WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:02.819 Welcome back to the Deep Dive. Our mission here 00:00:02.819 --> 00:00:05.940 is, well, it's pretty simple. We take these huge 00:00:05.940 --> 00:00:08.660 monolithic companies, the ones whose choices 00:00:08.660 --> 00:00:11.419 genuinely shape our world, and we try to give 00:00:11.419 --> 00:00:13.720 you the strategic map to understand them. Yeah, 00:00:13.759 --> 00:00:15.759 we turn stacks of, let's be honest, sometimes 00:00:15.759 --> 00:00:18.100 really dense sources into something you can actually 00:00:18.100 --> 00:00:21.359 use. Exactly. And today, we are peeling back 00:00:21.359 --> 00:00:23.820 the layers on a company whose name you definitely 00:00:23.820 --> 00:00:25.980 know. You see it on skyscrapers. You used to 00:00:25.980 --> 00:00:28.750 see it on a very famous... football jersey. We're 00:00:28.750 --> 00:00:31.489 talking about Aonplex. And most people hear Aon 00:00:31.489 --> 00:00:34.609 and just think insurance, a huge insurance broker. 00:00:34.770 --> 00:00:37.750 But that title, it just, it barely scratches 00:00:37.750 --> 00:00:39.649 the surface of what this company has become. 00:00:39.950 --> 00:00:42.390 It really doesn't. When you hear Aon, you might 00:00:42.390 --> 00:00:44.649 think risk management, sure, or maybe that Manchester 00:00:44.649 --> 00:00:47.289 United sponsorship. But this is a British American 00:00:47.289 --> 00:00:49.729 professional services giant and its history is, 00:00:49.829 --> 00:00:52.009 well, it's almost shockingly different from its 00:00:52.009 --> 00:00:54.390 current, you know, high finance age. We're going 00:00:54.390 --> 00:00:57.969 all the way back to 1919. Chicago. We're going 00:00:57.969 --> 00:01:00.530 to trace this journey from, believe it or not, 00:01:00.609 --> 00:01:03.570 selling cheap accident policies door to door 00:01:03.570 --> 00:01:07.049 all the way through this brutal, relentless strategy 00:01:07.049 --> 00:01:10.569 of global mergers. And not just mergers, but 00:01:10.569 --> 00:01:13.370 fundamental shifts in what they even do. They 00:01:13.370 --> 00:01:15.469 move completely away from their original business 00:01:15.469 --> 00:01:19.670 model. And along the way, I mean. There's tragic 00:01:19.670 --> 00:01:22.829 loss, major regulatory failures across multiple 00:01:22.829 --> 00:01:25.250 continents. It's quite a story. It is. It's a 00:01:25.250 --> 00:01:27.010 case study in corporate reinvention. I mean, 00:01:27.069 --> 00:01:30.010 Aon today is the second largest insurance broker 00:01:30.010 --> 00:01:32.269 in the world, no question. Right. But the real 00:01:32.269 --> 00:01:34.849 story is how they got there. How they evolved 00:01:34.849 --> 00:01:37.670 from just selling insurance policies to actively 00:01:37.670 --> 00:01:40.730 managing the most complex risks and human resource 00:01:40.730 --> 00:01:42.450 challenges for the biggest corporations on the 00:01:42.450 --> 00:01:44.930 planet. Our sources give us that timeline. They 00:01:44.930 --> 00:01:46.810 let us see exactly why they're structured the 00:01:46.810 --> 00:01:49.189 way they are now. Okay. That sounds like a powerful 00:01:49.189 --> 00:01:51.230 narrative. Yeah. So let's unpack this journey 00:01:51.230 --> 00:01:53.909 of a company whose name, Aon, actually means 00:01:53.909 --> 00:01:56.290 one. Yeah. The irony of that name, given how 00:01:56.290 --> 00:01:58.090 many pieces make up the whole, is something we'll 00:01:58.090 --> 00:02:00.189 definitely come back to. For sure. So before 00:02:00.189 --> 00:02:02.189 we dive into the history, let's just plant a 00:02:02.189 --> 00:02:07.370 flag. Who is Aon Plank right now in 2024? Because 00:02:07.370 --> 00:02:09.909 it's not just an insurance company. No, not at 00:02:09.909 --> 00:02:12.210 all. You have to think of it as a British American 00:02:12.210 --> 00:02:15.509 professional services firm. And that transatlantic 00:02:15.509 --> 00:02:18.129 thing, that duality, it's actually key to understanding 00:02:18.129 --> 00:02:20.780 how they operate. How so? Well, their global 00:02:20.780 --> 00:02:23.879 headquarters is in London, 122 Leadenhall Street. 00:02:23.960 --> 00:02:26.240 That's a clear signal about their commitment 00:02:26.240 --> 00:02:28.240 to the international financial markets. Right. 00:02:28.360 --> 00:02:31.439 But their roots and their massive North American 00:02:31.439 --> 00:02:34.460 operations, they are still firmly planted in 00:02:34.460 --> 00:02:36.879 Chicago in that huge skyscraper they call the 00:02:36.879 --> 00:02:39.500 Aon Center. So you have this dual continent structure 00:02:39.500 --> 00:02:41.939 overseen by the chairman, Lister Knight, the 00:02:41.939 --> 00:02:44.479 president, Eric Anderson, and the CEO, Greg Case. 00:02:44.680 --> 00:02:47.080 OK, so that's the structure. But to really get 00:02:47.080 --> 00:02:49.960 a handle on the modern Aon. We have to talk about 00:02:49.960 --> 00:02:51.860 where the money comes from. And you mentioned 00:02:51.860 --> 00:02:54.280 a pivot, so let's pause and define a core difference 00:02:54.280 --> 00:02:56.419 right now, the difference between underwriting 00:02:56.419 --> 00:02:58.520 and brokering. This distinction is everything. 00:02:58.659 --> 00:03:00.939 It is the key to their entire modern strategy, 00:03:01.099 --> 00:03:02.960 and it's why they became a global giant. Okay, 00:03:02.979 --> 00:03:05.270 so underwriting. When a company underwrites insurance, 00:03:05.750 --> 00:03:08.150 they're the ones taking on the risk. They are 00:03:08.150 --> 00:03:11.110 on the hook financially. If your factory burns 00:03:11.110 --> 00:03:13.650 down, the underwriter is the one who pays out 00:03:13.650 --> 00:03:16.210 the claim. So you need huge amounts of cash on 00:03:16.210 --> 00:03:19.110 hand. Huge. It's a capital intensive business. 