion. That

00:16:53.490 --> 00:16:55.649
political maneuvering really sets the stage,

00:16:55.830 --> 00:16:59.330
but the truly systemic controversy, the operational

00:16:59.330 --> 00:17:02.230
heart of this whole issue, that came to light

00:17:02.230 --> 00:17:06.250
with a 2023 ProPublica investigation. An investigation

00:17:06.250 --> 00:17:08.930
into Cigna's internal claims review practices.

00:17:09.289 --> 00:17:11.900
This is a really crucial part of the story. The

00:17:11.900 --> 00:17:14.079
investigation uncovered the existence of this

00:17:14.079 --> 00:17:17.119
highly automated algorithm driven system that

00:17:17.119 --> 00:17:19.680
they used to process claims, and it often resulted

00:17:19.680 --> 00:17:21.980
in rejection without any meaningful human review.

00:17:22.220 --> 00:17:26.619
The system was known internally as PXDX. ProPublica's

00:17:26.619 --> 00:17:28.960
reporting, which was based on internal documents

00:17:28.960 --> 00:17:32.099
and interviews, it detailed how this PXDX system

00:17:32.099 --> 00:17:35.140
allowed company doctors to automatically reject

00:17:35.140 --> 00:17:37.559
entire batches of claims. And the trigger was

00:17:37.559 --> 00:17:39.359
often something as simple as the claim lacking

00:17:39.359 --> 00:17:41.619
two specific codes. The system was programmed

00:17:41.619 --> 00:17:43.980
to look for a diagnosis code and a procedure

00:17:43.980 --> 00:17:46.240
code. Right. But the most damning part of the

00:17:46.240 --> 00:17:48.099
revelation was that the system enabled these

00:17:48.099 --> 00:17:50.640
company doctors to sign off on these mass rejections,

00:17:50.680 --> 00:17:52.799
even if they had never opened the patient's individual

00:17:52.799 --> 00:17:55.160
medical file. I mean, how is that even possible?

00:17:55.279 --> 00:17:57.880
Given the huge medical and financial consequences,

00:17:58.259 --> 00:18:00.759
how can a medical professional electronically

00:18:00.759 --> 00:18:03.720
sign off on a potentially life -altering denial

00:18:03.720 --> 00:18:06.779
without even looking at the patient's file? Well,

00:18:06.839 --> 00:18:09.440
the system leverages efficiency and volume. According

00:18:09.440 --> 00:18:13.019
to the documents ProPublica reviewed, PHDX saved

00:18:13.019 --> 00:18:16.380
Cigna money in two main ways. First, it let them

00:18:16.380 --> 00:18:18.200
deny claims they would have previously paid.

00:18:18.559 --> 00:18:21.140
And second, it drastically cut the labor costs

00:18:21.140 --> 00:18:23.880
for denials because the doctors never had to

00:18:23.880 --> 00:18:26.559
do an in -depth clinical review. They just clicked

00:18:26.559 --> 00:18:28.740
a button. They just used an electronic signature

00:18:28.740 --> 00:18:31.500
to approve the mass denial recommendations that

00:18:31.500 --> 00:18:33.559
were generated by the algorithm. Okay, this is

00:18:33.559 --> 00:18:36.160
where we hit the single most defining data point

00:18:36.160 --> 00:18:38.640
of this entire deep dive. This is where corporate

00:18:38.640 --> 00:18:41.759
optimization meets human need and just fails

00:18:41.759 --> 00:18:45.019
spectacularly. Over a two -month period, Cigna

00:18:45.019 --> 00:18:47.839
doctors denied over 300 ,000 requests for payment

00:18:47.839 --> 00:18:50.940
using this PXDX -driven method. The data showed

00:18:50.940 --> 00:18:52.660
that these doctors spent an average of, and you

00:18:52.660 --> 00:18:55.140
have to hear this, 1 .2 seconds on each case.

