WEBVTT

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Welcome back to the Deep Dive. Today we are unpacking

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a company that you probably see maybe every week,

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but its real size, its true complexity is so

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much bigger than what you see on the store shelves.

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Oh, much bigger. We're diving deep into CVS Health.

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And it's important to just, you know, set the

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stage right away. This is not just a retail chain

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we're talking about. We're looking at the second

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largest health care company in the world. Second

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largest. Who's number one? United Health Group.

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But CVS is right there behind them. That scale

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is just, it's hard to wrap your head around.

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I mean, we're looking at the 2024 financials

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and the revenue was, what, U .S. $372 .8 billion?

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Billion, with a B. And they have something like

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300 ,000 employees. It's a true behemoth. Right.

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And the sources you've provided, they give us

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this complete picture from their history of just

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aggressive acquisitions to this incredibly complex

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web of subsidiaries. And crucially. decades of

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some very serious legal and ethical problems

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that just seem to follow a company that gets

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this powerful. So our mission today is really

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to get past that image of consumer value stores.

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That's actually what CVS stood for back in 1963.

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I have no idea. Yeah. And we need to understand

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how they built this. This vertically integrated

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giant, how they got control of prescription management

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with Caremark, insurance with Aetna, and then

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the retail clinics with MediClinic. And there's

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a real tension there, isn't there? This massive

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scale on one hand, but it brings this massive

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scrutiny on the other. It always does. OK, so

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let's break this down. We're going to trace the

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path from one single store in Massachusetts to

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this global powerhouse. We'll look at the pillars

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of their current structure and we'll definitely

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spend a lot of time on the controversies, especially.

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the opioid crisis and, you know, the issues with

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prescription costs. For you, the goal is to see

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how this company isn't just selling you shampoo.

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They are actively, really actively shaping the

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entire American health care system. So the origin

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story is it's deceptively simple. It starts in

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1963, Lowell, Massachusetts. It was founded by

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two brothers, Stanley and Sidney Goldstein, and

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their partner, Ralph Hoagland. And it was just

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a store selling health and beauty products. No

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pharmacy. No pharmacy at the beginning. That

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was the key. The name, Consumer Value Stores,

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was literal. It was all about low prices on everyday

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items. So when did the pharmacy piece come in?

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Because that seems like the entire identity of

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the company now. It took four years, 1967. That's

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when they opened their first stores with actual

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pharmacy departments, one in Warwick, one in

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Cumberland, Rhode Island. And that was the pivot.

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That was the game changer. That was the strategic

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shift. It established this dual identity that

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they still have today. Yeah. A retail store,

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but one that's anchored by this essential health

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care service. And then the other defining piece

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of their DNA showed up just two years later.

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Aggressive expansion. Fueled by corporate change.

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Exactly. In 1969, they were sold to the Melville

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Corporation, which is this huge retail conglomerate.

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And that wasn't just a sale. It was like getting

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a massive injection of cash. It's what let them

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go from being a regional player to a national

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one. And that's when the acquisition sprint really

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kicks off. For what, the next three decades?

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Pretty much. By 1970, they already had 100 stores

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just in the Northeast. But they knew that wasn't

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enough. They needed to go national. Right. And

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you can see their strategy on the map. It's so

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methodical. In 1972, they buy 84 Clinton drug

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and discount stores. And that was their first

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big leap, right, into the Midwest. That was it.

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Centered in Indiana. They learned very early

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on that it's just faster to buy your way into

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a market than to build from scratch. Okay, so

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they keep filling in the map. Let's jump ahead.

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1990. 1990, they buy 500 people's drugstores.

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500? And this one was vital. It gave them a huge

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presence in the Mid -Atlantic. We're talking

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D .C., Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia. It wasn't

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random growth. They were targeting these critical

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population centers. And then in the late 90s,

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the scale just gets, I mean, it gets kind of

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overwhelming. Well, that's when they were spun

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off from Melville. 1996, they start trading on

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the New York Stock Exchange as their own company.

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And they immediately go on a shopping spree.

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A huge one. In 1997, they acquire over 2 ,500

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Revco drugstores. Let's just pause on that. 2

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,500 stores. In one transaction. Yes. It cemented

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their footprint across the Midwest, the Southeast,

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and the East. Overnight, they went from being

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a major player to an undisputed national contender.

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It happened in a single quarter. And they kept

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being precise, like when they wanted to get into

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Michigan. They just bought their way in. 207

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Arbor drugstores in 1998. It was like they were

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playing a game of Risk. just strategically taking

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over territories. But at the same time, while

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they're doing all this brick and mortar consolidation,

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they're also looking at the Internet. Yeah, which

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is something a lot of people forget. They were

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a pioneer in online pharmacy. With Soma .com.

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Right. In 1999, CVS buys Soma .com, which was

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the first online pharmacy in the country. They

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quickly rebranded to CVS .com. And suddenly,

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they're the first company that's truly integrated.

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Both physical and digital. Exactly. They saw

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where things were going. And they wanted to control

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that channel right away. And that desire to control

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the channel, and more importantly, the customer

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data, that leads directly to the extra care card.

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Launched in 2001. And to the average person,

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it just looks like a discount card. Yeah, you

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scan it, you get a coupon. But for CVS, it was

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this unbelievably powerful data collection engine.

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The success was just, it was staggering. 30 million

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people signed up in the first year. 30 million?

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In a year. And it eventually grew to over 70

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million cardholders. At the time, it was the

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largest retail loyalty program in the country.

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And it gave CVS this incredible ability to track

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everything. Not just what shampoo you bought,

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but when you refilled your prescriptions, what

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over -the -counter meds you bought with it. It

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created this incredibly detailed profile on tens

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of millions of Americans. Which laid the groundwork

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for a lot of what was to come. A lot of what

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was to come. Both good and, as we'll see, pretty

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controversial. The buying didn't stop, of course.

