WEBVTT 00:00:01.910 --> 00:00:04.589 It seems that springtime is a lousy season for 00:00:04.589 --> 00:00:07.290 nuclear power plants. The worst accidents seem 00:00:07.290 --> 00:00:10.429 to have happened in the spring. On a chilly March 00:00:10.429 --> 00:00:12.710 day with two reactors operating at full power 00:00:12.710 --> 00:00:15.130 delivered 2 ,200 megawatts of electricity to 00:00:15.130 --> 00:00:18.170 the community, workers there set off a sequence 00:00:18.170 --> 00:00:21.050 of events that would result in a near meltdown 00:00:21.050 --> 00:00:24.989 of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactor cores. In the 00:00:24.989 --> 00:00:26.910 bowels of the plant there was an electrical cable 00:00:26.910 --> 00:00:29.600 room called a cable spreading room. It's designed 00:00:29.600 --> 00:00:32.259 to separate the essential electrical cables for 00:00:32.259 --> 00:00:35.859 the plant's reactors. Those cables provided electrical 00:00:35.859 --> 00:00:38.659 lifeblood of the reactors and were key to controlling 00:00:38.659 --> 00:00:42.380 them. That room was the heart and brain of the 00:00:42.380 --> 00:00:46.560 reactors. On this March day, two construction 00:00:46.560 --> 00:00:48.719 workers were trying to seal air leaks between 00:00:48.719 --> 00:00:50.740 the reactor building and a turbine building. 00:00:51.240 --> 00:00:53.520 These buildings had to be airtight. Otherwise, 00:00:53.880 --> 00:00:55.960 radiation could escape from one to the other 00:00:55.960 --> 00:00:59.299 and possibly out to the environment and the people. 00:01:00.280 --> 00:01:02.840 They were using polyurethane foam material for 00:01:02.840 --> 00:01:05.359 this purpose and a candle to determine whether 00:01:05.359 --> 00:01:08.879 the leaks had been successfully plugged. Any 00:01:08.879 --> 00:01:11.079 escaping air would move the flame on the candle 00:01:11.079 --> 00:01:13.439 telling them that their work was not yet done. 00:01:14.620 --> 00:01:16.659 All was going according to plan until one of 00:01:16.659 --> 00:01:18.739 the workers placed the candle too close to the 00:01:18.739 --> 00:01:22.170 foam rubber. The foam rubber quickly burst into 00:01:22.170 --> 00:01:26.489 flames. The fire disabled critical systems, including 00:01:26.489 --> 00:01:29.189 the entire emergency core cooling system of the 00:01:29.189 --> 00:01:32.629 reactor unit one. Soon, it would be within an 00:01:32.629 --> 00:01:36.390 hour of meltdown. Maybe you think I'm describing 00:01:36.390 --> 00:01:38.469 the start of the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 00:01:38.469 --> 00:01:41.349 Japan, but this series of events occurred a lot 00:01:41.349 --> 00:01:44.189 closer to home. These things happened at the 00:01:44.189 --> 00:01:48.129 Browns Ferry nuclear plant in Alabama in 1975. 00:01:49.030 --> 00:01:53.510 35 years, 11 months, and 18 days before Fukushima. 00:01:54.769 --> 00:01:56.930 The parallels between the two accidents are both 00:01:56.930 --> 00:01:59.390 interesting and enlightening. To complete your 00:01:59.390 --> 00:02:01.489 sense of the timeline, the Brown's Ferry disaster 00:02:01.489 --> 00:02:03.769 occurred a little more than four years before 00:02:03.769 --> 00:02:06.409 the Three Mile Island accident in March of 79, 00:02:07.310 --> 00:02:09.969 and 11 years before the Chernobyl accident in 00:02:09.969 --> 00:02:13.729 April of 86. See what I mean about springtime? 00:02:14.659 --> 00:02:17.000 Years after the Browns Ferry fire, I went to 00:02:17.000 --> 00:02:19.419 work at that plant and found myself among some 00:02:19.419 --> 00:02:21.840 of the operators who had experienced the events 00:02:21.840 --> 00:02:25.979 firsthand. I talk a little bit about my conversations 00:02:25.979 --> 00:02:27.900 with them and what I learned from them in my 00:02:27.900 --> 00:02:30.419 book, Station Blackout. But because the book 00:02:30.419 --> 00:02:32.879 is primarily about the Fukushima disaster and 00:02:32.879 --> 00:02:35.560 its aftermath, I touched upon the lessons and 00:02:35.560 --> 00:02:38.659 parallels of Browns Ferry only briefly. And it 00:02:38.659 --> 00:02:41.740 is a story that deserves fuller attention. I'm 00:02:41.740 --> 00:02:44.139 very pleased to share it in more detail now. 00:02:44.439 --> 00:02:47.340 along with my promise to dedicate future podcasts 00:02:47.340 --> 00:02:50.340 to the stories of the heroic Fukushima operators, 00:02:50.780 --> 00:02:53.159 whose actions saved their planet and probably 00:02:53.159 --> 00:02:57.919 their country. Back to Brown's Ferry. The cable 00:02:57.919 --> 00:03:00.219 spreading room where the fire began is located 00:03:00.219 --> 00:03:02.659 just below the plant's control room. There's 00:03:02.659 --> 00:03:06.000 a wall penetration, a hole basically, between 00:03:06.000 --> 00:03:08.819 the turbine building, referred as the non -safety 00:03:08.819 --> 00:03:11.719 side, and the reactor building, the safety side. 00:03:11.979 --> 00:03:14.460 that houses the reactor and its safety systems. 