Welcome back to the Deep Dive. Today, we're taking
a deep, detailed look at a figure whose influence
has, well, really defined so much of the 21st
century global order. Vladimir Putin. That's
right. We are using our sources here to try and
map out his decades -long career, tracking his,
frankly, remarkable ascent from a Cold War intelligence
officer to the long -serving de facto leader
of Russia. And our mission really is to understand
the anatomy of this kind of perpetual power.
I mean, Putin has managed to stay at the helm
of Russia since, what, 1999 or 2000? Right. Serving
alternately as president, that was 2000 to 2008,
and then again since 2012, and as prime minister
in those years in between. It's a continuity
of command that... That's well, you just don't
see it much in modern democratic systems. No,
you really don't. And the scale of this continuity,
that's what truly demands this kind of deep dive.
I think if we look at those constitutional amendments
he signed back in 2021, those changes basically.
reset his term limits. They allow him to run
for election twice more. Yeah. Potentially he
could remain president until 2036. Yeah, potentially.
I mean, that isn't just long term leadership.
It feels like systemic perpetual power almost
by design. Exactly. And those amendments, they
weren't just about political longevity. You know,
they really codified his. ideological framework
and cemented this very centralized governing
structure, which I think we really need to unpack.
Okay. But just to set the stage, we have to immediately
place his rule within its, let's say, contentious
global context. And that context shifted massively
in 2023, didn't it? It really did. In March 2023,
the International Criminal Court, the ICC, issued
an arrest warrant for Putin. Right. The war crimes
allegations. Precisely. The warrant relates to
alleged war crimes, specifically involving the
illegal child abduction said to have occurred
during the war in Ukraine. Now, this places an
unprecedented legal cloud over a sitting G20
leader. It raises huge questions about his diplomatic
future, international trade. travel, everything.
Yeah. That sets a profoundly challenging tone
for understanding his rule right from the outset.
So when we look at the internal structure of
power he actually built, how do the sources describe
the political system under his watch? Well, consistently
and pretty uniformly, it's described as an authoritarian
dictatorship. Okay. It's a political environment
marked by some pretty profound challenges. Things
like endemic corruption. Russia consistently
scores exceptionally low on Transparency International's
Corruption Perceptions Index. It's also characterized
by systematic human rights violations, the often
violent suppression and imprisonment of political
opponents, and critically, the absence of genuinely
free and fair elections. Freedom House, for instance,
has rated Russia consistently low, highlighting
this massive democratic deficit that's really
been built up during his tenure. That's a powerful
overview of where things stand now. So let's
unpack the journey that brought him there. Let's
start with Section 2, The Ascent, beginning in
Leningrad in 1952. Right. The beginning of his
story is really essential because it's so deeply
rooted in the Soviet apparatus. He was born in
Leningrad, the youngest of three children. And
there's this truly fascinating detail about his
family background. His grandfather, Spirit on
Putin, was apparently a personal cook to none
other than Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin.
Wait, seriously? The grandson of Lenin's and
Stalin's personal cook. That's not just proximity.
That's a lineage rooted right there in the kitchen
of Soviet power. It is quite something, isn't
it? How much did that history, that closeness
to the inner circle, the actual mechanisms of
state authority, how much do we think that shaped
his early goals? Well, it certainly connects
his family directly to the foundational power
structures of the Soviet state. But his early
life was also marked by the very real physical
scars of World War II on Leningrad, the siege.
Ah, yes. Both his older brothers, Albert and
Victor, died during the war. Victor died from
diphtheria and starvation in 1942. His father
was a conscript, served in an NKVD destruction
battalion and was severely wounded. So this generation's
trauma, their service to the state, that really
defines his background. So a childhood shaped
by that Soviet power, legacy, scarcity, state
loyalty. Where did that path lead him academically?
He was known for being disciplined, quite focused.
From the age of 12, he trained really intensively
in martial arts, sambo, and judo, sort of embodying
physical discipline. And academically, he pursued
a pretty demanding track, graduating from the
Leningrad State University Law Faculty in 1975.
And what was his academic focus? Was it policy?
or more towards law enforcement. His thesis was
actually focused on commercial regulation. The
title was The Most Favored Nation Trading Principle
in International Law. Interesting. During this
time, of course, joining the Communist Party.
the CPSU, was basically a requirement for any
serious career advancement. He remained a member
until that coup attempt in 1991. Right. And crucially,
during his time at university, he met Anatoly
Sobchak. Ah, the mentor figure. Exactly. Sobchak
was teaching business law then. He'd later co
-author the Russian Constitution, become mayor
of St. Petersburg, a hugely influential mentor
for Putin. So the path from university led him
straight into the, well, the legendary KGB. What
defined his time in intelligence? He joined the
KGB right out of university in 75. After initial
training the 401st KGB school, he worked first
in counterintelligence. That's the second chief
directorate. Then he shifted to monitoring foreigners
and consular officials in the first chief directorate.
