WEBVTT

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Welcome back to the Deep Dive. Today we are focusing

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all our attention on April 26th, 1986. A date

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etched in history. Definitely. The location.

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The Chernobyl nuclear power plant, specifically

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Unit 4, right beside the planned city of Pripyat.

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And what happened there in the early hours was

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just... Seismic. Yeah. An explosion. So catastrophic,

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it remains one of only two incidents ever rated

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level seven. That's the absolute maximum severity

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on the international nuclear event scale. Right.

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And, you know, when you look at the sheer cost,

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Chernobyl is in a league of its own. You mean

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financially? Yeah, absolutely. Our sources confirm

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it's the single most expensive disaster in history.

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Yeah. Total estimated costs, containment, health

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fallout, economic impact. It's staggering. Over

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700 billion U .S. dollars. Wow. That number is

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hard to even grasp. It really challenged everything,

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didn't it? Political systems, science. Fundamentally,

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it forced a reckoning. So our mission today is

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to take this, well, this mountain of source material,

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the reports, the declassified files, scientific

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analyses, and try to piece together a clear narrative.

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It's complex. How did a safety test? A test designed

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specifically to improve safety. Exactly. How

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did that lead to the reactor's complete destruction?

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The core meltdown. And releasing, what was it,

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400 times more radioactive material than Hiroshima

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and Nagasaki combined. That's the estimate. It's

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almost unbelievable. It wasn't just one mistake,

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though. That's key. Right. It was systemic. Systemic

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flaws, yeah. Institutional denial is where engineering

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failure met, well, a kind of human arrogance,

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almost. So to understand the catastrophe, we

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have to start at the beginning. We have to. with

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the reactor itself, the RBMK design, and the

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dangers literally built into it. Okay, let's

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get into this. Nuclear reactors make heat through

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fission, obviously. But the critical thing, even

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after shutdown, you still need cooling. Absolutely

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critical. It's because of decay heat. Explain

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that a bit. Decay heat. So even when the main

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chain reaction stops, the leftover bits, the

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fission products, and the fuel, they're still

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radioactive. They keep decaying and releasing

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heat. And that's significant? Yeah, yeah. About

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6 % of the reactor's full thermal power. Now,

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6 % sounds small, maybe. But in a massive reactor

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like Chernobyl's Unit 4. Which was 3 ,200 megawatts

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thermal. Yeah. That 6 % is more than enough energy

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to cause a core meltdown if your coolant stops

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flowing. Catastrophic overheating. And the RBMK

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needed a lot of coolant flow. Just immense amounts.

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These RBMK -1000s were giants. They used ordinary

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water circulated by these huge electrically driven

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pumps. How much water are we talking? The documentation

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points to over 45 million liters per hour per

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reactor, just to keep things stable across all

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those individual fuel channels. It's a staggering

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volume, which demands constant, reliable electricity.

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Exactly. And that brings up the nightmare scenario.

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A station blackout. What happens if the grid

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goes down? How do you keep those vital pumps

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running? Okay, so that's the safety gap they

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were worried about. Precisely. In a total blackout,

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you've got backup diesel generators, but there's

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a lag. How long? Between 60 and 75 seconds for

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them to spool up to full power. And you needed

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that full power 5 .5 megawatt just for one main

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pump. A whole minute or more with potentially

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no cooling. That's the window of vulnerability,

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that minute where decay heat could just skyrocket

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temperatures. And bridging that specific 60 -second

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gap, that was the entire point of the test on

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April 26th. That was the goal. It was purely

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theoretical at that stage. Could the turbine

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itself help? The idea was harnessing the turbine's

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rotational momentum, its inertia. As it spins

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down after the steam is cut off, could it generate

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enough leftover electricity? Enough to power

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those main coolant pumps. For at least 45 seconds.

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That was the target. To cover most of that diesel

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startup time. Okay, makes sense in theory. But

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this wasn't the first time they'd tried this

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test. No, far from it. The sources highlight

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a really troubling history here. Attempts in

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82, 84, 85, they all failed. Failed how? Like

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explosions? No, not catastrophically back then.

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More technical glitches. Problems keeping the

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excitation voltage stable on the generator. Or

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sometimes the recording equipment just didn't

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work properly. But the fact that they kept trying.

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It suggests a strong push from somewhere. Maybe

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pressure to just pick the box, show full safety

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compliance, you know. What's really alarming,

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though, is the note that the people writing the

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test procedure, they didn't even know how the

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RBMK behaved under these specific low power conditions.

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That's more than just a glitch. That's a systemic

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failure. Yeah. A huge institutional blind spot,

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almost denial. And the whole environment. The

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sources mention a general... Lack of safety culture.

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Yeah. And we see chilling proof of that with

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the emergency core cooling system, the ECCS.

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The failsafe. What happened there? It's designed

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to flood the core with water if a major pipe

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breaks. Standard procedure. But they manually

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disabled it for the test preparations. But then

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the test got delayed. The key of grid controller

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asked them to wait. And that ECCS system, it

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was left disabled for 11 hours. 11 hours running

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without that ultimate safety net. Exactly. Yeah.

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Now, the ECCS being off didn't cause the explosion

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directly, but operating a reactor like that without

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its fundamental last line of defense for half

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a day, it's just blatant disregard for protocol.

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cutting the seatbelt before a risky maneuver.

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Which brings us to the reactor's core design

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flaw, the thing that made the RBMK so uniquely

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dangerous. The positive void coefficient, yeah.

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Let's break that down. Why was this feature so

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hazardous? Well, first, you need to understand

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why it was built that way. Unlike Western reactors

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using water for both cooling and moderating neutrons.

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Moderating means slowing neutrons down for fission,

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right? Correct. The RBMK was different. It was

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a dual -purpose design. Not just power, but historically

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it was good for making weapons -grade plutonium.

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Ah. So it used graphite blocks as the main moderator.

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Big stacks of it. Okay, graphite moderates. What

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about the water then? In this setup, the water

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flowing through the fuel channels was primarily

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the coolant. but it also absorbed a significant

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number of neutrons. So water took neutrons out

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of the reaction. Yes. And here's the deadly quirk.

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A positive void coefficient means that when that

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water coolant boils and turns into steam, steam

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bubbles or voids, that steam is much less effective

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at absorbing neutrons than the liquid water it

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replaced. Oh, I see. So less water or more steam

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means fewer neutrons get absorbed. Leaving more

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neutrons free to cause more fission. Which generates

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more heat. Which causes more boiling, more steam.

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Exactly. A positive feedback loop. More boiling,

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more steam voids, higher reactivity, more heat,

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even more voiling. A runaway train. In certain

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situations, especially at low power, yes, it

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could accelerate catastrophically. Most modern

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reactors have a negative void collector. Boiling

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slows things down. a natural brake. The RBMK,

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in certain modes, had a built -in accelerator

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pedal for when things started to go wrong. So

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you have the dangerous design, the disabled safety

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systems, and bad timing throws another wrench

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in the works. The human element. That delay from

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the Kiev grid controller pushed the test off

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the experienced day shift. And onto the night

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shift. Who had much less time to prepare for

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this really delicate, complex experiment. It

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was actually in the control room. Key players.

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Anatoly Dyatlov, the deputy chief engineer. He

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was supervising, reportedly putting immense pressure

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on the crew to get the test done. Then Alexander

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Akimov, the unit shift supervisor. responsible

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for the reactor itself, and crucially, Leonid

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Toptunov, the senior reactor control engineer.

