WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:02.980 Okay, let's unpack this. We're diving deep into 00:00:02.980 --> 00:00:06.719 the history, the staggering complexity, and the 00:00:06.719 --> 00:00:10.279 operational footprint of a company that is quite 00:00:10.279 --> 00:00:12.419 literally foundational to how the modern world 00:00:12.419 --> 00:00:15.919 communicates. Cisco Systems, Inc. It really is. 00:00:16.000 --> 00:00:18.160 It's the digital plumbing of the global economy. 00:00:18.320 --> 00:00:21.039 If you, the listener, have ever accessed a website, 00:00:21.260 --> 00:00:23.500 sent an enterprise email or streamed a video 00:00:23.500 --> 00:00:26.739 over a major carrier network, that data has almost 00:00:26.739 --> 00:00:29.219 certainly passed through a critical piece of 00:00:29.219 --> 00:00:32.439 Cisco gear. A router, a firewall. Something. 00:00:32.500 --> 00:00:35.399 Be it a colossal core router, a secure firewall, 00:00:35.640 --> 00:00:37.799 or a high -speed switch. The company is utterly 00:00:37.799 --> 00:00:40.320 ubiquitous, yet it often operates just out of 00:00:40.320 --> 00:00:42.060 the public spotlight. You know, it just fades 00:00:42.060 --> 00:00:44.020 into the technical background. Exactly. And our 00:00:44.020 --> 00:00:46.100 source material confirms the massive historical 00:00:46.100 --> 00:00:48.359 scale we're talking about here. Founded relatively 00:00:48.359 --> 00:00:52.320 recently in December 1984, this American multinational. 00:00:52.399 --> 00:00:54.899 Roulette. It quickly became an undeniable, defining 00:00:54.899 --> 00:00:57.479 powerhouse of the burgeoning Internet era. And 00:00:57.479 --> 00:00:59.719 that rise was meteoric. I mean, we have to remember 00:00:59.719 --> 00:01:02.460 the context of the dot -com bubble. At its peak 00:01:02.460 --> 00:01:05.480 in late March 2000, Cisco's market capitalization 00:01:05.480 --> 00:01:09.299 soared past an astonishing $500 billion. $500 00:01:09.299 --> 00:01:11.680 billion. That's a figure that briefly made it 00:01:11.680 --> 00:01:13.859 the world's most valuable company, surpassing 00:01:13.859 --> 00:01:16.799 even Microsoft at the time. That was a marker 00:01:16.799 --> 00:01:19.780 of pure market belief in the future of the Internet. 00:01:20.019 --> 00:01:23.439 A future Cisco was literally... building. And 00:01:23.439 --> 00:01:26.000 its status today reflects that continued, if 00:01:26.000 --> 00:01:29.239 maybe less explosive, importance. Even two decades 00:01:29.239 --> 00:01:32.159 after that peak, it remains a heavily traded, 00:01:32.319 --> 00:01:35.340 highly influential component of the NASDAQ, the 00:01:35.340 --> 00:01:37.719 S &P 500, and the Dow Jones Industrial Average. 00:01:37.819 --> 00:01:40.319 Right. That kind of longevity and centrality 00:01:40.319 --> 00:01:42.620 in the notoriously volatile technology sector, 00:01:42.780 --> 00:01:45.480 especially at this scale, is exceptionally rare. 00:01:45.920 --> 00:01:48.599 Longevity, in this case, really just means adaptability. 00:01:48.900 --> 00:01:51.480 So our mission today for you, the learner, is 00:01:51.480 --> 00:01:53.959 to trace that incredible complex journey. We 00:01:53.959 --> 00:01:56.159 want to see how Cisco grew from a humble, academic 00:01:56.159 --> 00:01:59.060 -rooted San Francisco router company into a global 00:01:59.060 --> 00:02:01.480 digital conglomerate. A leader in networking, 00:02:01.680 --> 00:02:03.900 security, and the Internet of Things, or IoT. 00:02:04.120 --> 00:02:06.530 Right. But crucially, we also need to examine 00:02:06.530 --> 00:02:08.870 the fuel that powered that explosive growth. 00:02:08.990 --> 00:02:11.849 Which was, you know, a relentless model of strategic 00:02:11.849 --> 00:02:14.770 acquisitions. And of course, the complex, sometimes 00:02:14.770 --> 00:02:18.789 troubling web of legal and geopolitical controversies 00:02:18.789 --> 00:02:22.330 it has had to navigate simply by virtue of being 00:02:22.330 --> 00:02:25.030 the owner of the pipes. It's a story of innovation 00:02:25.030 --> 00:02:28.990 meeting intense corporate accountability in the 00:02:28.990 --> 00:02:32.169 era of high speed global connectivity. We're 00:02:32.169 --> 00:02:34.770 distilling all the key nuggets, the surprising 00:02:34.770 --> 00:02:37.729 facts and the critical insights directly from 00:02:37.729 --> 00:02:39.789 the sources you provided. So this should be a 00:02:39.789 --> 00:02:42.389 fast, thorough and highly efficient briefing 00:02:42.389 --> 00:02:45.550 on one of the Internet's true, if often hidden. 00:02:46.240 --> 00:02:48.560 Let's start at the beginning because Cisco's 00:02:48.560 --> 00:02:51.319 origin story is fascinatingly unique. This wasn't 00:02:51.319 --> 00:02:53.960 a stereotypical startup founded by venture capitalists 00:02:53.960 --> 00:02:56.219 in a garage. No, not at all. It was established 00:02:56.219 --> 00:02:59.159 by two university computer scientists who were, 00:02:59.180 --> 00:03:01.139 I mean, they were just solving their own daily 00:03:01.139 --> 00:03:02.919 networking problems. That's a key distinction. 00:03:03.259 --> 00:03:05.680 It is. Cisco Systems was officially established 00:03:05.680 --> 00:03:09.139 in December 1984 by Leonard Bosak and Sandy Lerner. 00:03:09.280 --> 00:03:10.939 Their professional roles at Stanford University 00:03:10.939 --> 00:03:13.199 are central to the whole story. Right. Lerner 00:03:13.199 --> 00:03:15.060 was in the business school. She was the director 00:03:15.060 --> 00:03:17.020 of computer facilities for the Graduate School 00:03:17.020 --> 00:03:20.120 of Business, while Bosak managed the computers 00:03:20.120 --> 00:03:22.360 for the computer science department. They were 00:03:22.360 --> 00:03:24.819 physically positioned at the exact junction of 00:03:24.819 --> 00:03:27.539 two disparate campus networks that needed to 00:03:27.539 --> 00:03:29.639 talk to each other. And the problem they solved 00:03:29.639 --> 00:03:32.500 came directly from that necessity of academic 00:03:32.500 --> 00:03:36.139 life. It's all rooted in the early 1980s challenge 00:03:36.139 --> 00:03:39.300 of getting different, often incompatible computer 00:03:39.300 --> 00:03:42.219 systems at Stanford to communicate. Which led 00:03:42.219 --> 00:03:44.819 to a homemade device they called the Blue Box. 00:03:45.199 --> 00:03:47.400 The Blue Box. The Blue Box was the functional 00:03:47.400 --> 00:03:50.479 prototype for the multi -protocol router. But 00:03:50.479 --> 00:03:53.139 what's truly fascinating here is the IP lineage. 00:03:53.479 --> 00:03:56.000 The foundational coding was actually done by 00:03:56.000 --> 00:03:58.419 William Yeager, a research engineer at Stanford. 00:03:58.639 --> 00:04:00.710 And the hardware. The circuitry, which allowed 00:04:00.710 --> 00:04:03.270 the software to run, was made by Andy Bechtolsheim, 00:04:03.409 --> 00:04:06.270 who would later go on to co -found Sun Microsystems. 00:04:06.270 --> 00:04:08.750 Wow. Jaeger's original software architecture 00:04:08.750 --> 00:04:10.930 was critical because it was designed from the 00:04:10.930 --> 00:04:13.770 ground up to scale well across disparate protocols, 00:04:14.050 --> 00:04:16.290 which became, you know, the foundational ingredient 00:04:16.290 --> 00:04:19.550 for Cisco's initial massive commercial success. 00:04:20.069 --> 00:04:22.509 Okay, so they had the technology working perfectly 00:04:22.509 --> 00:04:25.209 on campus, connecting distant computers over 00:04:25.209 --> 00:04:28.610 a multi -protocol router system using Stanford's 00:04:28.610 --> 00:04:30.689 equipment. equipment and code. But then comes 00:04:30.689 --> 00:04:33.209 the classic Silicon Valley conflict, intellectual 00:04:33.209 --> 00:04:36.230 property, IP infringement and the university's 00:04:36.230 --> 00:04:38.949 institutional reaction. This raised an important 00:04:38.949 --> 00:04:41.430 and at the time relatively untested question 00:04:41.430 --> 00:04:44.329 about the line between academic research funded 00:04:44.329 --> 00:04:46.990 by the university and a commercial endeavor seeking 00:04:46.990 --> 00:04:51.490 massive private profit. In 1985, Bosak and another 00:04:51.490 --> 00:04:54.889 Stanford computer manager, Kirk Lougheed, adapted 00:04:54.889 --> 00:04:57.370 Yeager's fundamental software into the foundation 00:04:57.370 --> 00:05:00.769 for what would become Cisco IOS. Their operating 00:05:00.769 --> 00:05:04.269 system. Exactly. And this adaptation, moving 00:05:04.269 --> 00:05:06.430 proprietary university code into a commercial 00:05:06.430 --> 00:05:09.430 product, caused a severe corporate academic clash. 