00:18:55.339 --> 00:18:57.940
1 .2 seconds. I mean, just let that sink in for

00:18:57.940 --> 00:19:01.180
a moment. This is a claim determination, a decision

00:19:01.180 --> 00:19:03.819
that could decide. whether a patient gets a necessary

00:19:03.819 --> 00:19:07.180
medicine or a test. And it's reduced to a processing

00:19:07.180 --> 00:19:09.700
speed that's faster than a supermarket scanner.

00:19:09.900 --> 00:19:12.259
It fundamentally changes the role of the physician

00:19:12.259 --> 00:19:14.380
in the system, doesn't it? It transforms them

00:19:14.380 --> 00:19:18.039
from a clinician into a rubber stamp for an algorithmic

00:19:18.039 --> 00:19:20.319
denial machine. And that incredible speed even

00:19:20.319 --> 00:19:22.900
earned its own corporate slang. Which is just

00:19:22.900 --> 00:19:25.640
as telling. Internally, they called these rapid

00:19:25.640 --> 00:19:28.200
fire decisions click and close. Click and close.

00:19:28.380 --> 00:19:30.519
And what's more, this practice wasn't stopped

00:19:30.519 --> 00:19:33.539
even after the investigation came out. A 2024

00:19:33.539 --> 00:19:37.140
follow up report by ProPublica noted that a Cigna

00:19:37.140 --> 00:19:39.420
doctor who voiced concerns internally about being

00:19:39.420 --> 00:19:42.059
pressured to review cases this quickly was allegedly

00:19:42.059 --> 00:19:44.619
threatened with being fired. So it suggests a

00:19:44.619 --> 00:19:46.859
corporate culture where the efficiency and speed

00:19:46.859 --> 00:19:49.460
of denial are highly valued metrics, more so

00:19:49.460 --> 00:19:52.329
than clinical due diligence. The CXDX system

00:19:52.329 --> 00:19:54.549
shows us the scale and the efficiency of the

00:19:54.549 --> 00:19:57.049
denial mechanism. But we have to connect this

00:19:57.049 --> 00:20:00.509
symptomatic denial to the devastating human cost.

00:20:00.690 --> 00:20:03.210
And there's no better example of that than the

00:20:03.210 --> 00:20:06.109
tragic, high -profile case of Natalyn Sarkeesian.

00:20:06.269 --> 00:20:08.930
This case got intense media attention back in

00:20:08.930 --> 00:20:12.009
December 2007. It involved a California teenager

00:20:12.009 --> 00:20:15.490
who desperately needed a liver transplant. The

00:20:15.490 --> 00:20:18.309
facts were simple, and they were urgent. A matching

00:20:18.309 --> 00:20:20.630
liver was available. Her doctors estimated she

00:20:20.630 --> 00:20:23.910
had a 65 % chance of surviving for at least six

00:20:23.910 --> 00:20:25.970
months if the procedure went ahead immediately.

00:20:26.359 --> 00:20:28.599
But Cigna initially refused to authorize and

00:20:28.599 --> 00:20:30.799
pay for the transplant. And their official defense

00:20:30.799 --> 00:20:33.380
for this was widely criticized. They claimed

00:20:33.380 --> 00:20:35.759
there was insufficient data to prove the transplant

00:20:35.759 --> 00:20:37.680
would be safe and effective for her specific

00:20:37.680 --> 00:20:40.319
condition. Which just strained credulity, right?

00:20:40.400 --> 00:20:42.460
I mean, liver transplants have been a standard

00:20:42.460 --> 00:20:45.000
accepted medical treatment for decades, since

00:20:45.000 --> 00:20:48.200
the 1960s. Absolutely. Now, due to just intense

00:20:48.200 --> 00:20:50.900
public protest, media scrutiny, massive political

00:20:50.900 --> 00:20:53.839
pressure, Cigna eventually did reverse its decision.

