WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:03.319 Fukushima Daiichi. That name, it still carries 00:00:03.319 --> 00:00:05.559 a lot of weight, doesn't it? It really does. 00:00:05.900 --> 00:00:08.560 More than a decade later. And the accident there, 00:00:08.560 --> 00:00:10.640 well, it's still front and center in the debate 00:00:10.640 --> 00:00:13.019 here in Japan about nuclear power. Yeah, the 00:00:13.019 --> 00:00:15.119 whole question of restarting reactors, safety 00:00:15.119 --> 00:00:18.399 concerns, it's complex. You hear about the public 00:00:18.399 --> 00:00:21.079 anxiety, the operational challenges. It's a huge 00:00:21.079 --> 00:00:23.660 issue. Absolutely. And it's those complexities, 00:00:23.780 --> 00:00:27.410 those layers that we really want to... peel back 00:00:27.410 --> 00:00:29.510 today in this deep dive. We're not just skimming 00:00:29.510 --> 00:00:31.949 the surface here. No. The aim is to get a much 00:00:31.949 --> 00:00:34.390 deeper understanding of what happened, what it 00:00:34.390 --> 00:00:36.869 really means for Japan's energy path forward. 00:00:37.170 --> 00:00:39.810 Give you that richer picture. And for this, we're 00:00:39.810 --> 00:00:42.630 drawing on some, frankly, incredible insights 00:00:42.630 --> 00:00:45.130 from a discussion with Dr. Charles Casto. Right, 00:00:45.189 --> 00:00:48.469 Dr. Casto, former U .S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 00:00:48.469 --> 00:00:50.740 administrator. But the key thing is he actually 00:00:50.740 --> 00:00:54.420 led the USNRC response team in Japan right after 00:00:54.420 --> 00:00:57.280 the accident hit. He was there. Exactly. So he 00:00:57.280 --> 00:01:00.619 wasn't just getting reports secondhand. He experienced 00:01:00.619 --> 00:01:04.219 the crisis unfolding on the ground. That direct 00:01:04.219 --> 00:01:06.819 experience, plus his background in nuclear safety, 00:01:07.140 --> 00:01:09.920 crisis management. It's a very unique perspective. 00:01:09.980 --> 00:01:13.400 It really is. So the goal for us today is to 00:01:13.400 --> 00:01:16.129 move past the headlines, you know. to really 00:01:16.129 --> 00:01:19.189 unpack the crisis, the lessons learned, and crucially, 00:01:19.469 --> 00:01:21.569 the challenges Japan is still grappling with 00:01:21.569 --> 00:01:24.230 as it thinks about restarting its nuclear plants 00:01:24.230 --> 00:01:26.129 safely. And it's not just the technical side, 00:01:26.129 --> 00:01:28.209 the engineering. We'll be looking at the societal 00:01:28.209 --> 00:01:31.010 impact, the policy choices, that whole balance 00:01:31.010 --> 00:01:33.109 of power issue between regulators, operators, 00:01:33.250 --> 00:01:35.609 the government. It's all interconnected. A multi 00:01:35.609 --> 00:01:38.010 -dimensional puzzle, like you said. OK, so let's 00:01:38.010 --> 00:01:40.069 dive in. Right after the earthquake and tsunami, 00:01:40.269 --> 00:01:42.829 Dr. Castro talked about getting the call. It 00:01:42.829 --> 00:01:46.060 was... incredibly fast. He said something like 00:01:46.060 --> 00:01:48.480 three hours notice to get his passport, get on 00:01:48.480 --> 00:01:50.659 a plane to Tokyo, just shows the urgency, right? 00:01:50.840 --> 00:01:53.680 Absolutely. That kind of speed, it highlights 00:01:53.680 --> 00:01:56.180 how even the best laid plans can be overwhelmed. 