00:03:19.409 --> 00:03:22.430 You need massive reserves and you're carrying 00:03:22.430 --> 00:03:25.129 all that liability yourself. It's risky. OK, 00:03:25.210 --> 00:03:27.810 so then what's brokering? Brokering or consulting 00:03:27.810 --> 00:03:31.090 is completely different. You're the expert middleman. 00:03:31.250 --> 00:03:33.789 You're not carrying the risk. You go into that 00:03:33.789 --> 00:03:36.569 factory. You assess its risks. You help the owner 00:03:36.569 --> 00:03:39.509 find the best third party insurer and you negotiate 00:03:39.509 --> 00:03:42.229 the policy for them. Ah, so you're selling expertise. 00:03:42.330 --> 00:03:43.990 You're selling advice, not your own capital. 00:03:44.270 --> 00:03:47.050 Precisely. And that is a high margin capital 00:03:47.050 --> 00:03:49.909 light business. And Aon's business today is almost 00:03:49.909 --> 00:03:52.389 entirely that brokering and consulting. And they 00:03:52.389 --> 00:03:55.110 split that, what, $15 billion revenue stream 00:03:55.110 --> 00:03:57.900 into two main. pillars. That's right. The first 00:03:57.900 --> 00:04:00.159 and by far the largest is what they call risk 00:04:00.159 --> 00:04:03.240 capital. This accounts for about 67 percent of 00:04:03.240 --> 00:04:05.919 their 2024 revenues. And this is the core insurance 00:04:05.919 --> 00:04:07.479 and risk management stuff we were just talking 00:04:07.479 --> 00:04:10.060 about. Exactly. Brokerage consulting for corporate 00:04:10.060 --> 00:04:13.340 clients on operational risk, property and casualty 00:04:13.340 --> 00:04:15.819 insurance. And this is a really sophisticated 00:04:15.819 --> 00:04:18.759 part. Reinsurance. Reinsurance. Insurance for 00:04:18.759 --> 00:04:21.079 insurance companies. You've got it. If a big 00:04:21.079 --> 00:04:23.259 insurer has taken on too much risk, say they've 00:04:23.259 --> 00:04:26.040 insured every single skyscraper in Miami against 00:04:26.040 --> 00:04:28.759 hurricanes, that's a huge liability for them. 00:04:28.879 --> 00:04:31.540 Yeah. One bad storm and they're wiped out. So 00:04:31.540 --> 00:04:33.980 they go to a firm like Aon, a reinsurance broker, 00:04:34.220 --> 00:04:36.819 who helps them offload some of that risk to another 00:04:36.819 --> 00:04:39.420 company, a reinsurer. It is a very specialized, 00:04:39.839 --> 00:04:43.100 very complex, and very lucrative corner of the 00:04:43.100 --> 00:04:45.639 market. And Aon is a powerhouse in it. Okay, 00:04:45.680 --> 00:04:47.399 so that's two -thirds of the business. What's 00:04:47.399 --> 00:04:49.959 the other third? The other 33 % comes from their 00:04:49.959 --> 00:04:53.089 second pillar, human capital. And this is the 00:04:53.089 --> 00:04:55.329 part of the business that directly impacts millions 00:04:55.329 --> 00:04:57.750 of employees all over the world, even if they've 00:04:57.750 --> 00:05:00.870 never heard the name Aon. This division designs 00:05:00.870 --> 00:05:03.329 and manages health insurance solutions, retirement 00:05:03.329 --> 00:05:06.170 plans, pension structures for huge companies. 00:05:06.470 --> 00:05:09.490 They also provide talent advisory services, you 00:05:09.490 --> 00:05:11.430 know, consulting on hiring and compensation. 00:05:11.970 --> 00:05:13.930 It's a brilliant synergy, isn't it? It's incredible. 00:05:14.050 --> 00:05:16.709 If you're the CEO of a Fortune 500 company, you 00:05:16.709 --> 00:05:19.389 go to Aon to manage the risk for your factories 00:05:19.389 --> 00:05:21.410 and supply chains, and then you just stay with 00:05:21.410 --> 00:05:23.430 them. Because they can also design your entire 00:05:23.430 --> 00:05:25.730 employee benefits and retirement structure. They 00:05:25.730 --> 00:05:28.290 get embedded deep inside the client's operations 00:05:28.290 --> 00:05:31.209 on both the financial side and the human resources 00:05:31.209 --> 00:05:33.449 side. Deeply embedded. And the scale of that 00:05:33.449 --> 00:05:37.110 is just immense. When you look at the 2024 numbers, 00:05:37.329 --> 00:05:39.110 they're kind of staggering. Let's run through 00:05:39.110 --> 00:05:44.230 them. Revenue, U .S., $15 .7 billion. And a net 00:05:44.230 --> 00:05:48.110 income of $2 .65 billion. Their total assets 00:05:48.110 --> 00:05:51.689 are just shy of $49 billion. Wow. And to get 00:05:51.689 --> 00:05:54.110 that done, you need people, a lot of them. They 00:05:54.110 --> 00:05:56.709 have approximately 66 ,000 employees worldwide. 00:05:56.870 --> 00:05:59.250 And that huge human footprint, it's not just 00:05:59.250 --> 00:06:02.089 for making sales. It creates this inherent challenge 00:06:02.089 --> 00:06:04.790 of keeping everyone on the same page of global 00:06:04.790 --> 00:06:07.470 compliance, which, as we'll see, has been a major 00:06:07.470 --> 00:06:10.250 issue for them. Right. They're ranked 300th on 00:06:10.250 --> 00:06:13.709 the Fortune 500, 388th on the Forbes Global 2000. 00:06:14.430 --> 00:06:16.750 It all just confirms their position as the second 00:06:16.750 --> 00:06:19.430 largest insurance broker in the world. You really 00:06:19.430 --> 00:06:21.589 can't talk about global finance or corporate 00:06:21.589 --> 00:06:24.389 HR without talking about Aon. And that's the 00:06:24.389 --> 00:06:26.449 thing. They're not just responding to the market 00:06:26.449 --> 00:06:29.490 anymore. At their size, with their level of specialization, 00:06:29.790 --> 00:06:32.449 they are actively helping to define what modern 00:06:32.449 --> 00:06:34.509 corporate risk management looks like around the 00:06:34.509 --> 00:06:37.250 globe. OK, so let's take that $15 billion global 00:06:37.250 --> 00:06:40.800 titan and rewind the clock way back. Because 00:06:40.800 --> 00:06:43.480 the origins of Aeon Flock are completely, and 00:06:43.480 --> 00:06:46.079 I mean completely, unrecognizable from what we 00:06:46.079 --> 00:06:47.779 just described. Not even in the same universe. 