OK. And then he received. They suggest the Dresden
office was politically kind of marginal and his
duties were pretty mundane. You know that he
and his colleagues were reduced mainly to collecting
press clippings because the KGB apparatus in
East Germany was apparently quite. effective
by the late 80s. Right. The narrative of the
quiet, efficient, maybe even slightly bored desk
bound agent. But then there's the other account,
the darker, more conspiratorial one. Precisely.
There was investigative reporting alleging his
office was actually involved in coordinating
support for the terrorist Red Army faction, the
RAF. Wow. The suggestion being that Dresden was
used as a sort of discrete location for these
clandestine activities, far from the political
spotlight. light of Moscow or Berlin. Now, we
have to be impartial here. Of course. A 2023
investigation apparently disputed the key anonymous
source behind that RAF claim, labeling them a
notorious fabulist. So the truth remains contested.
But these conflicting stories, they definitely
shape his mythos. Regardless of what his day
to day tasks actually were, the collapse of the
Berlin Wall in 1989 must have been a moment of,
well, existential crisis for a KGB officer stationed
right there. Oh, undoubtedly. It was a defining
moment. How so? Yeah. state apparatus, even as
it was crumbling around him. And the end of his
intelligence career lined up almost perfectly
with the end of the Soviet Union itself. Yes,
exactly. He resigned from the KGB in August 1991,
specifically during the attempted coup against
Gorbachev. He then returned to Leningrad State
University and crucially renewed his vital friendship
with his former law professor, Anatoly Sobchak.
And from this point, his political rise was just
lightning fast. It's genuinely hard to overstate
how quickly he went from being a mid -ranking
intelligence officer to the head of the government.
It truly was an astonishing vertical ascent.
Back in St. Petersburg, which was Leningrad when
he started there, he worked in Sobchak's administration
from 1990 to 1996. Okay. He started as an international
affairs advisor, later headed the Committee for
External Relations, overseeing foreign investment.
This role put him directly in contact with Western
businesses, right in the middle of that chaotic
post -Soviet market economy. But his time in
St. Petersburg wasn't exactly clean, was it?
What do the sources say about the controversy
surrounding him, though? You're right. The sources
do confirm his time there was marred by investigations,
particularly concerning allegations of things
like asset valuation manipulation and some questionable
metal export licenses. Now, he was never charged
and he kept his post until Sobchak lost the mayoral
election in 96. But the investigations suggest
he learned very early on how to navigate that
murky intersection of politics and, let's say,
wealth management. And that loss for Sobchak
turned out to be Putin's political rocket fuel,
didn't it? He left St. Petersburg for Moscow
in 1996. Was this escaping the investigations
or just pure political opportunity? The sources
really point towards pure upward political ambition.
Facilitated by his connections, he was called
to Moscow, brought into the Yeltsin administration,
where he moved incredibly quickly through key
administrative roles. Like what? Deputy chief
of the presidential property management department,
then chief of the main control directorate, you
know, positions with real oversight. And then
the pivotal move came in 1998. That's it. In
98, Yeltsin appointed him director of the FSB,
the main successor agency to the KGB. He spent
about a year there focusing intensely on strengthening
the agency, really reestablishing the intelligence
community as a central pillar of state power.
OK. Then in August 1999, almost out of the blue,
he was appointed prime minister. And just four
months later, when Yeltsin resigned suddenly
on New Year's Eve. Putin became acting president.
Exactly. Acting president. So just to recap,
regional municipal advisor, the head of the FSB
to prime minister, then acting president, all
in about eight years. That trajectory, it leads
us directly into Section 3, the vertical of power
and economic realignment. Right. The moment he
effectively assumed power, his immediate focus
domestically was centralization. He inherited
this fragmented, pretty chaotic Russia where
regional governors held immense power. He needed
to build what he explicitly called the vertical,
a strict top -down structure of control. Okay.
How did he achieve that administrative consolidation?
What were the mechanics? Well, his first key
move was very early, May 2000. He issued a decree
organizing Russia's 89 federal subjects regions
basically into seven administrative federal districts.