00:05:09.769 --> 00:05:12.250 I can imagine. It got messy. By the summer of 00:05:12.250 --> 00:05:15.129 1986, the friction became too much. Bosak and 00:05:15.129 --> 00:05:17.370 Lougheed were forced to resign, and the situation 00:05:17.370 --> 00:05:20.110 was so cont - that Stanford even contemplated 00:05:20.110 --> 00:05:22.149 filing criminal complaints against the founders 00:05:22.149 --> 00:05:24.930 and the company. Or theft. For the outright theft 00:05:24.930 --> 00:05:27.269 of software and other intellectual property. 00:05:27.509 --> 00:05:31.170 It was a very, very messy, legally fraught start. 00:05:31.449 --> 00:05:33.490 That's an intense beginning for what became, 00:05:33.649 --> 00:05:36.329 for a moment, the world's most valuable company. 00:05:36.490 --> 00:05:40.000 So how is that legal standoff? ultimately resolved? 00:05:40.220 --> 00:05:42.519 Well, Stanford, perhaps realizing the commercial 00:05:42.519 --> 00:05:44.759 opportunity or maybe just seeking a clean exit 00:05:44.759 --> 00:05:47.500 from a public controversy, ultimately decided 00:05:47.500 --> 00:05:51.019 to license the core router software and two computer 00:05:51.019 --> 00:05:54.819 boards to Cisco in 1987. For a fee, I assume? 00:05:55.019 --> 00:05:57.879 For a fee, yes. That licensing agreement stabilized 00:05:57.879 --> 00:06:00.279 their foundation, allowing the company to pivot 00:06:00.279 --> 00:06:02.620 from legal defense to commercial growth alongside 00:06:02.620 --> 00:06:05.399 their core team, which included programmer Greg 00:06:05.399 --> 00:06:07.759 Satz and sales lead Richard Troiano. And then 00:06:07.759 --> 00:06:09.740 speaking of that, Commercial move. The branding 00:06:09.740 --> 00:06:13.579 is wonderfully literal and almost charmingly 00:06:13.579 --> 00:06:15.899 understated. The name Cisco itself is just a 00:06:15.899 --> 00:06:17.899 shortened version of San Francisco. Precisely. 00:06:17.899 --> 00:06:20.540 And in a nod to that origin, the company's earliest 00:06:20.540 --> 00:06:23.240 engineers were very particular, often insisting 00:06:23.240 --> 00:06:25.339 on the lowercase Cisco in its early documentation. 00:06:25.680 --> 00:06:28.199 And the logo, of course. The famous logo is a 00:06:28.199 --> 00:06:30.660 stylized depiction of the two majestic towers 00:06:30.660 --> 00:06:33.160 of the Golden Gate Bridge, nodding directly to 00:06:33.160 --> 00:06:35.959 its birthplace. So despite that early stabilization, 00:06:36.339 --> 00:06:38.740 the dynamics between the founders and the professional 00:06:38.740 --> 00:06:41.899 management didn't last long. They go public in 00:06:41.899 --> 00:06:45.560 early 1990 with a respectable market cap. But 00:06:45.560 --> 00:06:47.699 then the founding couple is out almost immediately. 00:06:47.759 --> 00:06:50.670 It was a brutal split. Sandy Lerner was fired 00:06:50.670 --> 00:06:54.209 on August 28th, 1990, less than six months after 00:06:54.209 --> 00:06:57.529 the IPO. Fired? Yes. And Leonard Bosak resigned 00:06:57.529 --> 00:07:00.389 immediately in protest. The couple that founded 00:07:00.389 --> 00:07:02.250 the entire enterprise, the people who brought 00:07:02.250 --> 00:07:04.829 the product to life, were just gone. And that's 00:07:04.829 --> 00:07:06.829 when John Morgridge takes over. Well, he'd been 00:07:06.829 --> 00:07:10.069 CEO since 1988. He continued leading the company, 00:07:10.269 --> 00:07:12.470 transitioning it from a small tech player into 00:07:12.470 --> 00:07:15.629 a dominant enterprise force until John T. Chambers 00:07:15.629 --> 00:07:18.449 took over in 1995. What's crucial to understand 00:07:18.449 --> 00:07:20.529 about this early phase before the Internet truly 00:07:20.529 --> 00:07:23.629 exploded is the commercial secret of their initial 00:07:23.629 --> 00:07:25.819 success. They weren't the very first company 00:07:25.819 --> 00:07:28.519 to sell a dedicated network node. No, but they 00:07:28.519 --> 00:07:30.300 were the first to achieve massive commercial 00:07:30.300 --> 00:07:32.720 scale because their devices supported multiple 00:07:32.720 --> 00:07:35.660 network protocols. That flexibility was everything 00:07:35.660 --> 00:07:37.600 at the time. It was. In the late 80s and early 00:07:37.600 --> 00:07:40.579 90s, networks were a messy mix of different standards. 00:07:40.839 --> 00:07:45.199 You had Avell IPX, AppleTalk, DSNet, and eventually 00:07:45.199 --> 00:07:48.519 TCP IP. Cisco's products were built to be the 00:07:48.519 --> 00:07:50.699 universal translator. And their hardware was 00:07:50.699 --> 00:07:53.379 CPU -based. Which helped. Right. A classical 00:07:53.379 --> 00:07:55.980 CPU -based architecture coupled with the flexibility 00:07:55.980 --> 00:07:58.560 of the iOS software. Which meant customers didn't 00:07:58.560 --> 00:08:00.180 have to rip and replace their hardware every 00:08:00.180 --> 00:08:02.319 time network standards changed. Exactly. They 00:08:02.319 --> 00:08:04.360 could keep up with changing technology simply 00:08:04.360 --> 00:08:06.620 through frequent software upgrades, giving the 00:08:06.620 --> 00:08:09.500 products incredibly long shelf lives. The source 00:08:09.500 --> 00:08:13.040 mentions the Cisco 2500 router model, a major 00:08:13.040 --> 00:08:15.459 success. And it stayed in production for almost 00:08:15.459 --> 00:08:18.569 a decade. Virtually unchanged. A decade that 00:08:18.569 --> 00:08:21.389 is just unheard of in modern tech, and it created 00:08:21.389 --> 00:08:24.589 immense customer loyalty and, well, huge profit 00:08:24.589 --> 00:08:26.930 margins. They also quickly captured the emerging 00:08:26.930 --> 00:08:28.990 service provider environment with product lines 00:08:28.990 --> 00:08:32.429 like the Cisco 7000 and the high -end Cisco 8500. 00:08:32.690 --> 00:08:35.850 But the real engine of growth, the strategy that 00:08:35.850 --> 00:08:39.570 defines Cisco's operational DNA even today, that 00:08:39.570 --> 00:08:42.279 started with Acquisales. Highly targeted strategic 00:08:42.279 --> 00:08:45.620 acquisitions. Absolutely. Cisco realized early 00:08:45.620 --> 00:08:47.480 on that they couldn't invent everything fast 00:08:47.480 --> 00:08:49.179 enough. So the solution was to buy innovation. 00:08:49.559 --> 00:08:51.860 Buy it and fold it into their product catalog. 00:08:52.590 --> 00:08:56.929 Between 1992 and 1994, they snapped up key companies 00:08:56.929 --> 00:08:59.690 specializing in Ethernet switching, Kalpana, 00:08:59.909 --> 00:09:01.889 Grand Junction, and Crescendo Communications. 00:09:02.470 --> 00:09:05.429 And Crescendo was led by Mario Mazzola, who became 00:09:05.429 --> 00:09:08.750 a huge figure inside Cisco for decades. A very 00:09:08.750 --> 00:09:11.769 instrumental leader. So why were those specific 00:09:11.769 --> 00:09:14.809 switching acquisitions so strategically vital? 00:09:14.990 --> 00:09:17.169 This goes back to a crucial technical distinction 00:09:17.169 --> 00:09:19.610 between routing and switching that the listener 00:09:19.610 --> 00:09:22.259 needs to understand in commercial terms. This 00:09:22.259 --> 00:09:24.679 is a key distinction. Before these acquisitions, 00:09:24.759 --> 00:09:27.340 the network was mainly defined by routing, Layer 00:09:27.340 --> 00:09:30.539 3 routing. Which is the complex part. The brains. 00:09:30.820 --> 00:09:33.379 It's the brain of the network, figuring out the 00:09:33.379 --> 00:09:36.059 best path for data to travel across vast distances, 00:09:36.200 --> 00:09:38.440 often involving slow, deep packet inspection. 00:09:38.879 --> 00:09:42.159 By contrast, switching, or Layer 2, is simple, 00:09:42.259 --> 00:09:44.700 fast data forwarding within a local network segment. 00:09:45.059 --> 00:09:47.000 So by integrating Layer 2 switching immediately, 00:09:47.360 --> 00:09:49.480 what commercial benefit did Cisco offer their 00:09:49.480 --> 00:09:52.980 customers? Speed and scalability. Customers can 00:09:52.980 --> 00:09:55.299 now move massive amounts of data instantly and 00:09:55.299 --> 00:09:57.379 efficiently within their local data centers or 00:09:57.379 --> 00:09:59.960 corporate networks using the acquired switching 00:09:59.960 --> 00:10:03.799 technology. While reserving Cisco's proven complex 00:10:03.799 --> 00:10:06.559 routing technology for connecting that local 00:10:06.559 --> 00:10:09.399 network. to the outside world. Exactly. This 00:10:09.399 --> 00:10:12.000 dual architecture established by acquiring these 00:10:12.000 --> 00:10:14.320 switching specialists dominated Cisco's product 00:10:14.320 --> 00:10:16.799 strategy throughout the 1990s and positioned 00:10:16.799 --> 00:10:19.000 them perfectly for the coming internet explosion. 