00:06:47.860 --> 00:06:50.139 We have to go back to the early 20th century, 00:06:50.300 --> 00:06:53.120 to a man named W. Clement Stone and a company 00:06:53.120 --> 00:06:55.060 called the Combined Insurance Company of America. 00:06:55.399 --> 00:06:57.480 So how did it start? The first seed was planted 00:06:57.480 --> 00:07:00.600 in 1918. Stone's mother bought a small insurance 00:07:00.600 --> 00:07:03.519 agency in Detroit, and a young W. Clement Stone 00:07:03.519 --> 00:07:05.639 went to work with her. But he was ambitious. 00:07:05.920 --> 00:07:08.600 By 1919, he'd started his own thing in Chicago. 00:07:09.319 --> 00:07:11.699 the combined registry code. And he wasn't selling 00:07:11.699 --> 00:07:13.920 complex reinsurance treaties to other insurance 00:07:13.920 --> 00:07:17.610 companies. Not even close. He was selling high 00:07:17.610 --> 00:07:20.209 volume, super accessible accident insurance. 00:07:20.569 --> 00:07:23.589 We're talking low cost, low benefit policies 00:07:23.589 --> 00:07:27.430 for the average working person, someone who couldn't 00:07:27.430 --> 00:07:30.449 afford a big comprehensive plan but needed, you 00:07:30.449 --> 00:07:32.050 know, something in case of a small accident. 00:07:32.269 --> 00:07:33.750 And the business model was really innovative 00:07:33.750 --> 00:07:36.189 for the time. And it was brilliant. It was direct. 00:07:36.350 --> 00:07:39.970 It was fast. Stone's agents could actually underwrite 00:07:39.970 --> 00:07:42.269 and issue the policies right there on the spot. 00:07:42.410 --> 00:07:44.579 No waiting. Instant gratification. diversification 00:07:44.579 --> 00:07:47.860 for a customer base that the big formal brokers 00:07:47.860 --> 00:07:50.639 probably just ignored. Exactly. Stone went straight 00:07:50.639 --> 00:07:53.139 to the people. It's incredible to think that 00:07:53.139 --> 00:07:55.259 this business model not only survived, but actually 00:07:55.259 --> 00:07:58.220 thrived through the roaring 20s and then somehow 00:07:58.220 --> 00:08:00.459 made it through the Great Depression. That's 00:08:00.459 --> 00:08:02.699 where you see the founders grit, I think. Absolutely. 00:08:02.920 --> 00:08:05.220 The Depression shuttered countless businesses, 00:08:05.319 --> 00:08:08.120 but Stone just adapted. He had to reduce his 00:08:08.120 --> 00:08:10.600 workforce, sure, but he doubled down on training 00:08:10.600 --> 00:08:13.079 and sales discipline. He knew that even when 00:08:13.079 --> 00:08:16.079 people had no money, they still feared accidents. 00:08:16.480 --> 00:08:18.660 There's a great detail in the sources, too, about 00:08:18.660 --> 00:08:21.019 him moving the business. Yeah, that's amazing. 00:08:21.259 --> 00:08:24.319 He temporarily moved operations to Arkansas and 00:08:24.319 --> 00:08:27.060 Texas, not for some big business reason, but 00:08:27.060 --> 00:08:29.560 because the climate was better for his son, who 00:08:29.560 --> 00:08:31.939 had a respiratory illness. That's the level of 00:08:31.939 --> 00:08:33.500 personal commitment that kept the whole thing 00:08:33.500 --> 00:08:37.769 going. So he spends decades building this. consolidating 00:08:37.769 --> 00:08:40.830 various agencies he buys up. And then in 1947, 00:08:41.210 --> 00:08:43.830 it becomes official. Right. The Combined Insurance 00:08:43.830 --> 00:08:45.929 Company of America is formally incorporated. 00:08:46.230 --> 00:08:48.169 And this is the company that pushes forward, 00:08:48.269 --> 00:08:51.129 selling health and accident policies, eventually 00:08:51.129 --> 00:08:53.710 even expanding internationally to Australia and 00:08:53.710 --> 00:08:56.629 Great Britain in the 70s. But then, as so often 00:08:56.629 --> 00:08:59.419 happens, the momentum stalls. The sources are 00:08:59.419 --> 00:09:01.620 pretty clear that the company just stagnated 00:09:01.620 --> 00:09:04.179 for about a decade under W. Clement Stone Jr. 00:09:04.480 --> 00:09:07.399 Yeah, growth flatlined. Innovation just stopped. 00:09:07.460 --> 00:09:09.440 And that prompted this incredible comeback story. 00:09:09.950 --> 00:09:12.830 The Elder Stone, at 79 years old, comes back 00:09:12.830 --> 00:09:16.129 to take control in 1982. Just temporarily. Just 00:09:16.129 --> 00:09:19.210 long enough to orchestrate the single most important 00:09:19.210 --> 00:09:21.809 move in the company's future, the merger with 00:09:21.809 --> 00:09:25.230 Patrick Ryan's firm. This is the moment. This 00:09:25.230 --> 00:09:28.129 is where the old school high volume sales model 00:09:28.129 --> 00:09:31.549 crashes into the new era. of sophisticated financial 00:09:31.549 --> 00:09:34.850 services. Absolutely. Patrick Ryan was a totally 00:09:34.850 --> 00:09:36.909 different breed. A Northwestern grad started 00:09:36.909 --> 00:09:39.690 his own thing, Ryan Insurance Company in 1964, 00:09:40.129 --> 00:09:43.330 specializing in auto credit insurance. He was 00:09:43.330 --> 00:09:45.580 already thinking much bigger. He was a broker. 00:09:45.740 --> 00:09:48.960 At heart, yes. He expanded in the 70s by buying 00:09:48.960 --> 00:09:51.320 up the insurance brokerage units of a big conglomerate 00:09:51.320 --> 00:09:53.779 called Esmark. So when he merged with Combined 00:09:53.779 --> 00:09:56.139 and took the reins, he initiated this massive, 00:09:56.220 --> 00:09:58.779 immediate strategic shift. He had zero interest 00:09:58.779 --> 00:10:02.120 in Stone's old business model. None. Ryan immediately 00:10:02.120 --> 00:10:04.440 started moving the new Combined company towards 00:10:04.440 --> 00:10:06.820 insurance brokering and more upscale, complex 00:10:06.820 --> 00:10:09.500 risk products. He was transforming them from 00:10:09.500 --> 00:10:12.100 a company that issues policies into a firm that 00:10:12.100 --> 00:10:14.120 gives high -end advice. And that kind of changed. 