Welcome back, Deep Divers. Today, we're taking
a shortcut to being well -informed about a figure
often overlooked in the grand narrative of American
history, yet whose decisions were absolutely
pivotal in shaping the nation. We're talking
about James Buchanan, the 15th president of the
United States. We've got a stack of fascinating
sources, historical accounts, biographical analyses.
All sorts of things, and our mission really is
to cut through the noise, give you the unvarnished
truth, and understand why Buchanan consistently
ranks among the most, well, controversial figures
in the Oval Office. Indeed. Our mission today
is definitely to unpack the life and presidency
of James B. Tannen. He was a man who served during
a period of, well, intense national division,
and his actions, or maybe his inactions, they're
still debated by historians today. Yeah, you
might know him as, you know, consistently ranked
among the worst presidents. That's the common
perception, yes. But we're going to try and understand
why and how he earned that legacy, drawing directly
from these historical accounts you've got there.
We have a really comprehensive look at his life,
starting right from his humble beginnings in
Pennsylvania, all the way to his final years
defending his reputation. It's it's a fascinating
deep dive into a man who was just deeply entwined
with the issues that led to the American Civil
War. Absolutely. So get ready for some surprising
facts and some critical insights that might even
challenge what you thought you knew about them.
And the core question we'll explore, I think,
is how a career politician, someone deeply experienced
in law and diplomacy. I mean, this wasn't his
first rodeo. Not at all. Decades of experience.
Exactly. How did he find himself presiding over
a nation on the absolute brink of collapse? And
why, despite his stated intentions, did he fail
so spectacularly to reconcile its fractured parts?
Was he just overwhelmed by history? Or did his
own approach, maybe his deep life in constitutional
literalism and not in interference, did that
actually speed things up, accelerate the disunion
he wanted to avoid? That's the key question,
isn't it? Let's unpack this. Okay, so let's start
at the very beginning. James Buchanan Jr., born
April 23, 1791. He didn't exactly have a silver
spoon in his mouth, did he? His origins sound,
well, remarkably humble for a future president.
Oh, far from it. Buchanan was born in a log cabin,
actually, at a place called Stoney Batter near
Cove Gap, Pennsylvania. A log cabin, really?
Yes. He was the second of 11 children and the
eldest son. His father, James Buchanan Sr., was
a Scotch -Irish immigrant, came over from County
Donegal in Ireland back in 1783. And his father's
story is quite something. How so? Well, he started
out, believe it or not, as an indentured servant.
But he quickly became the wealthiest resident
in their area, made his fortune as a merchant,
a farmer, real estate investor. Wow, that's quite
a job. It really is. Quite the American dream
story for the time. And it must have instilled
in young James a strong sense of ambition, financial
sense, but also maybe an awareness of social
mobility, the self -made man idea. Right, that
immigrant drive. And his mother, Elizabeth Spear,
She sounds like she had a really profound influence
on him in those early years. She certainly did.
Buchanan himself actually credited his early
education mainly to her. Elizabeth Spear was
apparently a highly literate woman, very interested
in poetry, politics. Yeah, she'd often quote
people like John Milton and William Shakespeare
to him. So this early exposure to intellectual
stuff, political discourse, it must have shaped
his mind, sparked his political curiosity early
on, grounded him in that classical thought and
rhetoric that served him so well later. But even
future presidents have their youthful moments,
it seems. What about Dickinson College? I heard
he nearly didn't make it through. Well, yeah,
before Dickinson, he attended Old Stone Academy
in Mercersburg, then went on to Dickinson College
in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. And interestingly,
yes, in 1808, he nearly got expelled. Expelled?
For what? For disorderly conduct. We're talking
things like drinking in local taverns, disturbing
the peace, even some vandalism, apparently. Typical
college stuff, maybe. Perhaps. a bit more serious
back then. But he pleaded for a second chance,
promised to reform himself, and, you know, to
his credit, he not only stayed, but graduated
with honors in 1809. So this early brush with,
let's say, serious trouble and his ability to
get back on track and excel, it does suggest
a certain resilience. Or maybe a capacity for
self -correction, or perhaps just a really strong
drive to avoid public disgrace. That seems to
be a theme later on. A quick learner, then. both
in books and maybe in talking his way out of
trouble. After college, he went straight into
law. Was that always the plan? Seems like it.
Immediately after graduating, later that same
year, he moved to Lancaster, trained for two
and a half years with a highly regarded lawyer,
James Hopkins. And this wasn't just, you know,
learning by rote. He really dug into the U .S.
Code, the Constitution, legal big names like
William Blackstone and his commentaries on English
law. So it was rigorous training, laid a very
strong, very formal foundation for his legal
and later political career, emphasizing precedent.
the letter of the law. And his legal career just
took off almost immediately. Did his background
help him get established so quickly? Absolutely.
He passed the bar exam in 1812, stayed in Lancaster,
and boom, rapidly made a name for himself as
a prominent lawyer. Just like that. Well, his
reputation for diligence, a sharp legal mind,
it meant his income just soared. By 1821, he
was earning over $11 ,000 a year. Which was a
lot back then. Oh, yeah. To put that in perspective,
that's like maybe $260 ,000 in today's money.
So it shows his rapid financial success, the
respect he commanded. And during this time, he
also became a Freemason, served as worshipful
master of his Lodge, Masonic Lodge number 43,
and even a district deputy grandmaster. So he
was plugging into those influential community
networks early on. That would definitely help
with political ambitions later. OK, so he's building
a successful professional life. He's well connected.
Then he steps into politics, but he starts as
a federalist, which is interesting given where
he ends up. How did that first affiliation shape
him? Yeah, he was actually the chairman of the
Lancaster chapter of the Federalist Party. Like
his father, he supported their platform, you
know, federal money for internal improvements,
import duties to protect industries, bringing
back a central bank. He was actually a strong
critic of the Democratic Republican President
James Madison during the War of 1812, lined up
with the Federalists, who were pretty skeptical
about that conflict. And he had a, well... a
surprising, almost hands -on role in the War
of 1812. Not exactly typical federalist politician
behavior. He did. It's a fun little footnote.
While he didn't serve in the formal militia during
the British occupation of Washington D .C. and
the threat to Baltimore, he joined a group of
young guys in the Baltimore area. And get this,
they were stealing horses for the United States
Army. Stealing horses. Seriously. You see, a
direct, if unconventional, contribution to the
war effort makes him the last president involved
in the War of 1812. A unique little piece of
his biography. And maybe an early sign. of his
practical rather than purely ideological approach
to things. He then gets into the Pennsylvania
House of Representatives. Was this just a stepping
stone or did he see it as more? Yeah, he was
elected as a Federalist in 1814, youngest member
at the time, served until 1816. The state legislature
sessions were deliberately short, only three
months. Oh, convenient. Very convenient. Allowed
him to keep up his lucrative law practice. In
fact, his political service actually helped him
get more clients and charge higher fees. Shows
he was pretty shrewd about leveraging his public
role for personal gain, for advancement. A notable
moment early on was his successful defense of
a district judge, Walter Franklin, in an impeachment
trial in 1815. He argued impeachment should only
be for actual judicial crimes or clear law violations,
not just unpopular decisions. Interesting. Setting
a precedent there. Exactly. Shows a very early
grasp of separation of powers, commitment to
legal precedent, things that would really influence
him later, maybe too much. And then comes the
big shift, federalist to Democrat. That's not
just a minor change. It's a whole party realignment.