00:10:19.379 --> 00:10:22.120 They could sell the brain, the router, and the 00:10:22.120 --> 00:10:25.360 incredibly fast spinal cord, the switch, all 00:10:25.360 --> 00:10:28.059 in one go. Okay, so that brings us to the next 00:10:28.059 --> 00:10:30.809 phase. The transition from the mid -90s onward 00:10:30.809 --> 00:10:33.269 is defined by two overwhelming market forces. 00:10:33.529 --> 00:10:36.250 The arrival of John T. Chambers as CEO in 1995 00:10:36.250 --> 00:10:39.929 and the unstoppable, truly global adoption of 00:10:39.929 --> 00:10:42.509 the Internet Protocol, or IP. Chambers took the 00:10:42.509 --> 00:10:44.429 reins and drove the company straight into the 00:10:44.429 --> 00:10:46.649 dizzying, exhilarating heights of the dot -com 00:10:46.649 --> 00:10:48.929 era. Because the world was suddenly adopting 00:10:48.929 --> 00:10:52.169 IP widely for commercial use, there was an insatiable, 00:10:52.190 --> 00:10:54.269 endless demand for the equipment that literally 00:10:54.269 --> 00:10:56.809 made the Internet work. Which meant Cisco's core 00:10:56.809 --> 00:11:00.029 products. Their product range expanded from the 00:11:00.029 --> 00:11:03.509 ubiquitous modem access shelves like the AS5200, 00:11:03.830 --> 00:11:05.909 which connected dial -up users. I remember those 00:11:05.909 --> 00:11:09.070 sounds. All the way up to the massive core GSR 00:11:09.070 --> 00:11:11.789 gigabit switch router routers, which formed the 00:11:11.789 --> 00:11:14.309 Internet's backbone. These products made them 00:11:14.309 --> 00:11:17.629 the undeniable dominant major player. As we mentioned, 00:11:17.809 --> 00:11:20.649 in late March 2000, Cisco reached that astronomical 00:11:20.649 --> 00:11:24.590 market cap of over $500 billion. Surpassing Microsoft. 00:11:24.809 --> 00:11:27.409 even briefly at the peak of market hysteria. 00:11:27.470 --> 00:11:29.950 That's a level of valuation driven purely by 00:11:29.950 --> 00:11:32.269 projection and excitement. But history shows 00:11:32.269 --> 00:11:34.809 that this impossible height was, well, impossible 00:11:34.809 --> 00:11:37.710 to sustain. Right after that peak, they faced 00:11:37.710 --> 00:11:40.470 their first major existential technology threat. 00:11:40.690 --> 00:11:42.889 The Silicon Challenge. This was a fundamental 00:11:42.889 --> 00:11:45.470 crisis driven by architecture. Cisco's legacy 00:11:45.470 --> 00:11:47.830 equipment relied heavily on CPUs running the 00:11:47.830 --> 00:11:50.850 complex iOS software. As IP networking matured 00:11:50.850 --> 00:11:52.889 and standardized, competitors realized they could 00:11:52.889 --> 00:11:55.169 bypass this relatively slow, general -purpose 00:11:55.169 --> 00:11:57.860 approach. By using dedicated hardware. Exactly. 00:11:58.000 --> 00:12:00.620 Using innovative, dedicated hardware specifically, 00:12:01.039 --> 00:12:03.899 application -specific integrated circuits, or 00:12:03.899 --> 00:12:06.299 ASICs for lightning -fast packet processing. 00:12:06.559 --> 00:12:08.779 And the major disruptor here was Juniper Networks. 00:12:09.159 --> 00:12:12.120 Correct. Juniper, which shipped its first product 00:12:12.120 --> 00:12:15.120 in 1999, was built from the ground up on this 00:12:15.120 --> 00:12:18.059 new philosophy. They used silicon hardware to 00:12:18.059 --> 00:12:20.799 accelerate the Layer 3 routing process, challenging 00:12:20.799 --> 00:12:23.240 Cisco directly in the highly lucrative service 00:12:23.240 --> 00:12:25.460 provider market. And this was an immediate severe 00:12:25.460 --> 00:12:28.799 threat. It was. By 2000, Juniper had chipped 00:12:28.799 --> 00:12:31.360 away about 30 % of Cisco's core service provider 00:12:31.360 --> 00:12:34.470 market share. So how did a giant like Cisco, 00:12:34.590 --> 00:12:37.029 whose entire architecture was based on a CPU 00:12:37.029 --> 00:12:40.250 and software legacy, respond to this challenge 00:12:40.250 --> 00:12:42.909 from a lean silicon -first competitor? This wasn't 00:12:42.909 --> 00:12:44.570 just a product update. It sounds like a total 00:12:44.570 --> 00:12:47.009 corporate reinvention. It was a decade -long, 00:12:47.149 --> 00:12:50.149 multi -pronged effort. First, they invested massively 00:12:50.149 --> 00:12:52.509 to develop homegrown ASICs to handle processing 00:12:52.509 --> 00:12:55.129 directly in silicon, matching Juniper's technological 00:12:55.129 --> 00:12:57.870 approach. And they introduced new hardware. Completely 00:12:57.870 --> 00:13:00.570 new, specialized hardware like the massive carrier 00:13:00.570 --> 00:13:03.090 routing system, the CRS -1. But what about the 00:13:03.090 --> 00:13:05.919 software? Because the complexity of that classic 00:13:05.919 --> 00:13:08.600 iOS was also a liability against a clean slate 00:13:08.600 --> 00:13:11.720 competitor. That's where the advanced iOS XR 00:13:11.720 --> 00:13:14.759 software architecture comes in. The old iOS was 00:13:14.759 --> 00:13:17.720 essentially a monolithic kernel. Meaning if one 00:13:17.720 --> 00:13:19.759 part crashed. The whole router could go down. 00:13:19.899 --> 00:13:23.620 The migration to iOS XR, which began around 2004, 00:13:23.980 --> 00:13:26.440 was a fundamental rewrite. It was designed to 00:13:26.440 --> 00:13:29.259 be modular and highly fault tolerant. In simple 00:13:29.259 --> 00:13:31.100 terms, what does that mean for a big service 00:13:31.100 --> 00:13:34.070 provider? It means if one line cart or one module 00:13:34.070 --> 00:13:36.669 inside a massive carrier -grade router crashed, 00:13:36.950 --> 00:13:40.210 the rest of the system could stay live, non -disrupted, 00:13:40.289 --> 00:13:43.309 processing billions of packets per second. This 00:13:43.309 --> 00:13:45.549 was a non -negotiable requirement for high -speed 00:13:45.549 --> 00:13:48.649 service providers. The iOS XR migration wasn't 00:13:48.649 --> 00:13:51.009 just an update, it was a total, costly rewrite 00:13:51.009 --> 00:13:53.690 necessary to regain technological competitiveness. 00:13:53.970 --> 00:13:55.690 So while that technological battle was raging, 00:13:56.029 --> 00:13:58.549 Chambers simultaneously attempted a bold and 00:13:58.549 --> 00:14:00.830 maybe in hindsight misguided strategic shift. 00:14:01.259 --> 00:14:03.720 It makes Cisco a household consumer brand, the 00:14:03.720 --> 00:14:08.759 human network era. Yes. Around 2006, Cisco Systems 00:14:08.759 --> 00:14:11.379 formally adopted the shortened name Cisco and 00:14:11.379 --> 00:14:14.460 launched this ambitious The Human Network advertising 00:14:14.460 --> 00:14:17.759 campaign. This effort was intended to bring Cisco 00:14:17.759 --> 00:14:20.240 into the household brand category. Primarily 00:14:20.240 --> 00:14:22.919 to support its consumer line, like the acquired 00:14:22.919 --> 00:14:25.899 Linksys products from 2003. They wanted a piece 00:14:25.899 --> 00:14:28.179 of that high -volume consumer networking market. 00:14:28.539 --> 00:14:31.240 It seems like that decade was defined by chasing 00:14:31.240 --> 00:14:34.000 new markets through acquisition, even outside 00:14:34.000 --> 00:14:36.100 of core routing and switching. They were following 00:14:36.100 --> 00:14:38.399 data wherever it flowed. Absolutely. They needed 00:14:38.399 --> 00:14:41.100 to broaden their portfolio beyond the core infrastructure, 00:14:41.399 --> 00:14:43.500 especially as software and security began to 00:14:43.500 --> 00:14:46.720 dominate. Take Ironport, acquired in 2007 for 00:14:46.720 --> 00:14:50.419 $830 million. That was for email security. Right. 