00:10:14.379 --> 00:10:16.379 requires some tough decisions. Oh, yeah. He brought 00:10:16.379 --> 00:10:18.440 in major cost -cutting measures, trimmed the 00:10:18.440 --> 00:10:20.980 staff. It was a clear signal to the market and 00:10:20.980 --> 00:10:23.159 internally that this company was done being a 00:10:23.159 --> 00:10:25.299 decentralized sales force. It was going to become 00:10:25.299 --> 00:10:28.240 a lean, centrally managed brokerage powerhouse. 00:10:28.480 --> 00:10:30.820 And the final piece of that transformation comes 00:10:30.820 --> 00:10:34.679 in 1987 with a rebrand. The holding company is 00:10:34.679 --> 00:10:37.659 formally renamed Aon. It comes from a Gaelic 00:10:37.659 --> 00:10:40.360 word that means one. You have to admire the boldness 00:10:40.360 --> 00:10:42.480 of that name choice. Oh, it's incredible. You 00:10:42.480 --> 00:10:45.720 take this gritty, low -cost accident insurer, 00:10:45.860 --> 00:10:48.539 you merge it with a sophisticated brokerage, 00:10:48.559 --> 00:10:50.740 and you immediately brand yourself for global 00:10:50.740 --> 00:10:53.720 domination with a name that suggests unity and 00:10:53.720 --> 00:10:56.120 singular focus. It's the end of the stone era. 00:10:56.279 --> 00:10:58.620 Completely. And the beginning of a relentless, 00:10:58.919 --> 00:11:02.700 singularly focused global expansion. They went 00:11:02.700 --> 00:11:04.799 from the guy selling you a policy at the train 00:11:04.799 --> 00:11:08.039 station to the firm advising the CEO of a Fortune 00:11:08.039 --> 00:11:11.500 500 company. So let's trace how that one company, 00:11:11.559 --> 00:11:14.220 Aon, immediately set out to become many through 00:11:14.220 --> 00:11:16.259 this incredibly aggressive global expansion. 00:11:16.559 --> 00:11:19.299 Patrick Ryan's legacy really is this M &A playbook. 00:11:19.610 --> 00:11:21.769 He knew that to compete with the big guys like 00:11:21.769 --> 00:11:24.169 Marsh and McLennan, they had to build a global 00:11:24.169 --> 00:11:26.309 footprint and they had to do it fast. And the 00:11:26.309 --> 00:11:28.909 1990s were just a whirlwind of activity. It started 00:11:28.909 --> 00:11:32.830 pretty quickly. Yeah, it did. In 1992, they acquired 00:11:32.830 --> 00:11:36.230 a major Dutch insurance broker, Hoedig Langeveld. 00:11:36.370 --> 00:11:39.169 That gave them an early important foothold in 00:11:39.169 --> 00:11:41.509 Europe. But the really pivotal moment came a 00:11:41.509 --> 00:11:44.950 few years later in 1995. Yes. This is when Aon 00:11:44.950 --> 00:11:47.789 sold its remaining direct life insurance holdings 00:11:47.789 --> 00:11:51.149 to General Electric. And this wasn't just a minor 00:11:51.149 --> 00:11:53.789 deal. This was Aon selling off the core function 00:11:53.789 --> 00:11:56.289 of its own heritage. They were selling the business 00:11:56.289 --> 00:11:59.269 of underrating risk. Which seems so counterintuitive. 00:11:59.639 --> 00:12:02.200 Why sell the very thing your company was founded 00:12:02.200 --> 00:12:05.559 on? Because, as we said, underwriting is capital 00:12:05.559 --> 00:12:08.779 intensive. It ties up billions of dollars. By 00:12:08.779 --> 00:12:11.419 selling it, Aon freed up all that capital and 00:12:11.419 --> 00:12:14.600 committed 100 % to the capital light, high margin 00:12:14.600 --> 00:12:17.159 world of consulting and brokering. It was a move 00:12:17.159 --> 00:12:19.279 to unlock their growth potential. And with that 00:12:19.279 --> 00:12:21.519 cash and that new focus, they went on a shopping 00:12:21.519 --> 00:12:25.159 spree. A massive one. 1997 saw these huge purchases 00:12:25.159 --> 00:12:27.500 like the Mene Group and most importantly, the 00:12:27.500 --> 00:12:30.200 insurance brokerage ANA services. Those were 00:12:30.200 --> 00:12:32.700 so big that for a short time, they actually became 00:12:32.700 --> 00:12:34.879 the largest insurance broker in the world. And 00:12:34.879 --> 00:12:37.480 then they went truly global in 98. Doubled their 00:12:37.480 --> 00:12:41.179 employee base. They bought Gili Carvajal, which 00:12:41.179 --> 00:12:43.519 was Spain's biggest retail insurance broker. 00:12:43.840 --> 00:12:47.019 They formed Aeon Korea. They were just hoovering 00:12:47.019 --> 00:12:49.320 up these established regional experts to get 00:12:49.320 --> 00:12:51.580 instant market access everywhere. But that kind 00:12:51.580 --> 00:12:53.559 of speed has to come at a price. It did. The 00:12:53.559 --> 00:12:57.659 sources are really clear on this. By 1999, the 00:12:57.659 --> 00:13:00.200 sheer cost of integrating all these different 00:13:00.200 --> 00:13:02.779 companies, you know, merging IT systems, aligning 00:13:02.779 --> 00:13:05.539 different corporate cultures, it hammered profits. 00:13:05.940 --> 00:13:08.539 It's the classic problem of acquisition. growth. 00:13:08.700 --> 00:13:10.279 Some people call it acquisition and suggestion. 00:13:10.659 --> 00:13:12.500 Right. They bought another business in 2000, 00:13:12.779 --> 00:13:16.139 but then almost immediately had to cut 6 % of 00:13:16.139 --> 00:13:18.740 the workforce just to deal with all the restructuring 00:13:18.740 --> 00:13:21.419 costs. Exactly. But that experience seems to 00:13:21.419 --> 00:13:24.200 have refined their strategy. As they moved into 00:13:24.200 --> 00:13:26.980 the 21st century, they shifted from just buying 00:13:26.980 --> 00:13:29.059 up geographic territory to making these very 00:13:29.059 --> 00:13:32.440 targeted leaps into specific high value advisory 00:13:32.440 --> 00:13:35.200 sectors. And the first big leap was in reinsurance. 