That number later expanded and got reorganized
a bit. And who ran these districts? Each district
was placed under the authority of a powerful
presidential envoy. These envoys acted as Moscow's
eyes and hands on the ground, making sure regional
governments towed the Kremlin line. So it sounds
like he was systematically stripping away the
independence that regional leaders had gained
after the USSR collapsed. That's exactly what
it looks like. And the sort of final nail in
the coffin for regional autonomy came in July
2000. when he gained the legal right to dismiss
the heads of these federal subjects, the governors.
Wow. And then, critically, in 2004, right after
the Bisland School siege tragedy, he replaced
the direct popular election of governors altogether.
How did that work? It became a system where the
president nominated the governor and then the
regional legislature simply confirmed the choice.
Effectively, Moscow picked the governors. And
he justified this move, which, let's be clear,
dismantled the key democratic mechanism by saying
it was necessary to combat separatism and organized
crime, right? Yes. He framed it as essential
for stability, for holding the country together.
This centralization, it defines the political
system he built. And the ideological framework
they developed for this top -down control was
termed sovereign democracy. Sovereign democracy.
What does that mean in practice? Well, the idea,
as presented, is that the government's actions
must enjoy popular support within Russia and
crucially be insulated from external, particularly
Western, political influence or pressure. I see.
But some critics, like the Swedish economist
Anders Aslund, characterize this style quite
differently, not as a system of modern governance,
but as highly personalized, centralized manual
management, like someone driving the whole country
by hand. That ability to control regional politics,
that manual management, must have given him the
leverage to then focus his centralized power
on the next critical piece. The economy. How
was the economy managed under this style? Yeah,
the economic policies under Putin are complex,
and the economist Sergei Guryev, he actually
divided them into four distinct periods, which
I think is a really helpful way to understand
how the state's role evolved over time. Okay,
walk us through those four phases. Sure. First,
Guryev identifies the reform period, roughly
1999 to 2003. This saw some initial structural
changes, tax reform, some liberalization, which
happened to coincide perfectly with the global
resource boom. Bright place. right time. Pretty
much. Second, the status period, say 2004 to
2008, this is where the state really starts reasserting
control over key industries, energy especially.
Okay. Third, the crisis recovery period, 2008
to 2013, basically navigating the global financial
crisis. And finally, the isolation stagnation
period from 2014 to the present, largely driven
by sanctions after the annexation of Crimea and
then the full -scale invasion. Let's focus on
that initial reform period boom for a second.
It's often held up as proof of his early effectiveness,
isn't it? It was certainly a boom, no question.
But the key driver, according to most analyses,
was largely external. first eight years or so,
the average GDP growth was an astonishing 7 %
per year. Incredible numbers. They are. And while
some early economic reforms definitely played
a part, the primary fuel was that massive five
-fold increase in global oil and gas prices.
The revenue surge was just immense. And they
used that revenue. They did. Russia was able
to successfully repay all of its substantial
Soviet era debts by 2005. They even managed to
gain entry into the World Trade Organization
in 2012, which seemed like a moment of real international
economic integration. But then the political
calculus shifted quite dramatically around 2004,
marking that transition into the status period.
Why the move away from market -oriented reform
towards more state control? Well, it seems the
consolidation of political power, that vertical,
was mirrored by a consolidation of economic power.
The status period focused heavily on making sure
the state controlled strategic sectors, energy,
aerospace, defense. How do they do that? They
formed these massive state champions like the
United Aircraft Corporation in 2006. And there
was a really clear non -negotiable emphasis on
ensuring majority Russian state ownership in
major joint ventures. Think of the... the 49
-51 split that was established in the 2004 Gazprom
Nord Stream pipeline deal. So 51 % state control.
Exactly. It guaranteed the Kremlin ultimate control
over these strategic assets. It suggests political
leverage was often prioritized over, say, pure
profit maximization or efficiency. Now, when
the state becomes the primary economic actor
like that, it often opens the door wide to corruption,
which, as we noted earlier, seemed to be an issue
even back in his St. Petersburg days. It's an
almost unavoidable connection, isn't it? Russia
has consistently received, frankly, abysmal scores
on the global corruption perceptions index throughout
his rule. The whole system, resource wealth extraction,
state controlled industry became deeply intertwined
with political loyalty and patronage networks.
Right. It got so blatant that the Organized Crime
and Corruption Reporting Project actually named
Putin their 2014 person of the year. Not an award
you'd want. It's infinitely not. And it wasn't
for fighting corruption, but specifically for.
furthering corruption and organized crime on
a global scale. That's how they saw it. And what
was the domestic perception of this system even
during those boom years when money was flowing?
Well, the sources indicate there was significant
public frustration even then. A 2018 survey,
for example, suggested that two -thirds of Russians
believed Putin bore full responsibility for the
problems of the country. So there's a clear irony.