What drove that for him? It's a really significant
move, and it tells you a lot about his political
character, I think. He got elected to the U .S.
House of Representatives in 1820, served five
terms there. His father died shortly after his
election, a personal loss during this time of
political change. He became a prominent leader
in Pennsylvania's Amalgamator Party, which was
this fascinating mix of Democratic Republicans
and former Federalists, really reflects that
fluid, kind of ideologically messy era of good
feelings. when party lines got blurry. So his
federalist ties weren't that strong? Apparently
not. His federalist convictions were, let's say,
weak. He switched parties after opposing a nativist
federalist bill targeting non -citizens. This
early willingness to shed ideological labels
for political advantage became a defining future
of his career. Maybe even tragically so. How
so? Well, it suggests his core conviction was
often about self -preservation advancement, which
paradoxically might have failed him when real,
uncompromising leadership was needed later on.
So he was a pragmatist, always adapting to the
political winds. Precisely. Look at the 1824
presidential election. He initially backed Henry
Clay. But when Pennsylvania voters overwhelmingly
preferred Andrew Jackson, Buchanan quickly switched
his support to Jackson. Smart politics, I guess.
He joined Jackson's faction after the election
loss, securing his spot in the emerging Democratic
Party. Although ironically, Jackson apparently
viewed him with contempt. Contempt? Why? There
was some misunderstanding about Buchanan's role,
trying to mediate between the Clay and Jackson
camps. Just shows how quickly alliances shifted,
how personal feelings could cloud politics. even
among supposed allies. Wow, held in contempt
by the very guy whose faction you're joining.
But he definitely became a strong advocate for
states' rights in Washington, building those
key southern alliances early on. He did. Buchanan
became a really avid defender of states' rights,
forged close relationships with many southern
congressmen. He even saw some New England congressmen
as... dangerous radicals because of their views
on federal power, abolitionism, things like that.
He built a strong Democratic coalition back in
Pennsylvania, too, pulled together former Federalist
farmers, Philadelphia artisans, Ulster Scots
Americans. That helped secure Pennsylvania for
Jackson in the 1828 election, shows that early
pattern of aligning with Southern political interests,
a tendency that just got stronger over time.
And he was making a name for himself in Congress,
chairing important committees, getting involved
in big cases. Yeah, he gained significant attention
prosecuting federal district judge James H. Peck
in an impeachment trial. The Senate acquitted
Peck, but Buchanan arguing that high stakes case
further cemented his reputation as a legal and
political force. Then he chaired the powerful
House Judiciary Committee. In 1831, he decided
not to run for reelection for the 22nd Congress,
which signaled he was aiming for higher office.
Some Pennsylvania Democrats even floated his
name for vice president in 1832. So he was definitely
climbing. His swift rise really reflects a man
with clear political goals and the skill to navigate
the complex world of Washington. So what we're
seeing here is Buchanan is this shrewd political
operator, someone who adapts his party ties as
needed, rises quickly through the ranks. The
key takeaway from this early period maybe is
that this political fluidity, while great for
his career, might have left him without that
unwavering moral compass needed later for the
Union's existential crisis. Exactly. Buchanan's
early career shows a man keenly aware of political
currents, willing to shift allegiance, capable
of building effective coalitions. Now, as he
climbed higher, his experiences in diplomacy
and the Senate were really instrumental in shaping
his national profile and, crucially, his views
on that growing sectional crisis that would define
his legacy. After his time in the House, Andrew
J. Jackson offered him a post that, well, you
mentioned Buchanan wasn't too thrilled about
it at first ambassador to Russia. What was the
thinking there? Was it a reward or? That's right.
After Jackson's reelection in 1832, he offered
Buchanan the Russia post. Buchanan was somewhat
reluctant. He saw St. Petersburg as a kind of
political exile, you know, far from the center
of American power. Makes sense. He eventually
took it. But it turns out Jackson's intention
might have been exactly that exile. Jackson apparently
considered Buchanan an incompetent busybody and
maybe a bit untrustworthy. Yeah, sheds light
on those complex, sometimes hostile relationships
even within the same party, how personal feelings
could influence big appointments. A bit of a
backhanded compliment or maybe just a backhanded
way to get him out of the way. So what was his
focus in Russia? Did he achieve much? His main
job was to hammer out a trade and shipping treaty.
He succeeded with the trade part, opened up some
new avenues for American merchants. But getting
free merchant shipping rights from Foreign Minister
Karl Nesselrode proved really difficult. Russia
was hesitant. And the irony is, just a year before
in Congress, Buchanan had publicly blasted Tsar
Nicholas I as a despot over Russia's handling
of the Polish uprising in 1830. Oh, wow. Awkward.
Very. Highlights that tension between his public
pronouncements and his later diplomatic duties.
Shows his ability to compartmentalize maybe.
Execute policy even for regimes he personally
criticized. It probably reinforced his view that
national interests trumped ideology and foreign
affairs. So he comes back from this exile and
then pretty quickly finds his way into the U
.S. Senate, a much more influential spot domestically.
Well, not immediately. He actually lost a state
legislature election when he first got back,
a minor setback. Yeah. But then the Pennsylvania
state legislature appointed him to the U .S.
Senate to succeed William Wilkins. He served
there for over a decade from 1834 to 1845, got
reelected in 36 and 42. And during his Senate
years, he became known for sticking really closely
to the Pennsylvania state legislature's guidelines,
sometimes even voting against positions he himself
had argued for in speeches, just to reflect his
constituents' will. That's interesting. Pragmatic
again? Extremely pragmatic and committed to his
representative role, even if it meant some inconsistency
between his words and his votes. He became known
for his commitment to states' rights and manifest
destiny. Two huge forces shaping America then.
Yes, those were absolutely defining aspects of
his Senate career. They stayed central to his
political identity. He opposed rechartering the
Second Bank of the United States, siding with
Jacksonian principles, tried to get a congressional
censure of Jackson removed. He turned down President
Martin Van Buren's offer to be attorney general,
preferred chairing those prestigious Senate committees,
judiciary, and foreign relations where he could
wield more influence. He was a vocal opponent
of the Webster -Ashburton treaty with Britain.
called it a surrender of lands, demanded the
entire rustic river valley for the U .S. In the
Oregon boundary dispute, he took that hardline
54 -40 or fight stance, wanting the whole territory,
and he was a strong supporter of annexing the
Republic of Texas. So very expansionist, very
nationalist. Definitely, but always framed within
his deep -seated state's rights principles. His
stance on slavery in the Senate is obviously
crucial given what happens later. This period
really seems to lock in his approach. Absolutely
critical. He notably opposed a gag rule that
John C. Calhoun sponsored to suppress anti -slavery
petitions in Congress. Buchanan actually joined
the majority to block it. Why? That seems counter
to his later positions. His reasoning was ironic.