00:13:35.679 --> 00:13:39.360 Right, 2008. They acquired the reinsurance intermediary 00:13:39.360 --> 00:13:44.120 Benfield Group for $1 .75 billion. This wasn't 00:13:44.120 --> 00:13:45.679 just about getting bigger. It was about getting 00:13:45.679 --> 00:13:49.080 smarter and more specialized. Benfield made Aon 00:13:49.080 --> 00:13:52.539 an instant powerhouse in that complex, high -stakes 00:13:52.539 --> 00:13:55.419 world of global catastrophic risk. And the second 00:13:55.419 --> 00:13:58.139 major leap came just two years later in 2010. 00:13:58.679 --> 00:14:02.720 That was the $4 .9 billion acquisition of Hewitt 00:14:02.720 --> 00:14:05.799 Associates. And this deal is so critical because 00:14:05.799 --> 00:14:08.159 it cemented the two -pillar structure of the 00:14:08.159 --> 00:14:10.399 modern Aon we talked about. Because Hewitt wasn't 00:14:10.399 --> 00:14:12.840 an insurance company. Not at all. It was a leading 00:14:12.840 --> 00:14:15.700 human resources consulting firm. Hewitt added 00:14:15.700 --> 00:14:18.879 23 ,000 employees. It massively boosted Aon's 00:14:18.879 --> 00:14:21.559 human capital side. And it pushed them deep into 00:14:21.559 --> 00:14:23.919 business process, outsourcing, managing things 00:14:23.919 --> 00:14:26.240 like payroll and benefits for other companies. 00:14:26.460 --> 00:14:28.299 Which provides that really sticky... recurring 00:14:28.299 --> 00:14:31.320 revenue. Incredibly sticky. If Aon is managing 00:14:31.320 --> 00:14:33.679 your company's pension plan, you're not going 00:14:33.679 --> 00:14:35.759 to switch providers on a whim. The Hewitt deal 00:14:35.759 --> 00:14:37.620 is what really made them that two -headed giant. 00:14:37.820 --> 00:14:40.519 But what's just as important in this M &A playbook 00:14:40.519 --> 00:14:43.610 is what they chose to sell. The divestments. 00:14:43.809 --> 00:14:46.009 They were ruthless about getting rid of anything 00:14:46.009 --> 00:14:48.149 that didn't fit that new model. They really were. 00:14:48.309 --> 00:14:51.389 And the perfect example is from 2007. They sold 00:14:51.389 --> 00:14:53.750 off their two major underwriting subsidiaries. 00:14:53.909 --> 00:14:55.669 Including the original company. The original 00:14:55.669 --> 00:14:58.490 one. The Combined Insurance Company of America, 00:14:58.769 --> 00:15:02.289 W. Clement Stone's baby, was sold to ACE Limited 00:15:02.289 --> 00:15:06.470 for $2 .4 billion. The rationale they gave was 00:15:06.470 --> 00:15:08.710 that these were low margin and capital intensive 00:15:08.710 --> 00:15:11.929 businesses. They literally sold their own past. 00:15:12.269 --> 00:15:14.309 to finance their future. That's a perfect way 00:15:14.309 --> 00:15:17.529 to put it. And they kept doing it. In 2017, they 00:15:17.529 --> 00:15:20.149 sold off the employee benefits outsourcing business, 00:15:20.389 --> 00:15:22.889 a big chunk of what they'd gotten from Hewitt 00:15:22.889 --> 00:15:25.730 to Blackstone for almost $5 billion. So if you 00:15:25.730 --> 00:15:27.870 put it all together, the strategy is just relentless. 00:15:28.519 --> 00:15:31.860 It is. Aon consistently moves away from anything 00:15:31.860 --> 00:15:35.500 that requires huge cash reserves or massive administrative 00:15:35.500 --> 00:15:38.659 overhead. And they pour all that focus and capital 00:15:38.659 --> 00:15:41.919 into high end, sophisticated consulting, advisory 00:15:41.919 --> 00:15:45.059 and brokerage services. They learned the hard 00:15:45.059 --> 00:15:47.820 lesson that owning the risk is way less profitable 00:15:47.820 --> 00:15:49.860 than just advising other people on how to manage 00:15:49.860 --> 00:15:52.440 it. But a company that grows that fast across 00:15:52.440 --> 00:15:55.720 that many borders, swallowing up dozens of different 00:15:55.720 --> 00:15:58.590 corporate cultures. is bound to run into some 00:15:58.590 --> 00:16:00.710 trouble. Oh, absolutely. And Aon has faced some 00:16:00.710 --> 00:16:03.870 major, very expensive regulatory reckonings over 00:16:03.870 --> 00:16:05.870 the years. The first one really redefined the 00:16:05.870 --> 00:16:08.110 whole industry in the United States, right? The 00:16:08.110 --> 00:16:11.169 investigation led by Eliot Spitzer back in 2004, 00:16:11.509 --> 00:16:14.029 2005. Yeah, he was the New York Attorney General 00:16:14.029 --> 00:16:16.009 at the time, and he went after the big three, 00:16:16.149 --> 00:16:18.950 Aon, Marshall McLennan, and Willis. And the whole 00:16:18.950 --> 00:16:21.149 thing was about a practice called contingent 00:16:21.149 --> 00:16:23.629 commissions. Right, which sounds complicated, 00:16:23.690 --> 00:16:26.580 but it was basically secret kickbacks. The insurance 00:16:26.580 --> 00:16:29.259 companies were paying the brokers directly on 00:16:29.259 --> 00:16:31.200 top of what the client was paying them. Which 00:16:31.200 --> 00:16:33.720 creates a massive conflict of interest. A huge 00:16:33.720 --> 00:16:36.299 one. The question was, is the broker recommending 00:16:36.299 --> 00:16:38.879 an insurer because they're the best option for 00:16:38.879 --> 00:16:41.340 the client? Or because that insurer is paying 00:16:41.340 --> 00:16:43.200 the broker a bigger commission under the table? 00:16:43.399 --> 00:16:46.299 It suggested the advice was tainted by self -interest. 00:16:46.620 --> 00:16:50.610 And the resolution was costly. Very. In 2005, 00:16:51.009 --> 00:16:55.610 Aon agreed to a $190 million settlement. Now, 00:16:55.690 --> 00:16:58.070 they didn't formally admit to any wrongdoing, 00:16:58.190 --> 00:17:00.889 which is pretty standard in these things. But 00:17:00.889 --> 00:17:03.850 a fine that big sends a very clear message. The 00:17:03.850 --> 00:17:05.910 whole industry had to become much more transparent 00:17:05.910 --> 00:17:08.549 after that. But the scrutiny didn't stop at the 00:17:08.549 --> 00:17:11.119 U .S. border. Just a few years later. They got 00:17:11.119 --> 00:17:14.220 hit in the UK. They did. In 2009, the UK's Financial 00:17:14.220 --> 00:17:17.539 Services Authority, the FSA, fined them almost 00:17:17.539 --> 00:17:19.700 six million pounds for what they called inadequate 00:17:19.700 --> 00:17:22.519 bribery and corruption controls. So this wasn't 00:17:22.519 --> 00:17:24.920 about contingent commissions. No, this was about 00:17:24.920 --> 00:17:27.920 their global operations. The FSA found that Aon 00:17:27.920 --> 00:17:30.200 had failed to properly assess the risks of who 00:17:30.200 --> 00:17:32.299 they were dealing with overseas between 2005 00:17:32.299 --> 00:17:35.180 and 2007. So not necessarily that they found 00:17:35.180 --> 00:17:37.859 proof of bribery, but that the systems to prevent 00:17:37.859 --> 00:17:40.490 bribery weren't good enough. Exactly. Exactly. 