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How experienced was he? Barely. He was only 25

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and had just three months of working independently

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on that console. Inexperience plus high pressure.

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The recipe for disaster. And the first problem

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they hit wasn't instability. It was the power

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dropping like a stone. Right. They were aiming

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for 700 to 1 ,000 megawatts thermal for the test.

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They got down to 720 milliW, which was fine.

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But then. It just plummeted. Yeah. Unexpectedly.

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Down to maybe 30 milliW thermal or even less.

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Practically shut down. Why? What caused that?

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Something called xenon poisoning. Xenon, like

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the gas? Yeah, xenon -135. It's a byproduct of

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fission, and it's really good at absorbing neutrons,

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kind of like control rods do. It poisons the

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reaction. Okay. Normally, at high power, the

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neutron flux is so intense, it burns off this

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xenon as fast as it's created from decaying iodine

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-135. But when they lowered the power... The

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neutron flux dropped too. Exactly. So the xenon

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wasn't being burned off quickly enough. It built

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up... rapidly choking the reactor, soaking up

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all the neutrons. So the reactor just died down.

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Pretty much. And this is where the really bad

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decision started. Under pressure to get the power

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back up for the test. Demense pressure from Dyatlov.

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They decided to basically brute force it. Override

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the xenon poisoning. By pulling out control rods,

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lots of them, manually removing them far beyond

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safe limits to flood the core with enough neutrons

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to overcome the xenon absorption and get the

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power level back up. That sounds incredibly risky.

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It was beyond risky. It was reckless. By 12 .39

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a .m., they managed to nurse the power back up

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to about 160 milliJoules. Still way below the

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700 milliW they needed for the test. Way below.

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But the cost was stability. To get even that

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160 millioad, they had pulled out almost every

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single control rod. Out of 211, maybe only six

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or eight effective rods were left in the core.

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Wow. Plus, to try and manage temperatures, they

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were running the main coolant pumps way too fast.

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Excessively high flow rate. What did that do?

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It meant the water entering the core was already

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very close to boiling point. So you had almost

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no control rods left. And the coolant was prying

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to turn into steam at the slightest provocation.

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The reactor was hypersensitive to that void effect.

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A ticking time bomb. And the worst part, they

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didn't even know how dangerous it was. That's

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the damning institutional failure. The RBMK design

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lacked a crucial safety feature, real -time monitoring

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of the operational reactivity margin, the ORM.

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The ORM. Basically, a measure of how many effective

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control rods are inserted and how quickly the

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reactor could be shut down if needed. It tells

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you your safety margins. And they didn't have

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that reading. No real -time calculation available

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to them. They had absolutely no idea their ORM

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had dropped way below the mandatory minimum,

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which was equivalent to having at least 15 rods

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fully inserted. Regulations required an immediate

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shutdown if the ORM fell that low. But they couldn't

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see it. They were flying blind. Totally blind.

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On the very edge of criticality without a functioning

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speedometer or safety gauge. And in that state,

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they started the test. At 1 .23 and 4 seconds

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AM, they shut off the steam supply to the turbine.

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It started to coast down, just like the test

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plan intended. But the power to the pumps? Immediately

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started dropping as the turbine slowed, which

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slowed the water flow through the core. Less

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water flow. More steam. Those voids started forming

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rapidly. And that positive void coefficient,

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which had been sort of held in check by the massive

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water flow. Now it took over. It started driving

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the reaction rate up. Yeah. Power began to climb.

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They must have seen it on the control panel.

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Oh, yes. They realized they were losing control.

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At 1 .23 and 40 seconds, Akimov slammed the AZ

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-5 button. The emergency shut down. Scram. The

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last resort. Witnesses said the control room

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was calm, though. Maybe they thought, OK, test

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failed, shut it down, believing the AZ -5 would

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work. But it didn't. It did the exact opposite.

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And this is where the design flaw becomes utterly

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lethal. Even if the reactor hadn't been unstable,

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the AZ -5 itself was fundamentally flawed. OK,

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this is the core of it, the control rods. Why

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did pushing the shutdown button trigger the explosion?

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It's one of the most horrifying design flaws

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imaginable. The RBMK control rods weren't solid

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boron carbide, the stuff that absorbs neutrons.

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No. What were they? They had tips, about 1 .3

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meters long, made of graphite, the same stuff

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used as the moderator. Graphite tips on the neutron

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-absorbing rods. Why? It was meant to enhance

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the neutron economy when the rods were fully

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withdrawn, pushing water out of the channel.

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But when the rods were almost fully out, like

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they were that night, the space below the absorber

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part of the rod and the lower part of the core

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was filled with a column of water. Water, remember,

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absorbs neutrons. Right. So when they hit AZ

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-5, the rods start moving down. The graphite

00:12:24.240 --> 00:12:27.539
tip goes in first. It displaces that column of

00:12:27.539 --> 00:12:29.840
neutron -absorbing water below it. And graphite

00:12:29.840 --> 00:12:32.320
moderates neutrons. It doesn't absorb them well.

00:12:32.539 --> 00:12:34.440
Exactly. So for those first critical seconds

00:12:34.440 --> 00:12:36.960
of insertion, the graphite moving into the bottom

00:12:36.960 --> 00:12:39.480
of the core actually increased the neutron population

00:12:39.480 --> 00:12:42.059
and the reaction rate locally. It momentarily

00:12:42.059 --> 00:12:44.509
boosted the power. Instead of shutting it down.

00:12:44.610 --> 00:12:47.929
Precisely. A massive localized power surge right

00:12:47.929 --> 00:12:50.129
at the bottom of the core. This was the positive

00:12:50.129 --> 00:12:52.570
scram effect. Had anyone ever realized this could

00:12:52.570 --> 00:12:55.350
happen? Tragically, yes. It had been observed

00:12:55.350 --> 00:12:58.269
and documented at another RBMK plant back in

00:12:58.269 --> 00:13:02.909
1983. But that information, classified, never

00:13:02.909 --> 00:13:05.309
put into the operating procedures. The operators

00:13:05.309 --> 00:13:07.669
had no warning. Unbelievable. So the power surge

00:13:07.669 --> 00:13:11.870
was... Immediate and huge. Instantaneous. Seconds

00:13:11.870 --> 00:13:14.190
after the button push, the output rocketed. Yeah.

00:13:14.250 --> 00:13:17.330
It went way past 530 millidobby levothermal almost

00:13:17.330 --> 00:13:20.190
instantly. Some models suggest it might have

00:13:20.190 --> 00:13:22.490
spiked to 10 times the reactor's normal operating

00:13:22.490 --> 00:13:25.090
power before things physically broke apart. What

00:13:25.090 --> 00:13:28.070
broke first? The fuel rods themselves fractured

00:13:28.070 --> 00:13:30.870
from the thermal shock. The fuel channels ruptured

00:13:30.870 --> 00:13:33.090
violently. Leading to the first explosion. A

00:13:33.090 --> 00:13:35.710
massive steam explosion. The coolant instantly

00:13:35.710 --> 00:13:38.190
flashed a high -pressure steam mixing with fragmented

00:13:38.190 --> 00:13:41.509
fuel. It blew the reactor vessel apart. And the

00:13:41.509 --> 00:13:44.909
lid? The 1 ,000 -ton upper biological shield,

00:13:45.009 --> 00:13:47.309
they called it Elena, was ripped off and blasted

00:13:47.309 --> 00:13:48.870
straight up through the roof of the reactor building.