He believed suppressing the petitions would actually
backfire, strengthening the abolitionists by
making them look like martyrs. He put it very
clearly. We have just as little right to interfere
with slavery in the South as we have to touch
the right of petition. So protect the right to
petition, even if you hate the petition's content.
Exactly. He consistently argued slavery was a
state issue. He blamed abolitionists for exciting
passions over it. instead of seeking solutions
within what he saw as the constitutional framework.
And what's really fascinating here is Buchanan's
unwavering belief that slavery was best left
to the individual states. This foundational view
would deeply shape his presidency. He saw federal
non -intervention as the only constitutional
path, a path of mutual forbearance. Which for
many became a path to disaster. Precisely, because
it failed to address the moral urgency or the
growing economic and political power of the slave
states. It just cemented his reputation as a
doe face, that term for a northerner with southern
sympathies. He prioritized sectional harmony
through non -interference, even if it implicitly
supported slavery's expansion. Moving on, he
then serves as Secretary of State under James
K. Polk. That's a huge role, putting him right
at the center of America's massive territorial
expansion. It was massive. Polk offered him either
Secretary of State or a Supreme Court seat, partly
as a reward for his support, but also maybe to
neutralize him as a party rival. Keep him close,
but under the presidential thumb. Clever politics.
Buchanan shows the State Department served for
Polk's whole term. And during that time, the
U .S. saw its largest territorial gain ever,
the Oregon Treaty, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
We're talking Texas, California, Nevada, New
Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Colorado. the map just
exploded. So he was overseeing this massive expansion.
How did he handle those big negotiations, Oregon
and Mexico? Well, with Oregon, he initially favored
the 49th parallel, a more moderate line. But
as northern Democrats got fired up with the 54
-40 or fight slogan, wanting everything up to
Alaska, he jumped on board. He adopted that more
aggressive position, yeah. Again, showing his
pragmatism, aligning with popular sentiment.
But eventually, he followed Polk's lead, and
they settled on the 49th parallel in the Oregon
Compromise of 1846. OK, and Mexico. With Mexico,
he held a, let's say, dubious view that a Mexican
attack on US troops justified the war. Initially,
he advised against claiming too much territory
south of the Rio Grande, worried about war with
Britain or France. But later, he argued for more
annexation, blaming Mexico for the war, saying
the compensation was too low. He tried to get
the Democratic nomination in 1848, but didn't
get much support outside PA and Virginia, lost
to Louis Cass. After Polk, he goes back to private
life for a bit, gets that interesting nickname.
Was this really a break or was he still playing
the game from the sidelines? Yeah, when the Whig
Zachary Taylor won in 48, Buchanan returned to
private life. He was getting older, still dressed
in that kind of old -fashioned style, which earned
him the nickname Old Public Functionary from
the press. Northern opponents often mocked him
with it, like he was a relic. But this period,
1849 to 52, wasn't really a political rest, more
like a strategic retreat. He bought Wheatland,
his famous estate near Lancaster, became the
center of this large family network, acting as
a sort of surrogate father to 22 nieces and nephews,
including Harriet Lane, who'd later be his first
lady. He also became president of the Board of
Trustees of Franklin and Marshall College from
52 to 66. So he kept a public, respectable profile.
The private life wasn't really private life for
him, was it? Still had his eye on the White House,
watching politics closely. Oh, absolutely. He
was quietly campaigning for the 1852 Democrats.
nomination, positioning himself as the guy who
could unite the fractured party. What was his
pitch? He rejected the old Missouri compromise,
welcomed Congress, shooting down the Wilmot Proviso,
that proposal to ban slavery in territories won
from Mexico. He kept criticizing abolitionism
as fanatical, insisted slavery should be decided
by state legislatures, not Congress. So doubling
down on the state's rights pro -southern stance?
Exactly. His sympathy for the South, consistent
since his Senate days, really solidified that
doe -face label. He strongly aligned with pro
-slavery arguments and constitutional interpretations.
But despite his efforts, he couldn't get the
two -thirds support needed for the 52 nomination.
That went to Franklin Pierce. Buchanan even turned
down the VP nomination, which went to his close
friend, William R. King. So he steps back onto
the international stage as minister to the United
Kingdom. And this move strategically keeps him
out of some really heated domestic debates back
on. That feels calculated. That's a key point,
and yet proved incredibly advantageous for his
presidential hopes later. He accepted the UK
post in 1853. Some saw it as a step backward
career -wise. Right. Less prestigious than Secretary
of State. But strategically brilliant. It allowed
him to completely avoid the incredibly divisive
debate over the Kansas -Nebraska Act. That whole
mess was tearing the country apart over popular
sovereignty, slavery's expansion. Leading Kansas.
Exactly. By being abroad, he stayed untainted
by the direct fallout, positioned imperfectly
as a compromise candidate later on. In the U
.K., his diplomatic efforts focused on reducing
British influence in Central America, renegotiating
the Clayton -Bolwer Treaty, promoting U .S. interests,
especially in Honduras and Nicaragua. And this
is where the infamous Austin Manifesto comes
in, a document that really captures that aggressive
expansionist spirit, especially towards Cuba.
Indeed. At President Pierce's urging, Buchanan
met in Austin, Belgium, in 1854, with the U .S.
ambassadors to Spain and France. The goal? Plan
the acquisition of Cuba. The buy -it. The resulting
Austin Manifesto proposed purchasing Cuba from
Spain. Spain was in revolution, nearly bankrupt.
But the final draft, which Buchanan initially
advised against, went way further. It suggested
that if Spain refused to sell, resting it from
Spain would be justified by every law, human
and divine. Wow. That's aggressive. Resting it.
Remarkably aggressive. Really pushing the boundaries
of international law and diplomacy. This moment
really highlights his deep involvement in expansionism.
Often with an eye towards slave territory, doesn't
it? What were the implications of such a bold
proposal? Oh, absolutely. The manifesto caused
a huge stir, both at home and abroad. It was
never actually acted upon, but it significantly
weakened the Pierce administration. It also kind
of dampened public support for Manifest Destiny
because many Northerners saw it, rightly, as
a blatant attempt to expand slave territory.
Right. So this period shows Buchanan's sustained
ambition, his deep involvement in expansionist
policies, often tilted towards protecting or
expanding slave territory, which was becoming
an incredibly sensitive issue. His willingness
to endorse such an aggressive, maybe even unconstitutional
move shows how committed he was to Southern interests
and what he saw as national expansion, even if
it escalated sectional tensions. So after all
these years, law, state politics, Congress, diplomacy,
navigating domestic and international waters,
James Buchanan finally reaches the top. the presidency.
His nomination in 1856, after all that strategic
maneuvering, being abroad during key fights,
it almost felt inevitable for him by then. It
did, in a way. Being conveniently out of the
country during the Kansas -Nebraska Act fight
made him that perfect compromise candidate. Powerful
senators could rally around him. They presented
him as this experienced leader who could appeal
to both North and South without the fresh baggage
of those recent sectional disputes. He won the
1856 Democratic nomination after 17 ballots.
Stephen Douglas dropping out really cleared the
path for him. And the platform he ran on it clearly
reflected his long held views, didn't it? Especially
on slavery, trying to somehow bridge that divide.