00:17:40.549 --> 00:17:42.950 The controls were lacking for a company of their 00:17:42.950 --> 00:17:45.950 size and global reach. Aon cooperated, which 00:17:45.950 --> 00:17:48.609 got them a 30 percent discount on the fine. But 00:17:48.609 --> 00:17:50.930 it really showed that their rapid M &A strategy 00:17:50.930 --> 00:17:54.009 had left some big, dangerous holes in their compliance 00:17:54.009 --> 00:17:57.150 structure. Which connects directly to the biggest 00:17:57.150 --> 00:17:59.509 regulatory problem they faced, the violations 00:17:59.509 --> 00:18:02.059 of the U .S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The 00:18:02.059 --> 00:18:04.779 FCPA. Right. That all came to a head in 2011. 00:18:05.180 --> 00:18:08.400 And the FCPA is a really serious law. It makes 00:18:08.400 --> 00:18:11.059 it illegal for U .S. companies to bribe foreign 00:18:11.059 --> 00:18:13.559 government officials to get or to keep business. 00:18:13.799 --> 00:18:16.140 It's designed to stop American companies from 00:18:16.140 --> 00:18:18.500 exporting corruption. And Aon got hit hard on 00:18:18.500 --> 00:18:22.000 this. They paid a $16 .26 million penalty to 00:18:22.000 --> 00:18:24.920 the SEC and the Department of Justice. The investigation 00:18:24.920 --> 00:18:27.420 found that Aon subsidiaries had made over $3 00:18:27.420 --> 00:18:31.019 .6 million in improper payments to foreign officials. 00:18:31.279 --> 00:18:33.579 other facilitators. And the reason was just blatant, 00:18:33.579 --> 00:18:36.420 to win insurance contracts. Simple bribery. But 00:18:36.420 --> 00:18:38.839 the really shocking part is the time frame. These 00:18:38.839 --> 00:18:41.279 payments went on from 1983 all the way through 00:18:41.279 --> 00:18:44.940 2007. Wait, through 2007? That's two years after 00:18:44.940 --> 00:18:47.119 the huge Spitzer settlement, which should have 00:18:47.119 --> 00:18:49.359 put everyone on high alert. That's the thing. 00:18:49.480 --> 00:18:52.670 It suggests... This wasn't just a few rogue employees. 00:18:52.950 --> 00:18:55.849 It points to a systemic issue, probably a culture 00:18:55.849 --> 00:18:58.150 they inherited when they bought up some of these 00:18:58.150 --> 00:19:00.349 smaller firms in other countries. So this goes 00:19:00.349 --> 00:19:02.670 back to that problem of acquisition indigestion. 00:19:02.890 --> 00:19:05.569 You don't just buy a company's assets. You buy 00:19:05.569 --> 00:19:08.309 its problems, too. You buy its culture, its habits, 00:19:08.430 --> 00:19:11.170 its skeletons in the closet. And the payments 00:19:11.170 --> 00:19:12.930 were happening all over the world. Costa Rica, 00:19:13.069 --> 00:19:16.109 Egypt, Vietnam, Indonesia, the UAE, Myanmar, 00:19:16.509 --> 00:19:19.690 Bangladesh. It shows how widespread the lack 00:19:19.690 --> 00:19:22.609 of oversight. really was. So these legal challenges, 00:19:22.710 --> 00:19:25.190 they reveal the dark side of that aggressive 00:19:25.190 --> 00:19:28.470 growth strategy. The fines are big, but the real 00:19:28.470 --> 00:19:30.970 cost must have been just the monumental effort 00:19:30.970 --> 00:19:33.970 to fix it all. Exactly. It's the decade -long, 00:19:34.130 --> 00:19:36.609 incredibly expensive task of trying to build 00:19:36.609 --> 00:19:39.190 and enforce a single global standard for anti 00:19:39.190 --> 00:19:41.869 -corruption and compliance after years of letting 00:19:41.869 --> 00:19:43.869 all these different regional operations do their 00:19:43.869 --> 00:19:46.150 own thing. It's the price they paid for that 00:19:46.150 --> 00:19:48.849 incredible speed of expansion. The story of a 00:19:48.849 --> 00:19:51.529 huge corporation like this is often told in mergers 00:19:51.529 --> 00:19:54.250 and fines, but sometimes it intersects with these 00:19:54.250 --> 00:19:57.690 major world events in a way that is just profound. 00:19:58.460 --> 00:20:00.660 An Aeon story is permanently linked to the tragedy 00:20:00.660 --> 00:20:03.700 of September 11th. It is. Their New York offices 00:20:03.700 --> 00:20:05.779 were in the South Tower of the World Trade Center, 00:20:05.940 --> 00:20:08.940 and they were high up on the 92nd floor and then 00:20:08.940 --> 00:20:11.859 a whole block of floors from 98 to 105. And the 00:20:11.859 --> 00:20:13.740 source material really highlights the incredible 00:20:13.740 --> 00:20:15.500 leadership shown in those first few minutes. 00:20:15.880 --> 00:20:18.039 When the first plane hit the North Tower at 8 00:20:18.039 --> 00:20:21.599 .46 a .m., an Aeon executive named Eric Eisenberg 00:20:21.599 --> 00:20:24.460 immediately, and with no hesitation, started 00:20:24.460 --> 00:20:26.599 an evacuation of their offices in the South Tower. 00:20:26.740 --> 00:20:29.680 That decision. saved so many lives. The timeline 00:20:29.680 --> 00:20:31.900 is just chilling. There was only a 17 -minute 00:20:31.900 --> 00:20:33.720 window between that first impact on the North 00:20:33.720 --> 00:20:36.000 Tower and the second plane hitting their tower, 00:20:36.140 --> 00:20:40.000 the South Tower, at 9 .03 a .m. Just 17 minutes. 