00:03:15.500 --> 00:03:17.800 The electrical cables for the safety systems 00:03:17.800 --> 00:03:20.620 run through this hole, but it is critical that 00:03:20.620 --> 00:03:23.219 there be no airflow between the two buildings. 00:03:24.039 --> 00:03:26.819 As I said earlier, any leak could potentially 00:03:26.819 --> 00:03:29.580 allow radioactive substance to flow from the 00:03:29.580 --> 00:03:32.139 reactor building into the turbine building and 00:03:32.139 --> 00:03:35.219 ultimately out to the environment, which is why 00:03:35.219 --> 00:03:37.939 the sealing of any possible leaks is a critical 00:03:37.939 --> 00:03:41.759 task. On that March day, working carefully as 00:03:41.759 --> 00:03:43.900 he was trained to do, one of the workers tore 00:03:43.900 --> 00:03:46.719 off two pieces of foam sheeting and jammed them 00:03:46.719 --> 00:03:50.319 into the hole. Not fully effective as it turns 00:03:50.319 --> 00:03:53.020 out, when he held the lit candle nearby to check 00:03:53.020 --> 00:03:55.560 his work, the draft between the two buildings 00:03:55.560 --> 00:03:58.219 quickly sucked the flame towards the flammable 00:03:58.219 --> 00:04:02.500 foam. As the foam started to smolder and glow, 00:04:02.919 --> 00:04:05.180 the other worker quickly handed the man a flashlight, 00:04:05.719 --> 00:04:09.150 which he used to try to knock out the fire. No 00:04:09.150 --> 00:04:12.250 luck. Next he tried to smother the fire by stuffing 00:04:12.250 --> 00:04:14.949 rags into the hole. That didn't work either. 00:04:15.870 --> 00:04:18.230 Increasingly desperate, the two workers pulled 00:04:18.230 --> 00:04:21.209 out the rags and one of them grabbed a fire extinguisher, 00:04:21.410 --> 00:04:24.430 quickly aiming a strong blast of CO2 right through 00:04:24.430 --> 00:04:27.689 the hole into the reactor building. Surely this 00:04:27.689 --> 00:04:31.389 would do the trick, right? Wrong. The fire continued 00:04:31.389 --> 00:04:34.629 to spread. He then tried a dry chemical extinguisher 00:04:34.629 --> 00:04:37.430 and then another. Neither put out the fire. which 00:04:37.430 --> 00:04:40.230 was now galloping through the polyurethane foam. 00:04:41.170 --> 00:04:43.490 In fact, the CO2 extinguisher had just pushed 00:04:43.490 --> 00:04:45.709 the flames further into the hole, and the chemical 00:04:45.709 --> 00:04:48.769 extinguisher had a blowtorch effect, causing 00:04:48.769 --> 00:04:52.589 the fire to literally roar. Although the dry 00:04:52.589 --> 00:04:55.290 chemicals did briefly douse the flames, they 00:04:55.290 --> 00:04:58.029 simply reignited. The workers should have activated 00:04:58.029 --> 00:05:00.790 a fire alarm even before attempting to douse 00:05:00.790 --> 00:05:03.930 the flames themselves. Instead, they struggled 00:05:03.930 --> 00:05:06.569 to put out the fire for about 15 minutes. to 00:05:06.569 --> 00:05:10.889 no avail. Only then, in a panic, did they run 00:05:10.889 --> 00:05:12.829 to a plant guard to tell him that the fire had 00:05:12.829 --> 00:05:16.529 broken out. He in turn violated protocol by calling 00:05:16.529 --> 00:05:18.949 the shift engineer's office rather than sounding 00:05:18.949 --> 00:05:22.370 an alarm. The shift engineer called the reactor 00:05:22.370 --> 00:05:25.189 operator in the control room and only then was 00:05:25.189 --> 00:05:28.870 the fire alarm sounded. I shudder to think what 00:05:28.870 --> 00:05:30.589 would have happened if the shift engineer had 00:05:30.589 --> 00:05:32.629 been away from his office on the construction 00:05:32.629 --> 00:05:35.290 side of the plant where he'd have no direct line. 00:05:35.519 --> 00:05:42.259 of communications to the control room. Even after 00:05:42.259 --> 00:05:44.319 the fire alarm sounded, the operators didn't 00:05:44.319 --> 00:05:46.379 consider it necessary to shut down the plant, 00:05:46.699 --> 00:05:50.439 and the reactors continued to operate. 