00:20:53.940 --> 00:20:55.789
They approved the claim. But the reversal came

00:20:55.789 --> 00:20:58.269
too late. Ms. Sarkeesian died while awaiting

00:20:58.269 --> 00:21:01.769
the procedure. Her death was just deeply, inextricably

00:21:01.769 --> 00:21:04.130
linked with the delay caused by Cigna's denial

00:21:04.130 --> 00:21:06.950
process. And the tragedy was then compounded

00:21:06.950 --> 00:21:10.390
by what happened next in the legal system. The

00:21:10.390 --> 00:21:14.049
Sarkeesian sued. But in 2009, a California court

00:21:14.049 --> 00:21:16.630
ruled that their claims against Cigna's decision

00:21:16.630 --> 00:21:19.690
making were preempted by a federal law. The Employee

00:21:19.690 --> 00:21:22.910
Retirement Income Security Act, or ERISA. Right,

00:21:22.990 --> 00:21:25.970
ERISA. And that led to the dismissal of all claims

00:21:25.970 --> 00:21:28.380
related to the coverage denial itself. This point

00:21:28.380 --> 00:21:31.039
about ERISA preemption is so important for understanding

00:21:31.039 --> 00:21:33.319
the regulatory environment these companies operate

00:21:33.319 --> 00:21:36.259
in. It's critical. ERISA is a federal law that

00:21:36.259 --> 00:21:38.359
regulates most employer -provided health plans,

00:21:38.519 --> 00:21:41.240
and it often acts as a legal shield for insurance

00:21:41.240 --> 00:21:43.559
companies and employers. It protects them from

00:21:43.559 --> 00:21:45.440
state -level lawsuits about coverage decisions,

00:21:45.740 --> 00:21:47.960
especially lawsuits seeking big damage awards

00:21:47.960 --> 00:21:50.420
for things like negligence or bad faith. So,

00:21:50.420 --> 00:21:52.900
in effect, the federal law protects Cigna from

00:21:52.900 --> 00:21:55.079
the financial consequences of a decision, even

00:21:55.079 --> 00:21:57.339
a tragic one, as long as they followed the plan.

00:22:01.119 --> 00:22:04.759
And when you connect the dots. When you look

00:22:04.759 --> 00:22:07.460
at the Sarkeesian case, that agonizing, high

00:22:07.460 --> 00:22:09.980
-profile individual denial, and you put it next

00:22:09.980 --> 00:22:13.559
to the PXDX system, the mass, 1 .2 -second automated

00:22:13.559 --> 00:22:16.579
denials, you see a clear and disturbing pattern.

00:22:16.779 --> 00:22:19.779
It's the same tension. Exactly. Both cases highlight

00:22:19.779 --> 00:22:22.779
the inherent, maybe insurmountable, tension between

00:22:22.779 --> 00:22:24.640
the pursuit of corporate profit, which demands

00:22:24.640 --> 00:22:27.960
fast, cheap denial processes, and the personalized

00:22:27.960 --> 00:22:30.589
life -and -death needs of a patient. In both

00:22:30.589 --> 00:22:32.549
cases, the corporate mechanism, whether through

00:22:32.549 --> 00:22:35.329
a legal shield or an algorithm, appears to triumph

00:22:35.329 --> 00:22:37.769
over patient advocacy. And this tension is reflected

00:22:37.769 --> 00:22:40.109
so dramatically in the financial and legal battles

00:22:40.109 --> 00:22:42.029
that have plagued Cigna for the last two decades.

00:22:42.289 --> 00:22:44.569
Which brings us to their other major legal challenges.

00:22:45.289 --> 00:22:47.430
Allegations of earnings manipulation and outright

00:22:47.430 --> 00:22:49.710
government fraud paint a really concerning picture.

00:22:49.890 --> 00:22:53.410
And we can trace this back to 2002. Cigna faced

00:22:53.410 --> 00:22:55.690
allegations that they violated the Securities

00:22:55.690 --> 00:22:58.670
Exchange Act. This was about alleged earnings

00:22:58.670 --> 00:23:01.029
manipulation, which destabilized the company

00:23:01.029 --> 00:23:03.890
and caused a big drop in their stock price. So

00:23:03.890 --> 00:23:06.009
financial instability and aggressive accounting,

00:23:06.250 --> 00:23:08.109
these aren't new issues for them. Not at all.