The economic success, largely built on that energy
revenue, funded a political system that many
of the very people it claimed to serve viewed
as deeply corrupt. Okay, moving into section
four then. If he's managing the economy manually,
as Oslo put it, he's certainly managing the national
narrative with an equally tight ideological fist.
Oh, absolutely. Control over information is just
paramount if you want to maintain that vertical
of power. And the sources we have are pretty
definitive on this. Since 1999, Putin has systematically
punished journalists who dare to challenge the
official state viewpoint. Systematically punished.
Yeah. And we saw a major, clearly orchestrated
crackdown on what little independent media was
left. particularly after his return to the presidency
in 2012. How does Russia rank globally in terms
of press freedom under his rule? Very, very poorly.
Reporters Without Borders ranked Russia 148th
in their 2013 World Press Freedom Index. They
classified the entire media environment as not
free. And this isn't just about overt censorship.
It's about actively engineering the information
landscape that citizens are exposed to. And what's
the primary delivery mechanism for this managed
narrative? Is it still TV? Television remains
absolutely king. Sources suggest approximately
two thirds of Russians use state controlled television
as their main news source. And around 85 percent
get most of their information overall from Russian
state media outlets. And what's the narrative
being pushed? It's a very specific, powerful
and quite historical narrative, essentially that
Putin and his inner circle are akin to modern
day Romanov Tsars who heroically ended the post
-Soviet chaos, the so -called time of troubles.
Right. It presents him not just as a president,
but as the indispensable national savior, the
ultimate stabilizing force. That media control
must have become absolute following the 2022
full scale invasion of Ukraine. It became effectively
totalitarian when it came to the. conflict. State
media outlets were given explicit orders to use
only official state sources. They were strictly
banned from using critical, accurate terms like
war, invasion or aggression. Instead, using special
military operation. Exactly. And the penalties
for violating these war censorship laws are incredibly
severe, up to 15 years in jail. It effectively
silenced virtually all internal media dissent
about the war. Beyond just controlling the media,
the entire ideological framework of the state
seems to have shifted under his rule towards
a very pronounced conservative turn. Yes, it
was a very systematic shift. He actively promotes
explicitly conservative policies, both at home
and internationally. He frequently launches these
rhetorical attacks against globalism, liberalism,
Western democratic norms. And he backs this up.
He does. He has cultivated and supported conservative
think tanks like the Isborski Club, which...
really emphasize fervent Russian nationalism,
traditionalism, and a systematic opposition to
liberal ideas. And a critical piece of cementing
this ideological shift seems to have been the
powerful alliance he forged with the Russian
Orthodox Church. That alliance is absolutely
central. You see consistently close collaboration
between the state and the Russian Orthodox Church,
which, of course, gained immense prestige and
influence after decades of Soviet repression.
And the church leadership reciprocated. Oh, very
much so. Patriarch Kirill, the head of the church.
publicly endorsed Putin's 2012 election victory,
actually proclaiming it a miracle of God. This
kind of merging of state and church provides
a powerful moral and historical justification
for the government's conservative and nationalist
direction. Now, under this conservative banner,
we've seen what many describe as a rapid erosion
of civil liberties and human rights. What are
some of the most restrictive laws that the sources
highlight? The sources detail several key ones.
First, there's the restrictive foreign agents
law. It's been expanded over the years, notably
in 2020. How does that work? It forces any Russian
human rights organizations, NGOs, even media
outlets that receive any international funding
to publicly brand themselves as foreign agents.
This severely hinders their work, makes it hard
to get funding or rent space, and basically brands
them as subversive elements, spies almost. And
globally, perhaps the most controversial has
been the legislation targeting the LGBTQ. plus
community. That would be the infamous gay propaganda
law, officially prohibiting the dissemination
of propaganda of non -traditional sexual relations
to minors. And the impact. Well, critics argue,
and the sources support this, that the law has
led directly to widespread censorship, severe
restrictions on public life for LGBT plus people,
and, worryingly, a documented increase in violence
and discrimination against the community. It
creates a climate of fear. We also see, according
to the sources, the systematic use of imprisonment
to silence major political dissent, often targeting
very high profile opponents. Yes, this is a consistent
tactic described. You have high profile figures
like Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the oligarch who challenged
Putin's authority early on and ended up in prison
for years. And more recently, Alexei Navalny,
who became arguably his most effective and visible
contemporary critic, who was imprisoned and ultimately
died in custody. And it's not just the figureheads.