45 minutes 00:05:50.439 --> 00:05:53.000 after the fire alarm sounded, the Unit 1 reactor 00:05:53.000 --> 00:05:55.100 operator discovered that all of his emergency 00:05:55.100 --> 00:05:58.660 pumps had been activated automatically. This 00:05:58.660 --> 00:06:01.060 would normally occur as a result of a change 00:06:01.060 --> 00:06:03.560 in the reactor's water level, but the reactor 00:06:03.560 --> 00:06:06.139 was operating normally. And the water level was 00:06:06.139 --> 00:06:09.800 unchanged. What was going on, he thought. Lights 00:06:09.800 --> 00:06:12.040 on the control panels began randomly glowing, 00:06:12.339 --> 00:06:15.279 brightening, dimming, and then going out. Alarms 00:06:15.279 --> 00:06:18.600 were sounding. At one point, smoke began pouring 00:06:18.600 --> 00:06:21.860 from the control boards. On one emergency panel, 00:06:22.560 --> 00:06:25.120 light bulb sockets began to pop, and the light 00:06:25.120 --> 00:06:28.339 bulb shattered. Thinking this was just part of 00:06:28.339 --> 00:06:30.660 some malfunction of the emergency system, the 00:06:30.660 --> 00:06:33.399 operator tried to shut it down. But it simply 00:06:33.399 --> 00:06:36.240 restarted on its own. reactivating the pumps 00:06:36.240 --> 00:06:39.019 and offering up more flashing lights, buzzers, 00:06:39.060 --> 00:06:42.620 and smoke. After 10 minutes, the reality began 00:06:42.620 --> 00:06:45.500 to sink in. Maybe the reactor should be shut 00:06:45.500 --> 00:06:48.220 down, he thought. But before the reactor operator 00:06:48.220 --> 00:06:50.939 could initiate this action, the power in the 00:06:50.939 --> 00:06:53.740 Unit 1 reactor began to drop precipitously, and 00:06:53.740 --> 00:06:57.079 the reactor's cooling water pumps quit. At that 00:06:57.079 --> 00:07:00.240 point, 55 minutes after the fire had started 00:07:00.240 --> 00:07:03.180 in the cable spreading room, the operator shut 00:07:03.180 --> 00:07:09.600 down the reactor. As a result of this chain of 00:07:09.600 --> 00:07:11.759 events, all control power and electrical power 00:07:11.759 --> 00:07:14.839 for the reactors was lost. All safety equipment 00:07:14.839 --> 00:07:18.060 for Unit 1 was lost, along with all systems that 00:07:18.060 --> 00:07:21.300 protected the core, except for one small pump. 00:07:21.860 --> 00:07:23.839 And it was not enough to keep the core cold. 00:07:24.639 --> 00:07:27.779 So that's what was happening in Unit 1. But what 00:07:27.779 --> 00:07:31.120 about Unit 2? On the Unit 2 side of the control 00:07:31.120 --> 00:07:33.480 room, warning lights were also going off. Panel 00:07:33.480 --> 00:07:37.189 lights were flashing and changing color. Backup 00:07:37.189 --> 00:07:39.029 electrical power to the emergency system had 00:07:39.029 --> 00:07:42.589 failed. Soon, just as in Unit 1, reactor power 00:07:42.589 --> 00:07:46.569 began inexplicably decreasing. And just as in 00:07:46.569 --> 00:07:48.790 Unit 1, the operator didn't immediately shut 00:07:48.790 --> 00:07:51.850 down the plant. Back in Unit 1, things were not 00:07:51.850 --> 00:07:54.490 going well. One hour and 15 minutes into the 00:07:54.490 --> 00:07:56.709 accident, all the nuclear instrumentation had 00:07:56.709 --> 00:08:00.250 been lost. So the operator had no way of knowing 00:08:00.250 --> 00:08:03.360 what was happening inside the reactor. How could 00:08:03.360 --> 00:08:06.279 he cool the core with just that one small pump? 00:08:06.779 --> 00:08:08.500 He had to figure out a way to get more water 00:08:08.500 --> 00:08:12.279 into the core. He decided to open some valves 00:08:12.279 --> 00:08:15.360 to depressurize the reactor. He hoped that this 00:08:15.360 --> 00:08:18.800 action would allow for low pressure systems to 00:08:18.800 --> 00:08:22.160 deliver water for the reactor. The question was, 00:08:22.620 --> 00:08:24.920 were these low pressure systems available? By 00:08:24.920 --> 00:08:27.439 the time the operator located one working low 00:08:27.439 --> 00:08:29.680 pressure pump, that could deliver an adequate 00:08:29.680 --> 00:08:32.299 supply of water to the reactor, the reactor water 00:08:32.299 --> 00:08:35.080 level had dropped parallelously low, to just 00:08:35.080 --> 00:08:38.759 48 inches above the core. For the moment, the 00:08:38.759 --> 00:08:41.980 Unit 1 reactor was under control, but for how 00:08:41.980 --> 00:08:45.259 long? Unit 2 avoided a meltdown by a similarly 00:08:45.259 --> 00:08:49.399 thin margin. Key safety systems, nuclear instrumentation, 00:08:49.559 --> 00:08:52.460 and communications failed. The operators for 00:08:52.460 --> 00:08:56.480 Unit 2 were becoming blind without this information. 