00:23:08.349 --> 00:23:11.269
Then you fast forward to 2020 and the Department

00:23:11.269 --> 00:23:14.250
of Justice gets involved, filing a major lawsuit

00:23:14.250 --> 00:23:16.490
alleging systematic fraud against government

00:23:16.490 --> 00:23:19.529
programs. This was a really serious charge. The

00:23:19.529 --> 00:23:22.470
DOJ alleged that Cigna defrauded Medicare Advantage,

00:23:22.509 --> 00:23:25.170
Medicare and Medicaid to the tune of $1 .4 billion.

00:23:25.650 --> 00:23:28.130
And the main mechanism of the alleged fraud was

00:23:28.130 --> 00:23:30.190
something called upcoding. Let's unpack that

00:23:30.190 --> 00:23:32.089
because it's a key part of how these Medicare

00:23:32.089 --> 00:23:34.809
Advantage plans work. How does upcoding generate

00:23:34.809 --> 00:23:36.849
fraudulent revenue? Well, Medicare Advantage

00:23:36.849 --> 00:23:39.009
plans get paid based on the health status of

00:23:39.009 --> 00:23:41.009
their members, which is calculated using something

00:23:41.009 --> 00:23:43.950
called a risk adjustment factor or RAF score.

00:23:44.430 --> 00:23:46.910
Basically, the sicker a patient is on paper.

00:23:47.289 --> 00:23:49.150
the higher their score and the more money the

00:23:49.150 --> 00:23:51.589
government pays the insurer, in this case Cigna.

00:23:51.710 --> 00:23:54.589
So upcoding is just exaggerating how sick people

00:23:54.589 --> 00:23:57.710
are. In essence, yes. It involves submitting

00:23:57.710 --> 00:24:00.490
diagnostic codes for health conditions that patients

00:24:00.490 --> 00:24:03.109
either didn't have or that weren't properly documented

00:24:03.109 --> 00:24:05.950
in their medical charts. This artificially inflates

00:24:05.950 --> 00:24:09.809
their RAF scores. And Cigna allegedly maximized

00:24:09.809 --> 00:24:11.349
their payments from the government this way,

00:24:11.490 --> 00:24:14.890
leading to $1 .4 billion in alleged overcharges.

00:24:15.609 --> 00:24:17.569
This shows that the drive to maximize revenue

00:24:17.569 --> 00:24:20.250
isn't just in denying commercial claims, but

00:24:20.250 --> 00:24:23.009
also in the reporting systems for government

00:24:23.009 --> 00:24:25.140
revenue. It says a lot about the priority they

00:24:25.140 --> 00:24:27.720
place on system optimization, right? Finding

00:24:27.720 --> 00:24:30.920
every possible avenue to maximize cash flow legally

00:24:30.920 --> 00:24:34.059
or allegedly illegally from these really complex

00:24:34.059 --> 00:24:36.559
government systems. But the legal drama wasn't

00:24:36.559 --> 00:24:39.200
just about fraud. It was also about extreme internal

00:24:39.200 --> 00:24:41.500
corporate conflict. Going back to that failed

00:24:41.500 --> 00:24:44.220
Anthem merger. Right. The 2020 investor lawsuit

00:24:44.220 --> 00:24:47.220
against Cigna CEO David Cordani and the board.

00:24:47.339 --> 00:24:50.220
It contains some truly explosive, almost unbelievable

00:24:50.220 --> 00:24:52.859
allegations about corporate sabotage. This was.

00:24:53.000 --> 00:24:55.599
Not your standard shareholder lawsuit. Investors

00:24:55.599 --> 00:24:57.640
allege that the CEO and board use what they call

00:24:57.640 --> 00:25:00.019
black ops style tactics to intentionally blow

00:25:00.019 --> 00:25:03.019
up the $48 billion merger with Anthem. And the

00:25:03.019 --> 00:25:06.299
claim was that the CEO, Cordani, tried to poison

00:25:06.299 --> 00:25:08.759
the deal after he failed to secure the top leadership

00:25:08.759 --> 00:25:12.019
job in the new combined company. Exactly. The

00:25:12.019 --> 00:25:14.619
lead plaintiff, a pension fund, claimed it was

00:25:14.619 --> 00:25:17.259
sabotaged out of personal ego. That is just an

00:25:17.259 --> 00:25:20.460
extraordinary accusation. That a CEO would allegedly