00:01:56.599 --> 00:01:58.840 You need immediate high level action when something 00:01:58.840 --> 00:02:02.040 that big hits so suddenly. And it wasn't just 00:02:02.040 --> 00:02:04.299 officials feeling the weight of it all. He told 00:02:04.299 --> 00:02:06.840 a story about the flight crew on his plane to 00:02:06.840 --> 00:02:10.259 Japan. They recognized the situation, apparently 00:02:10.259 --> 00:02:12.780 moved him up to first class, and spent hours 00:02:12.780 --> 00:02:14.680 asking him about the accident, worried about 00:02:14.680 --> 00:02:18.159 radiation, even just flying near Japan. Wow. 00:02:18.879 --> 00:02:20.919 That anecdote, it just, it really hits home, 00:02:21.020 --> 00:02:24.080 doesn't it? The level of global anxiety Fukushima 00:02:24.080 --> 00:02:26.979 sparked. It wasn't just Japan's problem. The 00:02:26.979 --> 00:02:30.009 fear spread worldwide. He also made an interesting 00:02:30.009 --> 00:02:32.310 point about the situation itself. He called it 00:02:32.310 --> 00:02:34.810 unique one developed first world nation helping 00:02:34.810 --> 00:02:37.969 another with this natural technology disaster. 00:02:38.129 --> 00:02:40.710 He termed it with these long term cross border 00:02:40.710 --> 00:02:42.729 impacts. That's a key distinction. It wasn't 00:02:42.729 --> 00:02:45.280 like. typical disaster relief or humanitarian 00:02:45.280 --> 00:02:47.900 aid. Right. The world has protocols for, say, 00:02:48.159 --> 00:02:51.039 earthquakes or floods, but a major technological 00:02:51.039 --> 00:02:53.719 crisis within a highly developed country that 00:02:53.719 --> 00:02:56.060 pose completely new challenges, especially for 00:02:56.060 --> 00:02:58.560 coordinating help and, crucially, information 00:02:58.560 --> 00:03:00.860 across borders. Which leads right into a massive 00:03:00.860 --> 00:03:03.180 challenge he faced getting reliable information, 00:03:03.319 --> 00:03:05.800 especially in those first few days. He used this 00:03:05.800 --> 00:03:08.900 really stark analogy like solving a murder case 00:03:08.900 --> 00:03:11.340 without access to the crime scene. That really 00:03:11.340 --> 00:03:15.560 paints a picture. Imagine trying to respond effectively 00:03:15.560 --> 00:03:18.800 when you just don't have the basic facts. And 00:03:18.800 --> 00:03:20.840 he pointed out the reactor information systems 00:03:20.840 --> 00:03:23.120 themselves were damaged. So it wasn't necessarily 00:03:23.120 --> 00:03:26.819 secrecy, but... But a genuine lack of data. They 00:03:26.819 --> 00:03:29.580 couldn't get reliable readings. The systems were 00:03:29.580 --> 00:03:31.780 compromised by the disaster itself. And there 00:03:31.780 --> 00:03:34.280 was this weird disconnect, he mentioned. The 00:03:34.280 --> 00:03:37.080 world was watching TV pictures, real time updates. 00:03:37.180 --> 00:03:39.960 He called it the first web streamed nuclear accident. 00:03:39.960 --> 00:03:42.520 Right. But inside the plant, the workers were 00:03:42.520 --> 00:03:45.080 apparently struggling to get basic info on what 00:03:45.080 --> 00:03:47.080 was happening in the reactors. That highlights 00:03:47.080 --> 00:03:49.360 a critical failure point, doesn't it? The internal 00:03:49.360 --> 00:03:51.479 monitoring systems, the things you rely on most 00:03:51.479 --> 00:03:54.060 in an emergency, they were knocked out. And even 00:03:54.060 --> 00:03:56.180 the data that was available, like thermal imaging. 00:03:56.360 --> 00:03:59.120 Interpreting unfamiliar data streams under pressure. 00:03:59.819 --> 00:04:01.819 Easy to get it wrong. And just getting the U 00:04:01.819 --> 00:04:04.120 .S. and Japanese teams coordinated took time. 00:04:04.259 --> 00:04:06.939 He figured about 10 days. To establish what he 00:04:06.939 --> 00:04:09.819 called a battle rhythm for sharing info, giving 00:04:09.819 --> 00:04:13.759 advice effectively. 