No. As of 2020 the Memorial Human Rights Center
which itself was later shut down listed 380 political
prisoners in Russia. That number included 78
residents of annexed Crimea illustrating the
scope of this political suppression. And finally,
this conservative turn seems to be codified right
into the state's most foundational documents
and even applied to demographic policy. Absolutely.
Those 2020 constitutional amendments we mentioned
earlier, they explicitly define marriage as exclusively
between one man and one woman, cementing traditional
values right into the Constitution. And the demographics.
In 2023, reflecting this deep seated concern
over Russia's declining birth rates, Putin publicly
urged Russian women to embrace their patriotic
duty, essentially, and have seven, eight, or
even more children. Wow. Seven or eight. It really
paints a picture of a system geared towards locking
down a very specific traditional nationalist
worldview, where even the citizens' personal
life choices are framed as subservient to the
state's demographic and ideological needs. That
intense domestic focus on traditionalism and
control seems to translate directly into his
often confrontational foreign policy. Which brings
us neatly to Section 5. The fundamental principle
governing that foreign policy seems to be this
concept of the near abroad. Yes, the near abroad
concept is absolutely key to understanding Russian
external relations under Putin. The Kremlin consistently
asserts what it calls a sphere of influence and
privileged interests over all the post -Soviet
states. Aye. They argue these territories are
just strategically vital to Russian security
and core interests. They see them as a necessary
buffer zone. That assertion of privileged interests.
It sounds strikingly familiar to certain historical
Western policies, doesn't it? It does. It's been
frequently compared by geopolitical experts to
the historical Monroe Doctrine, which the United
States asserted over its hemisphere. This idea
of preventing external influence and acclaimed
sphere of interest is what has led directly to
conflict in the region. Which specific conflicts
have arisen directly from this asserted sphere
of influence doctrine? Well, most notably, we
saw the 2008 Russo -Georgian War, which erupted
after Georgia tried to reassert control over
the breakaway region of South Ossetia. Russia
intervened forcefully. And then, critically,
the 2014 annexation of Crimea from Ukraine. Putin
justified the annexation by claiming Crimea has
always been and remains an inseparable part of
Russia. And his justification regarding Ukraine
itself. He asserted... quite controversially
and ahistorically, according to many historians,
that Ukraine itself was artificially created
on a whim by the Bolsheviks, basically denying
its legitimacy as a truly independent nation
separate from Russia. So the core conflict, the
full -scale 2022 invasion of Ukraine, was preceded
by years of this intense ideological justification
and some pretty explicit warnings. What did the
sources reveal about that ideological buildup?
The ideological groundwork was laid quite meticulously
over years. Way back in 2014 during the armed
insurgency in eastern Ukraine, Putin had already
stated publicly that he would use Russia's entire
arsenal of available means to protect Russian
speakers abroad. Establishing a pretext. Essentially,
yes. It established a potential justification
for intervention anywhere he claimed Russian
speakers were threatened. But the most profound
statement, the one that really stands out, was
that 2021 article that was made mandatory reading
for Russian military personnel. Yes, that lengthy
July 2021 article on the historical unity of
Russians and Ukrainians. The fact it was made
mandatory reading really underscores its strategic
importance in the Kremlin's view. And what did
it argue? In it, Putin explicitly stated that
the very formation of a Ukrainian state hostile
to Moscow was comparable in threat level to the
use of weapons of mass destruction against Russia.
Wow. Comparable to WMDs. It frames Ukrainian
sovereignty not just as an inconvenience or a
geopolitical challenge, but as an existential
military grade threat that justifies extreme
measures. Looking at the invasion context itself,
we now have Putin's own recent commentary reflecting
on the decision to launch it. His statements
in December 2023 were highly revealing, I think.
He indicated that Russia would only negotiate
when its stated objectives were completely achieved,
essentially confirming a maximalist position,
no compromise. Right. But perhaps the most striking
comment was his expression of regret, not regret
for starting the war, but regret that he did
not launch the invasion earlier. And with more
preparation, he stated it was, quote, impossible
to stand still and endure any longer. This really
confirms the long -term, deeply ideological nature
of the conflict from his perspective. OK, let's
turn now to the relationship with the West, specifically
the U .S. and NATO, and the often chilling reliance
on nuclear posturing. Relations seem to start
OK. cautiously after 9 -11, but they collapsed
pretty rapidly. That's right. Initially, post
9 -11, Russia did provide some intelligence support
to the U .S. in the early days of the war on
terror. But that cooperation just evaporated
quickly after 2003. Why then? Primarily driven
by Russia's vehement opposition to the U .S.-led
invasion of Iraq, which they saw as illegal unilateralism.
