WEBVTT

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Welcome back, Deep Divers. Today, we're taking

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a shortcut to being well -informed about a figure

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often overlooked in the grand narrative of American

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history, yet whose decisions were absolutely

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pivotal in shaping the nation. We're talking

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about James Buchanan, the 15th president of the

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United States. We've got a stack of fascinating

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sources, historical accounts, biographical analyses.

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All sorts of things, and our mission really is

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to cut through the noise, give you the unvarnished

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truth, and understand why Buchanan consistently

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ranks among the most, well, controversial figures

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in the Oval Office. Indeed. Our mission today

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is definitely to unpack the life and presidency

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of James B. Tannen. He was a man who served during

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a period of, well, intense national division,

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and his actions, or maybe his inactions, they're

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still debated by historians today. Yeah, you

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might know him as, you know, consistently ranked

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among the worst presidents. That's the common

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perception, yes. But we're going to try and understand

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why and how he earned that legacy, drawing directly

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from these historical accounts you've got there.

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We have a really comprehensive look at his life,

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starting right from his humble beginnings in

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Pennsylvania, all the way to his final years

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defending his reputation. It's it's a fascinating

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deep dive into a man who was just deeply entwined

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with the issues that led to the American Civil

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War. Absolutely. So get ready for some surprising

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facts and some critical insights that might even

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challenge what you thought you knew about them.

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And the core question we'll explore, I think,

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is how a career politician, someone deeply experienced

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in law and diplomacy. I mean, this wasn't his

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first rodeo. Not at all. Decades of experience.

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Exactly. How did he find himself presiding over

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a nation on the absolute brink of collapse? And

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why, despite his stated intentions, did he fail

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so spectacularly to reconcile its fractured parts?

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Was he just overwhelmed by history? Or did his

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own approach, maybe his deep life in constitutional

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literalism and not in interference, did that

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actually speed things up, accelerate the disunion

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he wanted to avoid? That's the key question,

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isn't it? Let's unpack this. Okay, so let's start

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at the very beginning. James Buchanan Jr., born

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April 23, 1791. He didn't exactly have a silver

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spoon in his mouth, did he? His origins sound,

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well, remarkably humble for a future president.

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Oh, far from it. Buchanan was born in a log cabin,

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actually, at a place called Stoney Batter near

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Cove Gap, Pennsylvania. A log cabin, really?

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Yes. He was the second of 11 children and the

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eldest son. His father, James Buchanan Sr., was

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a Scotch -Irish immigrant, came over from County

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Donegal in Ireland back in 1783. And his father's

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story is quite something. How so? Well, he started

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out, believe it or not, as an indentured servant.

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But he quickly became the wealthiest resident

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in their area, made his fortune as a merchant,

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a farmer, real estate investor. Wow, that's quite

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a job. It really is. Quite the American dream

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story for the time. And it must have instilled

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in young James a strong sense of ambition, financial

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sense, but also maybe an awareness of social

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mobility, the self -made man idea. Right, that

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immigrant drive. And his mother, Elizabeth Spear,

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She sounds like she had a really profound influence

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on him in those early years. She certainly did.

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Buchanan himself actually credited his early

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education mainly to her. Elizabeth Spear was

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apparently a highly literate woman, very interested

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in poetry, politics. Yeah, she'd often quote

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people like John Milton and William Shakespeare

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to him. So this early exposure to intellectual

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stuff, political discourse, it must have shaped

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his mind, sparked his political curiosity early

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on, grounded him in that classical thought and

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rhetoric that served him so well later. But even

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future presidents have their youthful moments,

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it seems. What about Dickinson College? I heard

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he nearly didn't make it through. Well, yeah,

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before Dickinson, he attended Old Stone Academy

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in Mercersburg, then went on to Dickinson College

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in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. And interestingly,

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yes, in 1808, he nearly got expelled. Expelled?

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For what? For disorderly conduct. We're talking

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things like drinking in local taverns, disturbing

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the peace, even some vandalism, apparently. Typical

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college stuff, maybe. Perhaps. a bit more serious

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back then. But he pleaded for a second chance,

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promised to reform himself, and, you know, to

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his credit, he not only stayed, but graduated

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with honors in 1809. So this early brush with,

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let's say, serious trouble and his ability to

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get back on track and excel, it does suggest

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a certain resilience. Or maybe a capacity for

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self -correction, or perhaps just a really strong

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drive to avoid public disgrace. That seems to

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be a theme later on. A quick learner, then. both

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in books and maybe in talking his way out of

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trouble. After college, he went straight into

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law. Was that always the plan? Seems like it.

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Immediately after graduating, later that same

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year, he moved to Lancaster, trained for two

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and a half years with a highly regarded lawyer,

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James Hopkins. And this wasn't just, you know,

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learning by rote. He really dug into the U .S.

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Code, the Constitution, legal big names like

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William Blackstone and his commentaries on English

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law. So it was rigorous training, laid a very

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strong, very formal foundation for his legal

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and later political career, emphasizing precedent.

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the letter of the law. And his legal career just

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took off almost immediately. Did his background

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help him get established so quickly? Absolutely.

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He passed the bar exam in 1812, stayed in Lancaster,

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and boom, rapidly made a name for himself as

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a prominent lawyer. Just like that. Well, his

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reputation for diligence, a sharp legal mind,

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it meant his income just soared. By 1821, he

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was earning over $11 ,000 a year. Which was a

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lot back then. Oh, yeah. To put that in perspective,

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that's like maybe $260 ,000 in today's money.

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So it shows his rapid financial success, the

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respect he commanded. And during this time, he

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also became a Freemason, served as worshipful

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master of his Lodge, Masonic Lodge number 43,

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and even a district deputy grandmaster. So he

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was plugging into those influential community

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networks early on. That would definitely help

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with political ambitions later. OK, so he's building

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a successful professional life. He's well connected.

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Then he steps into politics, but he starts as

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a federalist, which is interesting given where

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he ends up. How did that first affiliation shape

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him? Yeah, he was actually the chairman of the

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Lancaster chapter of the Federalist Party. Like

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his father, he supported their platform, you

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know, federal money for internal improvements,

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import duties to protect industries, bringing

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back a central bank. He was actually a strong

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critic of the Democratic Republican President

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James Madison during the War of 1812, lined up

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with the Federalists, who were pretty skeptical

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about that conflict. And he had a, well... a

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surprising, almost hands -on role in the War

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of 1812. Not exactly typical federalist politician

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behavior. He did. It's a fun little footnote.

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While he didn't serve in the formal militia during

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the British occupation of Washington D .C. and

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the threat to Baltimore, he joined a group of

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young guys in the Baltimore area. And get this,

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they were stealing horses for the United States

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Army. Stealing horses. Seriously. You see, a

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direct, if unconventional, contribution to the

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war effort makes him the last president involved

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in the War of 1812. A unique little piece of

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his biography. And maybe an early sign. of his

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practical rather than purely ideological approach

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to things. He then gets into the Pennsylvania

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House of Representatives. Was this just a stepping

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stone or did he see it as more? Yeah, he was

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elected as a Federalist in 1814, youngest member

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at the time, served until 1816. The state legislature

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sessions were deliberately short, only three

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months. Oh, convenient. Very convenient. Allowed

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him to keep up his lucrative law practice. In

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fact, his political service actually helped him

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get more clients and charge higher fees. Shows

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he was pretty shrewd about leveraging his public

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role for personal gain, for advancement. A notable

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moment early on was his successful defense of

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a district judge, Walter Franklin, in an impeachment

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trial in 1815. He argued impeachment should only

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be for actual judicial crimes or clear law violations,

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not just unpopular decisions. Interesting. Setting

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a precedent there. Exactly. Shows a very early

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grasp of separation of powers, commitment to

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legal precedent, things that would really influence

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him later, maybe too much. And then comes the

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big shift, federalist to Democrat. That's not

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just a minor change. It's a whole party realignment.

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What drove that for him? It's a really significant

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move, and it tells you a lot about his political

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character, I think. He got elected to the U .S.

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House of Representatives in 1820, served five

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terms there. His father died shortly after his

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election, a personal loss during this time of

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political change. He became a prominent leader

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in Pennsylvania's Amalgamator Party, which was

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this fascinating mix of Democratic Republicans

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and former Federalists, really reflects that

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fluid, kind of ideologically messy era of good

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feelings. when party lines got blurry. So his

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federalist ties weren't that strong? Apparently

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not. His federalist convictions were, let's say,

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weak. He switched parties after opposing a nativist

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federalist bill targeting non -citizens. This

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early willingness to shed ideological labels

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for political advantage became a defining future

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of his career. Maybe even tragically so. How

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so? Well, it suggests his core conviction was

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often about self -preservation advancement, which

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paradoxically might have failed him when real,

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uncompromising leadership was needed later on.

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So he was a pragmatist, always adapting to the

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political winds. Precisely. Look at the 1824

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presidential election. He initially backed Henry

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Clay. But when Pennsylvania voters overwhelmingly

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preferred Andrew Jackson, Buchanan quickly switched

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his support to Jackson. Smart politics, I guess.

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He joined Jackson's faction after the election

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loss, securing his spot in the emerging Democratic

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Party. Although ironically, Jackson apparently

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viewed him with contempt. Contempt? Why? There

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was some misunderstanding about Buchanan's role,

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trying to mediate between the Clay and Jackson

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camps. Just shows how quickly alliances shifted,

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how personal feelings could cloud politics. even

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among supposed allies. Wow, held in contempt

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by the very guy whose faction you're joining.

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But he definitely became a strong advocate for

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states' rights in Washington, building those

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key southern alliances early on. He did. Buchanan

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became a really avid defender of states' rights,

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forged close relationships with many southern

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congressmen. He even saw some New England congressmen

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as... dangerous radicals because of their views

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on federal power, abolitionism, things like that.

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He built a strong Democratic coalition back in

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Pennsylvania, too, pulled together former Federalist

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farmers, Philadelphia artisans, Ulster Scots

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Americans. That helped secure Pennsylvania for

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Jackson in the 1828 election, shows that early

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pattern of aligning with Southern political interests,

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a tendency that just got stronger over time.

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And he was making a name for himself in Congress,

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chairing important committees, getting involved

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in big cases. Yeah, he gained significant attention

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prosecuting federal district judge James H. Peck

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in an impeachment trial. The Senate acquitted

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Peck, but Buchanan arguing that high stakes case

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further cemented his reputation as a legal and

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political force. Then he chaired the powerful

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House Judiciary Committee. In 1831, he decided

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not to run for reelection for the 22nd Congress,

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which signaled he was aiming for higher office.

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Some Pennsylvania Democrats even floated his

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name for vice president in 1832. So he was definitely

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climbing. His swift rise really reflects a man

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with clear political goals and the skill to navigate

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the complex world of Washington. So what we're

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seeing here is Buchanan is this shrewd political

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operator, someone who adapts his party ties as

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needed, rises quickly through the ranks. The

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key takeaway from this early period maybe is

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that this political fluidity, while great for

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his career, might have left him without that

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unwavering moral compass needed later for the

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Union's existential crisis. Exactly. Buchanan's

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early career shows a man keenly aware of political

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currents, willing to shift allegiance, capable

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of building effective coalitions. Now, as he

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climbed higher, his experiences in diplomacy

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and the Senate were really instrumental in shaping

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his national profile and, crucially, his views

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on that growing sectional crisis that would define

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his legacy. After his time in the House, Andrew

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J. Jackson offered him a post that, well, you

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mentioned Buchanan wasn't too thrilled about

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it at first ambassador to Russia. What was the

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thinking there? Was it a reward or? That's right.

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After Jackson's reelection in 1832, he offered

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Buchanan the Russia post. Buchanan was somewhat

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reluctant. He saw St. Petersburg as a kind of

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political exile, you know, far from the center

00:12:37.320 --> 00:12:39.700
of American power. Makes sense. He eventually

00:12:39.700 --> 00:12:41.840
took it. But it turns out Jackson's intention

00:12:41.840 --> 00:12:45.340
might have been exactly that exile. Jackson apparently

00:12:45.340 --> 00:12:48.570
considered Buchanan an incompetent busybody and

00:12:48.570 --> 00:12:51.389
maybe a bit untrustworthy. Yeah, sheds light

00:12:51.389 --> 00:12:53.970
on those complex, sometimes hostile relationships

00:12:53.970 --> 00:12:56.669
even within the same party, how personal feelings

00:12:56.669 --> 00:12:58.990
could influence big appointments. A bit of a

00:12:58.990 --> 00:13:01.070
backhanded compliment or maybe just a backhanded

00:13:01.070 --> 00:13:03.409
way to get him out of the way. So what was his

00:13:03.409 --> 00:13:06.649
focus in Russia? Did he achieve much? His main

00:13:06.649 --> 00:13:08.830
job was to hammer out a trade and shipping treaty.

00:13:09.279 --> 00:13:11.580
He succeeded with the trade part, opened up some

00:13:11.580 --> 00:13:14.120
new avenues for American merchants. But getting

00:13:14.120 --> 00:13:16.379
free merchant shipping rights from Foreign Minister

00:13:16.379 --> 00:13:19.399
Karl Nesselrode proved really difficult. Russia

00:13:19.399 --> 00:13:22.480
was hesitant. And the irony is, just a year before

00:13:22.480 --> 00:13:25.860
in Congress, Buchanan had publicly blasted Tsar

00:13:25.860 --> 00:13:28.460
Nicholas I as a despot over Russia's handling

00:13:28.460 --> 00:13:32.480
of the Polish uprising in 1830. Oh, wow. Awkward.

00:13:32.899 --> 00:13:35.840
Very. Highlights that tension between his public

00:13:35.840 --> 00:13:38.120
pronouncements and his later diplomatic duties.