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They bought Statlander Pharmacy in 2000 for their

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specialty division. And then a huge one in 2004,

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1 ,268 Eckerd drugstores. That one pushed them

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into Texas and Florida, right? Yeah. Yep. High

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growth markets. So by the mid 2000s, they were

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a retail giant. But they were about to have this

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realization that the real power in health care

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wasn't just in selling the drug. It was in controlling

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the system that pays for the drug. Exactly. And

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that's where the story takes a dramatic turn.

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Away from retail and toward vertical integration.

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OK, so part one establishes CVS as this massive

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coast to coast retail chain. The move that really

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created the $372 billion company we see today,

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it wasn't about buying more stores. No, it was

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about buying the middleman. The pharmacy benefit

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manager, the PBM. Right. And CVS had been dipping

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their toes in this for a while. They launched

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their own PBM called Pharmacare way back in 1994.

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Just a small operation? Yeah, it was more of

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a strategic test. But the moment that changed

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everything was 2007. The merger with Caremark

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Rx. A colossal merger. It created CVS Caremark

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and it fundamentally altered the entire U .S.

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health care landscape. OK, so we have to break

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this down because this merger is really the engine

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of the whole company, right? It's where the money

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comes from, but it's also where a lot of the

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controversy comes from. It is. By joining the

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massive retailer CVS with the powerful PVM Caremark,

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the new company controlled two critical links

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in the chain. The place where you buy the drug

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and the system that manages the payment for it.

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Exactly. They now control not just where you

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fill your prescription, but the entire mechanism

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for how your insurance plan decides which drugs

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it's going to cover and at what price. So how

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does the PBM actually do that? How does it create

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this internal profit machine? It's all about

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something called formulary management and rebate

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negotiation. The formulary is just the list of

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drugs your insurance plan will cover. Caremark

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goes to the big drug manufacturers and negotiates

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massive rebates. We're talking billions of dollars

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in exchange for giving a specific drug preferential

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treatment on that list. So they get paid by Pfizer,

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for example, to make sure Lipidor is on the list

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instead of a competitor's drug. Precisely. They

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then pass some of that rebate back to the health

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plan, but they often keep a significant chunk

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for themselves. That's called the spread. So

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if they're managing the formulary for tens of

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millions of people, they can steer patients toward

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the drugs where they, care mark, get the biggest

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kickback. Even if that drug isn't the cheapest

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or maybe even the most effective option. That

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feels like a huge conflict of interest. It's

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baked right into the PBM model. They can influence

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the doctor. by controlling what's covered, and

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the pharmacist by controlling reimbursement rates.

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And because of the vertical integration, the

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retail pharmacy feeds the PBM, and the PBM steers

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business right back to the retail pharmacy. It's

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a closed loop, a very, very lucrative closed

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loop. And this new identity as a healthcare giant

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prompted a really public, really strategic move

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in 2014. The tobacco decision. Right. They stopped

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selling cigarettes. It was a brilliant move from

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a branding perspective. September 2nd, 2014,

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they pull all tobacco products from all 7 ,700

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locations a month earlier than they had planned.

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The CEO at the time, Larry Merlo, he said something

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like, cigarettes and health care just don't go

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together. Which sounds purely ethical. It was

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a good thing to do. But it was also incredibly

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strategic. Because it came right before their

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biggest push into health care services. It was

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essential. It cleaned up their image. It helped

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establish the CVS brand as a legitimate health

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care company, not just a convenience store that

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happens to have a pharmacy in the back. And right

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after the ban, they officially changed the corporate

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name from CVS Caremark to CVS Health. Signaling

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the new direction. The new direction. That the

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future, the big money, was in services, not in

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selling candy in magazines. Which brings us to

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the final piece of the puzzle, the ultimate integration,

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Aetna. The capstone. In December 2017, they announced

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the deal to buy Aetna for roughly $69 billion.

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And this was just, it was unprecedented. They

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weren't just buying more pharmacies. They were

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buying the system that pays for everything. Everything.

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Before Aetna. They controlled the drug benefits

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through Caremark. With Aetna, they got the whole

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insurance mechanism, medical, dental, behavioral

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health plans, everything for Aetna's 22 million

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members. So now if you're an Aetna member, your

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prescriptions are processed by Caremark and you

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are, let's say, strongly encouraged to fill them

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at a CVS. You are. They can keep all the profit

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streams internal. They get the insurance premium

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from you, they get the PBM spread from the drug

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company, and they get the retail profit from

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the sale. The whole system is designed to keep

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every dollar inside the company. And you can

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see this strategy change the actual stores almost

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immediately. Oh, yeah. After the merger, stores

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started these massive renovations to focus more

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on health services and less on traditional retail.

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And that's where the Health Hub idea comes from.

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That's the genesis. It launched in Houston in

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2019. And the plan was super ambitious. They

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wanted 1500 health hubs by the end of 2021. The

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pandemic slowed that down, obviously. So what's

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the real difference? If I walk into a health

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hub versus a regular CVS? It's a totally different

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layout and staff. At least a fifth of the floor

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space is dedicated to services. You'll see rooms

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for health screenings, areas for managing chronic

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conditions like diabetes, more medical equipment,

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and a much bigger, minute clinic space. So they're

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literally ripping out aisles of greeting cards

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and seasonal candy to make room for clinical

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care. That's exactly what they're doing, and

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they're staffing up for it. Health hubs have

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care concierges to help you navigate services.