00:14:50.500 --> 00:14:53.000 It instantly brought in sophisticated email security 00:14:53.000 --> 00:14:55.399 and their revolutionary sender -based reputation 00:14:55.399 --> 00:14:58.179 service, which eventually evolved into a risk 00:14:58.179 --> 00:15:00.279 intelligence platform used across their entire 00:15:00.279 --> 00:15:02.500 security portfolio. And they moved into mobile 00:15:02.500 --> 00:15:06.370 as well. Yes, in 2009, they bought Starrent Networks 00:15:06.370 --> 00:15:09.370 for $2 .9 billion to get deep into the mobile 00:15:09.370 --> 00:15:11.970 packet core business. This allowed them to sell 00:15:11.970 --> 00:15:14.610 equipment that managed the actual data flow for 00:15:14.610 --> 00:15:17.210 mobile carriers, a massive growth area with the 00:15:17.210 --> 00:15:19.309 rise of smartphones. They were just horizontally 00:15:19.309 --> 00:15:22.169 expanding everywhere they saw data flowing, from 00:15:22.169 --> 00:15:25.730 email to 3G and 4G networks. But the acquisition 00:15:25.730 --> 00:15:28.450 strategy was difficult to maintain. Despite these 00:15:28.450 --> 00:15:31.129 massive purchases, they were running into significant 00:15:31.129 --> 00:15:34.340 financial headwinds by early 2010s, suggesting 00:15:34.340 --> 00:15:36.460 the complexity of juggling all these markets 00:15:36.460 --> 00:15:38.799 was taking a toll. Because competition was hitting 00:15:38.799 --> 00:15:41.460 them hard from all sides. It was. Domestically, 00:15:41.539 --> 00:15:43.759 they still fought Juniper and Alcatel -Lucent. 00:15:43.820 --> 00:15:47.200 But overseas, they faced severe low -cost competition 00:15:47.200 --> 00:15:49.480 from Huawei, particularly in emerging markets. 00:15:49.779 --> 00:15:52.980 By 2011, this competition and lower -than -expected 00:15:52.980 --> 00:15:55.899 profit forced massive restructuring. This is 00:15:55.899 --> 00:15:57.960 where we first see the painful scale of their 00:15:57.960 --> 00:16:00.399 restructuring efforts. That year, Cisco had to 00:16:00.399 --> 00:16:02.980 commit to reducing annual expenses by $1 billion 00:16:02.980 --> 00:16:06.299 and announced plans to cut up to 10 ,000 jobs. 00:16:06.419 --> 00:16:08.970 10 ,000. Which was roughly 14 % of their total 00:16:08.970 --> 00:16:13.090 workforce of 73 ,400 employees at the time. Chambers 00:16:13.090 --> 00:16:15.289 was very public about calling out his competitors, 00:16:15.450 --> 00:16:17.850 particularly Huawei, during that time, though 00:16:17.850 --> 00:16:20.110 he was careful to focus on security and transparency 00:16:20.110 --> 00:16:23.090 rather than just price. And the final signal 00:16:23.090 --> 00:16:25.909 that the consumer diversion wasn't working came 00:16:25.909 --> 00:16:29.269 shortly after this massive layoff. Yes, the 2013 00:16:29.269 --> 00:16:32.750 sale of the Linksys home router unit to Belkin, 00:16:32.950 --> 00:16:35.629 that signaled the decisive end of the human network 00:16:35.629 --> 00:16:37.679 consumer experience. They were getting back to 00:16:37.679 --> 00:16:40.019 their roots. They decided to strategically focus 00:16:40.019 --> 00:16:42.820 back entirely on enterprise, service provider, 00:16:42.899 --> 00:16:44.940 and business sales, where their brand equity 00:16:44.940 --> 00:16:47.539 and profit margins were far higher. They further 00:16:47.539 --> 00:16:50.019 signaled this exit by selling off their television 00:16:50.019 --> 00:16:53.059 set -top box division to Technicolor for a much 00:16:53.059 --> 00:16:55.480 smaller sum in 2015. Which they had acquired 00:16:55.480 --> 00:16:57.980 from Scientific Atlanta for almost $7 billion 00:16:57.980 --> 00:17:01.559 years earlier. A huge initial investment. The 00:17:01.559 --> 00:17:03.799 focus was definitively back on the data center 00:17:03.799 --> 00:17:06.200 and the enterprise network. out of that consumer 00:17:06.200 --> 00:17:08.799 exit, the modern Cisco narrative is dominated 00:17:08.799 --> 00:17:12.359 by one defining theme, the massive, relentless 00:17:12.359 --> 00:17:14.819 push into cybersecurity and application monitoring. 00:17:15.039 --> 00:17:17.920 Yes. If their first era was about academic innovation 00:17:17.920 --> 00:17:20.799 and the second was about scale, this third era 00:17:20.799 --> 00:17:23.859 is clearly about protection, performance, and 00:17:23.859 --> 00:17:27.559 software. The sources show a relentless, multibillion 00:17:27.559 --> 00:17:29.539 -dollar pivot toward enterprise security and 00:17:29.539 --> 00:17:32.500 cloud services, powered almost exclusively by 00:17:32.500 --> 00:17:34.900 acquisitions. They were filling in every major 00:17:34.900 --> 00:17:38.400 gap in their portfolio. In 2013 alone, they bought 00:17:38.400 --> 00:17:42.019 SourceFire for $2 .7 billion. SourceFire was 00:17:42.019 --> 00:17:44.160 crucial because it provided advanced intrusion 00:17:44.160 --> 00:17:46.019 prevention systems, IPS, and next -generation 00:17:46.019 --> 00:17:49.220 firewalls. So that instantly made Cisco a serious 00:17:49.220 --> 00:17:51.359 player in network security beyond just basic 00:17:51.359 --> 00:17:53.619 firewalls. It did. And the buying spree just 00:17:53.619 --> 00:17:56.460 accelerated, hitting every layer of the enterprise 00:17:56.460 --> 00:17:58.579 security stack. We're talking about a stream 00:17:58.579 --> 00:18:00.740 of companies defining Cisco's modern portfolio. 00:18:01.319 --> 00:18:04.119 OpenDNS and Lancope in 2015. What did those bring 00:18:04.119 --> 00:18:07.109 to the table? OpenDNS gave them cloud -delivered 00:18:07.109 --> 00:18:10.269 domain name system security, basically, preventing 00:18:10.269 --> 00:18:13.109 users from ever reaching malicious sites by filtering 00:18:13.109 --> 00:18:16.670 at the DNS level. Lancope provided NetFlow analytics 00:18:16.670 --> 00:18:18.869 for detecting internal network anomalies and 00:18:18.869 --> 00:18:21.789 threats. Then came CloudLock in 2016 for cloud 00:18:21.789 --> 00:18:25.190 access security. And then the huge buys, AppDynamics, 00:18:25.250 --> 00:18:26.930 which they snatched up the day before its IPO 00:18:26.930 --> 00:18:30.789 for $3 .7 billion in 2017. And Duo Security for 00:18:30.789 --> 00:18:35.410 $2 .35 billion in 2018. Duo is particularly interesting 00:18:35.410 --> 00:18:37.970 given the industry -wide focus on identity management. 00:18:38.289 --> 00:18:41.529 It is. Duo gave Cisco immediate leadership in 00:18:41.529 --> 00:18:44.609 multi -factor authentication or MFA and zero 00:18:44.609 --> 00:18:47.269 trust architecture. These acquisitions didn't 00:18:47.269 --> 00:18:49.390 just add products. They bought massive talent 00:18:49.390 --> 00:18:51.849 pools and instantly installed Cisco as a leader 00:18:51.849 --> 00:18:54.609 in cybersecurity, application monitoring, and 00:18:54.609 --> 00:18:56.930 modern identity security. They turned Cisco into 00:18:56.930 --> 00:18:59.450 a complete security platform, not just a hardware 00:18:59.450 --> 00:19:01.960 vendor. That's the key. But the biggest bet, 00:19:02.059 --> 00:19:04.119 the acquisition that defines their push into 00:19:04.119 --> 00:19:06.819 the future of AI infrastructure protection observability 00:19:06.819 --> 00:19:10.059 is the mega deal for Splunk. This is the critical 00:19:10.059 --> 00:19:13.980 modern context. Announced in 2023 and completed 00:19:13.980 --> 00:19:17.640 in March 2024, the $28 billion acquisition of 00:19:17.640 --> 00:19:20.420 Splunk is Cisco's largest acquisition yet. And 00:19:20.420 --> 00:19:22.660 it positions the company to power and protect 00:19:22.660 --> 00:19:25.000 the AI revolution. This is not just a modest 00:19:25.000 --> 00:19:28.019 expansion, it's a massive strategic shift. So 00:19:28.019 --> 00:19:30.559 what specifically does Splunk provide? that is 00:19:30.559 --> 00:19:33.759 so valuable to a company like Cisco in the age 00:19:33.759 --> 00:19:36.839 of AI. Splunk specializes in collecting, indexing, 00:19:36.839 --> 00:19:39.319 and analyzing machine -generated data log files, 00:19:39.579 --> 00:19:43.039 metrics, security events at enormous scale. This 00:19:43.039 --> 00:19:44.680 is known as observability. And why does this 00:19:44.680 --> 00:19:47.140 matter for AI? Well, firstly, AI training requires 00:19:47.140 --> 00:19:50.099 vast structured data sets. And secondly, securing 00:19:50.099 --> 00:19:52.319 AI infrastructure requires monitoring millions 00:19:52.319 --> 00:19:55.319 of data points constantly. By integrating Splunk, 00:19:55.460 --> 00:19:57.819 Cisco can now offer customers an end -to -end 00:19:57.819 --> 00:19:59.839 view. They control the network. The network with 00:19:59.839 --> 00:20:02.119 Cisco hardware, the application performance with 00:20:02.119 --> 00:20:04.180 AppDynamics, and the security intelligence and 00:20:04.180 --> 00:20:06.500 log aggregation with Splunk. They're building 00:20:06.500 --> 00:20:08.680 an integrated operating system for the entire 00:20:08.680 --> 00:20:11.460 data center, not just the network devices. Beyond 00:20:11.460 --> 00:20:14.039 acquisitions, their core products and technological 00:20:14.039 --> 00:20:16.920 advancement. still fall into those five major 00:20:16.920 --> 00:20:21.220 established areas. Networking, security, collaboration, 00:20:21.660 --> 00:20:24.759 data center, and IoT. I see their collaboration 00:20:24.759 --> 00:20:27.700 tools frequently mentioned, WebEx being the big 00:20:27.700 --> 00:20:29.819 one that competes with Microsoft Teams and Zoom. 00:20:30.170 --> 00:20:33.150 WebEx is key, especially post -pandemic. That 00:20:33.150 --> 00:20:35.849 whole collaboration suite includes Jabber for 00:20:35.849 --> 00:20:38.490 messaging, and they recently acquired Slido, 00:20:38.670 --> 00:20:41.509 which is a Q &A and polling platform, specifically 00:20:41.509 --> 00:20:44.450 to enhance WebEx engagement and make virtual 00:20:44.450 --> 00:20:47.089 meetings more interactive. So they're still iterating 00:20:47.089 --> 00:20:49.210 even on their established product lines to keep 00:20:49.210 --> 00:20:51.730 pace with modern work demands. Absolutely. But 00:20:51.730 --> 00:20:53.769 on the pure hardware front, they didn't stop 00:20:53.769 --> 00:20:55.750 fighting the Silicon War they started decades 00:20:55.750 --> 00:20:58.349 ago with Juniper. They actually went back to 00:20:58.349 --> 00:21:00.309 the drawing board for chips. development. Right. 