00:13:38.440 --> 00:13:41.279
Shows his ability to compartmentalize maybe.

00:13:41.700 --> 00:13:44.139
Execute policy even for regimes he personally

00:13:44.139 --> 00:13:47.179
criticized. It probably reinforced his view that

00:13:47.179 --> 00:13:49.360
national interests trumped ideology and foreign

00:13:49.360 --> 00:13:52.759
affairs. So he comes back from this exile and

00:13:52.759 --> 00:13:54.980
then pretty quickly finds his way into the U

00:13:54.980 --> 00:13:58.019
.S. Senate, a much more influential spot domestically.

00:13:58.100 --> 00:14:00.440
Well, not immediately. He actually lost a state

00:14:00.440 --> 00:14:02.179
legislature election when he first got back,

00:14:02.259 --> 00:14:04.779
a minor setback. Yeah. But then the Pennsylvania

00:14:04.779 --> 00:14:06.899
state legislature appointed him to the U .S.

00:14:07.000 --> 00:14:09.679
Senate to succeed William Wilkins. He served

00:14:09.679 --> 00:14:13.779
there for over a decade from 1834 to 1845, got

00:14:13.779 --> 00:14:16.799
reelected in 36 and 42. And during his Senate

00:14:16.799 --> 00:14:19.059
years, he became known for sticking really closely

00:14:19.059 --> 00:14:21.259
to the Pennsylvania state legislature's guidelines,

00:14:21.620 --> 00:14:23.820
sometimes even voting against positions he himself

00:14:23.820 --> 00:14:26.440
had argued for in speeches, just to reflect his

00:14:26.440 --> 00:14:28.700
constituents' will. That's interesting. Pragmatic

00:14:28.700 --> 00:14:31.100
again? Extremely pragmatic and committed to his

00:14:31.100 --> 00:14:33.740
representative role, even if it meant some inconsistency

00:14:33.740 --> 00:14:36.379
between his words and his votes. He became known

00:14:36.379 --> 00:14:39.240
for his commitment to states' rights and manifest

00:14:39.240 --> 00:14:42.259
destiny. Two huge forces shaping America then.

00:14:42.360 --> 00:14:45.179
Yes, those were absolutely defining aspects of

00:14:45.179 --> 00:14:47.460
his Senate career. They stayed central to his

00:14:47.460 --> 00:14:50.440
political identity. He opposed rechartering the

00:14:50.440 --> 00:14:52.899
Second Bank of the United States, siding with

00:14:52.899 --> 00:14:55.639
Jacksonian principles, tried to get a congressional

00:14:55.639 --> 00:14:58.740
censure of Jackson removed. He turned down President

00:14:58.740 --> 00:15:00.960
Martin Van Buren's offer to be attorney general,

00:15:01.779 --> 00:15:04.259
preferred chairing those prestigious Senate committees,

00:15:04.460 --> 00:15:06.299
judiciary, and foreign relations where he could

00:15:06.299 --> 00:15:09.080
wield more influence. He was a vocal opponent

00:15:09.080 --> 00:15:11.320
of the Webster -Ashburton treaty with Britain.

00:15:11.659 --> 00:15:14.899
called it a surrender of lands, demanded the

00:15:14.899 --> 00:15:18.139
entire rustic river valley for the U .S. In the

00:15:18.139 --> 00:15:20.720
Oregon boundary dispute, he took that hardline

00:15:20.720 --> 00:15:24.200
54 -40 or fight stance, wanting the whole territory,

00:15:24.200 --> 00:15:26.340
and he was a strong supporter of annexing the

00:15:26.340 --> 00:15:28.639
Republic of Texas. So very expansionist, very

00:15:28.639 --> 00:15:31.159
nationalist. Definitely, but always framed within

00:15:31.159 --> 00:15:34.039
his deep -seated state's rights principles. His

00:15:34.039 --> 00:15:36.399
stance on slavery in the Senate is obviously

00:15:36.399 --> 00:15:38.419
crucial given what happens later. This period

00:15:38.419 --> 00:15:41.620
really seems to lock in his approach. Absolutely

00:15:41.620 --> 00:15:44.399
critical. He notably opposed a gag rule that

00:15:44.399 --> 00:15:47.519
John C. Calhoun sponsored to suppress anti -slavery

00:15:47.519 --> 00:15:50.220
petitions in Congress. Buchanan actually joined

00:15:50.220 --> 00:15:53.639
the majority to block it. Why? That seems counter

00:15:53.639 --> 00:15:56.100
to his later positions. His reasoning was ironic.

00:15:56.419 --> 00:15:58.919
He believed suppressing the petitions would actually

00:15:58.919 --> 00:16:01.559
backfire, strengthening the abolitionists by

00:16:01.559 --> 00:16:04.200
making them look like martyrs. He put it very

00:16:04.200 --> 00:16:07.120
clearly. We have just as little right to interfere

00:16:07.120 --> 00:16:09.659
with slavery in the South as we have to touch

00:16:09.659 --> 00:16:12.379
the right of petition. So protect the right to

00:16:12.379 --> 00:16:15.000
petition, even if you hate the petition's content.

00:16:15.200 --> 00:16:18.139
Exactly. He consistently argued slavery was a

00:16:18.139 --> 00:16:21.139
state issue. He blamed abolitionists for exciting

00:16:21.139 --> 00:16:23.759
passions over it. instead of seeking solutions

00:16:23.759 --> 00:16:26.200
within what he saw as the constitutional framework.

00:16:26.700 --> 00:16:28.899
And what's really fascinating here is Buchanan's

00:16:28.899 --> 00:16:31.759
unwavering belief that slavery was best left

00:16:31.759 --> 00:16:34.580
to the individual states. This foundational view

00:16:34.580 --> 00:16:37.600
would deeply shape his presidency. He saw federal

00:16:37.600 --> 00:16:39.899
non -intervention as the only constitutional

00:16:39.899 --> 00:16:43.539
path, a path of mutual forbearance. Which for

00:16:43.539 --> 00:16:47.120
many became a path to disaster. Precisely, because

00:16:47.120 --> 00:16:50.299
it failed to address the moral urgency or the

00:16:50.299 --> 00:16:53.120
growing economic and political power of the slave

00:16:53.120 --> 00:16:56.220
states. It just cemented his reputation as a

00:16:56.220 --> 00:16:58.840
doe face, that term for a northerner with southern

00:16:58.840 --> 00:17:01.860
sympathies. He prioritized sectional harmony

00:17:01.860 --> 00:17:04.720
through non -interference, even if it implicitly

00:17:04.720 --> 00:17:07.420
supported slavery's expansion. Moving on, he

00:17:07.420 --> 00:17:09.619
then serves as Secretary of State under James

00:17:09.619 --> 00:17:12.700
K. Polk. That's a huge role, putting him right

00:17:12.700 --> 00:17:15.430
at the center of America's massive territorial

00:17:15.430 --> 00:17:18.130
expansion. It was massive. Polk offered him either

00:17:18.130 --> 00:17:21.150
Secretary of State or a Supreme Court seat, partly

00:17:21.150 --> 00:17:23.589
as a reward for his support, but also maybe to

00:17:23.589 --> 00:17:26.329
neutralize him as a party rival. Keep him close,

00:17:26.329 --> 00:17:29.029
but under the presidential thumb. Clever politics.

00:17:29.450 --> 00:17:31.289
Buchanan shows the State Department served for

00:17:31.289 --> 00:17:33.170
Polk's whole term. And during that time, the

00:17:33.170 --> 00:17:35.789
U .S. saw its largest territorial gain ever,

00:17:36.069 --> 00:17:39.049
the Oregon Treaty, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.

00:17:39.250 --> 00:17:41.990
We're talking Texas, California, Nevada, New

00:17:41.990 --> 00:17:45.269
Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Colorado. the map just

00:17:45.269 --> 00:17:47.950
exploded. So he was overseeing this massive expansion.

00:17:48.490 --> 00:17:50.869
How did he handle those big negotiations, Oregon

00:17:50.869 --> 00:17:53.329
and Mexico? Well, with Oregon, he initially favored

00:17:53.329 --> 00:17:56.390
the 49th parallel, a more moderate line. But

00:17:56.390 --> 00:17:59.289
as northern Democrats got fired up with the 54

00:17:59.289 --> 00:18:02.289
-40 or fight slogan, wanting everything up to

00:18:02.289 --> 00:18:04.829
Alaska, he jumped on board. He adopted that more

00:18:04.829 --> 00:18:07.329
aggressive position, yeah. Again, showing his

00:18:07.329 --> 00:18:09.529
pragmatism, aligning with popular sentiment.

00:18:10.269 --> 00:18:12.630
But eventually, he followed Polk's lead, and

00:18:12.630 --> 00:18:15.250
they settled on the 49th parallel in the Oregon

00:18:15.250 --> 00:18:18.970
Compromise of 1846. OK, and Mexico. With Mexico,

00:18:19.130 --> 00:18:22.849
he held a, let's say, dubious view that a Mexican

00:18:22.849 --> 00:18:26.289
attack on US troops justified the war. Initially,

00:18:26.369 --> 00:18:28.710
he advised against claiming too much territory

00:18:28.710 --> 00:18:30.950
south of the Rio Grande, worried about war with

00:18:30.950 --> 00:18:34.049
Britain or France. But later, he argued for more

00:18:34.049 --> 00:18:36.359
annexation, blaming Mexico for the war, saying

00:18:36.359 --> 00:18:38.880
the compensation was too low. He tried to get

00:18:38.880 --> 00:18:41.319
the Democratic nomination in 1848, but didn't

00:18:41.319 --> 00:18:44.299
get much support outside PA and Virginia, lost

00:18:44.299 --> 00:18:47.319
to Louis Cass. After Polk, he goes back to private

00:18:47.319 --> 00:18:48.859
life for a bit, gets that interesting nickname.

00:18:49.220 --> 00:18:51.279
Was this really a break or was he still playing

00:18:51.279 --> 00:18:53.720
the game from the sidelines? Yeah, when the Whig

00:18:53.720 --> 00:18:57.200
Zachary Taylor won in 48, Buchanan returned to

00:18:57.200 --> 00:19:00.039
private life. He was getting older, still dressed

00:19:00.039 --> 00:19:01.980
in that kind of old -fashioned style, which earned

00:19:01.980 --> 00:19:04.420
him the nickname Old Public Functionary from

00:19:04.420 --> 00:19:07.259
the press. Northern opponents often mocked him

00:19:07.259 --> 00:19:10.279
with it, like he was a relic. But this period,

00:19:10.680 --> 00:19:14.319
1849 to 52, wasn't really a political rest, more

00:19:14.319 --> 00:19:17.650
like a strategic retreat. He bought Wheatland,

00:19:17.690 --> 00:19:20.630
his famous estate near Lancaster, became the

00:19:20.630 --> 00:19:23.049
center of this large family network, acting as

00:19:23.049 --> 00:19:25.990
a sort of surrogate father to 22 nieces and nephews,

00:19:26.289 --> 00:19:28.089
including Harriet Lane, who'd later be his first

00:19:28.089 --> 00:19:30.869
lady. He also became president of the Board of

00:19:30.869 --> 00:19:32.970
Trustees of Franklin and Marshall College from

00:19:32.970 --> 00:19:36.690
52 to 66. So he kept a public, respectable profile.

00:19:36.849 --> 00:19:38.789
The private life wasn't really private life for

00:19:38.789 --> 00:19:40.809
him, was it? Still had his eye on the White House,

00:19:40.890 --> 00:19:43.130
watching politics closely. Oh, absolutely. He

00:19:43.130 --> 00:19:45.809
was quietly campaigning for the 1852 Democrats.

00:19:45.740 --> 00:19:48.559
nomination, positioning himself as the guy who

00:19:48.559 --> 00:19:51.059
could unite the fractured party. What was his

00:19:51.059 --> 00:19:53.819
pitch? He rejected the old Missouri compromise,

00:19:54.619 --> 00:19:57.180
welcomed Congress, shooting down the Wilmot Proviso,

00:19:57.299 --> 00:19:59.619
that proposal to ban slavery in territories won

00:19:59.619 --> 00:20:02.539
from Mexico. He kept criticizing abolitionism

00:20:02.539 --> 00:20:05.680
as fanatical, insisted slavery should be decided

00:20:05.680 --> 00:20:09.059
by state legislatures, not Congress. So doubling

00:20:09.059 --> 00:20:12.099
down on the state's rights pro -southern stance?

00:20:12.460 --> 00:20:15.349
Exactly. His sympathy for the South, consistent

00:20:15.349 --> 00:20:18.069
since his Senate days, really solidified that

00:20:18.069 --> 00:20:20.789
doe -face label. He strongly aligned with pro

00:20:20.789 --> 00:20:23.329
-slavery arguments and constitutional interpretations.

00:20:23.970 --> 00:20:25.789
But despite his efforts, he couldn't get the

00:20:25.789 --> 00:20:28.349
two -thirds support needed for the 52 nomination.