00:13:49.409 --> 00:13:51.149
Gone. Shaking all the cooling pipes with it.

00:13:51.230 --> 00:13:53.610
Severing everything. Guaranteeing the core was

00:13:53.610 --> 00:13:56.129
now exposed, open to the air. And then the second

00:13:56.129 --> 00:13:58.230
explosion just seconds later. Yeah, two or three

00:13:58.230 --> 00:14:01.230
seconds later. Even bigger. More powerful. estimated

00:14:01.230 --> 00:14:04.850
maybe 225 tons of TNT equivalent. What caused

00:14:04.850 --> 00:14:07.610
that one? It's still steam. That's debated. The

00:14:07.610 --> 00:14:09.570
consensus is likely further steam explosions,

00:14:09.750 --> 00:14:12.409
maybe hydrogen combustion. But this second blast

00:14:12.409 --> 00:14:15.490
did the final damage. It completely pulverized

00:14:15.490 --> 00:14:18.149
the core, ejected burning graphite blocks and

00:14:18.149 --> 00:14:20.669
fuel chunks hundreds of meters away. Which ironically

00:14:20.669 --> 00:14:22.549
stopped the chain reaction. By dispersing the

00:14:22.549 --> 00:14:25.950
fuel, yes, the nuclear reaction stopped. But

00:14:25.950 --> 00:14:28.759
it started a massive graphite fire. Fueled by

00:14:28.759 --> 00:14:30.759
the superheated graphite hitting the oxygen in

00:14:30.759 --> 00:14:32.480
the air. There are these accounts for people

00:14:32.480 --> 00:14:36.600
outside seeing strange lights. Alexander Yurchenko's

00:14:36.600 --> 00:14:38.860
account is chilling. He was just outside Unit

00:14:38.860 --> 00:14:42.860
4, saw this very beautiful, intense, laser -like

00:14:42.860 --> 00:14:44.940
beam of blue light shooting upwards from the

00:14:44.940 --> 00:14:47.720
destroyed reactor hall, flooding up into infinity.

00:14:48.039 --> 00:14:51.110
What was that? Ionized air glow. just a raw visual

00:14:51.110 --> 00:14:53.549
manifestation of the immense radiation and energy

00:14:53.549 --> 00:14:56.029
release physics made visible and terrifying.

00:14:56.250 --> 00:14:58.149
You mentioned the cause of the second blast is

00:14:58.149 --> 00:15:00.990
debated. What's the alternative theory? The nuclear

00:15:00.990 --> 00:15:03.710
fizzle hypothesis. It suggests the second blast

00:15:03.710 --> 00:15:06.169
wasn't just steam or hydrogen, but involved a

00:15:06.169 --> 00:15:08.889
very brief, uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction,

00:15:09.070 --> 00:15:12.049
a prompt criticality in a small part of the dispersed

00:15:12.049 --> 00:15:14.950
fuel. Like a tiny nuclear bomb? A very small,

00:15:15.009 --> 00:15:18.740
inefficient one, yes. A fizzle. The evidence

00:15:18.740 --> 00:15:23.559
cited is weirdly high. Xenon -135 levels measured

00:15:23.559 --> 00:15:27.299
days later, hundreds of kilometers away in Sharapovets.

00:15:27.379 --> 00:15:30.460
Why is that significant? Xenon -135 decays really

00:15:30.460 --> 00:15:33.710
fast. Half -life is only about eight hours. To

00:15:33.710 --> 00:15:37.210
detect it so far away so soon, proponents argue

00:15:37.210 --> 00:15:39.409
it must have been blasted high into the atmosphere

00:15:39.409 --> 00:15:42.210
very quickly, like in a nuclear event, rather

00:15:42.210 --> 00:15:44.610
than just drifting slowly from the fire plume.

00:15:44.690 --> 00:15:46.570
It's not the mainstream view, but it's out there.

00:15:46.730 --> 00:15:48.750
Meanwhile, back at the plant, firefighters are

00:15:48.750 --> 00:15:51.450
rushing in. Absolute heroes, but completely unaware

00:15:51.450 --> 00:15:53.850
of what they were facing. The first unit, led

00:15:53.850 --> 00:15:56.610
by Lieutenant Voldemar Pravik, they just saw

00:15:56.610 --> 00:15:58.549
a fire at the power plant. Their job was to put

00:15:58.549 --> 00:16:00.789
out the fire. Exactly. Prevented spreading to

00:16:00.789 --> 00:16:02.629
the adjacent Unit 3, which was still operating.

00:16:02.929 --> 00:16:05.090
Yeah. The big danger was the roof it was covered

00:16:05.090 --> 00:16:07.590
in bitumen, which is basically asphalt. Highly

00:16:07.590 --> 00:16:09.389
flammable. So they went up onto the roof of the

00:16:09.389 --> 00:16:11.429
turbine hall. Straight into hell. They found

00:16:11.429 --> 00:16:13.889
chunks of graphite scattered everywhere, burning

00:16:13.889 --> 00:16:17.190
debris, intense heat. And the radiation. Unimaginable

00:16:17.190 --> 00:16:19.690
levels. They described feeling pins and needles

00:16:19.690 --> 00:16:22.009
on their skin, a metallic taste in their mouths.

00:16:22.629 --> 00:16:24.950
Classic signs of massive radiation exposure.

00:16:25.789 --> 00:16:28.800
They didn't know it was a reactor itself. One

00:16:28.800 --> 00:16:30.820
firefighter famously said, we didn't know it

00:16:30.820 --> 00:16:32.240
was the reactor. Is it the reactor or not the

00:16:32.240 --> 00:16:34.740
reactor? They were getting fatal doses in minutes.

00:16:35.019 --> 00:16:37.860
Compounding this tragedy was the failure to even

00:16:37.860 --> 00:16:40.799
measure the radiation accurately at first. Utter

00:16:40.799 --> 00:16:43.159
chaos and denial. The control room instruments

00:16:43.159 --> 00:16:46.340
were useless off the scale. Most portable decimeters

00:16:46.340 --> 00:16:49.299
they had were low range, only up to about 3 .6

00:16:49.299 --> 00:16:52.279
rungens per hour. They maxed out instantly. Were

00:16:52.279 --> 00:16:55.610
there any high range detectors? Yes. One capable

00:16:55.610 --> 00:16:58.049
of reading up to 1 ,000 R -second, a lethal dose,

00:16:58.190 --> 00:17:00.889
very quickly. But it was either locked away,

00:17:00.990 --> 00:17:02.669
couldn't be found, or was buried in the debris.

00:17:02.850 --> 00:17:04.430
They couldn't get an accurate reading. Which

00:17:04.430 --> 00:17:06.910
led Akimov, the shift supervisor... To refuse

00:17:06.910 --> 00:17:08.730
to believe the reactor core was actually destroyed.

