WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:02.020 Welcome to the Deep Dive. We've got your materials 00:00:02.020 --> 00:00:04.219 and we're ready to dig in, pull out those key 00:00:04.219 --> 00:00:06.379 insights for you. Yep. Acting as your expert 00:00:06.379 --> 00:00:09.000 guides. And today we're diving into something 00:00:09.000 --> 00:00:12.720 pretty intense. A transcript from Charles Chuck 00:00:12.720 --> 00:00:16.000 Casto. He's a real nuclear industry veteran. 00:00:16.120 --> 00:00:19.179 Oh, yeah. Deeply experienced. And crucially, 00:00:19.539 --> 00:00:23.000 he was there on the ground after Fukushima Daiichi. 00:00:23.129 --> 00:00:26.109 His background is, well, extensive. Air Force, 00:00:26.329 --> 00:00:29.250 nuclear weapons safety. Nuclear science degree, 00:00:29.649 --> 00:00:32.869 planned operator, NRC certified instructor, examiner. 00:00:32.969 --> 00:00:35.590 He climbed the ranks of the NRC deputy regional 00:00:35.590 --> 00:00:38.490 administrator. And then the big one. Lead NRC 00:00:38.490 --> 00:00:40.929 executive over in Japan right after the disaster. 00:00:41.609 --> 00:00:44.229 Then director for site ops. Wow. And involved 00:00:44.229 --> 00:00:46.969 in helping Japan rebuild their regulatory body 00:00:46.969 --> 00:00:50.350 too. Exactly. Part of no ECD mission. Plus, he 00:00:50.350 --> 00:00:52.130 co -authored a book about the other Fukushima 00:00:52.130 --> 00:00:55.090 plant. the Akrotini, the one that survived. OK, 00:00:55.170 --> 00:00:57.630 so the expertise is undeniable. And based on 00:00:57.630 --> 00:00:59.310 his intro, it looks like we're tackling this 00:00:59.310 --> 00:01:01.490 from two angles today. Right. First, looking 00:01:01.490 --> 00:01:04.069 at global crisis leadership more broadly. And 00:01:04.069 --> 00:01:06.409 second, zeroing in on the very specific lessons 00:01:06.409 --> 00:01:09.250 learned from Fukushima Daiichi itself. And what's 00:01:09.250 --> 00:01:11.609 really useful is that his insights aren't just 00:01:11.609 --> 00:01:14.969 from Fukushima. His Ph .D. research looked at 00:01:14.969 --> 00:01:18.629 a whole range of extreme crises. Like what? Well. 00:01:18.859 --> 00:01:21.859 Deepwater Horizon, obviously, but also major 00:01:21.859 --> 00:01:24.700 hurricanes, Superstorm Sandy, even going back 00:01:24.700 --> 00:01:27.980 to Three Mile Island. OK. And he spoke to leaders 00:01:27.980 --> 00:01:29.939 from those events. Yep. Interviewed people who 00:01:29.939 --> 00:01:31.939 are right in the middle of it all. Gives it a 00:01:31.939 --> 00:01:34.219 really broad perspective. That's valuable. He 00:01:34.219 --> 00:01:36.319 uses that Flat Earth analogy, doesn't he, to 00:01:36.319 --> 00:01:38.379 talk about how interconnected everything is now. 00:01:38.400 --> 00:01:41.000 He does. You know, a crisis anywhere can affect 00:01:41.000 --> 00:01:44.379 everywhere. Terrorism, global travel spreading 00:01:44.379 --> 00:01:46.640 disease like Ebola. Yeah, or those Malaysian 00:01:46.640 --> 00:01:49.750 airliners. A single event grabs the whole world's 00:01:49.750 --> 00:01:51.790 attention. And that leads right into the core 00:01:51.790 --> 00:01:54.469 problem he identifies. Which is? That our current 00:01:54.469 --> 00:01:57.390 approach to global crisis leadership is, well, 00:01:57.390 --> 00:01:59.650 it's pretty ad hoc. Kind of making it up as we 00:01:59.650 --> 00:02:02.049 go along each time. OK, so what's the fix he's 00:02:02.049 --> 00:02:05.010 suggesting? He argues we need to standardize 00:02:05.010 --> 00:02:07.890 the international response more. Make it look 00:02:07.890 --> 00:02:10.849 a bit more like how countries handle domestic 00:02:10.849 --> 00:02:13.830 crises. With common language, common terms. Exactly. 00:02:14.090 --> 00:02:15.930 Especially in complex industries like nuclear. 00:02:16.199 --> 00:02:18.719 He saw real differences with Japan, how they 00:02:18.719 --> 00:02:21.340 measured radiation, the tech they used, even 00:02:21.340 --> 00:02:24.180 how they designated plants or defined evacuation 00:02:24.180 --> 00:02:26.099 zones. Right, things you'd think would be universal 00:02:26.099 --> 00:02:29.039 in that field. You would, but they weren't. And 00:02:29.039 --> 00:02:31.379 he stresses we need to share best practices, 00:02:31.879 --> 00:02:33.860 especially with countries just starting nuclear 00:02:33.860 --> 00:02:36.139 programs, and frankly in other tech fields too. 00:02:36.280 --> 00:02:39.460 Build that capability before the crisis is. That's 00:02:39.460 --> 00:02:42.469 the idea. Proactive, not just reactive. OK, let's 00:02:42.469 --> 00:02:45.509 dig into that analysis of extreme events. His 00:02:45.509 --> 00:02:47.870 research, talking to leaders from Deepwater, 00:02:48.069 --> 00:02:52.349 Fukushima, Sandy. What jumped out as being different 00:02:52.349 --> 00:02:55.069 on the ground in each case? Well, what's really 00:02:55.069 --> 00:02:57.310 striking is how different the core concerns were. 00:02:57.550 --> 00:03:01.909 Deepwater Horizon, a lot of focus on weak safety 00:03:01.909 --> 00:03:04.349 procedures, maybe a shaky safety culture. Right, 00:03:04.370 --> 00:03:05.969 and getting different companies to cooperate. 