00:20:28.750 --> 00:20:31.410
That went to Franklin Pierce. Buchanan even turned

00:20:31.410 --> 00:20:33.569
down the VP nomination, which went to his close

00:20:33.569 --> 00:20:36.349
friend, William R. King. So he steps back onto

00:20:36.349 --> 00:20:39.349
the international stage as minister to the United

00:20:39.349 --> 00:20:41.890
Kingdom. And this move strategically keeps him

00:20:41.890 --> 00:20:44.099
out of some really heated domestic debates back

00:20:44.099 --> 00:20:46.319
on. That feels calculated. That's a key point,

00:20:46.380 --> 00:20:48.480
and yet proved incredibly advantageous for his

00:20:48.480 --> 00:20:50.539
presidential hopes later. He accepted the UK

00:20:50.539 --> 00:20:53.460
post in 1853. Some saw it as a step backward

00:20:53.460 --> 00:20:56.059
career -wise. Right. Less prestigious than Secretary

00:20:56.059 --> 00:20:59.279
of State. But strategically brilliant. It allowed

00:20:59.279 --> 00:21:01.980
him to completely avoid the incredibly divisive

00:21:01.980 --> 00:21:04.920
debate over the Kansas -Nebraska Act. That whole

00:21:04.920 --> 00:21:07.259
mess was tearing the country apart over popular

00:21:07.259 --> 00:21:10.779
sovereignty, slavery's expansion. Leading Kansas.

00:21:10.940 --> 00:21:14.480
Exactly. By being abroad, he stayed untainted

00:21:14.480 --> 00:21:17.180
by the direct fallout, positioned imperfectly

00:21:17.180 --> 00:21:20.009
as a compromise candidate later on. In the U

00:21:20.009 --> 00:21:22.210
.K., his diplomatic efforts focused on reducing

00:21:22.210 --> 00:21:24.930
British influence in Central America, renegotiating

00:21:24.930 --> 00:21:27.369
the Clayton -Bolwer Treaty, promoting U .S. interests,

00:21:27.410 --> 00:21:29.670
especially in Honduras and Nicaragua. And this

00:21:29.670 --> 00:21:31.910
is where the infamous Austin Manifesto comes

00:21:31.910 --> 00:21:35.529
in, a document that really captures that aggressive

00:21:35.529 --> 00:21:37.630
expansionist spirit, especially towards Cuba.

00:21:37.970 --> 00:21:40.789
Indeed. At President Pierce's urging, Buchanan

00:21:40.789 --> 00:21:43.990
met in Austin, Belgium, in 1854, with the U .S.

00:21:44.269 --> 00:21:46.430
ambassadors to Spain and France. The goal? Plan

00:21:46.430 --> 00:21:49.059
the acquisition of Cuba. The buy -it. The resulting

00:21:49.059 --> 00:21:51.539
Austin Manifesto proposed purchasing Cuba from

00:21:51.539 --> 00:21:54.099
Spain. Spain was in revolution, nearly bankrupt.

00:21:54.579 --> 00:21:56.819
But the final draft, which Buchanan initially

00:21:56.819 --> 00:21:59.559
advised against, went way further. It suggested

00:21:59.559 --> 00:22:02.140
that if Spain refused to sell, resting it from

00:22:02.140 --> 00:22:05.119
Spain would be justified by every law, human

00:22:05.119 --> 00:22:08.279
and divine. Wow. That's aggressive. Resting it.

00:22:08.500 --> 00:22:11.220
Remarkably aggressive. Really pushing the boundaries

00:22:11.220 --> 00:22:14.240
of international law and diplomacy. This moment

00:22:14.240 --> 00:22:17.539
really highlights his deep involvement in expansionism.

00:22:18.180 --> 00:22:19.980
Often with an eye towards slave territory, doesn't

00:22:19.980 --> 00:22:22.220
it? What were the implications of such a bold

00:22:22.220 --> 00:22:25.250
proposal? Oh, absolutely. The manifesto caused

00:22:25.250 --> 00:22:27.769
a huge stir, both at home and abroad. It was

00:22:27.769 --> 00:22:30.349
never actually acted upon, but it significantly

00:22:30.349 --> 00:22:33.190
weakened the Pierce administration. It also kind

00:22:33.190 --> 00:22:35.809
of dampened public support for Manifest Destiny

00:22:35.809 --> 00:22:38.869
because many Northerners saw it, rightly, as

00:22:38.869 --> 00:22:41.069
a blatant attempt to expand slave territory.

00:22:41.509 --> 00:22:44.009
Right. So this period shows Buchanan's sustained

00:22:44.009 --> 00:22:46.809
ambition, his deep involvement in expansionist

00:22:46.809 --> 00:22:49.890
policies, often tilted towards protecting or

00:22:49.890 --> 00:22:52.049
expanding slave territory, which was becoming

00:22:52.049 --> 00:22:54.490
an incredibly sensitive issue. His willingness

00:22:54.490 --> 00:22:57.470
to endorse such an aggressive, maybe even unconstitutional

00:22:57.470 --> 00:23:00.109
move shows how committed he was to Southern interests

00:23:00.109 --> 00:23:02.650
and what he saw as national expansion, even if

00:23:02.650 --> 00:23:05.289
it escalated sectional tensions. So after all

00:23:05.289 --> 00:23:09.630
these years, law, state politics, Congress, diplomacy,

00:23:10.190 --> 00:23:12.349
navigating domestic and international waters,

00:23:12.910 --> 00:23:16.259
James Buchanan finally reaches the top. the presidency.

00:23:16.799 --> 00:23:20.099
His nomination in 1856, after all that strategic

00:23:20.099 --> 00:23:22.599
maneuvering, being abroad during key fights,

00:23:23.240 --> 00:23:25.519
it almost felt inevitable for him by then. It

00:23:25.519 --> 00:23:28.220
did, in a way. Being conveniently out of the

00:23:28.220 --> 00:23:30.299
country during the Kansas -Nebraska Act fight

00:23:30.299 --> 00:23:33.339
made him that perfect compromise candidate. Powerful

00:23:33.339 --> 00:23:35.400
senators could rally around him. They presented

00:23:35.400 --> 00:23:38.039
him as this experienced leader who could appeal

00:23:38.039 --> 00:23:41.119
to both North and South without the fresh baggage

00:23:41.119 --> 00:23:43.559
of those recent sectional disputes. He won the

00:23:43.559 --> 00:23:46.640
1856 Democratic nomination after 17 ballots.

00:23:47.180 --> 00:23:49.200
Stephen Douglas dropping out really cleared the

00:23:49.200 --> 00:23:51.539
path for him. And the platform he ran on it clearly

00:23:51.539 --> 00:23:54.039
reflected his long held views, didn't it? Especially

00:23:54.039 --> 00:23:56.019
on slavery, trying to somehow bridge that divide.

00:23:56.009 --> 00:23:58.630
Absolutely. The Democratic platform supported

00:23:58.630 --> 00:24:00.849
the fugitive slave law, called for an end to

00:24:00.849 --> 00:24:03.549
anti -slavery agitation, and pushed for U .S.

00:24:03.829 --> 00:24:06.289
ascendancy in the Gulf of Mexico, signaling more

00:24:06.289 --> 00:24:08.750
expansionism. Who was he up against? In the general

00:24:08.750 --> 00:24:11.329
election, he faced Millard Fillmore for the nativist

00:24:11.329 --> 00:24:14.329
Know Nothings and John C. Fremont for the brand

00:24:14.329 --> 00:24:16.769
new Republican Party, which was gaining serious

00:24:16.769 --> 00:24:19.650
ground in the North. Buchanan didn't actively

00:24:19.650 --> 00:24:22.609
campaign much that was common then, but he pledged

00:24:22.609 --> 00:24:26.559
to uphold the platform. And he won. He did. Secured

00:24:26.559 --> 00:24:29.519
every slave state except Maryland, plus five

00:24:29.519 --> 00:24:32.099
free states, including his home state, Pennsylvania,

00:24:32.619 --> 00:24:34.380
making him the first president from Pennsylvania.

00:24:34.859 --> 00:24:37.680
He got 45 percent of the popular vote, a solid

00:24:37.680 --> 00:24:41.660
174 electoral votes. But his victory speech sounded

00:24:41.660 --> 00:24:44.019
pretty combative, reflecting the deep divisions

00:24:44.019 --> 00:24:46.769
he was inheriting. It was. Buchanan flat out

00:24:46.769 --> 00:24:49.410
denounced the Republicans as a dangerous and

00:24:49.410 --> 00:24:51.829
geographical party that had unfairly attacked

00:24:51.829 --> 00:24:54.609
the South. He pledged, quote, the object of my

00:24:54.609 --> 00:24:56.710
administration will be to destroy a sectional

00:24:56.710 --> 00:24:58.890
party in North or South and to restore harmony

00:24:58.890 --> 00:25:00.990
to the union under a national and conservative

00:25:00.990 --> 00:25:04.109
government. Ambitious goal. Very, but ultimately

00:25:04.109 --> 00:25:07.519
unattainable. His goal was clear. Qualsectionalism,

00:25:07.900 --> 00:25:10.220
by upholding what he saw as constitutional order

00:25:10.220 --> 00:25:13.140
and the rights of slave states. His words, though,

00:25:13.180 --> 00:25:15.480
did absolutely nothing to soothe angry northern

00:25:15.480 --> 00:25:18.059
Republicans. They saw his election as a huge

00:25:18.059 --> 00:25:20.500
victory for the slave power. So he takes the

00:25:20.500 --> 00:25:24.019
oath of office, March 4, 1857, from Chief Justice

00:25:24.019 --> 00:25:27.559
Roger B. Taney. And his inaugural address lays

00:25:27.559 --> 00:25:29.680
out his vision, or maybe his desperate hope,

00:25:29.900 --> 00:25:32.180
for the nation. Yeah, he committed right away

00:25:32.180 --> 00:25:34.819
to serving only one term, stated how much he

00:25:34.819 --> 00:25:36.759
abhorred the growing divisions over slavery.

00:25:37.200 --> 00:25:39.799
He repeated his long held belief. Congress should

00:25:39.799 --> 00:25:42.799
play no role in deciding slavery status in states

00:25:42.799 --> 00:25:45.539
or territories. Boccular sovereignty from the

00:25:45.539 --> 00:25:47.519
Kansas -Nebraska Act. That was the key principle.

00:25:47.539 --> 00:25:50.240
He even went so far as to recommend a federal

00:25:50.240 --> 00:25:52.420
slave code to protect slave owners rights in

00:25:52.420 --> 00:25:54.460
federal territories. That was a position many

00:25:54.460 --> 00:25:57.500
Southerners favored. And then crucially, he alluded

00:25:57.500 --> 00:26:01.539
to a then pending Supreme Court case Dred Scott

00:26:01.539 --> 00:26:04.200
v. Sanford, which he said would permanently settle

00:26:04.200 --> 00:26:07.680
the issue of slavery. And this raises that critical

00:26:07.680 --> 00:26:11.779
question. How much did he really know about that

00:26:11.779 --> 00:26:14.279
decision coming down the pike? And how did that

00:26:14.279 --> 00:26:17.440
shape what he said publicly? His words suggested

00:26:17.440 --> 00:26:20.119
a finality that he seemed to believe, or at least

00:26:20.119 --> 00:26:22.619
desperately hoped, the court would provide. Take

00:26:22.619 --> 00:26:25.900
the whole issue out of politics. But this wasn't

00:26:25.900 --> 00:26:28.079
just innocent hope. That's the crucial point,

00:26:28.180 --> 00:26:30.200
isn't it? Because what we now know about his

00:26:30.200 --> 00:26:33.152
involvement in the Dred Scott decision is...

00:26:33.150 --> 00:26:35.549
Pretty damning. This wasn't just an educated

00:26:35.549 --> 00:26:38.170
guess. It looks like direct interference. Not

00:26:38.170 --> 00:26:40.690
at all an educated guess. We now know that Justice

00:26:40.690 --> 00:26:42.930
Robert C. Greyer, who, like Buchanan, was from

00:26:42.930 --> 00:26:45.470
Pennsylvania, leaked the decision details to

00:26:45.470 --> 00:26:47.849
President -elect Buchanan before the inauguration.

00:26:48.109 --> 00:26:50.009
Before. So he knew exactly what was coming when

00:26:50.009 --> 00:26:51.910
he gave that speech. Precisely. When Buchanan

00:26:51.910 --> 00:26:54.410
spoke about the impending decision settling everything,

00:26:54.849 --> 00:26:56.750
he already knew what the court was going to decide.

00:26:56.890 --> 00:26:58.809
He was essentially prepping the nation for it.

00:26:59.190 --> 00:27:02.690
And he didn't just know. He actively tried to

00:27:02.690 --> 00:27:05.410
influence its scope, pushing for a broader ruling.

00:27:05.690 --> 00:27:07.430
That sounds like the executive branch meddling

00:27:07.430 --> 00:27:09.289
with the judiciary. That's exactly what it looks

00:27:09.289 --> 00:27:12.170
like. Back in January 1857, he consulted with

00:27:12.170 --> 00:27:15.069
Justice John Catron, asked about the case's outcome,

00:27:15.269 --> 00:27:18.230
and subtly suggested that maybe a broader decision,

00:27:18.670 --> 00:27:21.289
one going beyond just Dred Scott's personal freedom

00:27:21.289 --> 00:27:24.390
plea, would be more prudent, you know, settle

00:27:24.390 --> 00:27:27.210
the issue permanently. Catron apparently confirmed

00:27:27.210 --> 00:27:29.349
the Southern majority would rule against Scott.

00:27:29.470 --> 00:27:31.809
but probably on narrow grounds unless Buchanan

00:27:31.809 --> 00:27:33.950
could persuade Justice Greer to join a broader

00:27:33.950 --> 00:27:37.009
decision. So Buchanan wrote to Greer, stressed

00:27:37.009 --> 00:27:39.349
how nationally important a comprehensive ruling

00:27:39.349 --> 00:27:42.690
would be, and he convinced him. That gave the

00:27:42.690 --> 00:27:44.569
Southern majority the leverage they needed to

00:27:44.569 --> 00:27:47.109
issue that sweeping decision, the one broad enough

00:27:47.109 --> 00:27:49.549
to declare the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional.