And perhaps even more crucially, the continued
expansion of NATO eastward, closer and closer
to Russia's borders. This profound deterioration
really reached a boiling point in 2007. Ah, yes.
That was a landmark Munich Security Conference
speech. What was the essence of Putin's argument
there? It made huge waves. It was a full -throated,
global condemnation of U .S. foreign policy delivered
right in the heart of the Western security establishment.
Putin criticized what he explicitly called the
United States' monopolistic dominance. Meaning?
He argued the U .S. was engaged in the almost
uncontained hyper -use of force in international
relations, basically. acting unilaterally, ignoring
international law and institutions. He argued
this meant no one feels safe. And ironically,
this U .S. policy was succeeding only in stimulating
a new global arms race. A clear declaration that
the post -Cold War unipolar moment was over,
in his view. Absolutely. It was a signal that
Russia would no longer accept that order. And
the nuclear rhetoric quickly followed suit, framing
Russia's own military modernization, especially
its nuclear forces, as a necessary response to
perceived threats. What specific threats? The
Kremlin consistently argues that Russia has been
forced to modernize its nuclear capabilities,
primarily because the U .S. withdrew from the
1972 anti -ballistic missile ABM Treaty back
in 2002. Right. that withdrawal as fundamentally
undermining its strategic deterrent, its ability
to strike back if attacked. This strategic posturing
led to his notorious 2018 statement about a potential
nuclear conflict. Martyrs, quote. Yes. An aggressor
should know that vengeance is inevitable, that
he will be annihilated. We, meaning Russians,
will go to heaven as martyrs. It's a shocking
framing, really, turning the concept of mutual
assured destruction into some kind of moral or
even religious victory. And that escalation,
that nuclear brinkmanship, has only continued
into the present decade, hasn't it? It has. Russia
suspended its participation in the new START
treaty, the last major nuclear arms reduction
treaty with the United States. Suspending, not
withdrawing entirely, but still. Still a major
blow to arms control. Furthermore, in September
2024, Putin issued a really severe warning stating
that Russia would consider nuclear retaliation.
even if it were attacked only with conventional
weapons. That sounds like a shift. Experts noted
it as a very worrying, apparent deviation from
Russia's traditional, although somewhat opaque,
doctrine, which generally reserved nuclear use
for existential threats or nuclear attack. It
lowered the threshold, potentially. This tension
with Western allies has played out not just in
grand policy statements, but through specific
lethal incidents on the soil of allied nations,
particularly, it seems, in the UK. Yes, the sources
detail two extremely high - profile poisonings
that UK authorities linked directly back to the
Russian state. First, back in 2006, the poisoning
of the former KGB FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko
in London. With polonium, right? Using radioactive
polonium -210, yes. A truly exotic and state
-level method. And the official UK inquiry drew
a pretty clear line of responsibility, didn't
it? It did. The 2016 UK public inquiry concluded
that the FSB operation to kill Litvinenko was
probably approved by Mr. Patrushev, then head
of the FSB, and also by President Putin. And
the motive? The inquiry cited Litvinenko's very
public and damaging criticisms of the Kremlin
leadership and the FSB itself as the likely motive,
sending a message. Then the second major incident
involved a nerve agent. That was the 2018 Novichok
poisoning of Sergei Skripal, a former Russian
military intelligence officer who had been a
double agent for the UK, and his daughter Yulia
in Salisbury. Novichok, another state signature.
Exactly. A military grade nerve agent developed
by the Soviet Union. The UK formally accused
the Russian state and the foreign secretary at
the time, Boris Johnson, stated publicly that
it was overwhelmingly likely Putin himself had
personally ordered the attack. So these incidents,
they underscore a willingness to use lethal.
That's certainly how many analysts interpret
them. Now, while the relationship with the West
has been so confrontational, Putin has simultaneously
been busy building powerful global partnerships,
particularly looking eastward and also into the
Middle East. Yes, this is the very calculated
eastward pivot. Russia has cultivated increasingly
strong strategic... relationships, especially
with China and India. They work through organizations
like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SEO,
and the BRICS economic grouping. And the tangible
results. Massive infrastructural cooperation
is one key outcome. The prime example is the
huge $400 billion Power of Siberia natural gas
pipeline deal signed with China. It locks in
long -term energy supply to China, providing
Russia with revenue and political leverage in
exchange for China's diplomatic backing. What
about regions traditionally seen as more under
Western influence, like the Middle East and Africa?
Has Russia made inroads there? Systematically.