00:03:06.069 --> 00:03:07.729 And that was a big one, too. But then you look 00:03:07.729 --> 00:03:10.349 at Fukushima. Totally different pressure points. 00:03:10.629 --> 00:03:12.990 The absolute priority was supporting the workers 00:03:12.990 --> 00:03:15.870 in just horrific conditions. Unfathomable, yeah. 00:03:16.129 --> 00:03:18.689 And the communication challenges were immense. 00:03:19.229 --> 00:03:21.370 Just getting reliable information was a nightmare. 00:03:21.449 --> 00:03:23.669 So even though they're both huge disasters... 00:03:23.669 --> 00:03:26.870 The immediate problems felt very distinct. Although, 00:03:27.469 --> 00:03:29.889 interestingly, some of the human stuff fear, 00:03:30.370 --> 00:03:32.370 trust breaking down that seemed more consistent. 00:03:32.509 --> 00:03:35.590 Okay, so the big takeaway. Every extreme crisis 00:03:35.590 --> 00:03:38.750 is kind of its own beast. Pretty much. Which 00:03:38.750 --> 00:03:40.449 really undermines the idea that you can just 00:03:40.449 --> 00:03:44.550 have one single crisis leadership playbook, right? 00:03:44.810 --> 00:03:47.150 He called the existing theories a Tower of Babel, 00:03:47.310 --> 00:03:49.469 didn't he? Yeah, because so many theories come 00:03:49.469 --> 00:03:52.870 from studying just one event in depth like Carl 00:03:52.870 --> 00:03:55.210 Weich's sense -making theory from the Mann Gulch 00:03:55.210 --> 00:03:57.830 fire. Or normal accident theory, high reliability 00:03:57.830 --> 00:03:59.870 organization. Right. They're insightful for that 00:03:59.870 --> 00:04:02.770 one case, maybe. Yeah. But try applying the Mann 00:04:02.770 --> 00:04:05.789 Gulch lessons directly to a complex nuclear accident. 00:04:05.870 --> 00:04:07.949 It doesn't always map perfectly. Leads to a lot 00:04:07.949 --> 00:04:10.530 of different ideas, but no single unified theory 00:04:10.530 --> 00:04:12.909 that works everywhere. Exactly. The Tower of 00:04:12.909 --> 00:04:15.729 Babel. So if the events are so different, what 00:04:15.729 --> 00:04:18.310 about the leaders? Did his research find any 00:04:18.310 --> 00:04:20.889 consistent traits needed or did that vary wildly 00:04:20.889 --> 00:04:23.540 too? It strongly suggests the leadership traits 00:04:23.540 --> 00:04:27.279 really depend on the situation. Fukushima was 00:04:27.279 --> 00:04:30.439 a powerful example. Oh, so? The operators there, 00:04:30.459 --> 00:04:32.740 they really stress things like the leader's personality, 00:04:32.939 --> 00:04:37.100 their character. Basic trust was huge. And of 00:04:37.100 --> 00:04:39.180 course, their experience. That personal connection. 00:04:39.579 --> 00:04:42.629 Yeah. And he even talks about defiance. In extreme 00:04:42.629 --> 00:04:45.930 life or death moments, sometimes pure survival 00:04:45.930 --> 00:04:48.870 instinct can override rules or orders. Like Yoshida 00:04:48.870 --> 00:04:51.889 and the water injection. Exactly. Defying the 00:04:51.889 --> 00:04:53.850 prime minister's initial hesitation, because 00:04:53.850 --> 00:04:56.430 as an operator, he knew what needed to be done 00:04:56.430 --> 00:04:59.170 now to prevent something worse. That's a stark 00:04:59.170 --> 00:05:02.170 example. How did that compare to Deepwater Horizon? 00:05:02.410 --> 00:05:04.560 Quite a contrast, actually. On the deepwater 00:05:04.560 --> 00:05:07.339 horizon, a major issue seemed to be inexperience, 00:05:07.560 --> 00:05:10.259 maybe a lack of deep technical mastery among 00:05:10.259 --> 00:05:12.819 some key leaders. The technology itself was too 00:05:12.819 --> 00:05:15.100 complex. It seems the complexity of that specific 00:05:15.100 --> 00:05:17.339 deep sea drilling operation kind of outstripped 00:05:17.339 --> 00:05:19.600 the leader's ability to fully grasp it in the 00:05:19.600 --> 00:05:23.019 moment, which likely contributed to the chaos 00:05:23.019 --> 00:05:25.439 and panic. That's interesting. And what about 00:05:25.439 --> 00:05:28.420 culture? You mentioned... the Japanese operator's 00:05:28.420 --> 00:05:31.100 valuing personality. Does culture play a big 00:05:31.100 --> 00:05:33.740 role in what kind of leadership works? That's 00:05:33.740 --> 00:05:36.019 a really good question. Chuck offered an interesting 00:05:36.019 --> 00:05:38.199 sort of anecdotal observation on that. Oh, yeah. 00:05:38.500 --> 00:05:41.680 He suggested that when people face that immediate 00:05:41.680 --> 00:05:46.019 visceral fear of death. sometimes cultural norms 00:05:46.019 --> 00:05:48.439 can kind of melt away. Really? He pointed to 00:05:48.439 --> 00:05:51.759 Yoshida again, arguing that his defiant actions 00:05:51.759 --> 00:05:53.860 might have stemmed less from traditional Japanese 00:05:53.860 --> 00:05:56.759 culture and more