00:27:49.900 --> 00:27:52.940
This definitely moves beyond mere inaction. It

00:27:52.940 --> 00:27:55.259
looks like direct influence, almost a conspiracy,

00:27:55.740 --> 00:27:57.720
to try and settle the slavery question in the

00:27:57.720 --> 00:27:59.920
South's favor and shut down political debate.

00:28:00.400 --> 00:28:03.140
Two days after Buchanan's sworn in, Chief Justice

00:28:03.140 --> 00:28:06.460
Taney delivers the Dred Scott decision. And it

00:28:06.460 --> 00:28:08.579
was, like you said, a bombshell. What were the

00:28:08.579 --> 00:28:10.559
immediate consequences, especially up north?

00:28:10.880 --> 00:28:13.549
It was a political earthquake. Yeah, it denied

00:28:13.549 --> 00:28:15.650
Scott's freedom, but the impact was way bigger

00:28:15.650 --> 00:28:18.470
than just one man. It broadly asserted Congress

00:28:18.470 --> 00:28:21.170
had no constitutional power to exclude slavery

00:28:21.170 --> 00:28:23.950
in the territories. That effectively killed the

00:28:23.950 --> 00:28:27.109
Missouri Compromise of 1820. Right. Plus, it

00:28:27.109 --> 00:28:29.650
stated slaves were property without rights and

00:28:29.650 --> 00:28:32.589
that no African -American free or enslaved could

00:28:32.589 --> 00:28:35.539
ever be a full U .S. citizen. Buchanan's letters

00:28:35.539 --> 00:28:37.660
weren't public then, but people saw him talking

00:28:37.660 --> 00:28:40.200
quietly with Taney at the inauguration. That

00:28:40.200 --> 00:28:42.579
fueled Republican suspicions of a conspiracy

00:28:42.579 --> 00:28:44.640
between the president and the chief justice to

00:28:44.640 --> 00:28:47.400
advance slavery. Understandable. This decision,

00:28:47.680 --> 00:28:50.460
as historian David Blight puts it, was the great

00:28:50.460 --> 00:28:54.319
pivot on the road to disunion. Why? Because it,

00:28:54.319 --> 00:28:57.579
quote, stoked the fear, distrust and conspiratorial

00:28:57.579 --> 00:29:00.079
hatred already common in both the North and the

00:29:00.079 --> 00:29:03.400
South to new levels of intensity. It was a major,

00:29:03.599 --> 00:29:06.200
major disaster. Dramatically inflamed tensions

00:29:06.200 --> 00:29:09.099
led directly toward the Civil War, completely

00:29:09.099 --> 00:29:11.420
backfired on Buchanan's hope to end the debate.

00:29:11.940 --> 00:29:14.400
So he kicks off his presidency with this unprecedented

00:29:14.400 --> 00:29:16.720
judicial mess, and then his administration faces

00:29:16.720 --> 00:29:18.720
a whole bunch of other challenges, starting with

00:29:18.720 --> 00:29:21.180
his own cabinet. He wanted harmony, but it sounds

00:29:21.180 --> 00:29:23.099
like he got the opposite. Yeah, he aimed for

00:29:23.099 --> 00:29:25.099
an obedient, harmonious cabinet, but the way

00:29:25.099 --> 00:29:27.460
he built it was disastrous, deeply imbalanced.

00:29:27.900 --> 00:29:30.099
Four of his southern ministers were large -scale

00:29:30.099 --> 00:29:32.400
slaveholders who later joined the Confederacy,

00:29:32.900 --> 00:29:35.599
and the three northern department heads, all

00:29:35.599 --> 00:29:37.779
dough -faces northerners sympathetic to the South.

00:29:38.160 --> 00:29:40.339
His goal was clearly to dominate the cabinet

00:29:40.339 --> 00:29:42.759
with men who agreed with him on slavery and states'

00:29:42.960 --> 00:29:45.500
rights, ensure loyalty to his vision. But that

00:29:45.500 --> 00:29:48.910
backfired, too. Of course. It alienated tons

00:29:48.910 --> 00:29:51.049
of people in the North, especially because he

00:29:51.049 --> 00:29:53.250
failed to appoint any followers of Stephen Douglas

00:29:53.250 --> 00:29:55.430
that just fragmented the Democratic Party even

00:29:55.430 --> 00:29:58.109
more. He also had a rocky relationship with his

00:29:58.109 --> 00:30:00.329
own vice president, John C. Breckenridge, right

00:30:00.329 --> 00:30:02.890
from the start. Another sign of those deep ideological

00:30:02.890 --> 00:30:06.150
splits. He basically created a cabinet more aligned

00:30:06.150 --> 00:30:08.930
with Southern secessionist thinking than national

00:30:08.930 --> 00:30:12.039
unity. And then almost right away. the economy

00:30:12.039 --> 00:30:14.779
tanks, adding another crisis layer to his early

00:30:14.779 --> 00:30:17.660
term. What were the Panic of 1857 about and how

00:30:17.660 --> 00:30:20.440
did Buchanan handle it? The Panic of 1857 hit

00:30:20.440 --> 00:30:22.440
in the summer of that year, started with the

00:30:22.440 --> 00:30:24.220
collapse of the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust

00:30:24.220 --> 00:30:26.819
Company, triggered by over -speculation in land

00:30:26.819 --> 00:30:29.539
and railroads, plus a drop in European demand

00:30:29.539 --> 00:30:32.339
for American farm products. Oof, bad timing.

00:30:32.589 --> 00:30:35.309
Terrible timing, it spread fast. 1 ,400 state

00:30:35.309 --> 00:30:38.630
banks, 5 ,000 businesses went bankrupt. Northern

00:30:38.630 --> 00:30:41.210
cities saw massive unemployment, hunger, people

00:30:41.210 --> 00:30:44.089
demanding relief. The agricultural South, though,

00:30:44.089 --> 00:30:46.950
with high cotton prices, was initially less affected,

00:30:47.089 --> 00:30:48.829
which just added to the sectional bitterness.

00:30:49.170 --> 00:30:52.009
How did Buchanan respond? He blamed it on over

00:30:52.009 --> 00:30:55.109
-speculation. And sticking to his Jacksonian

00:30:55.109 --> 00:30:57.829
principles, limited government, hard currency,

00:30:58.430 --> 00:31:01.329
minimal federal intervention in crises, he restricted

00:31:01.329 --> 00:31:04.430
paper money. froze federal funds for public works

00:31:04.430 --> 00:31:07.289
and refused any kind of economic stimulus or

00:31:07.289 --> 00:31:11.089
relief efforts. Completely consistent with his

00:31:11.089 --> 00:31:13.690
philosophy, but it left many people suffering,

00:31:14.230 --> 00:31:16.289
drew heavy criticism from those who thought the

00:31:16.289 --> 00:31:19.109
government should step in. The economy did recover

00:31:19.109 --> 00:31:22.089
eventually, after a few years. But Buchanan's

00:31:22.089 --> 00:31:24.569
perceived inaction during the crisis. It just

00:31:24.569 --> 00:31:26.670
fueled northern resentment, raised more questions

00:31:26.670 --> 00:31:28.750
about his leadership. And despite wanting to

00:31:28.750 --> 00:31:30.589
cut the deficit, the federal budget actually

00:31:30.589 --> 00:31:33.730
grew 15 % during his term. He also had to deal

00:31:33.730 --> 00:31:36.029
with conflict out west in the Utah territory.

00:31:36.609 --> 00:31:38.430
The Utah war, that sounds like a significant

00:31:38.430 --> 00:31:40.670
military challenge. It was. In the spring of

00:31:40.670 --> 00:31:42.670
57, the Latter -day Saints and their leader,

00:31:42.910 --> 00:31:45.269
Brigham Young, were clashing with federal representatives.

00:31:45.609 --> 00:31:48.069
There was harassment, violence against non -Mormons.

00:31:48.470 --> 00:31:50.470
This tragically led to the Mountain Meadows Massacre

00:31:50.410 --> 00:31:54.710
in September 1857, the Utah Territorial Militia

00:31:54.710 --> 00:31:57.730
attacked a wagon train, killed 125 settlers.

00:31:58.210 --> 00:32:01.089
Horrific. Good grief. Butanin, apparently offended

00:32:01.089 --> 00:32:04.109
by Mormon militarism and polygamy, and maybe

00:32:04.109 --> 00:32:06.390
looking for a distraction from the mess back

00:32:06.390 --> 00:32:10.029
east, authorized a military expedition, sent

00:32:10.029 --> 00:32:13.569
2 ,500 troops to replace Young as governor. Did

00:32:13.569 --> 00:32:16.289
it come to fighting? The Mormons resisted initially,

00:32:16.549 --> 00:32:19.349
destroyed some army property, prepared for a

00:32:19.349 --> 00:32:22.589
fight, but Buchanan wisely sent Thomas Alcain,

00:32:22.750 --> 00:32:24.609
a non -Mormon friend of the Latter -day Saints,

00:32:24.910 --> 00:32:27.029
who managed to negotiate a peaceful agreement.

00:32:27.809 --> 00:32:30.670
Buchanan granted amnesty. Federal troops occupied

00:32:30.670 --> 00:32:33.650
Utah without more bloodshed. So it ended peacefully,

00:32:34.069 --> 00:32:36.329
but was the initial military response necessary?

00:32:36.539 --> 00:32:39.119
Some historians think Buchanan's initial actions

00:32:39.119 --> 00:32:41.880
were an inappropriate response, maybe based on

00:32:41.880 --> 00:32:44.779
uncorroborated reports, a potential overreaction

00:32:44.779 --> 00:32:47.039
fueled by the religious and social prejudices

00:32:47.039 --> 00:32:49.900
of the time, and that intervention cost the federal

00:32:49.900 --> 00:32:52.559
government millions. Amidst all this domestic

00:32:52.559 --> 00:32:55.119
turmoil, there was one rare moment of technological

00:32:55.119 --> 00:32:57.680
triumph. Something that briefly captured everyone's

00:32:57.680 --> 00:33:00.500
imagination. Ah, you mean the transatlantic telegraph

00:33:00.500 --> 00:33:03.839
cable in 1858. Yeah, after several failed tries,

00:33:04.279 --> 00:33:06.539
they finally laid a working cable across the

00:33:06.539 --> 00:33:09.980
Atlantic, linking North America and Europe. Buchanan

00:33:09.980 --> 00:33:12.099
was the first president to get an official telegram

00:33:12.099 --> 00:33:14.859
across it. Queen Victoria sent him a 98 -word

00:33:14.859 --> 00:33:17.960
message. Took 16 hours to transmit. The technology

00:33:17.960 --> 00:33:21.279
was so primitive. 16 hours. Still amazing, though.

00:33:21.369 --> 00:33:25.410
It was. Buchanan's response hailed it as a triumph

00:33:25.410 --> 00:33:28.329
more glorious than was ever won by a conqueror

00:33:28.329 --> 00:33:31.410
on the field of battle, bond of perpetual peace

00:33:31.410 --> 00:33:34.109
and friendship between the kindred nations. It

00:33:34.109 --> 00:33:36.349
was this rare moment of unity, international

00:33:36.349 --> 00:33:38.950
goodwill, and a presidency just drowning in division

00:33:38.950 --> 00:33:41.990
and conflict. A little glimpse of a more connected,

00:33:42.150 --> 00:33:44.789
peaceful world, even as his own nation was tearing

00:33:44.789 --> 00:33:47.130
itself apart. A rare beacon of unity, like you

00:33:47.130 --> 00:33:49.660
said. But just as the world was shrinking America

00:33:49.660 --> 00:33:52.119
itself was fracturing and nowhere more painfully

00:33:52.119 --> 00:33:54.900
than in bleeding, Kansas That was becoming an

00:33:54.900 --> 00:33:57.859
open wound Indeed. The Kansas -Nebraska Act of

00:33:57.859 --> 00:34:01.140
54, letting settlers decide on slavery via popular

00:34:01.140 --> 00:34:03.480
sovereignty, had basically turned Kansas into

00:34:03.480 --> 00:34:06.140
a mini -civil war, bleeding Kansas. You had two

00:34:06.140 --> 00:34:08.539
rival governments, the anti -slavery one in Topeka,

00:34:08.659 --> 00:34:11.199
the pro -slavery one at La Compton, and Buchanan

00:34:11.199 --> 00:34:13.960
sided with. Buchanan, sticking to his consistent

00:34:13.960 --> 00:34:16.300
pro -Southern leanings and his constitutional

00:34:16.300 --> 00:34:19.579
interpretation, chose to endorse the pro -slavery

00:34:19.579 --> 00:34:22.099
La Compton government. a move that would prove

00:34:22.099 --> 00:34:24.880
absolutely disastrous. And this leads straight

00:34:24.880 --> 00:34:27.659
into the infamous LaCompton Constitution controversy,

00:34:28.039 --> 00:34:30.900
a real flash point in his presidency. What was

00:34:30.900 --> 00:34:33.840
so contentious about this constitution and why

00:34:33.840 --> 00:34:36.500
did Buchanan back it so hard? Well, Buchanan

00:34:36.500 --> 00:34:38.940
appointed Robert J. Walker as territorial governor.

00:34:39.400 --> 00:34:41.739
Walker was experienced, but he quickly saw the

00:34:41.739 --> 00:34:44.059
depth of the election fraud and violence in Kansas.

00:34:44.659 --> 00:34:47.099
The LaCompton government, totally dominated by

00:34:47.099 --> 00:34:50.380
pro -slavery guys, cooked up a pro -slavery constitution.