10 days. That really underscores 00:04:13.759 --> 00:04:15.979 the difficulty of international collaboration 00:04:15.979 --> 00:04:19.220 mid -crisis. You need those protocols, that common 00:04:19.220 --> 00:04:22.040 language established before disaster strikes, 00:04:22.620 --> 00:04:24.910 not figured out on the fly. But maybe one of 00:04:24.910 --> 00:04:27.610 the most profound things Dr. Castro said about 00:04:27.610 --> 00:04:30.550 the immediate aftermath, he insisted there weren't 00:04:30.550 --> 00:04:32.889 just three crises. Right. Not just earthquake, 00:04:33.050 --> 00:04:35.709 tsunami, nuclear event. He said there were five. 00:04:36.060 --> 00:04:39.420 He specifically added a societal crisis and a 00:04:39.420 --> 00:04:42.300 policy crisis. And that's such a crucial reframing. 00:04:42.480 --> 00:04:45.319 It forces you to see the impact beyond the purely 00:04:45.319 --> 00:04:47.579 technical. It wasn't just about the reactors 00:04:47.579 --> 00:04:49.360 failing. It was about the public fear, the loss 00:04:49.360 --> 00:04:52.360 of trust. Exactly. The societal crisis. And then 00:04:52.360 --> 00:04:54.339 the policy crisis, looking at the frameworks, 00:04:54.459 --> 00:04:56.439 the regulations, the government response structures 00:04:56.439 --> 00:04:59.040 that were maybe inadequate or contributed to 00:04:59.040 --> 00:05:01.560 the problem. To really fix things, he argued, 00:05:01.839 --> 00:05:03.819 you have to tackle all five. They're all linked. 00:05:04.029 --> 00:05:07.250 Let's dig into that policy crisis bit more. Dr. 00:05:07.550 --> 00:05:09.750 Castro mentioned the history of Japan's electricity 00:05:09.750 --> 00:05:12.470 system, how power was pretty concentrated with 00:05:12.470 --> 00:05:14.870 the big utilities, even before nuclear became 00:05:14.870 --> 00:05:17.470 big. Yeah, he suggested that historical concentration 00:05:17.470 --> 00:05:20.350 might have sort of skewed the balance, potentially 00:05:20.350 --> 00:05:22.709 impacting how regulation worked, how emergency 00:05:22.709 --> 00:05:25.850 response was structured. When a few players have 00:05:25.850 --> 00:05:28.170 that much influence, it can be harder to get 00:05:28.170 --> 00:05:30.610 truly independent oversight. That's the potential 00:05:30.610 --> 00:05:35.139 risk, yes. Which ties into his thoughts on the 00:05:35.139 --> 00:05:37.519 current balance of power. He acknowledges the 00:05:37.519 --> 00:05:39.620 regulator, the NRA, has a lot more authority 00:05:39.620 --> 00:05:42.540 now. What? But he stresses it needs to be a shared 00:05:42.540 --> 00:05:44.939 responsibility. It can't just be the regulator. 00:05:45.500 --> 00:05:47.819 So who else needs to be involved? Well, the operators 00:05:47.819 --> 00:05:50.199 themselves, obviously. They need to truly own 00:05:50.199 --> 00:05:53.319 safety. Go beyond just ticking boxes for compliance. 00:05:53.899 --> 00:05:56.579 Aim for operational excellence. Be clearly responsible. 00:05:56.779 --> 00:05:59.720 Okay, regulator, operator. elected officials. 00:05:59.939 --> 00:06:02.339 They have a huge role. Listening to the public, 00:06:02.459 --> 00:06:04.259 providing that emergency response structure, 00:06:04.779 --> 00:06:07.060 and crucially... What's that? ...leading a national 00:06:07.060 --> 00:06:10.199 conversation about risk. Ah, okay. A public dialogue. 