Russia has sought to undermine what it sees as
the U .S.-led international order by expanding
its influence in these areas. Putin visited Iran
back in 2007, the first Soviet or Russian leader
to do so since Stalin went for the Tehran conference
in 1943. That's significant. It is. And he publicly
condemned the 2011 NATO -led military intervention
in Libya, calling it medieval calls for crusades,
deliberately framing Western actions as aggressive
imperialism. And the most significant military
move outside the post -Soviet space was undoubtedly
Syria, wasn't it? Absolutely. The direct military
intervention in Syria starting in 2015 to prop
up the Bashar al -Assad regime was a major geopolitical
move from Moscow's perspective. What were the
aims? It seems it was explicitly aimed at undermining
the U .S.-led coalition fighting ISIS, preventing
regime change, and critically securing permanent
Russian influence in the eastern Mediterranean.
They solidified their presence using bases like
the TARDIS naval base. It showed Russia was willing
and able to project power far beyond its borders
again. And in Africa? the strategy seems to have
involved establishing quieter, sometimes deniable
military footholds. Yes. Often using private
military companies, PMCs like the Wagner Group,
though their status is now complex. Moscow dispatched
Russian PMCs to various conflicts, notably securing
a significant, almost permanent military presence
by intervening decisively in the Central African
Republic Civil War. Right. And the first ever
Russia -Africa summit was held in 2019, highlighting...
the strategic priority Moscow placed on establishing
resource extraction deals and security relationships
across the continent, often filling vacuums left
by former colonial powers or competing directly
with Western influence. The persona Putin presents
to the world is so fundamental to his domestic
support, and it appears incredibly curated. Oh,
it's textbook cult of personality construction,
meticulously designed to project this image of
the strongman, the vogue, the father of the nation.
How was that achieved? It involves these highly
publicized, often quite macho, tough guy photo
opportunities and stunts. We've all seen them.
The photos of him shirtless while fishing or
riding a horse in Siberia. Right, the submersible
dive. Diving in a tiny submersible in Lake Baikal,
driving a Formula One car, demonstrating his
skills in martial arts, he holds an eighth Dan
black belt in judo, which is very high. This
carefully crafted image is meant to scream strength,
competence, decisiveness, control. And this image
of physical strength is often coupled with a
very distinctive, quite sharp communicative style,
isn't it? Absolutely. He's known for using these
pithy aphorisms, memorable soundbites, and sometimes
surprisingly coarse or vulgar language. Like
the criminal jargon. Yes. Notably, he occasionally
employs Russian criminal jargon known as penya.
This linguistic choice, sort of speaking the
language of the street, is widely interpreted
as a deliberate move to connect with a broader,
perhaps traditionally tougher segment of the
population. It adds this layer of perceived authenticity,
maybe even danger, to his otherwise polished
public image. Additionally, this carefully cultivated
image has brought him immense, if often controversial,
recognition over the years. Significant recognition,
yes. He was named Time Magazine's Person of the
Year back in 2007. And Forbes magazine ranked
him as the world's most powerful individual for
four consecutive years, from 2013 to 2016. But
it's controversial recognition. Definitely. The
controversy is perhaps best encapsulated by that
term that emerged in Germany, Putinmerster. Meaning?
Literally. One who understands Putin. It became
a derogatory political buzzword used to criticize
politicians or public figures who seem to advocate
for greater empathy or understanding of the Kremlin's
motives, seen by critics as appeasement. Now,
the public persona is of this man of relatively
modest means, dedicated solely to serving the
state. But the question of his actual private
wealth is one of the most explosive and certainly
most opaque elements surrounding his rule. The
contrast is truly astonishing. It almost screams
cognitive dissonance. Officially, his reported
income is quite modest, for example, the equivalent
of about $270 ,000 back in 2012. Yet he's been
photographed numerous times wearing luxury wristwatches
with a collective value estimated by journalists
at around $700 ,000. That's nearly three times
his official annual salary just on his wrist.
And the allegations from opposition figures,
investigative journalists, and Western intelligence
agencies about his true wealth are just staggering.
Estimates of a secret multi -billion dollar fortune
go as high as $160 billion, maybe even more.
Though proving it is incredible. difficult. So
how does one reconcile that level of visible
personal luxury, like the watches, with the carefully
crafted image of the dedicated state servant?
The sources seem to suggest it's all hidden behind
this complex network of proxies. That is the
core finding, really, from those major offshore
financial leaks. The Panama Papers in 2016, the
Pandora Papers in 2021. They linked very close
personal associates of Putin. Like who? People
like the cellist Sergei Rolduzhin, a childhood
friend, and the Rotenberg brothers, his former
judo partners. These leaks connected them to
billions of dollars held in complex offshore
structures. Specifically, about $2 billion just
in Rolduzhin's network was... And Roldugin himself
claimed he wasn't really a businessman. Yet somehow
he accumulated assets worth maybe $100 million.