00:34:50.460 --> 00:34:53.579
OK. But the proposed referendum on slavery, it

00:34:53.579 --> 00:34:56.219
was deeply flawed. Even if voters rejected slavery

00:34:56.219 --> 00:34:58.380
on paper, existing slaves and their kids would

00:34:58.380 --> 00:35:00.920
still remain enslaved. So there was no real way

00:35:00.920 --> 00:35:03.300
for the anti -slavery majority to actually prohibit

00:35:03.300 --> 00:35:05.960
slavery. They rightly boycotted the referendum

00:35:05.960 --> 00:35:08.519
as a total sham. But Buchanan accepted it anyway.

00:35:08.710 --> 00:35:11.349
Despite massive protests from Governor Walker,

00:35:11.889 --> 00:35:14.789
from former Kansas governors, all attesting to

00:35:14.789 --> 00:35:17.730
the widespread fraud, Buchanan decided to accept

00:35:17.730 --> 00:35:20.210
the LaCompton Constitution. He saw it as the

00:35:20.210 --> 00:35:22.849
legitimate outcome of popular sovereignty, despite

00:35:22.849 --> 00:35:25.389
all the evidence screaming otherwise. He really

00:35:25.389 --> 00:35:27.230
pushed this through Congress, didn't he? Even

00:35:27.230 --> 00:35:29.989
resorting to what some called political bribery.

00:35:30.329 --> 00:35:32.650
This wasn't just passive acceptance, it was an

00:35:32.650 --> 00:35:35.929
active campaign. Oh, he went all out. In a December

00:35:35.929 --> 00:35:38.710
1857 meeting with his former ally Stephen A.

00:35:38.809 --> 00:35:41.650
Douglas, Buchanan aggressively demanded all Democrat

00:35:41.650 --> 00:35:44.389
support, admitting Kansas under LeCompton. He

00:35:44.389 --> 00:35:46.630
sent it to Congress, attacked the revolutionary

00:35:46.630 --> 00:35:49.630
government in Topeka, used favors, patronage

00:35:49.630 --> 00:35:52.710
jobs, even offers of cash for votes. It was an

00:35:52.710 --> 00:35:54.889
unprecedented level of presidential arm twisting.

00:35:55.570 --> 00:35:58.110
It narrowly passed the Senate in March. But then

00:35:58.110 --> 00:36:00.989
a crucial coalition, no nothing, things, Republicans,

00:36:01.449 --> 00:36:03.789
and importantly, Northern Democrats led by Stephen

00:36:03.789 --> 00:36:06.110
Douglas defeated the bill in the House. Douglas

00:36:06.110 --> 00:36:09.090
again, why did he oppose his own party's president?

00:36:09.630 --> 00:36:12.349
Douglas was the champion of true popular sovereignty.

00:36:13.070 --> 00:36:15.650
He saw the LaCompton Constitution as a total

00:36:15.650 --> 00:36:18.929
perversion of that principle. It made him a formidable

00:36:18.929 --> 00:36:21.869
opponent to Buchanan. And this defeat, it created

00:36:21.869 --> 00:36:24.610
a massive, irreparable split within the Democratic

00:36:24.610 --> 00:36:27.199
Party, basically sealing its fate. maybe even

00:36:27.199 --> 00:36:29.940
the nations. An irreparable one, absolutely.

00:36:30.559 --> 00:36:32.980
Buchanan reportedly never forgave Douglas for

00:36:32.980 --> 00:36:35.719
that house defeat, saw it as a personal betrayal.

00:36:36.260 --> 00:36:38.539
He systematically fired all Douglas supporters

00:36:38.539 --> 00:36:41.500
from patronage jobs in Illinois and DC, essentially

00:36:41.500 --> 00:36:44.139
declared war on a powerful wing of his own party.

00:36:44.380 --> 00:36:46.679
Wow, he didn't give up on Kansas, though. No,

00:36:46.840 --> 00:36:49.300
instead of accepting defeat, Buchanan backed

00:36:49.300 --> 00:36:53.440
the 1858 English bill. It offered Kansas immediate

00:36:53.440 --> 00:36:55.920
statehood and public lands if they accepted Lecompton.

00:36:56.699 --> 00:36:59.380
But Kansans overwhelmingly rejected that in another

00:36:59.380 --> 00:37:02.159
referendum, cementing their anti -slavery stance.

00:37:02.840 --> 00:37:05.059
Kansas eventually got admitted as a free state

00:37:05.059 --> 00:37:08.320
in January 1861, but only after bitter southern

00:37:08.320 --> 00:37:10.599
opposition. And if we connect this to the bigger

00:37:10.599 --> 00:37:12.920
picture, this internal Democratic Party warfare,

00:37:13.179 --> 00:37:15.320
it was a critical factor in weakening the party,

00:37:15.639 --> 00:37:18.280
paving the way for a Republican victory in 1860.

00:37:18.599 --> 00:37:20.780
The whole Lecompton fight became the battleground

00:37:20.780 --> 00:37:23.380
for control of the Democratic Party. Buchanan,

00:37:23.780 --> 00:37:26.400
Southern Democrats, and doe faces on one side.

00:37:26.860 --> 00:37:28.960
Douglas and Northern Democrats on the other.

00:37:29.239 --> 00:37:31.699
A fight over principles, really. Buchanan insisted

00:37:31.699 --> 00:37:34.360
everyone respect the Dred Scott decision as final.

00:37:34.900 --> 00:37:37.239
Douglas championed popular sovereignty, arguing

00:37:37.239 --> 00:37:39.320
territories should still get to exclude slavery.

00:37:40.019 --> 00:37:42.699
Buchanan even actively tried to defeat Douglass's

00:37:42.699 --> 00:37:45.360
Senate re -election in Illinois in 1858, wring

00:37:45.360 --> 00:37:47.340
competing candidates against him a move that,

00:37:47.480 --> 00:37:49.179
ironically, could have handed the election to

00:37:49.179 --> 00:37:51.719
Abraham Lincoln. But Douglass won anyway. Douglass

00:37:51.719 --> 00:37:55.059
still won. But Buchanan's support base shrank

00:37:55.059 --> 00:37:58.139
to this narrow coalition of Southerners. The

00:37:58.139 --> 00:38:01.320
Democratic Party was profoundly fractured, unable

00:38:01.320 --> 00:38:04.300
to unite against the rising Republicans. That

00:38:04.300 --> 00:38:07.440
fracture was basically a gift to the Republicans.

00:38:08.019 --> 00:38:09.960
So while the domestic situation was just collapsing

00:38:09.960 --> 00:38:12.820
around him, Buchanan still had these ambitious

00:38:12.820 --> 00:38:15.659
foreign policy goals, almost like trying to project

00:38:15.659 --> 00:38:17.260
strength abroad that he didn't have at home.

00:38:17.420 --> 00:38:20.360
He did seem to. He launched this ambitious foreign

00:38:20.360 --> 00:38:23.699
policy, wanted to establish U .S. hegemony over

00:38:23.699 --> 00:38:26.780
Central America. Counter -European imperialism

00:38:26.780 --> 00:38:29.980
really pushed the Monroe Doctrine. He tried renegotiating

00:38:29.980 --> 00:38:31.760
the Clayton Buller Treaty with Britain, which

00:38:31.760 --> 00:38:34.539
limited U .S. influence down there. He also aimed

00:38:34.539 --> 00:38:36.900
for American protectorates over the Mexican states

00:38:36.900 --> 00:38:39.320
of Chihuahua and Sonora. And he never gave up

00:38:39.320 --> 00:38:41.920
on his long term goal of acquiring Cuba, saw

00:38:41.920 --> 00:38:45.159
it as vital for U .S. security economy. But the

00:38:45.159 --> 00:38:47.239
House blocked most of that, fearing more slave

00:38:47.239 --> 00:38:49.860
territory. Was he successful anywhere? He did

00:38:49.860 --> 00:38:52.199
manage to convince the British to cede the Bay

00:38:52.199 --> 00:38:54.400
Islands to Honduras and the Mosquito Coast to

00:38:54.400 --> 00:38:56.940
Nicaragua. That consolidated U .S. influence

00:38:56.940 --> 00:38:59.659
a bit. He even launched a military expedition

00:38:59.659 --> 00:39:02.039
to Paraguay. That seems kind of random. That's

00:39:02.039 --> 00:39:05.440
right, an obscure episode. In 1858, Buchanan

00:39:05.440 --> 00:39:08.760
ordered the Paraguay Expedition, sent a big force,

00:39:08.900 --> 00:39:12.079
2 ,500 Marines, 19 warships, to punish Paraguay

00:39:12.079 --> 00:39:15.039
for firing on the USS Water Witch, a diplomatic

00:39:15.039 --> 00:39:17.940
insult he took very seriously. It was costly,

00:39:18.079 --> 00:39:20.719
took months to get down there. But yeah, it resulted

00:39:20.719 --> 00:39:23.719
in a Paraguayan apology and they paid an indemnity,

00:39:24.300 --> 00:39:26.280
showed he was willing to use force to protect

00:39:26.280 --> 00:39:28.820
American interests abroad. He also considered

00:39:28.820 --> 00:39:31.679
buying Alaska from Russia, made an initial $5

00:39:31.679 --> 00:39:35.880
million offer in 1859. Those talks laid the groundwork

00:39:35.880 --> 00:39:38.500
for the later purchase under Seward. Plus, he

00:39:38.500 --> 00:39:40.500
secured important trade deals with China, the

00:39:40.500 --> 00:39:42.719
Treaty of Tianjin, and Japan, the Harris Treaty,

00:39:43.039 --> 00:39:45.579
expanded American influence in Asia, and famously

00:39:45.579 --> 00:39:49.300
received a Japanese delegation in May 1860, a

00:39:49.300 --> 00:39:51.420
really exotic diplomatic event for the time.

00:39:51.679 --> 00:39:53.860
It's quite a contrast, isn't it? Dealing with

00:39:53.860 --> 00:39:56.280
foreign dignitaries, trade deals, thinking about

00:39:56.280 --> 00:39:59.969
buying Alaska? While back home his administration

00:39:59.969 --> 00:40:02.789
was facing corruption charges. I heard he was

00:40:02.789 --> 00:40:05.010
even offered a herd of elephants by the King

00:40:05.010 --> 00:40:08.610
of Siam. You can just picture Buchanan dealing

00:40:08.610 --> 00:40:11.469
with secession, trying to politely decline a

00:40:11.469 --> 00:40:13.949
herd of elephants. Yes, apparently Lincoln was

00:40:13.949 --> 00:40:15.710
the one who had to decline that offer later,

00:40:15.849 --> 00:40:18.769
citing the climate. But while all this international

00:40:18.769 --> 00:40:21.050
stuff was happening, yes, he was facing a serious

00:40:21.050 --> 00:40:23.309
domestic investigation. The Co -vote Committee.

00:40:23.650 --> 00:40:27.130
Exactly. March 1860, the House set up the Co

00:40:27.130 --> 00:40:29.829
-vote Committee to investigate Buchanan's administration,

00:40:30.309 --> 00:40:33.610
looking into alleged impeachable offenses. bribery,

00:40:33.969 --> 00:40:36.469
extortion, mostly around patronage. His supporters

00:40:36.469 --> 00:40:38.309
most have cried foul. Oh, yeah. They called it

00:40:38.309 --> 00:40:40.869
a partisan attack driven by a Republican congressman

00:40:40.869 --> 00:40:43.389
with a personal grudge. And ultimately, the committee

00:40:43.389 --> 00:40:45.469
couldn't establish grounds for actually impeaching

00:40:45.469 --> 00:40:48.530
Buchanan. But the majority report issued in June

00:40:48.530 --> 00:40:51.349
alleged widespread corruption and abuse of power

00:40:51.349 --> 00:40:53.889
among his cabinet seriously undermined public

00:40:53.889 --> 00:40:56.710
trust. And the allegations were pretty bad. Painted

00:40:56.710 --> 00:40:58.929
a picture of an administration bending rules

00:40:58.929 --> 00:41:01.710
for political gain. They were serious. The committee

00:41:01.710 --> 00:41:04.090
gathered evidence suggesting Buchanan tried to

00:41:04.090 --> 00:41:06.710
bribe members of Congress through intermediaries

00:41:06.710 --> 00:41:09.969
back in 58 to get votes for the LaCompton Constitution,

00:41:10.789 --> 00:41:13.010
accusations of threatening relatives with job

00:41:13.010 --> 00:41:16.570
loss if they didn't vote his way. Witnesses testified

00:41:16.570 --> 00:41:19.090
federal funds were used against Stephen Douglas's

00:41:19.090 --> 00:41:22.030
faction within the party. The public was reportedly

00:41:22.030 --> 00:41:24.989
shocked by the extent of the alleged bribery,

00:41:25.289 --> 00:41:27.090
this perception of a compromised government.

00:41:27.260 --> 00:41:30.199
especially from a president who championed constitutional

00:41:30.199 --> 00:41:33.539
purity. Republicans punted and distributed thousands

00:41:33.539 --> 00:41:35.920
of copies of the crevode report as campaign material

00:41:35.920 --> 00:41:39.420
in 1860. Further damaged Buchanan's reputation,

00:41:39.639 --> 00:41:42.000
the Democratic party standing right when they

00:41:42.000 --> 00:41:45.920
needed unity most. So as the 1860 election loomed,

00:41:46.420 --> 00:41:49.059
he famously decided not to run again. Said he'd

00:41:49.059 --> 00:41:51.340
be happier going back to Wheatland. He must have

00:41:51.340 --> 00:41:53.219
known the country was in deep, deep trouble.