00:17:08.809 --> 00:17:11.950
He saw the damage, the graphite, but the available

00:17:11.950 --> 00:17:14.750
low readings contradicted it. He clung to the

00:17:14.750 --> 00:17:16.829
idea the reactor vessel was intact. And sent

00:17:16.829 --> 00:17:19.849
his men. Sent his crew members totally unprotected

00:17:19.849 --> 00:17:22.789
into highly radioactive areas to manually open

00:17:22.789 --> 00:17:25.450
water valves, trying to pump cooling water into

00:17:25.450 --> 00:17:27.569
what he thought was a damaged but intact core.

00:17:27.769 --> 00:17:30.109
A fatal decision based on bad information. Bad

00:17:30.109 --> 00:17:32.809
astrophic. Those workers received lethal doses

00:17:32.809 --> 00:17:36.210
almost immediately. Akimov himself, Toptunov,

00:17:36.369 --> 00:17:38.430
many of the firefighters and plant workers who

00:17:38.430 --> 00:17:41.750
were there in those first hours. They died agonizing

00:17:41.750 --> 00:17:44.349
deaths from acute radiation syndrome, mostly

00:17:44.349 --> 00:17:47.329
within three weeks. So the immediate horror of

00:17:47.329 --> 00:17:50.549
the explosion gives way to denial, political

00:17:50.549 --> 00:17:53.329
denial from the Soviet Union. A culture of secrecy

00:17:53.329 --> 00:17:55.950
that cost precious time. The explosion was 1

00:17:55.950 --> 00:17:59.509
.23 a .m. Saturday. The world didn't know officially

00:17:59.509 --> 00:18:02.349
until Monday, April 28th. And it wasn't the Soviets

00:18:02.349 --> 00:18:05.190
who broke the news. No, it was Sweden. Workers

00:18:05.190 --> 00:18:07.329
at the Forsmark nuclear power plant over 1 ,000

00:18:07.329 --> 00:18:09.769
kilometers away set off radiation alarms just

00:18:09.769 --> 00:18:11.750
going into work. Their shoes were contaminated.

00:18:12.029 --> 00:18:14.609
Sweden demanded answers, and that forced Moscow's

00:18:14.609 --> 00:18:16.670
hand. And Pripyat, the city built for the plant

00:18:16.670 --> 00:18:19.210
workers, 50 ,000 people living right next door.

00:18:19.349 --> 00:18:22.470
They weren't evacuated for 36 hours. 36 agonizing

00:18:22.470 --> 00:18:25.269
hours breathing contaminated air. And when the

00:18:25.269 --> 00:18:27.230
evacuation finally happened... It was under false

00:18:27.230 --> 00:18:29.490
pretenses. Beased out, told it was temporary.

00:18:29.809 --> 00:18:32.369
Just for three days, they said. Pack only essentials.

00:18:32.730 --> 00:18:36.920
So people left. Everything. Pets, photos, documents.

00:18:37.279 --> 00:18:39.940
Everything. Believing they'd be right back. The

00:18:39.940 --> 00:18:42.680
initial 10 -kilometer evacuation zone quickly

00:18:42.680 --> 00:18:47.079
became 30 kilometers. Eventually, 135 ,000 people

00:18:47.079 --> 00:18:49.559
were permanently displaced. And Moscow insisted

00:18:49.559 --> 00:18:53.539
on the May Day parade. Incredible, isn't it?

00:18:53.539 --> 00:18:55.700
Issued a directive not to cancel the May Day

00:18:55.700 --> 00:18:58.960
celebrations in Kiev, just downwind. Keep up

00:18:58.960 --> 00:19:00.980
the appearance of normality even as invisible

00:19:00.980 --> 00:19:03.779
poison rained down. Peak Soviet denial. Once

00:19:03.779 --> 00:19:05.779
the scale sunk in, though, there was this immediate

00:19:05.779 --> 00:19:08.180
fear of something even worse. A secondary steam

00:19:08.180 --> 00:19:10.500
explosion, yeah. The nightmare scenario 2 .0.

00:19:10.559 --> 00:19:12.660
Explain that. They realized the reactor core

00:19:12.660 --> 00:19:15.519
debris had melted into this lava -like mass corium,

00:19:15.579 --> 00:19:18.299
they call it. A mix of fuel, concrete, sand,

00:19:18.480 --> 00:19:20.720
incredibly hot, maybe 1 ,200 degrees Celsius

00:19:20.720 --> 00:19:22.880
or more. And it was melting downwards. Melting

00:19:22.880 --> 00:19:25.359
through the concrete reactor floor. And directly

00:19:25.359 --> 00:19:27.460
below that floor were huge pools of water. The

00:19:27.460 --> 00:19:29.000
bubble pool is part of the pressure suppression

00:19:29.000 --> 00:19:32.460
system. Thousands of tons of water. If that molten

00:19:32.460 --> 00:19:35.279
corium hit the water. Bang. A massive thermal

00:19:35.279 --> 00:19:38.559
explosion. Like dropping molten metal into water,

00:19:38.700 --> 00:19:42.380
but on a radioactive, gigantic scale. It could

00:19:42.380 --> 00:19:44.319
have ejected vastly more radioactive material,

00:19:44.599 --> 00:19:47.220
potentially destroyed the other reactors. Just

00:19:47.220 --> 00:19:49.519
unthinkable. Which led to this incredibly dramatic,

00:19:49.680 --> 00:19:53.059
heroic moment. The Chernobyl divers. Three engineers.

00:19:53.480 --> 00:19:56.619
Alexey Naninenko, Valery Bezpilov, and Boris

00:19:56.619 --> 00:19:59.400
Barinov. They volunteered. Volunteer for what?

00:19:59.579 --> 00:20:02.259
To go down into the flooded, pitch black basement

00:20:02.259 --> 00:20:05.259
corridors beneath the reactor, wade through highly

00:20:05.259 --> 00:20:07.900
radioactive water, find the valves for the sluice

00:20:07.900 --> 00:20:10.440
gates, and open them to drain those bubbler pools.

00:20:10.759 --> 00:20:12.660
Knowing the risk. They were told it was certainly

00:20:12.660 --> 00:20:15.220
a suicide mission. The radiation levels were

00:20:15.220 --> 00:20:17.319
astronomical. They went anyway, found the valves

00:20:17.319 --> 00:20:20.019
in the dark by feel, opened them, the pools drained.

00:20:20.299 --> 00:20:22.279
Did they survive? Early reports said they died

00:20:22.279 --> 00:20:24.299
quickly. That was misinformation, part of the

00:20:24.299 --> 00:20:27.140
mythology. Amazingly, they all survived. They

00:20:27.140 --> 00:20:29.619
received high doses, yes, suffered health problems

00:20:29.619 --> 00:20:32.980
later, but they lived for many years. Annanenko

00:20:32.980 --> 00:20:35.720
is reportedly still alive today. They were decorated

00:20:35.720 --> 00:20:38.799
as heroes decades later. But was their sacrifice

00:20:38.799 --> 00:20:41.480
actually needed? I read later analysis suggested.

00:20:41.940 --> 00:20:45.240
That's the tragic irony, potentially. Later probes

00:20:45.240 --> 00:20:46.859
found the corium had actually started dripping

00:20:46.859 --> 00:20:49.480
into the water before they drained it. But instead

00:20:49.480 --> 00:20:51.890
of a massive explosion? What happened? When the

00:20:51.890 --> 00:20:54.190
molten corium hit the water, it cooled rapidly,

00:20:54.430 --> 00:20:57.690
fragmenting into this porous, pumice -like ceramic

00:20:57.690 --> 00:21:00.470
material. Relatively stable. Some of it even

00:21:00.470 --> 00:21:03.410
floated. So the giant steam explosion might not

00:21:03.410 --> 00:21:05.549
have happened anyway. But they didn't know that.