00:25:20.460 --> 00:25:23.640
use internal resources. lawyers, PR specialists

00:25:23.640 --> 00:25:26.759
to orchestrate a Trojan horse campaign against

00:25:26.759 --> 00:25:29.279
a massive merger that was supposed to create

00:25:29.279 --> 00:25:38.569
huge shareholder value. Rife with internal conflict,

00:25:38.730 --> 00:25:41.309
where personal ambition allegedly trumped shareholder

00:25:41.309 --> 00:25:43.730
value and corporate strategy. So while the main

00:25:43.730 --> 00:25:46.509
Anthem -Cigna fight ended in a draw, these investor

00:25:46.509 --> 00:25:48.990
allegations really highlighted the severe instability

00:25:48.990 --> 00:25:51.049
at the top of the company during that period.

00:25:51.309 --> 00:25:53.349
And if you overlay all this legal and financial

00:25:53.349 --> 00:25:55.910
turmoil onto public perception, the picture gets

00:25:55.910 --> 00:25:58.569
even darker. Cigna has been repeatedly recognized

00:25:58.569 --> 00:26:01.029
for just how negatively people feel about them.

00:26:01.150 --> 00:26:03.319
They have. Cigna was named... one of the most

00:26:03.319 --> 00:26:05.740
hated companies in the U .S. by the American

00:26:05.740 --> 00:26:08.660
Consumer Satisfaction Index, the ACSI, in both

00:26:08.660 --> 00:26:12.039
2015 and again in 2018. This isn't just casual

00:26:12.039 --> 00:26:14.740
dissatisfaction. This is systemic, measured public

00:26:14.740 --> 00:26:17.319
antipathy. And the data really backs up that

00:26:17.319 --> 00:26:19.640
negative sentiment. It suggests that this perception

00:26:19.640 --> 00:26:22.099
is rooted in their actual policies. Data from

00:26:22.099 --> 00:26:24.619
2011, compiled by the California Nurses Association,

00:26:24.940 --> 00:26:28.599
found that Cigna denied a massive 39 .6 % of

00:26:28.599 --> 00:26:32.329
all claims reviewed that year. 39 .6%. That denial

00:26:32.329 --> 00:26:34.349
rate is the foundation of the whole controversy.

00:26:34.609 --> 00:26:36.930
And it becomes truly alarming when you compare

00:26:36.930 --> 00:26:39.410
it to a major competitor operating in the same

00:26:39.410 --> 00:26:41.730
market under the same regulations. In that same

00:26:41.730 --> 00:26:44.630
time frame, a competitor like Aetna denied only

00:26:44.630 --> 00:26:48.470
about 5 .9 % of all claims. So 39 .6 % versus

00:26:48.470 --> 00:26:50.549
5 .9%. That's not a small difference. That is

00:26:50.549 --> 00:26:52.990
a fundamental categorical operational difference,

00:26:53.150 --> 00:26:56.160
a sevenfold difference in denial rates. What

00:26:56.160 --> 00:26:58.440
does that imply about Cigna's business model

00:26:58.440 --> 00:27:01.160
compared to their peers? It implies a philosophy

00:27:01.160 --> 00:27:03.980
that is just inherently more restrictive, more

00:27:03.980 --> 00:27:06.740
aggressive in its efforts to contain costs, or

00:27:06.740 --> 00:27:09.160
maybe more accurately, to contain payouts. That

00:27:09.160 --> 00:27:11.440
high denial rate suggests a very strong internal

00:27:11.440 --> 00:27:14.519
directive to maximize profit by minimizing medical

00:27:14.519 --> 00:27:17.230
expenses. And it seems highly likely that this

00:27:17.230 --> 00:27:20.089
restrictive philosophy was the precursor to and

00:27:20.089 --> 00:27:22.809
the justification for developing that highly

00:27:22.809 --> 00:27:26.049
automated click and close PXDX system we talked

00:27:26.049 --> 00:27:28.849
about. I think so. When you are rejecting nearly

00:27:28.849 --> 00:27:32.470
two out of every five claims, efficiency in that

00:27:32.470 --> 00:27:35.309
rejection process becomes absolutely paramount

00:27:35.309 --> 00:27:37.910
to your business model. It raises that core question.