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The Minute Clinic has more support staff medical

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assistants, RNS, to help the nurse practitioners

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and physician assistants. They're turning the

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corner drugstore into a front door for primary

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care. That's the goal. Make the most of that

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incredible physical footprint we talked about

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earlier. So we have the big three care mark,

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Aetna, and the retail pharmacies. But to really

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get the full picture of CVS Health, You have

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to look at all the other subsidiaries, all these

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specialized companies they've acquired to make

00:12:18.120 --> 00:12:20.679
their model, you know, almost bulletproof. Yeah,

00:12:20.720 --> 00:12:23.279
when you connect all the dots, you see this ecosystem

00:12:23.279 --> 00:12:25.960
that lets them manage and monetize a patient's

00:12:25.960 --> 00:12:29.190
entire journey from start to finish. OK, so let's

00:12:29.190 --> 00:12:32.169
start with the one everyone knows, CVS Pharmacy.

00:12:32.289 --> 00:12:36.570
It's just massive. 9 ,600 stores, all 50 states,

00:12:36.750 --> 00:12:40.669
D .C., Puerto Rico. The scale alone gives them

00:12:40.669 --> 00:12:44.240
incredible power. And the reach is... It's just

00:12:44.240 --> 00:12:46.460
unavoidable. They fill more than one out of every

00:12:46.460 --> 00:12:48.919
five prescriptions written in the United States.

00:12:49.080 --> 00:12:51.159
And 85 percent of the U .S. population lives

00:12:51.159 --> 00:12:54.299
within 10 miles of a CVS. It's a piece of the

00:12:54.299 --> 00:12:56.940
American landscape. OK, next up, the engine of

00:12:56.940 --> 00:13:00.519
the whole thing. CVS Caremark, the PBM. We know

00:13:00.519 --> 00:13:03.059
its job is managing benefits, but the scale is

00:13:03.059 --> 00:13:05.440
what's important here. Caremark manages prescription

00:13:05.440 --> 00:13:08.860
dispensing for more than 75 million people. 75

00:13:08.860 --> 00:13:11.779
million. It does everything. Plan design, formulary

00:13:11.779 --> 00:13:14.340
management, claims processing, mail orders, specialty

00:13:14.340 --> 00:13:17.039
drugs. And here's the key part. It doesn't just

00:13:17.039 --> 00:13:19.700
do this through CVS stores. Right. It has a network

00:13:19.700 --> 00:13:23.980
of over 68 ,000 retail pharmacies, chains, independents.

00:13:24.019 --> 00:13:25.659
So even if you go to your local neighborhood

00:13:25.659 --> 00:13:27.759
pharmacy, chances are your payment is still being

00:13:27.759 --> 00:13:29.419
run through the Caremark system. They get a piece

00:13:29.419 --> 00:13:30.840
of the action no matter where you go. Pretty

00:13:30.840 --> 00:13:32.960
much. And then the third pillar, Aetna, is the

00:13:32.960 --> 00:13:35.279
one that pays the bills. Aetna provides the funding.

00:13:35.629 --> 00:13:39.289
Medical, dental, pharmaceutical insurance. The

00:13:39.289 --> 00:13:42.230
huge strategic advantage is that if you are both

00:13:42.230 --> 00:13:45.470
the insurer and the PBM, You don't have to negotiate

00:13:45.470 --> 00:13:48.850
with anyone. You set the prices internally. The

00:13:48.850 --> 00:13:51.149
profit margins are all yours. Total control.

00:13:51.450 --> 00:13:53.649
Total control. And then the front door for a

00:13:53.649 --> 00:13:56.169
lot of people for simple things is Minute Clinic.

00:13:56.509 --> 00:13:58.669
The walk -in clinic inside the store. It's the

00:13:58.669 --> 00:14:00.610
lowest cost way for them to get you into their

00:14:00.610 --> 00:14:02.590
system. Yeah. It's the biggest walk -in clinic

00:14:02.590 --> 00:14:06.029
chain in the U .S., over 1 ,100 locations. Again,

00:14:06.230 --> 00:14:09.070
super accessible. Half the population lives within

00:14:09.070 --> 00:14:11.669
10 miles of one. And it's for, you know, minor

00:14:11.669 --> 00:14:14.370
stuff, vaccinations, strip tests, things you

00:14:14.370 --> 00:14:16.169
don't want to go to a doctor's office or an expensive

00:14:16.169 --> 00:14:18.429
urgent care for. Exactly. It's a feeder system.

00:14:18.970 --> 00:14:21.110
But beyond those main consumer parts, they have

00:14:21.110 --> 00:14:23.230
these highly specialized divisions for the really

00:14:23.230 --> 00:14:25.690
complex, really expensive conditions, which is

00:14:25.690 --> 00:14:27.049
where the biggest profits are in health care.

00:14:27.149 --> 00:14:29.429
And that's where CVS Specialty comes in. Right.

00:14:29.490 --> 00:14:31.210
This is the largest specialty pharmacy in the

00:14:31.210 --> 00:14:34.500
U .S. It handles the incredibly complex and expensive

00:14:34.500 --> 00:14:37.320
drugs for things like cancer, rheumatoid arthritis,