00:06:10.500 --> 00:06:13.259 Exactly. Dr. Castro believes society needs to 00:06:13.259 --> 00:06:15.879 discuss and decide what level of risk from nuclear 00:06:15.879 --> 00:06:19.259 power is acceptable. Then, elected officials 00:06:19.259 --> 00:06:21.259 should take that consensus and put it into law. 00:06:21.480 --> 00:06:23.720 So the regulator regulates within boundaries 00:06:23.720 --> 00:06:26.939 set by the public via politicians. Precisely. 00:06:27.040 --> 00:06:29.399 The acceptable risk level shouldn't just be a 00:06:29.399 --> 00:06:31.620 technical decision made by the regulator alone, 00:06:31.620 --> 00:06:34.439 and ultimately he feels public acceptance is 00:06:34.439 --> 00:06:37.019 the bottom line. If people don't feel the risks 00:06:37.019 --> 00:06:39.819 are managed acceptably, then moving forward is 00:06:39.819 --> 00:06:42.759 incredibly difficult, if not impossible. Right, 00:06:42.879 --> 00:06:45.680 which ties directly into restarting plants. What 00:06:45.680 --> 00:06:48.000 needs to happen first, according to him? Before 00:06:48.000 --> 00:06:50.620 anything else, the public needs to be convinced 00:06:50.620 --> 00:06:53.079 that the Fukushima Daiichi issues are genuinely 00:06:53.079 --> 00:06:56.259 resolved, that the lessons have truly sunk in. 00:06:56.199 --> 00:06:59.060 Trust has to be rebuilt. And how do you do that? 00:06:59.519 --> 00:07:02.420 He emphasized engaging society on emergency planning. 00:07:03.079 --> 00:07:05.399 The regulator needs to really prioritize and 00:07:05.399 --> 00:07:08.000 appreciate that societal dimension, not just 00:07:08.000 --> 00:07:09.899 focus on the hardware. So dealing with those 00:07:09.899 --> 00:07:12.300 societal and policy crises he mentioned? They're 00:07:12.300 --> 00:07:14.620 prerequisites. You can have the best technical 00:07:14.620 --> 00:07:16.860 fixes in the world, but if you haven't addressed 00:07:16.860 --> 00:07:18.939 the public trust issues and the policy weaknesses, 00:07:19.680 --> 00:07:22.120 restarting reactors faces a massive uphill battle. 00:07:22.379 --> 00:07:25.399 Makes sense. Okay, so shifting to lessons learned 00:07:25.399 --> 00:07:28.480 more broadly. International protocols came up, 00:07:28.620 --> 00:07:31.540 right? Yes, huge point. Better communication 00:07:31.540 --> 00:07:34.339 protocols, common terminology for transnational 00:07:34.339 --> 00:07:37.480 crises. He noted how different countries were 00:07:37.480 --> 00:07:40.060 using different emergency classifications during 00:07:40.060 --> 00:07:42.819 Fukushima. Which must have caused confusion. 00:07:43.199 --> 00:07:46.259 Absolutely. In a crisis, you need crystal clear 00:07:46.259 --> 00:07:49.519 standardized language delays because people are 00:07:49.519 --> 00:07:52.579 using different terms that can have serious consequences. 00:07:52.920 --> 00:07:55.399 He also talked about the need for a robust incident 00:07:55.399 --> 00:07:58.379 command system, scalable to one that can grow 00:07:58.379 --> 00:08:01.300 to match the size of the crisis. His phrase was 00:08:01.300 --> 00:08:03.800 as big as the accident, meaning it's too big 00:08:03.800 --> 00:08:06.740 for one person or even a small group to handle 00:08:06.740 --> 00:08:09.879 alone. Exactly. You need coordination, clear 00:08:09.879 --> 00:08:12.579 roles, clear communication lines. Relying too 00:08:12.579 --> 00:08:15.000 heavily on just one or two people creates bottlenecks 00:08:15.000 --> 00:08:17.240 and risks mistakes. Another recommendation was 00:08:17.240 --> 00:08:19.220 about information sources. Right, the need for 00:08:19.220 --> 00:08:21.500 government to have its own independent sources 00:08:21.500 --> 00:08:23.959 of information right there at the nuclear sites. 