00:27:38.460 --> 00:27:40.720
Is this a health insurance company or is it a

00:27:40.720 --> 00:27:43.279
highly efficient denial processing company? It's

00:27:43.279 --> 00:27:45.799
a huge corporate contradiction, a company generating

00:27:45.799 --> 00:27:48.079
billions as a leader in health services while

00:27:48.079 --> 00:27:50.880
denying nearly 40 percent of claims. But we do

00:27:50.880 --> 00:27:52.400
have to acknowledge the counterpoint to this.

00:27:52.539 --> 00:27:55.019
They've also secured industry accolades and major

00:27:55.019 --> 00:27:57.059
strategic partnerships. They're not universally

00:27:57.059 --> 00:27:58.779
failing. No, and that's absolutely essential

00:27:58.779 --> 00:28:01.400
for a deep dive like this. For a significant

00:28:01.400 --> 00:28:03.720
period, Cygnus has been recognized for aspects

00:28:03.720 --> 00:28:06.240
of its operational excellence. For example, in

00:28:06.240 --> 00:28:08.819
2009, they received a gold award from Gartner

00:28:08.819 --> 00:28:11.859
and a one -to -one for exemplary customer relationship

00:28:11.859 --> 00:28:14.559
strategy. And then just a year later, in 2010,

00:28:14.759 --> 00:28:17.099
they got the prestigious J .D. Power Award for

00:28:17.099 --> 00:28:19.259
customer service across all of their call centers,

00:28:19.420 --> 00:28:22.160
and they won that four consecutive times. Which

00:28:22.160 --> 00:28:24.420
creates this really fascinating and instructive

00:28:24.420 --> 00:28:27.819
dichotomy for you, the listener. How can a company

00:28:27.819 --> 00:28:30.940
win prestigious customer service awards for four

00:28:30.940 --> 00:28:33.720
years running, which suggest excellent service

00:28:33.720 --> 00:28:36.400
interactions, while simultaneously denying almost

00:28:36.400 --> 00:28:39.000
two out of every five claims and being named

00:28:39.000 --> 00:28:42.200
one of the most hated companies in America? It

00:28:42.200 --> 00:28:44.359
points to a fundamental misalignment between

00:28:44.359 --> 00:28:46.720
process efficiency and outcome satisfaction.

00:28:47.180 --> 00:28:50.160
I think that's exactly it. The J .D. Power Awards

00:28:50.160 --> 00:28:52.420
likely reflect the efficiency and courtesy of

00:28:52.420 --> 00:28:54.819
routine interactions. Answering billing questions,

00:28:55.039 --> 00:28:57.779
changing your doctor, processing simple forms.

00:28:57.900 --> 00:29:00.579
It measures how easy they are to call. It doesn't

00:29:00.579 --> 00:29:02.559
measure satisfaction with the ultimate critical

00:29:02.559 --> 00:29:05.400
coverage decisions. Not at all. Especially not

00:29:05.400 --> 00:29:07.759
those life -altering claims. You can have a very

00:29:07.759 --> 00:29:10.200
friendly, responsive call center that is simply

00:29:10.200 --> 00:29:13.460
delivering bad news extremely politely. The difference

00:29:13.460 --> 00:29:16.650
between... being easy to deal with administratively

00:29:16.650 --> 00:29:18.789
and being easy to rely on clinically when the

00:29:18.789 --> 00:29:21.109
stakes are high. And beyond these awards, their

00:29:21.109 --> 00:29:23.549
history of strategic alliances shows a constant

00:29:23.549 --> 00:29:26.250
forward -looking business strategy, even after

00:29:26.250 --> 00:29:28.750
the Anthem disaster. Right. Their alliances show

00:29:28.750 --> 00:29:31.009
their consistent focus on key markets, especially

00:29:31.009 --> 00:29:33.809
retirees. A key partnership was announced in

00:29:33.809 --> 00:29:36.740
April 2010 with Humana. The goal was to offer

00:29:36.740 --> 00:29:39.759
a streamlined Medicare Advantage solution specifically

00:29:39.759 --> 00:29:42.240
for employers focusing on their retired workers.