00:08:56.720 --> 00:09:00.039 The room was filling with smoke. Alarms were 00:09:00.039 --> 00:09:03.279 blaring in their ears. They were becoming blind 00:09:03.279 --> 00:09:06.360 just as the operators were on Unit 1. The operators 00:09:06.360 --> 00:09:09.080 were able to depressurize the reactor and use 00:09:09.080 --> 00:09:12.259 low pressure systems to cool the core, thus narrowly 00:09:12.259 --> 00:09:14.940 averting a meltdown. Back at the site of the 00:09:14.940 --> 00:09:17.419 fire, the Plant Fire Brigade was assembled and 00:09:17.419 --> 00:09:19.919 determined to get into the reactor building and 00:09:19.919 --> 00:09:21.820 attack the fire from the other side of the hole. 00:09:22.320 --> 00:09:25.620 But this was not easily done. The loss of electricity 00:09:25.620 --> 00:09:27.620 had plunged the interior of the reactor building 00:09:27.620 --> 00:09:30.159 into darkness, and it was filled with dense, 00:09:30.519 --> 00:09:34.580 thick smoke. They needed breathing apparatus 00:09:34.580 --> 00:09:37.639 to survive inside, and they were woefully under 00:09:37.639 --> 00:09:39.919 -equipped in that department. And after several 00:09:39.919 --> 00:09:42.700 heroic attempts to get in, the firefighters gave 00:09:42.700 --> 00:09:45.820 up. In the turbine building, one firefighter 00:09:45.820 --> 00:09:48.519 tried to turn on the CO2 fire suppression system 00:09:48.519 --> 00:09:51.350 and flood the entire spreading room. Only to 00:09:51.350 --> 00:09:54.409 find that the CO2 system had purposely been disabled 00:09:54.409 --> 00:09:57.409 to prevent spraying construction workers with 00:09:57.409 --> 00:10:00.269 CO2 while they worked. The spreader room was 00:10:00.269 --> 00:10:02.710 crowded and difficult to navigate under the best 00:10:02.710 --> 00:10:06.049 of circumstances. But when wearing an air pack 00:10:06.049 --> 00:10:08.210 and mask and carrying a fire extinguisher, it 00:10:08.210 --> 00:10:11.830 was nearly impossible for the firefighters. Firefighters 00:10:11.830 --> 00:10:14.350 tried crawling under the cables, but their air 00:10:14.350 --> 00:10:16.330 packs were too cumbersome. They took them off 00:10:16.330 --> 00:10:19.019 and slid them along ahead of themselves. In the 00:10:19.019 --> 00:10:20.919 process, the nozzle of one of the extinguishers 00:10:20.919 --> 00:10:24.399 broke off, making a horrific noise and making 00:10:24.399 --> 00:10:28.179 the extinguisher useless. Air packs were in short 00:10:28.179 --> 00:10:30.700 supply and not all of them worked. Some included 00:10:30.700 --> 00:10:33.200 face masks and some of them didn't, and others 00:10:33.200 --> 00:10:36.220 were not fully charged. Of course, even when 00:10:36.220 --> 00:10:38.720 charged, they could only be used for a limited 00:10:38.720 --> 00:10:42.080 amount of time. One firefighter tried to use 00:10:42.080 --> 00:10:45.129 a manual override to start the flow of CO2 It 00:10:45.129 --> 00:10:47.029 discovered that a metal construction plate had 00:10:47.029 --> 00:10:50.190 been installed over the handle. Unable to locate 00:10:50.190 --> 00:10:52.789 a simple screwdriver to remove the plate, he 00:10:52.789 --> 00:10:56.169 couldn't get this done. It would later be discovered 00:10:56.169 --> 00:10:58.870 that nearly all manual CO2 controls in the plant 00:10:58.870 --> 00:11:02.429 had been similarly obstructed. The firefighter 00:11:02.429 --> 00:11:05.169 finally restored power to the CO2 system, but 00:11:05.169 --> 00:11:07.730 when they deployed it, the result was simply 00:11:07.730 --> 00:11:10.909 to drive heavy black smoke up into the control 00:11:10.909 --> 00:11:13.799 room choking the operators. making it even more 00:11:13.799 --> 00:11:17.000 difficult to control the reactors. The operators 00:11:17.000 --> 00:11:18.679 and others in the control room began choking 00:11:18.679 --> 00:11:21.279 and coughing up smoke. It was evident that they'd 00:11:21.279 --> 00:11:23.620 soon have to evacuate unless they could get the 00:11:23.620 --> 00:11:26.600 control room ventilated. Firefighters shut off 00:11:26.600 --> 00:11:29.840 the CO2 system to stop the influx of smoke and 00:11:29.840 --> 00:11:32.580 opened the control room doors, but the fire burnt 00:11:32.580 --> 00:11:35.700 on. Two firefighters grabbed flashlights and 00:11:35.700 --> 00:11:39.000 went up into the spreader room to try again to 00:11:39.000 --> 00:11:41.240 extinguish the fire. but the flashlights couldn't 00:11:41.240 --> 00:11:44.539 penetrate the thick black smoke. On their way 00:11:44.539 --> 00:11:46.700 to the spreader room, they encountered some 12 00:11:46.700 --> 00:11:49.200 workers in or near the room who'd been overcome 00:11:49.200 --> 00:11:52.899 by the CO2 and were close to death. They would 00:11:52.899 --> 