00:14:37.720 --> 00:14:41.159
genetic diseases. And these specialty drugs are

00:14:41.159 --> 00:14:44.460
a huge chunk of all drug spending, right? A hugely

00:14:44.460 --> 00:14:46.879
disproportionate amount. So by controlling this

00:14:46.879 --> 00:14:48.940
segment, CVS Health makes sure all that high

00:14:48.940 --> 00:14:51.259
margin business stays inside their system. What

00:14:51.259 --> 00:14:53.559
about patients who need care at home, like IV

00:14:53.559 --> 00:14:56.419
infusions? That's Quorum. They acquired Quorum

00:14:56.419 --> 00:14:59.779
in 2014. It provides home infusion services to

00:14:59.779 --> 00:15:03.500
about 140 ,000 patients a year. And the synergy

00:15:03.500 --> 00:15:06.399
is brilliant. How so? Aetna, the insurer, can

00:15:06.399 --> 00:15:08.279
say, we're not going to pay for this expensive

00:15:08.279 --> 00:15:10.340
infusion in a hospital. You have to get it at

00:15:10.340 --> 00:15:13.019
home from our company, Quorum. They lower their

00:15:13.019 --> 00:15:16.320
costs and keep the profit, all under the CVS

00:15:16.320 --> 00:15:18.139
health umbrella. And they're also deep inside

00:15:18.139 --> 00:15:21.039
places like nursing homes. That's Omnicare. which

00:15:21.039 --> 00:15:23.759
they bought in 2015. Omnicare is the pharmacy

00:15:23.759 --> 00:15:25.840
service provider for thousands of skilled nursing

00:15:25.840 --> 00:15:28.440
and assisted living facilities, so they manage

00:15:28.440 --> 00:15:30.559
drug access for one of the most complex patient

00:15:30.559 --> 00:15:32.980
populations out there. It's an incredible network,

00:15:33.139 --> 00:15:34.879
and their latest moves show they're not done

00:15:34.879 --> 00:15:36.700
building, they're going after primary care now.

00:15:36.879 --> 00:15:39.399
This is their future. They want to control health

00:15:39.399 --> 00:15:43.279
care from the very beginning. In 2022, they bought

00:15:43.279 --> 00:15:45.519
Signify Health for about $8 billion. billion.

00:15:45.639 --> 00:15:48.919
What does Signify do? They specialize in in -home

00:15:48.919 --> 00:15:51.860
health evaluations, trying to manage care before

00:15:51.860 --> 00:15:54.419
people get really sick. And then the huge one

00:15:54.419 --> 00:15:58.419
in 2023, Oak Street Health. For $10 .6 billion.

00:15:59.259 --> 00:16:02.799
This is a monumental move. Oak Street Health

00:16:02.799 --> 00:16:05.600
is a network of primary care centers that focuses

00:16:05.600 --> 00:16:08.379
on Medicare patients. This tells you that CVS

00:16:08.379 --> 00:16:10.159
Health doesn't just want to fill your prescriptions

00:16:10.159 --> 00:16:12.220
anymore. They want to be your doctor. They want

00:16:12.220 --> 00:16:14.039
to be your primary medical home. They want to

00:16:14.039 --> 00:16:16.139
manage your health from the yearly checkup all

00:16:16.139 --> 00:16:18.059
the way through your cancer treatment and insurance

00:16:18.059 --> 00:16:20.799
claims. And all the while, the retail stores

00:16:20.799 --> 00:16:23.320
are still there, pumping out foot traffic and,

00:16:23.460 --> 00:16:26.299
more importantly, data. That's the secret sauce.

00:16:26.600 --> 00:16:29.019
The retail side isn't just about selling toothpaste.

00:16:29.399 --> 00:16:31.919
It's about that massive data pipeline from the

00:16:31.919 --> 00:16:34.500
extra care card, which they now monetize through

00:16:34.500 --> 00:16:37.940
the CVS Media Exchange or CMX. It lets them sell

00:16:37.940 --> 00:16:40.000
targeted advertising with surgical precision.

00:16:40.320 --> 00:16:42.580
It's just another revenue stream built on top

00:16:42.580 --> 00:16:44.879
of the whole structure. So we've laid out the

00:16:44.879 --> 00:16:47.639
scale, the structure of CVS Health, but that

00:16:47.639 --> 00:16:50.259
integration, especially with the PBM, has put

00:16:50.259 --> 00:16:52.559
the company under just, I mean, constant legal

00:16:52.559 --> 00:16:55.059
and public scrutiny. To really understand this

00:16:55.059 --> 00:16:57.279
company, you have to spend time on the sheer

00:16:57.279 --> 00:16:59.980
volume of these issues. You do. And it's critical

00:16:59.980 --> 00:17:02.179
to see that the very thing that makes the PBM

00:17:02.179 --> 00:17:05.799
so profitable, these complex, secret negotiations

00:17:05.799 --> 00:17:08.579
over drug costs, is what repeatedly gets them

00:17:08.579 --> 00:17:10.799
into trouble for fraud and deceptive practices.

00:17:11.160 --> 00:17:13.029
Let's start at the beginning of the PBM. era.

00:17:13.170 --> 00:17:16.009
Even before CVS bought them, Caremark had a history

00:17:16.009 --> 00:17:18.470
of scandals, right? Oh, yeah. Back in the late

00:17:18.470 --> 00:17:21.089
80s and early 90s, Caremark was involved in multiple

00:17:21.089 --> 00:17:23.569
health fraud and Medicare fraud scandals. With

00:17:23.569 --> 00:17:26.210
the government. Yes. And it resulted in settlements

00:17:26.210 --> 00:17:30.130
costing the company more than $250 million. So

00:17:30.130 --> 00:17:32.049
this pattern of regulatory trouble was there

00:17:32.049 --> 00:17:33.990
from the very start. And that trouble followed

00:17:33.990 --> 00:17:36.750
them, leading to a huge settlement in 2005 over

00:17:36.750 --> 00:17:39.009
pharmaceutical kickback. Right. Caremark paid

00:17:39.009 --> 00:17:42.390
$137 .5 million to settle federal... lawsuits.

00:17:42.690 --> 00:17:44.730
The allegation was that a company they had just

00:17:44.730 --> 00:17:47.829
bought, Advance PCS, was taking kickbacks from

00:17:47.829 --> 00:17:50.049
drug makers. So basically, they were getting

00:17:50.049 --> 00:17:53.470
paid to push certain drugs over others. Exactly.