00:29:42.460 --> 00:29:45.480
A partnership targeting a very lucrative aging

00:29:45.480 --> 00:29:48.900
demographic. Exactly. And speaking of Humana,

00:29:48.980 --> 00:29:52.079
that intense drive for consolidation never really

00:29:52.079 --> 00:29:55.190
went away. Despite the huge failure of the Anthem

00:29:55.190 --> 00:29:58.690
merger, Reuters reported in late 2023 that Cigna

00:29:58.690 --> 00:30:01.329
and Humana were in serious talks for another

00:30:01.329 --> 00:30:03.930
massive merger. Potentially valued at $60 billion.

00:30:04.250 --> 00:30:06.769
$60 billion. The talks were confirmed to be underway.

00:30:07.069 --> 00:30:08.930
Had that deal gone through, it would have been

00:30:08.930 --> 00:30:10.930
another colossal restructuring of the U .S. healthcare

00:30:10.930 --> 00:30:13.930
landscape. However, the Wall Street Journal reported

00:30:13.930 --> 00:30:16.589
in December 2023 that the merger talks were ultimately

00:30:16.589 --> 00:30:19.470
called off. Any reason given for why those talks

00:30:19.470 --> 00:30:21.690
ended? The report suggested a mix of things.

00:30:22.440 --> 00:30:24.619
disagreements over valuation, complex regulatory

00:30:24.619 --> 00:30:27.039
hurdles, and Cigna's board deciding to shift

00:30:27.039 --> 00:30:29.619
its focus. Instead of the merger, Cigna announced

00:30:29.619 --> 00:30:32.440
a huge stock buyback plan. So it reinforces the

00:30:32.440 --> 00:30:35.160
idea that even at this size, consolidation is

00:30:35.160 --> 00:30:37.660
the main goal. But if a merger is too risky,

00:30:38.170 --> 00:30:40.690
They pivot immediately to maximizing shareholder

00:30:40.690 --> 00:30:43.190
returns through other means like buybacks. It's

00:30:43.190 --> 00:30:45.529
always about maximizing value one way or another.

00:30:45.710 --> 00:30:48.390
And finally, their global strategy goes beyond

00:30:48.390 --> 00:30:51.210
just covering expats. They've also been active

00:30:51.210 --> 00:30:53.369
in pursuing joint ventures in emerging markets.

00:30:53.390 --> 00:30:56.509
Right. In 2011, they established a big international

00:30:56.509 --> 00:30:59.609
partnership with the TTK Group, an Indian business

00:30:59.609 --> 00:31:03.890
conglomerate. This venture, Cigna TTK, was specifically

00:31:03.890 --> 00:31:05.990
designed to grow the health insurance business

00:31:05.990 --> 00:31:08.950
within India, showing their effort to expand

00:31:08.950 --> 00:31:11.690
into diverse global markets. Okay, let's try

00:31:11.690 --> 00:31:13.849
to bring all of this home. Let's summarize the

00:31:13.849 --> 00:31:16.529
key takeaways for you, the listener, from this

00:31:16.529 --> 00:31:19.529
deep dive into the Cigna Group. I think the first

00:31:19.529 --> 00:31:21.710
key takeaway is just the sheer tension built

00:31:21.710 --> 00:31:24.670
into Cigna's very structure. On one hand, it's

00:31:24.670 --> 00:31:27.369
this financial behemoth over $247 billion in

00:31:27.369 --> 00:31:29.970
revenue with a deep, centuries -long history.