Absolutely. The Democratic platform supported
the fugitive slave law, called for an end to
anti -slavery agitation, and pushed for U .S.
ascendancy in the Gulf of Mexico, signaling more
expansionism. Who was he up against? In the general
election, he faced Millard Fillmore for the nativist
Know Nothings and John C. Fremont for the brand
new Republican Party, which was gaining serious
ground in the North. Buchanan didn't actively
campaign much that was common then, but he pledged
to uphold the platform. And he won. He did. Secured
every slave state except Maryland, plus five
free states, including his home state, Pennsylvania,
making him the first president from Pennsylvania.
He got 45 percent of the popular vote, a solid
174 electoral votes. But his victory speech sounded
pretty combative, reflecting the deep divisions
he was inheriting. It was. Buchanan flat out
denounced the Republicans as a dangerous and
geographical party that had unfairly attacked
the South. He pledged, quote, the object of my
administration will be to destroy a sectional
party in North or South and to restore harmony
to the union under a national and conservative
government. Ambitious goal. Very, but ultimately
unattainable. His goal was clear. Qualsectionalism,
by upholding what he saw as constitutional order
and the rights of slave states. His words, though,
did absolutely nothing to soothe angry northern
Republicans. They saw his election as a huge
victory for the slave power. So he takes the
oath of office, March 4, 1857, from Chief Justice
Roger B. Taney. And his inaugural address lays
out his vision, or maybe his desperate hope,
for the nation. Yeah, he committed right away
to serving only one term, stated how much he
abhorred the growing divisions over slavery.
He repeated his long held belief. Congress should
play no role in deciding slavery status in states
or territories. Boccular sovereignty from the
Kansas -Nebraska Act. That was the key principle.
He even went so far as to recommend a federal
slave code to protect slave owners rights in
federal territories. That was a position many
Southerners favored. And then crucially, he alluded
to a then pending Supreme Court case Dred Scott
v. Sanford, which he said would permanently settle
the issue of slavery. And this raises that critical
question. How much did he really know about that
decision coming down the pike? And how did that
shape what he said publicly? His words suggested
a finality that he seemed to believe, or at least
desperately hoped, the court would provide. Take
the whole issue out of politics. But this wasn't
just innocent hope. That's the crucial point,
isn't it? Because what we now know about his
involvement in the Dred Scott decision is...
Pretty damning. This wasn't just an educated
guess. It looks like direct interference. Not
at all an educated guess. We now know that Justice
Robert C. Greyer, who, like Buchanan, was from
Pennsylvania, leaked the decision details to
President -elect Buchanan before the inauguration.
Before. So he knew exactly what was coming when
he gave that speech. Precisely. When Buchanan
spoke about the impending decision settling everything,
he already knew what the court was going to decide.
He was essentially prepping the nation for it.
And he didn't just know. He actively tried to
influence its scope, pushing for a broader ruling.
That sounds like the executive branch meddling
with the judiciary. That's exactly what it looks
like. Back in January 1857, he consulted with
Justice John Catron, asked about the case's outcome,
and subtly suggested that maybe a broader decision,
one going beyond just Dred Scott's personal freedom
plea, would be more prudent, you know, settle
the issue permanently. Catron apparently confirmed
the Southern majority would rule against Scott.
but probably on narrow grounds unless Buchanan
could persuade Justice Greer to join a broader
decision. So Buchanan wrote to Greer, stressed
how nationally important a comprehensive ruling
would be, and he convinced him. That gave the
Southern majority the leverage they needed to
issue that sweeping decision, the one broad enough
to declare the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional.
This definitely moves beyond mere inaction. It
looks like direct influence, almost a conspiracy,
to try and settle the slavery question in the
South's favor and shut down political debate.
Two days after Buchanan's sworn in, Chief Justice
Taney delivers the Dred Scott decision. And it
was, like you said, a bombshell. What were the
immediate consequences, especially up north?
It was a political earthquake. Yeah, it denied
Scott's freedom, but the impact was way bigger
than just one man. It broadly asserted Congress
had no constitutional power to exclude slavery
in the territories. That effectively killed the
Missouri Compromise of 1820. Right. Plus, it
stated slaves were property without rights and
that no African -American free or enslaved could
ever be a full U .S. citizen. Buchanan's letters
weren't public then, but people saw him talking
quietly with Taney at the inauguration. That
fueled Republican suspicions of a conspiracy
between the president and the chief justice to
advance slavery. Understandable. This decision,
as historian David Blight puts it, was the great
pivot on the road to disunion. Why? Because it,
quote, stoked the fear, distrust and conspiratorial
hatred already common in both the North and the
South to new levels of intensity. It was a major,
major disaster. Dramatically inflamed tensions
led directly toward the Civil War, completely
backfired on Buchanan's hope to end the debate.
So he kicks off his presidency with this unprecedented
judicial mess, and then his administration faces
a whole bunch of other challenges, starting with
his own cabinet. He wanted harmony, but it sounds
like he got the opposite. Yeah, he aimed for
an obedient, harmonious cabinet, but the way
he built it was disastrous, deeply imbalanced.
Four of his southern ministers were large -scale
slaveholders who later joined the Confederacy,
and the three northern department heads, all
dough -faces northerners sympathetic to the South.
His goal was clearly to dominate the cabinet
with men who agreed with him on slavery and states'
rights, ensure loyalty to his vision. But that
backfired, too. Of course. It alienated tons
of people in the North, especially because he
failed to appoint any followers of Stephen Douglas
that just fragmented the Democratic Party even
more. He also had a rocky relationship with his
own vice president, John C. Breckenridge, right
from the start. Another sign of those deep ideological
splits. He basically created a cabinet more aligned
with Southern secessionist thinking than national
unity. And then almost right away. the economy
tanks, adding another crisis layer to his early
term. What were the Panic of 1857 about and how
did Buchanan handle it? The Panic of 1857 hit
in the summer of that year, started with the
collapse of the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust
Company, triggered by over -speculation in land
and railroads, plus a drop in European demand
for American farm products. Oof, bad timing.
Terrible timing, it spread fast. 1 ,400 state
banks, 5 ,000 businesses went bankrupt. Northern
cities saw massive unemployment, hunger, people
demanding relief. The agricultural South, though,
with high cotton prices, was initially less affected,
which just added to the sectional bitterness.
How did Buchanan respond? He blamed it on over
-speculation. And sticking to his Jacksonian
principles, limited government, hard currency,
minimal federal intervention in crises, he restricted
paper money. froze federal funds for public works
and refused any kind of economic stimulus or
relief efforts. Completely consistent with his
philosophy, but it left many people suffering,
drew heavy criticism from those who thought the
government should step in. The economy did recover
eventually, after a few years. But Buchanan's
perceived inaction during the crisis. It just
fueled northern resentment, raised more questions
about his leadership. And despite wanting to
cut the deficit, the federal budget actually
grew 15 % during his term. He also had to deal
with conflict out west in the Utah territory.
The Utah war, that sounds like a significant
military challenge. It was. In the spring of
57, the Latter -day Saints and their leader,
Brigham Young, were clashing with federal representatives.
There was harassment, violence against non -Mormons.