00:21:05.670 --> 00:21:08.150
They acted based on the terrifying possibility.

00:21:08.470 --> 00:21:11.130
Absolutely. Heroism based on the best, worst

00:21:11.130 --> 00:21:13.690
-case knowledge they had. At the same time, they

00:21:13.690 --> 00:21:15.470
were worried about the ground under the reactor.

00:21:16.009 --> 00:21:18.029
Yeah, contaminating the groundwater was a huge

00:21:18.029 --> 00:21:20.650
concern, that corium mass sinking deep into the

00:21:20.650 --> 00:21:22.750
earth. What was the plan there? Freezing the

00:21:22.750 --> 00:21:25.029
ground? That was the ineffable wild idea. Use

00:21:25.029 --> 00:21:27.769
oil drilling tech to inject liquid nitrogen,

00:21:28.029 --> 00:21:30.849
create a frozen barrier underneath. Quickly realized

00:21:30.849 --> 00:21:32.829
it was impractical. That's dead. They brought

00:21:32.829 --> 00:21:35.789
in miners, coal miners, subway builders from

00:21:35.789 --> 00:21:39.849
Moscow and Kiev. Their task, dig a tunnel 150

00:21:39.849 --> 00:21:42.750
meters long directly underneath the reactor foundation.

00:21:43.349 --> 00:21:45.930
Why the tunnel? The original plan was to install

00:21:45.930 --> 00:21:49.109
a massive heat exchanger in it, a concrete pad

00:21:49.109 --> 00:21:52.470
cooled by pipes to solidify the ground and draw

00:21:52.470 --> 00:21:54.849
heat away if the corium kept melting down. Did

00:21:54.849 --> 00:21:57.410
they build it? They dug the tunnel, working in

00:21:57.410 --> 00:22:00.309
brutal heat and high radiation. But by the time

00:22:00.309 --> 00:22:02.609
it was ready, they realized the corium had curved

00:22:02.609 --> 00:22:05.410
and stabilized enough on its own. The active

00:22:05.410 --> 00:22:07.450
cooling system wasn't needed. So the tunnel?

00:22:07.630 --> 00:22:09.950
They filled it with thousands of tons of concrete.

00:22:10.799 --> 00:22:12.940
Not for cooling, but for structural support.

00:22:13.660 --> 00:22:15.980
To shore up the foundation of the damaged reactor

00:22:15.980 --> 00:22:18.240
building, prevent it collapsing further. Now

00:22:18.240 --> 00:22:20.440
the cleanup on top. Getting rid of the debris,

00:22:20.579 --> 00:22:22.519
especially on the roofs, that's where the robots

00:22:22.519 --> 00:22:25.980
came in. Or rather, where they failed. They needed

00:22:25.980 --> 00:22:28.599
to clear about 100 tons of intensely radioactive

00:22:28.599 --> 00:22:31.940
debris fuel fragments, graphite chunks off the

00:22:31.940 --> 00:22:33.980
roof surround the reactor, particularly Unit

00:22:33.980 --> 00:22:36.619
3's roof, to prepare for building the first shelter.

00:22:36.819 --> 00:22:39.380
High -tech solution, right. Remote control robots.

00:22:39.700 --> 00:22:42.049
They tried everything. Soviet moon rover chassis,

00:22:42.390 --> 00:22:46.269
German police robots, Japanese models, about

00:22:46.269 --> 00:22:48.549
60 different machines. Sent them up, pushed the

00:22:48.549 --> 00:22:50.809
debris off. How did that work out? Terribly.

00:22:51.109 --> 00:22:53.730
The gamma radiation fields were just too intense,

00:22:53.950 --> 00:22:55.609
fried the electronics, cooked the batteries.

00:22:55.910 --> 00:22:58.950
Most of the robots failed very quickly. Even

00:22:58.950 --> 00:23:00.789
the heavily shielded ones. Oh, so technology

00:23:00.789 --> 00:23:04.470
wasn't the answer there. Not at all. Valery Legasov,

00:23:04.670 --> 00:23:07.170
a key scientist in the response, famously said,

00:23:07.839 --> 00:23:09.740
We learned that robots are not the great remedy

00:23:09.740 --> 00:23:12.119
for everything. The machines couldn't handle

00:23:12.119 --> 00:23:15.599
it. Which left? People? The biorobots. Human

00:23:15.599 --> 00:23:18.680
liquidators. Mostly young military conscripts.

00:23:18.680 --> 00:23:20.920
Doing the roof cleanup manually. 90 % of it,

00:23:20.960 --> 00:23:23.839
yes. Shoveling highly radioactive graphite off

00:23:23.839 --> 00:23:28.000
the roof. 3 ,828 men did that specific job. How

00:23:28.000 --> 00:23:30.220
could they possibly survive that? Extremely short

00:23:30.220 --> 00:23:32.839
shifts. They'd run out, shovel maybe one or two

00:23:32.839 --> 00:23:35.799
loads, and run back. Maximum exposure time was

00:23:35.799 --> 00:23:38.779
40 to 90 seconds. Even then, they absorbed huge

00:23:38.779 --> 00:23:41.619
doses, an average of 25 rem each, for that roof

00:23:41.619 --> 00:23:44.240
work alone. Just incredible bravery or perhaps

00:23:44.240 --> 00:23:46.700
ignorance of the true long -term risk. A mix

00:23:46.700 --> 00:23:49.259
of both, probably. Duty, orders, maybe not fully

00:23:49.259 --> 00:23:51.460
grasping the invisible danger. But it got the

00:23:51.460 --> 00:23:54.539
job done at immense human cost. And all this

00:23:54.539 --> 00:23:56.960
was to prepare for the sarcophagus. The first

00:23:56.960 --> 00:23:59.519
containment structure, built incredibly fast,

00:23:59.619 --> 00:24:03.000
between June and November 1986, a monumental

00:24:03.000 --> 00:24:05.059
feat of engineering under impossible conditions.

00:24:05.319 --> 00:24:08.029
What was its main purpose? Stop the ongoing release

00:24:08.029 --> 00:24:10.789
of radioactive dust, shield the environment from

00:24:10.789 --> 00:24:13.390
the exposed core, and crucially, protect the

00:24:13.390 --> 00:24:15.589
thousands of workers still operating the other

00:24:15.589 --> 00:24:18.410
Chernobyl reactors, especially Unit 3 next door.

00:24:18.650 --> 00:24:21.450
They work in crane cabins heavily shielded with

00:24:21.450 --> 00:24:23.869
lead. But it was never meant to be permanent.

00:24:24.049 --> 00:24:26.609
No, it was a temporary fix designed for maybe

00:24:26.609 --> 00:24:29.410
30 years max. It was rushed, built remotely,

00:24:29.609 --> 00:24:32.390
full of gaps, structurally unsound in the long

00:24:32.390 --> 00:24:35.150
run. Which led to the massive structure we see

00:24:35.150 --> 00:24:37.390
there today. The new safe confinement, the NSC.