00:11:56.419 need to be rescued immediately, and they were 00:11:56.419 --> 00:11:59.860 by the already overburdened firefighters. By 00:11:59.860 --> 00:12:01.659 this point, the rubber insulation around the 00:12:01.659 --> 00:12:04.679 cable was burning, producing dense black smoke 00:12:04.679 --> 00:12:07.340 and sickening fumes and causing those fighting 00:12:07.340 --> 00:12:10.580 the fire to vomit repeatedly. Back in the reactor 00:12:10.580 --> 00:12:13.039 building, operators put on breathing equipment 00:12:13.039 --> 00:12:16.120 and made three attempts to open valves to cool 00:12:16.120 --> 00:12:19.379 the reactors. But their air packs provided only 00:12:19.379 --> 00:12:22.100 18 minutes of air. Not enough time to get the 00:12:22.100 --> 00:12:24.960 job done and get back to safety. After their 00:12:24.960 --> 00:12:28.240 third attempt, frustrated and unable to recharge 00:12:28.240 --> 00:12:30.659 the air packs, they went back to the control 00:12:30.659 --> 00:12:33.039 room. They'd need better equipment if they were 00:12:33.039 --> 00:12:38.000 to succeed at their task. For another six hours, 00:12:38.500 --> 00:12:41.120 electrical cables continued to burn. The Athens, 00:12:41.120 --> 00:12:43.000 Alabama Fire Department had been on the scene 00:12:43.000 --> 00:12:46.059 since about 1 .30 p .m., an hour and a half after 00:12:46.059 --> 00:12:48.799 the fire began. But most of the firefighting 00:12:48.799 --> 00:12:51.139 was still being carried out by the Plant Fire 00:12:51.139 --> 00:12:54.899 Brigade. The local fire chief didn't believe 00:12:54.899 --> 00:12:57.100 the fire was electrical in nature and wanted 00:12:57.100 --> 00:12:59.639 to douse it with water rather than using the 00:12:59.639 --> 00:13:03.059 CO2 or dry chemicals. In his view, the hot wires 00:13:03.059 --> 00:13:05.620 needed to cool. and this could only be done with 00:13:05.620 --> 00:13:08.399 water. But the Tennessee Valley Authority, the 00:13:08.399 --> 00:13:10.799 organization that ran the plant, continued to 00:13:10.799 --> 00:13:13.039 insist that the fire was in fact electrical. 00:13:13.899 --> 00:13:16.320 And they had a policy of not putting water on 00:13:16.320 --> 00:13:18.840 an electrical fire to avoid electrocution of 00:13:18.840 --> 00:13:21.779 firefighters. The fire chief was frustrated. 00:13:22.779 --> 00:13:25.620 Plant employees were using B and C types of fire 00:13:25.620 --> 00:13:28.440 extinguishers to put out what he knew was a Type 00:13:28.440 --> 00:13:32.120 A fire. Around 6 p .m., he again suggested the 00:13:32.120 --> 00:13:34.889 use of water. and the plant superintendent finally 00:13:34.889 --> 00:13:38.950 agreed. As a result, the Athens Fire Department 00:13:38.950 --> 00:13:42.090 put out the fire in about 20 minutes, a fire 00:13:42.090 --> 00:13:44.970 that had burnt for hours and nearly melted down 00:13:44.970 --> 00:13:50.490 two reactors. Concerns about reactor pressure 00:13:50.490 --> 00:13:52.889 increasing and stopping the low pressure water 00:13:52.889 --> 00:13:55.309 flow to the reactor core suddenly appeared on 00:13:55.309 --> 00:13:58.590 Unit 1. Under these conditions, with increasing 00:13:58.590 --> 00:14:01.419 pressure and the loss of water, Meltdown could 00:14:01.419 --> 00:14:04.980 begin in as little as a few hours. Reactor pressure 00:14:04.980 --> 00:14:08.740 mounted higher and higher. How could they depressurize 00:14:08.740 --> 00:14:11.840 the reactor? Then one of the shift engineers 00:14:11.840 --> 00:14:14.320 remembered that the system had been installed 00:14:14.320 --> 00:14:16.340 during construction that would allow for the 00:14:16.340 --> 00:14:19.299 depressurization of the reactor by using nitrogen 00:14:19.299 --> 00:14:23.379 in lieu of the failed air systems. The operators 00:14:23.379 --> 00:14:25.759 plunged back into the smoke -filled reactor building 00:14:25.759 --> 00:14:28.559 to find the nitrogen valves. and align them so 00:14:28.559 --> 00:14:31.539 that the reactor could be depressurized. Finally, 00:14:31.559 --> 00:14:35.159 at about 9 .50 p .m., the operators began to 00:14:35.159 --> 00:14:38.460 depressurize the reactor. The normal shutdown 00:14:38.460 --> 00:14:40.519 of the reactor was finally accomplished at 4 00:14:40.519 --> 00:14:43.299 a .m. The tragedy of the Brown's Ferry fire was 00:14:43.299 --> 00:14:46.659 over, with dozens treated for smoke inhalation, 00:14:46.940 --> 00:14:50.700 but no loss of life. Other emergency system failures 00:14:50.700 --> 00:14:52.580 plagued the plant in the wake of the disaster. 