00:20:40.220 --> 00:20:42.920 And in that terrifying, confusing window, because 00:20:42.920 --> 00:20:45.880 of that order to evacuate, an incredible 924 00:20:45.880 --> 00:20:48.279 of the roughly 1 ,100 Aeon employees who were 00:20:48.279 --> 00:20:51.180 there that morning managed to get below the 77th 00:20:51.180 --> 00:20:53.759 floor. Below the impact zone. Right. Before the 00:20:53.759 --> 00:20:56.720 second plane hit. But the loss was still just... 00:20:56.960 --> 00:21:01.460 Immense. Aon lost 176 employees that day. These 00:21:01.460 --> 00:21:03.920 were the people who were above the impact zone 00:21:03.920 --> 00:21:06.240 or who just couldn't get out in time before the 00:21:06.240 --> 00:21:08.759 tower collapsed. It was the largest loss of life 00:21:08.759 --> 00:21:11.279 for any single company in the World Trade Center. 00:21:11.440 --> 00:21:13.339 It is heartbreakingly one of the people killed 00:21:13.339 --> 00:21:15.660 was the executive who made that crucial evacuation 00:21:15.660 --> 00:21:19.890 call, Eric Eisenberg. That human cost, it really 00:21:19.890 --> 00:21:22.210 shaped the company's identity in the years that 00:21:22.210 --> 00:21:24.549 followed. For sure. But shifting gears completely, 00:21:24.890 --> 00:21:27.430 Aon also sought out public visibility in a very 00:21:27.430 --> 00:21:29.690 different way. They decided to put their complex 00:21:29.690 --> 00:21:31.930 business -to -business brand in front of billions 00:21:31.930 --> 00:21:34.589 of consumers through a massive sports sponsorship. 00:21:34.910 --> 00:21:37.089 The Manchester United deal. The landmark shirt 00:21:37.089 --> 00:21:39.890 sponsorship deal. They signed it in 2009, and 00:21:39.890 --> 00:21:43.109 in 2010, the Aon logo replaced AIG on the front 00:21:43.109 --> 00:21:45.349 of those famous red jerseys. Which is an interesting 00:21:45.349 --> 00:21:47.869 move, right? Your clients are CEOs in risk. managers, 00:21:47.869 --> 00:21:50.609 not the average football fan. It seems counterintuitive, 00:21:50.609 --> 00:21:52.509 but the brand recognition you get from that is 00:21:52.509 --> 00:21:55.069 just incalculable. It was also very expensive. 00:21:55.430 --> 00:21:58.029 The deal was worth 80 million pounds over four 00:21:58.029 --> 00:22:00.890 years. At the time, it was the most lucrative 00:22:00.890 --> 00:22:03.869 shirt deal in history. It was. It took this complex 00:22:03.869 --> 00:22:07.049 kind of opaque professional services firm and 00:22:07.049 --> 00:22:10.369 it connected its name to this global brand that 00:22:10.369 --> 00:22:12.430 people have a really emotional connection to. 00:22:12.529 --> 00:22:15.089 You can't buy that kind of trust with trade ads. 00:22:15.309 --> 00:22:17.309 And even after Chevrolet took over the main shirt 00:22:17.309 --> 00:22:20.569 sponsorship in 2014, Aon didn't just walk away. 00:22:20.970 --> 00:22:23.890 No, they deepened the relationship. From 2013 00:22:23.890 --> 00:22:26.869 all the way to 2021, Aon had the naming rights 00:22:26.869 --> 00:22:29.109 to the club's training facility and sponsored 00:22:29.109 --> 00:22:31.410 their training kits. That deal was reportedly 00:22:31.410 --> 00:22:34.569 worth another £180 million. So they shifted their 00:22:34.569 --> 00:22:37.269 association from just the team to the idea of 00:22:37.269 --> 00:22:40.029 elite performance and training excellence. Exactly. 00:22:40.029 --> 00:22:42.589 It's a very strategic long -term commitment to 00:22:42.589 --> 00:22:45.009 brand association. From the profound tragedy 00:22:45.009 --> 00:22:48.069 of 9 -11 to the global visibility of a football 00:22:48.069 --> 00:22:50.589 sponsorship, you can see a company... that is 00:22:50.589 --> 00:22:52.710 very determined to control its own narrative. 00:22:52.910 --> 00:22:55.470 And that relentless strategic maneuvering, it 00:22:55.470 --> 00:22:57.690 continues right up to the present day, often 00:22:57.690 --> 00:23:00.029 with these huge, eye -watering sums of money 00:23:00.029 --> 00:23:03.430 involved. And the biggest recent story from 2021 00:23:03.430 --> 00:23:06.490 was actually the massive deal that didn't happen. 00:23:06.650 --> 00:23:09.150 The merger with their biggest rival, Willis Towers 00:23:09.150 --> 00:23:12.009 Watson. Right. This would have created an undisputed 00:23:12.009 --> 00:23:15.250 number one behemoth in the global brokerage space. 00:23:15.490 --> 00:23:17.349 It would have been game over for the competition. 00:23:17.690 --> 00:23:20.400 So what happened? They agreed to merge, but the 00:23:20.400 --> 00:23:23.339 deal was terminated. The reason was a straight 00:23:23.339 --> 00:23:26.579 up antitrust impasse. Regulators in the U .S. 00:23:26.579 --> 00:23:29.380 and Europe looked at the sheer market power this 00:23:29.380 --> 00:23:31.900 new combined company would have, and they basically 00:23:31.900 --> 00:23:35.279 blocked it. Wow. So Oleon has reached a scale 00:23:35.279 --> 00:23:38.240 where its own growth is now being checked by 00:23:38.240 --> 00:23:40.119 governments worried about a monopoly. That's 00:23:40.119 --> 00:23:42.789 right. But they didn't pause for long. They immediately 00:23:42.789 --> 00:23:45.490 went back to the M &A playbook, but they refocused 00:23:45.490 --> 00:23:47.990 their firepower on targets that would strengthen 00:23:47.990 --> 00:23:50.250 their core services without setting off all the 00:23:50.250 --> 00:23:52.569 antitrust alarm bells. Which brings us to the 00:23:52.569 --> 00:23:55.750 NFP deal. The prime example. In December 2023, 00:23:56.210 --> 00:23:58.869 they agreed to acquire NFP, which is a big provider 00:23:58.869 --> 00:24:01.430 of risk, benefits, and wealth advisory services. 00:24:01.690 --> 00:24:04.190 But they specifically target the middle market. 00:24:04.349 --> 00:24:06.630 And the price tag on that was $13 .4 billion. 