It strongly suggests a classic proxy system,
doesn't it? It certainly implies, according to
the investigators, a systematic use of proxies,
trusted friends, family members, associates to
shield the true beneficial owner of these vast
funds. It effectively hides the wealth from public
scrutiny, from potential international sanctions,
and allows him to maintain that relatively austere
public image while allegedly controlling assets
valued in the billions. And this alleged secrecy
extends even to his residences, far beyond the
official government compounds like the Kremlin
or Novogar. Absolutely. While he uses numerous
official government residences, critics and investigative
reports point to these incredibly controversial,
allegedly personal estates. The most famous,
of course, is that massive Italianette -style
palace complex near Galenzic on the Black Sea
coast. Often called Putin's Palace. Exactly.
Estimated to have cost something like $1 .35
billion to build. Alexei Navalny's investigative
team released a hugely popular documentary claiming
this colossal structure was built through an
intricate corruption scheme specifically for
Putin's personal private use. They argued it's
the physical manifestation of his secret wealth
and power. The Kremlin denies it, of course.
Finally, then, how is his legacy being assessed,
both critically and supportively, now that we
are well over two decades into his rule? The
assessments are, as you'd expect, profoundly
divided. Internationally, the critical voices
are incredibly harsh, especially now. Friedinghaus,
as we mentioned, has rated Russia not free since
2005. Post -2022 invasion, world leaders have
used exceptionally stark language. Joe Biden,
Justin Trudeau, Boris Johnson have all labeled
him things like a lying, murderous dictator and
a bully. Hillary Clinton, even before that, characterized
him simply as arrogant. But inside Russia, particularly
perhaps among older generations, the assessment
often remains strongly supportive, doesn't it?
Yes, many Russians genuinely credit him or at
least did for a long time for reviving Russia's
fortunes. They argue he restored order, national
pride and economic stability after the perceived
chaos and national humiliation of the Yeltsin
years in the 1990s. Right. Even the former Soviet
leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who is often critical
of Putin's democratic backsliding, publicly stated
at one point that Putin had saved Russia from
the beginning of a collapse during that initial
period. He brought stability at a. cost. Looking
now towards the longer view, how do contemporary
historians or analysts frame his overall impact
on the world stage? Well, a recent assessment,
I think it was Franklin Foer writing for 2025
publication, declared quite starkly that the
world is now living in the age of Vladimir Putin.
The age of Putin. His argument was that. Putin's
greatest, most lasting success was fundamentally
shattering the post -Cold War transatlantic order,
the idea of American unipolarity. He succeeded
in challenging U .S. dominance, promoting his
alternative model of strongman conservatism and
sovereign nationalism, and fueling a global turn,
or at least a questioning, against liberal democracy.
Foer argues he has fundamentally reshaped the
geopolitical landscape regardless of what happens
next. So the detailed journey we've taken today,
drawing on all these sources, it really shows
this clear, perhaps terrifying pattern. From
a KGB officer steeped in secrecy through that
incredibly rapid political ascent marked by consolidating
power, the vertical and economic realignment
based on state control, often fueled by resource
wealth, to a foreign policy rooted in reclaiming
spheres of influence and confronting the West.
The sources seem to synthesize a leader whose
political success at home and confrontation abroad
were enabled in large part by that resource wealth
all wrapped up in this public image of carefully
cultivated masculine strength. And that profound
tension, that gap between the visible strength
and the, well, the invisible alleged power and
wealth, that leads us to our final provocative
thought for you, the listener. Okay. This man
built his entire public image on projecting transparency,
control, masculine strength. Yet his actual power
and certainly his alleged multibillion dollar
wealth seem guarded by unparalleled state secrecy,
elaborate proxy networks and what critics describe
as deep rooted systemic corruption. So the question
is, to what extent is the authoritarian structure
Putin built complete with the pervasive cult
of personality, the massive unconfirmed wealth
seemingly held by associates? To what extent
is this simply the modern personalized expression
of a deeply rooted Russian historical tradition
of highly centralized secretive state power?
Or is it something different? Is it a unique
personalized dictatorship designed specifically
to make the man himself, Vladimir Putin, completely
indistinguishable from the state he commands?
A question I suspect that the world will be wrestling
with long after the age of Putin is officially
declared over. Thank you for joining us for this
deep dive.