This tragically led to the Mountain Meadows Massacre
in September 1857, the Utah Territorial Militia
attacked a wagon train, killed 125 settlers.
Horrific. Good grief. Butanin, apparently offended
by Mormon militarism and polygamy, and maybe
looking for a distraction from the mess back
east, authorized a military expedition, sent
2 ,500 troops to replace Young as governor. Did
it come to fighting? The Mormons resisted initially,
destroyed some army property, prepared for a
fight, but Buchanan wisely sent Thomas Alcain,
a non -Mormon friend of the Latter -day Saints,
who managed to negotiate a peaceful agreement.
Buchanan granted amnesty. Federal troops occupied
Utah without more bloodshed. So it ended peacefully,
but was the initial military response necessary?
Some historians think Buchanan's initial actions
were an inappropriate response, maybe based on
uncorroborated reports, a potential overreaction
fueled by the religious and social prejudices
of the time, and that intervention cost the federal
government millions. Amidst all this domestic
turmoil, there was one rare moment of technological
triumph. Something that briefly captured everyone's
imagination. Ah, you mean the transatlantic telegraph
cable in 1858. Yeah, after several failed tries,
they finally laid a working cable across the
Atlantic, linking North America and Europe. Buchanan
was the first president to get an official telegram
across it. Queen Victoria sent him a 98 -word
message. Took 16 hours to transmit. The technology
was so primitive. 16 hours. Still amazing, though.
It was. Buchanan's response hailed it as a triumph
more glorious than was ever won by a conqueror
on the field of battle, bond of perpetual peace
and friendship between the kindred nations. It
was this rare moment of unity, international
goodwill, and a presidency just drowning in division
and conflict. A little glimpse of a more connected,
peaceful world, even as his own nation was tearing
itself apart. A rare beacon of unity, like you
said. But just as the world was shrinking America
itself was fracturing and nowhere more painfully
than in bleeding, Kansas That was becoming an
open wound Indeed. The Kansas -Nebraska Act of
54, letting settlers decide on slavery via popular
sovereignty, had basically turned Kansas into
a mini -civil war, bleeding Kansas. You had two
rival governments, the anti -slavery one in Topeka,
the pro -slavery one at La Compton, and Buchanan
sided with. Buchanan, sticking to his consistent
pro -Southern leanings and his constitutional
interpretation, chose to endorse the pro -slavery
La Compton government. a move that would prove
absolutely disastrous. And this leads straight
into the infamous LaCompton Constitution controversy,
a real flash point in his presidency. What was
so contentious about this constitution and why
did Buchanan back it so hard? Well, Buchanan
appointed Robert J. Walker as territorial governor.
Walker was experienced, but he quickly saw the
depth of the election fraud and violence in Kansas.
The LaCompton government, totally dominated by
pro -slavery guys, cooked up a pro -slavery constitution.
OK. But the proposed referendum on slavery, it
was deeply flawed. Even if voters rejected slavery
on paper, existing slaves and their kids would
still remain enslaved. So there was no real way
for the anti -slavery majority to actually prohibit
slavery. They rightly boycotted the referendum
as a total sham. But Buchanan accepted it anyway.
Despite massive protests from Governor Walker,
from former Kansas governors, all attesting to
the widespread fraud, Buchanan decided to accept
the LaCompton Constitution. He saw it as the
legitimate outcome of popular sovereignty, despite
all the evidence screaming otherwise. He really
pushed this through Congress, didn't he? Even
resorting to what some called political bribery.
This wasn't just passive acceptance, it was an
active campaign. Oh, he went all out. In a December
1857 meeting with his former ally Stephen A.
Douglas, Buchanan aggressively demanded all Democrat
support, admitting Kansas under LeCompton. He
sent it to Congress, attacked the revolutionary
government in Topeka, used favors, patronage
jobs, even offers of cash for votes. It was an
unprecedented level of presidential arm twisting.
It narrowly passed the Senate in March. But then
a crucial coalition, no nothing, things, Republicans,
and importantly, Northern Democrats led by Stephen
Douglas defeated the bill in the House. Douglas
again, why did he oppose his own party's president?
Douglas was the champion of true popular sovereignty.
He saw the LaCompton Constitution as a total
perversion of that principle. It made him a formidable
opponent to Buchanan. And this defeat, it created
a massive, irreparable split within the Democratic
Party, basically sealing its fate. maybe even
the nations. An irreparable one, absolutely.
Buchanan reportedly never forgave Douglas for
that house defeat, saw it as a personal betrayal.
He systematically fired all Douglas supporters
from patronage jobs in Illinois and DC, essentially
declared war on a powerful wing of his own party.
Wow, he didn't give up on Kansas, though. No,
instead of accepting defeat, Buchanan backed
the 1858 English bill. It offered Kansas immediate
statehood and public lands if they accepted Lecompton.
But Kansans overwhelmingly rejected that in another
referendum, cementing their anti -slavery stance.
Kansas eventually got admitted as a free state
in January 1861, but only after bitter southern
opposition. And if we connect this to the bigger
picture, this internal Democratic Party warfare,
it was a critical factor in weakening the party,
paving the way for a Republican victory in 1860.
The whole Lecompton fight became the battleground
for control of the Democratic Party. Buchanan,
Southern Democrats, and doe faces on one side.
Douglas and Northern Democrats on the other.
A fight over principles, really. Buchanan insisted
everyone respect the Dred Scott decision as final.
Douglas championed popular sovereignty, arguing
territories should still get to exclude slavery.
Buchanan even actively tried to defeat Douglass's
Senate re -election in Illinois in 1858, wring
competing candidates against him a move that,
ironically, could have handed the election to
Abraham Lincoln. But Douglass won anyway. Douglass
still won. But Buchanan's support base shrank
to this narrow coalition of Southerners. The
Democratic Party was profoundly fractured, unable
to unite against the rising Republicans. That
fracture was basically a gift to the Republicans.
So while the domestic situation was just collapsing
around him, Buchanan still had these ambitious
foreign policy goals, almost like trying to project
strength abroad that he didn't have at home.
He did seem to. He launched this ambitious foreign
policy, wanted to establish U .S. hegemony over
Central America. Counter -European imperialism
really pushed the Monroe Doctrine. He tried renegotiating
the Clayton Buller Treaty with Britain, which
limited U .S. influence down there. He also aimed
for American protectorates over the Mexican states
of Chihuahua and Sonora. And he never gave up
on his long term goal of acquiring Cuba, saw
it as vital for U .S. security economy. But the
House blocked most of that, fearing more slave
territory. Was he successful anywhere? He did
manage to convince the British to cede the Bay
Islands to Honduras and the Mosquito Coast to
Nicaragua. That consolidated U .S. influence
a bit. He even launched a military expedition
to Paraguay. That seems kind of random. That's
right, an obscure episode. In 1858, Buchanan
ordered the Paraguay Expedition, sent a big force,
2 ,500 Marines, 19 warships, to punish Paraguay
for firing on the USS Water Witch, a diplomatic
insult he took very seriously. It was costly,
took months to get down there. But yeah, it resulted
in a Paraguayan apology and they paid an indemnity,
showed he was willing to use force to protect
American interests abroad. He also considered
buying Alaska from Russia, made an initial $5
million offer in 1859. Those talks laid the groundwork
for the later purchase under Seward. Plus, he
secured important trade deals with China, the
Treaty of Tianjin, and Japan, the Harris Treaty,
expanded American influence in Asia, and famously
received a Japanese delegation in May 1860, a
really exotic diplomatic event for the time.