00:17:53.470 --> 00:17:55.950
To promote their products, even over cheaper

00:17:55.950 --> 00:17:58.509
generics, in government programs like Medicare.

00:17:59.190 --> 00:18:01.990
The decision about which drug you get was being

00:18:01.990 --> 00:18:04.710
influenced by a corporate payment, not just what

00:18:04.710 --> 00:18:07.150
was best for you or what was cheapest. And while

00:18:07.150 --> 00:18:10.150
they didn't admit they did anything wrong, $137

00:18:10.150 --> 00:18:14.490
.5 million settlement tells you how serious the

00:18:14.490 --> 00:18:16.950
government thought it was. This same pattern

00:18:16.950 --> 00:18:20.009
led to another big lawsuit in 2008, the one for

00:18:20.009 --> 00:18:22.829
deceptive practices. This one was so revealing.

00:18:22.869 --> 00:18:25.089
It was a multi -state lawsuit, and they settled

00:18:25.089 --> 00:18:29.000
for $38 .5 million. It really exposed the mechanics

00:18:29.000 --> 00:18:31.380
of how Caremark was profiting from something

00:18:31.380 --> 00:18:34.019
called drug switching. What's that? Attorneys

00:18:34.019 --> 00:18:36.140
general from 28 states alleged that Caremark

00:18:36.140 --> 00:18:38.700
was telling doctors to switch patients to certain

00:18:38.700 --> 00:18:41.259
brand -name drugs, and they were marketing it

00:18:41.259 --> 00:18:43.440
as a way to save the patient or the health plan

00:18:43.440 --> 00:18:45.980
money. But that wasn't actually true. Not always.

00:18:46.259 --> 00:18:48.759
The investigation found that the switch often

00:18:48.759 --> 00:18:51.859
led to tiny savings, or sometimes it even increased

00:18:51.859 --> 00:18:54.819
the cost. But the real winner was always Caremark.

00:18:55.279 --> 00:18:57.079
Because they were steering business to the drug

00:18:57.079 --> 00:18:59.240
companies that gave them the biggest rebates.

00:18:59.440 --> 00:19:01.960
The patient was just a pawn in the middle. A

00:19:01.960 --> 00:19:04.500
pawn in a revenue game. The settlement was a

00:19:04.500 --> 00:19:06.839
big deal, though. It put some real guardrails

00:19:06.839 --> 00:19:09.619
in place. What kind of guardrails? CVS was explicitly

00:19:09.619 --> 00:19:12.079
banned from telling a doctor to switch a drug

00:19:12.079 --> 00:19:15.160
if it would cost the patient more. And they couldn't

00:19:15.160 --> 00:19:17.160
suggest a switch if the original drug's patent

00:19:17.160 --> 00:19:19.700
was about to expire, which was a classic trick

00:19:19.700 --> 00:19:21.900
to squeeze the last bit of profit out of a brand

00:19:21.900 --> 00:19:25.230
name before a cheap generic hit the market. And

00:19:25.230 --> 00:19:27.490
beyond the financial issues, there's this recurring

00:19:27.490 --> 00:19:30.430
problem with how CVS Health handles patient data.

00:19:30.710 --> 00:19:32.829
It's the most sensitive information they have,

00:19:32.970 --> 00:19:35.069
and they have repeatedly gotten in trouble for

00:19:35.069 --> 00:19:37.410
it. The first big public blowup was way back

00:19:37.410 --> 00:19:40.869
in 1998 with the Alensis incident. A real wake

00:19:40.869 --> 00:19:44.230
-up call. CVS was caught sharing specific prescription

00:19:44.230 --> 00:19:47.410
information with a marketing company called Alensis.

00:19:47.609 --> 00:19:49.849
What was Alensis doing with it? They were using

00:19:49.849 --> 00:19:52.089
it to send targeted mailings to people's homes.

00:19:52.509 --> 00:19:54.490
You know, time to refill your heart medication

00:19:54.490 --> 00:19:57.990
or promoting related products. People were outraged.

00:19:58.029 --> 00:20:00.549
I remember the editor of a major medical journal

00:20:00.549 --> 00:20:03.650
called it a gross invasion of privacy. The medical

00:20:03.650 --> 00:20:06.950
community was furious that this intimate health

00:20:06.950 --> 00:20:09.490
data was being used for marketing without any

00:20:09.490 --> 00:20:11.789
real consent. So what happened? After a huge

00:20:11.789 --> 00:20:16.559
backlash, CVS cut ties with lenses. They didn't

00:20:16.559 --> 00:20:18.519
stop the practice. They just brought the whole

00:20:18.519 --> 00:20:21.519
targeted mailing program in -house. So they kept

00:20:21.519 --> 00:20:23.619
using the data. They just controlled it themselves.

00:20:23.960 --> 00:20:25.960
Exactly. And this problem of protecting data

00:20:25.960 --> 00:20:29.660
came up again big time in 2009. They settled

00:20:29.660 --> 00:20:31.900
huge charges with both the Federal Trade Commission

00:20:31.900 --> 00:20:34.079
and the Department of Health and Human Services.

00:20:34.279 --> 00:20:37.140
The FTC and HHS. The FTC said they failed to

00:20:37.140 --> 00:20:39.519
protect sensitive customer and employee information.