00:41:53.389 --> 00:41:55.789
Yeah, he famously told Lincoln, his successor,

00:41:56.469 --> 00:41:58.630
if you are as happy in entering the White House

00:41:58.630 --> 00:42:01.030
as I shall feel on returning to Wheatland, you

00:42:01.030 --> 00:42:05.190
are a happy man. At the 1860 Democratic Convention,

00:42:05.690 --> 00:42:08.369
the party just catastrophically split over slavery

00:42:08.369 --> 00:42:10.849
in the territories. Right, Douglas versus Breckenridge.

00:42:11.030 --> 00:42:12.769
Stephen Douglas got the northern nomination,

00:42:13.090 --> 00:42:15.730
John C. Breckenridge got the southern one, Buchanan

00:42:15.730 --> 00:42:17.889
still holding that deep grudge against Douglas

00:42:17.889 --> 00:42:21.179
just... tepidly supported Breckenridge. This

00:42:21.179 --> 00:42:23.659
complete fracture of the Democrats allowed Abraham

00:42:23.659 --> 00:42:26.380
Lincoln, the Republican, to win a four -way race

00:42:26.380 --> 00:42:28.639
with only about 40 percent of the popular vote,

00:42:28.980 --> 00:42:32.340
but a clear electoral college win. Buchanan became

00:42:32.340 --> 00:42:34.420
the last Democrat to win the presidency until

00:42:34.420 --> 00:42:37.860
Grover Cleveland, way later in 1884, marked a

00:42:37.860 --> 00:42:40.239
profound shift in American politics. With Lincoln's

00:42:40.239 --> 00:42:42.460
victory, the nation just plunged into crisis,

00:42:42.860 --> 00:42:45.219
and Buchanan's lame duck period became this time

00:42:45.219 --> 00:42:47.780
of intense scrutiny and ultimately historical

00:42:47.880 --> 00:42:50.059
condemnation. This is where many historians say

00:42:50.059 --> 00:42:52.719
his failure was most acute, right? Absolutely.

00:42:53.039 --> 00:42:55.400
As early as October, the commanding general,

00:42:55.659 --> 00:42:58.400
Winfield Scott, seasoned military guy, warned

00:42:58.400 --> 00:43:00.659
Buchanan that at least seven states were likely

00:43:00.659 --> 00:43:03.599
to secede, recommended deploying troops to protect

00:43:03.599 --> 00:43:06.119
federal property down south. Seems like sensible

00:43:06.119 --> 00:43:09.139
advice. But Buchanan distrusted Scott. thought

00:43:09.139 --> 00:43:12.420
he was old and maybe unreliable, he ignored those

00:43:12.420 --> 00:43:15.019
critical recommendations. He did initially tell

00:43:15.019 --> 00:43:17.900
his secretary of war, John B. Floyd, to reinforce

00:43:17.900 --> 00:43:20.980
southern forts. But Floyd, a southern sympathizer

00:43:20.980 --> 00:43:23.760
himself, persuaded Buchanan to revoke the order,

00:43:24.179 --> 00:43:26.539
leaving federal installations totally vulnerable.

00:43:26.860 --> 00:43:31.510
And his December 1816 message to Congress. It

00:43:31.510 --> 00:43:33.590
didn't exactly calm things down. It's going to

00:43:33.590 --> 00:43:36.010
get worse with mixed messages. Quite the opposite.

00:43:36.210 --> 00:43:39.010
In that message, Buchanan gave this very legalistic

00:43:39.010 --> 00:43:41.429
argument. He denied states had the right to secede,

00:43:41.690 --> 00:43:43.889
called it revolutionary. But then in the same

00:43:43.889 --> 00:43:45.849
breath, he maintained the federal government

00:43:45.849 --> 00:43:48.190
was without power to prevent them from doing

00:43:48.190 --> 00:43:50.849
it. Wait, what? You can't succeed, but we can't

00:43:50.849 --> 00:43:53.809
stop you. Exactly. And controversially, he blamed

00:43:53.809 --> 00:43:56.429
the whole crisis on the intemperate interference

00:43:56.429 --> 00:43:58.670
of the northern people with the question of slavery.

00:43:59.230 --> 00:44:01.289
Suggested that if northern states didn't repeal

00:44:01.289 --> 00:44:03.889
their unconstitutional and obnoxious enactments,

00:44:04.550 --> 00:44:07.150
meaning personal liberty laws blocking the Fugitive

00:44:07.150 --> 00:44:10.030
Slave Act, then southern states would be justified

00:44:10.030 --> 00:44:12.789
in revolutionary resistance. Wow. blaming the

00:44:12.789 --> 00:44:16.349
North. His only proposed solution, an explanatory

00:44:16.349 --> 00:44:18.769
amendment guaranteeing slavery in states and

00:44:18.769 --> 00:44:20.869
territories, strengthening fugitive slave laws.

00:44:21.369 --> 00:44:24.190
The address got slammed by both North for its

00:44:24.190 --> 00:44:27.090
weakness and blame shifting, and South for denying

00:44:27.090 --> 00:44:30.010
secession. Just deepened the sense of paralysis

00:44:30.010 --> 00:44:32.289
and division. His cabinet started falling apart

00:44:32.289 --> 00:44:35.030
too. And there were even accusations of espionage,

00:44:35.369 --> 00:44:37.730
outright disloyalty from his inner circle. Churchary

00:44:37.730 --> 00:44:40.329
Secretary Howell Cobb from Georgia resigned five

00:44:40.329 --> 00:44:42.630
days after that address, said his views were

00:44:42.630 --> 00:44:45.510
irreconcilable with Buchanan's. Buchanan kept

00:44:45.510 --> 00:44:47.389
surrounding himself with Southerners, ignoring

00:44:47.389 --> 00:44:49.849
Republicans, still hoping for some Southern -led

00:44:49.849 --> 00:44:53.190
compromise. Unbelievable. He notoriously refused

00:44:53.190 --> 00:44:56.349
to fire his Interior Secretary, Jacob Thompson,

00:44:56.789 --> 00:44:59.030
who was actively serving as Mississippi's agent

00:44:59.030 --> 00:45:02.380
to discuss secession. or Secretary of War John

00:45:02.380 --> 00:45:05.719
B. Floyd, despite an embezzlement scandal. Floyd

00:45:05.719 --> 00:45:08.039
eventually resigned, but not before allegedly

00:45:08.039 --> 00:45:10.300
sending tons of firearms to southern states,

00:45:10.380 --> 00:45:12.900
where they ended up in Confederate hands. Even

00:45:12.900 --> 00:45:15.539
Buchanan's close friend, Rose O 'Neill Greenhow,

00:45:15.599 --> 00:45:18.599
was actively spying for the Confederacy. Shows

00:45:18.599 --> 00:45:20.920
how deeply compromised his administration had

00:45:20.920 --> 00:45:23.380
become. Despite this rapid unraveling, there

00:45:23.380 --> 00:45:25.320
were some last -gitch efforts to compromise.

00:45:25.860 --> 00:45:28.579
Did anything look remotely possible? Efforts

00:45:28.579 --> 00:45:30.860
by Senator John J. Crittenden, Representative

00:45:30.860 --> 00:45:34.039
Thomas Corwin, former President John Tyler. They

00:45:34.039 --> 00:45:36.179
all failed, even though Buchanan supported them.

00:45:36.860 --> 00:45:38.900
These proposals usually offered concessions to

00:45:38.900 --> 00:45:41.460
slave states. Republicans rejected them, refusing

00:45:41.460 --> 00:45:44.239
to allow slavery's expansion. Bardent secessionists

00:45:44.239 --> 00:45:46.719
rejected them as not enough. The deadlock. Total

00:45:46.719 --> 00:45:49.880
deadlock. Buchanan even secretly asked President

00:45:49.880 --> 00:45:52.380
-elect Lincoln to call for a national referendum

00:45:52.380 --> 00:45:55.809
on slavery. A desperate move. Lincoln wisely

00:45:55.809 --> 00:45:58.210
declined, wouldn't legitimize a question that

00:45:58.210 --> 00:46:00.710
had already torn the country apart. The Corwin

00:46:00.710 --> 00:46:02.949
Amendment, barring Congress from intersearing

00:46:02.949 --> 00:46:05.369
with slavery where it existed, actually passed

00:46:05.369 --> 00:46:07.929
Congress, but was never ratified. Just shows

00:46:07.929 --> 00:46:10.889
how deep the divide was. And then came the Fort

00:46:10.889 --> 00:46:14.289
Sumter standoff, a direct prelude to war. It

00:46:14.289 --> 00:46:16.510
became Lincoln's problem, but it was a crisis

00:46:16.510 --> 00:46:19.300
Buchanan inherited and failed to solve. By the

00:46:19.300 --> 00:46:22.280
end of January 61, six more slave states had

00:46:22.280 --> 00:46:24.659
seceded, formed the Confederate States of America.

00:46:25.139 --> 00:46:27.639
Buchanan, finally taking a slightly firmer stance,

00:46:28.059 --> 00:46:29.920
replaced his departed Southern cabinet members

00:46:29.920 --> 00:46:33.039
with staunch unionists. John Adams Dix, Edwin

00:46:33.039 --> 00:46:35.000
M. Stanton, Joseph Holt. That must have changed

00:46:35.000 --> 00:46:37.380
the dynamic. It did. When Buchanan considered

00:46:37.380 --> 00:46:39.800
surrendering Fort Sumter, that federal fort in

00:46:39.800 --> 00:46:41.960
Charleston Harbor, his new cabinet threatened

00:46:41.960 --> 00:46:45.480
to resign en masse. He relented. On January 5th,

00:46:45.519 --> 00:46:47.820
he sent a ship, the Star of the West, to reinforce

00:46:47.820 --> 00:46:51.159
Sumpter with 250 men and supplies. But critically,

00:46:51.380 --> 00:46:53.659
he failed to ask Major Robert Anderson, the commander

00:46:53.659 --> 00:46:57.139
at Sumpter, for covering fire. Confederate cannons

00:46:57.139 --> 00:46:59.719
fired on the ship, forced it to turn back north

00:46:59.719 --> 00:47:02.300
without delivering anything. Buchanan chose not

00:47:02.300 --> 00:47:06.199
to respond to this clear act of war, still desperately

00:47:06.199 --> 00:47:09.639
seeking compromise, left the standoffs unresolved.

00:47:10.220 --> 00:47:12.340
Anderson's message on March 3rd about dwindling

00:47:12.340 --> 00:47:15.019
supplies. That landed squarely on Lincoln's desk

00:47:15.019 --> 00:47:18.280
the very next day as Buchanan's term ended. And

00:47:18.280 --> 00:47:20.119
this is really where his legacy gets cemented,

00:47:20.219 --> 00:47:22.900
isn't it? His belief that he couldn't or shouldn't

00:47:22.900 --> 00:47:25.420
intervene decisively during that critical lame

00:47:25.420 --> 00:47:27.880
duck period. It's central to how he's viewed.

00:47:28.420 --> 00:47:30.519
He presided over the nation as it fractured,

00:47:30.739 --> 00:47:33.300
seemingly paralyzed by his constitutional interpretations.

00:47:33.800 --> 00:47:36.679
His perhaps naive hope for compromise allowed

00:47:36.679 --> 00:47:38.980
the secession crisis to just fester. During his

00:47:38.980 --> 00:47:41.780
term, yeah, Minnesota, Oregon, Kansas were admitted

00:47:41.780 --> 00:47:43.940
to the union, but those were totally overshadowed

00:47:43.940 --> 00:47:45.880
by the looming civil war, which he basically

00:47:45.880 --> 00:47:48.539
handed off to Lincoln. So Buchanan leaves office,

00:47:48.739 --> 00:47:50.619
the civil war explodes just two months later,

00:47:50.619 --> 00:47:53.420
and he retires to Wheatland. a man vilified by

00:47:53.420 --> 00:47:55.780
so many. He spent his final years, it seems,

00:47:56.079 --> 00:47:58.139
trying to make sense of and defend what he did

00:47:58.139 --> 00:48:01.039
during those tumultuous times. He did. Mostly

00:48:01.039 --> 00:48:03.760
stayed in his study, reading, writing letters,

00:48:04.179 --> 00:48:07.139
increasingly isolated from the public. But despite

00:48:07.139 --> 00:48:10.300
the criticism, the war, he did publicly support

00:48:10.300 --> 00:48:12.800
the Union and the war effort. Wrote to former

00:48:12.800 --> 00:48:15.019
colleagues that the assault upon Sumter was the

00:48:15.019 --> 00:48:16.880
commencement of war by the Confederate states

00:48:16.880 --> 00:48:19.179
and no alternative was left but to prosecute

00:48:19.179 --> 00:48:22.250
it with vigor. Okay, so he did support the Union

00:48:22.250 --> 00:48:24.489
effort. Yes, he supported Lincoln's draft, the

00:48:24.489 --> 00:48:27.909
conscription, but he personally opposed the Emancipation

00:48:27.909 --> 00:48:30.789
Proclamation, citing constitutional violations,

00:48:31.210 --> 00:48:33.880
though he never publicly criticized it. probably

00:48:33.880 --> 00:48:36.000
didn't want to undermine the Union war effort.

00:48:36.500 --> 00:48:38.679
He also urged fellow Pennsylvania Democrats,

00:48:38.860 --> 00:48:41.619
young men, to enlist in the Union army. Shows

00:48:41.619 --> 00:48:44.420
a core, if maybe complicated, loyalty to the

00:48:44.420 --> 00:48:46.880
nation. But the public wasn't exactly ready to

00:48:46.880 --> 00:48:49.260
give or forget, were they? The blame for the

00:48:49.260 --> 00:48:51.480
war seemed to land right on his shoulders. Oh,

00:48:51.519 --> 00:48:54.389
far from it. The war was sometimes called Buchanan's

00:48:54.389 --> 00:48:57.050
War in the press. He got daily hate mail, threatening

00:48:57.050 --> 00:49:00.469
letters. Stores in his own town, Lancaster, displayed

00:49:00.469 --> 00:49:02.769
his picture with Trader inked on his forehead.