00:08:24.279 --> 00:08:27.279 Not just relying on the operator's reports. Precisely. 00:08:27.779 --> 00:08:30.160 He mentioned that NISA, the regulator back then, 00:08:30.300 --> 00:08:32.980 had people, but maybe not assigned continuously 00:08:32.980 --> 00:08:35.600 to sites like in some other countries. Having 00:08:35.600 --> 00:08:38.080 independent government eyes and ears on site 00:08:38.080 --> 00:08:41.159 gives decision -makers unbiased real -time data. 00:08:41.620 --> 00:08:44.600 That's crucial. Dr. Casto also reflected a bit 00:08:44.600 --> 00:08:47.240 on how the U .S. changed after incidents like 00:08:47.240 --> 00:08:50.740 Three Mile Island or 9 -11, and sort of questioned 00:08:50.740 --> 00:08:53.139 whether Japan had adapted its safety culture 00:08:53.139 --> 00:08:55.419 and regulations quite as proactively over the 00:08:55.419 --> 00:08:58.080 years. He noted the U .S. tends to be quite self 00:08:58.080 --> 00:09:00.320 -critical after events, leading to regulatory 00:09:00.320 --> 00:09:02.659 changes. It's a fair question about that cycle 00:09:02.659 --> 00:09:05.309 of learning and improvement. are lessons from 00:09:05.309 --> 00:09:08.269 past incidents truly embedded globally. It speaks 00:09:08.269 --> 00:09:10.649 to needing ongoing critical self -assessment 00:09:10.649 --> 00:09:12.590 everywhere. And you mentioned the U .S. concept 00:09:12.590 --> 00:09:15.210 of FLEX. Yes. F -L -E -X flexible and diverse 00:09:15.210 --> 00:09:17.809 coping strategies. Basically having backup equipment, 00:09:18.129 --> 00:09:20.409 pumps, generators stored safely away from the 00:09:20.409 --> 00:09:22.509 plant, ready to be brought in if the site's own 00:09:22.509 --> 00:09:25.029 equipment is damaged. The idea being? Resilience. 00:09:25.240 --> 00:09:27.919 Ensuring the plant can remain safe for at least 00:09:27.919 --> 00:09:31.159 72 hours, even if it's cut off from outside help 00:09:31.159 --> 00:09:34.080 because of, say, earthquake or tsunami damage 00:09:34.080 --> 00:09:37.259 to roads and infrastructure. That 72 -hour window 00:09:37.259 --> 00:09:39.720 gives time for external resources to get there. 00:09:40.000 --> 00:09:41.980 OK, let's move into some specific questions that 00:09:41.980 --> 00:09:44.320 came up in the discussion. There was one about 00:09:44.320 --> 00:09:48.820 operator error, specifically about Mr. Yoshida, 00:09:49.059 --> 00:09:51.529 the late plant manager. and his understanding 00:09:51.529 --> 00:09:54.570 of some valves. Yes, that came up. Dr. Castro 00:09:54.570 --> 00:09:58.669 was quite reluctant to judge. He emphasized the 00:09:58.669 --> 00:10:01.149 incredibly difficult, overwhelming conditions 00:10:01.149 --> 00:10:03.049 those operators were facing. Understandable. 00:10:03.230 --> 00:10:05.269 His point, I think, was that it's often more 00:10:05.269 --> 00:10:07.509 useful to look at potential systemic issues, 00:10:07.789 --> 00:10:10.210 training, procedures, the human -machine interface, 00:10:10.610 --> 00:10:12.950 rather than focusing solely on individual actions 00:10:12.950 --> 00:10:15.669 under extreme duress. The complexity of managing 00:10:15.669 --> 00:10:18.289 multiple reactors on one site was also discussed. 00:10:18.590 --> 00:10:20.769 Right, the idea that during a crisis, you almost 00:10:20.769 --> 00:10:23.070 need to treat each unit as its own separate challenge, 00:10:23.269 --> 00:10:25.289 with its own leadership team reporting up to 00:10:25.289 --> 00:10:27.029 an overall site command. It's not just one big 00:10:27.029 --> 00:10:29.980 problem, but several simultaneous ones. Exactly. 