00:20:40.250 --> 00:20:44.789
And they paid HHS $2 .25 million for violating

00:20:44.789 --> 00:20:48.109
the big health privacy law. It just showed a

00:20:48.109 --> 00:20:50.329
pattern of failing to meet the standard required

00:20:50.329 --> 00:20:52.369
when you handle this kind of information at such

00:20:52.369 --> 00:20:55.190
a massive scale. But of all the controversies,

00:20:55.190 --> 00:20:57.130
I think the ones related to the opioid crisis

00:20:57.130 --> 00:20:59.450
represent the biggest challenge to their image

00:20:59.450 --> 00:21:01.089
as a health care company. Some of the details

00:21:01.089 --> 00:21:04.490
are just they're damning. The DEA investigation

00:21:04.490 --> 00:21:08.700
in 2011 in that one small town in Florida. Sanford,

00:21:08.700 --> 00:21:12.400
population 53 ,000. The DEA found that the CVS

00:21:12.400 --> 00:21:15.299
pharmacies there were ordering enough painkillers

00:21:15.299 --> 00:21:17.779
to supply a city eight times its size. Eight

00:21:17.779 --> 00:21:20.380
times? Around 400 ,000 people. The volume should

00:21:20.380 --> 00:21:22.259
have been a massive red flag. Just break down

00:21:22.259 --> 00:21:25.059
the numbers on that one store. One single CVS

00:21:25.059 --> 00:21:28.099
in Sanford ordered 1 .8 million oxycodone pills

00:21:28.099 --> 00:21:31.559
in one year. 1 .8 million? That's almost 138

00:21:31.559 --> 00:21:34.160
,000 pills a month. The average for other pharmacies

00:21:34.160 --> 00:21:36.920
in Florida was around 5 ,300 a month. It's just

00:21:36.920 --> 00:21:38.920
an astronomical difference. It screams diversion.

00:21:39.299 --> 00:21:41.099
And the investigators saw it happening with their

00:21:41.099 --> 00:21:44.200
own eyes. They did. They noted that about every

00:21:44.200 --> 00:21:46.900
third car in the drive -thru was picking up a

00:21:46.900 --> 00:21:50.039
prescription for oxycodone or hydrocodone. And

00:21:50.039 --> 00:21:52.019
pharmacists admitted that customers were coming

00:21:52.019 --> 00:21:54.839
in using street slang for the drugs. Clear signs

00:21:54.839 --> 00:21:57.359
they were being sold illegally. And this lack

00:21:57.359 --> 00:22:00.000
of oversight wasn't just in Florida. Massachusetts

00:22:00.000 --> 00:22:04.039
settled with them in 2016. For almost $800 ,000.

00:22:04.559 --> 00:22:07.039
That settlement was about them failing to give

00:22:07.039 --> 00:22:09.039
their pharmacists access to the state's prescription

00:22:09.039 --> 00:22:11.940
monitoring program, the PMP. The database that's

00:22:11.940 --> 00:22:13.579
supposed to stop people from doctor shopping

00:22:13.579 --> 00:22:16.220
for pills. Right. By not checking it, they were

00:22:16.220 --> 00:22:18.220
just fueling the crisis, filling prescriptions

00:22:18.220 --> 00:22:19.839
without doing the basic due diligence required.

00:22:20.180 --> 00:22:22.559
But the real legal earthquake was the federal

00:22:22.559 --> 00:22:26.279
jury verdict in Ohio. November 2021. A federal

00:22:26.279 --> 00:22:29.039
jury found CVS, along with Walgreens and Walmart,

00:22:29.279 --> 00:22:31.759
liable for helping to create the opioid crisis

00:22:31.759 --> 00:22:34.680
in two Ohio counties. And this is a huge deal

00:22:34.680 --> 00:22:36.720
because it was the first time the pharmacy companies

00:22:36.720 --> 00:22:38.579
themselves were held accountable in a trial.

00:22:38.700 --> 00:22:40.880
So what was the legal argument? What did the

00:22:40.880 --> 00:22:43.440
jury decide was their failure? The argument was

00:22:43.440 --> 00:22:47.210
their failure to monitor. The law says pharmacies

00:22:47.210 --> 00:22:49.089
have a responsibility to make sure prescriptions

00:22:49.089 --> 00:22:51.630
are for a legitimate medical purpose. They're

00:22:51.630 --> 00:22:53.710
supposed to flag and stop suspicious orders,

00:22:53.869 --> 00:22:56.690
ones that are too big, too frequent, too many

00:22:56.690 --> 00:23:00.190
cash payments. The jury decided that CVS's systems

00:23:00.190 --> 00:23:02.730
completely failed to do this, and that failure

00:23:02.730 --> 00:23:05.150
allowed the flood of pills to wreck these communities.

00:23:05.789 --> 00:23:08.009
And the financial penalty for that was massive.

00:23:08.150 --> 00:23:11.890
It was. In August 2022, the judge ordered CVS

00:23:11.890 --> 00:23:14.710
and the others to pay $650 million in damages

00:23:14.710 --> 00:23:18.089
just for that one lawsuit. It set this huge precedent

00:23:18.089 --> 00:23:20.789
that pharmacies are co -liable for the epidemic.

00:23:20.950 --> 00:23:23.609
It was a game changer. Beyond these huge systemic

00:23:23.609 --> 00:23:26.009
issues, there's also been this steady drumbeat

00:23:26.009 --> 00:23:29.150
of problems with just, you know, basic dispensing

00:23:29.150 --> 00:23:31.210
accuracy. Which is supposed to be the one thing

00:23:31.210 --> 00:23:34.460
a pharmacy never gets wrong. In 2005, an investigation

00:23:34.460 --> 00:23:37.400
in Boston found 62 different errors or quality

00:23:37.400 --> 00:23:40.000
problems over a few years. It was so bad the

00:23:40.000 --> 00:23:41.920
state had to bring in a nonprofit to monitor

00:23:41.920 --> 00:23:44.059
them for two years. And they've also got into

00:23:44.059 --> 00:23:46.339
trouble for what they sell on their retail shelves.