00:49:03.150 --> 00:49:05.610
Ouch. That's harsh. The Senate even proposed

00:49:05.610 --> 00:49:08.489
a resolution condemning him. It failed, but the

00:49:08.489 --> 00:49:11.230
sentiment was clear. Newspapers accused him of

00:49:11.230 --> 00:49:13.860
colluding with the Confederacy. Even his former

00:49:13.860 --> 00:49:16.300
cabinet members, some now in Lincoln's administration,

00:49:17.079 --> 00:49:19.699
refused to defend him publicly, probably wanted

00:49:19.699 --> 00:49:22.139
to distance themselves from his unpopular policies.

00:49:22.659 --> 00:49:25.679
All this public vitriol made him reportedly distraught,

00:49:25.880 --> 00:49:28.300
sick, and depressed really affected his final

00:49:28.300 --> 00:49:30.280
years. He tried to set the record straight himself,

00:49:30.760 --> 00:49:33.159
wrote a memoir defending his legacy. What was

00:49:33.159 --> 00:49:35.820
his argument? Who did he blame in the end? He

00:49:35.820 --> 00:49:37.940
first defended himself in an exchange of letters

00:49:37.940 --> 00:49:40.179
with Winfield Scott, published in the National

00:49:40.179 --> 00:49:43.539
Intelligencer in 1862. But his big defense came

00:49:43.539 --> 00:49:45.739
in his memoir, Mr. Buchanan's Administration

00:49:45.739 --> 00:49:48.599
on the Eve of Rebellion, published in 1866, a

00:49:48.599 --> 00:49:51.039
year after the war ended. And his take was? In

00:49:51.039 --> 00:49:53.679
it, he squarely blames secession on the malign

00:49:53.679 --> 00:49:55.719
influence of Republicans and the abolitionist

00:49:55.719 --> 00:49:58.599
movement. argued their agitation provoked the

00:49:58.599 --> 00:50:01.199
South. He expressed satisfaction with his own

00:50:01.199 --> 00:50:04.360
decisions even during the secession crisis, maintained

00:50:04.360 --> 00:50:07.219
he acted within his constitutional powers, and

00:50:07.219 --> 00:50:09.440
ultimately blamed Robert Anderson at Sumter,

00:50:09.760 --> 00:50:12.280
Winfield Scott for bad advice, and Congress for

00:50:12.280 --> 00:50:15.130
the unresolved issues that led to war. So not

00:50:15.130 --> 00:50:18.150
his fault, basically. Essentially, yeah. He argued

00:50:18.150 --> 00:50:20.570
the crisis was beyond any president's power to

00:50:20.570 --> 00:50:22.769
solve and that he'd kept the peace as long as

00:50:22.769 --> 00:50:26.050
constitutionally possible. He died on June 1st,

00:50:26.050 --> 00:50:29.590
1868 at Wheatland, age 77, from respiratory failure.

00:50:29.920 --> 00:50:32.280
buried in Lancaster. Let's talk about his core

00:50:32.280 --> 00:50:34.400
political philosophy. That Doe Face label keeps

00:50:34.400 --> 00:50:36.420
coming up. Seems central to understanding how

00:50:36.420 --> 00:50:39.400
he approached the crisis. The term Doe Face really

00:50:39.400 --> 00:50:42.179
does capture his identity. A northerner with

00:50:42.179 --> 00:50:45.639
strong pro -southern principles. Buchanan genuinely

00:50:45.639 --> 00:50:48.219
sympathized with the cultural social values of

00:50:48.219 --> 00:50:51.059
the Plander class. He interacted with them more

00:50:51.059 --> 00:50:53.079
and more, especially after entering the Senate

00:50:53.079 --> 00:50:56.519
in 1834, forming close ties with southern leaders.

00:50:56.960 --> 00:50:59.219
He believed the great object of his administration

00:50:59.219 --> 00:51:02.070
was quote, to arrest, if possible, the agitation

00:51:02.070 --> 00:51:04.489
of the slavery question in the North and to destroy

00:51:04.489 --> 00:51:07.369
sectional parties. That was his guiding star,

00:51:07.909 --> 00:51:09.929
a belief that by ending the debate, sticking

00:51:09.929 --> 00:51:12.309
strictly to the Constitution, the Union could

00:51:12.309 --> 00:51:15.110
survive, even if his methods constantly failed.

00:51:15.750 --> 00:51:18.329
So personally opposed to slavery, but politically,

00:51:18.809 --> 00:51:21.369
he seemed to actively defend and enable its expansion.

00:51:21.469 --> 00:51:23.429
This is where it gets really interesting, personally

00:51:23.429 --> 00:51:25.610
against slavery, but politically enabling its

00:51:25.610 --> 00:51:27.690
expansion. How do we reconcile that huge paradox?

00:51:27.960 --> 00:51:30.619
It's a profound paradox right at the heart of

00:51:30.619 --> 00:51:33.719
his controversial legacy. While he was personally

00:51:33.719 --> 00:51:36.880
opposed to slavery in the abstract, saw as a

00:51:36.880 --> 00:51:39.300
moral wrong, he believed the abolitionists were

00:51:39.300 --> 00:51:42.440
actively preventing a solution. By inflaming

00:51:42.440 --> 00:51:45.239
passions, pushing for federal intervention, he

00:51:45.239 --> 00:51:47.639
even claimed they'd postpone the emancipation

00:51:47.639 --> 00:51:49.980
of the slaves in three or four states for at

00:51:49.980 --> 00:51:52.840
least half a century with their radicalism. Wow.

00:51:53.210 --> 00:51:55.650
blaming the abolitionists for slavery continuing.

00:51:55.989 --> 00:51:58.230
It seems so. He was willing to give slaveholders

00:51:58.230 --> 00:52:01.010
the benefit of the doubt, even stated in his

00:52:01.010 --> 00:52:02.889
third annual message that slaves were treated

00:52:02.889 --> 00:52:05.750
with kindness and humanity, and that philanthropy

00:52:05.750 --> 00:52:07.909
and self -interest of the master have combined

00:52:07.909 --> 00:52:10.710
to produce this humane result. Yikes. That hasn't

00:52:10.710 --> 00:52:13.550
aged well. Not at all. It suggests this deeply

00:52:13.550 --> 00:52:16.769
conflicted stance. His personal moral reservations

00:52:16.769 --> 00:52:19.190
were completely overshadowed by his political

00:52:19.190 --> 00:52:21.590
convictions about states' rights, his desperate

00:52:21.590 --> 00:52:23.840
desire to save the Union through appeasement

00:52:23.840 --> 00:52:26.860
and constitutional non -interference. He believed

00:52:26.860 --> 00:52:29.179
that only through that approach could the agitation

00:52:29.179 --> 00:52:32.400
stop and the Union survive. He saw the agitation

00:52:32.400 --> 00:52:35.079
itself as the greater evil, more dangerous than

00:52:35.079 --> 00:52:38.099
slavery's existence. He also hammered on constitutional

00:52:38.099 --> 00:52:41.260
restraint, almost to a fault, arguing the federal

00:52:41.260 --> 00:52:43.360
government just didn't have the power to intervene.

00:52:43.920 --> 00:52:47.000
That was central to his philosophy, almost an

00:52:47.000 --> 00:52:49.760
unshakable dogma for him. He believed the Constitution

00:52:49.760 --> 00:52:53.139
was made of restraints imposed not by arbitrary

00:52:53.139 --> 00:52:55.719
authority, but by the people upon themselves

00:52:55.719 --> 00:52:59.440
and their representatives. He emphasized mutual

00:52:59.440 --> 00:53:02.960
forbearance as the key to keeping sectional jealousies

00:53:02.960 --> 00:53:05.619
down. And on slavery specifically. He repeated,

00:53:06.000 --> 00:53:08.119
although in Pennsylvania we are all opposed to

00:53:08.119 --> 00:53:10.460
slavery in the abstract, we can never violate

00:53:10.460 --> 00:53:12.820
the constitutional compact we have with our sister

00:53:12.820 --> 00:53:15.579
states. Their rights will be held sacred by us

00:53:15.579 --> 00:53:18.079
under the Constitution. It is their own question.

00:53:18.380 --> 00:53:21.889
And there let it remain. shows his unwavering

00:53:21.889 --> 00:53:24.389
commitment to his interpretation of the Constitution

00:53:24.389 --> 00:53:27.130
as a pact between states. Even when it meant

00:53:27.130 --> 00:53:29.530
upholding institutions he personally disliked,

00:53:29.630 --> 00:53:31.650
or institutions that were tearing the Union apart,

00:53:32.170 --> 00:53:34.550
his constitutional literalism left almost no

00:53:34.550 --> 00:53:36.789
room for moral or political flexibility. And

00:53:36.789 --> 00:53:39.289
he had complex, almost contradictory views on

00:53:39.289 --> 00:53:41.750
tariffs and territorial expansion, too. Trying

00:53:41.750 --> 00:53:44.019
to balance competing interests. Yeah, deeply

00:53:44.019 --> 00:53:47.039
conflicted on tariffs, torn between free trade,

00:53:47.159 --> 00:53:49.579
which helped the agricultural South, and protective

00:53:49.579 --> 00:53:52.119
duties, which helped northern industries. He

00:53:52.119 --> 00:53:54.800
wanted to benefit everyone, but knew either policy

00:53:54.800 --> 00:53:56.900
would likely help one section at the expense

00:53:56.900 --> 00:54:00.019
of the other. He once complained, I am viewed

00:54:00.019 --> 00:54:02.300
as the strongest advocate of protection in other

00:54:02.300 --> 00:54:05.099
states, whilst I am denounced as its enemy in

00:54:05.099 --> 00:54:07.800
Pennsylvania. highlights how difficult his position

00:54:07.800 --> 00:54:10.280
was. And expansion. On territorial expansion,

00:54:10.380 --> 00:54:13.460
he was all for it. Famously said, what sir? Prevent

00:54:13.460 --> 00:54:15.280
the people from crossing the Rocky Mountains?

00:54:15.559 --> 00:54:17.239
You might just as well command the Niagara not

00:54:17.239 --> 00:54:19.719
to flow. We must fulfill our destiny. Classic

00:54:19.719 --> 00:54:23.380
manifest destiny talk. Exactly. But on the resulting

00:54:23.380 --> 00:54:25.800
spread of slavery through expansion, he claimed

00:54:25.800 --> 00:54:28.960
he felt a strong repugnance by any act of mind

00:54:28.960 --> 00:54:31.099
to extend the present limits of the Union over

00:54:31.099 --> 00:54:34.000
a new slaveholding territory. Even hoped acquiring

00:54:34.000 --> 00:54:36.849
Texas would somehow limit not enlarge slavery's

00:54:36.849 --> 00:54:40.170
reach. So even in his expansionist dreams, the

00:54:40.170 --> 00:54:42.989
shadow of slavery was always there, a dilemma

00:54:42.989 --> 00:54:45.230
he consistently failed to solve without making

00:54:45.230 --> 00:54:48.369
the national divide even deeper. Beyond politics,

00:54:48.730 --> 00:54:50.989
Buchanan's personal life has always drawn interest

00:54:50.989 --> 00:54:54.889
in speculation, especially his lifelong bachelorhood,

00:54:55.170 --> 00:54:57.570
which was pretty unusual for public figures back

00:54:57.570 --> 00:55:00.239
then. It's true. He also had that eye condition,

00:55:00.340 --> 00:55:03.380
esotropia, crossed eyes. One eye short -sighted,

00:55:03.380 --> 00:55:06.400
the other farsighted, led him to tilt his head

00:55:06.400 --> 00:55:09.460
forward and to the side in conversation, which,

00:55:09.599 --> 00:55:11.840
unfortunately, led to ridicule from guys like

00:55:11.840 --> 00:55:14.940
Henry Clay. Might have made him seem aloof or

00:55:14.940 --> 00:55:17.179
peculiar to some. And then there's the really

00:55:17.179 --> 00:55:19.840
tragic story of Anne Caroline Coleman, his lost

00:55:19.840 --> 00:55:22.280
love. Many point to that as the reason he never

00:55:22.280 --> 00:55:24.920
married. Yeah, back in 1818, he got engaged to

00:55:24.920 --> 00:55:27.019
Anne Caroline Coleman, daughter of a wealthy

00:55:27.019 --> 00:55:29.539
iron and manufacturer. But they apparently spent

00:55:29.539 --> 00:55:31.900
little time together. Buchanan was busy with

00:55:31.900 --> 00:55:34.059
his demanding legal political work, especially

00:55:34.059 --> 00:55:37.300
during the panic of 1819. Rumors started flying

00:55:37.300 --> 00:55:39.280
that he was involved with other women and heard

00:55:39.280 --> 00:55:41.380
them, accused him of only being interested in

00:55:41.380 --> 00:55:43.820
her money. She broke off the engagement, and

00:55:43.820 --> 00:55:47.079
shortly after, in December 1819, she died inexplicably

00:55:47.079 --> 00:55:50.840
at just 23. From hysterical convulsions, historians

00:55:50.840 --> 00:55:52.920
now think it was likely a laudanum overdose.

00:55:53.199 --> 00:55:56.099
Tragic. Incredibly tragic. And her family refused

00:55:56.099 --> 00:55:58.840
Buchanan's request to attend her funeral. He

00:55:58.840 --> 00:56:01.159
later claimed he stayed unmarried out of devotion

00:56:01.159 --> 00:56:03.980
to her memory. That narrative kind of took hold.