from a universal reactor operator 00:05:56.759 --> 00:06:01.139 culture. This absolute focus on stopping the 00:06:01.139 --> 00:06:03.579 meltdown, whatever it takes. The immediate threat 00:06:03.579 --> 00:06:05.860 overrides the cultural programming almost. In 00:06:05.860 --> 00:06:08.139 that extreme moment maybe. It's a compelling 00:06:08.139 --> 00:06:10.019 thought. What about the other side of culture, 00:06:10.100 --> 00:06:12.240 like how we attribute responsibility in the U 00:06:12.240 --> 00:06:14.459 .S.? There's often this expectation that leaders 00:06:14.459 --> 00:06:16.920 have total mastery, right? Absolutely. And that 00:06:16.920 --> 00:06:19.560 links back to Deepwater Horizon's issues. You 00:06:19.560 --> 00:06:21.959 had this expectation of control and deep understanding. 00:06:22.060 --> 00:06:24.540 But the reality was different. Right. The person 00:06:24.540 --> 00:06:26.899 arguably most knowledgeable technically wasn't 00:06:26.899 --> 00:06:29.319 in the top spot. And there was real confusion 00:06:29.319 --> 00:06:32.420 about roles and responsibilities. That clashes 00:06:32.420 --> 00:06:34.819 hard with the cultural expectation of mastery. 00:06:35.019 --> 00:06:37.759 And he drew a parallel to Fukushima there. He 00:06:37.759 --> 00:06:40.860 did. Yoshida had the deep technical know -how, 00:06:41.279 --> 00:06:43.860 but the ultimate decision -making power sat higher 00:06:43.860 --> 00:06:47.160 up, Prime Minister, corporate leaders who maybe 00:06:47.160 --> 00:06:50.339 didn't have that same granular second -by -second 00:06:50.339 --> 00:06:53.439 understanding of the reactor physics. So a disconnect 00:06:53.439 --> 00:06:56.259 between knowledge and authority. In both cases, 00:06:56.420 --> 00:06:58.160 yeah, though in different ways. Let's shift gears 00:06:58.160 --> 00:07:00.540 a bit to emotions. This seemed like a really 00:07:00.540 --> 00:07:03.500 central finding in his research for extreme crises. 00:07:03.879 --> 00:07:06.019 Oh, absolutely critical. He found that as the 00:07:06.019 --> 00:07:08.540 crisis gets worse and the perceived threat of 00:07:08.540 --> 00:07:11.600 death goes up, the leader's own felt emotions 00:07:11.600 --> 00:07:14.180 and how they manage the team's emotions become 00:07:14.180 --> 00:07:17.839 hugely important. More so than in, say, a routine 00:07:17.839 --> 00:07:19.800 problem. Much more so. He talks about a shift 00:07:19.800 --> 00:07:22.420 to emotional leadership, points to Masuda at 00:07:22.420 --> 00:07:24.519 the Daini plant, the one that survived as someone 00:07:24.519 --> 00:07:27.180 who really led through managing his team's emotions 00:07:27.180 --> 00:07:29.819 effectively. And even at Fukushima Daiichi itself. 00:07:30.029 --> 00:07:31.850 Yeah, he mentioned an operator in the control 00:07:31.850 --> 00:07:34.689 room playing that vital role, keeping people 00:07:34.689 --> 00:07:38.709 focused amidst the absolute chaos. And this emotional 00:07:38.709 --> 00:07:41.310 leadership was, what, lacking on the deep water 00:07:41.310 --> 00:07:44.089 horizon? Seems like it. A very stark contrast. 00:07:44.730 --> 00:07:47.870 He described disorganization, people acting purely 00:07:47.870 --> 00:07:50.149 on instinct. Like jumping off the rig. Yeah. 00:07:50.389 --> 00:07:52.709 And even what he called counter -leadership actions 00:07:52.709 --> 00:07:54.990 that actually hindered the response. Like the 00:07:54.990 --> 00:07:57.470 captain's reaction to the mayday? Or the chief 00:07:57.470 --> 00:08:00.149 maid disconnecting the rig from the well. actions 00:08:00.149 --> 00:08:02.910 driven perhaps by panic or confusion, but ultimately 00:08:02.910 --> 00:08:05.470 making things worse shows what happens when that 00:08:05.470 --> 00:08:07.769 emotional grounding isn't there from leadership. 00:08:08.250 --> 00:08:10.689 He also mentioned this idea of a threshold of 00:08:10.689 --> 00:08:13.269 trust changing dramatically. Can you unpack that 00:08:13.269 --> 00:08:15.449 a bit? Yeah, it's the idea that, you know, normally 00:08:15.449 --> 00:08:19.649 we operate with a certain baseline trust in systems, 00:08:19.730 --> 00:08:22.290 procedures, the people around us. Okay. But when 00:08:22.290 --> 00:08:24.470 you're suddenly facing imminent danger, like 00:08:24.470 --> 00:08:26.829 your life is on the line right now, that threshold 00:08:26.829 --> 00:08:30.410 shifts massively. You become much more reliant 00:08:30.410 --> 00:08:33.970 on gut instinct. Immediate cues from people right 00:08:33.970 --> 00:08:37.429 there with you. Trust in like distant bosses 00:08:37.429 --> 00:08:40.389 or complex procedures could just evaporate. You 00:08:40.389 --> 00:08:43.049 trust what you see and feel in that moment. So 00:08:43.049 --> 00:08:46.629 boiling it down. No single leadership style works 00:08:46.629 --> 00:08:49.230 for these extreme events. Definitely not. And 00:08:49.230 --> 00:08:52.250 that raw fear, the potential for death, it changes 00:08:52.250 --> 00:08:54.350 everything, decision -making, how people respond. 