00:21:00.390 --> 00:21:02.069 This is where the development of the Silicon 00:21:02.069 --> 00:21:04.849 1 ASIC chip line becomes central to their future 00:21:04.849 --> 00:21:07.789 relevance. This is Cisco's attempt to own the 00:21:07.789 --> 00:21:10.349 silicon layer again, rather than relying solely 00:21:10.349 --> 00:21:12.730 on external chip vendors. And the performance 00:21:12.730 --> 00:21:16.150 numbers on this proprietary silicon are staggering. 00:21:16.549 --> 00:21:19.430 They really are. The G100 model reached a speed 00:21:19.430 --> 00:21:22.740 of 25 .6 terabits per second. which directly 00:21:22.740 --> 00:21:25.559 throws down the gauntlet to major competitors 00:21:25.559 --> 00:21:28.900 like Broadcom's dominant Tomahawk series, as 00:21:28.900 --> 00:21:31.619 well as chips from NVIDIA and Marvell. And by 00:21:31.619 --> 00:21:34.700 2023, the sources indicate the Silicon 1 G200 00:21:34.700 --> 00:21:37.160 was designed to offer an astonishing speed of 00:21:37.160 --> 00:21:40.680 51 .2 terabits per second. To put that 51 .2 00:21:40.680 --> 00:21:42.650 terabits in perspective for you. the listener. 00:21:42.849 --> 00:21:45.490 That's the phenomenal raw data speed required 00:21:45.490 --> 00:21:47.869 to handle the foundational data movement for 00:21:47.869 --> 00:21:51.190 an entire large -scale AI cluster or a hyperscale 00:21:51.190 --> 00:21:53.569 cloud region. That's the strategic point. They're 00:21:53.569 --> 00:21:55.569 not just building routers anymore. They're building 00:21:55.569 --> 00:21:58.450 the specialized network architecture that allows 00:21:58.450 --> 00:22:01.049 the next generation of computing to even function. 00:22:01.390 --> 00:22:03.109 And these chips aren't just for Cisco's routers. 00:22:03.440 --> 00:22:05.779 No, they are now selling Silicon One ships directly 00:22:05.779 --> 00:22:08.579 to hyperscalers, competing directly with Broadcom 00:22:08.579 --> 00:22:11.279 and other component manufacturers. They realize 00:22:11.279 --> 00:22:13.079 that controlling the fundamental building block 00:22:13.079 --> 00:22:15.440 is necessary for controlling the future of the 00:22:15.440 --> 00:22:18.059 network. It's a company defined by massive financial 00:22:18.059 --> 00:22:21.430 success and technological leadership. But that 00:22:21.430 --> 00:22:24.529 success runs parallel to an unusual and, frankly, 00:22:24.609 --> 00:22:27.150 painful corporate operations cycle, which we 00:22:27.150 --> 00:22:29.630 call the layoff paradox. Right. They seem to 00:22:29.630 --> 00:22:32.130 constantly cut thousands of jobs, even during 00:22:32.130 --> 00:22:34.950 periods of profitability. The pattern is undeniable 00:22:34.950 --> 00:22:36.890 and crucial to understanding their modern business 00:22:36.890 --> 00:22:40.410 model. We saw layoffs in 2013, about 4 ,000 jobs, 00:22:40.650 --> 00:22:44.950 6%. Then 2014, 6 ,000 workers, 8%. And a recent 00:22:44.950 --> 00:22:48.009 major cut in February 2024 of more than 4 ,000 00:22:48.009 --> 00:22:51.029 jobs, 5 % of the workforce. That was due to reduced 00:22:51.029 --> 00:22:53.309 demand from telecom and cable service providers 00:22:53.309 --> 00:22:56.089 who were delaying spending. But the paradox is 00:22:56.089 --> 00:22:58.390 the timing of these announcements versus their 00:22:58.390 --> 00:23:00.470 overall financial results, which are almost always 00:23:00.470 --> 00:23:02.950 positive. Precisely. They announced cuts in August 00:23:02.950 --> 00:23:06.509 2024, 7 % of employees. At the very same time, 00:23:06.529 --> 00:23:09.390 they announced a huge financial result, $10 .3 00:23:09.390 --> 00:23:11.930 billion in profit for the fiscal year. And this 00:23:11.930 --> 00:23:14.690 pattern repeated in August 2025, where they eliminated 00:23:14.690 --> 00:23:17.650 221 positions across their Milpitas and San Francisco 00:23:17.650 --> 00:23:20.210 offices, alongside announcing an 8 % increase 00:23:20.210 --> 00:23:22.829 in revenue for the fiscal year. So how do we 00:23:22.829 --> 00:23:25.279 synthesize this? If they are making billions 00:23:25.279 --> 00:23:29.200 in profit, why the continuous cyclical pruning 00:23:29.200 --> 00:23:31.700 of the workforce? It doesn't sound like a company 00:23:31.700 --> 00:23:34.119 struggling to survive. No, it sounds like a strategy. 00:23:34.339 --> 00:23:36.859 This is the core insight of their operating model. 00:23:37.240 --> 00:23:40.519 It's not cost cutting in the classic sense. It's 00:23:40.519 --> 00:23:43.460 a constant strategy of buying and pruning. They 00:23:43.460 --> 00:23:46.279 maintain massive financial success, not by cutting 00:23:46.279 --> 00:23:49.319 costs overall, but by constantly dismantling 00:23:49.319 --> 00:23:51.920 legacy hardware teams whose skills are no longer 00:23:51.920 --> 00:23:54.480 needed. Like teams focused on copper based switching 00:23:54.480 --> 00:23:57.240 or older collaboration platforms. Right. And 00:23:57.240 --> 00:23:59.000 they use that capital and workforce reduction 00:23:59.000 --> 00:24:02.079 to fund massive high growth software and security 00:24:02.079 --> 00:24:04.740 acquisitions like Splunk. It's constant organizational 00:24:04.740 --> 00:24:08.140 restructuring and resource. reallocation, masquerading 00:24:08.140 --> 00:24:11.039 as cyclical layoffs. They shed the past to fund 00:24:11.039 --> 00:24:13.420 the future. That reframes the entire discussion 00:24:13.420 --> 00:24:16.059 around their corporate culture. Shifting briefly 00:24:16.059 --> 00:24:18.680 to their physical footprint, they are still fundamentally 00:24:18.680 --> 00:24:21.740 a Silicon Valley entity, but they've been optimizing 00:24:21.740 --> 00:24:24.039 their facilities lately, especially after the 00:24:24.039 --> 00:24:26.500 latest acquisitions. Their primary identity is 00:24:26.500 --> 00:24:29.519 San Jose, California, historically headquartered 00:24:29.519 --> 00:24:33.329 at 170 West Tasman Drive. with dozens of buildings 00:24:33.329 --> 00:24:36.369 making up the massive corporate campus. It employed 00:24:36.369 --> 00:24:39.349 over 15 ,000 full -time workers in the Bay Area. 00:24:39.589 --> 00:24:41.650 But they also have that second big campus. A 00:24:41.650 --> 00:24:44.150 strategically important second large campus in 00:24:44.150 --> 00:24:46.549 Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, with 00:24:46.549 --> 00:24:49.410 7 ,000 employees. And the recent consolidation 00:24:49.410 --> 00:24:53.450 in San Jose. Yes. In October 2024, they consolidated 00:24:53.450 --> 00:24:55.950 their Bay Area offices and moved their main headquarters 00:24:55.950 --> 00:24:58.869 to the former Splunk office space located on 00:24:58.869 --> 00:25:01.549 the south side of Santana Row in San Jose. That 00:25:01.549 --> 00:25:03.890 streamlining move symbolizes their strategic 00:25:03.890 --> 00:25:06.869 priority. Yeah. The core of the company now formally 00:25:06.869 --> 00:25:09.049 centers around their largest, newest acquisition. 00:25:09.309 --> 00:25:12.150 Exactly. Before we move on to the complex controversies, 00:25:12.150 --> 00:25:14.609 we must mention a unique and critical aspect 00:25:14.609 --> 00:25:17.150 of their corporate operations that showcases 00:25:17.150 --> 00:25:19.009 the positive side of their technical mastery. 