00:56:04.380 --> 00:56:06.280
But there's also speculation that her death might

00:56:06.280 --> 00:56:09.019
have served another purpose. A convenient cover

00:56:09.019 --> 00:56:12.300
story for his lifelong bachelorhood. Some do

00:56:12.300 --> 00:56:14.639
speculate that her death merely served to deflect

00:56:14.639 --> 00:56:17.739
questions about Buchanan's sexuality and bachelorhood,

00:56:18.239 --> 00:56:20.380
gave him a socially acceptable reason for being

00:56:20.380 --> 00:56:23.099
single in an era that looked suspiciously at

00:56:23.099 --> 00:56:25.860
lifelong bachelors. Biographers like Gene H.

00:56:26.019 --> 00:56:28.519
Baker suggest maybe he was celibate, perhaps

00:56:28.519 --> 00:56:31.860
even asexual. Others, like James W. Lowen and

00:56:31.860 --> 00:56:34.079
Robert P. Watson, have more pointedly guessed

00:56:34.079 --> 00:56:36.860
he might have been homosexual, citing his extremely

00:56:36.860 --> 00:56:39.260
close relationship with the Alabama politician

00:56:39.260 --> 00:56:42.030
William Rufus King. William Rufus King, Franklin

00:56:42.030 --> 00:56:44.010
Pierce's vice president. They lived together

00:56:44.010 --> 00:56:46.250
for years, right? What was that relationship

00:56:46.250 --> 00:56:48.869
like? How did people see it back then? Yes, Buchanan

00:56:48.869 --> 00:56:51.530
and King, both lifelong bachelors, they lived

00:56:51.530 --> 00:56:53.230
together in a Washington boarding house, went

00:56:53.230 --> 00:56:56.150
to social events together for a decade from 1834

00:56:56.150 --> 00:57:00.010
to 1844. Buchanan himself once called their relationship

00:57:00.010 --> 00:57:02.849
a communion. They were inseparable. A communion.

00:57:03.389 --> 00:57:05.630
Hmm. Andrew Jackson mockingly called them Miss

00:57:05.630 --> 00:57:09.000
Nancy and Aunt Fancy, common euphemisms for effeminate

00:57:09.000 --> 00:57:11.699
men back then, suggests their unusually close

00:57:11.699 --> 00:57:14.820
bond was noticed, maybe subtly ridiculed. Buchanan's

00:57:14.820 --> 00:57:17.099
own postmaster general also called King Aunt

00:57:17.099 --> 00:57:19.900
Fancy and Buchanan's better half or wife. Wow,

00:57:20.039 --> 00:57:23.239
that's quite direct. King died four years before

00:57:23.239 --> 00:57:26.079
Buchanan became president. Buchanan described

00:57:26.079 --> 00:57:29.119
him as among the best, the purest and most consistent

00:57:29.119 --> 00:57:32.780
public man I have known. A really profound eulogy.

00:57:33.320 --> 00:57:35.119
And this raises an important question, doesn't

00:57:35.119 --> 00:57:38.469
it? How much did his personal life, the societal

00:57:38.469 --> 00:57:41.210
expectations of the time, influence his political

00:57:41.210 --> 00:57:43.929
decisions or his public image? We can only speculate,

00:57:43.949 --> 00:57:46.369
of course. But it's compelling to wonder if maybe

00:57:46.369 --> 00:57:48.780
the tragic loss of Anne Coleman The constant

00:57:48.780 --> 00:57:51.320
scrutiny of his bachelorhood pushed Buchanan

00:57:51.320 --> 00:57:54.460
into this almost emotionally guarded hyper -constitutionalist

00:57:54.460 --> 00:57:57.059
stance. Perhaps a leader who was less personally

00:57:57.059 --> 00:57:59.659
reserved, more emotionally connected to the public's

00:57:59.659 --> 00:58:01.719
anxieties, might have found different ways to

00:58:01.719 --> 00:58:04.019
compromise. Hard to know. Impossible to know

00:58:04.019 --> 00:58:06.260
for sure, especially since it's likely their

00:58:06.260 --> 00:58:08.440
nieces destroyed correspondence between them.

00:58:09.119 --> 00:58:11.239
But the speculation definitely adds another layer

00:58:11.239 --> 00:58:13.199
to understanding this man who seemed to struggle

00:58:13.199 --> 00:58:15.280
connecting with the emotional reality of his

00:58:15.280 --> 00:58:17.730
fracturing nation. Well, he certainly predicted

00:58:17.730 --> 00:58:21.030
that history will vindicate my memory. But that

00:58:21.030 --> 00:58:23.130
hasn't quite happened, has it? He's consistently

00:58:23.130 --> 00:58:25.949
ranked among the absolute worst presidents. Clearly,

00:58:25.949 --> 00:58:29.190
that hasn't quite happened. No. Historians, scholars,

00:58:29.570 --> 00:58:32.190
they've consistently ranked Buchanan at or near

00:58:32.190 --> 00:58:34.250
the bottom since the first rankings came out

00:58:34.250 --> 00:58:38.610
in 1948. For vision, leadership, domestic and

00:58:38.610 --> 00:58:42.289
foreign, moral authority, positive historical

00:58:42.289 --> 00:58:45.760
significance. He's right down there. There's

00:58:45.760 --> 00:58:48.179
a strong consensus his presidency was a catastrophic

00:58:48.179 --> 00:58:50.840
failure directly preceding the Civil War. He's

00:58:50.840 --> 00:58:53.920
often criticized not just for inaction. but for

00:58:53.920 --> 00:58:56.599
a perceived bias toward the South during that

00:58:56.599 --> 00:58:59.539
secession crisis. He is. Critics point to his

00:58:59.539 --> 00:59:01.760
unwillingness or inability to act in the face

00:59:01.760 --> 00:59:04.619
of secession. See his constitutional rigidity

00:59:04.619 --> 00:59:08.280
as just paralysis. Jean Baker, one of his biographers,

00:59:08.500 --> 00:59:11.199
is particularly harsh. She says his failing was

00:59:11.199 --> 00:59:13.699
not inactivity, but rather his partiality for

00:59:13.699 --> 00:59:16.239
the South, a favoritism that bordered on disloyalty.

00:59:16.340 --> 00:59:18.780
That's strong. She calls him a stubborn, mistaken

00:59:18.780 --> 00:59:21.420
ideologue whose principles held no room for compromise,

00:59:21.940 --> 00:59:23.909
concludes he came close to committing treason

00:59:23.909 --> 00:59:25.989
than any other president in American history

00:59:25.989 --> 00:59:28.650
because of his actions and inactions during that

00:59:28.650 --> 00:59:31.650
critical lame duck period. Wow, closer to treason.

00:59:32.449 --> 00:59:34.409
That's about as strong a condemnation as you

00:59:34.409 --> 00:59:37.309
can get. Are there any defenses of his presidency?

00:59:37.989 --> 00:59:39.909
Any historians offering a more charitable view?

00:59:40.110 --> 00:59:43.250
Yes, some do offer a more nuanced if not exactly

00:59:43.250 --> 00:59:46.929
positive defense. Philip S. Klein, another biographer

00:59:46.929 --> 00:59:49.829
writing back in 1962, offered a more charitable

00:59:49.829 --> 00:59:53.130
perspective. He argued Buchanan assumed leadership

00:59:53.400 --> 00:59:56.320
when an unprecedented wave of angry passion was

00:59:56.320 --> 00:59:58.800
sweeping over the nation. Klein considered it

00:59:58.800 --> 01:00:01.820
a remarkable achievement that Buchanan held the

01:00:01.820 --> 01:00:04.239
hostile sections in check during these revolutionary

01:00:04.239 --> 01:00:07.380
times by meticulously sticking to legalisms and

01:00:07.380 --> 01:00:09.559
constitutional interpretations that, in Klein's

01:00:09.559 --> 01:00:12.579
view, prevented an even earlier, maybe more chaotic,

01:00:12.659 --> 01:00:15.639
start to the war. So he bought time. That's the

01:00:15.639 --> 01:00:17.920
argument. Klein suggested Buchanan's weaknesses

01:00:17.920 --> 01:00:21.079
got magnified by enraged partisans, that his

01:00:21.079 --> 01:00:22.719
talents, which might have made him a great president,

01:00:22.730 --> 01:00:25.230
in quieter times were just overshadowed by the

01:00:25.230 --> 01:00:27.630
cataclysmic events of civil war and by the towering

01:00:27.630 --> 01:00:30.489
Abraham Lincoln. These defenses often emphasize

01:00:30.489 --> 01:00:33.110
how overwhelming the crisis was, arguing maybe

01:00:33.110 --> 01:00:34.909
no single person could have stopped the conflict

01:00:34.909 --> 01:00:38.050
by then. Despite the fierce debate over his legacy,

01:00:38.309 --> 01:00:41.210
his low rankings, he does have quite a few memorials

01:00:41.210 --> 01:00:43.489
scattered around the country. He does. There's

01:00:43.489 --> 01:00:46.090
a big bronze and granite memorial down in Washington

01:00:46.090 --> 01:00:49.719
D .C. unveiled in 1930. has his statue flanked

01:00:49.719 --> 01:00:52.380
by figures representing law and diplomacy, the

01:00:52.380 --> 01:00:54.900
two pillars of his career. An earlier monument,

01:00:55.179 --> 01:00:58.940
this huge 250 ton pyramid, stands on his birthplace

01:00:58.940 --> 01:01:01.440
site in Stony Batter, Pennsylvania, dedicated

01:01:01.440 --> 01:01:03.780
back in 1911. Several counties are named for

01:01:03.780 --> 01:01:06.579
him, Iowa, Missouri, Virginia, the one in Texas

01:01:06.579 --> 01:01:09.559
got renamed, cities, townships too, like Buchanan,

01:01:09.559 --> 01:01:12.079
Michigan, his childhood high school, James Buchanan

01:01:12.079 --> 01:01:14.960
High School. He was even portrayed, albeit comically,

01:01:15.119 --> 01:01:17.849
in that 2019 film Raising Buchanan. While his

01:01:17.849 --> 01:01:20.110
reputation is fiercely debated, his name is still

01:01:20.110 --> 01:01:22.309
out there on the landscape. So what we've seen

01:01:22.309 --> 01:01:25.110
today is this profoundly complex figure, right?

01:01:25.309 --> 01:01:27.590
A skilled lawyer, diplomat, a committed advocate

01:01:27.590 --> 01:01:30.050
for states' rights, who gets the top job at the

01:01:30.050 --> 01:01:32.389
absolute most perilous moment in American history.

01:01:32.889 --> 01:01:34.809
And despite his personal feelings against slavery,

01:01:35.010 --> 01:01:37.949
his stated desire to save the Union, his actions,

01:01:37.969 --> 01:01:40.070
or maybe his lack of action, especially around

01:01:40.070 --> 01:01:42.690
Brett Scott, the Compton secession crisis, they

01:01:42.690 --> 01:01:44.550
ultimately just deepened the very divisions he

01:01:44.550 --> 01:01:46.610
wanted to heal. His unwavering constitutional

01:01:46.610 --> 01:01:49.110
liter - meant to keep order, ironically left

01:01:49.110 --> 01:01:50.949
him paralyzed when the nation desperately needed

01:01:50.949 --> 01:01:53.389
more leadership and decisive action. It's such

01:01:53.389 --> 01:01:55.809
a powerful lesson, isn't it? A president who

01:01:55.809 --> 01:01:58.389
believes so strongly in constitutional restraint,

01:01:58.949 --> 01:02:01.449
avoiding federal intervention, finds his principles

01:02:01.449 --> 01:02:04.429
just utterly overwhelmed by the moral and political

01:02:04.429 --> 01:02:07.349
reality of his time. He wanted to stop the agitation

01:02:07.349 --> 01:02:10.170
of the slavery question, but his whole approach,

01:02:10.449 --> 01:02:13.250
tragically, seemed to just pour fuel on the fire,

01:02:13.550 --> 01:02:16.050
leading the nation right to the brink. It really

01:02:16.050 --> 01:02:18.489
makes you think about the limits of purely legalistic

01:02:18.489 --> 01:02:21.650
solutions when you're facing profound moral and

01:02:21.650 --> 01:02:24.050
societal divides. And this raises an important

01:02:24.050 --> 01:02:25.989
question for you, our listener, to maybe chew

01:02:25.989 --> 01:02:28.610
on. Given everything we've explored, what do

01:02:28.610 --> 01:02:31.429
you think was James Buchanan's single most significant

01:02:31.429 --> 01:02:34.150
missed opportunity? Was there a point where a

01:02:34.150 --> 01:02:35.750
different decision could have truly changed the

01:02:35.750 --> 01:02:38.610
course of American history? Or maybe was the

01:02:38.610 --> 01:02:40.489
fracture of the union just inevitable by then,

01:02:40.570 --> 01:02:42.510
regardless of who was in the Oval Office, just

01:02:42.510 --> 01:02:45.250
waiting for its moment to finally break? Something

01:02:45.250 --> 01:02:47.570
to ponder as you continue your own deep dive

01:02:47.570 --> 01:02:49.690
into history and leadership. Thank you for joining

01:02:49.690 --> 01:02:51.730
us for this deep dive into the life and legacy

01:02:51.730 --> 01:02:54.309
of James Buchanan. We hope you feel much more

01:02:54.309 --> 01:02:56.570
informed and maybe even a little more curious

01:02:56.570 --> 01:02:59.730
about this pivotal, if often criticized, president.

01:03:00.730 --> 01:03:02.989
We'll be back soon with another deep dive into

01:03:02.989 --> 01:03:04.250
the sources that matter to you.