00:23:46.640 --> 00:23:49.480
Right. In 2018, the Center for Inquiry sued them

00:23:49.480 --> 00:23:52.559
for consumer fraud over selling homeopathic medicines.

00:23:52.880 --> 00:23:54.799
The argument being that these products don't

00:23:54.799 --> 00:23:56.740
actually do anything. And that by putting them

00:23:56.740 --> 00:23:59.380
on the shelf next to real medicine, CVS gives

00:23:59.380 --> 00:24:02.200
them a credibility they don't deserve. The lawsuit

00:24:02.200 --> 00:24:04.339
argued it was dangerous because people might

00:24:04.339 --> 00:24:06.220
choose these ineffective treatments instead of

00:24:06.220 --> 00:24:08.500
getting real medical care, which could make them

00:24:08.500 --> 00:24:11.660
sicker or even lead to death. It's a real ethical

00:24:11.660 --> 00:24:14.160
question for a company that calls itself health.

00:24:14.759 --> 00:24:18.660
But these errors can have just catastrophic human

00:24:18.660 --> 00:24:21.940
costs. The incident in 2023 was heartbreaking.

00:24:22.220 --> 00:24:24.900
Just a terrible, tragic case of human error.

00:24:25.119 --> 00:24:28.839
A patient, Tamika Thomas, was going through IVF.

00:24:29.119 --> 00:24:31.299
She was supposed to be given medication to help

00:24:31.299 --> 00:24:33.480
her pregnancy. Instead, the pharmacist gave her

00:24:33.480 --> 00:24:36.240
misoprostol. An abortion pill. An abortion pill.

00:24:36.380 --> 00:24:38.400
She lost both of the embryos she had transferred.

00:24:38.460 --> 00:24:41.259
Her quote was just, they just killed my baby.

00:24:41.579 --> 00:24:43.819
It's a devastating reminder of what's at stake.

00:24:43.960 --> 00:24:46.339
And what were the consequences for CVS? The two

00:24:46.339 --> 00:24:48.299
pharmacists were fined and put on probation.

00:24:48.700 --> 00:24:51.799
And CVS Pharmacy, the corporation, got the maximum

00:24:51.799 --> 00:24:56.160
fine. $10 ,000. $10 ,000. Wow. Let's just let's

00:24:56.160 --> 00:24:58.000
also circle back to the pricing issues. They

00:24:58.000 --> 00:25:00.259
were fine for misrepresenting Medicare prices,

00:25:00.339 --> 00:25:02.660
too, weren't they? They were. In 2012, they paid

00:25:02.660 --> 00:25:05.819
five million dollars to settle FTC charges that

00:25:05.819 --> 00:25:08.839
they misrepresented the prices of certain Medicare

00:25:08.839 --> 00:25:11.720
Part D drugs for things like breast cancer and

00:25:11.720 --> 00:25:14.519
epilepsy. Again, it's a breach of trust with

00:25:14.519 --> 00:25:17.319
a really vulnerable population, and it ties right

00:25:17.319 --> 00:25:20.000
back to the PVM's control over pricing. So we've

00:25:20.000 --> 00:25:22.660
gone through the transformation, the model, and

00:25:22.660 --> 00:25:25.319
the decades of controversy. To finish up, let's

00:25:25.319 --> 00:25:27.640
look at where the company is headed now and how

00:25:27.640 --> 00:25:29.720
they try to balance all this power with being

00:25:29.720 --> 00:25:32.279
a good corporate citizen. You can really see

00:25:32.279 --> 00:25:34.000
their strategy in their operational decisions.

00:25:34.400 --> 00:25:36.539
They are all in on the health hub and the Oak

00:25:36.539 --> 00:25:38.559
Street primary care model, and they're moving

00:25:38.559 --> 00:25:40.769
away from just being a retailer. That's behind

00:25:40.769 --> 00:25:43.190
the store closures, right? Exactly. In 2021,

00:25:43.509 --> 00:25:46.349
they announced plans to close 900 stores over

00:25:46.349 --> 00:25:49.049
three years. Which is about 10 percent of all

00:25:49.049 --> 00:25:52.109
their U .S. stores. It's a huge number. But they

00:25:52.109 --> 00:25:54.809
justified it by saying consumer behavior has

00:25:54.809 --> 00:25:57.609
changed and they need to focus on their future

00:25:57.609 --> 00:26:00.049
in health care delivery. They're getting rid

00:26:00.049 --> 00:26:02.690
of underperforming retail locations so they can

00:26:02.690 --> 00:26:04.670
invest that capital into building out more clinical

00:26:04.670 --> 00:26:07.269
spaces. But even as they're closing some stores,

00:26:07.369 --> 00:26:09.289
they're finding new ways to make money off the

00:26:09.289 --> 00:26:12.230
ones that are left and off their website. That's

00:26:12.230 --> 00:26:15.230
where the CVS Media Exchange, CMX, comes in.

00:26:15.329 --> 00:26:17.410
Their advertising network. It's their retail

00:26:17.410 --> 00:26:20.250
media network launched in 2020. It's an increasingly

00:26:20.250 --> 00:26:22.670
common way for big retailers to monetize their

00:26:22.670 --> 00:26:25.450
customer data. They use all that extra care card

00:26:25.450 --> 00:26:27.549
information to let other companies like, you

00:26:27.549 --> 00:26:29.910
know, a cereal brand or a soda company target

00:26:29.910 --> 00:26:32.390
ads with incredible precision on CVS websites

00:26:32.390 --> 00:26:35.250
and apps. Just another high margin revenue stream.

00:26:35.480 --> 00:26:37.779
And despite these changes, the sheer financial

00:26:37.779 --> 00:26:40.539
scale of the company is just, it's still immense.