00:08:54.610 --> 00:08:57.129 It fundamentally alters the landscape. Leadership 00:08:57.129 --> 00:09:00.570 has to adapt to that specific event, that specific 00:09:00.570 --> 00:09:03.450 emotional context. Which brings up a fascinating 00:09:03.450 --> 00:09:06.450 point he addressed. Can you actually train for 00:09:06.450 --> 00:09:09.070 that? Train instinct, intuition, managing those 00:09:09.070 --> 00:09:11.759 fear thresholds? It's tough, right? He acknowledges 00:09:11.759 --> 00:09:13.879 you can do, and we see it in the military, emergency 00:09:13.879 --> 00:09:16.720 services. Right, firefighters, paramedics. Exactly. 00:09:17.019 --> 00:09:19.299 But it's much harder in other fields. A key difference 00:09:19.299 --> 00:09:21.679 is often the core priority. Mission versus people. 00:09:22.019 --> 00:09:24.120 Kind of. In the military, the mission might come 00:09:24.120 --> 00:09:26.620 first. And there's intense, immersive training 00:09:26.620 --> 00:09:28.899 built around accepting risk, including the risk 00:09:28.899 --> 00:09:31.720 of death. It fosters a certain mindset, unit 00:09:31.720 --> 00:09:34.399 cohesion. Harder to replicate in a civilian company. 00:09:34.750 --> 00:09:37.590 Very hard. The primary focus is usually preserving 00:09:37.590 --> 00:09:40.330 life above all else. The ethical lines are different. 00:09:40.629 --> 00:09:42.750 And you just can't easily simulate that level 00:09:42.750 --> 00:09:45.750 of life and death pressure in, say, a corporate 00:09:45.750 --> 00:09:48.149 training exercise. He also had a caution about 00:09:48.149 --> 00:09:51.049 overtraining for heroism, didn't he? Using Chernobyl 00:09:51.049 --> 00:09:53.210 as an example. Yes, that was a really important 00:09:53.210 --> 00:09:55.730 point. He warned against training or encouraging 00:09:55.730 --> 00:09:59.169 people to take heroic, potentially fatal actions 00:09:59.169 --> 00:10:02.610 like massive radiation doses, unless it's absolutely 00:10:02.610 --> 00:10:04.840 clear they are saving lives immediately. Because 00:10:04.840 --> 00:10:07.480 a radiation plume is usually a long -term risk. 00:10:07.980 --> 00:10:09.759 Generally, yes, a cancer risk down the line, 00:10:09.960 --> 00:10:13.440 not instant death. So sacrificing lives now for 00:10:13.440 --> 00:10:15.379 a potential reduction in future cancers. Yeah. 00:10:15.600 --> 00:10:18.220 The ethics get very complicated. He argued for 00:10:18.220 --> 00:10:20.460 strategic thinking instead. Learning from incidents 00:10:20.460 --> 00:10:23.580 like Brown's Ferry. Right. Where a more measured 00:10:23.580 --> 00:10:25.639 strategic response proved better than immediate, 00:10:25.779 --> 00:10:28.460 maybe heroic, but ultimately less effective actions. 00:10:29.019 --> 00:10:30.899 The goal should be designing systems like the 00:10:30.899 --> 00:10:33.700 FLEX strategies he mentioned. Those backup systems? 00:10:34.000 --> 00:10:36.139 Yeah, the flexible coping strategies. Designing 00:10:36.139 --> 00:10:38.100 things so you minimize the need for that kind 00:10:38.100 --> 00:10:40.580 of extreme heroism in the first place. Build 00:10:40.580 --> 00:10:43.779 in resilience. OK, that makes sense. This seems 00:10:43.779 --> 00:10:45.980 to lead into his integrated theory of extreme 00:10:45.980 --> 00:10:48.740 crisis leadership. Can you sketch out the main 00:10:48.740 --> 00:10:51.539 parts of that model? Sure. He breaks crises down 00:10:51.539 --> 00:10:55.360 into like three types, routine, extreme, and 00:10:55.360 --> 00:10:58.840 dangerous. We're focused on the extreme category 00:10:58.840 --> 00:11:01.360 here. Right. And in those extreme events, the 00:11:01.360 --> 00:11:03.779 ones with that superluminal sense of potential 00:11:03.779 --> 00:11:06.580 failure, he talks about his model highlights 00:11:06.580 --> 00:11:09.019 five key leadership dimensions. OK, what are 00:11:09.019 --> 00:11:11.960 they? Situational awareness, crisis management, 00:11:12.500 --> 00:11:14.659 which is more the logistics, the stuff, decision 00:11:14.659 --> 00:11:17.970 making, leadership itself, and the big one. emotion. 00:11:18.129 --> 00:11:20.029 And emotion is central. It becomes the driving 00:11:20.029 --> 00:11:22.190 force influencing everything else. He suggests 00:11:22.190 --> 00:11:24.190 leadership in these moments often shifts toward 00:11:24.190 --> 00:11:27.210 the kind of warrior ethos driven by instinct, 00:11:27.450 --> 00:11:30.169 intuition, and that fundamental need to preserve 00:11:30.169 --> 00:11:32.350 life, sometimes even over the original mission. 00:11:32.690 --> 00:11:35.409 Okay, let's pivot to his personal lessons from 00:11:35.409 --> 00:11:38.909 being there during Fukushima. He outlined four 00:11:38.909 --> 00:11:42.230 main areas. Information flow, keeping the big 00:11:42.230 --> 00:11:44.889 picture, anchoring facts and decision making. 