00:14:53.560 --> 00:14:55.960 After nightfall, aircraft warning lights on the 00:14:55.960 --> 00:14:59.799 600 -foot plant stack went out, leaving it vulnerable 00:14:59.799 --> 00:15:03.080 to an aircraft collision. Someone tried to notify 00:15:03.080 --> 00:15:06.720 the security officers of this situation by public 00:15:06.720 --> 00:15:10.399 telephone, but couldn't reach them. They then 00:15:10.399 --> 00:15:12.440 called the State Environment's Emergency Center 00:15:12.440 --> 00:15:14.240 and explained the condition, only to be told 00:15:14.240 --> 00:15:17.480 to contact the FAA so that aircraft might be 00:15:17.480 --> 00:15:21.539 warned. That was a nonsensical action. The computer 00:15:21.539 --> 00:15:23.700 printer recording the events ran out of tape 00:15:23.700 --> 00:15:27.039 at 4 .30 p .m. and wasn't replaced until 2 p 00:15:27.039 --> 00:15:29.659 .m. the following day. Because of that, much 00:15:29.659 --> 00:15:31.580 of what happened moment to moment could only 00:15:31.580 --> 00:15:34.779 be reconstructed anecdotally after the fact. 00:15:35.860 --> 00:15:38.259 Similarly, the tape recorders used to record 00:15:38.259 --> 00:15:41.059 phone calls were not fully functional and only 00:15:41.059 --> 00:15:43.580 partial transcripts were taken. Some of the calls 00:15:43.580 --> 00:15:46.360 that were recorded exposed that senior managers 00:15:46.360 --> 00:15:48.919 were making light of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 00:15:48.919 --> 00:15:52.210 decision to come and investigate the fire. Some 00:15:52.210 --> 00:15:54.669 even made fun of the investigators themselves. 00:15:55.350 --> 00:15:57.450 Plant leaders were recorded telling the public 00:15:57.450 --> 00:15:59.690 affairs officer at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 00:15:59.690 --> 00:16:03.309 that the public news media would probably, quote, 00:16:03.570 --> 00:16:07.409 drive you out of your mind, unquote. He had asked 00:16:07.409 --> 00:16:11.129 if the NRC had issued a press release. They had 00:16:11.129 --> 00:16:14.309 issued one at 430 p .m. that day, four and a 00:16:14.309 --> 00:16:17.240 half hours after the fire. But the upshot of 00:16:17.240 --> 00:16:19.139 the press release was that the situation could 00:16:19.139 --> 00:16:22.059 have been a hell of a lot worse. Not a meaningful 00:16:22.059 --> 00:16:26.080 press release. Emergency procedures for the reactors 00:16:26.080 --> 00:16:28.879 were problematic as well. Even though there had 00:16:28.879 --> 00:16:31.340 been previous fires at the plant, many employees 00:16:31.340 --> 00:16:33.600 didn't know how to call in an alarm, nor had 00:16:33.600 --> 00:16:37.279 they been trained in emergency procedures. When 00:16:37.279 --> 00:16:39.000 the word of the fire had spread throughout the 00:16:39.000 --> 00:16:41.120 plant, many of the employees had gone to the 00:16:41.120 --> 00:16:43.440 control room, which added to the chaos of the 00:16:43.440 --> 00:16:46.740 situation. in a room meant to hold six people, 00:16:46.940 --> 00:16:50.240 suddenly there were 50 to 75, and few of them 00:16:50.240 --> 00:16:53.200 were actually helping. After the fire, there 00:16:53.200 --> 00:16:55.600 was much discussion about why flammable foam 00:16:55.600 --> 00:16:57.820 had been used to fix the leaks in the first place. 00:16:58.740 --> 00:17:00.799 The workers themselves knew that the foam was 00:17:00.799 --> 00:17:03.159 flammable, and they'd been told as much by an 00:17:03.159 --> 00:17:06.619 electrical engineer. Some senior managers admitted 00:17:06.619 --> 00:17:09.480 that they knew the foam was flammable, but had 00:17:09.480 --> 00:17:11.819 never dreamed anybody would use a candle to test 00:17:11.819 --> 00:17:14.619 it. Others said they knew about the candles but 00:17:14.619 --> 00:17:17.420 had no idea the foam was flammable. The real 00:17:17.420 --> 00:17:19.339 irony of the Browns Ferry fire was that two days 00:17:19.339 --> 00:17:22.279 earlier another engineer had put out a similar 00:17:22.279 --> 00:17:24.980 fire. The night shift engineers and the assistant 00:17:24.980 --> 00:17:28.119 engineers all met to discuss it. They had concluded 00:17:28.119 --> 00:17:30.240 that the candle procedure should no longer be 00:17:30.240 --> 00:17:33.880 used. However, no follow -up action was taken. 