00:24:37.839 --> 00:24:42.099
That gigantic arch, 105 meters high, 256 meters

00:24:42.099 --> 00:24:44.640
long, the largest movable land structure ever

00:24:44.640 --> 00:24:46.519
built. When was that put in place? Construction

00:24:46.519 --> 00:24:49.319
started around 2010, finished nearby, and then

00:24:49.319 --> 00:24:51.140
it was slid over the top of the old sarcophagus

00:24:51.140 --> 00:24:54.400
in Unit 4 between 2016 and 2018. An incredible

00:24:54.400 --> 00:24:56.680
project. And its purpose? Designed to last 100

00:24:56.680 --> 00:24:59.960
years. It seals off the site, contains the remaining

00:24:59.960 --> 00:25:03.119
radioactivity, and crucially, houses the remote

00:25:03.119 --> 00:25:05.039
-controlled cranes and equipment needed for the

00:25:05.039 --> 00:25:09.099
next phase. Slowly. carefully dismantling the

00:25:09.099 --> 00:25:11.839
original sarcophagus and the reactor debris underneath.

00:25:12.059 --> 00:25:14.000
When is that cleanup supposed to finish? The

00:25:14.000 --> 00:25:16.680
current schedule aims for completion around 2065.

00:25:17.369 --> 00:25:19.569
A century after the accident. Let's talk about

00:25:19.569 --> 00:25:22.210
that long legacy. 400 times Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

00:25:22.269 --> 00:25:25.150
It's not just the amount, but the type of radioactive

00:25:25.150 --> 00:25:27.869
stuff released. Right. Different isotopes behave

00:25:27.869 --> 00:25:30.329
differently. Their danger depends on volatility,

00:25:30.569 --> 00:25:32.829
how easily they spread, and their half -life,

00:25:32.910 --> 00:25:35.089
how long they stay radioactive. What were the

00:25:35.089 --> 00:25:37.390
main culprits from Chernobyl? Three big ones

00:25:37.390 --> 00:25:40.640
stand out. First, iodine -131. Very volatile,

00:25:40.759 --> 00:25:43.400
spread easily. Short half -life, only eight days.

00:25:43.579 --> 00:25:46.900
So the danger was intense, but brief. Intense

00:25:46.900 --> 00:25:49.700
initial danger, yes. Got into the air, onto grass,

00:25:49.900 --> 00:25:52.519
cows ate the grass, people drank the milk. It

00:25:52.519 --> 00:25:54.960
concentrates in the thyroid gland. Responsible

00:25:54.960 --> 00:25:57.319
for a lot of the initial radiation dose, and

00:25:57.319 --> 00:25:59.799
crucially, the later thyroid cancers. Okay, what

00:25:59.799 --> 00:26:02.079
else? After the iodine decayed... Then you worry

00:26:02.079 --> 00:26:05.420
about the long -haul isotopes. Cesium -137 is

00:26:05.420 --> 00:26:09.160
key. Half -life of 30 years. Released as an aerosol,

00:26:09.319 --> 00:26:11.900
fine particles that drifted far and wide settled

00:26:11.900 --> 00:26:14.059
into the soil. And it stays dangerous for decades.

00:26:14.559 --> 00:26:17.059
Yeah. It gets into the food chain, mimics potassium

00:26:17.059 --> 00:26:19.180
in the body, can accumulate in muscles, including

00:26:19.180 --> 00:26:21.819
the heart. It's a major reason large areas are

00:26:21.819 --> 00:26:24.420
still uninhabitable. And the third one? Strontium

00:26:24.420 --> 00:26:27.759
-90. Half -life of about 29 years. Chemically,

00:26:27.859 --> 00:26:31.180
it behaves like calcium. So it goes to... Bones.

00:26:31.180 --> 00:26:33.440
Exactly. Accumulates in bones, irradiates the

00:26:33.440 --> 00:26:35.460
bone marrow, another long -term hazard. And the

00:26:35.460 --> 00:26:37.700
spread wasn't uniform, was it? It depended heavily

00:26:37.700 --> 00:26:42.400
on weather. Totally. Wind patterns, rain. That

00:26:42.400 --> 00:26:45.259
determined where the worst fallout landed. About

00:26:45.259 --> 00:26:47.420
100 ,000 square kilometers were significantly

00:26:47.420 --> 00:26:49.940
contaminated across Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia.

00:26:50.380 --> 00:26:52.500
But it went much further. Oh, yes. Irregular

00:26:52.500 --> 00:26:54.559
patches, hot spots appeared all over Europe.

00:26:54.740 --> 00:26:57.000
Heavy rain washed contaminants out of the clouds,

00:26:57.099 --> 00:27:00.079
especially over mountains. The Alps, Welsh mountains,

00:27:00.319 --> 00:27:02.799
Scottish Highlands, Norway. Some sheep farming

00:27:02.799 --> 00:27:05.319
restrictions still exist today because of Chernobyl

00:27:05.319 --> 00:27:07.880
cesium in the soil. And the Soviets even tried

00:27:07.880 --> 00:27:10.720
to control the weather. There's documented evidence

00:27:10.720 --> 00:27:14.440
of the Soviet Air Force seeding clouds, deliberately

00:27:14.440 --> 00:27:17.960
causing rain over parts of Belarus. Why? To try

00:27:17.960 --> 00:27:19.759
and wash the radioactive particles out of the

00:27:19.759 --> 00:27:22.220
air before the clouds reach major cities like

00:27:22.220 --> 00:27:26.380
Moscow. It worked in a way, but it meant incredibly

00:27:26.380 --> 00:27:29.160
contaminated, heavy black rain fell on towns

00:27:29.160 --> 00:27:31.920
like Gomel in Belarus instead, just shifting

00:27:31.920 --> 00:27:34.119
the disaster. Let's turn to the human health

00:27:34.119 --> 00:27:37.390
impact. We know about the immediate deaths. 30

00:27:37.390 --> 00:27:39.309
confirmed direct deaths within the first few

00:27:39.309 --> 00:27:42.569
months. Two from the explosions, 28 from acute

00:27:42.569 --> 00:27:45.430
radiation syndrome, ARS, among the first responders

00:27:45.430 --> 00:27:48.190
and plant staff. A handful more ARS -related

00:27:48.190 --> 00:27:50.230
deaths occurred over the next year or so. But

00:27:50.230 --> 00:27:52.680
the long -term effects, especially cancer. That's

00:27:52.680 --> 00:27:54.599
always been controversial. Highly controversial

00:27:54.599 --> 00:27:57.019
and hard to pin down definitively outside of

00:27:57.019 --> 00:27:59.920
one clear link. Which is? Thyroid cancer, especially

00:27:59.920 --> 00:28:01.539
in those who were children or adolescents in

00:28:01.539 --> 00:28:03.980
1986, living in the most contaminated areas.

00:28:04.160 --> 00:28:06.859
That iodine -131 exposure. How many cases? By

00:28:06.859 --> 00:28:09.480
2005, international studies confirmed over 6

00:28:09.480 --> 00:28:13.059
,000 cases in Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia that

00:28:13.059 --> 00:28:15.880
were attributable to chiroble radiation. Fortunately,

00:28:16.160 --> 00:28:18.619
thyroid cancer is usually very treatable if caught

00:28:18.619 --> 00:28:21.920
early. How many died from it? Sadly, about 15

00:28:21.920 --> 00:28:23.900
deaths were recorded from those thousands of

00:28:23.900 --> 00:28:26.960
cases by the mid -2000s. A tragedy, but the overall

00:28:26.960 --> 00:28:29.660
mortality rate was low thanks to treatment. What

00:28:29.660 --> 00:28:32.819
about other cancers? Leukemia? Solid tumors?