It's quite a contrast, isn't it? Dealing with
foreign dignitaries, trade deals, thinking about
buying Alaska? While back home his administration
was facing corruption charges. I heard he was
even offered a herd of elephants by the King
of Siam. You can just picture Buchanan dealing
with secession, trying to politely decline a
herd of elephants. Yes, apparently Lincoln was
the one who had to decline that offer later,
citing the climate. But while all this international
stuff was happening, yes, he was facing a serious
domestic investigation. The Co -vote Committee.
Exactly. March 1860, the House set up the Co
-vote Committee to investigate Buchanan's administration,
looking into alleged impeachable offenses. bribery,
extortion, mostly around patronage. His supporters
most have cried foul. Oh, yeah. They called it
a partisan attack driven by a Republican congressman
with a personal grudge. And ultimately, the committee
couldn't establish grounds for actually impeaching
Buchanan. But the majority report issued in June
alleged widespread corruption and abuse of power
among his cabinet seriously undermined public
trust. And the allegations were pretty bad. Painted
a picture of an administration bending rules
for political gain. They were serious. The committee
gathered evidence suggesting Buchanan tried to
bribe members of Congress through intermediaries
back in 58 to get votes for the LaCompton Constitution,
accusations of threatening relatives with job
loss if they didn't vote his way. Witnesses testified
federal funds were used against Stephen Douglas's
faction within the party. The public was reportedly
shocked by the extent of the alleged bribery,
this perception of a compromised government.
especially from a president who championed constitutional
purity. Republicans punted and distributed thousands
of copies of the crevode report as campaign material
in 1860. Further damaged Buchanan's reputation,
the Democratic party standing right when they
needed unity most. So as the 1860 election loomed,
he famously decided not to run again. Said he'd
be happier going back to Wheatland. He must have
known the country was in deep, deep trouble.
Yeah, he famously told Lincoln, his successor,
if you are as happy in entering the White House
as I shall feel on returning to Wheatland, you
are a happy man. At the 1860 Democratic Convention,
the party just catastrophically split over slavery
in the territories. Right, Douglas versus Breckenridge.
Stephen Douglas got the northern nomination,
John C. Breckenridge got the southern one, Buchanan
still holding that deep grudge against Douglas
just... tepidly supported Breckenridge. This
complete fracture of the Democrats allowed Abraham
Lincoln, the Republican, to win a four -way race
with only about 40 percent of the popular vote,
but a clear electoral college win. Buchanan became
the last Democrat to win the presidency until
Grover Cleveland, way later in 1884, marked a
profound shift in American politics. With Lincoln's
victory, the nation just plunged into crisis,
and Buchanan's lame duck period became this time
of intense scrutiny and ultimately historical
condemnation. This is where many historians say
his failure was most acute, right? Absolutely.
As early as October, the commanding general,
Winfield Scott, seasoned military guy, warned
Buchanan that at least seven states were likely
to secede, recommended deploying troops to protect
federal property down south. Seems like sensible
advice. But Buchanan distrusted Scott. thought
he was old and maybe unreliable, he ignored those
critical recommendations. He did initially tell
his secretary of war, John B. Floyd, to reinforce
southern forts. But Floyd, a southern sympathizer
himself, persuaded Buchanan to revoke the order,
leaving federal installations totally vulnerable.
And his December 1816 message to Congress. It
didn't exactly calm things down. It's going to
get worse with mixed messages. Quite the opposite.
In that message, Buchanan gave this very legalistic
argument. He denied states had the right to secede,
called it revolutionary. But then in the same
breath, he maintained the federal government
was without power to prevent them from doing
it. Wait, what? You can't succeed, but we can't
stop you. Exactly. And controversially, he blamed
the whole crisis on the intemperate interference
of the northern people with the question of slavery.
Suggested that if northern states didn't repeal
their unconstitutional and obnoxious enactments,
meaning personal liberty laws blocking the Fugitive
Slave Act, then southern states would be justified
in revolutionary resistance. Wow. blaming the
North. His only proposed solution, an explanatory
amendment guaranteeing slavery in states and
territories, strengthening fugitive slave laws.
The address got slammed by both North for its
weakness and blame shifting, and South for denying
secession. Just deepened the sense of paralysis
and division. His cabinet started falling apart
too. And there were even accusations of espionage,
outright disloyalty from his inner circle. Churchary
Secretary Howell Cobb from Georgia resigned five
days after that address, said his views were
irreconcilable with Buchanan's. Buchanan kept
surrounding himself with Southerners, ignoring
Republicans, still hoping for some Southern -led
compromise. Unbelievable. He notoriously refused
to fire his Interior Secretary, Jacob Thompson,
who was actively serving as Mississippi's agent
to discuss secession. or Secretary of War John
B. Floyd, despite an embezzlement scandal. Floyd
eventually resigned, but not before allegedly
sending tons of firearms to southern states,
where they ended up in Confederate hands. Even
Buchanan's close friend, Rose O 'Neill Greenhow,
was actively spying for the Confederacy. Shows
how deeply compromised his administration had
become. Despite this rapid unraveling, there
were some last -gitch efforts to compromise.
Did anything look remotely possible? Efforts
by Senator John J. Crittenden, Representative
Thomas Corwin, former President John Tyler. They
all failed, even though Buchanan supported them.
These proposals usually offered concessions to
slave states. Republicans rejected them, refusing
to allow slavery's expansion. Bardent secessionists
rejected them as not enough. The deadlock. Total
deadlock. Buchanan even secretly asked President
-elect Lincoln to call for a national referendum
on slavery. A desperate move. Lincoln wisely
declined, wouldn't legitimize a question that
had already torn the country apart. The Corwin
Amendment, barring Congress from intersearing
with slavery where it existed, actually passed
Congress, but was never ratified. Just shows
how deep the divide was. And then came the Fort
Sumter standoff, a direct prelude to war. It
became Lincoln's problem, but it was a crisis
Buchanan inherited and failed to solve. By the
end of January 61, six more slave states had
seceded, formed the Confederate States of America.
Buchanan, finally taking a slightly firmer stance,
replaced his departed Southern cabinet members
with staunch unionists. John Adams Dix, Edwin
M. Stanton, Joseph Holt. That must have changed
the dynamic. It did. When Buchanan considered
surrendering Fort Sumter, that federal fort in
Charleston Harbor, his new cabinet threatened
to resign en masse. He relented. On January 5th,
he sent a ship, the Star of the West, to reinforce
Sumpter with 250 men and supplies. But critically,
he failed to ask Major Robert Anderson, the commander
at Sumpter, for covering fire. Confederate cannons
fired on the ship, forced it to turn back north
without delivering anything. Buchanan chose not
to respond to this clear act of war, still desperately
seeking compromise, left the standoffs unresolved.