00:17:34.740 --> 00:17:36.559 It's easy to conclude that it wasn't a matter 00:17:36.559 --> 00:17:38.640 of whether there would be a significant fire 00:17:38.640 --> 00:17:41.460 at Browns Ferry, but when. In order to learn 00:17:41.460 --> 00:17:43.720 from a terrible circumstance such as the Brown's 00:17:43.720 --> 00:17:46.099 Ferry fire, it's important to look not only at 00:17:46.099 --> 00:17:48.619 the events themselves, but at the reaction to 00:17:48.619 --> 00:17:52.019 the events. How was the emergency handled? Has 00:17:52.019 --> 00:17:55.180 it unfolded? Were there proper safety protocols 00:17:55.180 --> 00:17:57.759 in place? Were they understood and followed? 00:17:58.680 --> 00:18:01.059 At Brown's Ferry on that day, the environmental 00:18:01.059 --> 00:18:03.599 radiation monitors on Unit 1 were lost almost 00:18:03.599 --> 00:18:06.299 immediately, and those on Unit 2 were not functioning 00:18:06.299 --> 00:18:10.019 from 2 p .m. until 9 p .m. Had there been a release 00:18:10.019 --> 00:18:12.500 of radiation, the operators would not have been 00:18:12.500 --> 00:18:15.279 able to gauge the severity of the release. They 00:18:15.279 --> 00:18:17.420 would not have been able to determine the proper 00:18:17.420 --> 00:18:20.339 evacuation protocol for the public to keep people 00:18:20.339 --> 00:18:23.920 safe from the radioactive exposure. Both the 00:18:23.920 --> 00:18:26.660 NRC and the plant's operator, the federal government's 00:18:26.660 --> 00:18:28.980 Tennessee Valley Authority, insisted that no 00:18:28.980 --> 00:18:31.579 radiation release had occurred, but there were 00:18:31.579 --> 00:18:33.599 continuing difficulties in getting air samples 00:18:33.599 --> 00:18:36.660 to verify this. As the fire raged on, officials 00:18:36.660 --> 00:18:38.640 tried to get samples from the meteorological 00:18:38.640 --> 00:18:41.279 tower at the plant, but the smoke was too thick 00:18:41.279 --> 00:18:44.839 to allow it. Effective sampling of air finally 00:18:44.839 --> 00:18:48.480 began at 4 45 p .m. in Athens, 10 miles northeast 00:18:48.480 --> 00:18:51.720 of the plant. No samples were available from 00:18:51.720 --> 00:18:53.859 the area southeast of the plant, which was the 00:18:53.859 --> 00:18:55.420 direction in which the wind was blowing at the 00:18:55.420 --> 00:18:58.059 time of the fire. Had there been a radiation 00:18:58.059 --> 00:19:01.180 release, it would have moved in that direction, 00:19:01.880 --> 00:19:04.829 towards Decatur, Alabama. Had the accident resulted 00:19:04.829 --> 00:19:07.049 in a court meltdown, much of the surrounding 00:19:07.049 --> 00:19:10.369 population would have had to evacuate. Shockingly, 00:19:10.970 --> 00:19:13.670 throughout the course of the event, no one ever 00:19:13.670 --> 00:19:16.269 notified the Civil Defense Coordinator for Limestone 00:19:16.269 --> 00:19:19.369 County. He didn't even hear about the fire until 00:19:19.369 --> 00:19:22.049 March 24th, two days after it had been put out. 00:19:22.910 --> 00:19:24.829 The Limestone County Sheriff wasn't notified 00:19:24.829 --> 00:19:27.569 either, but even if he had been notified, he 00:19:27.569 --> 00:19:29.789 wouldn't have known what to do. He had never 00:19:29.789 --> 00:19:31.789 been given a copy of the emergency evacuation 00:19:31.789 --> 00:19:34.279 plan. The sheriff of Morgan County didn't hear 00:19:34.279 --> 00:19:37.480 about the fire until about four hours after it 00:19:37.480 --> 00:19:40.140 started, but he was advised to keep quiet about 00:19:40.140 --> 00:19:44.279 it to avoid public panic. No official notification 00:19:44.279 --> 00:19:46.880 was made to the state of Alabama Highway Patrol 00:19:46.880 --> 00:19:50.140 or Public Health Department. Other relevant state 00:19:50.140 --> 00:19:52.140 agencies would say later that they didn't have 00:19:52.140 --> 00:19:55.059 up -to -date copies of the emergency plan. In 00:19:55.059 --> 00:19:57.079 the months that followed the Browns Ferry fire, 00:19:57.740 --> 00:20:00.039 the NRC headquarters in Washington remained silent 00:20:00.039 --> 00:20:02.400 about it. The press release said that the two 00:20:02.400 --> 00:20:04.240 reactors had been safely shut down and cooled 00:20:04.240 --> 00:20:09.000 during the fire, downplaying the event. NRC inspectors 00:20:09.000 --> 00:20:10.640 themselves reported there had been a redundant 00:20:10.640 --> 00:20:12.680 cooling system available during the cool down. 00:20:12.960 --> 00:20:15.779 They said certain critical instrumentation, such 00:20:15.779 --> 00:20:17.480 as that monitoring the reactor water levels, 00:20:17.720 --> 00:20:19.299 temperature and pressure within the reactors 00:20:19.299 --> 00:20:22.279 had continued to function, and both plants had 00:20:22.279 --> 00:20:25.809 been safely shut down. They also said that on 00:20:25.809 --> 00:20:28.369 Unit 1, emergency core cooling systems had been 00:20:28.369 --> 00:20:30.930 activated and supplied water to the reactor. 