00:10:30.399 --> 00:10:33.419 Each needing focused attention and specific response 00:10:33.419 --> 00:10:35.860 plans within the bigger picture. There's also 00:10:35.860 --> 00:10:38.159 a hypothetical raised. What if the political 00:10:38.159 --> 00:10:40.860 leadership had been different? Say, Prime Minister 00:10:40.860 --> 00:10:43.700 Abe instead of Prime Minister Cannes. Would the 00:10:43.700 --> 00:10:45.960 response have changed? Dr. Castro circled back 00:10:45.960 --> 00:10:48.200 to a point he'd made earlier. The lack of independent 00:10:48.200 --> 00:10:51.059 information. Precisely. He suggested that the 00:10:51.059 --> 00:10:53.320 absence of an independent, reliable information 00:10:53.320 --> 00:10:56.100 channel directly to the prime minister was likely 00:10:56.100 --> 00:10:58.440 a major factor shaping the government's response, 00:10:58.960 --> 00:11:00.759 regardless of who is actually in the top job 00:11:00.759 --> 00:11:04.070 at that moment. The system itself, or lack thereof, 00:11:04.450 --> 00:11:07.409 was maybe more critical than the individual leader 00:11:07.409 --> 00:11:10.230 in that specific context. That seemed to be his 00:11:10.230 --> 00:11:12.830 implication, yes. Access to unbiased information 00:11:12.830 --> 00:11:15.409 is fundamental for any leader in a crisis. Now, 00:11:15.690 --> 00:11:18.210 inevitably, rumors swirl after big events. One 00:11:18.210 --> 00:11:20.370 was addressed directly this idea the U .S. threatened 00:11:20.370 --> 00:11:23.929 to send 120 experts to the prime minister's office, 00:11:24.129 --> 00:11:27.490 Cantel. Ah, yes. Dr. Castro clarified that. The 00:11:27.490 --> 00:11:30.220 U .S. did send a substantial team. About 150 00:11:30.220 --> 00:11:32.799 people, he said, to the U .S. embassy in Tokyo 00:11:32.799 --> 00:11:35.580 to provide technical support, logistical help. 00:11:35.879 --> 00:11:37.960 But not throttling to barge into the PM's office. 00:11:38.139 --> 00:11:40.960 No, he stated that specific claim was inaccurate. 00:11:41.779 --> 00:11:43.879 It's important to stick to the facts, especially 00:11:43.879 --> 00:11:46.899 when misinformation can spread so easily. His 00:11:46.899 --> 00:11:49.179 team worked out of the embassy coordinating with 00:11:49.179 --> 00:11:51.100 the Japanese government. And another point of 00:11:51.100 --> 00:11:54.440 speculation. Did Tepso ever consider just pulling 00:11:54.440 --> 00:11:57.649 out? abandoning the Daiichi site during the worst 00:11:57.649 --> 00:12:00.389 of it. Dr. Castro indicated he didn't have direct 00:12:00.389 --> 00:12:03.049 knowledge of that. Whether that was ever seriously 00:12:03.049 --> 00:12:06.149 on the table remains, I suppose, a point of debate 00:12:06.149 --> 00:12:08.129 in different accounts of the crisis. What is 00:12:08.129 --> 00:12:10.610 undeniable is the scale of the challenge Tepstow 00:12:10.610 --> 00:12:13.570 faced then and still faces now with decommissioning. 00:12:13.850 --> 00:12:15.769 Absolutely. And speaking of that, Dr. Castro 00:12:15.769 --> 00:12:18.950 mentioned his more recent visits to Fukushima 00:12:18.950 --> 00:12:22.009 Daiichi and also Daini, the nearby sister plant. 00:12:22.169 --> 00:12:24.590 What were his impressions? He noted significant 00:12:24.590 --> 00:12:27.389 progress, especially at Daiichi, with the very 00:12:27.389 --> 00:12:29.970 difficult decommissioning work. He specifically 00:12:29.970 --> 00:12:32.029 mentioned improvement to managing the groundwater 00:12:32.029 --> 00:12:34.870 contamination issue, which was huge. It's an 00:12:34.870 --> 00:12:37.970 immense undertaking. Immense. He expressed real 00:12:37.970 --> 00:12:39.870 respect for the leadership shown, mentioning 00:12:39.870 --> 00:12:42.450 Mr. Yoshida, of course, and also Mr. Masuda, 00:12:42.570 --> 00:12:44.529 who's been central to the decommissioning effort 00:12:44.529 --> 00:12:47.190 since. He acknowledged the incredible level of 00:12:47.190 --> 00:12:49.009 effort involved. Good to hear about progress. 