00:25:19.170 --> 00:25:21.630 Cisco's Network Emergency Response Vehicles, 00:25:21.690 --> 00:25:24.420 or NRVs. Yes, the NRVs. This is a remarkable 00:25:24.420 --> 00:25:26.940 example of specialized corporate citizenship 00:25:26.940 --> 00:25:30.079 applying their core expertise to crisis response. 00:25:30.460 --> 00:25:33.259 These large self -contained vehicles are maintained 00:25:33.259 --> 00:25:35.500 and deployed by Cisco employees during natural 00:25:35.500 --> 00:25:38.359 disasters and public crises, often when local 00:25:38.359 --> 00:25:40.579 infrastructure has been completely destroyed. 00:25:40.880 --> 00:25:43.160 So they provide essential communication infrastructure 00:25:43.160 --> 00:25:46.140 for first responders, fire teams and emergency 00:25:46.140 --> 00:25:49.089 management personnel. What kind of robust communication 00:25:49.089 --> 00:25:52.329 capability are we talking about inside one of 00:25:52.329 --> 00:25:54.329 these massive vehicles? Full wired and wireless 00:25:54.329 --> 00:25:57.470 services, voice over IP, radio interoperability 00:25:57.470 --> 00:25:59.650 systems that allow different first responder 00:25:59.650 --> 00:26:01.789 organizations to talk to each other and network 00:26:01.789 --> 00:26:03.630 based video surveillance. And they get their 00:26:03.630 --> 00:26:06.190 signal from satellite. Right. They provide secured 00:26:06.190 --> 00:26:09.009 high definition video conferencing and can deliver 00:26:09.009 --> 00:26:11.750 up to 72 megabits per second of bandwidth, both 00:26:11.750 --> 00:26:14.390 up and down via a massive. A true communications 00:26:14.390 --> 00:26:18.460 hub in a disaster zone. The sources list deployments 00:26:18.460 --> 00:26:20.819 at critical moments like Hurricane Sandy in 2012, 00:26:21.140 --> 00:26:24.160 the devastating 2010 Haiti earthquake, and numerous 00:26:24.160 --> 00:26:27.279 California wildfires in 2007. It really demonstrates 00:26:27.279 --> 00:26:30.240 a commitment to applying their foundational technology 00:26:30.240 --> 00:26:33.279 expertise to real -world crises that save lives. 00:26:33.599 --> 00:26:36.500 And finally, a key operational aspect often overlooked 00:26:36.500 --> 00:26:38.839 by consumers is the immense certification ecosystem 00:26:38.839 --> 00:26:42.339 Cisco sponsors. These professional certifications 00:26:42.339 --> 00:26:44.960 are absolutely the lifeblood of the global IT 00:26:44.960 --> 00:26:47.880 and networking workforce. The CCNA, the CCNP, 00:26:48.019 --> 00:26:51.160 the CCIE, these are standard career markers for 00:26:51.160 --> 00:26:53.160 network professionals. They are career defining. 00:26:53.380 --> 00:26:56.079 They are. Cisco Systems sponsors a deep and complex 00:26:56.079 --> 00:26:58.599 line of IT professional certifications for their 00:26:58.599 --> 00:27:00.859 products, running from entry level, which is 00:27:00.859 --> 00:27:03.579 CCT, up to associate, like CCNA, professional, 00:27:03.880 --> 00:27:07.599 CCNP, expert, CCIE, and the apex, the architect 00:27:07.599 --> 00:27:09.779 level, or CTAR. And these are all provided through 00:27:09.779 --> 00:27:12.579 the Cisco. Networking Academy. Yes, which trains 00:27:12.579 --> 00:27:15.059 the global networking workforce in critical fields 00:27:15.059 --> 00:27:17.940 spanning collaboration, cyber ops, data center, 00:27:18.059 --> 00:27:20.640 devnet, enterprise, security, and service provider. 00:27:20.980 --> 00:27:23.960 In essence, Cisco doesn't just build the internet's 00:27:23.960 --> 00:27:26.640 infrastructure, they also train the vast global 00:27:26.640 --> 00:27:29.259 workforce required to install, maintain, and 00:27:29.259 --> 00:27:32.779 secure it. Okay, now we transition to the unavoidable 00:27:32.779 --> 00:27:35.240 complexity of being a major global technology 00:27:35.240 --> 00:27:38.539 provider. When you are the digital backbone of 00:27:38.539 --> 00:27:41.460 much of the world, Cisco is inherently entangled 00:27:41.460 --> 00:27:44.700 in global politics, surveillance, legal battles, 00:27:44.859 --> 00:27:47.559 and ethical disputes. It's an immense burden 00:27:47.559 --> 00:27:50.019 of scale, and we need to look at these controversies 00:27:50.019 --> 00:27:51.960 impartially as they appear in the source material, 00:27:52.200 --> 00:27:54.240 ensuring we give them the gravity they deserve. 00:27:54.519 --> 00:27:56.440 When a company owns the essential digital pipes, 00:27:56.680 --> 00:27:58.980 sovereign governments pay attention and sometimes 00:27:58.980 --> 00:28:01.910 interfere. We have to start with the major geopolitical 00:28:01.910 --> 00:28:04.250 and censorship issues, specifically regarding 00:28:04.250 --> 00:28:06.930 the supply of technology used by regimes in China 00:28:06.930 --> 00:28:09.549 and India. In China, the criticism has been severe 00:28:09.549 --> 00:28:11.910 and longstanding. Cisco supplied surveillance 00:28:11.910 --> 00:28:14.470 and internet infrastructure used to enforce censorship 00:28:14.470 --> 00:28:16.890 in the People's Republic of China. Including 00:28:16.890 --> 00:28:19.049 involvement with the notorious Golden Shield 00:28:19.049 --> 00:28:21.549 project. Right, which is often referred to as 00:28:21.549 --> 00:28:23.849 the initial foundation of the Great Firewall. 00:28:24.329 --> 00:28:26.829 And Cisco's official defense has always been 00:28:26.829 --> 00:28:29.569 consistent. Yes. They say they sell the same 00:28:29.569 --> 00:28:31.509 standardized commercial equipment worldwide. 00:28:31.750 --> 00:28:34.549 They maintain that they do not customize or develop 00:28:34.549 --> 00:28:37.289 specialized filtering capabilities specifically 00:28:37.289 --> 00:28:39.910 to help governments block access to information. 00:28:40.450 --> 00:28:43.170 The equipment is sold, but the configuration 00:28:43.170 --> 00:28:46.630 is up to the purchaser. However, the legal challenges 00:28:46.630 --> 00:28:50.430 related to this involvement are ongoing and extremely 00:28:50.430 --> 00:28:52.940 significant in the U .S. court system. You're 00:28:52.940 --> 00:28:54.960 referring to the lawsuit filed by Falun Gong 00:28:54.960 --> 00:28:58.880 practitioners? This is a very serious and complicated 00:28:58.880 --> 00:29:02.119 case filed under the Alien Tort Statute, which 00:29:02.119 --> 00:29:05.059 allows non -US citizens to sue for certain human 00:29:05.059 --> 00:29:07.400 rights violations committed abroad. And what's 00:29:07.400 --> 00:29:10.000 the core allegation? The lawsuit alleges that 00:29:10.000 --> 00:29:12.400 Cisco knowingly developed and customized its 00:29:12.400 --> 00:29:14.759 product to create features that specifically 00:29:14.759 --> 00:29:17.240 aided the Chinese government in the prosecution 00:29:17.240 --> 00:29:19.859 and abuse of Falun Gong practitioners. And the 00:29:19.859 --> 00:29:22.099 status of that lawsuit has fluctuated dramatically. 00:29:22.730 --> 00:29:25.809 It has. Initially, a lower court dismissed the 00:29:25.809 --> 00:29:28.970 suit in 2014, siding with Cisco. But the United 00:29:28.970 --> 00:29:30.930 States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 00:29:30.930 --> 00:29:33.769 reversed that decision in 2023, allowing the 00:29:33.769 --> 00:29:35.930 lawsuit to proceed to a trial where evidence 00:29:35.930 --> 00:29:38.470 could be presented. And the last we heard. The 00:29:38.470 --> 00:29:40.710 last development mentioned is Cisco appealing 00:29:40.710 --> 00:29:43.569 that ruling to the Supreme Court, trying to halt 00:29:43.569 --> 00:29:46.289 the trial from moving forward. The stakes for 00:29:46.289 --> 00:29:48.950 corporate liability are enormous. And the ethical 00:29:48.950 --> 00:29:51.329 concerns about China extend beyond censorship 00:29:51.329 --> 00:29:54.700 to labor practices within the supply chain. In 00:29:54.700 --> 00:29:57.480 2020, Cisco was accused by the Australian Strategic 00:29:57.480 --> 00:30:00.299 Policy Institute of being potentially connected 00:30:00.299 --> 00:30:04.059 to forced Uyghur labor in Xinjiang. This is part 00:30:04.059 --> 00:30:06.380 of a broader finding raised against at least 00:30:06.380 --> 00:30:09.359 82 major international brands regarding components 00:30:09.359 --> 00:30:11.599 or supply chain links originating from the region. 