00:20:32.609 --> 00:20:34.829 Although a loss of cooling accident never occurred, 00:20:35.130 --> 00:20:37.609 those systems, they insisted, had been shut off 00:20:37.609 --> 00:20:41.109 to prevent overfilling of the reactor, none of 00:20:41.109 --> 00:20:45.369 which factually represented the event. None of 00:20:45.369 --> 00:20:50.130 it was accurate. I arrived at Brown's Ferry a 00:20:50.130 --> 00:20:53.200 few years later as a plant operator. Many of 00:20:53.200 --> 00:20:56.079 my colleagues, those who trained, supervised, 00:20:56.160 --> 00:20:58.700 and managed me, had actually fought the fire. 00:20:59.440 --> 00:21:01.619 They shared their stories of the fire with me, 00:21:01.619 --> 00:21:04.660 and I learned many lessons from them. At one 00:21:04.660 --> 00:21:06.480 point, I asked an operator who had been in the 00:21:06.480 --> 00:21:09.500 control room that day, who was known in the official 00:21:09.500 --> 00:21:12.180 report as Operator M, whose real name was Gary 00:21:12.180 --> 00:21:14.680 McChristian, whether he'd been frightened during 00:21:14.680 --> 00:21:17.759 the accident. Well, he said, you know, they're 00:21:17.759 --> 00:21:20.279 operating with an air mask on, with light bulbs 00:21:20.279 --> 00:21:23.500 popping out of their sockets. and heavy dense 00:21:23.500 --> 00:21:26.339 smoke is coming in from the control board and 00:21:26.339 --> 00:21:29.299 filling the room. Sure, there was a lot to deal 00:21:29.299 --> 00:21:32.000 with and a lot of fear, but I didn't really get 00:21:32.000 --> 00:21:33.799 concerned until they called and told me that 00:21:33.799 --> 00:21:36.900 the spreader room ceiling was caving in. The 00:21:36.900 --> 00:21:40.400 concrete was spalding. You have to understand, 00:21:41.240 --> 00:21:44.140 that ceiling was the control room floor. At that 00:21:44.140 --> 00:21:46.640 point, I got a little worried. Gary was a great 00:21:46.640 --> 00:21:48.579 operator as well as a great friend and mentor. 00:21:49.000 --> 00:21:52.079 On that day, concerned or not, He was a hero. 00:21:53.180 --> 00:21:55.059 The operators at Brown's Ferry were every bit 00:21:55.059 --> 00:21:57.200 as heroic as the ones I would later encounter 00:21:57.200 --> 00:22:01.220 at Fukushima. On that note, let's skip ahead 00:22:01.220 --> 00:22:04.819 35 -plus years for a moment. After reflecting 00:22:04.819 --> 00:22:07.960 on these two accidents, my question is, in all 00:22:07.960 --> 00:22:10.259 that time between Brown's Ferry and Fukushima 00:22:10.259 --> 00:22:13.220 over 35 years, did we really learn anything? 00:22:14.119 --> 00:22:16.839 The operators at Fukushima, too, faced a situation 00:22:16.839 --> 00:22:19.119 where they had to devise alternate means to cool 00:22:19.119 --> 00:22:22.539 the reactors. As I detail in the book, a man 00:22:22.539 --> 00:22:25.359 named Yoshida, the site vice president, fortunately 00:22:25.359 --> 00:22:27.720 he knew of an alternate fire protection connection 00:22:27.720 --> 00:22:30.299 that would allow water into the reactor core, 00:22:30.680 --> 00:22:33.400 much as the operators at Brown's Ferry had made 00:22:33.400 --> 00:22:36.740 the nitrogen connection to reduce pressure. In 00:22:36.740 --> 00:22:39.740 both situations, heroic actions under the most 00:22:39.740 --> 00:22:43.180 challenging conditions saved the day. As we explore 00:22:43.180 --> 00:22:46.319 Fukushima in future podcasts, the parallels between 00:22:46.319 --> 00:22:49.519 the two accents will become clear and enlightening. 00:22:49.740 --> 00:22:52.339 Thankfully, the American nuclear industry has 00:22:52.339 --> 00:22:55.200 learned from both devastating situations. The 00:22:55.200 --> 00:22:57.559 industry is exponentially safer today because 00:22:57.559 --> 00:22:59.400 of what we learned from the heroes of Brown's 00:22:59.400 --> 00:23:02.079 Ferry and Fukushima. These were operators who 00:23:02.079 --> 00:23:03.759 did the best that they could with what they were 00:23:03.759 --> 00:23:07.759 given. Neither gave in to fear or panic, and 00:23:07.759 --> 00:23:10.059 neither gave up until they prevailed over the 00:23:10.059 --> 00:23:12.759 nuclear disaster. My job as a nuclear safety 00:23:12.759 --> 00:23:14.980 consultant is to help ensure that we never need 00:23:14.980 --> 00:23:17.940 that kind of heroic action again. It may sound 00:23:17.940 --> 00:23:21.410 strange, But I would be very happy to wake up 00:23:21.410 --> 00:23:24.329 in a world without the need for nuclear heroes.