00:12:49.409 --> 00:12:52.529 Now. Circling back to the societal and emergency 00:12:52.529 --> 00:12:55.450 planning aspects. Yes. He really hammered this 00:12:55.450 --> 00:12:58.029 home. The need for that national risk discussion 00:12:58.029 --> 00:13:00.370 we talked about. And better plans. Realistic 00:13:00.370 --> 00:13:03.850 emergency plans. He stressed thinking about sheltering 00:13:03.850 --> 00:13:06.169 in place, especially for big cities where mass 00:13:06.169 --> 00:13:09.450 evacuation might just not be feasible, and much, 00:13:09.549 --> 00:13:12.389 much better public notification systems. He contrasted 00:13:12.389 --> 00:13:14.690 Japan's system with its earthquake early warning 00:13:14.690 --> 00:13:16.470 system, right? Exactly. The earthquake system 00:13:16.470 --> 00:13:20.000 is world class. incredibly fast. The system for 00:13:20.000 --> 00:13:22.519 nuclear emergency notifications, he felt, was 00:13:22.519 --> 00:13:25.200 comparatively slow and needed significant improvement 00:13:25.200 --> 00:13:27.480 to be truly effective in a fast moving crisis. 00:13:27.740 --> 00:13:30.519 OK, let's talk about Dr. Casta's own stance on 00:13:30.519 --> 00:13:33.200 nuclear power itself. How did he position himself? 00:13:33.419 --> 00:13:36.360 Very clearly. He said he's pro safety, not pro 00:13:36.360 --> 00:13:38.860 nuclear or anti nuclear intrinsically. Safety 00:13:38.860 --> 00:13:42.360 first, last and always. That's the message. His 00:13:42.360 --> 00:13:44.720 view is that the technology safety depends entirely 00:13:44.720 --> 00:13:47.799 on how it's managed, regulated, operated. and 00:13:47.799 --> 00:13:50.139 the decision to use it or not. That belongs to 00:13:50.139 --> 00:13:52.460 the public, he believes. Society has to weigh 00:13:52.460 --> 00:13:54.720 the risks and benefits and decide what's acceptable. 00:13:55.240 --> 00:13:58.080 If a country does choose nuclear, then his focus 00:13:58.080 --> 00:14:01.059 is on helping them do it as safely as humanly 00:14:01.059 --> 00:14:03.620 possible. Right. It puts the onus on public dialogue, 00:14:03.879 --> 00:14:06.710 transparency, informed consent. He did offer 00:14:06.710 --> 00:14:08.950 a critique, though, of the current regulatory 00:14:08.950 --> 00:14:11.950 approach in Japan, didn't he? He did. He expressed 00:14:11.950 --> 00:14:14.909 a perception, anyway, that perhaps the NRA, the 00:14:14.909 --> 00:14:17.669 current regulator, focuses quite heavily on paperwork, 00:14:17.970 --> 00:14:20.149 on documentation review. More than— More than 00:14:20.149 --> 00:14:22.950 perhaps a— assessing actual human performance. 00:14:23.570 --> 00:14:25.629 How well do the teams perform under pressure 00:14:25.629 --> 00:14:28.429 and realistic simulated emergencies? Drills, 00:14:28.710 --> 00:14:31.309 exercises, performance -based checks. So balancing 00:14:31.309 --> 00:14:34.029 the paper checks with observing real capability. 00:14:34.210 --> 00:14:36.149 That seemed to be the gist of his observation. 