Anderson's message on March 3rd about dwindling
supplies. That landed squarely on Lincoln's desk
the very next day as Buchanan's term ended. And
this is really where his legacy gets cemented,
isn't it? His belief that he couldn't or shouldn't
intervene decisively during that critical lame
duck period. It's central to how he's viewed.
He presided over the nation as it fractured,
seemingly paralyzed by his constitutional interpretations.
His perhaps naive hope for compromise allowed
the secession crisis to just fester. During his
term, yeah, Minnesota, Oregon, Kansas were admitted
to the union, but those were totally overshadowed
by the looming civil war, which he basically
handed off to Lincoln. So Buchanan leaves office,
the civil war explodes just two months later,
and he retires to Wheatland. a man vilified by
so many. He spent his final years, it seems,
trying to make sense of and defend what he did
during those tumultuous times. He did. Mostly
stayed in his study, reading, writing letters,
increasingly isolated from the public. But despite
the criticism, the war, he did publicly support
the Union and the war effort. Wrote to former
colleagues that the assault upon Sumter was the
commencement of war by the Confederate states
and no alternative was left but to prosecute
it with vigor. Okay, so he did support the Union
effort. Yes, he supported Lincoln's draft, the
conscription, but he personally opposed the Emancipation
Proclamation, citing constitutional violations,
though he never publicly criticized it. probably
didn't want to undermine the Union war effort.
He also urged fellow Pennsylvania Democrats,
young men, to enlist in the Union army. Shows
a core, if maybe complicated, loyalty to the
nation. But the public wasn't exactly ready to
give or forget, were they? The blame for the
war seemed to land right on his shoulders. Oh,
far from it. The war was sometimes called Buchanan's
War in the press. He got daily hate mail, threatening
letters. Stores in his own town, Lancaster, displayed
his picture with Trader inked on his forehead.
Ouch. That's harsh. The Senate even proposed
a resolution condemning him. It failed, but the
sentiment was clear. Newspapers accused him of
colluding with the Confederacy. Even his former
cabinet members, some now in Lincoln's administration,
refused to defend him publicly, probably wanted
to distance themselves from his unpopular policies.
All this public vitriol made him reportedly distraught,
sick, and depressed really affected his final
years. He tried to set the record straight himself,
wrote a memoir defending his legacy. What was
his argument? Who did he blame in the end? He
first defended himself in an exchange of letters
with Winfield Scott, published in the National
Intelligencer in 1862. But his big defense came
in his memoir, Mr. Buchanan's Administration
on the Eve of Rebellion, published in 1866, a
year after the war ended. And his take was? In
it, he squarely blames secession on the malign
influence of Republicans and the abolitionist
movement. argued their agitation provoked the
South. He expressed satisfaction with his own
decisions even during the secession crisis, maintained
he acted within his constitutional powers, and
ultimately blamed Robert Anderson at Sumter,
Winfield Scott for bad advice, and Congress for
the unresolved issues that led to war. So not
his fault, basically. Essentially, yeah. He argued
the crisis was beyond any president's power to
solve and that he'd kept the peace as long as
constitutionally possible. He died on June 1st,
1868 at Wheatland, age 77, from respiratory failure.
buried in Lancaster. Let's talk about his core
political philosophy. That Doe Face label keeps
coming up. Seems central to understanding how
he approached the crisis. The term Doe Face really
does capture his identity. A northerner with
strong pro -southern principles. Buchanan genuinely
sympathized with the cultural social values of
the Plander class. He interacted with them more
and more, especially after entering the Senate
in 1834, forming close ties with southern leaders.
He believed the great object of his administration
was quote, to arrest, if possible, the agitation
of the slavery question in the North and to destroy
sectional parties. That was his guiding star,
a belief that by ending the debate, sticking
strictly to the Constitution, the Union could
survive, even if his methods constantly failed.
So personally opposed to slavery, but politically,
he seemed to actively defend and enable its expansion.
This is where it gets really interesting, personally
against slavery, but politically enabling its
expansion. How do we reconcile that huge paradox?
It's a profound paradox right at the heart of
his controversial legacy. While he was personally
opposed to slavery in the abstract, saw as a
moral wrong, he believed the abolitionists were
actively preventing a solution. By inflaming
passions, pushing for federal intervention, he
even claimed they'd postpone the emancipation
of the slaves in three or four states for at
least half a century with their radicalism. Wow.
blaming the abolitionists for slavery continuing.
It seems so. He was willing to give slaveholders
the benefit of the doubt, even stated in his
third annual message that slaves were treated
with kindness and humanity, and that philanthropy
and self -interest of the master have combined
to produce this humane result. Yikes. That hasn't
aged well. Not at all. It suggests this deeply
conflicted stance. His personal moral reservations
were completely overshadowed by his political
convictions about states' rights, his desperate
desire to save the Union through appeasement
and constitutional non -interference. He believed
that only through that approach could the agitation
stop and the Union survive. He saw the agitation
itself as the greater evil, more dangerous than
slavery's existence. He also hammered on constitutional
restraint, almost to a fault, arguing the federal
government just didn't have the power to intervene.
That was central to his philosophy, almost an
unshakable dogma for him. He believed the Constitution
was made of restraints imposed not by arbitrary
authority, but by the people upon themselves
and their representatives. He emphasized mutual
forbearance as the key to keeping sectional jealousies
down. And on slavery specifically. He repeated,
although in Pennsylvania we are all opposed to
slavery in the abstract, we can never violate
the constitutional compact we have with our sister
states. Their rights will be held sacred by us
under the Constitution. It is their own question.
And there let it remain. shows his unwavering
commitment to his interpretation of the Constitution
as a pact between states. Even when it meant
upholding institutions he personally disliked,
or institutions that were tearing the Union apart,
his constitutional literalism left almost no
room for moral or political flexibility. And
he had complex, almost contradictory views on
tariffs and territorial expansion, too. Trying
to balance competing interests. Yeah, deeply
conflicted on tariffs, torn between free trade,
which helped the agricultural South, and protective
duties, which helped northern industries. He
wanted to benefit everyone, but knew either policy
would likely help one section at the expense
of the other. He once complained, I am viewed
as the strongest advocate of protection in other
states, whilst I am denounced as its enemy in
Pennsylvania. highlights how difficult his position
was. And expansion. On territorial expansion,
he was all for it. Famously said, what sir? Prevent
the people from crossing the Rocky Mountains?
You might just as well command the Niagara not
to flow. We must fulfill our destiny. Classic
manifest destiny talk. Exactly. But on the resulting
spread of slavery through expansion, he claimed
he felt a strong repugnance by any act of mind
to extend the present limits of the Union over
a new slaveholding territory. Even hoped acquiring
Texas would somehow limit not enlarge slavery's
reach. So even in his expansionist dreams, the
shadow of slavery was always there, a dilemma
he consistently failed to solve without making
the national divide even deeper. Beyond politics,
Buchanan's personal life has always drawn interest
in speculation, especially his lifelong bachelorhood,
which was pretty unusual for public figures back
then. It's true. He also had that eye condition,
esotropia, crossed eyes. One eye short -sighted,
the other farsighted, led him to tilt his head
forward and to the side in conversation, which,
unfortunately, led to ridicule from guys like
Henry Clay. Might have made him seem aloof or
peculiar to some. And then there's the really
tragic story of Anne Caroline Coleman, his lost
love. Many point to that as the reason he never
married. Yeah, back in 1818, he got engaged to
Anne Caroline Coleman, daughter of a wealthy
iron and manufacturer. But they apparently spent
little time together. Buchanan was busy with
his demanding legal political work, especially
during the panic of 1819. Rumors started flying
that he was involved with other women and heard
them, accused him of only being interested in
her money. She broke off the engagement, and
shortly after, in December 1819, she died inexplicably
at just 23. From hysterical convulsions, historians
now think it was likely a laudanum overdose.