00:30:11.799 --> 00:30:14.259 Across the continent in India, similar concerns 00:30:14.259 --> 00:30:15.920 regarding government surveillance and censorship 00:30:15.920 --> 00:30:18.480 arose related to the disputed region of Jammu 00:30:18.480 --> 00:30:21.410 and Kashmir. Allegations surfaced in 2020 that 00:30:21.410 --> 00:30:23.650 Cisco was assisting the Jammu and Kashmir administration 00:30:23.650 --> 00:30:27.049 in building a massive firewall. A firewall? intended 00:30:27.049 --> 00:30:29.910 to prevent Internet users from accessing blacklisted 00:30:29.910 --> 00:30:33.309 websites, including social media portals, through 00:30:33.309 --> 00:30:36.069 fixed -line connections. Correct. Cisco officially 00:30:36.069 --> 00:30:38.789 denies these allegations, stating its technology 00:30:38.789 --> 00:30:41.470 is sold for legitimate, standard network security 00:30:41.470 --> 00:30:44.130 purposes. Okay, moving to one of the most sensitive 00:30:44.130 --> 00:30:47.470 areas, U .S. state surveillance. Reports connecting 00:30:47.470 --> 00:30:50.150 Cisco to the National Security Agency, the NSA, 00:30:50.410 --> 00:30:53.150 following the Snowden leaks, have cast a particularly 00:30:53.150 --> 00:30:56.289 long shadow over the trust many enterprises have. 00:30:56.109 --> 00:30:58.950 customers place in their firewalls and core network 00:30:58.950 --> 00:31:02.150 devices. This revolves around specific, detailed 00:31:02.150 --> 00:31:04.869 allegations of backdoors and supply chain intervention. 00:31:05.450 --> 00:31:07.670 The German magazine Der Spiegel reported that 00:31:07.670 --> 00:31:10.150 the NSA developed a tailored hacking tool called 00:31:10.150 --> 00:31:14.029 Jetty Plow, specifically for gaining access to 00:31:14.029 --> 00:31:16.430 several Cisco firewall lines, including the widely 00:31:16.430 --> 00:31:20.029 used ASA and the older PIX series. This suggests 00:31:20.029 --> 00:31:22.690 the NSA had vulnerabilities specifically targeted 00:31:22.690 --> 00:31:24.950 at Cisco's security products. But the allegations 00:31:24.950 --> 00:31:27.549 didn't stop at theoretical hacking tools. The 00:31:27.549 --> 00:31:29.609 most alarming reports involved physical kinetic 00:31:29.609 --> 00:31:32.009 intervention in the supply chain itself precisely 00:31:33.150 --> 00:31:35.670 Files released alongside Glenn Greenwald's book 00:31:35.670 --> 00:31:38.990 No Place to Hide detailed how the NSA's Tailored 00:31:38.990 --> 00:31:43.890 Access Operations, or TAO unit, physically intercepted 00:31:43.890 --> 00:31:46.609 shipped routers and servers destined for targeted 00:31:46.609 --> 00:31:48.910 organizations globally. They were just pulling 00:31:48.910 --> 00:31:51.049 them off the delivery trucks. The process involved 00:31:51.049 --> 00:31:53.509 redirecting the hardware shipments, physically 00:31:53.509 --> 00:31:56.269 opening the packaging, installing covert firmware, 00:31:56.509 --> 00:31:59.049 and then resealing the boxes perfectly before 00:31:59.049 --> 00:32:01.309 they were delivered to the customer. They were 00:32:01.309 --> 00:32:04.390 essentially installing a Trojan horse at the 00:32:04.390 --> 00:32:06.920 hardware level. Yes, pre -positioning access 00:32:06.920 --> 00:32:09.980 points into hard target networks globally. The 00:32:09.980 --> 00:32:12.539 source is, quote, an NSA manager describing these 00:32:12.539 --> 00:32:14.880 Trojan horse systems as being some of the most 00:32:14.880 --> 00:32:17.579 productive operations in TAO because they guaranteed 00:32:17.579 --> 00:32:20.500 access into the target's core networks. The implication, 00:32:20.700 --> 00:32:22.700 of course, is that if a router or server was 00:32:22.700 --> 00:32:25.119 coming from a U .S. vendor, it could be tampered 00:32:25.119 --> 00:32:27.359 with en route. Which is an existential threat 00:32:27.359 --> 00:32:29.859 to your brand. So given the threat these allegations 00:32:29.859 --> 00:32:32.640 pose to Cisco's global brand, especially as a 00:32:32.640 --> 00:32:35.990 security provider, how did the company Cisco's 00:32:35.990 --> 00:32:38.950 chief security officer and general counsel publicly 00:32:38.950 --> 00:32:41.910 and vehemently denied ever working with any government 00:32:41.910 --> 00:32:45.049 U .S. or otherwise to weaken their products for 00:32:45.049 --> 00:32:47.990 exploitation or to implement security backdoors. 00:32:48.210 --> 00:32:50.789 And they took it to the top. They noted the seriousness 00:32:50.789 --> 00:32:53.950 of the allegations prompted Cisco's CEO to express 00:32:53.950 --> 00:32:56.230 concern directly to the president of the United 00:32:56.230 --> 00:32:59.269 States, arguing that the alleged actions threatened 00:32:59.269 --> 00:33:01.569 the integrity of the U .S. technology industry 00:33:01.569 --> 00:33:04.559 globally. Despite those strong denials, security 00:33:04.559 --> 00:33:06.900 issues continue to pop up, sometimes involving 00:33:06.900 --> 00:33:10.180 their collaboration systems, which are now ubiquitous 00:33:10.180 --> 00:33:12.440 in corporate life. Yes. The source mentions a 00:33:12.440 --> 00:33:15.710 very recent discovery in 2025. A backdoor found 00:33:15.710 --> 00:33:17.950 in the Unified Communications Manager, which 00:33:17.950 --> 00:33:20.410 handles enterprise phone and collaboration services. 00:33:20.809 --> 00:33:23.470 And Cisco removed it quickly. They did. But the 00:33:23.470 --> 00:33:26.089 very presence of such vulnerabilities in core 00:33:26.089 --> 00:33:28.869 trusted communications tools raises an important 00:33:28.869 --> 00:33:31.450 and continuous question about oversight, code 00:33:31.450 --> 00:33:34.349 integrity, and the overall security posture of 00:33:34.349 --> 00:33:37.009 complex enterprise software. Beyond government 00:33:37.009 --> 00:33:39.990 level controversies, they faced high stakes battles 00:33:39.990 --> 00:33:42.250 over intellectual property and marketplace competition 00:33:42.250 --> 00:33:45.789 that hit them directly. The centripetal networks 00:33:45.789 --> 00:33:48.390 case is a major one, illustrating the risk of 00:33:48.390 --> 00:33:51.269 high -volume acquisition strategies. In 2020, 00:33:51.529 --> 00:33:54.670 Cisco was ordered to pay a staggering $1 .9 billion 00:33:54.670 --> 00:33:57.829 to centripetal networks. For infringing on four 00:33:57.829 --> 00:34:00.369 specific cybersecurity patents held by the smaller 00:34:00.369 --> 00:34:04.809 firm, $1 .9 billion is a massive payout, even 00:34:04.809 --> 00:34:07.240 in the world of patent law. The court found that 00:34:07.240 --> 00:34:09.579 Cisco had willfully infringed on Centripital's 00:34:09.579 --> 00:34:11.980 patents relating to technology used for threat 00:34:11.980 --> 00:34:15.039 detection and network intelligence. This payout 00:34:15.039 --> 00:34:17.320 represented a huge cost, even for a company of 00:34:17.320 --> 00:34:19.679 Cisco's size, and it highlights the constant 00:34:19.679 --> 00:34:21.960 legal exposure inherent in acquiring so many 00:34:21.960 --> 00:34:24.639 small firms. They also faced an antitrust lawsuit 00:34:24.639 --> 00:34:26.980 aimed at their core maintenance and support services, 00:34:27.219 --> 00:34:29.860 a practice which on the surface might seem like 00:34:29.860 --> 00:34:32.420 standard enterprise business. That was the Multivan 00:34:32.420 --> 00:34:35.719 lawsuit filed in 2008. The central allegation 00:34:35.820 --> 00:34:38.420 was that Cisco was engaging in anti -competitive 00:34:38.420 --> 00:34:41.460 practices by essentially forcing customers to 00:34:41.460 --> 00:34:43.760 buy its proprietary maintenance service, known 00:34:43.760 --> 00:34:46.679 as SmartNet. Just to get critical bug fixes and 00:34:46.679 --> 00:34:49.679 patches? Right. The argument was that this bundling 00:34:49.679 --> 00:34:52.280 stifled competition for third -party maintenance 00:34:52.280 --> 00:34:54.619 providers like Multiven. And the courts took 00:34:54.619 --> 00:34:57.340 it seriously enough. They did. Cisco settled 00:34:57.340 --> 00:35:00.260 that antitrust lawsuit in 2010, agreeing to make 00:35:00.260 --> 00:35:02.579 its software updates available to all Multiven 00:35:02.579 --> 00:35:04.900 customers, essentially separating the availability 00:35:05.039 --> 00:35:07.019 of critical patches from the purchase of the 00:35:07.019 --> 00:35:09.699 SmartNet service. A significant legal victory 00:35:09.699 --> 00:35:11.800 for maintaining competition in the enterprise 00:35:11.800 --> 00:35:14.940 support ecosystem. It was. Let's turn now to 00:35:14.940 --> 00:35:17.820 two critical ethical and societal controversies 00:35:17.820 --> 00:35:21.019 tied both to Cisco's global workforce and the 00:35:21.019 --> 00:35:23.579 use of their technology by their customers. First, 00:35:23.619 --> 00:35:26.000 the caste discrimination lawsuit in the heart 00:35:26.000 --> 00:35:28.420 of Silicon Valley. This is a highly specific, 00:35:28.639 --> 00:35:31.219 deeply serious legal challenge that started in 00:35:31.219 --> 00:35:34.280 2020. The California Department of Fair Employment 00:35:34.280 --> 00:35:36.960 and Housing filed a lawsuit against Cisco and 00:35:36.960 --> 00:35:39.659 two of its employees, alleging severe discrimination 00:35:39.659 --> 00:35:42.239 against an Indian engineer based on him being 00:35:42.239 --> 00:35:44.940 from a lower caste than his colleagues. So this 00:35:44.940 --> 00:35:47.840 brought the complex social issue of caste discrimination, 00:35:48.300 --> 00:35:51.599 historically confined to South Asia, squarely 00:35:51.599 --> 00:35:53.699 into the American workplace and legal system. 