00:24:07.420 --> 00:24:09.720 Massive. The fact that they executed one of their 00:24:09.720 --> 00:24:12.660 biggest acquisitions ever right after the failure 00:24:12.660 --> 00:24:16.539 of the biggest merger in history, it just signals 00:24:16.539 --> 00:24:19.220 their fierce determination to keep growing. They 00:24:19.220 --> 00:24:21.500 were telling the market, we're growing one way 00:24:21.500 --> 00:24:23.799 or another. And the middle market is a smart 00:24:23.799 --> 00:24:27.099 play. It's a stable, diverse client base that 00:24:27.099 --> 00:24:29.660 makes them less dependent on only serving those 00:24:29.660 --> 00:24:32.500 top tier global corporations. And beyond just 00:24:32.500 --> 00:24:34.359 buying market share, they're also buying technology. 00:24:34.599 --> 00:24:37.559 Oh, absolutely. In March 2024, they acquired 00:24:37.559 --> 00:24:39.700 the tech assets and the intellectual property 00:24:39.700 --> 00:24:43.299 of a company called Hum .ai. It's an AI powered 00:24:43.299 --> 00:24:45.660 platform. So this is about integrating artificial 00:24:45.660 --> 00:24:48.059 intelligence directly into their risk models. 00:24:48.279 --> 00:24:51.420 Exactly. Hum .ai is designed to enhance their 00:24:51.420 --> 00:24:54.240 commercial fleet services. So think about dynamic 00:24:54.240 --> 00:24:56.500 insurance pricing and real -time risk advice 00:24:56.500 --> 00:24:59.839 for huge trucking companies. It shows that Aon 00:24:59.839 --> 00:25:02.460 understands the future of risk advice is predictive, 00:25:02.619 --> 00:25:05.720 not just reactive. And this combination of aggressive 00:25:05.720 --> 00:25:08.339 M &A and tech investment is why they're constantly 00:25:08.339 --> 00:25:10.910 getting industry awards. For sure. If you look 00:25:10.910 --> 00:25:13.089 at a snapshot of their accolades, you can see 00:25:13.089 --> 00:25:15.750 where they are really valued. It's in the consulting 00:25:15.750 --> 00:25:19.109 and advisory roles. Like in 2014, the Financial 00:25:19.109 --> 00:25:21.829 Times named them Investment Consultancy of the 00:25:21.829 --> 00:25:24.569 Year. Right. And on the human capital side, in 00:25:24.569 --> 00:25:27.789 2013, they got a perfect score on the Human Rights 00:25:27.789 --> 00:25:30.130 Campaign's Corporate Equality Index, which is 00:25:30.130 --> 00:25:32.309 a big deal. And their specialized divisions, 00:25:32.490 --> 00:25:35.349 like the reinsurance arm, were constantly winning 00:25:35.349 --> 00:25:37.789 awards for their analytics. And that's the theme. 00:25:37.890 --> 00:25:40.130 Ahon is valued for its intellectual capital, 00:25:40.309 --> 00:25:42.690 its data analytics, its specialized expertise. 00:25:43.089 --> 00:25:45.549 It's the ultimate confirmation that their big 00:25:45.549 --> 00:25:48.089 strategic pivot away from underwriting was the 00:25:48.089 --> 00:25:50.930 right move. So if we tie all this together, their 00:25:50.930 --> 00:25:53.170 strategy today is fundamentally the same as it 00:25:53.170 --> 00:25:56.000 was when Patrick Ryan took over. It really is. 00:25:56.339 --> 00:25:59.519 Relentlessly use massive M &A to redefine their 00:25:59.519 --> 00:26:02.480 market position. Keep shedding the low margin, 00:26:02.640 --> 00:26:05.200 capital intensive stuff and pour that money into 00:26:05.200 --> 00:26:08.240 high margin advisory services. Now with a big 00:26:08.240 --> 00:26:10.980 focus on AI and new markets like the middle market 00:26:10.980 --> 00:26:13.500 with NFP. They're doing whatever it takes to 00:26:13.500 --> 00:26:15.900 remain that undisputed number two global broker 00:26:15.900 --> 00:26:17.940 while constantly pushing the boundaries of what's 00:26:17.940 --> 00:26:20.460 possible. That is just an immense story of corporate 00:26:20.460 --> 00:26:22.859 transformation. I mean, we've watched a tiny 00:26:22.859 --> 00:26:25.259 Chicago firm selling. cheap accident policies 00:26:25.259 --> 00:26:28.759 become this multi -billion dollar global colossus 00:26:28.759 --> 00:26:31.420 that manages the most complex risks imaginable 00:26:31.420 --> 00:26:34.250 for the biggest companies on earth. It's a powerhouse 00:26:34.250 --> 00:26:37.430 defined by relentless acquisition, by that profound 00:26:37.430 --> 00:26:39.829 and necessary shift away from underrating toward 00:26:39.829 --> 00:26:42.569 high margin consulting, and by a history marked 00:26:42.569 --> 00:26:44.930 by both these incredible strategic triumphs like 00:26:44.930 --> 00:26:47.430 the Hewitt acquisition and some very significant 00:26:47.430 --> 00:26:50.490 systemic regulatory fines. It really showcases 00:26:50.490 --> 00:26:53.069 the power of a strategic pivot in the face of 00:26:53.069 --> 00:26:55.549 both internal stagnation and a rapidly changing 00:26:55.549 --> 00:26:58.210 market. And that leads us to our final provocative 00:26:58.210 --> 00:27:01.539 thought for you, the learner. The company's name, 00:27:01.700 --> 00:27:05.079 Aeon, means one in Gaelic. It was the name Patrick 00:27:05.079 --> 00:27:07.519 Ryan chose to symbolize unity and integration. 00:27:07.799 --> 00:27:11.099 Yet its entire history is this constant collision 00:27:11.099 --> 00:27:14.299 of disparate parts. Dozens of acquired companies, 00:27:14.559 --> 00:27:16.920 millions in penalties for compliance failures 00:27:16.920 --> 00:27:19.539 in seven different countries, these massive, 00:27:19.599 --> 00:27:22.380 sometimes competing divisions like risk capital 00:27:22.380 --> 00:27:24.579 and human capital. So the question for you to 00:27:24.579 --> 00:27:27.119 consider is this. In the world of hyperscaled, 00:27:27.119 --> 00:27:29.240 acquisition -driven professional services, can 00:27:29.240 --> 00:27:32.099 a company ever truly be won or is it perpetually 00:27:32.099 --> 00:27:34.710 destined to remain a powerful yet fractured collection 00:27:34.710 --> 00:27:37.369 of highly specialized parts unified only by the 00:27:37.369 --> 00:27:38.369 brand name on the balance sheet.