00:31:30.490 --> 00:31:33.089
But its modern identity is defined by this aggressive

00:31:33.089 --> 00:31:36.150
vertical integration, especially that $67 billion

00:31:36.150 --> 00:31:38.769
Express Scripts acquisition and the creation

00:31:38.769 --> 00:31:41.450
of Evernorth. And that integration gives them

00:31:41.450 --> 00:31:44.269
this unparalleled control over the entire health

00:31:44.269 --> 00:31:46.869
and drug supply chain, which lets them maximize

00:31:46.869 --> 00:31:49.650
profit by containing costs at every single level.

00:31:49.789 --> 00:31:51.930
And the second takeaway is that shocking operational

00:31:51.930 --> 00:31:55.009
contradiction we uncovered. You have the external

00:31:55.009 --> 00:31:57.130
recognition, like the four J .D. Power Awards

00:31:57.130 --> 00:32:00.069
on one side, and on the other, you have the operational

00:32:00.069 --> 00:32:02.670
reality exposed by whistleblowers and journalists.

00:32:03.069 --> 00:32:06.549
The 39 .6 % claim denial rate, seven times higher

00:32:06.549 --> 00:32:09.049
than some competitors, and the explicit existence

00:32:09.049 --> 00:32:12.809
of the PXDX click -and -close system, where medical

00:32:12.809 --> 00:32:15.569
professionals spent just 1 .2 seconds to deny

00:32:15.569 --> 00:32:18.230
hundreds of thousands of potentially life -altering

00:32:18.230 --> 00:32:20.509
claims. And the legal landscape just cements

00:32:20.509 --> 00:32:22.950
that image of high -pressure finance and conflict.

00:32:23.130 --> 00:32:26.349
The $1 .4 billion Medicare fraud lawsuit, the

00:32:26.349 --> 00:32:29.230
investor allegations of a CEO intentionally sabotaging

00:32:29.230 --> 00:32:31.410
a merger, all these threads come together to

00:32:31.410 --> 00:32:33.549
show a company where the constant battle between

00:32:33.549 --> 00:32:35.849
corporate optimization and patient outcomes appears

00:32:35.849 --> 00:32:38.690
repeatedly to favor optimizing the corporate

00:32:38.690 --> 00:32:41.539
process. It's a profound and frankly a pretty

00:32:41.539 --> 00:32:44.200
unsettling lesson in how the mechanism of generating

00:32:44.200 --> 00:32:47.200
profit has become completely inseparable from

00:32:47.200 --> 00:32:49.940
the mechanism of managing human health. And this

00:32:49.940 --> 00:32:52.119
raises a final provocative thought for you, the

00:32:52.119 --> 00:32:54.940
listener, to consider long after this is over.

00:32:55.289 --> 00:32:58.210
When these massive vertically integrated systems

00:32:58.210 --> 00:33:00.789
like Evernorth, which control pharmacy benefits

00:33:00.789 --> 00:33:04.130
globally, implement denial mechanisms like click

00:33:04.130 --> 00:33:07.289
and close, requiring doctors to spend 1 .2 seconds

00:33:07.289 --> 00:33:10.130
reviewing a claim, does the pursuit of scale

00:33:10.130 --> 00:33:13.170
fundamentally change the nature of care? Has

00:33:13.170 --> 00:33:15.049
the managed healthcare industry, by achieving

00:33:15.049 --> 00:33:17.630
this level of automation and complexity, transformed

00:33:17.630 --> 00:33:20.490
from a human health service into a pure information

00:33:20.490 --> 00:33:23.400
and financial processing industry? And given

00:33:23.400 --> 00:33:25.539
the protections offered by laws like ERISA and

00:33:25.539 --> 00:33:27.980
the vast resources these companies have, what

00:33:27.980 --> 00:33:30.160
are the truly effective regulatory limits when

00:33:30.160 --> 00:33:32.299
dealing with entities that are this large, this

00:33:32.299 --> 00:33:34.940
complex, and this efficient at maximizing revenue

00:33:34.940 --> 00:33:37.160
through denial? Absolutely. That is something

00:33:37.160 --> 00:33:39.079
worth some serious consideration. Thank you for

00:33:39.079 --> 00:33:40.980
joining us for this deep dive into the Cigna

00:33:40.980 --> 00:33:42.420
Group. We will see you next time.