00:11:45.450 --> 00:11:47.429 Starting with information flow sounds like that 00:11:47.429 --> 00:11:50.889 was a massive problem in Japan. Oh, huge. He 00:11:50.889 --> 00:11:53.470 described it as really poor, especially getting 00:11:53.470 --> 00:11:56.049 information from the Daiichi site up to the decision 00:11:56.049 --> 00:11:58.289 makers like the prime minister. Why was it so 00:11:58.289 --> 00:12:02.039 bad? Well, the site itself was isolated. Physically 00:12:02.039 --> 00:12:04.460 and informationally and initially a lot of the 00:12:04.460 --> 00:12:06.299 instruments just weren't working They were flying 00:12:06.299 --> 00:12:08.120 blind to some extent and then the whole world 00:12:08.120 --> 00:12:10.860 was watching online Exactly first web stream 00:12:10.860 --> 00:12:13.340 nuclear accident. So yeah, there's massive global 00:12:13.340 --> 00:12:15.919 hunger for instant updates But the actual data 00:12:15.919 --> 00:12:18.559 just wasn't there or wasn't flowing Did the American 00:12:18.559 --> 00:12:21.000 team struggle with this initially too? They did 00:12:21.000 --> 00:12:23.700 their first instinct maybe naturally for engineers 00:12:23.700 --> 00:12:27.000 was engineer to engineer talk But the situation 00:12:27.000 --> 00:12:30.610 was too vast too complex for that No single person 00:12:30.610 --> 00:12:33.009 or even a small team could see the whole picture. 00:12:33.570 --> 00:12:36.110 He said it took them about 10 days to get a really 00:12:36.110 --> 00:12:38.149 effective information system going with Japanese. 00:12:38.450 --> 00:12:40.350 10 days is a long time in a crisis like that. 00:12:40.529 --> 00:12:43.309 It really is. And in the meantime, they had issues 00:12:43.309 --> 00:12:46.289 getting clear, contextualized info to the U .S. 00:12:46.950 --> 00:12:49.450 ambassador. Bits of raw data without context. 00:12:50.429 --> 00:12:53.129 It led to this whipsawing effect where the understanding 00:12:53.129 --> 00:12:55.809 of how bad things were kept swinging wildly, 00:12:56.230 --> 00:12:58.269 made it hard to advise the White House effectively. 00:12:58.809 --> 00:13:01.110 So what was his solution? How do you fix that 00:13:01.110 --> 00:13:04.169 information flow problem? His mantra became listen, 00:13:04.289 --> 00:13:07.210 learn, help and lead. OK. He felt the initial 00:13:07.210 --> 00:13:09.889 American impulse was maybe more listen and boss 00:13:09.889 --> 00:13:12.610 jump in with solutions before fully grasping 00:13:12.610 --> 00:13:14.470 the local situation, the Japanese perspective. 00:13:14.590 --> 00:13:17.210 So listen first. Really listen. Understand the 00:13:17.210 --> 00:13:20.000 problem from their side. Learn the specific challenges, 00:13:20.179 --> 00:13:22.559 then offer help based on what they need. And 00:13:22.559 --> 00:13:25.220 only then, once you've built that trust and understanding, 00:13:25.580 --> 00:13:28.039 can you effectively lead or co -lead the response. 00:13:28.419 --> 00:13:30.820 Makes sense. Okay, second point. Keeping the 00:13:30.820 --> 00:13:33.620 big picture. You had that castopandemonium curve. 00:13:33.679 --> 00:13:36.019 What's that about? It's a simple but powerful 00:13:36.019 --> 00:13:41.059 visual. Imagine a graph as a crisis starts. One 00:13:41.059 --> 00:13:43.159 line tanks. That's reliable information dropping 00:13:43.159 --> 00:13:46.179 off. Right. Instruments fail. Chaos. Exactly. 00:13:46.350 --> 00:13:48.789 And as that line goes down, another line shoots 00:13:48.789 --> 00:13:52.230 up. That's leadership panic or anxiety. Less 00:13:52.230 --> 00:13:55.049 data, more fear. OK, I can picture that. So the 00:13:55.049 --> 00:13:57.090 curve just shows that inverse relationship. When 00:13:57.090 --> 00:14:00.070 things are normal, lots of data, low anxiety. 00:14:00.429 --> 00:14:02.909 When things go sideways, data vanishes, anxiety 00:14:02.909 --> 00:14:05.929 spikes. It captures that feeling of being overwhelmed 00:14:05.929 --> 00:14:08.049 when you lose visibility. So how do you manage 00:14:08.049 --> 00:14:10.110 that? How do you keep the big picture when the 00:14:10.110 --> 00:14:12.289 data is shaky and panic is rising? You talked 00:14:12.289 --> 00:14:14.850 about setting the goalposts. Yeah. This was his 00:14:14.850 --> 00:14:17.009 key technique for managing the information flow 00:14:17.009 --> 00:14:19.710 upwards to leaders like the ambassador. It means 00:14:19.710 --> 00:14:22.210 defining two boundaries. Boundaries. You define 00:14:22.210 --> 00:14:25.700 the best worst case, the best. outcome you can 00:14:25.700 --> 00:14:27.940 realistically hope for given the bad situation 00:14:27.940 --> 00:14:31.899 and The worst worst case the most terrible but 00:14:31.899 --> 00:14:34.200 still plausible outcome. Okay, like bookends 00:14:34.200 --> 00:14:37.259 for the situation exactly so early on at Fukushima, 00:14:37.299 --> 00:14:41.519 maybe the best worst was getting water injection 00:14:41.519 --> 00:14:45.240 stable No major plume the worst worst might have 