Tragic. Incredibly tragic. And her family refused
Buchanan's request to attend her funeral. He
later claimed he stayed unmarried out of devotion
to her memory. That narrative kind of took hold.
But there's also speculation that her death might
have served another purpose. A convenient cover
story for his lifelong bachelorhood. Some do
speculate that her death merely served to deflect
questions about Buchanan's sexuality and bachelorhood,
gave him a socially acceptable reason for being
single in an era that looked suspiciously at
lifelong bachelors. Biographers like Gene H.
Baker suggest maybe he was celibate, perhaps
even asexual. Others, like James W. Lowen and
Robert P. Watson, have more pointedly guessed
he might have been homosexual, citing his extremely
close relationship with the Alabama politician
William Rufus King. William Rufus King, Franklin
Pierce's vice president. They lived together
for years, right? What was that relationship
like? How did people see it back then? Yes, Buchanan
and King, both lifelong bachelors, they lived
together in a Washington boarding house, went
to social events together for a decade from 1834
to 1844. Buchanan himself once called their relationship
a communion. They were inseparable. A communion.
Hmm. Andrew Jackson mockingly called them Miss
Nancy and Aunt Fancy, common euphemisms for effeminate
men back then, suggests their unusually close
bond was noticed, maybe subtly ridiculed. Buchanan's
own postmaster general also called King Aunt
Fancy and Buchanan's better half or wife. Wow,
that's quite direct. King died four years before
Buchanan became president. Buchanan described
him as among the best, the purest and most consistent
public man I have known. A really profound eulogy.
And this raises an important question, doesn't
it? How much did his personal life, the societal
expectations of the time, influence his political
decisions or his public image? We can only speculate,
of course. But it's compelling to wonder if maybe
the tragic loss of Anne Coleman The constant
scrutiny of his bachelorhood pushed Buchanan
into this almost emotionally guarded hyper -constitutionalist
stance. Perhaps a leader who was less personally
reserved, more emotionally connected to the public's
anxieties, might have found different ways to
compromise. Hard to know. Impossible to know
for sure, especially since it's likely their
nieces destroyed correspondence between them.
But the speculation definitely adds another layer
to understanding this man who seemed to struggle
connecting with the emotional reality of his
fracturing nation. Well, he certainly predicted
that history will vindicate my memory. But that
hasn't quite happened, has it? He's consistently
ranked among the absolute worst presidents. Clearly,
that hasn't quite happened. No. Historians, scholars,
they've consistently ranked Buchanan at or near
the bottom since the first rankings came out
in 1948. For vision, leadership, domestic and
foreign, moral authority, positive historical
significance. He's right down there. There's
a strong consensus his presidency was a catastrophic
failure directly preceding the Civil War. He's
often criticized not just for inaction. but for
a perceived bias toward the South during that
secession crisis. He is. Critics point to his
unwillingness or inability to act in the face
of secession. See his constitutional rigidity
as just paralysis. Jean Baker, one of his biographers,
is particularly harsh. She says his failing was
not inactivity, but rather his partiality for
the South, a favoritism that bordered on disloyalty.
That's strong. She calls him a stubborn, mistaken
ideologue whose principles held no room for compromise,
concludes he came close to committing treason
than any other president in American history
because of his actions and inactions during that
critical lame duck period. Wow, closer to treason.
That's about as strong a condemnation as you
can get. Are there any defenses of his presidency?
Any historians offering a more charitable view?
Yes, some do offer a more nuanced if not exactly
positive defense. Philip S. Klein, another biographer
writing back in 1962, offered a more charitable
perspective. He argued Buchanan assumed leadership
when an unprecedented wave of angry passion was
sweeping over the nation. Klein considered it
a remarkable achievement that Buchanan held the
hostile sections in check during these revolutionary
times by meticulously sticking to legalisms and
constitutional interpretations that, in Klein's
view, prevented an even earlier, maybe more chaotic,
start to the war. So he bought time. That's the
argument. Klein suggested Buchanan's weaknesses
got magnified by enraged partisans, that his
talents, which might have made him a great president,
in quieter times were just overshadowed by the
cataclysmic events of civil war and by the towering
Abraham Lincoln. These defenses often emphasize
how overwhelming the crisis was, arguing maybe
no single person could have stopped the conflict
by then. Despite the fierce debate over his legacy,
his low rankings, he does have quite a few memorials
scattered around the country. He does. There's
a big bronze and granite memorial down in Washington
D .C. unveiled in 1930. has his statue flanked
by figures representing law and diplomacy, the
two pillars of his career. An earlier monument,
this huge 250 ton pyramid, stands on his birthplace
site in Stony Batter, Pennsylvania, dedicated
back in 1911. Several counties are named for
him, Iowa, Missouri, Virginia, the one in Texas
got renamed, cities, townships too, like Buchanan,
Michigan, his childhood high school, James Buchanan
High School. He was even portrayed, albeit comically,
in that 2019 film Raising Buchanan. While his
reputation is fiercely debated, his name is still
out there on the landscape. So what we've seen
today is this profoundly complex figure, right?
A skilled lawyer, diplomat, a committed advocate
for states' rights, who gets the top job at the
absolute most perilous moment in American history.
And despite his personal feelings against slavery,
his stated desire to save the Union, his actions,
or maybe his lack of action, especially around
Brett Scott, the Compton secession crisis, they
ultimately just deepened the very divisions he
wanted to heal. His unwavering constitutional
liter - meant to keep order, ironically left
him paralyzed when the nation desperately needed
more leadership and decisive action. It's such
a powerful lesson, isn't it? A president who
believes so strongly in constitutional restraint,
avoiding federal intervention, finds his principles
just utterly overwhelmed by the moral and political
reality of his time. He wanted to stop the agitation
of the slavery question, but his whole approach,
tragically, seemed to just pour fuel on the fire,
leading the nation right to the brink. It really
makes you think about the limits of purely legalistic
solutions when you're facing profound moral and
societal divides. And this raises an important
question for you, our listener, to maybe chew
on. Given everything we've explored, what do
you think was James Buchanan's single most significant
missed opportunity? Was there a point where a
different decision could have truly changed the
course of American history? Or maybe was the
fracture of the union just inevitable by then,
regardless of who was in the Oval Office, just
waiting for its moment to finally break? Something
to ponder as you continue your own deep dive
into history and leadership. Thank you for joining
us for this deep dive into the life and legacy
of James Buchanan. We hope you feel much more
informed and maybe even a little more curious
about this pivotal, if often criticized, president.
We'll be back soon with another deep dive into
the sources that matter to you.