00:26:40.900 --> 00:26:43.859
The 2024 numbers are still hard to believe. $372

00:26:43.859 --> 00:26:48.019
.8 billion in revenue, $253 .2 billion in assets.

00:26:48.380 --> 00:26:51.099
When a company is that big, their decisions just

00:26:51.099 --> 00:26:53.339
fundamentally impact the cost and delivery of

00:26:53.339 --> 00:26:56.180
health care for everyone. So on the other side

00:26:56.180 --> 00:26:58.960
of the coin, how does the company try to project

00:26:58.960 --> 00:27:01.579
a positive image? What are they doing in terms

00:27:01.579 --> 00:27:04.839
of philanthropy and social commitments? They

00:27:04.839 --> 00:27:07.380
do have some longstanding initiatives. The CVS

00:27:07.380 --> 00:27:10.059
Samaritan Vans, for example, have been providing

00:27:10.059 --> 00:27:13.660
free roadside assistance since 1978. And their

00:27:13.660 --> 00:27:16.339
charity Golf Classic has raised millions for

00:27:16.339 --> 00:27:18.859
nonprofits. And they've responded to consumer

00:27:18.859 --> 00:27:21.500
pressure on issues like animal welfare. They

00:27:21.500 --> 00:27:24.420
have. In 2016, they made a public promise to

00:27:24.420 --> 00:27:27.960
source 100 % cage -free eggs. And to their credit,

00:27:28.059 --> 00:27:30.099
they actually did it ahead of schedule by the

00:27:30.099 --> 00:27:32.839
end of 2022. It shows they can execute on these

00:27:32.839 --> 00:27:34.799
kinds of public promises when they want to. And

00:27:34.799 --> 00:27:37.140
their most recent big commitment is in an interesting

00:27:37.140 --> 00:27:40.440
area, affordable housing. Right. It shows they're

00:27:40.440 --> 00:27:42.059
thinking about the social determinants of health.

00:27:42.240 --> 00:27:45.480
In 2024, they committed almost $35 million to

00:27:45.480 --> 00:27:47.339
help build two affordable housing developments

00:27:47.339 --> 00:27:50.299
in Hawaii. Creating hundreds of new homes. Exactly.

00:27:50.359 --> 00:27:52.960
It's an acknowledgment that a person's health

00:27:52.960 --> 00:27:55.640
is about more than just what happens in a pharmacy

00:27:55.640 --> 00:27:58.900
or a clinic. It's about addressing these bigger

00:27:58.900 --> 00:28:02.359
structural issues. So we've covered this incredible

00:28:02.359 --> 00:28:05.519
journey from a single consumer value store to,

00:28:05.680 --> 00:28:08.160
you know, the second largest healthcare company

00:28:08.160 --> 00:28:10.319
in the world. It's a really powerful story of

00:28:10.319 --> 00:28:13.049
corporate growth. Built on that retail expansion

00:28:13.049 --> 00:28:16.309
in the 90s and then the huge strategic shift

00:28:16.309 --> 00:28:19.109
with the Caremark merger in 2007 and the Aetna

00:28:19.109 --> 00:28:22.170
acquisition in 2017. What's clear is that the

00:28:22.170 --> 00:28:24.269
face of the company is the store, but the engine

00:28:24.269 --> 00:28:27.009
is the PBM. It's the thing that drives the revenue

00:28:27.009 --> 00:28:30.329
and at the same time is the source of all these

00:28:30.329 --> 00:28:32.630
controversies over costs and kickback. Yeah.

00:28:32.730 --> 00:28:34.990
The key takeaway for you is that CVS Health isn't

00:28:34.990 --> 00:28:37.049
just a bunch of different businesses. It's one

00:28:37.049 --> 00:28:39.289
highly centralized system that controls your

00:28:39.289 --> 00:28:42.019
prescription insurance. your drug benefits, your

00:28:42.019 --> 00:28:44.259
local pharmacy, your specialty care. And now

00:28:44.259 --> 00:28:46.180
they're coming for your primary care doctor with

00:28:46.180 --> 00:28:48.319
Oak Street Health. They are. This concentration

00:28:48.319 --> 00:28:51.000
of power just makes them this undeniable force

00:28:51.000 --> 00:28:53.759
that shapes the health care experience for basically

00:28:53.759 --> 00:28:56.140
every American. So we'll leave you with a final

00:28:56.140 --> 00:28:59.440
thought on all this. CVS Health says its mission

00:28:59.440 --> 00:29:01.440
is to improve the future health of Americans.

00:29:01.839 --> 00:29:04.319
But its history is filled with massive settlements

00:29:04.319 --> 00:29:07.900
for deceptive practices and a federal jury literally

00:29:07.900 --> 00:29:10.619
finding them co -responsible for the opioid crisis.

00:29:11.240 --> 00:29:13.839
Can a corporation that controls so much of the

00:29:13.839 --> 00:29:17.000
system and carries that much baggage truly earn

00:29:17.000 --> 00:29:19.039
the public trust it needs to be your primary

00:29:19.039 --> 00:29:21.990
care provider? Think about that tension. That

00:29:21.990 --> 00:29:24.309
conflict between optimizing for profit and being

00:29:24.309 --> 00:29:26.210
a trusted health care partner. Think about it

00:29:26.210 --> 00:29:27.990
the next time you're in a health hub or your

00:29:27.990 --> 00:29:30.130
prescription is run through Caremark or you use

00:29:30.130 --> 00:29:32.650
your Aetna insurance card. That complexity is

00:29:32.650 --> 00:29:35.069
modern American medicine. Until the next E -Dive,

00:29:35.170 --> 00:29:35.769
stay curious.