00:14:45.240 --> 00:14:48.299 been say unit two exploding like the others So 00:14:48.299 --> 00:14:50.019 you give the leader that range you give them 00:14:50.019 --> 00:14:52.559 that range it frames the situation And the idea 00:14:52.559 --> 00:14:56.120 is don't bother the Lear with every little data 00:14:56.120 --> 00:14:59.120 point within those goal posts. Pretty much. If 00:14:59.120 --> 00:15:01.559 new information comes in, but it still fits within 00:15:01.559 --> 00:15:04.440 that defined range, you don't necessarily need 00:15:04.440 --> 00:15:06.820 to escalate it immediately. Let the team handle 00:15:06.820 --> 00:15:08.519 it. But if something looks like it might break 00:15:08.519 --> 00:15:10.440 outside those goal posts, then you need to pay 00:15:10.440 --> 00:15:13.700 attention. But first, verify. His advice was 00:15:13.700 --> 00:15:17.539 let the data bake. Don't react instantly and 00:15:17.539 --> 00:15:20.230 get some friends. See if others confirm the reading 00:15:20.230 --> 00:15:22.509 or observation. Check it carefully before you 00:15:22.509 --> 00:15:25.110 move the goalposts. Right. Because moving the 00:15:25.110 --> 00:15:27.490 goalposts implies a fundamental shift in the 00:15:27.490 --> 00:15:30.110 situation. And that does need leadership attention. 00:15:30.549 --> 00:15:32.929 It prevents those knee -jerk reactions, keeps 00:15:32.929 --> 00:15:35.149 the public messaging more stable. He had that 00:15:35.149 --> 00:15:37.769 funny anecdote about using sleep time to communicate 00:15:37.769 --> 00:15:40.029 the trend. Yeah, that was brilliant. Very human. 00:15:40.669 --> 00:15:43.450 The ambassador was exhausted. So instead of complex 00:15:43.450 --> 00:15:45.809 technical updates, Jock started telling him how 00:15:45.809 --> 00:15:48.320 much sleep he might be able to get. Like 20 minutes 00:15:48.320 --> 00:15:50.879 versus 37 minutes. Exactly. It was a simple, 00:15:51.360 --> 00:15:54.279 relatable, even slightly humorous way to signal 00:15:54.279 --> 00:15:56.539 whether things were generally getting better 00:15:56.539 --> 00:16:00.059 or worse. A great example of translating technical 00:16:00.059 --> 00:16:02.759 complexity for a non -technical leader. Okay. 00:16:02.919 --> 00:16:06.639 Third point, anchoring facts. Sounds straightforward, 00:16:06.639 --> 00:16:09.039 but he learned something specific from Governor 00:16:09.039 --> 00:16:12.600 Thornburg at Three Mile Island. Yeah. Thornburg, 00:16:12.740 --> 00:16:15.399 with his prosecutor background, really drilled 00:16:15.399 --> 00:16:18.179 into him the need to interrogate not just the 00:16:18.179 --> 00:16:20.620 facts, but the source of the facts. Question 00:16:20.620 --> 00:16:23.100 the person giving you the information. Vigorously. 00:16:23.700 --> 00:16:25.759 Where do they get it? How reliable is it? Do 00:16:25.759 --> 00:16:28.179 they have a bias? You need to build your understanding 00:16:28.179 --> 00:16:31.220 on a solid foundation of genuinely verified information, 00:16:31.799 --> 00:16:34.200 especially when rumors and misinformation are 00:16:34.200 --> 00:16:36.620 flying around. Makes sense. Finally, decision 00:16:36.620 --> 00:16:38.720 making. He contrasted the White House desire 00:16:38.720 --> 00:16:41.379 for an aggressive, comprehensive response with 00:16:41.379 --> 00:16:45.000 the risks of incrementalism. Right. His concern 00:16:45.000 --> 00:16:47.620 with incrementalism, like slowly raising the 00:16:47.620 --> 00:16:50.120 alert level step by step, is that it can make 00:16:50.120 --> 00:16:52.360 the public feel like things are constantly getting 00:16:52.360 --> 00:16:55.299 worse and aren't under control. Like the INS 00:16:55.299 --> 00:16:58.409 scale changes at Fukushima. Exactly. He argued 00:16:58.409 --> 00:17:00.889 for maybe being a bit more conservative or perhaps 00:17:00.889 --> 00:17:03.610 setting the initial worst -case goalpost wire 00:17:03.610 --> 00:17:06.970 to avoid that perception of constantly escalating 00:17:06.970 --> 00:17:09.750 danger. Be upfront about the potential severity 00:17:09.750 --> 00:17:12.289 earlier. He also brought up social amplification 00:17:12.289 --> 00:17:15.490 of risk. What did he mean by that? That's where 00:17:15.490 --> 00:17:18.029 social or political factors can override purely 00:17:18.029 --> 00:17:21.450 technical considerations. Public pressure, political 00:17:21.450 --> 00:17:23.990 concerns. They can force decisions that aren't 00:17:23.990 --> 00:17:26.369 necessarily the optimal technical solution. Like 00:17:26.369 --> 00:17:28.829 the prime minister stopping the release of slightly 00:17:28.829 --> 00:17:31.309 radioactive water. That was the prime example. 00:17:31.630 --> 00:17:33.670 Technically, releasing that water was the quickest 00:17:33.670 --> 00:17:36.230 way to help cool things down. But the social 00:17:36.230 --> 00:17:38.450 and political pressure, especially from fishermen, 00:17:38.630 --> 00:17:41.190 was immense. And that decision had consequences. 