00:14:36.570 --> 00:14:38.789 Ensuring the human element is robustly evaluated, 00:14:39.049 --> 00:14:41.330 not just the procedures on paper. And finally, 00:14:41.490 --> 00:14:44.269 the topic of earthquakes. Predicting them, setting 00:14:44.269 --> 00:14:46.610 safety standards in a place like Japan. Yeah, 00:14:46.710 --> 00:14:49.570 he acknowledged the inherent uncertainty. You 00:14:49.570 --> 00:14:52.029 can't predict earthquakes with perfect accuracy. 00:14:52.190 --> 00:14:54.389 So you have to plan for uncertainty. Exactly. 00:14:54.529 --> 00:14:56.669 Plan for scenarios where the quake might be bigger 00:14:56.669 --> 00:14:59.230 or different than predicted. Build in safety 00:14:59.230 --> 00:15:01.269 margins. He used that analogy. You don't want 00:15:01.269 --> 00:15:04.190 a fire in your house, right? You take precautions, 00:15:04.509 --> 00:15:06.909 even if you can't predict exactly when or if 00:15:06.909 --> 00:15:10.090 a fire might happen. Natural hazards carry inherent 00:15:10.090 --> 00:15:12.909 risks. So preparedness for beyond design basis 00:15:12.909 --> 00:15:15.529 events is key. Absolutely crucial for critical 00:15:15.529 --> 00:15:18.350 infrastructure like nuclear plants in seismically 00:15:18.350 --> 00:15:20.470 active zones. Okay, so wrapping this deep dive 00:15:20.470 --> 00:15:24.190 up, Fukushima was clearly just incredibly multifaceted. 00:15:24.690 --> 00:15:27.470 Technical failures, yes, but deeply intertwined 00:15:27.470 --> 00:15:31.659 with societal trust. policy frameworks. Dr. Castro's 00:15:31.659 --> 00:15:33.500 perspective really highlights those connections 00:15:33.500 --> 00:15:36.279 and the lessons about crisis management, communication, 00:15:36.460 --> 00:15:38.740 the need for independent information, and really 00:15:38.740 --> 00:15:40.840 addressing those societal and policy dimensions, 00:15:40.980 --> 00:15:42.899 not just the engineering fixes. And the challenges 00:15:42.899 --> 00:15:45.399 for Japan remain significant as it considers 00:15:45.399 --> 00:15:48.580 the path forward for nuclear energy. It really 00:15:48.580 --> 00:15:51.500 boils down to rebuilding that public trust. open 00:15:51.500 --> 00:15:53.940 dialogue, demonstrating an absolute commitment 00:15:53.940 --> 00:15:57.580 to safety in its broadest sense, technical, societal, 00:15:58.039 --> 00:16:00.440 governmental, and fostering that shared understanding 00:16:00.440 --> 00:16:02.940 of risks and benefits. It definitely leaves you 00:16:02.940 --> 00:16:05.399 thinking, doesn't it, about that balance between 00:16:05.399 --> 00:16:08.899 technology, how much risk we as a society are 00:16:08.899 --> 00:16:12.799 willing to live with, and just how vital, transparent, 00:16:13.059 --> 00:16:16.399 effective governance is for safety in any complex 00:16:16.399 --> 00:16:18.879 high -stakes field. What level of risk are you 00:16:18.879 --> 00:16:20.820 comfortable with when you think about it. And 00:16:20.820 --> 00:16:22.860 how informed should that decision really be? 00:16:23.139 --> 00:16:25.120 It's a question for everyone. A lot to mull over. 00:16:25.399 --> 00:16:27.559 Indeed. And for listeners interested in digging 00:16:27.559 --> 00:16:29.919 even deeper, Dr. Castro has apparently shared 00:16:29.919 --> 00:16:32.299 more insights and lectures at places like Temple 00:16:32.299 --> 00:16:34.840 and Tokyo universities. Good to know. Well, thank 00:16:34.840 --> 00:16:37.019 you for joining us on this deep dive today. Our 00:16:37.019 --> 00:16:39.940 pleasure. We hope this exploration of Dr. Castro's 00:16:39.940 --> 00:16:42.000 insights has given you a richer, more nuanced 00:16:42.000 --> 00:16:44.419 view of the Fukushima accident and the complex 00:16:44.419 --> 00:16:46.720 considerations shaping Japan's nuclear future.