00:28:33.059 --> 00:28:35.160
That's where it gets much murkier. Studies have

00:28:35.160 --> 00:28:37.299
generally not found statistically significant

00:28:37.299 --> 00:28:40.039
increases in leukemia or other cancers in the

00:28:40.039 --> 00:28:42.700
wider population that can be definitively linked

00:28:42.700 --> 00:28:45.539
only to Chernobyl radiation, outside of potentially

00:28:45.539 --> 00:28:47.599
higher risks among the liquidators who receive

00:28:47.599 --> 00:28:50.549
the largest doses. But it's complex, hard to

00:28:50.549 --> 00:28:52.630
separate from other factors. But the health impact

00:28:52.630 --> 00:28:54.609
wasn't just physical radiation effects. There

00:28:54.609 --> 00:28:58.019
was immense psychological damage. Massive. The

00:28:58.019 --> 00:29:00.759
fear of radiation itself caused widespread anxiety,

00:29:01.160 --> 00:29:03.960
stress, psychosomatic illnesses. People were

00:29:03.960 --> 00:29:06.500
terrified, often fueled by sensational media

00:29:06.500 --> 00:29:08.960
or lack of clear information. And this fear had

00:29:08.960 --> 00:29:12.119
real consequences. Devastating ones. Studies

00:29:12.119 --> 00:29:15.339
estimate that perhaps 100 ,000 to 200 ,000 elective

00:29:15.339 --> 00:29:17.539
abortions occurred across Europe in the months

00:29:17.539 --> 00:29:19.579
after Chernobyl. Abortions performed because

00:29:19.579 --> 00:29:22.160
of fear of radiation damage to the fetus. Exactly.

00:29:22.619 --> 00:29:25.180
even in places where the actual radiation dose

00:29:25.180 --> 00:29:28.019
received was negligible from a medical standpoint.

00:29:28.319 --> 00:29:32.339
In Greece alone, an estimated 2 ,500 excess abortions

00:29:32.339 --> 00:29:35.640
were attributed solely to Chernobyl fears. Researchers

00:29:35.640 --> 00:29:38.480
concluded this was a tragic, unjustified consequence

00:29:38.480 --> 00:29:42.000
driven by panic, not medical necessity. Let's

00:29:42.000 --> 00:29:43.839
look at the environment, the exclusion zone.

00:29:44.140 --> 00:29:46.720
2 ,600 square kilometers, what happened there?

00:29:46.920 --> 00:29:49.980
Immediately downwind, disaster. About four square

00:29:49.980 --> 00:29:52.579
kilometers of pine forest died quickly. The needles

00:29:52.579 --> 00:29:55.000
turned reddish -brown, became known as the Red

00:29:55.000 --> 00:29:56.859
Forest. It was eventually bulldozed and buried.

00:29:57.000 --> 00:29:59.559
Water contamination, too. A major worry, especially

00:29:59.559 --> 00:30:02.000
the Pripyat River feeding into the Dunipa Reservoir

00:30:02.000 --> 00:30:04.799
system, which supplies water to Kiev. They built

00:30:04.799 --> 00:30:08.220
huge underwater dikes, silt traps, even a massive

00:30:08.220 --> 00:30:10.980
underground clay wall 30 meters deep to try and

00:30:10.980 --> 00:30:12.519
stop contaminants leaching into the groundwater.

00:30:12.839 --> 00:30:15.019
But paradoxically, the zone today is thriving.

00:30:15.180 --> 00:30:18.339
In terms of wildlife, yes. It's the ultimate

00:30:18.339 --> 00:30:21.779
irony. With humans gone... The lack of competition

00:30:21.779 --> 00:30:24.319
has turned the exclusion zone into a massive

00:30:24.319 --> 00:30:28.640
accidental nature reserve. Wolves, wild boar,

00:30:28.819 --> 00:30:33.759
elk, lynx, Przelski's horses reintroduced. Populations

00:30:33.759 --> 00:30:36.180
are booming. Nature is resilient when people

00:30:36.180 --> 00:30:37.980
leave. But the contamination is still there.

00:30:38.039 --> 00:30:40.450
You mentioned wild boar in Germany. Yeah, it's

00:30:40.450 --> 00:30:43.029
a weird anomaly. Wild boar in some parts of Germany

00:30:43.029 --> 00:30:45.690
still test above the legal limit for cesium -137

00:30:45.690 --> 00:30:48.410
consumption. For decades, everyone assumed it

00:30:48.410 --> 00:30:50.990
was all Chernobyl fallout. That's not. Recent

00:30:50.990 --> 00:30:53.230
studies analyzing isocope ratios, specifically

00:30:53.230 --> 00:30:56.769
cesium -135 versus cesium -137, found that in

00:30:56.769 --> 00:30:58.970
many German boars, a significant chunk of the

00:30:58.970 --> 00:31:00.950
contamination actually matches the signature

00:31:00.950 --> 00:31:03.269
of atmospheric nuclear weapons testing from the

00:31:03.269 --> 00:31:06.089
1950s and 60s. Wow, so Cold War testing fallout

00:31:06.089 --> 00:31:08.130
is still cycling through the ecosystem. Seems

00:31:08.130 --> 00:31:09.960
so. It gets locked in the soil. oil taken up

00:31:09.960 --> 00:31:12.140
by fungi like truffles which boar love to eat.

00:31:12.440 --> 00:31:14.900
It shows just how incredibly persistent this

00:31:14.900 --> 00:31:17.160
stuff is in the environment. A nuclear legacy

00:31:17.160 --> 00:31:19.259
lasting generations. And we can't forget the

00:31:19.259 --> 00:31:22.339
people who went back. The Samosli. The self -settlers.

00:31:22.480 --> 00:31:25.480
Mostly elderly people, maybe around 180 or so

00:31:25.480 --> 00:31:27.920
today, who illegally returned to their ancestral

00:31:27.920 --> 00:31:30.759
homes inside the zone. They refused to leave

00:31:30.759 --> 00:31:33.839
or came back despite the risks. How do they survive?

00:31:34.200 --> 00:31:36.559
Assistance farming, basically. Living off the

00:31:36.559 --> 00:31:39.799
land they know. It's a complex human story, defiance,

00:31:39.880 --> 00:31:42.440
attachment to home, maybe a different perception

00:31:42.440 --> 00:31:45.140
of risk, a testament to resilience of a sort.