00:35:53.900 --> 00:35:56.489 Indeed, the lawsuit asserts that the The company 00:35:56.489 --> 00:35:59.090 failed to prevent or address the alleged harassment, 00:35:59.289 --> 00:36:01.489 which included lower performance review ratings 00:36:01.489 --> 00:36:04.409 and denied opportunities. This has forced Cisco 00:36:04.409 --> 00:36:06.869 to grapple with the complex dynamics of managing 00:36:06.869 --> 00:36:09.690 a highly diverse international workforce while 00:36:09.690 --> 00:36:11.929 adhering to U .S. anti -discrimination laws. 00:36:12.289 --> 00:36:14.590 And finally, their entanglement in the sensitive 00:36:14.590 --> 00:36:17.010 Israeli -Palestinian conflict, which has had 00:36:17.010 --> 00:36:19.469 profound internal and external consequences for 00:36:19.469 --> 00:36:21.630 the company. The source material is very specific 00:36:21.630 --> 00:36:23.650 here regarding the utilization of their facilities. 00:36:33.109 --> 00:36:36.929 And that involvement, particularly the AI targeting 00:36:36.929 --> 00:36:40.110 component, has created severe internal company 00:36:40.110 --> 00:36:43.210 conflict. What happened when employees tried 00:36:43.210 --> 00:36:45.539 to raise this internally? According to reports 00:36:45.539 --> 00:36:48.239 in April 2025, the corporate response was heavy 00:36:48.239 --> 00:36:51.099 -handed. Employees who spoke out against Cisco's 00:36:51.099 --> 00:36:54.019 ties to Israel were reportedly fired. Furthermore, 00:36:54.320 --> 00:36:56.900 attempts to organize employee support for divestment 00:36:56.900 --> 00:36:59.539 or to even discuss the humanitarian consequences 00:36:59.539 --> 00:37:02.059 were censored. They just banned discussion of 00:37:02.059 --> 00:37:03.860 the conflict in company meetings. That's what 00:37:03.860 --> 00:37:06.119 was reported. And the human toll on their workforce 00:37:06.119 --> 00:37:08.860 has been immense. It has. The sources report 00:37:08.860 --> 00:37:12.059 that since October 2023, at least 32 Cisco employees 00:37:12.059 --> 00:37:15.519 reportedly lost $200 88 family members in Gaza. 00:37:16.239 --> 00:37:18.860 This internal tragedy set against the corporate 00:37:18.860 --> 00:37:21.780 policy of censorship highlights the immense difficulty 00:37:21.780 --> 00:37:24.880 of being a massive global provider when its tools 00:37:24.880 --> 00:37:27.599 are utilized in active, sensitive conflict zones. 00:37:27.820 --> 00:37:29.559 And we should also note the significant financial 00:37:29.559 --> 00:37:32.199 consequences of geopolitical alignment, specifically 00:37:32.199 --> 00:37:35.219 their 2022 decision to curtail sales and operations 00:37:35.219 --> 00:37:37.380 in Russia following the invasion of Ukraine. 00:37:37.619 --> 00:37:40.000 That necessary decision came with significant 00:37:40.000 --> 00:37:43.539 financial and logistical costs. It did. In 2023, 00:37:43.960 --> 00:37:46.820 Cisco found it logistically impossible to re 00:37:46.820 --> 00:37:49.260 -export the equipment, spare parts, vehicles, 00:37:49.519 --> 00:37:53.239 and even office furniture they left behind. Consequently, 00:37:53.400 --> 00:37:55.840 they had to physically destroy those assets, 00:37:56.059 --> 00:38:00.480 totaling 1 .86 billion rubles, or about $23 million. 00:38:00.940 --> 00:38:02.960 Rather than risking them falling into the wrong 00:38:02.960 --> 00:38:05.519 hands or being illegally resold. Right. They 00:38:05.519 --> 00:38:07.800 also had to write off a large debt from the Russian 00:38:07.800 --> 00:38:11.460 mobile operator MTS. This was a costly but necessary 00:38:11.460 --> 00:38:13.769 withdrawal. demonstrating the financial risks 00:38:13.769 --> 00:38:16.309 of navigating global politics. Okay, so if we 00:38:16.309 --> 00:38:19.130 synthesize this whole deep dive, we see two parallel 00:38:19.130 --> 00:38:22.030 CISCOs that are locked in constant tension. On 00:38:22.030 --> 00:38:24.150 one hand, you have the unparalleled technological 00:38:24.150 --> 00:38:27.170 pioneer that, starting with the blue box and 00:38:27.170 --> 00:38:29.090 moving through the GSR routers and the latest 00:38:29.090 --> 00:38:31.909 Silicon One ships, literally designed and built 00:38:31.909 --> 00:38:34.190 the multi -protocol infrastructure of the modern 00:38:34.190 --> 00:38:36.369 internet. They set global standards in networking, 00:38:36.670 --> 00:38:38.789 security, and enterprise connectivity that are 00:38:38.789 --> 00:38:40.789 simply indispensable. And on the other hand, 00:38:40.789 --> 00:38:43.099 you have the comp - complex, often heavily scrutinized 00:38:43.099 --> 00:38:45.800 global entity, a corporation wrestling constantly 00:38:45.800 --> 00:38:48.320 with immense geopolitical and ethical accountability. 00:38:48.659 --> 00:38:50.900 From fighting off lawsuits, alleging assistance 00:38:50.900 --> 00:38:53.440 in foreign government persecution, to dealing 00:38:53.440 --> 00:38:56.079 with the immense fuck out from alleged NSA supply 00:38:56.079 --> 00:38:59.340 chain implants, to paying massive patent fines. 00:38:59.579 --> 00:39:02.760 And trying to manage profound internal conflict 00:39:02.760 --> 00:39:05.820 arising from a caste discrimination lawsuit and 00:39:05.820 --> 00:39:08.199 the use of their technology in sensitive conflicts 00:39:08.199 --> 00:39:11.440 abroad. It highlights the central theme. of 21st 00:39:11.440 --> 00:39:14.480 century technology. Scale creates responsibility 00:39:14.480 --> 00:39:17.300 that often exceeds management capacity. Right. 00:39:17.480 --> 00:39:20.239 The tools Cisco sells are essential for communication 00:39:20.239 --> 00:39:23.019 and commerce, but they are equally valuable for 00:39:23.019 --> 00:39:26.099 surveillance, control, and warfare. This reality 00:39:26.099 --> 00:39:29.019 drives their entire operational strategy and 00:39:29.019 --> 00:39:31.199 their risk profile. And as we've seen, Cisco 00:39:31.199 --> 00:39:33.440 continues to accelerate its growth, constantly 00:39:33.440 --> 00:39:35.559 adapting its strategy through multi -billion 00:39:35.559 --> 00:39:38.579 dollar deals like the $28 billion Splunk acquisition. 00:39:38.800 --> 00:39:40.840 Which drives it deep into foundational digital 00:39:40.840 --> 00:39:43.119 infrastructure needed for the AI revolution. 00:39:43.920 --> 00:39:46.219 Because of this deep foundational involvement 00:39:46.219 --> 00:39:49.679 in network security and now AI data, its ethical 00:39:49.679 --> 00:39:51.699 and governmental entanglements are not niche 00:39:51.699 --> 00:39:54.079 issues. They're critical to every user of the 00:39:54.079 --> 00:39:56.119 internet globally, including you, the listener. 00:39:56.360 --> 00:39:58.599 So that brings us to our final thought for you 00:39:58.599 --> 00:40:01.579 to mull over. If the technology backbone of the 00:40:01.579 --> 00:40:04.599 modern world is maintained, secured and innovated 00:40:04.599 --> 00:40:08.099 upon by a handful of massive, indispensable global 00:40:08.099 --> 00:40:11.360 corporations like Cisco, how can we, the users 00:40:11.360 --> 00:40:14.000 and citizens, ensure that the unrelenting market 00:40:14.000 --> 00:40:16.940 demand for technological speed, convenience and 00:40:16.940 --> 00:40:20.000 sovereign security doesn't continuously and systematically 00:40:20.000 --> 00:40:23.559 compromise fundamental privacy and ethical accountability? 00:40:24.090 --> 00:40:26.070 What exact balance must be struck when global 00:40:26.070 --> 00:40:28.989 enterprise and its profit motives meet sovereign 00:40:28.989 --> 00:40:32.230 security interests? And who truly enforces that 00:40:32.230 --> 00:40:34.590 balance when the technology itself becomes the 00:40:34.590 --> 00:40:36.429 battlefield? Something for you to chew on as 00:40:36.429 --> 00:40:37.389 you connect to the network tonight.