00:17:41.549 --> 00:17:43.690 He estimated it delayed achieving coal shutdown 00:17:43.690 --> 00:17:46.730 by about six months. It's a powerful example 00:17:46.730 --> 00:17:49.369 of how non -technical factors can drive decisions 00:17:49.369 --> 00:17:53.069 in a crisis. He saw similar things in Sandy and 00:17:53.069 --> 00:17:56.089 Deepwater Horizon 2. So Wrapping up his personal 00:17:56.089 --> 00:17:59.369 lessons. Manage information flow carefully with 00:17:59.369 --> 00:18:03.349 that listen, learn, help, lead, idea. Keep the 00:18:03.349 --> 00:18:06.049 big picture using goalposts. Anchor your facts 00:18:06.049 --> 00:18:08.930 rigorously and make decisions that are decisive 00:18:08.930 --> 00:18:11.170 but also account for that social amplification 00:18:11.170 --> 00:18:13.670 of risk. Exactly. And he stressed the leader 00:18:13.670 --> 00:18:16.170 staying calm and the value of meta -thinking. 00:18:16.400 --> 00:18:19.099 thinking about your own thinking process to anticipate 00:18:19.099 --> 00:18:21.720 what's needed next. It all comes back to managing 00:18:21.720 --> 00:18:24.920 emotions, recognizing uniqueness, and understanding 00:18:24.920 --> 00:18:27.509 how fear changes everything. The transcript also 00:18:27.509 --> 00:18:29.529 had a Q &A section with some good follow -up. 00:18:29.589 --> 00:18:31.650 Someone asked about international standardization 00:18:31.650 --> 00:18:34.329 for disaster response, inspired by how things 00:18:34.329 --> 00:18:36.349 improved domestically after Hurricane Sandy. 00:18:36.490 --> 00:18:38.529 Yeah, he saw the value in that. Mentioned FEMA 00:18:38.529 --> 00:18:41.230 and US side on the US side, the idea of maybe 00:18:41.230 --> 00:18:43.329 taking the US national response framework and 00:18:43.329 --> 00:18:45.009 trying to adapt it internationally. Involving 00:18:45.009 --> 00:18:47.369 the State Department, technical experts. Right. 00:18:47.849 --> 00:18:49.690 But he was also realistic about the hurdles. 00:18:50.459 --> 00:18:52.440 Existing international bodies have their own 00:18:52.440 --> 00:18:55.140 dynamics. There are cultural and political barriers. 00:18:55.599 --> 00:18:58.259 Some countries might be hesitant. It's complex. 00:18:58.579 --> 00:19:01.119 Another point was about the NRC having good relationships 00:19:01.119 --> 00:19:04.079 not just with foreign regulators, but with the 00:19:04.079 --> 00:19:05.960 governments themselves. Absolutely critical. 00:19:06.259 --> 00:19:09.420 He emphasized the role of EMILYs here. Fukushima 00:19:09.420 --> 00:19:11.500 really showed that those broader government to 00:19:11.500 --> 00:19:14.140 government connections are vital, not just regulator 00:19:14.140 --> 00:19:17.039 to regulator. And it sounds like his ideas, like 00:19:17.039 --> 00:19:19.039 the goalpost model, are actually being looked 00:19:19.039 --> 00:19:21.180 at for training diplomats now. You mentioned 00:19:21.180 --> 00:19:23.279 that, yeah. Places like the Foreign Service Institute 00:19:23.279 --> 00:19:25.400 are starting to incorporate more crisis leadership 00:19:25.400 --> 00:19:28.000 training, and his model is apparently being considered. 00:19:28.319 --> 00:19:31.150 There was also a question about... timing, balancing 00:19:31.150 --> 00:19:33.630 the need for a fast, aggressive response with 00:19:33.630 --> 00:19:36.390 the need to verify data first. That seems like 00:19:36.390 --> 00:19:38.890 a constant tension. It really is. He stuck to 00:19:38.890 --> 00:19:42.230 his principles. No. Yes. Go big. Go comprehensive 00:19:42.230 --> 00:19:45.410 in your planning and initial posture. But verify 00:19:45.410 --> 00:19:48.250 before you take drastic, irreversible actions 00:19:48.250 --> 00:19:51.369 based on a single data point. Using the goalpost 00:19:51.369 --> 00:19:54.329 framework again. Exactly. He gave the example 00:19:54.329 --> 00:19:57.180 of the doomsday scenario at Fukushima. the fear 00:19:57.180 --> 00:19:59.420 they might have to evacuate the entire site. 00:20:00.359 --> 00:20:03.240 The response wasn't to panning, but to proactively 00:20:03.240 --> 00:20:05.960 focus on ensuring automated water injection would 00:20:05.960 --> 00:20:08.539 continue, preventing the need for evacuation, 00:20:09.380 --> 00:20:11.420 addressing the extreme possibility strategically 00:20:11.420 --> 00:20:13.740 while still verifying the overall situation. 00:20:14.019 --> 00:20:15.960 What about the point where the mission shifts? 00:20:16.160 --> 00:20:18.140 From saving the plant to just containing the 00:20:18.140 --> 00:20:20.839 damage, Unit 3 exploding seemed like a key moment. 00:20:20.970 --> 00:20:23.250 Definitely. He said that was a real point of 00:20:23.250 --> 00:20:25.789 dejection for the staff, a major psychological 00:20:25.789 --> 00:20:28.589 blow. The focus had to shift more towards containment 00:20:28.589 --> 00:20:31.349 and preventing further catastrophe. Similar shifts 00:20:31.349 --> 00:20:33.609 happened in Deepwater Horizon towards personnel 00:20:33.609 --> 00:20:36.710 safety. Yes. And in both cases, you saw workers 00:20:36.710 --> 00:20:39.029 taking initiative sometimes, even without direct 00:20:39.029 --> 00:20:41.069 orders, just trying to fix things or help others. 