00:31:45.279 --> 00:31:47.940
Okay, back to the reactor site itself. Inside

00:31:47.940 --> 00:31:51.500
that huge new safe confinement arch, the danger

00:31:51.500 --> 00:31:54.299
isn't over, is it? No, there's an ongoing scientific

00:31:54.299 --> 00:31:57.410
concern. Deep within the ruins, you still have

00:31:57.410 --> 00:32:00.269
tons of that corium fuel mass mixed with debris

00:32:00.269 --> 00:32:03.269
covered in radioactive dust. And it's still potentially

00:32:03.269 --> 00:32:05.890
reactive. Potentially. Remember, water slows

00:32:05.890 --> 00:32:08.569
neutrons down, making fission more likely. Well,

00:32:08.690 --> 00:32:11.089
rainwater still seeps into the structure as that

00:32:11.089 --> 00:32:13.190
water evaporates or levels change. It changes

00:32:13.190 --> 00:32:15.670
the neutron environment. Exactly. If water levels

00:32:15.670 --> 00:32:18.049
drop in certain areas where fuel debris is concentrated,

00:32:18.390 --> 00:32:20.509
it could theoretically allow neutron activity

00:32:20.509 --> 00:32:23.109
to increase, maybe even leading to self -sustaining

00:32:23.109 --> 00:32:25.549
fission reactions again, not an explosion. but

00:32:25.549 --> 00:32:28.170
the smoldering nuclear reactions. Has this been

00:32:28.170 --> 00:32:31.369
detected? There were worrying signs. Between

00:32:31.369 --> 00:32:34.630
2017 and 2020, instruments detected neutron density

00:32:34.630 --> 00:32:37.470
doubling in one inaccessible subreactor room.

00:32:37.710 --> 00:32:40.539
It seemed to stabilize in 2021. but it's being

00:32:40.539 --> 00:32:43.299
watched very closely. What's the risk if it starts

00:32:43.299 --> 00:32:46.200
up again? The main fear is not a big power surge,

00:32:46.339 --> 00:32:48.460
but that sustained fission would generate heat,

00:32:48.599 --> 00:32:51.420
dry out the remaining material further, and potentially

00:32:51.420 --> 00:32:54.299
release more radioactive dust and aerosols inside

00:32:54.299 --> 00:32:57.460
the NSC, making the plan dismantling incredibly

00:32:57.460 --> 00:33:00.339
difficult and hazardous. It's a simmering threat.

00:33:00.559 --> 00:33:03.059
Finally, the political impact. Chernobyl wasn't

00:33:03.059 --> 00:33:05.720
just a technical disaster. It was a system -shattering

00:33:05.720 --> 00:33:08.849
event. Mikhail Gorbachev himself later said Chernobyl

00:33:08.849 --> 00:33:11.250
might have been the real cause of the collapse

00:33:11.250 --> 00:33:13.730
of the Soviet Union. How so? The sheer scale

00:33:13.730 --> 00:33:15.730
of the disaster, combined with the attempted

00:33:15.730 --> 00:33:18.769
cover -up and the obvious incompetence in managing

00:33:18.769 --> 00:33:21.490
it, completely eroded public trust in the government

00:33:21.490 --> 00:33:24.769
and the entire Soviet system. It forced Gorbachev's

00:33:24.769 --> 00:33:27.450
hand on his policy of glasnost openness. Because

00:33:27.450 --> 00:33:29.569
they couldn't hide this. They couldn't hide something

00:33:29.569 --> 00:33:32.670
impacting half of Europe. Glasnost, intended

00:33:32.670 --> 00:33:34.730
to strengthen the system through transparency,

00:33:35.089 --> 00:33:38.029
ended up exposing all its flaws and contradictions,

00:33:38.130 --> 00:33:40.950
accelerating its demise. And declassified files

00:33:40.950 --> 00:33:43.390
later showed the flaws were known much earlier.

00:33:43.650 --> 00:33:46.880
That was the ultimate indictment. KGB files released

00:33:46.880 --> 00:33:49.019
years later confirmed that scientists knew about

00:33:49.019 --> 00:33:52.240
the RBMK's key design flaws, the positive void

00:33:52.240 --> 00:33:55.400
coefficient, the graphite tips problem, as early

00:33:55.400 --> 00:33:59.019
as 1973. 13 years before the accident. 13 years.

00:33:59.220 --> 00:34:01.099
Reports went up the chain to the Central Committee.

00:34:02.319 --> 00:34:04.319
And they were essentially buried, classified,

00:34:04.680 --> 00:34:07.180
ignored in favor of meeting energy targets and

00:34:07.180 --> 00:34:09.659
maintaining political face. It was a systemic,

00:34:09.820 --> 00:34:13.159
top -down failure long before Dyatlov, Akimov,

00:34:13.159 --> 00:34:15.739
and Topchunov were in that control room. Catastrophe

00:34:15.739 --> 00:34:17.880
wasn't just possible. It was practically baked

00:34:17.880 --> 00:34:20.900
in. And the economic cost still being felt today.

00:34:21.099 --> 00:34:23.980
Hugely. Sources indicate Chernobyl still eats

00:34:23.980 --> 00:34:26.619
up something like 5 -7 % of Ukraine's entire

00:34:26.619 --> 00:34:29.300
national budget every single year. Belarus is

00:34:29.300 --> 00:34:31.659
heavily impacted too. The cleanup, healthcare,

00:34:31.780 --> 00:34:34.059
social support, it's a multi -generational burden.

00:34:34.260 --> 00:34:35.900
It changed the world's view on nuclear power

00:34:35.900 --> 00:34:39.800
too. Absolutely. Triggered a massive global downturn

00:34:39.800 --> 00:34:42.920
in new reactor construction. Fueled anti -nuclear

00:34:42.920 --> 00:34:45.980
movements, especially in Europe. Germany's decision

00:34:45.980 --> 00:34:48.820
to phase out nuclear power has roots in Chernobyl.

00:34:49.230 --> 00:34:51.650
It starkly demonstrated the potential consequences

00:34:51.650 --> 00:34:54.530
when complex technology meets human fallibility

00:34:54.530 --> 00:34:58.510
and institutional secrecy. The cost of that secrecy

00:34:58.510 --> 00:35:00.690
was infinitely higher than the cost of openness

00:35:00.690 --> 00:35:02.590
would have been. It really underscores the terrifying

00:35:02.590 --> 00:35:05.050
intersection of technology, human factors, and

00:35:05.050 --> 00:35:07.289
political systems. You had the human errors pulling

00:35:07.289 --> 00:35:09.889
rods, disabling safety systems. You had the catastrophic

00:35:09.889 --> 00:35:12.829
technical flaws, the void coefficient, the graphite

00:35:12.829 --> 00:35:15.389
tips. And amplifying it all was the political

00:35:15.389 --> 00:35:18.050
failure, the culture of secrecy, the denial.

00:35:18.730 --> 00:35:21.050
A perfect storm on every level. So the cleanup

00:35:21.050 --> 00:35:24.210
continues until 2065, potentially. The environmental

00:35:24.210 --> 00:35:26.289
impacts, like on Norwegian sheep farming, could

00:35:26.289 --> 00:35:28.769
last a century. And yet, there's still a chance

00:35:28.769 --> 00:35:30.710
of fission starting up again inside the containment.

00:35:30.989 --> 00:35:32.610
It leaves you with a really profound question,

00:35:32.789 --> 00:35:35.789
doesn't it? In our increasingly complex, interconnected

00:35:35.789 --> 00:35:38.630
world, how do we make sure these hidden institutional

00:35:38.630 --> 00:35:41.409
flaws, these buried warnings, don't turn seemingly

00:35:41.409 --> 00:35:44.369
small errors into global crises that span generations?

00:35:45.599 --> 00:35:47.659
Chernobyl proved the biggest danger wasn't just

00:35:47.659 --> 00:35:50.239
the atom, it was the arrogance and secrecy surrounding

00:35:50.239 --> 00:35:52.980
it. What lesson from all this resonates most

00:35:52.980 --> 00:35:54.780
strongly with you? What's the enduring takeaway?