00:20:41.269 --> 00:20:44.210 Which relates to that emergency machoism idea 00:20:44.210 --> 00:20:46.430 Governor Thornburg warned about people offering 00:20:46.430 --> 00:20:49.470 unsolicited, maybe unhelpful solutions. Right. 00:20:50.000 --> 00:20:52.779 Chuck agreed with the caution. While initiative 00:20:52.779 --> 00:20:55.960 is good, training should ideally channel it productively. 00:20:56.319 --> 00:20:58.140 You don't want people just randomly trying things. 00:20:58.440 --> 00:21:00.859 They saw some of that at Fukushima, but mostly 00:21:00.859 --> 00:21:03.180 the trained operators stuck to what they knew. 00:21:03.680 --> 00:21:05.519 He shared some powerful stories from visiting 00:21:05.519 --> 00:21:07.900 Fukushima later too, the workers who came back. 00:21:08.099 --> 00:21:10.339 Yeah, the dedication was incredible. After the 00:21:10.339 --> 00:21:13.380 initial mass evacuation, so many returned. He 00:21:13.380 --> 00:21:15.279 mentioned seeing the plant director, Uchida, 00:21:15.559 --> 00:21:19.259 with his meager rations. The sheer devastation. 00:21:19.319 --> 00:21:21.759 It really brings home the human element, the 00:21:21.759 --> 00:21:24.339 resilience of ordinary people in extraordinary 00:21:24.339 --> 00:21:26.980 circumstances. Even without that intense military 00:21:26.980 --> 00:21:28.839 -style training we discussed earlier. Exactly. 00:21:28.900 --> 00:21:31.680 Which led to a final question. Does nuclear power 00:21:31.680 --> 00:21:34.319 need a military -like structure? Should we hire 00:21:34.319 --> 00:21:37.059 soldiers? No, he pushed back on that. The goal, 00:21:37.059 --> 00:21:39.420 he argued, isn't to need soldiers, it's to make 00:21:39.420 --> 00:21:41.799 the system resilient enough without needing that 00:21:41.799 --> 00:21:44.480 level of heroic intervention. Better design, 00:21:44.819 --> 00:21:47.720 FLEX systems, strategic planning. Strategy over 00:21:47.720 --> 00:21:50.769 tactics. His preference? Yes. Like water in, 00:21:51.109 --> 00:21:54.549 no play out. Focus on the core objectives. He 00:21:54.549 --> 00:21:57.750 did briefly compare commercial nuclear to the 00:21:57.750 --> 00:21:59.950 Navy's program. Navy has a good record, right? 00:22:00.089 --> 00:22:02.650 Potentially better safety, yes, but also different 00:22:02.650 --> 00:22:05.670 cost structures, less complex operations in some 00:22:05.670 --> 00:22:08.210 ways, no power grid attached directly to their 00:22:08.210 --> 00:22:10.210 reactors. But ultimately, he brought it back 00:22:10.210 --> 00:22:13.130 to leadership. Even with the best tech, leadership 00:22:13.130 --> 00:22:15.849 is what resolves these extreme crises. And that 00:22:15.849 --> 00:22:18.089 leadership can come from anywhere. From unexpected 00:22:18.089 --> 00:22:22.069 places, like Izawa at Fukushima, or the young 00:22:22.069 --> 00:22:24.190 tugboat captain in the Miracle on the Hudson, 00:22:24.650 --> 00:22:27.390 or Masuda at Dainey, who wasn't initially seen 00:22:27.390 --> 00:22:30.140 as that kind of leader. So wrapping up this deep 00:22:30.140 --> 00:22:32.799 dive, it's clear that global crisis leadership 00:22:32.799 --> 00:22:36.279 is just incredibly complex. So many moving parts. 00:22:36.900 --> 00:22:39.319 Absolutely. Adaptable leadership, managing information, 00:22:39.660 --> 00:22:42.059 handling emotions, thinking strategically under 00:22:42.059 --> 00:22:44.039 immense pressure. Hopefully you listening have 00:22:44.039 --> 00:22:46.680 a much deeper sense now of the real challenges, 00:22:46.740 --> 00:22:49.279 but also some potential solutions when these 00:22:49.279 --> 00:22:51.440 extreme events happen. It's way more than just 00:22:51.440 --> 00:22:53.519 the headlines. And it leaves us with a big question 00:22:53.519 --> 00:22:55.779 for you to consider. In this super connected 00:22:55.779 --> 00:22:58.950 world, with the potential for these big tech 00:22:58.950 --> 00:23:01.529 disasters always lurking. How much should we 00:23:01.529 --> 00:23:04.309 really push for international cooperation and 00:23:04.309 --> 00:23:06.950 standardized responses? What role should that 00:23:06.950 --> 00:23:09.690 play in making us all more resilient? Something 00:23:09.690 --> 00:23:11.910 to think about. And if you want to dig deeper, 00:23:12.130 --> 00:23:13.809 you could look up that Harvard Business Review 00:23:13.809 --> 00:23:15.710 article Chuck co -authored, or maybe explore 00:23:15.710 --> 00:23:17.710 the principles of the national response framework 00:23:17.710 --> 00:23:19.970 he mentioned. Thanks for joining us on this deep 00:23:19.970 --> 00:23:22.930 dive into the intense world of extreme crisis 00:23:22.930 --> 00:23:23.410 leadership.